Armies of the 3,000 BC to 539 BC

Organisation, tactics, dress and equipment. 210 illustrations and 9 maps.

by Nigel StiUman and Nigel Tallis

Egyptian Old Kingdom, Middle Kingdom, New Kingdom, S,itc, libyan, Nubian, KU 5hiu~. Sumerian, Akkadian, Eblaitc. Amoritc, HammUl1lpic lhhylonian, Old Assyrian, Human, MilaMian, K.ssitc, Middle: Assyrian, Neo Assyrian, Neo n, Chaldun, GUlian, Mannatan, Iranian, Cimmerian, Hyluos. Canaanite, Syrian, Ugaritic, Hebrew, Philistine, Midianitc Arab, Cypriot, Phoenician, Hanian. Hillile, Anatolian, , Neo Hinile, Aramaun, Phrygian. Lydian. Uranian, Elamilc, Minoan. Mycenaean, Harappan.

A WARGAMES RESEARCH GROUP PUBLICATION INTRODUCTION

This book. chronologically the finl in the W.R.G. series, attempts the diflkulltaP: ofducribingl he military organisa­ tion and equipment of the many civilisations ohhe ancienl Near East over a period of 2,500 years. It is du.slening to note tbatthis span oftime is equivalent to half of all recorded history and that a single companion volume, should anyone wish to attempt it, wou.ld have to encompass the period 539 BC to 1922 AD! We hope that our researches will rcOca the: .... St amount of archacologiaJ, pictorial and tarual evidence ..... hich has survived and been rW)vered from this region. It is a matter of some rcp-ct that tbe results of much of the research accumulated in this century has tended to be disperKd among a variety of sometimes obscure publications. Consequently, it is seldom that this mJterial is aplo!ted to its full potcoti.al IS a source for military history.

We have attempted 10 be as comptcbensive IS possible and to make UK of the lcuer known sourcCI and the most recent ruearm. Since, although scveral works have coocen~raled on the military aspectS oflhe: bener·known general 'Biblical' nations in some depth, other nations, such IS MitaMi and , which probably had a greater impact in terms of military developments, hive remained in comparative obKurity. Previous research has also tended 10 focus on the better documented periods while the later dynutiCi of Egypt and the: Early Dynastic and Akkadian periods in Muopotamia for aample, are often summarily dealt with. Within tbe usually accepted ceographical limits of the Near East (, Syria, Egypt, the Levant, Mesopotamia and Iran) _ have included the Aegean civilisations because their military orpniAlion and equipment ..... ere dosely related to their Ncar Eastern contemporarin and because It times they played a signiflcant pan in the politia of the re,ion.

For the ,eneral reader the nature of the evideo« with which we are dealin, often presents problems of interpreta­ tion. Ancient styles of an appear unusual and di$toned to the modem eye, the: anistic principles and aims of ancient anisllare frequently not our own. M regards written evidence, we do not pouess the type of histories and military manuab that researches ofiuer ages can dnw on. Instead, one musl utilise the often equally valuable royal annals, chrooklcs, letters, commemorative stelae and all manner of bureaucratic evidence in order (0 ,lean items or military relevance. That many nations were fully competcot in mJtten of organisation, tletia and drill is clear from the Idministrative and economk tats which were conamed only with day to day reality. Obviously, ..... hat can be Aid concerning the various nations ofthc Near Easl at diffuent periods depends on the nature and amount ofthc IUMv' inC cvidencc. HoftYU, this evidence is subject 10 cmtinual iDCale and rc-inttrpmllion IS arch:teoloPcal in\utiptioD in the repon procrCIKI.

For those readers who wilb to pursue tbe subject fuMer we have included I bibliography Illhe bKlt ofthc booIt.. It. lenph well illustrates the IJlUI of infomtation lvailable. In ,eneral it lists only those works either of most usc during out research or those most nsily available for the ,eocral reader, Ind we ofTet our lpolOCicsto tbose tcholtn who were Dot' included, but whose works provided maoy valUlble inai,htl into this period of military history.

We would like to thank Phil Barlter and Bob O'Brien ofW.R.G. for livin, us the: opponunity to write this boolt, and for Iheir great patiencc during the liter stages of the work.

N. R. Stillman, N. C. Tallis October 1984

Copyrighl 1984 © N. R. Slillman and N. C. Tallis

Note OD Term.laololY Military terminolOl)', in the lanJUagcs of the nations concerned, appctn throughout in ittlic. These (emlS often defy adequate tran.llllon, .Ithough Iheir context in ancientlexu indicates their meanin,. In DUny CIJCS it is from the intensive study of such terms thlt mi litary organisa tions can be reconstructed, it is therefore most relevant to include them_ El}'Ptiao terms have been rendered II Egyptologists would pronounce the c:oruonantal skeleton writ­ ten in hlc:roc.Iyphic and we have followed the convenlion of rendering the Sumerian in capitals with stpartte syllables. Fonunltciy the ocher lanrua,es ca n be rendered directly.

PbocOKl and printed in England by Flu:iprinl Ltd., Wonhin" SIWCX

2 CONT ENTS P.,. INTROD UCTION .....•.•...... •...... • ...... 2 ORGANiSATION ...... 5 Egypt ...... •. . .••.• . •..• ••. . . ..• • • . •..•.•••••. ••. . .. •• .... 5 Th~ Libyans ...... •. . •.• .... • .•....•...... •. • .. •. •...... •.... 13 Nubia ...... •...... 13 Sum~ r and Akkad ...... •. • ...... •.. .. 15 Th~ Old Babylonian and Old Assyrian Kingdoms ...... 20 Milanni and Mesopotamia ...... •.•..•.•.... •.. .. 23 ...... •...... • .... 26 Babylon ...... •. ...•.•....•...... •....• . •....•.... 32 and Syria .....•...... •••..•••••.. ••• •..... •• ... •. • • ....••... 32 Th ~ H~br~w s ...... •...•.•..•.•...... •....•.•.. . .•.... 36 Th~ Philistin~s ...... •...... •...... •.... •.... 38 Phoenicia and Cyprus ...... ••• •• . ..• •. .•.. •• •.... ••••..•••.. 38 Anatolia and l h~ Hi ttit~ Emp i r ~ ...... •...... •...... •...... •...... 39 Th~ Sea· Peoples ...... •...... •...... • ....•.... 42 Th~ Neo-Hiniles and Aramaeans ...... 43 Phrygians and Lydians ...... •• • ••.•• • • • ... .. • ...... • •...•... 46 Uranu ...... •.•....•...... • ...... 46 Elam ...... •...... •...... •...... 47 The A~g~a n ...... •..... , ...... •.• . " .•••. , . . ,' •... "...... 48 Th~ Indus Va ll ~y ... , . .•. , .. .. , ••... , ..•. ,...... 53 TACTICAL METHODS ...... 53 Egypt .", ... , ...... •.. .. •. , ...... •.•..... 53 Th~ Libya ns and Nubians ...... , ...... , ...... 58 Sumerian tactics ...... , ...... ,., ... ,...... 59 The Old Babylonian and Old Assyrian Kingdoms...... •...... 59 The Mitannians and Kassites ...... , ... ,...... 60 The Assyrians ...... •. • • . •...... • . .... 60 The Babylonians ...... ••• . .... • •.....••.• . ...•.• . ...•.. . .. 62 Th~ Elamit~s ...... • ...... • ...... •. ... •...... 63 Canaan and Syria ...... •. • . . . . •...... 63 Hittit ~ tactics ...... • . ..•.•...... •••••••• • . .•.. • .... 64 Th~ N~o- H ittites and Arama~a n s ...... •...... •.•..•.•...... 65 Th~ Minoans and Myc~na~an s ...... , . . . •...... 66 The Mountain Kingdoms ...... •.•. . •• • ... ..••. . ...••••... . •... 67 Th~ Nomads ...... • .. •. •.. •.• ...... •. •.... •... 68 MAJOR BATTLES OF THE PERIOD ...... 69 DRESS AND EQUIPMENT ...... 91 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 203 CHRONOLOG ICA L CHART 208

3 NILE DELTA NAUKRATIS EGYPT AND ~. , G UI NUBIA Lower Egyptian Nomes Egypt Upper Egypt lower Eg ypt (' 1 ~ f AY UM<:::::?, Abu ( E~ph,anu,,4t 1 Ineb-hedj 1 1 (McmpI>o1l ;L " " • Huald4topol 'l Sinai 2 Djeba (Edlu) 2 Khem 71- " TdlOl of' Hut-ihyt , " 3 Ne'hen 3 , " (H.ulkonpol.ll JSIWA " H4trmopol!l 4 Was et (TheMI) Merke • " • 4 .. Gebtu (CopI011 Sa;t (S a.d " 5 5 Upper fune t Per- Wadj et " 6 6 (Buto, XO!l) " " Egypt 7 Hut-selc.hem MUE I .. EGYPT ID • 7 , -. -. Abedju tAbydo 8 Per. Alum "",10' 8 tp,lhOl'l) • ~11f' 1 \ ..,.,.. ~. Kh em-Min Per-Ausor 5 9 9 f8u~.m) - WES H"N • • TH ESES . , . , Ojeb o 10 Kem-We, _, OAS ES' , • 10 (AOw.b!l1 , 11 Shos-hot ep 11 Ka-hebes ELEPHANTINE 12 Tu-il e( 12 Tjeb -nelJer -- IXM""yIOiI CHHln SOU! 1Al rul) funu '" 13 13 (H4tI.opo/,,) 14 Qu IeUIU } 14 1jel f~"uml NUBIA Khmun 8o 'h 15 lHumopol,,) 15 Wawat Hebenu Djedjef 16 tc)ty. ·_l 16 ~ndu l ~~" Ko-Sa 8ehutet 17 lC,nopoI") 17 Buhf" _ -< Medj.y H,pponul Per-8ostet ~ 18 18 (Bubuml Per- me~ed Djane! 1T1llt11 19 10.,.,n< II 19 20 Henen-nesut 20 Pe,-Iopdu fHt:r,kkopol.l) Kush 21 N ./opohl Fayum,' AM.OdIe- /(In,IIIOI'I'I '" n ld' I" 22 Aph,od'I~1 Prow"", .... ~. N~P~f' ,,, E,'(fIt'''' "amu.o: Abu, lunu, Khmun EU, • LA REACH

4 ORGANISATION EGYPT

THE OLD AND MIDDLE KlNGDOMS

T he basis of civil and military organisation was the 'nomes' or provinces. These originated as prehistoric tribal districts which combined 10 form the kingdoms of Upper and Lower Egypt. 'The Two Lands' wcrc united in to one country around 3000 BC, by the legendary King Menes. He wu possibly HOT-Aha ('Fighting-Falcon'). E:.Jc h nomt wu administered by a hat)Nlo meaning 'hereditary-noble' or 'nomarch',

The Names The general reserve of young men eligible for conscription was known as djamu. and from this were drawn those eligible for military service, known as htwt'"~ -lUfru . (youthful recruits). In addition there were hereditary profes­ sional soldiers called D."QUlyu (warriors) who WOtt red ostrich plumes in their hair. unain highly ,rained soldiers werc called mOljIJI, offen uanslated as 'shock-troopll'.

Raising and mining of recruits was probably the responsibility oftbe jmy~r lrnN.nu'Mjrv (Commander of Recruits) a function which was usually performed by the nomlrch. The Middle Kingdom Nomarch, Thuthotep, records the muster of the 'youthful r«:mit s of the West of the Hare Nome', those of the EaSt of the Hate Nome, and also the 'youths of the warriors of the Hare Nome'. Thus nomes that were si mated asuide Ihe Nile had an aUlomalic division of lroops into at lt3st IWO bodies. The 'youlhs of the warriors' refers to the muster of the next generation of hereditary soldiers eligible for service. The 'lnstmctions for King Merykare' (composed by Khety of the 10th Dynasty for his son), menti on trull recruits 'went forth' althe age of20. The mmjar, or shock-troops, had tbeir own commander; the jm~ mmjar (Comm ander of shock troops). The various types ofuoops available in the nomes refleets the fact lhat many of the 'reemin' would bt mainly employed as a source oflabout. Good soldier material would have been selected from the youths recruited from the peasantry, 10 be trained and formed into units to sup­ plement the hereditary soldiers. The hereditary soldiers were perhaps a surviwl from the predynastic organisation of the nome. The ordinary recruit may han had a limited term of service while the warrior repla~ his father and served throughout his active life_This system continued up to the btginning of the New Kingdom, for Ahmose, son-ofEbana, states in his tomb inscription; 'my father was a soldier of the King ... Sekenenre ... then I was a soldier in his stead, in the ship, The Wild Bull, in the time of . .. Nebpehtire (Ahmose I)'.

Nomarchs were required to supply contingents for national eITons when requested by the king, and normally led them on campaign as their commanders. In the reign of Senusret I (1971-1926 Bq, Amunemhat of the Oryx nome took 400 'of all the most select' of his trOOps on the king's campaign intO Nubia, He took 600 'of all the bravest of the Oryx nome' on a subsequent campaign led by the Vizier SenusreL Nome contingents would wry in size according to the population of the nome concerned, This nome was situated in Middle Egypt, and larger numbers would probably bt mustered from areas such as Memphis, Thebes and the Delta where the cultivated Lands were more extensive.

Nomarchs acted as the generals of the forccs of their nome. A nomarch might be: commissioned by the king [0 use his forces to carry OUt cenain tuks, such as obtaining sto ne from remote quarrics in the desert, or undenaking trading mission! to distant lands, Small military expeditions might bt mounted by nomarchs as pan of their respon­ sibilities for cenain regions or frontiers. Some nomarchs bore the tille im~ ow, meaning 'scout-kader' or possibly even 'commander offoreigo auxiliaries'. The most notable of these was Harkhufin the 6th Dynasty who led expedi­ tions d~p ioto Africa, Their forccs were likely to include such fortign auxil ia ries as Nubians and Aamu Bedouin.

ProtOC1)is from tomb inscriptions show (hat nomarchs could often hold sever~l other offices such as priest, scout· lcader, sole-

5 Retalne" and the Royal Army A nonarch would usually maintain a body or personal retainers, or slrmuu. In tomb paintings orthe Middle Kingdom these are usually armed with a large shield and hefty axe. They closely accompanied the noble as he carried out his duties and no doubt compri sed his personal bodyguard in battle. The king also possessed slrml1u, and an inner retinue of highly truSted officials known as ' Sole·Companions' to whom might be entrusted any important commis· sion. In the Old Kingdom the slremsu were a very small and select body, possibly nOi entirely military in character.

During the Middle Kingdom the slrmlSu of the king were expanded and organised as a military unit. In the reign of Senusret III (1878·1841 Bq, Sebek·Khu was one of the royal retainers and began his ar«:r in command of a unit of 6 men. He was subsequently promoted to a slremsu tn Irtqa (Retainer of the Ruler) and given command of 60 men on an expedition into Nubia. His gallantry won him promotion to a sthtdj Shemsu (Instructor of Re· tainers) in command ofa unit of 100 men. Sebek·Khu fought at the battle ofSekmem as commander of the rearguard, indicating that the royal retainers had an important role on the battlefield.

The slrtmtu we re supplemented by 1r00pS conscripted from the provinces for the Royal Army. These: were called Irtnu.ntJnI (Household Recruits) and were commanded by an imY"" Irmu·nt/nI, (Commander of the Household Recruits). An 'Army·Scribe' was sent into each nome to select one man in a hundred malt'S to form a company for the Royal Army.

A unit mentioned in the Old Kingdom is the tjtstt (battalion), m"ning simply a large body of troops. The sa (Com· pany) appears in the Middle Kingdom but there is no record of its size at this time. Model soldiers from a tomb al Asyut were organised into two bodies of 40 men, which may represent a basic unit of organisation. They march in 10 ranks, "ch rank being 4 abreast, so they are clC2tly drilled troops and probably typical of most provincial soldiers.

Foreign Auxiliaries Of the Nubian uibesmen who served the Egyptians, the most favoured were the Medjay. They we re employed as $COUIS and skirmishers from the Old Kingdom and figure prominently in the campaign of Kamose. The Medjay may be identical to a group known as tbe 'Pan-Gn.ve' people, of whom archaeological evidence has been found in Upper Egypt. Their cemeteries do not atend funher nonh than tbe limit ofTheban territory during the Hyksos period, so they probably featured mainly in Upper Egyptian forces. They originated in the desens east of the Nile, in Lower Nubi • . Burials conain weaponry and various trinkets of Egyptian manufacture, tbe presenC1: of which might indicate their employment IS mercenaries by the Egyptians. Weapon fmds demonstrate tbat tbey we re ar· chers. By the beginning of the New Kingdom the Medjay had begun to assimilate Egyplian culture an d become indistinguishable in tbe archaeological re cord.

The model soldiers from a tomb at Asyut comprised a body of Egyptian spearmen and one of Nubian archers. The laner are or~nised in the same way IS the Egyptians, suggesting that some auxiliaries may have been drilled on Egyptian lines as close-order tlOOpt.

Apan from the Medjay other foreign troops employed by tbe Egyptians were Nubians from the tribes of In;el, Yam, Wawat. and Kaau, Tjemehu·Libyans and Bedouin nomads from the eastern dcsens, Sinai and Southern Palestine.

NatJoDal Army The tomb inscription of Weni contains an order of battle for a major national effon against the nomads ('Sand· Dwellers') of Southern Palestine. They must have posed a seriou5threat to Egypt in the reign of Pc pi I (2289·2255 BC) to require an army numbering 'lens of thousands' to be despatched against them fIVe times. Every a\l1lilable source of troops seems to have been aploited and thus reflects the state of military organisation of the 6th Dynasty. Overall command was gi ven to Weni, a highly trusted royal official.

Egyptian troops were dr.Iwn from tbe whole of Upper and Lower Egypt, troops from Sedjer and Kensedjeru (unknown loations) and auxiliaries from the Nubians of In jet, Mcdjay, Yam, Wawat and Kaau and T jemebu·Lib)'2DS.

EgyptJao eommande" Possible troop sources represented. Nomarchs Nome conting ents. Royal Seal Bearers Royal troops. Sole·Companions of Palace King's inner retinue of officers.

6 H~dmen of Senlements Town militias. Companions Royal retainers. Scout-Leader. Foreign auxiliaries. Chief PrieSlS Troops f1iKd from temple lands. Chief District Officials Royal troops from provinces.

Many of Weni'. subordinates would have held several of these offiCeS at the ume time and so not 111 the titles may have b«:n included because they have I militlry aspect. Weni may have listed such titles simply to emphatise the great Authority which had b«:n de legated to him.

There were. twO centntl arsenals, one for Upper and one for Lower Egypt, supervised by the im~ WtIJ (ovUS«.r of the tWO ancnals). These could have functioned as cc.ntro for the:: manufacture and storage ofwapon. to be issued to royal troops and to bring those: mustered for national elTons up to scratch.

THE NEW KINGDOM

As a result of the slfuggle against the Hyksos and imperial cspansion into Asil, the Egyptian army became a major state institution, recruited and maintained csclusively by the « ntral authority.

The coDlllWlder-in-chief of the entire armed forett was the Pharaoh. Directly responsible to him was the Vizier, in his role as Minister of War.

Originally there were only tWO I rmy corps, one positioned in the North, the:: ()(her in the South. These are mentioned in In edict of Horemhab (1148-1120 BC). This was later increased to three; A"um, Re (PTe) and Ptall, named after the patron gods orthe regions in which they were stationed; Thebes, Hdiopolis and Memphis. A rourth army was created in the 19th Dynasty, named &1 (or Sultkh), arter the patron god or the new capital, Pi-Ramesses. This gave a disposition of twO armies in the Eastern Odta, one Centrallnd one Southern army. The main strength was directed towards the CllStern frontier and pj·Rarnesscs was the marshalling point for campaigns into . SigniflClDt1y, there was no army 10 cover the Western Delta, which had nOl been under threat since the Middle Kingdom. Thi. may aplain the difficulty in preventing Libyan incursions at the end ofthe:: New Kingdom even tbough the Western Deltl and desert areas were heavily fortified.

Each army corps (muha) provided a field army for foreign campaigns. The Army was commanded by an imy"" mlslla, or '"tr-,"lSita (Irmy·general), assisled by an idlfu (adjutant or deputy).

Against I rebellion in Hamath, which was in danger of sprelding and threalened Bctb-5han, Sed 1(1118-1304 BC) senl three armies 10 different objectives. The 'First Army ofAmu,,·Mighty of Bows' was sent 10 Hamatb, the ' Firsl Army of Re-Plentiful of Valour' was scnt to rel ieve Beth-Shan, Ind the 'Fint army of Stl-Strong of Bows' was des­ patched to Yenoam (furthcst away from the centre of trouble). The designations 'First Army' and the specill tides mighl indicate thai each army corps could provide more lhan one army, possibly one in the field aDd ODe iD reserve. Alte rnatively, the home base may have acted II a recruitment and replacement depot, only the best tTOOPS being picked for service in the 'Fint Army'. It also seems likely that there wn a miliary protocol in which the umy or AmUIi held seniority, was given tbe most importlnltasks, and formed tbe vanguard 00 the march (as al Kadesh). Armies could clearly operale IS fully independent forces at some distance from each other; the umy of Set was sent to Yenoam possibly 10 block Iny foreign intervention.

Frontler fortresses were divided into a Northern and Southern command, each under an i,"y--tr /tAtum (overscc: r of fortresses). Glrrison tTOOPS were ailed iwaytr.

RecrWtmeDt Most ordinary soldiers were enlisted by co nscription. In the reign orRamesscs III (1198-1166 Bq Ihis was a draft or one man in ten ofthosc eligible for service (djamu). It was arried 01.11 by the 'Scribe of the Recruits'. One source records an incident ofrecruiUDent by impressment. Officers and administrative personnel were usuilly wlunteen. An army ca reer offered greal prospectS of advancement fo r an educated man. Horemhab began his career II In army scribe and eventually became Phafloh. Ay (1152-1348 BC) and Ramesses l (1320-1318 Bq abo begin in the army. Social StltuS and f.mily COMect.iOns played. part in the recruitment of the chariotry.

The best of tht recruits, or rre/ru, were formed into ulflttptrU (d rill-complnies) It Memphis or Thebes, and went from there to Ictive service. The term ,"lII/yr was now used ror seasoned soldiery in general. The term for 'private soldier' was wow.

7 w~"" There were two basic types ofinfannYi mtgau (shooters) and na*'ull-QD (band-to-hand fighten, lilerally 'suong-arm boys').

The basic tactical and administrative unit was the 10 (company). The: full romplcmcnI was 250 mcn but it could sometimes be under strength. Each $1:1 tu.d its own name and standard. This was carried by the: rjai',oyt (5Ilndaed. bearer), who commanded the: unit. Three adminiSlrlltivc: personnel were an ached to the W; a scribe, adjutant (idnu), and quancemlster.

The so was subdivided into 5 platoons of 50 men each under I 'Grc:uesl ofFifly', These in turn comprised 5 squads of 10 men each under a 'Greatest ofTen',

Two or morc: companies could be: combined to form a pdjtt (host). This was comnunded by I "~JNdjtt (hOSt­ commander), Attached (0 the pldjtl were a StlUl (assault~ffic cr ) and a muhltlb (transpon officer). The pdjtt was probably a tactical formation, the uact sizc of which is not known and may not havc been fIXed. Thc orp nisation ofmc sa was based on multiples of fivc . If this WIIS ex tcndcd to thc ped jC t it would havc comprised 5 companies (1250 men).

Thc hery-p.tdjet could also act as a garrison commandcr.

Thc names of many infantry companics havc survived and a selection is included below: Bull in Nubia TIte company oJleing Ntbmare; TIte Aton G/ittm (Ntbmare was thc 'Thronc-namc' of Amunhotcp JJI (1417-1 379 BC). TIte company oj Shootmi Aun ApptJlrt For Him Mtnlthtprure; Dtstroyn oj Syria (fhutmoK IV, 1425· 1417 BC). Amun; Strmgth oj tlte Army P(Jdfor oj Gods Strong in V(Jlour Mmkh~t; Ruler oj Rulm (Thutmose UI, 150+1450 BC).

Somc SOUfCC1 mcntion companies of only 200 men, such as a papyrus which statcs that a force of three companics contained 600 mcn, and somc of thc Amarna lettcn in which 200 men or multiples of 200 arc requcsted. It is dif· ficullto discern any paint at which thc unit size was altered although it had been suggested as pan of a military rcform in the 20th Dynasty. Most probably, 250 men was a muimum and somc units wcrc dcliberatelY maintained at only 200 mcn, or could nOI maintain full strength. Chari."" Thc Egyptian term for chariotry was t(J·fUt.ltetry. The basic unit was the vehicle itKlfwhich was driven by a ludjm. 'chariotw, often also called a leerQUI, 'shield·bearer'. The fighting crc wman was called a lomry.

Attached to each ChariOI was a ptA"", ' runner', who fought on foot in suppan oflhe chariot. Also associated with thc cbariony is the taletm-barer, whose function is unknown. It is perhaps an altcrnativc tcrm for onc of thc other soldiers.

Tcn charion and crcws formed a trOOp of charimry, commanded by a letdjm·ttpy, 'lSI charioteer'. Five trOOpS, com· prising 50 vehicles, formed a squadron, under a 'Standard Bearer of Chariot Wa rlion'.

Sevcnl sqUlldrons could be: combined to form. chariotry p.tdjtt, led by a 'Commander of. Chariotry Host'. As witb tbc infantry p.tdjer, its enct siu is not known and may havc been variablc. If it followed Ihe same pattern as the smaller unin il would contain 5 squadrons, lotalling 250 vchiclcs.

Maintcnance and administ~tion oflhe chariotry was carried out by 'the liable' (po.jlru). Slable personnel included an adjutant of chariotry, stablemaslcr, various scribes, grooms and artisans.

Tht Phonix and Ma'II!ts/.jn.JuSli£t, are thc names of two charim squadrons. The following unit names could havc belonged 10 either infantry or chariotry:

8 Till Fau 0/ Rt Bdowd 0/ Amu/I Otltr/lrrower 0/ tlrt Evi/·Onts Rtptlltr 0/ tlrt Tthu·Land

CaYal~ Honcmen were used for reconnaissance and carrying messages. They were called Itlrapilyu, 'scouts'. They carried a bow and sometimes wore textile armour but do not appear to have had any other combat role. Linle is known of their organisation but small detachments probably accompanied ea ch battle format ion.

Ellte Troop. The corps d'tlite of the 18th Dynasty was the ktnyt

Ramesses II (1304·1237 BC) possessed twO units of guard infantry; one comprising native Egyptians, the other being 'rebellious·hearted Sherden' apprehended while aiding the Della and recognised as useful soldier material.

In battle the Pharaoh was accompanied by a body of chariOtry retainers including high officials, army commanders and royal princes. The Pharaoh's closest retainers were still known as sirmllu.

Marmet Infantry companies could be selected to become a klttnyt·ntt·stkhlper, 'tnining contingent' of a ship. They would receive training for amphibiou.s operations and then be assigned to a warship. The standard bearer would become the ship's commander. Such troops were distinguished by the wearing of the 'naval·kilt'. Originally this was a slit· leather garment but was later replactd by a kilt in the style of the Sca·Peoples.

A full sa of250 men would seem a large number for a single warship (although the Egyptians were quite capable of building ships large enough to carry a pair of obelian laid end to end!). The son of warship depicted in the naval battle reliefs at Medinet Habu would require only 50 men. The full contingent WlIS probably required for large transpons from wbicb the marines would disembark to fight on land.

Wanhip. The best representations of warships of a type designed for fighling in naval engagc.menlS occur in the reliefs of a sca·battle at Medinet Habu. These date to the reign of Ramesses iii and record his defeat of the Sea·Peoples. The ships had a single bank or 10 oars on each side. The rowers (being marines like the fighting crew) were pro­ tected by high gunwhales. A castle was mounted fore and afl. The prow did not curve upward, but projected for· ward. h was carved in the form of a lion's bead. with a human head in its jaws. and could have been used to ram enemy ships above the water-line. The mast remained upright in action, but the sail WlIS furled. Steering oan were mounted on the af! castle.

Fighting crew occupied the castles and deck, with the addition of a slinger in the crow's nellt, a man swinging a grappling hook in tbe forccasde and another optating a boarding·pike at Ihe bow.

Auxiliary troop. Foreign troops were organised into separate units on similar lines to native Egyptian troops. The company was commanded by an Egyptian standard·bearer and subdivided into 5 platoons or 50 men. Each of these: was led by a 'Leader-of·Tribesmen' oftht same: nationality as the troops. Aus.iliaries we re usually allowed 10 retain their nalive dress and equipment and probably their own style of fighting. As the '50' was not divided into squads. they may ha\"C formed up more loosely than Egyptians and were less rigorously drilled. Foreign troops employed by the: Egyptians included Nubians, Libyans, Sea·Peoples. Bedouin, Canaanites and Syrians. When fighting in Retjennu the Egyp­ tian army might be augmented by allies from Canaanite vassal states. These: could include maryannu and nt'arin elite troops. , The Medjay At the beginning of the New Kingdom the Mediay fulfilled their old function as auxiliary skirmishers and scoutS, and were used as such by Kamose:. Later, the term Medjay had come to mean the spe<:ial 'necropolis·police' of Thebes who guarded the Valley of Kings and patrolled the surrounding desens. Their numbers gradually began to include more Egyptians than Nubians. The commander bore the title 'Chief of Medjay' and was wisted by an ianu. They were organised into companies, each under I Irny-Medjay, and were mainly archen.

Administration and LogI.tie.

Scribes who conveyed instructions 10 the trOOps and recorded the captives and boolY taken after a battle were called flItlrtnu 'heralds'. Deeds of bravery were reported to the Pharaoh by the he ralds, and the soldiers concerned we re rewarded with 'the gold of Villour, or promotion. In order to assess enemy losses, Egyptian trOOps were given a bounty for every severed hand of a falle n enemy that they brought in. This would obviously open up the possibility dllll Egyptian dead and wounded might be mutilated by their ow n men. To avoid this, only the hands of enemies with a lighter or duker complexion we re taken. The Libyans, however were generally so similar to Egyptians that the only way to ensure distinction was to order the taking of their uncircumcised phalli. In the reliefs al Medinet Ha bu, grisly heaps of both members ue shown being counted by scribes.

In return for male captives and military equipment taken in battle, soldiers were rewarded with gold, fe. male slaves and land-grants.

Allitoops were supplied and equipped by the state. Rations included la rge amounts of bread, vegetables, meat and replacement linen garments. Officers received such luxuries as wine, olive oil, honey, figs and fish. The staple drink was beer.

Size of Forces.

In the Egyptian accounts of the major battles fought during the New Kingdom ~riod, the numbers of Egyptian troops involved are never given. Allhough figures are often qUOted for the size of Egyptian armies, there is no dirca evidence: 10 su ppOrt this. Sucb figu res seem to be estimates de rived ultimately from IWO sources: the Wadi Ham· mamat stela dating to the reign of Ramoses IV, (1166- 1160 BC), and Papyrus Anastasi I.

The Hammamat Slela lists the forces sem on an expedition 10 the stone quarries of the Wadi Hammanllil in the easlern desert of Egypt. The military component includes the following: I DepulY of the Army I Charioleer of the Residence I Scribe of Ihe Army Lists I Scribe of the Deputy of the Army 20 military scribes 20 Chiefs of Coun Slablcs (chariOt warriors?) I Chief of the Commandant of the Army 20 Infantry Commanders 50 Charioteers SOOO infantrymen 50 Mediay police

The twenty infantry commanders would suggest twenty units of 250 infantrymen and these are accompanied by one squadron of fifry chariOlS. On the basis of this information, it has often been assumed that field armies usually numbered SOOO men and that therefore the total of Egyplian forces involving fou r armies would number 20,000 men. However there are reasons for doubting the reliabililY of this document for such calculations, wch as the low ratio of chariotry to infantry and the Don·m.ililary nature of the expedition. The leader of the expedition was the 'Chief ofWor!ts', Ramassesnakht, and il was normal practice to use conscript troops as a source oflobour. Fur· thennore, 900 dead who could ha\'e included military personnel are stated to be excluded from the liS!. The overall total of 8362 contains nOD

10 This i, simply a brigade of auxiliary lroopS over which the sc ribe: must imagine he is in command and for which he must divide up the rations. It is said to be: pan of an army be:ing despatched against Canaanite rebe:ls.

These texts cannot be: rega rded as proving a fIXed size or composition ror Egyplian armies. The term mUM is used in tbe same way.as our word 'Army' and can rerer 10 non·military personnel or even objects, as can the wordptdjt t. The size orsuch rorces should be: considered as defined by what was required or available ror the campaign in ques­ tion. For military action in remote desert regions against less wcll~uipped and organised enemies, a small army with a low ratio or chariotry to inrantry mig ht be: required_ In Syria or Canaan or against major threa ts, much larger armies with a higher r:nie or chariouy could be expected. The higher ratio or dwiotry required in Asia is demonsU'lItcd by the Armama Lelten in which the Prince or Byblos asked the Pharaoh to provide 200 to 600 inrantry and 20 to 30 chariots_ The ratio he re is one troop or 10 chariots 10 one co mpany of 200 men.

Papyrus Huris records that Ramesses III organised the youth into generations (djamu) of 100,000 according to age. Military recruits were probably drarted from these 'ge nentions' on an annual basis. A drart or one man in ten would give a figure or 10,000 rresh conscripts rrom each draft. These wou ld augmeOlthe existing forces COOlain­ ing many career soldiers. The exact le ngth or service is not k.nown but was possibly quile long.

UBYAN AND KUSHITE PERIODS

At the end ofthe New Kingdom, Egypt split into two kingdoms. The priests or Arnun at Thebes ruled the South while the 21st Dynasty ruled the Nonh rrom Tanis in the Delta. A slronghold or the SoUlhernen at Teudioi (El Hibe:h) marked the border.

Libyan incunions had continued unabated since the last victories against them under Ramcsses III. These augmCllted the large numbe:rs or Libyans and Sca-Peoples allowed to senle on tbe land in return for military serviet. This le:d 10 Ihe: de:velopme:nt or a military ClSle: called Ihe: M6hwtJ.h or Ma. The 22nd DynaslY was a Libyan ramily, rounded by the 'Chief of the MtJIrWQIr', Sheshonq I (9 45-924 BC).

By the mid-8 th century BC, Nonhero Egypt had b«ome a p:uchwo rk or small principalities. Some were ruled by MtJhwtsh chiers, othen by local provincial rulen and rival dynasties. The most powerful state was in the Western Della ru led by the 'Great Chief or the West', Ternakht (724-717 BC). His attempts to gain concrol or the South (which had rallen to Kush), provoked the intervention of tbe Kushite King, Piye (750-712 BC, usually known u Piankhy, but the 'anlth' is silent).

It is not known to what extent New Kingdom organisation continued into this period. Both kingdoms maintained armies, commanded by the high priest in the South, an d a royal prince in the Nonh. T he commander-in-chierbore the title mu-mtJha-wtr or 'great army general', lesse r officers being hauryu, or 'leaders'. The account orthe Palesti­ nian campaign or Sheshonq I in II Chron. 12; 2-9, gives the composition of his army as 1,200 chariots, 60,000 'horsemen', and countless Luhims, Sikkims and ElhiopialU. The numbe: r of horsemen may be: an exagger:uion for 6000, and cou ld include both chariot crews and some cavalry. The Lubims and Sikkims arc probably Libyan and Sea-People auxiliaries.

The remarkable steia recording in detail the conquest or Egypt by Piye around 730 BC, reren to 'Libyans and ravourite: soldiers' among the roretS ofnrn~khl. The army or a Northern ruler would be composed of various con­ tingents rrom the princes under his sway. A large proportion would be Libyans or Mtshroesh. Egyptian infantry of the New Kingdom type may have declined or disappearcci_

T HE SAITE PERIOD

The Kushite 25th Dynasty ruled Egypt until they were driven out by the Assyrians. Ashurbanipal appointed Necho, local ruler orSais in the Delta, as his chiervaual in Egypt rollowing the revolt ofT anutamun (664-657 BC). His son Psamtik I (664-6 10 BC) took adva ntage or Assyria's imminmt collapse to make Egypt independent. During the 26th Dynasty, or '8:lite' period, Egyp t experienced a renaissance and b«ame once more I major world power. In order to assist tbe Assyrians and block Babylonian advance. Necho II (6 1()'595 BC) led Egyptian forces to tbe . He: also cre3ted a na vy equipped with the latest galleys, supposedly sponsored the circum-navigation or Arrica by a Phoenician expedition, and seriously considered II precursor of the Sue:!: canal.

11 An imponam development in the military field was the increasing usc of Greek mercenaries. were called haw-nebu, 'new-foreigners'. The first body of me rcenaries was a party of bronze-clad raiders who had landed in the Delta and were recruiled by Psamtik I. They could possibly have been sent by his ally, Gyges of , to assist Psamtik to achieve iodepeode.oce. from Assyria. They we re. installed in tWO military settlcmems astride the Pelusiac arm of the Nile, known as the st ral opaeda. The qualities of the hoplite were rapidly appreciated by the Pharaohs who built up large forces of Ionian and Karian mercenaries. Apries (589·570 BC) had 30,000 of these stationed in Sais according to Herodotus (Book 11).

A major garrison of Greek mercenaries was established at Daphnae in the Eastern Delta and may have been one oflhe Jratopaeda. However, as it was still functioning in the reign of Amasis and continued until the Persian con­ quest of 525 BC, it may have been a separate senlemem.

Most of the Saite Pharaohs were phil-hellenes who maintained friendly relations with Greek states. The Egyptian population however regarded Greeks as religiously unclean and avoided close association. The native clement of the anny was paniculariy jealous of the favour shown to Greek mercenaries. This resentmem finally erupted into a mutiny against Apries resuiting in his deposition in favour of Amasis (Ahmose ll, 57(}.526 BC).

Herodotus observed that Egyptian troops were provided by a military caste divided into the Calasiriu and the Her­ mOlybif$. They were professional soldiers who spent their time eJrclusively in military training. Membership of this caste was hereditary and each man was supported by a grant of 12 araurae of land, free of tu:. 1000 Calasiries and 1000 Hermotybies were required to serve for a year as the royal body-guard. This was done in rotation so that no man ever se.rved in the guard twice, doubtless a political precaution.

Troops belonging to these castes were sculed in cenain districts listed by Herodotus as folloW'S:

The Calatiriu were settled in Thebes, Bubastis, Aphthis, Mendes, Sebe:nnytus, Athribis, Pharbaethus, Thmuis, Onophis, Anysis and Myecphoris.

Hermorybies were sculed in Busiri!, Sais, Chemmis, Papremis, The Island of Prospi[is and Natho.

Mosl of these districts are Delta nomes or cities. The total number of Caltuiriu was 250,000. The Hermolybies numbered 160,000.

Herodotus records that the Egyptians maintained three major garrisons, one guarding each of the principle fron­ liers; Daphne watched the Eastern approaches, ElepMOline on the Nubian frontier, and Marea on the Libyan fron· tier. According to the hislOrian, troops served three years on garrison duty without relief, which led to descnions. A colony of such deserters had grown up in Nubia.

A mass desenion from Elephantine in the reign of Psamlik I is mentioned by Herodotus. A similar incident in the time of Apries was recorded by the inscription of the garrison commander, Nesu-Hor.

Troops from the Egyptian military caste could be used as garrison trOOps.

The Navy Necho II was very interested in naval mailers and made Egypt into a first-rate naval power. Herodotus says that he had triremes built on both the Mediterranean and Red-Sca coasts. Egyptian foreign policy during this period concentrated on preventing the Babylonians and,laler, the Persians, from expanding into Syria and Palestine. The Phoenician fleet would be at the disposal of any power that conquered this area and thus it was essential for Egypt to have a navy adequate to defend herself. Assyrian wail'paintings from and reliefs from Nine\'Ch demonstrate thaI biremes equipped with rams were available in Phoenicia by 700 BC at the latest.

The standard equipmeOl of the Saite navy was a large warship called Keb"el. This term replaces the previous Egyp­ tian word for warship, aha w (man-of-war), and so probably refers to a new type of ship. The hieroglyphic deler· minative shows a Greek-style galley and the tenn wa s still used in the Ptolemaic period to descri be: the polyremes used by both Egypt and her enemies.

The strong ties es tablished be:tween the Saite rulers and Greek states such as Cori nth (where Periander named his son Psammetichos after Psamtik II), make it likely that Greek CJrpenise in shipbuilding would be: available to tbe Egyptians. The large and effective naval coOlingents, supplied by Egypt as a Persian satrapy, which fought at Salamis and Animision, probably reflt('t Ihe naval build-up of the Saite Pharaohs.

12 The commander of the Egyptian fleet bore the title i",~ keblltt IItSU 'Commander of the King', GaileY" .

Sbortly before Cambyscs'. conquest tbe admiral, WadjahorresDe. and tbe Greek commander, Pbanes of Haliar· nassus, deserted Egypt. The army made a stand al Pc1usium but was defeated.

There we re several Egyptian revolts. The revolt of Jnaris was usistcd by the Athenians but crushed by Anuel'lles. A later revolt led toO In IlIiln« with Sparta and I period of ind.ependence under the 30th Dynuty. large numbcn of Greek IDCI'CCf1Iries were employed. Grttb, such as the: Athcn.ian gcncn.l, Chabrias, and the Spartan king, AgisiI.seus, were now in positiDns in the high command.

THE LIBYANS The term ' libyan' il used here toO include tbe tribes thai inhabiled the western desert and lIeppes Dn the western edge of the Nile Vill ey. This area Slrtlched frDm tbe Mediterranean cout 100 Nubil, in which the Weslern Oases were the furthest Egyptian outposts.

The libyans were nomldie herdunen WhD lived in latber tenes and relied on hunting, gathering and the produce of cattle and goatl.

At fint the Egyptia ns encountered only tWO tribes, the Tjehenu an d the T jemehu.

The Tjehenu were ethnically Ikin to the Egyptians and probably became culturally distina from them al the time of the unificatiDn. The T jemehu, however, were light·skinned and fair·haired. They probably entered Africa froOm Europe around 3000 BC. Their physical Ippearance is clearly represented in Egyptian ITt.

These peoples were tbe main worry for the Egyptians until the Iller New Kingdom when the Kehek, Meshwesh, Seped, Mlhasun and Libu appear (the name Lib)'1l derives from the l ibu). Some even more obscure tribes appear in the Papyrul Hlrris; me Esbeh, Keykesh, Shai, Hes aDd Deken. One of the main reasons for libyan unresl Will me gradual dcsieauioo of the Sahara whieh forced rribes to mDve ca5twards, pUlling pressUrt on each other which led to incunio ns intO Egypt. The most serious occurCDceJ took place during tbe later New Kingdom Ind continued throughout the follDwing period, resulting in dynasties of Libyan Drigin ruling in Lower Egypt.

In me reigns of Merenptlh I Dd Ramessct lit sevenl tribes formed coalitions, and in the former reign were joined by contingents of Sea·Peoples. They pllccd one cbief as overal.llC2der and mounted mISsive llI5IIulu on Egypt in­ tending to se ttle. In the face Df defClt, the coalition broke up and the lcader wu deposed. Following these luKb IIl1e numbers of tribesmen we re recruited intD the Egyptian army and placed in military settlements. These were later augmented by funher Wives of tribesmen and developed intO I military caste tlking ilS nlme frDm the tribe of the Mcshwesh. libyan forces originally consisted entirely Dfinfantry using throw-sticks, javelins and how1. By the late New KingdDm they hid acquired a fev.' chariots, probably reserved for dUef., and Ilrge numbers of IDng sWDrds Df Sea·Peoples type (possibly obtained from them). At Per-Yer, 9111 copper swords were taken by the Egyptians but only 12 pairs Df hDtSCS. At R auho, 603 bows, 2310 quivers, 93 chariots, 92 spear. Ind 183 Meshwesh horse. and asses were captured. These figures indicate the rcillivc quantities ofwcapons available to the lib)'1los. Numbers of slain and caPNrcd wry frDm 2000 to 12000,10 I coalition of tribes could produce I large army.

NUBIA

Nubia was divided into twO partS; Lower Nubia or Wawat. utending from Elephantine 10 the 2nd Cataraa. Ind Upper Nubia or Kush extending beyond this. The Nile valley in Wawat was narrDW Ind supponed I small popula' tion. The: dCRn and scrubllnds 10 Em and West we:re inhabiled by Nomadic herdsmen. The Nile valley in Kush widens II the DongDla reach and could support I larger popuililion. It was possible fDr I powerfullr.ingdom to deve lop here. A kingdom Df Kush arose seven1 times in this area and posed a serious threat toO Egypt.

The Egyptians campaigned into Nubia IS tlrly as the lSI Dynasty, I.Dd began exploiting its raw materials in the Old Kingdom. The so-aIled 'A""IrDUp' inhabillots IItbis time were culturally similar 100 the Predynastic Egyptians. By the 6th Dynasty, however, me .ituation had changed and the 'C-group' appear. They may be equated with the tribes and kingdoms recorded by Weni and Harthuf; The lnjet, MedjlY, Wlwat. Ylm, 8ctju, I Dd K..uu. Harkhuf was able to reach Ylm by selling off from Aswan or the Abydos region (via the Western Oases) 10 it must have lain toO the south.weII, (one journey took 8 mDnths). On one apcd.itiDn Harthuf found that tbe king of Yam bad gDne toO WIt with the Tjemebu Libyans. This king also supplied Harkhuf wi th In cscon of tTOOPS to aupplemcnt his Egyptians IS mey passed through me territDry of I cDnfcd.etltiDD of Jnjet, Sctju and Wawil tribes.

13 The Middle Kingdom F rontier in Nubia The Pharaohs of the Middle Kingdom embarked on the conquest and annexation of Lower Nubia. They intended 10 exploit the local raw materials (panicularly gold), create wealth by trading with the Nubian tribes, extend the frontier further up the Nile (keeping large military forces under tht conuol of the King to do Ihis) and ultimately 10 curb or conquer the kingdom of Kush, located in Upper Nubia. The process was under way by Ihe reign of Senusretl and completed by Senusret Ill, who led five campaigns into Nubia and established the frontier at Semna. beyond the 2nd Cataract. During this time the Egyptians constructed a remarkable system of fonresses which show that the science of fonification was already well advanced. Proceeding from the outer defences inward, the basic features of eac h fon were as follows: A glacis surmounted by a cove red parapet, then a dry ditch overlooked by loopholed ramparts equipped with round bastions. A single loophole on the inside, divided into three loopholes on the outside. allowed a single archer 10 shoot in three directions while remaining totaUy concealed. There were two levels of loopholes. The gateway was massively fortified aUowing atlackers to be shot at from three sides as they approached the gate. The ditch was crossed by a drawbridge. The gate protruded from a massive enclosure wall equipped with square bastions and towers rising higher than the loopholed outer rampan. The enclosure walls offonresses situated on rocky spurs utilised the contour oflhe ground while those: on level ground we re rectangular in plan. Directly behind the wall was an open zone allowing a clear field of fire from the battlements against enemies who might actually force an entry. Construction was of mud·brick and timber.

The largest fort could accommodate 300 men and their dependants while the entire system would require a garrison of several thousands. The population of this pan of Nubia has betn estimated at about 10,000, mainly nomadic people, so the threat from Kush must have been consideral;lle unless the system was also intended to concentrate military power in the hands of the king and away from the provinces (Senusret III actually abolished the nomaTchs). Funerary stelae indicate that most of the garrisons were Thebans.

A Middle Kingdom papyrus has survived which li sts tbe Nubian fonresses and gives their Egyptian names. The fortress chain is described below, proceeding from south to north.

I. Subtiun of Nubia; the fortress at Se mna South. 2. Khakaure (Senusrtt 1/1) is powerful; the fonress of Semna. This fOri commands the na rrowest part of Ihe 2nd cataract. It was the largest and suongest fon and situated on an 'L·shaped' rocky spur. 3. Warding off lht Bows; Kumma, positioned opposite Semna. 4. Rtpelling the Inu; situated on Uronani island. It had a long tail-wall to enfilade the st retches of the Nile on either side and impede the progress of enemy vessels.

Semna and Uronani were linked by a wall 4.5 km. in length, situated parallel 10 the river on its western side. This guarded against outflanking movements attempting to by-pass Semna.

5. Curbing Ihe CoUrltn"es; situated al Shalfak and also possessing a spur wall. 6. Iknl j a huge fon and Irading centre at Mirgissa, incorporating a fort on Dabnani Island. This fonress com­ manded the Kabuka Rapids. These rapids were impassable during the low Nile and a mud slipway 2 km. in length was constructed around them to enable ships to be dragged overland to keep tht supply line open all year round. The mud has preserved the marks offeet and ships. This fon was a ce ntre for weapon manufacture and stone 'formers' for shields have been found here. 7. Buhnl; this impressive fortress was the administrative centre of Egyptian Nubia. 8. Embracing the T"fOO-Lamls. 9. 'Rt~l/illg th t Mtdjay~ si tuated al Serra. 10. Ma'am; the vast stronghold of Anieba.

Nonh of this point lookout posts were situated west of the Nile manned by troops from the main fons to guard against outflanking movemems from the desert. The east bank was not so well guarded as the west bank, but it was occupied by friendly Medjay Nubians.

II . Baki; the fortress of Kuban on the East Bank. This was a comrol point for Ihe Wadi·EI.Allaqi gold mines. It also covered a dese n rood against possible outflanking movements.

Further nonh there were forts on the Island of Biga. Elephantine (the traditional frontier) and in Upper Egypt.

14 Some food for che garrisons was produced 10000lly bUI most supplic:s were shipped upmc:am from Egypt, which reprc:sc:nled a massive logislial problem. Apan from the slipway, other means of securing year-round passage in­ cluded a barrage 10 maintain I sufficient heighl of wlter over the rapids and I anal called GDOd art /h, wa)'1 oj Khalcaurt, which WIS 80 metres long and loaled near Sehel, to en.ble wanhips to by·paS! the rapids.

Most fons were wilhin signalling distance of each other or could be linked by signalling OUtposts.

At the eod of the Middle Kingdom high Niles damaged the fonifiations and the weak central authority began to lose: conuol of the relion_ Many fom ..... ere burnt. This could have been done by retreating garrisons recalled to Egypt in the face of the Hybos thrnll!, if not by enemy lction. The kingdom of Kush took over Wawal. The capitll ofthu kingdom wu probably at Kunna where a mauive blockhou5t-like stronghold, Ind burills containing hundreds of sacrificed retainen and Egyptian booty have: been found. Egyptian officials (and possibly garrisons?) switched allegiance: to the: King of Kush. Kush was in contact with the Hyksos and reglrded IS In enemy by Ram05c:.

Kamose: and Ahmose: begDn the rc:conqucsi of Nubia which was completed by Thutmose: I. After this there were only I few minor rebellions Dod punitive raids. Nubia was Innexed and convened into an administrative extension of Egypt ruled by the 'Viceroy of Kush" Issisted by an idnu of the Nonhern region and one for the South. The garrison was commanded by the 'Battalion Commander of Kush' and many of the old fons were re·furbished and altered. Colonial settlements known as 'Temple.towns' ..... ere implanted and Ihe population became incrmingly Egyp­ tianised.

By the end oflhe New Kingdom a serious decline had set in and Egypt completely losl conuol of chis region. One of the last c:vems before the darkness fell was the invasion ofEgypl by the Nubian garrison under the vice roy Pinhasi who reached the nome of Cynopolis. He may have been rontc:nding with Ihe Libyans for control of Egypt.

The Kinsdom of KU l h Around 850 BC I rc:surgent kingdom of Kush, stee:ped in Egyptian cuhure and fanatially devoted to Egyplian gods (pre:-c:minenlly Amun-rt) began 10 impose iudf on Egypt. King Kuhta already controlled Upper Egypt when he was succc:c:ded by Piyt. Wbe::n Tefnakht Inc:mpled to conquer the South, Piyt turned his initial defe::nsive movc:s into a 'CJUude' to conquer Egypt, tlllbUshing the 25th. Kushile, Dynasty. The following kings, Shabau, Tlhu qa and TlIIutamun, defe::nded Egypt from Assyrian upansioD fintly by supponing israelile and Judean rebels and later on thcir own ground. After y.::an ofhard f1&hting and dc:suuctKlD the Kushites were: e\'e:ntually forced out of Egypt.

The: Piyt Sle!. and Assyrian records show Ihat the Kushite forces included arche:n, slingen, spc:1Innen, c:hariotry and prably Clvalry (Ihe Kusbite kings were panicullrly fond oflheir horses). They were:: also rompele:nl in con­ tempoTlr}' liege tc:<:hniquc:s and possc:uc:d a l1«t. Piyt's success sc:c:ms to have been achic::ved by I combination of fannicism and ingenuity. The later kings fought with great delennination 19ainst Ihe Assyrians.

On the whole, Nubian lribesmen would be organised on the: basis of clln or ad·hoc divisions. The various kingdoms of Kush however could be e:xpc:cted to achieve: I higher level of organisation pouibly imitating conte:mporary Egyp­ tian practice and eve:n utilising Egyptian c:xpc:nisc: when available:.

MESoPOTAMIA

SUMER AND AKKAD: THIRD MILLENNIUM B.C.

Early Dyn.atle Sumer (e.3000.2334 B.C.) ClimDle and geography ronspired to enforce civilisation on Ihe inhabitanlS of Southern Iraq, for, though the alluvial plain berwec:n the great Tigris and Euphrates rivers is potentially highly productive:, there is scant rainfall and exlensive: anificial irrigalion is c:ssc:ntial for agriculture:.

The need to raise and dirc:<:t the !.hour needed for the digging and mainleoance of canals, wlle:rways and other public works demanded a hi,h degree: of socill organisation and, although the:: evidence for specifiCilly military organisnion is limited, it wu clearly based on that employed for civil projc:<:1I.

By the beginning of the Early Dynl5tic period the population of Soulhern Iraq, thc:.n known 15 Sltm" or SlrumtT, was composed of (V(O main ethnic groups: those who lived in the south and spoke: Sumc:run, and LhoIc:, prc:dominantly in the nonb, who spoke I Semitic language that is now called Akkadian. Both groups shared. common, Sume::rian, culture:: which was widely imitlted in both Syril (as reprtstnted II Mlri and Ebla) and Southern lnn. " " ToH~IU~n ch,,,f lmoun, them b(ln, P"'""'kh.od ~) \

SU~"'T' EaLA• • SIMMURRUM LULLUBI

GUTI 9 ..ESHNUNNA . ">c,. MARTU DE. ~ AWAN ~ 'SH" Y

Sumer. MESOPOTAMIA U' • rd in the 3 millennium Be To Dllmun I nc!

Politically, Sumer was divided into several small, competing city-stAtes, cons.isting Ordle capital city rin ged by oUllying lawns and villages and surrounded by wluablc irrigated farm land and uncultivated steppe used for pasture. The cities were generally large and their populations numerous, the walts ofUruk (ltPditionally fim built by the famous Gilgamesh) were: 10 kilometres in circumference, so human resources we rt considerable:. However, Su.mcr was com· plettly lacking in Slone, good-qualilY timber and metal ore and the city-states vied with each othcr [0 gain control of either the trade: routes or sources of supply of {hest vi lal raw ma terials - a simation compounded by endemic disputes over Wllterways and border land .

The Sumerians envisaged each city·slile as belonging to its patron god and his 'family' of minor deities, and early Sumerian rulers reguded themselves only as EN, ' lord', or ENS!, 'governor', of the god's eanhly estates, their office combining both religious and $«Ular functions. The prttise definition of the differences between the titles EN and ENS! is unciear, however a third title, LUGAL ('grtat man', or 'king') is less ambiguous, and seems 10 have ~ adopted by I ruler wbo had gained hegemony over sevellil city-states. An even more prestigioU$ title, and one thai remained so long after the Early Dynastic period, was 'King of Kish', which, because of the early dominance of that city, became synonymoU$ with Sumerian overlordship. A Sumerian ruler who could gain conuol of Kish and the holy city of Nip pur (t he 'borne' ofEnlil, the suprtme god of the Sumerian pantheon) would therefore be universally recognised as overlord of Sumer.

Whether EN, ENS!, or LUGAL I Sumerian ruler WllS an autocrat whose palace and household (E. GAL) came to rival the city's temples.

A Sumerian city-state was a temple, and to I lesser atent, a palace economy. The state's temples functioned as the mater administrative and economic units in Sumer, organising trade and employing lhousands of workers in temple workshops and 00 the land. The bulk of the population consisted of landless tenants and labourers who worked on the csteosive royal and temple estates (which together attOUnted for at least two-thirds of a city-state'!

J6 land). In times of peace these men were organised into specialised group5 according to their profession, under the supervision of UGULA, 'commanden', NU. BANDA, 'C3ptains', and certainly in the cue of a temple's tenants, AGRIG, 'superintendents', and SANGA, or 'slew:ards'.

Private landownen did exist but these were family, or 'dan' holdings resembling, on a smaller scale, the estates of the noble and royal 'clans'.

In time of wat a city'. ruler could conseri!" both royal and temple tenann for military service, the extent and condi· tions of which Ire not fully known. Both labouren and soldiers were called ERIN a word which originally meant I yoke or necQu)(k and succinctly implies the nature of their employment! Two, mort ezplicitly military, titles wert SHUB.LUGAL, meaning 'king's mainer', and AGA.USH, 'follower'. The SHUB.LUGAL pfObably formed part of the rOY11 household and performed regular military and para.military duties. The AGA.USH, by analogy with the later use ofthiJ term, Ippear to have been ERIN who regularly served IS soldiers, rather than IS labourers., when fulfilling their obligations IS royal or temple clients. A general term for a soldier was ERIN.SUMMA, or 'spearman'.

Military uniu seem to have had filled sizes, although the size of similarly organised work·gangs varied according to the nanue oflhe work. It is prob:r.ble that the same officers could be detailed to command both military and civil units.

A NU.BANDA probably commanded between 60 to 100 men (since: the Sumerians used both a decimal and a sell' agcsimal number system - which is why we have sixty minutes in an hour). Officers of higher or lower rank were te rmed UGULA, with the actual sile of Ihe command being indicated by a numeral SU ffIX , as in, for example, UGULA.NAM.IO('commande r of 10'). P resumably thert were six 10 ten UGULA.NAM.IO under a NU.BANDA.

La rge r units were probably formed by brigading logether several oflhese NUBANDA companics. The largest uniu mentioned occur in texts from the small city,sllte ofShurrupak, were 67().680 men strong, and are described as 'going into battlc'.

Troops conscripted from temple ellltcs appear 10 have retained their own commanders and command 5tructur~. In one documented instance a SANGA of the Nimar temple at Lagasb led troops levied from its eslales 10 overtake .." Mat 6IJI) EbmJu Wdcn an}'inj offbotxY!TOID Uj»b. 1Jx Jiu!K/Jx lJiloIilt lOla iJ D{JJifJQJJ{ iJJ lit//' of lh~ m;Iuw {TOlD SblUTlJpU sd IlJUt:fl1 WI hjgb(r fottmtions W~ utrJIllr 6IJ() (a 7M luane.

In Iddition to the contcTipt militia each cily... tlle would seem to IUlVe posscucd II lffilll, r~lUlar forct bncd on lhe ruler', househole!. Tan of~.2600 B.C . from Shutrupak. al lhal Ilm~ aub}a:1 10 th" kin. orlh~ pow~rfW . 111" of Kish, describe. lurprilingly large royal household of SOfDC 600 men, which includes 144 cupbearers, 113 muli· d.ns and 65 cooks (I), together with various cnfismen. Aside from most oftbc: crafismc.n these titles W~.ft probably only honorary, reflecting both the ItIIW of their bolders IS royal retainers and tbe common usage of the eztcnded 'household' U In Idministntive unit in the Near East (the famous Sargon of Akbd began his Clreer u a cupbearer ofth~ king of Kish Ind governor of Aglde). Another lext SI.les lhatlhe 'chief· mason' ofKish was having his banle· Clr repaired in ShurrupU's p.l~ workshop, which suggesu that. proportion at least of the fOyal household usually fought from battlc-can. Certlinly one ruler of the state of Umma had an elite unit of si:ll:ly vehides.

There is little indication oflhe total number ofbanle-ars that could be mustered by Iny one dIY-5tlte, Iside from Umma. However, even if no individual cily could afford 10 maint.in more than 60, this would suggest that a power· ful LUGAL, such as lugllugesi who controlled all southern Sumer, could conceivably field over 600 battle-ars.

Tenants and soldiers, including the household troops, rcc:e:ived monthly rations of food and oil IS wages from tem· pic and pal.ce granaries. Important temple and palace officials liso held grants ofllnd from royal and temple esUtCl, generally fOf life.

The Dynasty of AkUd (e. 2334·2154 B.C.) The rtign of Sargon (Sharru·kin, 'true, legitirMle king') of Akbd was I momentous turning·poinl in the history of Mesopotamia. He, Ind his dynasty, introduced I new conctpt of kingship and set a mark lhat succttding gen~ra­ tions of rulers would Ittempt to emulate. For lhe ftrst time Akbdia.n bccsme the langulge for olTkial inscriptions, and the Semitic-speaking northernen achieved genull political dominance.

To sutxlue the stronpy independent traditions of the conquered city·statCl, Sargon replaced their rulers with his own governors., or JhaUanaiJlJtl. In order to ensurt tbeir loyalty they were IlwlYS Akkadians, Ind oflen members ofhis own family or clan. Those nativt rulen who retained their posilion5 ,,"'ere closely walchtd by rOYl1 appointen

11 and officials. Similarly, the religious establishment of Sumer "'{as carefully connolled by SarGon'. installation of his daughter, Enheduanna, as hiGh'priesteM of Nannar (the moon·god) at Ur.

Akkadian tats relating to sp«:ifically military affairs arc rare, though much more extensive thin for the preceeding Early Cynntic period.

Sargon's household consisted of 5400 men, who in Akkadian were termedguruslt, in Sumerian, ERIN. They were stationed in Sargon's p,alace It Agade, where they 'ate bread daily before lhe king' .nd undoubllibly formed the profwional core of his army. High officials were the SAGI./;'fAH, or 'chief cupbearc.r', and SAGI, o r 'cupbearer', as in tbe previous period. The royal cupbearers probably formed an inner bodyguard for the king.

As in the Early Dynastic period bolh work.gangs and military units had a similar, if nO( identical, command struc· Nre. The genersllum for both IOldiers and labourers was either ",rusll, or ERIN, though it would sccm thatgurusll may hive hid a more precise meaning of an adult male who was capable of I full-days work. Royal and temple tenants sccm, as before, to have provided the main pan of Akkadian Irmits, sometimes being described as /u·uru, or 'city men', which suggests that their employment and recruitment was sti1llocal and based on their home city. The levying ofthesc men wn probably the responsibility of the city's GIR.NITAhllakJtanaJuun. They were issued with rations of grain and beer every 4/5 days.

However, an Akkadian innovation was the nlJitum , a class of soldier probably to be identified with the aga.us" lugal, or 'royal soldier'. The nirltwrn held plots of land, almost certainly from the king, in addition to recei"ing rations of fi sh and sail every three months. This land·gram marks a considerable change from earlier practice and was pro­ bably introduced to strengthen the soldiers' loyalty 10 the king IS an individual (a ro yal te nant always remained 10, no maHer who the .ctual ruler was) while reducing the burden on the palacc's economy, since the nisltwm had in pan to maintain himself. The system would also provide greater numbers ofscmi·professional soldiers for the army and ensure thlt roY11 forCC5 would be on hand 10 supprw any revolts loally. Officers and men could be termed miltum .

Other, ra ther comprehensive, terms for soldiers .....ere: LU. TUKULLA, literally: 'he who lics on the weapon', lind LU Gl$1I GlD. DA or 'spearmen'.

Tats from Umm. show that bmd rations for workmen and soldiers were issued in lots of 30, 60, 90,120,180, 240 and 600 lones, which would seem to indicate the theOretical strengths of Ihe units presenl. Aplin from the suggested unit strengths of30 and 90 men these figures accord quite ..... ell with Early DynllSlicunilS of60 and ~700 Strong, and are in any caSt ttraightforw.rd multiplcs of 60. From this evidence it may be posNllled Ibtt the king's hOUKhold troops comprised nine 'battalions' of6OO men, each probably commanded by. GIR.NITA, or 'coIont.!'. Other ranks of officer included the PA .PA/sM !Utattim, literally: 'he of two ttaffs (of office)', The title indicata lhat this officer commanded t..... o or more units of6O, since below this rank WIIS the NU-BANDA and the UGULA; the laner .lso remaining in use as a general term for 'officer' (n in UGULA-NU·BANDA) together with the Akka· dian rabi $lJbl~ 'trOOP commander'. The nnk of NU. BANDA remained unchanged as 'capllin', or 'company com· mander'. UGULA, when used with precision, still meant, 'commander', or 'n.c.o.'.

Light trOOPS or skirmishers were known as NIM--soldiers, or 'flics', no doubt because of their lack of formation and speed ofmovernent! In the Aklr.adian period these soldien could also be foreign mercenaries, from the Zagros mountains and the west, as well as native troops - probably the younger, less experienced conscripts.

It is difficult due to the scardty of material to judge the different proponions of troops available to an Akkadian commander. However, a li st of soldiers guarding the walls at Umma has a body of 107 niJItu and 469 LU.URU 'sleeping on the wall'. lflhis proponion is at all representative it would suggat lru.tlhc.rc were four times as many militiamen to semi.regular nisitu. This does nOI mean of course that Aklr.adian Innics would mainlain these propor­ tions in the fie ld, as the nisltu were regularly moved about the empire, one leiter stales: 'his nilitu have indeed gone away 10 Uruk', while the l.U.URU do nOl appear to have usually campaigned far from home.

The military usc of both banie-c:ars and straddle-c:ars seems [0 have declined rapidly following the Early Dynastic period. One suspects that the fu.rcacbing and strenuous campaigns of the Akbdian kings, often directed against lightly armed tribesmen in rough lerrain, quickly highlighted the deficiencies of vehicles designed for shon-range warfare belween nearby city-states.

Both platform and Slraddlc-cars seem Slilllo have been employed as fut mounts for couriers however, special 'chlriO! roads' being mentioned in some texIS. Other textS list numbers of equid! and their fodder.

18 Army sizes Ire rarely mentioned, though taking III evidence into account, AJr.kadian armies probably numbered over 20,000 men.

Tbe Third DYD.tty of Ur (c, 2112·2004 B.C.) After nearly I century of anarchy in Sumer, following the collapse of the Dynuty of Akbd's authority, when tbe barbarous Guti were the arbiten of power in the land, one UN-Hegal, the king of Uruk, 'returned the ltinphip to Sumer'. What battles this king fought, what allies he had, we do not know in any detlili Ilthough it would seem that most of biJ shon, seven-year reign was spent in driving the Guti out of Sumer and establishing his conuol oftbe country. HOwrlOCf, Utu-Hegal's dynasty was nOl: destined to lut - the king was swept IWIY Ind drowned while supervising the construction ofa new canal. It was his governor ofUr, I man named Ur-Nammu, who was to found a dynasty and an empire that would sec the fmal flowering of Sumerian culture. By his founh year Ur­ Nammu, by force oflrms Ind diplomacy, had so enended his rule as to declare himself: 'King ofSumer Ind Allid'.

The ltings of the T hird Dynasty ofUr, unlike tbe im perialistic kings of Allid, did not unduly mCl, their military achievements. Instead their surviving inscriptions concentrate OD tbe digging of canlls, the rebuilding of temples and the restoution of order to the land.

Individull cities and their surrou nding districts were administered by governors, ENSI, appointed by, and directly responsible to, the king. The ENSIs were frequ ently moved from city to city (for example, the ENSI of Ashur was transferred to Susa) either to prevent strong local tics developing as a threat to the king, or perhaps to use the tale nll of In able ma n to the full in troublesome areas. Many of these imponant positions, villi to the cohesion of the empire, were filled by clOSt rdalion! of the king. There arc several instances ofgovemors marricd 10 royal princc.s.scs, and in one case a king's uncle was an ENSI.

The duties of an ENSI we re to maintain order in his city, to );eep the local canals and road, in good repair, to «IlIecl and organise the district's tribute, and to kee p tbe king informed of eve nts in the area. Communications wtre maintained by the use of the numerous royal mcssengcn travelling the we ll -kept roads from city to city in the empire.

In order to pre>n.nt tbe frequent re\'olts of the Dynasty of Akkad the military responsibilities of the governor were «Inttntrated in a new POSt, sJraUana, of equal lIatus to the ENS/. The tWO types of official, tbe one mili tary, the OI:her civilian aist side by side in some districts, although they were. so melimes combined in one person. This is more commonly the cue in oudying provinces, whose security depended on the military. Thul the governor of Mari was always a sllakAaruJ, IS wu Ihe governor of Elam, while in Zariqum and Ashur it varied according to tbe mi litary situation.

Ouring the reign of Shulgi the sJraltlt.aruJ of Uruk wu his younger son, Sbu-Suen.

& ...ocU as commanding hi. district's soldiers, the shaJrAanaJruJ were responsible for the consc:ription of labourers for agricultural and constructional work.

Collectively, the men employed on civil ian and mi litary tasks were called eitber ERIN, sabuffI, or Ufflfflannum, and they appear to have been «Insc:ripted from tenants on royal and temple land holdings. It would seem that only the besl, finest conscripts were pickcd for regular military service since soldiel1 were sometimes termed SAG. ERIN or ER IN.SAG.GA, 'chosen men'. However, soldiers could still be employed on civilia n duties, such IS traruporting CUt reeds and digging and cleari ng canals. The pool of available civilian labour also functioned .. a 'reserve' (DAMU.DIRI. TAl used to IIlcngthen the ERIN.SAG.GA in emerge ncies.

The ERIN were di vided inlO companies, commanded by the familiar NU.BANDA, ideally comprising 100 men in IOSCetions of 10 men each unde r an UGULA orSHESH.GAL.NAM.10(litenlly: 'big brother of 10'!). However, companies were sometimes as much u 60% undersnength.

The majority of each company were vetet1lns termed ERIN. GAL GAL, or 'strong men', with a .maIl proponion of company sltength made up of ERIN. TUR. TUR, 'youths' or 'recruits'.

All ERIN rccc:ived regular payments of barley, oil and beer, though one leller from a military commander teporu that hi. soldiers wou ld mutiny if their 'wlgcs' were not quickly paid!

Household $Oldim wr:re ailed ERIN.LUGAL or LU. TUKUL " BOlh soldiers and workmen 5C1:m 10 have be1:n moved aOOUi the empire as required. and though army sizes are nOI recorded. one body of workmen on canal maintenance was 21,799 strong.

It is probable that higher unit organisation remainea unchanged from the Akkadia n period.

Isin, Lana aDd the Am an te leulement. Following the collapse of the: Third Dynasty of Ur, a successor kingdom, ccnlerea on the city of Isin, managed to maintain peace and stability in Sumer. The kings of the First Dynasty or hin deliberately strove to mainlain the traditions of the kings of Ur, eve n to the extenl of retaining Sumerian as the official language of inscriptions, though the majority or the population now spoke Akkadian.

During this period, in the early years orthe second miUeniu m, many Amorite tribes ceased to be nomadic. Instead, in large numbers, they settled around, and in some cases inside, the old urban centres throughout Mesopotamia and Syria. This process of gradual urbanisation created numerous small Amorite kingdoms, ofwhkh the most signifi· cant wen (Yamkhad). Qatna, Mari and Ashur.

The Amoriles in southern Mesopotamia were quickly assimilated culturally and by the end orme Old Babylonian period they had been totally absorbed by the nati\'e, Akk..adian-speaking. population. In Assyria, howe\"Cr, the Arnorite dynuty or Shamshi·Adad I was later regarded as an unwelcome intrusion of roreigners 'not or Assyrian blood'. or lhe many Amorite kingdoms established in Mesopotamia tWO in panicular achieved considerable power and importance. The first of thC$C was the kingdom of Larsa, founded by Gungunum, c. 1932 B.C. a 'Sheikh of the Amorites' whose tribe settled about ursa in the last days of the Third Dynasty kings of Ur. Gungunum seized Ur rrom Lipit-bhtar of Isin and gained conuol of the lucrative trade between Ur and Dilmun (modern Bahnin) in copper, gol d, ivory and precious stones rrom their sources of supply in Iran, Oman, and, possibly, India.

Both bin and Larsa roughl ror dominance amongst t.he multitude of Amorite kingdoms, the kings or both cities claiming 10 be 'King ofSumer and Akkad'. Howeve r, by 1860 B.C., Irra·immiti, the king orlsin, ruled linle more th~n the capital. and Amorite sheikhs had eS I ~b li 5 hed kingdoms around Kish, Uruk, Mal"llld, Sippar, and a small lown called Bab-ilim, or Babylon. Irra·imitti must have been an exceedingly unlucky man. When an omen roretold the dealh of the king, Irra·imini followed the standard procedure and proclaimed a 'substitute king', his gardener Enlil·hani. Afler a shon time such 'substitutes' were usually put to death, thereby the omen being fulfilled. Unfor· tunately Im ·imiui ale a precipitate bowl of broth, and died, leaving the gardener as king. The hurriedly deified Enlil·b:mi ruled the steadily eroding Sllle of Isin for over 20 years!

THE OLD BABYLONIAN AND OLD ASSYRIAN KINGDOMS 1894·1595 BC

When Hammul"lllpi (1792·1750 Bq ascended the throne or Babylon, the mosl powe rful Slate in Mesopotamia was Assyria. (known then as Ashur or Subinu,) ruled by Shamshi·Acbd I (1813· 1781 BC). Most orthe area to the south of Babylon was controlled by Rimsin (1822·1763 Bq of Eshnunna. The city-state of Mari, si tuated on the middle stretch of the Euphrates, at the iunction ofimponant trade routes, was within Shamshi·Adad's sphere of influence and administered by his ratber elTete son Yasmakh·Adad, (we know this from the letten sent to him by his father, which make excellent reading!). Assyria n power began to decline witb the death orShamshi·Adad I. Even his com· pelent eldest son and successor, hhme·Dagan. could not prevent Yasnukh·Adad losing Ihe throne orMari to Zimri· Lim, or the rise ofHammurapi 10 supremacy in Mesopotam ia. Hammurapi defeated Assyria, fuhnun D. and Larsa, and remained frien dly with Mari until that city was itselr annexed by him. It is from the enormous palace archive which has survivcd al MIlri, that the political, diplomatic and military situ:Jlion existing II this time can be reconstructed in remarkable detail.

Military Organisation Mililary organisation in the Amorite Slates or Mesopotamia and Sy ria (or which Babylon, Assyria and Yamkhad, or Aleppo, we re tbe. mOIl powuful) appears to have been very similar. A common Indition of Amorite tribal organiS:l­ tion was combined wilh elements of Sumerian tradition.

T exIS make it clear that there were two basic types of soldie r; the (proper) soldier, or (qaqad) rtdim, and his reserve, or IQIt.Mlnasnu . They were required to serve either on wllr-Krvice, police-dUlies or labouring (such as d.igging canals and building ronifications). thi s obligation of service bein,g ICrmed illt.um. In return for this service the soldier and '0 his family were granted I house Ind lind by the king, and it appears Ihlt ail the ma le m~Clbers of the family shared the ilkum duties in tum, perhlps on In annUliI basis. These plou of land, generally minimum of one bur or 65 hectares. were apparently divided between tbe udum aod his reserve in the proportion of2:1, and remained the property of the king. This land could neither be leased nor sold, and could be recllimed by the king al any time. The lCtuallength of service involved in j/bm is nOI clear.

The ruler was usually accompanied on ampaign by his household retinue, known at Mati and Ashur either as the girslilum~ the kiJi, IMrrim, or jusl the:: kisrum. AI Babylon the king's retinue was always called the JtUi, IMrri, and seems 10 have comprised 500 to 1000 men.

From tbe rtdu. were selected elite troops known as bdlrntm or hrt'nlm (derived from the: word meaning 'to choose'). Only "willi (free citizens) could b«ome bdhntm.

Unit Organbadon An anny or 'expediLion' ("'amlltim), could number as many as 20,000, 30,000 or even 60,000 men, but smaller forces of 100, 1000, 2000 and 10,000 are also recorded. The commander·in-chief of an army was known IS an aliJt pdni.

The GAL.MAR. TU. or rDbi Amurrnm, meaning 'Commandu of Amo rites', was an administrative rank II Mari, liaising belwun the army and the coun . In Yamkhad, Eshnunna and Babylon (where the rank was UGALA.MAR · TU or _ft.il Amurrnm), he was an active military commander ove r large bodies of troops, numbering up to 3000.

The DUB.SAR.AiAR. TU or lupsar Amurntm, meaning 'scribe of the Amoriles', could lead forces in the field. He wu s«ond in command 10 Ihe rDbi A murrnm, in charge of the ccnsusand consc:ript IislS.

The GALKUD or rabi pinjm, a 'aptain', (known It Babylon IS a PA.PA or _/til sliD IIlwttim), commanded the 'company', known as a KUD or pirs;m, of 200 men.

The NU.BANDA or lopuuam, commanded units less than 200 strong but grtaler than 10, probably 100 men, IS this number WlIS required to guard I 1wlsiJu:J (district) and a NUBANDA luJisu, was responsible for a vi113ge. He could command a baztJft.AD/Jim (suongpoint) and btJtJr'ntm (elite troops).

The tlJMatum, or squad nflO men wucommanded by an UGAU.(IO) LU or r»a1til (10) aw;/um, a SOrt of'decurion'. At Babylon he was called an UGALA.NAM.(10) nr rcoJtil ul/llmim.

The ordinary ,oldiers ..llere known as UKU. USH or rtdum, 10 which the epithet SI.SA or iSMntm, meaning 'regular' could be added. Small numbers could let as bodyguards alongside Prltqll, in bodies around 500 strong. Militlry reserves were known as LU.DIRIG.GA or I/Xlt/antm at Mati, and DAKH or raJtUAllm It Blbylon.

Small detachments of soldiers used for escon or guard duties were refer~ 10 as an Dlift./um.

Troop Typel The grealer pan of the army at Ihis time consisted of infantry, of which there were several different typc5. The ma in diviJion was between ,obum ft.ibitum, or 'heavily-Irmed troops' and sob"m fDllor" m, or 'light troops'. Sources indicate lhat the sobum /tibi/um required tn operate from I base, or tue up holding positions, while the Ulbum qaltatum, were C'lpable nf mounting ambushes or wrmishing, and could include guides and look-outs. Troops could also be defined as sobum emuqo /um. or 'veterans', and as sabum doltnum or sab,,1I'I' dtJmqam, refe rring to panicularly good or effective troops. An interesting trOOp-type. which appears to have been considered essentia l to take on cam­ paign (Shamsl·Adad once reprimanded Yasmakh·Adad for neglecting 10 mobilise them), were the ba'l·ntm. The tenn is de rived from the word meaning 'to hunl' (like Ihe Napoleonic 'chuseur' and 'jaeger'), and their principle weapon WI! an ue.

Chariotry consisted of two types oflw()owheeled datiOl, the 1UJrMbsum Ind the nalHJlum. Some chariots were fu r­ ther defined as 'fISt'. ChariotS are known from Syrian and Anatoliln Kals Ind models from Blbylonia at this lime. Their design was a development of the earlier Sumerian 'piliform-car', but were equipped with spoked wheels. They were drawn by twO or four mules. donkeys or horses, which were now making their appc.ranee in the Near EaSt . Le;ther coven for chariot, and animals Ire l iso hinted :It. A limited amounl of tiding 1110 took place, and a leller from "uri, advises the king lhat it was nOI fitting fo r a sove.reign 10 ride I hnrse:.

21 D efe nee The countrysjde was guarded against marauders by means offon ified outposts or strongpoints ca lled bazaJrhatum, and guard troops who included spears among their equipment. These outpostS reponed movements ofpcoplc, pur­ sued fugitives and were capable of resisting serious attacks. Fire'signals were used to give warning of impending anack and to mobilise the armed forces in defence. A letter from the eldest son of Shamshi· Ad ad I, hhme-Dogan, to his rather incompetent brother, Yasmakh·Adad at Mari, tdls us that when a large raiding party entered his ter· ritory, Yasmakh seems to ha\'C panicked and lit two fire-signals at night, which resulted in complete national mobilisa­ tion. His brother advised him to send out m~ngers to repon that it was only a false alarm and hall the process.

Auxiliary T roops Great reliance was placed on assistance from v:usa.1 or allied states. Contingents supplied by foreign allies were known as sam.1I1 tilJatu1l1 , while native reinforcements were referred to as sahum ruddum . Allied contingents could be very large; one contingent sent to Mllfi from Yamkhad, numbered 10,000 men, another, from Hammurapi, numbered 10,500.

Allies could prove unreliable as Shamshi-Adad I found out. In one letter he refers 10 a cen2in Yashub-Addu, who had altered his allegiance several times in the previous three years and in the space of only two months would swear an 02th of allegiance to one lting and then swear an 02 th to another, thereby becoming an enemy of the first king. Another source records that 15 minor ltings followed Hammurapi, with similar numbers allied 10 ursa, Eshnunna and Yamkhad.

Nomadic tribes were often allied or subjCClto the Amorile ltingdoms, and could be levied for military service. This may have been imposed as a condition of settlement within the te rritory of the state. M ilitary scribes were sent into their encampments to list those eligible for service. Tribesmen were sometimes reluctant to be levied, and in order to encourage them the bead of an executed criminal would be carried around their encampments. In one leller Shamshi-Adad states that if the king goes on campaign, every member of the tribe should be made aVlli lable by the tribal chief. To hold anyone back would be 'sacrilege against the lting'. The tribes rKOrded at Mari were the H ana (who were of particular military imponance), Sutu, Banu·yamin (Benjaminitcs) and Bani-Sim'a1. The Banu· yamin we re panicularly unreliable and unconuollable. Habiru, or 'Apiru' tribesmen arc mentioned, and apparently lived in the approaches to Syria.

Composition of Armlcs

A letter from Shamshi-Adad I to Yasmakh·Adad consists ofinslruClions 1510 the mU Sler of trOOpS for I campaign, and may provide an example ofa typical army. Yasmakh-Adad has already gOt 3000 men, levied for their military service. 2000 men arc to be levied from among the tribal encampmen ts, for which purpose military scribes have already entered the camps and made lists. 1000 of these men should be Hana, 600 should be levied from the Uprapu, Yarikhu Ind Amanu sub-tribes, and 200 and 300 can be obtained 'here and there' until sufficient n umbe r have been collected. Only 1000 personal retainers will be required, and the total of troops will be 6000. To these will be added 10,000 men sent by Shamshi-Adad, probably native Assyrians, described as a strong and well-equippcd contingent. A funher 6000 allied troops are expected to come from Eshnunna. The entirt force is described as '20,000; a strong army', (i n fact it totals 22,000).

Supply Apart from soldiers, an army would require supplies and transport. This consisted of pack-donkeys , fou r·wheeled wagons (mqllum ) and boats. The laner would be especially important when it is considered that the Euphrates was a major milit ary route. In one case 200 ships were required to tnnsport 3000 men. Although this suggests sma ll ships carrying only 15 men each, they may have been larger with some devoted to supplies.

Mari was 8 centre for weapon manufacture, and armouries were probably attached to the palace. Shamshi-Adad I scnt orders to Mari for shields, arrowheads and siege equipment, and the palace supplied Hana tribesmen with some weapons.

Military Law The famous law

. ~'c.'" HATT IAN STATES (" 0 ~ CONQuERED BY ~c..P~:. f...tU/i/i "-J ..L ':-,...... ' ... . I, ~ "\ .." lfSHU ·. ":::.\ • SHU S H"' ~ • ~ STATES '0 '---~ EBLA- • GUT I TURUKKU I .'.0"",. tv" . --- I MARl- t" KASS ITI RETJENNU I "­ "" ESHNUNNA • , THE AMORITE WORLD c. 1895 - 1595 Be HAMMUR"PIC EHPIRE --- OLD HITTITE EMPIRE .. - . - . -

MITANNI AND MESOPOTAMIA 1600 TO 1200 Be

The Hurnans

The original homeland Oflhe Hurri WliIIS situated in Ihe highlands where Ihe Euphrates and Tigris rise, and their language was related 10 Uranian. During the 2nd Millennium Be, Hunian. begDn 10 form a growing element in the populaliGns of Syria and Mmpolamia. By the 17th ~ntury BC sevenl Hurrian slates had formed in thm regions. By 16th cenlUry Be a confederation of such Stales had given rise to a powerful Slate in Ihe region of Nor­ thcrn Mesopolamia belween the Euphntes and Tigris, known as Ihe l az; r• . This was Ihe kingdom of , known as Hanigalbat 10 Ihe Assyrians, Ind probably as Naharin to Ihe Egyptians and Canaaniles. The origil1lll homeland of the Hurri.ns was known to the Hiuites as Ihe 'Hurri-Iond'.

The MilaDD.lan Empire The kings of Milanni, ruling from lheir c.pital, Washshuganni. spread their influence over the Stiles of Nonhern Syria thaI had been formerly under Hittite control during the Old Hiuile Kingdom; , Aleppo, Muki. h., Nukhashshe and n'CfI KizzuW'lnJ in Analolia. Nonhwards, thtir aKltrol extended over the Hum.land, and ca5fWlrds, deep into Mesopollmia, the cities of Arnpha and Nuzi being close 10 Nineveh itself. Au yria was hemmed in 10 west and south by Mitlnni and may even have been • M..iWlnian vassal at Ihis time. This reprelCntl the heighl of Mitannian power in the (Sl h century Be, achieved during the reigns of Paratama and Shaullalar. The cam­ paigns ofThutmose 1II expanded the Egyplil n Empire II Mitannian c:xpense, and brought Egypl into direct con­ fila wilh Mi[anni. Analam. I, regained some ICrritory, and Thutmose IV of E&ypI established peaceful rclalions by entering inlo a marriage IlIilnce, after lengthy negOliation. The twO nations became firm allies during the reigns " of ShUiama I and ArnuDhOl:ep III of Egypt, perhaps in response 10 the renewed su·tn"h of the Hittites. An anti· Egyptian flKtion, led by a ctruin Ud·ki, opposed the Egyptian alliance and assassinated the king, Anasruhumln, placing his brother. Tusbnna, 00 the throne. He disposed of Ud·ki and renewed the Egyptian pact, but the: sec:dJ of in lema I strife had been sown. The new king of Halli, Suppiluliumu, commenced hostililies Iglinst Mitlnni, bUlan initial made was dcfel'ncd by Tushr:aua. The Hittites then began to outfllnk Mitanni Itrategically by draw· ing Kiuuwl(Da under their control and forming an alliance witb I rival claimant 10 the: throne, Anltlllll. woo had set himself up as king in the Hum·land. In three wan, SuppiJuliwnas conquered Mitlnni'. Syrian vusala ud broke the power of Milanni, aided by civil war within dun counuy. By supponing rival claimants as their prOltgCl the Hittites brought the pelter pan of Mituni under their control. Meanwhile the Assyrians seized this oppor· tunity to secure their independence under Asbur-uballitl, and invaded Mitanni from the East . The final ovcnhrow ofa much reduced Hanigalblt, was accomplimed by Shalmancscrl (127401245 Bq. Hittite --- I' Hurri- \ c::! , - Empire - land I ~ I Ki-zzuwatna- - - I ,, Mitanni - AssyrJ;-' \) Mukish Naharin HarJig \ a1b 't , ,/'

I Mitannian Empire - -- I Elam MITANNI AND NEIGHBOURS c. 1380 Be

Mhannian O,..aniu tion Information ahoutthe military organiution of the Kingdom of Mitanni de rives from evidence re lating to the Vlssal kingdom of Arraphl. situated on the eastern fringe of the Milannian Empire, contained in the IrchivCJ from Nun.

Arnpha was divided into provinces called nalru, each posscssing I wa ll cd capital and levenl smaller walled towns, or alu. The province was Rdministered for the king by a IwllUhlu. or r/wln'" mCi/i official. Undcr him, each town and district wu governed by a ntua""u, or 'mayor'. Within each district were nume rous dima /i. These were settle· ments or estates with their own lord, or btl dim!u , The estate comprised a few villages and a fortified 'manor' or willchtower. It WIIS worked by tenants known as asnJlwbu.

Frequent &kinnishing with Auyria required that each towo be garrisoned by royal Arraphan troops, Arraphan militia, or even regular Millnnian forces. The Iwza""u WIIS responsible for the ICCUrily of his own district, but mlY not have actually been. field commander. The militia were !talioned in Imall forces .t each town.

One of the documents from Nun mentions men ofthe 'lands' of Haoigalbat, Ampha and Mitanni, and perhaps, together with Nlharin, these names refer properly to grtIt provinces of the Mitannian Empire, Ihe names Nlharin and Hanigan)lt beinllUumed by the Egyptians and Assyrians as terms for this peat power, being the names of the reliona with which they had the most contlla. This would aplain why contingent' could be designated u 'of Hanigalbal' or 'Millnni' Ind the usc of these: names to refer to more specirK: regions within Mitanoi.

24 The warrior cI~ ss, or fUlltItIiSIIJItIl, consisu:d of professional soldien and militia who were under In obligation to serve. This obligation was known u isltnrll, (literally 'man of arm",.,') or ;{ltll. Soldie n were called Qlilt illtll, 'one who performs the:: illtll dUly'.

MaryllDlIU The cream oIthe army were the chariot war riors known as maryallll.,. The: skills ofhorKmanship and chariot war­ fare we:~ highly developed among the Hurrians, and the ' maryalfllll-system' wu prot-bly invented ltId brought to perfection in Mitanni. Millnnian ideas and the: panc:m of their equipment had a profound inIluena: on the:: dcvt:lop­ ment of chariouy in all the neighbouring countries.

The term mar)\:Jnnu, meaning 'noble chariot warrior', derivea from an Indo-European word rdated to the:: Sanskrit marya, meaning 'youth' or 'hero'. Maryalllfu stalUs was connected with land holdings ltId could be: hemiiuuy. TheR: could be: mOR: than one grade of mal'}'Jlfllu-scrvice, but not all chariOt ry personnd wcre of mQr)\:J nllu Slams, and not all mtJ?"I"fUI, posKSSed chariots.

The king poueucd an inner bodyguard of chariot!}' mown u the IMp; IluIrri, (literally 'the fect of the king'). con­ siJling of about tcn chariots. A force of ten chariotS was also required to provide a bodyguard for the king" son in battle. The rest oftbc chariot ry consisted of elite chariotecn, known as aliA sm', meaning 'campaigner' or 'veteran', IIOd militia charioteen.

Royal moryannu could be: ICnt OUt from the « in MilllOni to assist in the dc:fc:ntt of the:: provinces. These 'charioteers of Hanigalbal' are known al four towns, numbering over 200 chariots in aU .

ElIch charioteer was wigned aIIu or 'brothers', (probably grooms or 'squire'), Ind 'bowmen of the chariotecn'.

Hanigalt-t (Mitann;) Ind Kardiniash (Kassite Babylonia) were noted as sources of good horses. The Hurrian.s ap­ pear to have ~ apert It horlCmanship and a Hurrian manual on the subject written by I certain Kikkuli, was transilled intO Hittite It Hattusas, indicating how other nltions valued their aptrtisc. Honea began training in their Itt year and we~ pulling chariot. by their 3rd year. They became proper chariot bones between their 4th and 9th year. Horses were graded accoroins to quality and reserve horses were known u maIm Hones were fed on barley and regularly aerciscd by being driven certain prescribed distances.

At Nuzi, horlC. were apparently ridden on occuion and messc:ngen called mar l/tipri, arc known to have U'I\-dlcd in this way. A term for 'horstman' was raltib IUli.

Infantry, known u Utllltu(ltlu, comprised both archers ltId spcan:nm who could be equipped witb swords and leather armour.

The alJuhabu tenants could Illso serve u soldien.

Unit Org.Dllation The: chariot unit, or tmanti. of 5 or 10 vehicles was commanded by an tmalliultlu. SiJ: such unil5 were commande1i by I 'chief tmontultill'. This officer was also in volved with supplying rations to the men under his command and one is rKOrdcd as commanding a garrison, so it is possible that he could also command infant!}'.

Apart from the chariot organisllion me ntioned above, tats refer to officers ca ll ed rob (5,4 rob (f0,4 and rob (12), who commanded units of these sizes. The rab (10) was equivalent to the mlon(ultlll. Inventories of equipment are sometimes in quantities of 100 or just over 200, suggesting further possible groupi ngs. One source li.1I 3000 olik iflti, consisting of chariOleers and archen, another records the following troops and numbers; 536 charioteers, 261 Qlilt iflt~ 196 nalthuJ/ultu, 26 asll1lwbu, 82 archers, 66 aliA iflti archers and 55 bowmen ofthe chariotry. Texts also refer to men mustered from particular cities, indicating that districts may have: provided the basis for individual units.

Many Nuzi tablets arc described as 'tablets of the right' or ' le ft', ltId entriea refer to men of the 'right' or ' left' and the inspection of equipment belonging to these two divisions. ThiJ would indicate thai the army was divided inlo left and right wings for organisational and tactical purposca. Presumably there was I 'ccnt~' also. TalS speak of 230 men, 156 ofwbom arc chariOtCC:fS, of the 'left', 260 'brothcn' of the 'left' and acale armour for men IIOd hones of the 'left-', so we should conceive ofleft IIOd right winp of the: anny comprising hundrcdJ of weU-cquipped chariots, probably with infltltry support. Some ofthc:sc men are associated wi th the:: palace and so may be dite troops.

25 Ka rdunia, h; Ka,.ite Babylonia The Kassites (Kashshu), whose original homcland was in the region of LuriSlan in Iran, made thei r appearance in Babylonia as the Old Babylonian Empire fell into dedine. They seem (0 have inflilraled peacefully, gndually senling on the land, eventually cre:lling a kingdom on the frontien of Babylonia. While this was happening, Southern Babylonia had rebelled, creating an independent kingdom oflhe 'Sea-Land', but it was the Hittites, und er Mursilis I, who delivered the final blow to the Old Babylonian kingdom when they advanced down tbe Euphrata and ucked Babylon. After a sbon period, wben the king oflbe Sea-l.3nd was in control, a Kassite dynasty ascended (he tltrone of Babylon. By 1460 the Sea-Land had fallen under their comrol, and Kirduniash, as Kassile Babylon was known, bc:came a united and apparently well·governed state, r«ognised as a first-nte power by her neighbours.

Milit.ary campaigns were directed at three: main enemies. The Sutu uibc:smen. inhabiting the desens ncar the middle Euphnues, the Elamites, who offen mounled raids into Baby[onia, and chiefly the Assyrians, usually in dispute of border territories. The SUN seem to have been quite a serious menace, one raid pcnetnting as far as Uruk. Messengers to and from Karduniash were regularly interrupted while passing through the regions in which they roomed. Kadc:shman Kharbe led a major campaign against the SUN and established a permanent garris.on 10 secure the route. BOlh Karduniash and Assyria were equally concerned aboul these nomads and s.ometimes co-operated by exchanging intelligence reports. Kurigalzu (1340-[324 Be) achieved a major victory against Elam. and succeeded in c:lpturing $usa. The Elamite king, Khurpatila, bad mustered his army in the fontess ofDur-Shulgi and threatened to invade Babyloni.a. Here he was defeated and pursued imo Elam. Kurigalzu also IIppe~rs to have been successful in one of the many border wars against Assyria, defeating the Assyrians in two battks at Arbela an d Sugaga, close to Ashur. the ClIpital of Assy ria. These wan usually resulted in a new demarClltion of the border be tween the tWO countries.

With the collapse of the M itannian Empire, Assyria became st ronger and began to intervene in Babylonia. The Kassiles seem to have formed alliances with the Turukku and Guti tribt-s of the bgros mount.ains in order to outflank Assyria, forcing Assyrian expeditions into these regions. Kashtiliash IV (1242-1235 Be) provoked a decisive Assyrian response when he invaded Assyria while Tukulti-Ninurta I \10'.&5 on campaign far 10 the north in the highlands of Nairi. A major war ensued in which KaSliliash was forced back and defeated. The Assyrians went on to c:lpture Babylon. annex important border district! and install their own governors in Babylonia. Following this Auyrians, Elamites and K.assite rebt-ls vied for control until the King ofElam, Shutruk-Nahhunte, invaded Babylonia, defeated her army and plundered Babylon very thoroughly, carrying orr the image of the stale-god, Marduk, to Susa. The Kassite dynasty w:IIS brought to an end.

Surviving records from this period are sparse aDd have received little attention, so il is difficult to reconstruct Kassite military organisation. A system similar to that of Arrapha, descri bed under Mitanni, is likely. The army probably featured a slrong chariot arm as the Kassites, like tbe Hunians, were renowned for their knowledge of horseman­ ship. Horses from Karduniash were in demand as far aWlilY as Egypt and Hatti. Large quantities of gold were received from Egypt in return for horses and chariots. The kuduml-Stones, inscribed boundary markers recording land-grants, suggest a land-owning aristocracy which could have provided the chariot-warriors. Letters 10 high officials and kings refer to guards, fons and chariotry ofthcir cities or territories. The inscription ofWti-Marduk. dating to the following dynasty, records that he was a commander of the chariotry oflhe right-wing. T he inscription conetrns a land-granl in return for his service at the battle of the Ulai (c. 1120 BC). Representations on kudurru demonstnte the existence of infantry archers.

ASSYRIA

The military history of Auyria falls into Ihree main periods; (I) the Old Assyrian Period (2000- 1700 BC), during which time the king. Shamshi-Adad I (1813-1781 Be), created an Assyrian Empire which included the state of Mari. Assyrian military org~nisalion at that time was probably closely related to that of M~ri and is described together with the Old Babylonian system in an earlier section. (2) The Middle Assyrian Period (1365-745 BC), when Assyria broke away from Mitannian domin.ation under Ashur-uballil I, bt-gan to establish her control over Mesopotamia, fought orr the Aramaean incunions and embarked on a policy of conquest which created the Assyrian Empire. (3) The Nto-Assyrian Period (745-609 Be) corresponds to the Assyrian Empire at iu height, from the re-organisation of Tiglath-Pilcser III to its final overthrow by the Medes, Babylonians and Scythians.

THE MIDDLE ASSYRIAN PERIOD 1365·745 BC Up to the time of Ashur-uballit 1(1365-1330 BC), Assyria had been a relatively weak state, restricted to the Uppcr Tigris valley and probably a vassal of Mitanni. The region of Arnpha' and Nuzi, close to Nineveh, was pan of " the M itannian Empire, and the military organisation of Assyria was probably ... ery similar. It is likely that later Assyrian military organisation de ... eloped from Mitannian roots. The Assyrians had to defend themsel ...es againsl enemies on all sides, the Mitanni, the KlSsites, Suhu and Ahlamu tribesmen to the south, and mountain peoples to the nonh and tast. When the Mitannian Empire began to break up under Hittite attack, the Assyrians, under Ashul-uballit I and later Shalmaneser I, se.iud terrilory from Hanigalbat (as Milanni was called in Assyria), and arne imoconulC! with the H ittites. A ftw border skinnishes may have: followed, encouraging the Hinites and Egyp­ tian,lO make peace in the face of this new threat. Kassite influence o\'er Assyria was decisively ended by Tukulti­ Ninuna I (1244-1208 8q. The conquest of Hanigalbat probably had:l great strengthening effect on Assyria IS tbis region already had a well-developed military organisation and "'.... rrior class. Tiglath-Pileser I (1115·\077 BC) conquered regions fun her west of Assyria and led Assyrian arms across the Euphrates as far as the Mediterranean, but it was a shOll lived success, for the AnlllMean incursions threw Assyria OntO the defensive for several generations. The oomadic Aramaeans overran many of the Hinite successor states. They also occupied the Babylonian country­ side, but wert n.,rowly prevented from seuling in Assyria by determined drom on tbe pan of Assyrian kings, although the Assyrian te rritories welt of the T igris were lost.

Adad·Nirari II and Tikulti-Ninuna II campaigned against the Aramaeans and succeeded in conquering terrilOry as far as the river Khabur, and Assyria had r«overed as a military power with the accession of Ashurnasirpal 11 (884-859 8q. T his ruthless and aggressive king led Assyrian arms once again :as far u the Mediterranean COUt . His successor. Shalmaneser 1II (858-824 BC), campaigned in the Taurus and Zagros mountains and in Babylonia, sent an army d~p inlO Iran as fQ r as Media, and allempted a lasting conquest of the Nro-Hinites and Aramaeans west oftbe Euphrates. Bi t- Adini was conquered in 856, and in 853 Shalmaneser crosscd the Euphrates. He was prevented in achieving his objecti ve by a coalition led by Hamath and Damascus at (he banle orKarkar. Shalmaneser cont inued to allack these stO tes and in 841 'crossed the Euphrates for (he 16th time', but failed to conquer Damascus. Eventually Shalmaneser abandoned this policy. He had also auacked Uranu but, again, without lasting results.

Despite their m il ita ry proweu, the Assyrians were not able to create an empire out of their conquests. only a sphere ofinfi uence within which they were supreme. The main strategy behind their campaigns was to reduce the power of their ri vals and increase their own. Tribute was imposed on conquered SUites, and puniti... e ezped.itions were sent promptly if it was OOt fonhcoming. This tribute was of massive economic value to Assyria and included livestock, foodstuffs, luxury goods, wood. captive labour and items of dirtCt military value such u horses, chariots, iron, other metals and weaponry. In order to increase respect and renown, a form of psychological warfare was de ... eloped io which se ...ere reprisals were meted out against enemy resistance or rebellion_ Thc:sc: methods were represented in palace rtliefs, where ... isiting dignitaries could I« them and take note. and so may not actually ~ ... e h«n used as much :as it would appear.

MUlta,..,. Organi. atlon. The military organisation of Assyria at this time was probably developed from the system used in Mitanm, which had once atended into what was OOW Anyna and in t.he rtgions east of the Euphrates which Assyria had taken over. It was probably based. on an obligation to reoder military Krvice to the king on tbe p:at1 of individuals known as the /Ib-obligation. This continued into the N~Assyrian period. and the Ufb Ilta rn element of the later organisa­ tion may preserve something of the earlier system, although then eztended to the Empire as writ One source rt'COtds troops known as khurodu (quradu?), who carried OUt the ilJtu~bliplion with thdr 'brothen'. In the time: ofSbal.m.ancstt III men wert levied from the villages and assigned by the provincial governor to various units or officers, in a similar manner to later practice. These unit. wert probably also kim, as the rank 101 kitnl u klturodu ('commander of Jtlturodu units') is known. Some son of substitution may have been possible as lists tJ:is( of men levied as substitutes (.l!umu) ror others.

The army consisted of chariolry, probably provided by a land~wning nobility, and some regular elite chariotry of the king; cavalry, which probllbly de ... eloped during the 9th cenlury OUt of the: cha riotry; and infantry, consisling of Ituplhu and ashorittu. The Itupsltu, were peasant amscripts and the Dlllan'ltu were bener-trained and equipped elite troops. The lerm asllDriltU is related to the words ashantlintu ('prowess') and asltoridll (· ... anguard'). Tiglath­ Pileser I records t~t some of his soldiers were trained ' for a fight [0 the finish'. Infantl}' comprised spearmen and archers.

As 10 unit organisation, the basic unit, or lIim, appears to ~ ... ~ tJ:isted and represented troops re cruited Crom • cenain loc:aJity. A smaller unit was a squad of ten meo. commanded by IlOilO, or rob tsllirrt. The levy of troops from their villages was the responsibility of the rab Dlanj (village oveneet). Fons (IIDlsll) we re manned by wbi osllabll (garrison troops) and commanded by Itomalll, or Itolillu officers.

The: second-in-c-ommand to the Iling was the IIlTlanu, a general who could lead campaigns instead of the king, as did the tllrtanu, Daian-Ashur, during the rtigo of S~lmane:sc:r III.

27 Mushki ;' \ rartu /u / \ r'i h" Ludu / ..<'" . -., '-0 Huu'" ~ Urm'~ G"<~ Nairo' .. Que - '_ / - C,.ch em,st!. ~ "~~. ./(ornrnOhu ,,"'• • 0.,·\-. Mann .. • ~'rrln"- ....,. / ) . Arbela ~ -"­ ~ Madal \ • "",", :.I- Hamllh ~ . v ·..·, • ~ ~ \:>, 1'l ladnana Olmncu~ ~. , . Ellipi \ - , ~­ • 'UPPER SEA' / ARISI " "'" SIdOr ~\,... "­ Parsumash f 1,fe '->:~ l - 'I:+-,· r i p\J\(,UOU C J> " t>-~-S ab,..011 11.1 '1"'8,,( • Suu f ,~ 8IT-OAKU " ;:f . Jerunlem " Elamtu I ''(" I " BIT-AMW(ANI ~~ \ Musru ~udahO/ " . C(J ~,~, / ...... ~ "U ~ / \ / "l - / THE ASSYRIAN - / - - ;' I \ EMPIRE 'lOWER c. 650 Be SEA' • ~.'• THE NED-ASSYRlAN EMPiRE 745-609 BC The mililary and adminisf.ralive organisation oflhe Nco-Assyrian Empire ....,.s probably fhe resul! of reforms made by Tiglalh·Pile:K!r III (745·727 Be). Shalmaneser III died in 824 Be amid rebellion and civi l war in Assyria. He .....15 followed by a sUCCCS5ion of wC1lk king. who wtn: unable 10 maintain internal stabilily and hold Assyria's con­ qucsis in Ibe face of the growing power ofUrartu. Adad·Nirari III, who did achieve some limiled success, ascc:nded lbe throne as a minor, his mOfher. Sammuramal (Semiramis), acting 15 regenl. The problem was also panly due 10 lhe old mililary and administrative sytlem, which was falling infO decay. In 745 Be a revoir in Kalhu (Nimrod) placed a cenain general Pulu on the Ihrone, who took the name Tiglalh-Pileser (III). Tigialb.Pile:K!r proceeded 10 refonn Ihe government of Assyria in order 10 lirengthen Ihe cenlral aUlhorilY and weld AuyrUin conqucsls intO an empire stronger !han before:. Assyria iuelf was re-orpni5ed inlO strultier provinces. and vassal stalCS .....ere annes:ed and lnosfonncd inlO further provinces. Each was governed by a 51a le appointed bt/.pilwli (provincitllord) or sWrru (gcm::rnor). Terrilorics nOlsuillble for annendon were nevenhelw supervised by a ,tpll (o ....erseer) . An emcienl courier Iyslem \llas tslablished fhroughoul the Empire and the king maintained dOK control over the provinces and rKeived detailed repons (surviving examples being invaluable for the reconstruction of military organisalion). A regular standing army was crealed, backed up in lime of war by a well-organiJed cill-up of men under obligation to render milillry service. Perhaps fhe leaSI successful innoontion was the mJSS deponalion of subject peoples and their re-sculemenl in olher parts of the Empire, probably intended 10 diminish nationilloyaities and enhance a sensc of belonging 10 the Empire. It lended to enhance dislike of Assyril.

The army wu divided into four component pans; (I) me qurubllti, or 'household IrOOpS', (2) the Itisi, shDmm: or 'king's standing army', (3) Ihe IDb sham, or 'king's men', a son of 'Ierr i to rial anny', and (4) the dikll/-mati, or 'gene.r.l l levy', a sort of'levy-cn.mlSsc' of the populalion, likely to be used only in I.imes of greal notional emergency. The fi rst three clements musl now be dc.scri bed in greluer detail.

The Qurubull

The ,II",buti, known more rully IS ,II",bu/i Jlto Wpe and often simply as slla sluX eomprised Ihe personal bodyguard of Ihe king. The crown prince and the queen also had their own bodyguard units, fhe qurubutl' mal' sharrland the ,urubut; IImmi sham. The fll,IIbuti contained both cavalry. or ,IIrublltt slla pitllalli and chariOlry, lIarltabtil JIu~ Sargon U rKOrds twO oc:casKIns when he ",-ent into action accompanied only by his bodyguard cavalry, which numbered 1000 men. Bodyguard infantry also aistcd, known IS ~k slttpL One unit was called the ..II,," shtpt ,IIradu, the tenn fllrMII, meaning 'heroes'.

The Kisir Sbarnni The kis;r sAarnui, or 'king's standin, limy', ....,.s a luge force composed of regular, professional soldiers, maio­ tained by the king. ElemenlS of this force would be 5Ialioned throughout Ihe Empire in order 10 back up the locally­ rcauitcd forces. M.ost of the troop-types used by Ihe Assyrians we re. represented among ilS ranks. These comprised; chariotry (MrkDbrll), caonlry (Pi/MIIII), and infanfry (,,"Jtu). The infantry were funber lub-dividcd into Irchers (MIll '/Uti), speannen (lIasil ~maru), various types oflhield-bcaren, and slingc.n. Records show tbal the best clements in Ihe armies of conquered countries were recruited into the kisir slla""ti. Sargon U, fot cumple recruited 50 chariots from Samaria (Israel), 200 chariolS and 600 Clvalry from Hamath, and 200 cavalry Ind 3000 infantry from Car­ chemish. Judean infantry and large numbers of Ar.lmacan, ChaldCIJIlnd Elamite Irchen were also recruited into this force on various occasions. Thesc troops would be issued standard Assyrian mililary uniform Ind equipment and become almost indistinguishable from the Assyrian soldiers, unlike provincial levies.

The Sob Shorn

The Jab .IIDrrl~ or 'king's men', were under an obligation to render scrvice to the king, which was known as illru. The illtu-obligllion may have been connected in some way wilh land, ailhough some non·landowners were also liable. It WlIS admini5lered ac«lrding 10 village of reside. nce. Some land-grants carried an es:emplion (~Jtutt) from j/ku. There were three IypC:S of iIJtu·service; IS a soldier (wb IMm). as a reserve soldier (slla ltutaJ/i). or as a worker on capilal projtctS (dllllll). The best men were: sdtcted 10 discharge Iheir obligation as soldiers. Equal numben were seltctcd 10 stand by in reserve and lhe remainder suved IS dll/Ju. Some men could have their service as wb sMm· commulcd 10 bearing the cost of equipping and supplying another wb SMm. The i/ltll-obligarion WlIS a regular Innual requirement and could Ilso be imp05ed especially for a campaign, or 'hulu', perhaps because campaigns wtre sometimes required II unusuai llmes of the year. The provincial governors wtre responsible for Ihe mobilisa· lion oflhe wb slwrri in their province:. Each rob Itim, or 'unit-commander' wu allocalcd I village or group of villages by the king from which to fonn his unil and was responsible for the call up of his own men. The troopl would

29 frequently be required to mo\'e from their province of origin to join a ampaign or serve in Inother province, 50 when the mobilisation was completed, the provincial go\'ernor handed o\oc r the troops 10 In officer responsible for their transit, the slla ,urbuti. This system Ipplied in III the provinces orthc Empire, and it seems that nativt Assyrians provided the majority of the chariOlry Ind cavalry, while subjta peoples, espttially Aram:loeans, p rovided most of Ihe infantry. Under the designltion I4b Utorn' were included $Orne full·time mercenaries who were supported by specialland.grants known as 'bow·land'. Requisition or HOl"'SCa Horses were tJ:tremely valuable and vital 10 the military organisation of the stlte. Hones did not figure 115 an impor' lant part orthe rural economy and were hardly e\'er used as ordinary draughtanim:lols along with Olen, donke)'5, mules and ameli. This is demonstrated by census r«Ords and was probably the cue in similar economies such as those of Babylon Ind Egypt. The horse was primarily kept and bred for wlr. Horse stocb within Assyria had to be ~gularly strengthened by horses obtained from such important hone·breeding regions as Inn, Urartu and Anatolia. These could be captured during campaigns o r acquired as tribute (mailof(u). There were IWO types of horses, slla niri or 'yok~horses ', the most numerous type. required for luirnessing to chariots, and pitholJu or 'cavalry mounts'. \I,'hich were more valuable. Military horses were most probably state property. They ..... ere kept and looked after, howe\'er, by the soldiers in their villages when not on campaign, ..... ho rectived assistance for this from the stale. Ouring the 1st, 2nd and 3Td months (March,May), these horses we~ requisitioned in the provinces in a similar manner to the call.up of the sab sham, the I1Ime term, bit,u, being used for the levy of both. This was in readiness for the beginning of the campaign season in the 4th month (June). The central authority sent OutlWO muslrarkisu officials into each province to collect the horses. They we re assisted by a sholmu Iha pirlralli ma'aJ I~ or 'governor of the cavalry corral'. There were also musharkiSllI for specific parts of the army, such 115 the musharkisu sha pirhafli qurubult, who coll taed for the cavalry bodyguard. T he hones were assembled at piTTan; (assembly points) situated at Ninevth, Dur-Sharrukin (Khor5:1bad), ~nd Kalhu (Nimrod), where the main anenal, the t1w1·mas1rarr~ was located. The bit,u of horses also included a small proponion of mules (probably for pack animals). This information is based on administrative documenlS including daily reportS of the hones entering the assembly points. These show thaI during the fint three months, hundreds of horses were arriving from the provinces each day. The figu.res ofhorscs are listed according to the province and according to cenlin high officials, rep~sen tin g their great landed estates.

Unit Organisation The oVCf1lll commander of the army wlllthe king. (,harrum). Under him .....e re sevtral high officials whose duties were varied, such as the rab slra,t, abcJ,O-Uu, rab tAaffi and rab llIa·rilh". Of these, Ihe rab slraqt could be employed in a military capacity, but the comnunder·in-ch.ief and sccond·in-command 10 the king was the umanu. There were, in fact, twO lurtO"US, the rurta"u Ilia i",ir/~ or 'tunanu of Ihe right', and the tunanu SM Iltumtli. or 'turtanu of the left', the former being Ihe chief turtanu. As the terms IUggest, these commanden probably took d12rge of the right and left wings of the army in battle. Presumably the king commanded the cenue. The btl pilulli and sllaltnu (provincial governors) commanded the forces stationed in their provinces, assuming the title slrut rt:Sh~ or 'general' of the province.

The smallest unit of organiution comprised 10 men under a rab altiTtt, or 'commlnder of 10'. The rob Itisri led his own company or kisru ('knot') of2 platoons raised from his atel. Scvenlltisn' brigaded together under a military slraAlnu (nO[ to be confused with the governorial rank) formed higher tlctical units. Chariot Itliri comprised five 10 vehicle sections under rab ahirll and rab Itisri. This represented the regiment rttrUited from a village or group of \'ilJages, or a garrison.

Troop Types A great variety of troop types were available to the Assyrian army. These included: chariotry (comprising such crewmen as 'chariOl·men', ' rein·holders' and 'third· men'); cavalry, or slro pitholli (comprising bowmen and spearmen); infan· try, known as :Ilku or auk .htp~ and pioneers, known as Ititltitlu or Itishltodu. There we~ several different t)TCS of infantry, defined according to equipment or function as archers (nolh qashti or sab ,asti), spearmen, or naslr aanront, three types of shield·bearer; IfQSlri lukllr,: IfQSIr kabob; and nash ariru, and slingers. It is not clear as to the distinction between the different types of shield carried by Ihe three types ohhield·belrer. Presumably these troops WCfe equipped with a weapon in addition to the shield, and these may be alternative terms for the speurnen, speci. fying the type of shield being carried. It seems likely that these trOOPS formed the front ranks of mixed bodies of archers and Spc:lrmen. Some troops, Itallapan~ forming the vanguard, seem to havt tnvelled in light vehicles.

Reliefs show that troops also varied lIccording to armour and formation. Scale or lamellar armour was usually issued to elite troops, charicxry, cavalry and closc-formation infantry. Lighdy-anned skirmishers, optrlting in open·formation, armed with bow or sling, were provided by levies from subject peoples such as Anmaean and Chaldean tribesmen. Mercenaries were obtained from these tribes and possibly liso the and Scythians.

JO Whatever their pri mary role, troops could be: con\'l:rted to otber function u occasion demanded. II ~ms likely that cavalry were originally chariot cn:ws, re-trained, perhaps, in order to work in difficult lerrain, and charior crews could also be: dismounled 10 operate as a unit during sieges. The well·armoured chariolry crews would perhaps also be: used in the exposed positiol15 on siege-engines.

Sin afForce. The size of armies would be: dictated by the nature of the campaign, logislical ronsideratiorlS dependenl on t.he dillanet 10 be: covered and nlture of the terrain (apparenl in tbe Egyptian operations and campaigns in mountainous or dCKn tegions), the speed II which the army \Ir"iS ~uired 10 muster (records aiSI of Ibe campaign proceeding before the mustcr was complete due to the urgency of the situalion) and Ibe number ofttoops which could be: spared and nor tied down in orher pans of lhe empire. Ashurnasirpal II rerords an army of 50,000 while his father in 885 Be mustered 1351 ChariOiS. In 842 Shalmaneser III had 2002 chariors and 5542 cavalry of a lotal forC"t of 120,000. Sargon II records that he "ationed the 'left lurtanu' in Kumrnuhu wilh a force of 150 chariOts, 1500 caV1.lry, 20,000 archer. and 10,000 orher infanlry. A repon concerning' review of the sab rnam' stationed in the region of umu., C1rried OUI on royal inmucrions, lists a small force of 1430 men. It consisted of the following:

10 chariots 10 horx teams for Ihe chariots 97 Clvalry mounu II chariot-drive rs 12 'third men' 30 messengers 53 'chariot·me n' Total: 106 chariot lroopS 161 cavalrymen 130 'charior·men' 52 other troops of unknown type Total: 343 'chanor·men' 181 amp-followers and other personnel including; servants, tailors, bullers, victuallers, bakers. household penon· nel, scribes, cooks and donkey drivers.

360 Gumya troops 440 IIU 'aya Iroops

This is stated to be only pan of the forcu of the province, the rest being still to arrive.

MobiliutioD The institution of the kuir snaJ'Tllti meant that the king did not have to await full mobilisation of tbe sab snam before C1)mnlencing a campaign. Esarhaddon records an occasion when he did not waste time with any ofthe nonnal preparations for a campaign but wenl fonh in the cold winter month of Shabal. These actions would be: required against sudden and unexpected evenu luch as rebelliol15 or invasion. Campaigru; of conquest required careful prcpan­ tion ready for the campaign season. The main .rmy would set fonh from Assyria to be: joined by the C1)ntingents from tbe provinces as it went. Provincial governon laid up supplies in their provinces in case the king'. expedition should pass through. T roops on active service, whether It.isir slraJ'Tllti or sab sllam, could be: kept in the field for long periods, as one letter records that a cavalry unit had not been given leave for three years. Service in regions such as Egypt and Babylonia might well require such long periods without re lief.

The Assyrians (reflted advance assembly and supply points near (0 the regions into which Clmpaigns were frequently mounted. One such WII Kar.Shalmanescr. a crossing·point on the Euphrates. Like Kar-Shalmaneser, (fonnerly Til· Banip). these might be fortified royal cities of the previous rulers of conquered regions, and had been garrison cities and supply depou in their lime. These military bases were called birrJrt.

The Royal Courier SYltem Among surviving Assyrian documents .re numerous letters seDt by military officials and provincial govcrnors to the king, reponing in dellil on such matters as troop dispositions and Illte of readiness. Thil enabled the king to plan military campaigns very carefully and react quickly to t\TeIlts. Mes.sages were carried by mounted mcsse:ngers along planned routts. These rnesKngcrs tf1velled in 20-30 mile stages, perhaps with I cavalry escon. In difficult terrain or bad wefllher conditions foot runners may have been used.

31 BABYLON 1126·539 BC The period following the reign ofNebuchadrezzar I (1126-1105 Bq, who inflicted a major military defeat on the Elamites, is rather dark and disordered_ Several dynasties passed, but few great kings. Border wars witb Assyria continued, and sometimes Assyrian kings, such as Tukulti-Ninuna II, Sbalmaneser III and Shamshi-Adad V, mounted major campaigns into Babylonia, extending Assy rian political influence over Babylon, but not conquering it. Dur­ ing the 11th ,entury BC large numbers of Aramacans Stttied in Babylonia, forming tribal districts and becoming a ,onstant source of disorder in the following centuries. In 728 BC the unstable situation in Babylonia led to Tiglath­ Pilese r III making himself King of Babylon. Hencefonh, Assyrian kings ruled Babylonia thcmsdves or, as a son of protector, through a native ruler who met their approval. There were, of course, numerous revolts, usually in­ volving the anti-Assyrian Aramaean and Chaldean tribes, supponed by Elam. Esarhaddon's allemptto form a son of dual monar,hy of Assyria and Babylon, ruled by his tWO sons, Ashurbanipal and Shamash-shuma-ukin, failed when the latter also rose in rebellion against Assyria.

The Chaldeans The Chaldcans had been in Babylonia at least si nce the reign of Shalmancscr 1I1. Like the Aramaeans, they were also organised into tribal 'houses' (bitu), each under a sheikh. These were located in the marshy regions of South em Babylonia, ncar the border with Elam, and comprised the Bil-Dakuri, Bit-Yakin and Bit-Amukani. The Chaldean sheikhs were powerful enough to seize the throne of Babylon and rebel against Assyria. One of the mOSt serious rebellions was that of Metodach-Baladan (Marduk-apla-iddina, 721-710 BC, and again in 703 Bq, of the Bit-Yakin tribe. He was a dangerous and persistent enemy of Assyria. Ashurbanipal became King of Babylon himself (as Kandelanu) following the revolt of his brother, but in the ,onfusion that followed his death, another Chaldean, NabopoJassar (Nabu-aplu-usur, 625-605 BC) look the throne of Babylon. The Assyrian Empire collapsed in the face of the combined attacks of Nabopolassar and his allies, the Medes under Cyaxares.

The Neo.Babylonian Empire Under Nebucbadrezzar II (604-562 BC) the Babylonians created an empire that encompassed nearly all of the pre\'ious Assyrian empire. The Egyptians, who had attempted to prevent this and had assisted Assyria, were pushed back from the Euphrates and as rar as their own borders, but attempts to conquer Egypt were nOI successful. The Medes had pressed as far as Lydia, and the Babylon ians constructed a wall near Sippar, where the Tigris and Euphrates flow close to each other, as a defensive measure against them. Nebuchadreuar was followed by three kings who ruled amid internal disorder, until Nabonidus was placed on the throne by a cou p d'etat. H e failed 10 save his kingdom from an easy conquest by the Persian king, Cyrus the Great, in 539 BC.

Military organisation during this period was probably very similar to that of Nco-Assyria and had probably been extended into Babylonia by the Assyrians. The i/b obligation existed in some rorm as it did in Assyria. Babylonian rorces included chariotry, ca valry and inrantry, including 5000 quruburi on the Assyrian model, supplemented with light troopS, especially arcbers, provided by the Aramaeans and Chaldeans. Tbese were available in large numbers and the Babylonian kings seem to have attempted to improve their effectiveness by issuing them with shields and spears. The basic unit was the kini commanded by Ihe shaknu.

CANAAN AND SYRIA 3200· 1700 BC

Little is known about military organisation in the period pr~eding the Amorite settlement and the emergence of the Hyksos state. Canaan was occupied by nomadic tribes whose organisation is hinted at in the Egyptian story ofSinuhe. The tribe was ruled by a chieftain who could prove his right to rule with a demonstration of his prowess as a warrior, and defend his position in the same way or with the aid of II champion. He was supported by II personal retinue known as hlnkhu, to the Egyptians, and probably related 10 the Hebrew hanakim. There were also fonified cities (one is shown under attack in an Egyptian tomb scene at Deshashe), or which Sedom and Gomorrah provide famous examples. A battle fought by these cities, leading the forces of a coalition of cities in the Dead Sea region against a Mesopolamian army. is recorded in Genesis. Unfortunately the opposing kings cannot be iden tified in Mesopotamian records. The Egyptians periodically mounted campaigns into this region and many citY-Slates and tribes arc men tioned in the Egyptian 'execration·texts' (magical curses placed on enemies). T bese mention tribal chiefs and their retainers, such as the Sum, and cities, such as Byblos, Ul1a1:3 and Askelon. To the nortb, there were more cilies and stronger stat es. Along the coaSt there were pons in contact wit h Egypt, trading in timber and r~eptive to Egyptian culture. In the Syrian hinterland were cities like Ebla, organised on the Sumerian model.

32 Ebla was very populous, weU-(lrganised and clearly an imponant power. It possessed an army and engaged in warfare wit h Mari. It eventually fell 10 Naram-Suen. The Amoriu:s established powerful SlItes in this region, among them Yamkhad and Qatna. In the south at this time, Amorite political and military organisation (described under the seClions on the Old Babylon.ian and Assyrian Kingdoms), had also taken rool. A federation of Canaanite princes formed the Hyksos Empire which atended its control over Nonhem Egypt.

THE HYKSOS It is now generally accepted that the Hyksos were not a migrating horde of'chariot·nomads' sweeping through the Near EaS! and conquering Egypt by vinue of new weapons alone. Hyksos is a corruplion of the Egyptian term HtAa·Khffll!tr, meaning 'Foreign Rulm'. Th.i! name had been applied to Canaanite princes befon this time. Knowledge of chariot warfare together with associated developments in the military field had already filtered into Syria and Canaan from Hurrian and Mesopotamian sources.

A large number of Hyksos personal n9mes survive which define them as rulers of Canunite, rather than Hurri.n origin who ruled over Southern Palestine and Nonhem Egypt supponed by many Inste chieflains and Egypti.n provincial nobles.

Egypt did not fall to a sudden invasion. The Hyksos take-over progressed by stages. The 13th Dynasty held powe.r when, in 1720 BC, Ihe Hyksos took advantage of the weakening central authority and seized the capilal of Egypt':! nonhern warer (depanment). This was Avaris (Hill-WOW) in the ElIstern Delta. Hyksos chiefs a~mpa ni ed by retinues of forcign uoops began to take over the Delta. Native resistance held OUI for some lime al Xois, but the rule of Ihe 13th Dynasty receded to the South.

By 1674 BC the Hyluos had appointed an overall chieftain, the first ofa line of'Great-Hyksos', called $aInu. In 1674 he seized Memphis from the Egyptian King Dudimose. Southern Egypt was r edu~d to vassaldom. garrisons were pla~ in 'advantageous positions', and Avaris became the Hyluos capital.

Maoetho, I PlOlemaic Egyptian hislOnan, Slatts that $alalis maintained a garrison of240,ooo (uaggeratiool) well­ armed troops It Awris. He came there in summer to 'train them on manoeuvres and so strike terror into foreign tribes'. It is tempting 10 view this as a garbled memory of the creation of the firsl chariOt corps in Egypt. Grtve:s of foreign soldiers have recently been acavated at Katana.Qantir, now believed to be the site of Avans.

Salatis was followed by Yak-Baal and then Khyan who styled hiauelf ' Embra~r of Regions'. In his reign trading contact! extended throughout the Near EaSI, and the Hyksos state became an important world power. Apophis was the fint of the G reat Hyksos [0 adopt an Egyptian personal name. The Hyksos Kings made great efrons to appear as legitimate Pharaohs. They embraced the local god of Avans, &1, (the Egyptian countupan of Baal). An arrogant ultimatum sent by Apophis to the Theban Icing, Seqenenrc-Tao, sparked off a war ofliberation. Sekenenre 'The Brave ' met his death in bailIe against Apophis. His SOD, Kamosc, continued the war by reducing the Egyptian sup­ ponen of the Hyksos and probably recaptured Memphis. His younger brother, Ahmose I, beseiged and took Avaris and pushed on into Palestine where he reduced tbe stronghold of Sharuhen.

Although the wheel and the horse we re already known in Egypt. it was the Hyksos who introduced chariotry as a wing of [he armed forces . If the threat made by Kamosc that he would 'take over the chariotry' was actually ca rried OU t by Ahmosc, then the New Kingdom chariot corps mly well have been built up from. nucleus inherited from the Hyksos.

The forces available to the Hyksos state would have included a cenlral body of chariotry and foreign troops belong­ ing to the 'Greal Hyksos' ruler based at Avaris. These would be: augmented by the personal retline.n of the lesser Hyksos chieftains. The foreign element would be backed up by the local troops of Egyptian provincial nobles who suppon ed the Hyksos, and who bore the brunt of the figbting against Kamosc.

Culturally, the Hyksos were related to the Amorites Ind Canuoites.

33 CANAAN AND SYRIA 1700 - 1200 BC

The ancient name 'Canaan', deJlOled the region flom Gua to l.c:banon. Rl rjtrfl1u WIS a general term for Syria and Palestine. Another term used by the Egyptians for Palestine WIS Djahy. Politically this area was divided into many city-states, each ruled by a king or mtli•. The terrain varied greally. The cultiwted plains and valleys in which the cities stood were separated by hills cove red by cedar forest or scrub. To the east lay the Syrian steppe, inhabited by nomadic tribes who frequcnlly penelfated into the cuhivated lands. Important SIllies included Amurru, K.inzu (Kadesh), Mukish (Alalakh). , Gubla (Byblos), NukhlShshe. Tuni!>, Qatna and Khalba (Aleppo).

C archem ish. The Hebrew Kh.lb. Kingdoms 1t. ".f~ Muk ish x CHARIOT CITIES {: ....r-i • ~flEETS ~ fb 0: ;r-s. "'l JI)kh ] .4 DISTRICTS 1don ~ i I/Jflip (0 t 6 :ji Tyre Dama« ... , • CIt' Qatna NIY " 8 HuOf' Unqi Israel ~ ~\J>OO °R,moth_ Ama'u Do, G,lud . " 6 Q,.. ,ded ] S~ I '" Km,dom , 7 ~ border • M'lpah I ...... " 12 • 1'" II '" ~ • lr "Jerul~lem S A,IIdoct· " • Ekron ~ ."".elon ,:0 q:: .. ' ~ ~Q (i"'cJ: .: ./t"", ~ BUilth ,. ,,-" Gezer • Judah BetMooron " EDOM THE LEVANT • Shooruhen in the 2nd millennium Be b ,on Gebr r.l'., MIDIAN

War between citY-Slltes was commonplace, as were the ravages of nomadic Bedouin and 'Apiru (Jlabiruj. The great powers of Egypt. Mitllnni and Hani made use of these local conflicts to exlend their spheres orinfluence. Canaanite rulers would also anempt to play-ofTthe greal powers against each other to funher their own ambitions. Aziru of Amurru was adept at this during the reign of Akhenllten (1379- 1362 Be).

Canaanite armies relied mai nly on high-quality chariotty. provided by a ~ial elite of noble chariot warriors. the maryanna. This term is ultimately derived from 1m 'lndG-European' word meaning youlh or hero. Mar)'Qnna evolved in Canaanite society following the introduction of ChariOI warfare at the beginning of this period. The origin of this institution is probably to be found among the Hurrians of .\titanni. Mitannian military practice had considerable influence on Canaanite warfare and there WllS a strong Human element in the population. especially llmong maryanna.

34 The mal'}"lnnll was I profe"ional chariot warrior who possessed sufficienl wellth to mlintain I two-horse chariot and the a$SOCilted armour and equipment. T he source of this weallh was a Land holding carrying an obligation to scrw: the king. A ntal'}"lnnll would also pos$CS5 such retlineB 15 I driver, grooms and a small number offOCM­ soldiers or 'runners'. Mal'}"lnllll status was generally hereditary, initially being conferred by the king. It is possible that maryallllQ could be provided by merchants and craftsmen u well as landed nobility. Rulers possessed I per­ sonal re!lnue of elite maryall"". The term nt'anll IXCUrs in Ugaritic tats, in Egyptian tats u a reference to Ca· naanite enemies and later as a Hebrew term for elite soldiers. A force of nt'an'lI who rescued R2.mcsscs 11 at Kadesh could have been allies from Amurru. This term probably refers to elite mal)l2nllO,

Most of the ordinlry infantry were conscripted from the peasantry, or IIl1psllu. They we re free citizens who owned land but we re liable for conscription for work or war. In the infantry arc referred to by the Akk2dian terms saM *P~ sabt bitari Pictorial evidence suggc:su that infantry ....'Cre usually lightly equipped archers or spearmen. They took second place to chariotry Ind acted in suppon of them, in contrast to Egyptian tlctical thinking. Elite units of infantry acted as royal guilds, like the ' Royal Archers' of Piryawaza of Damascus.

Canaanite princes could supplemenl their forces with Shaasu or Sutu Bedouin, and 'Apir'll, or garrison troops pro­ \·ided by their imperial overlords. 'Apir'll, or Habiru, was a term long used for I clln of fl'CCbooten Ind outcasts including outlaws, fugitives, desen nomads and even some settled people. The similarity of the name to that of the Hebrews has uoused much debate. The term may well have been applied to them by the Canaanites and gave rise to the name Heb rew. These bands we re also known as IIabbarll (bandits) Ind 'Dusty-Ones'. They were un­ doubl:edly rugged and fierce but also unreliable and treachcroU5. 'Apiru were olien employed as merccnuics, Piryawaza of Damascus could count frie ndly Sutu mnd 'Apinl amongst his forces, but non-aligned 'Apirw posed a considerable threat to the Canaanite ci ties. 'Apirll bands could be quite weil-cquippcd and might even include chariotry.

One of the main occupations for the forces of Canaanite city-states would be curbing the activities of 'Apr'ru and desc n nomads. Some of then bands could be quite llrge and dangerous. A b:md of SUIU recorded in archive! from Alalakh contained 1436 men, 80 ofthesc were CbariO(etTS Ind 1006 were 1111111OIIU, probably I type of u cher. T he ci ty of Alalakh iuelf could only mUSler 31 mal)'lJfIlll oUI of a male popuialion of around 1200 and the surrounding 22 villages with populations varying from II to 500. One \'i1lage fell to a SUIU force of 17 infantry, 7 chariotecn and 4 IIIaIUinu·troops, while 2000 IIIIbiru captured lallul, on the Euphrates nonh of Car chern ish. An 'Apiru chief posed such I tbrot to the old adversaries, Shuwudata of Hebron and' Abdu·Heha of , that they united Ind even rcccl\-cd SO chariots to a"ist them from Accho and Achshaph. Milkilu of Gczer asked the Pharaoh to provide clwiots to protect his bnd against 'Apiru. Perhaps chariots werc particularly dTectivc: at pursuing Ind roodng out 'ApirN raiders.

Such bands provided I refuge and potential supponers fo r political fugitives like Labaya (who made himself ruler ofScchem with their aid) and Idrimi (who fled to them with only his chariot Ind I groom and ended up IS ruler of ALaIakh).

SMrdanu mercenaries arc mentioned at Byblos and Ugarit.

The Egypdan Empire In Canaao and Syria By the reign of Amunhotep III Egyptian control had been firmly established in Canaan and Southern Syria. Unlike Nubia which was administered as I Southern extension of Egypt, the Egyptians did not interfere wi th the long established arrangements of the Canaanites. Their main concern was to cnsure a regular now of tribute and the exclusion of any rival power from the region. To achievc: this end, garrisons wcte set up at Ullaza, Sharuhen, SumeTll and Irqata, and administrative centres at Gna and JOPpl. The ITCli was gove rned by an Egyptian 'Oversecr of All Foreign Countries' (the counterpart of the Viceroy of Kush). Each city-state was supervised by an Egyptian fMpury, a sort of political officer or 'resident', called a 1O"i"l1 by the Canaanites.

Imperial protocol demanded that Canaanite kings be referred to as /tlla:anll, 'headman' or JUSt aw/l/, 'man', of such· and·such city (use of the word IIIt/i! 110'11 considered impeninent by the Egyptians). Local rulers were allowed much freedom of action to defend themselves and indulge in warfare with each other, as lonlll they acted out of loyalty to Pharaoh. They lII'ere nOl slow to usc this acust to obtain mate rial assistance from Emt.

Egyptian garrison ltoopS in Canaan consisted of infantry, usually Egyptian or Nubian archers, and chariO(ry. Gar­ rison forces were $IIlIn; Megiddo and Oezer required only 100 men, other cities as few as SO. Bybl05 once requested IS many all 600 men and 30 chariots while Piryawua required 200. Loca.l rulers were corutlntly requesting the EgyptianJ to send more trOOPS to assist against riwl cities Ind 'Apiru. The Egyptians may sometimes have taken a cynical view of these requests.

35 Garrison uoops seem to have been allocated on an annual basis; vassals often complain that if the Pharaoh doet not send 'archers' this year, he would lose territory to his enemies.

Egyptian garrisons were onen I menace in themselves to their hosts. OfficeI'! indulged in corruption and troops became drunk and disorderly. They might even pillage the palace of the local prince if Iheir rations were not fonh­ coming.

Ugarh This information derives from the palace archives of Ugnit (modem Ras Shamra) situated on the Syrian coast. Many of the temu appearing in these texts are related to AJUr.:Klian, Egyptian and Hurrian military terminology, and demonstrate the great interchange of military ideas in this region. The organisation they portray is probably relevanl to most of the stales of Syria during this period.

Upn! was an important mercantile stale deriving ils wealth from ~ and land commerce. Untillhe mid-14th cen· tury BC it feU within the Egyptian sphere of influence, but later became an ally of the Hiltites.

Fo rces comprised an army and navy. The navy was imponantlo a COlIstal state like Ugarit, and was probably well­ developed. It could be used to suppon land operation. and also fighl battles al~. Ug'ltit was sometimes subjected to seaborne raids by pirates like the Lukka. The Ugarilic flt1:1 may have been enli5led by the Hittites when they required naval forces.

T he army was under the command of the prince who constituted a rtsuti, 'subordinate ally' when forming pan of the army of a major power. Full y~uipped troops, sabu natib, consisted ofinfantcy and cho riotry. Units were commanded by officen called mur-u, but unit sizes are not known. Mur-u seem to have been connected with land holdings. Some mur-u belonged to special units such as the 'Officers of the Crown Prince'.

The chariolry were commanded by the okil narAabt~ 'Chief ofChariouy'. The main strength of the chariolry were mO~lfna, 'noble chariot warrion'. A son of 'household chariOtty' was provided by the 'Maryo.znna of the King'. The term ne'orim occun at Ugarit, probably referring, IS elsewhere. to elite chariotry. The maryo.znnu was Ihe com­ mander of the chariot. Another chariOtry soldier was the kUy, 'groom' who may have ridden in the chariot and was responsible for three hones (presumably [wo for harnessing to the vehicle and one spare). The tjtnntlf may have been another crewman, possibly an archer. It is possible that Ugarit used three-man chariOIS on the Hillile model. Ugaril wu a wealthy Slale and could muster a large cbariot force numbering 1000 chariots.

Infanlty included palace guards, troops who patrolled the counlryside, and troops recruited from Ihe peasantry, known IS ItMpttj (a venion of huprhu), or awilu Mm/.!. Among troops who cannol be clearly defined are the mtd­ nfem, possibly archen. and tJTDtli imjlll~ probably spearmen, (tbe imirrll-spear is known from the Old Babylonian period). Some troops may have worn corslets or tiryana (related to the Akkadiln term Ulriam). Uprit was destroyed al the time of the Sea-Peoples' disturbances. Official correspondence between Upril and Aluhiya (Cyprus) (dating to shonly before this happened) Slate thai Ihe Ugaritic forces had all been despatcbed to help the Hittites and that seaborne raiders had appeared 01T the COllSt.

THE HEBREWS Initially Ihe basic divisions were those of tribe or clan. These rallied to the call of the acknowledged leader. Within these divisions smaller units were formed according to the decimal sys tem, with leaders of 100's and 1000's. All males over 20 yean old were considered Ihe fighting strength. Leaden had to select the troops n~ed for certain tasks from among the generll musler of tribesmen. Forces were divided shortly before the bailie, according to the requirements of the situation. When Joshua was Ittempting 10 oustlhe Belhelites from the ruins of Ai, his scouts estimated Ibat 3000 men would be enough. When the fintlllack. failed. Joshua was forced to use the whole tribal hosl in a feigned flight with a small group of picted men to move in behind the enemy. In the face ofa large raid by Midianite and Amalekile nomads, Gideon mustered tribesmen from Asher. Zcbulun, Naptali and Manesseh. Gideon planned a night attack and needed to separate a force of stealthy warrion. He observed how the tribesmen wenlto drink at a water-hole and picked those IMtiay down 10 drink. These men knew tbalthey were most vulnerable al such times lind were clearly uperienced in nomadic-style warfare. Gideon obtained 300 such men whom he sub­ divided inlO three panies. They were 10 approach the enemy camp from three sides while the rest of the tribesmen were 10 block the enemy's escape route. Funher evidence of the improvised nllturt of tribal warfare comes from the same action in which Gideon had to alen the tribes of Ephraim to block the escape of the enemy across the fords of the Jordan. However, they were not impressed at being warned at such a late stage. Not III the tribesmen rushed 10 the call oflheir leaden with the same enlhuiasm. In order 10 musler enough men 10 relieve Jabesh..Qilead from the AIDIlekites. Saul threatened 10 kililhe oxen of Inyone who did nOI turn up. As the Dew king, Saul wu e5tablishing his authority to call out the tribal levy. As the Hebrews became uniu:d and organised under a single king I more permanent military organisation developed. Saul created a fo rce of 3000 lill hGllwr, 'cbosc::n men', with whom he seiud Gibeah from the . On this occasion 1000 men were dcuched under the command of Saul's son, Jonathan.

Da vld'i Military OrsaointJoD David inherited I system blsed on the musler ofuiballevies in time of war common to many Near·EiJlem states, although most, unlike Israd, supplemented and strengthened these levies with e:hariouy and regular soldiers.

Israel'l militil wu orglnised intO urnlS Iccording to a decimal system under elected 'valiant men', iJ IIQyil, whn as commanders, .car, led uniu of 1000 (Q'kJplrimJ. 100 (mt'tllrJ. SO and 10. The militia were recruited II musters by the tribal chief, or MJ~ and assigned to their individual mt'ttll in peacetime, and ponibly received lOme rudimenlaty training. There were vlrious tribal specialities with cenlin weapons and styles of fighting. The Benjaminiu:s for eumple were considered good at archery and slinging. The Benjaminites of Gibeah could mUlter 700 isll hGltwr, or 'picked men', who 'were left·handed; every onc could sling a stone It a hare and not mill'. The Gldites were swift and fierce, the Judeans used spear and buckler, and the tribesmen ofZebulun were competent with all weapons and able to keep rank.

The pressures of conslant warfare made il necessary to appoiot overall leaders and ultimately led to the establish· ment of a monarchy. King Saul came 10 maintain a pe~na l semi·regu l ar army of 3 Q'itJpllim of isll hGllwr in his household, and David, when he Iled from Saul's service, acquired a personal follow ing of his own . This band was perhaps typical ofwhatlhe Canaanites would call 'tJpirw or IIQbiru, consisting of' . . . everyone that was in distress and everyone thai was in debt and every man that wu discontented'. David'. retinue eventually numbered 600 men or 6 mt 'ttll~ and 10 escape from Saul he entered the service of the Philistine prince; Aehish ofGath, who placed his contingent in a border outPUll 10 suppress nomadic raiders such as the AmalekitCi. When Saul mel his death in battle with the PhilistinC$ at Gilboa, David seized Ihe opportunily to make himse:lf King of Israel.

David UlCd his band of followers, known as ,iblxm'm, or 'mighty mm', as a core Iround which 10 build rus military organisation. From tbcsc were selC'Cled an inner elite of officers called 'The Thiny'. The tribal levy wu organised into 12 divisions totalling 24,000 men. Each division wu to $land in readintsll for one month in rotalion. The com· manders oflbe divisions were appoinled from among tbe Tbiny. This meant that part oflhe tribal levy was always under the direct control of the king and Ivailable immcdiltdy 10 face any national threat.

David formed a foreign bodyguard of'Cherethiles' and 'Pc:lethites' probably recruited from Philistines and Cretans settled on Ihe coaSt of Soulhern Canaan.

Israelite fortts were mainly infantry untillbe reign of Solomon. Consequenlly Hebrew commanders had always been wary oflhe Canaanite and Philistine chariotry. They usually attempted to fight in terrain that wu unsuitable for charlO( tactics. When David defeated Hadadc:ur orZobeh and his allies from Danwcus, he: captured 1000 chariots but ordered the horses to be 'houghed' except for 100 spans. Obviously David only had need of, or means of sup­ poning, a small force of chariotry.

Solomon'a C hariotry Solomon had sufficient wealth to organise and maintain a chariot corps. Horses (at 150 shekels each) were pur­ chlsed from Egypt, the Nto·Hiuile lIales and the Aramacan slates of Syria; chariots (at 6000 shekels) were bought from Egypt. In this way a force of 1,400 chariOls and 12,000 chllriotry personnel (referred to as 'horsemen') was eslablished. They wtre stalioned in special chariOt cities and a reserve was kept at Jtruulem. The figure: of 12,000 scc:ms large compared 10 the number of verucles. There would have been twO, possibly thrc:e, crewmen 10 each vehicle and the figure probably also includes runners and grooms. Tbere may even have bc:cn replattmC:OI crews and tbe chariotry may have been accompanitd by cavalry. Perhaps some of the runners were mounted (the mounts could then double as spare chariOl horses). Developments such as these were taking place lmong the Nco-Hittites Ind Aramaeans and in Assyria, leading to the devc:lopment of true cavalry. Solomon built stables in the chariot cities wllh I totaJ number of staUs to bouse 40,000 (probably 4,(00) horses. Stables dating to the reign of Ahab have: bc:cn c:xcavated at Me,iddo. They contained space for 450 barxs. Assuming that each vehicle required t .....o horses plus one spare, we arri\~ II a figure of 150 chariots stllioned al Megiddo. This could represc:nl I rhrc:c­ squadron formation, each squadron comprising 50 \·c:hiclcs.

37 In order to supply the coun and the chariot cities (which were also 'store' cities), Solomon divided his kingdom inlO 12 provinces of equal productive capacity, ~ch controlled by a "uib official. Each province supplied the king ~nd the stables for one month of each r~r in rotation. It seems that this system did not extend to Judah or that region provided some other scrvice which is nO( known.

The ch~riot cities ..... ere probably chosen for their strategic impon:mce ~nd would be located on borders or major military routes. Apan from the king's central reserve at Jerusalem the ehariot cities protr..bly included: Megiddo, Hazor, Gezer, Tadmoor (later known as Palmyra), Hamalh·Zobeh, Beth·horon, Baalath and Tell Qedah.

At Karkar in 853 BC Ah~b led a contingent of 2000 ch:ariots and 10,000 infantry (his was the largest chariot con· tingent). It is possible that Solomon's org~nisation continued into Ahab's reign, or was developed by him, as 12 chariot Cilies with st~bles of the same size as those: at Megiddo would give a total of 1,800 chariots. The funher 200 could be provided by the king's central rescrve, the nl'(;Irin.

THE PIDUSTINES The name Philistine, and ultim3tely Palestine, derives from the Pelesct, one of the 'Sca.Peoples'. Wnpon finds suggest that some Sea.Peoples were al ready established in Canaan as garrison troops under the Ramenide Phanohs. The origin of the Philistincs probably datet to the rtpulse of the greal I~nd onslaught against Egypt in the time of Ramesscs Ill. With the Egyptian fromier barred 10 them, the inwden Clrved out a territory for thcms.clves around the five citics of Ashdod, Askelon, Ekron, Gath and Gaza. The Tiiller settled on Ihe coast to their nonh and possibly a sma ll group of Cretans 10 their south. The Philistine cities were each ruled by a prince, but they usually acted in co ncert and met in a cou ncil called the SQrnty. They gradually began to assimilate Canaanite culture: lind methods of warfare. Thei r allempts to exen aUlhority over most of Ca naan naturally brought them inlO confliC! wi th the Hebrews. The Philistines seem to have adopted chariotry on the Canaanite model; at Mount Gilboa the Israelitcs were shot down by arrow! from the pursuing Philistines. For campaigns in to enemy turitory the prin~ mustered their forccs at Aphek. Advance posilions might be set up from which the surrounding area could be ravaged. At Michmash the Philistint1 divided their forces into three columns for this purpose and placed a rearguard to cover their escape route through the narrow pass. Like the Hebrews, the Philistines were also menaced by nomadic raiders. In order to suppress them and watch the frontie rs, they established sclliements of auxiliaries such as David's ,ibborim, at Ziklag.

PHOENICIA AND CYPRUS 1200-539 BC The Phoenician pons recovered from the Sea- Peoples' IIllack, but the population now included large endaves of Sea·Peoples. The Egyptian ' Repon of Wen am un' describes this states of affairs and mentions that Dar, for example, was ruled by a prince called Tjcld:er·Ba'~I , and that Tjekker fleet! from these enclaves we re still interfe ring wilh trade in these waters in the 11th century BC. Sea·Peoples had also scllied in Cyprus, and it is interesting fO nOle that on an ivory plaque: from Enkomi, runners dresscd exactly like Pele:sct are shown following the: chariot of a Near·Eastern style m(;lryannll. The city-states of Phoenicia did not have the same military strength on land as their powerful Nee-Hittite:, Anmaean and Israelite neighbours, bUllheir real strength I~y in their fleets. A Neo- Hillite relief from Kautepe, Assyrian reliefs of Scnnacherib and the Til.Barsip paintings all depict warships that are dearly equipped with nffiS. The Auyrian sources show biremts which have rowers on the lower deck and soldiers on the upper deck, which is prottcted by a gunwhale on which round shields are mounted. The ram in the T il· Barsip example is clearly shod in bronu. Thc:sc: sour~ probably show Phoenician ships which would have been available to the powers which could control the Phoenician pons, an d indicate the level of naval developme:n t reached by the 8th century BC. The first land power to make use of such fo rces WloIS Solomon, who formed an alliance with Hiram of Tyre, enabling him to keep a nawl force at Ezion Ge:ber where it could dominate the Red Sea, commanding nOl only imporlant trade rOUlet but Egypt's CIStern flank. Ashurtr..nipal was later to use the fleets of22 ofhis Phoenician vassals to approach Egypt from her weak nonhern flank. The Phoenician contingents recorded at the battle of Karkar may illustrate the weakness in land for~ . They contain few or no chario[5 and moslly small numbers of infantry. Unable to compete: with strong inland states, Phoenician Slates narurally employed their navics to expand wcstwardJ into the Mediterranean. The control ofthc:sc: states, which included Aradu!, Byblos, Sidon, Tyre, Accho, Irkate, Arvad, Usanata and Shian, was of great stralegic ad va ntage and also great economic value. Lacking slrong land forces, thc:sc: cities rtlied on wi thstanding sieges in order to survive, pe rhaps coullting on sup­ ply by 5c:a. Some ci ties were actually si tuated on islands separated from the coast, such as Arvad. The Assyrians had to reduce these by construction of siege moles.

AI the time of the Assyrian Empire, Cyprus, or Iadnana as it was known in Assyria, was divided into several city· states. T hese were Edi'il, KilnlSi, Pappa, Silli, Kuri, Tamesi, Nuria, Sillu'ua, Qani.hadasti and Lidir. Cyprus fell 3. under the control of Assyria following tbe conquest of the Phoenician stalts beg\ln by Tiglath·Pileser III and com· pleted by his successors, becoming tributary under Ashurbanipal. Later, Cyprus was to fa ll for a time within the sphere of influence of the Saite kings of Egypt.

ANATOUA AND THE HITTITE EMPIRE Ear ly Anatolia Little can be said of the military organisation of this area before the Hittite Empire. The rich tombs found at Dorak, AIDctI Huyuk and the Pontic region demonstrate the existence of several principalities. From around 2300 BC the mineral wealth of this area had attraded the attention of Akkadian and Assyrian merchants. Assyrian kings spon­ sored the establishment ofl.rading colonies, called karum, among the city-statts of ccntnlll Anatolia. There we re about ten small principalities in this area including Dukhumid, Wakhshushana, K.hurum and most imponantly Kanes h, where the chief karum was situated. T hese states may have been ruled by a single 'Prince of Princes'. Relations with the Assyrians were friendly and the natives profited greatly from their tnllde . No doubt military ideas from Mc.sopoumia filteT(d into Anatolia along the same trade roUt es. The natives were known as the Hatti, but there was alT( ady an intrusive dement in the population who were later to emerge as the Hittites. The Hittites traced their origin to a King of Kus5anll, Pithanas, who conquered Kanesh, and his son Annitas who made it his capital around j 750 BC. The was descended from the tongue spoken in Kanesh and the name of the older inhabitants was adopted as the name of the Hinile state, The founder oflhc Hittite slale was considered to be a king of Kussara, Labarnas, who extended his rule to the sea. It was during this pe riod that knowledge of the two-horsed chariot fi ltered imo Anatolia. A text from the reign of Aninas mentions a body of 1,400 men and a unit of 40 chariots.

Tbe Old Hittile Kingdom Labarnas's son, Hanusilis, campaigned against the Amorite states of Syria. reaching the Euphnlltes before being killed in [he war against Yamkhad (Aleppo). M UT'Si lis I completed his conquesl5 and ..... ent on down the Euphrates to sack mighty Babylon, an e\'ent which shook the Near East. This empire was lost under successive weak kings and had to be re-established by Suppiluliumas I.

Little is known about military organisation in this period tllCCpl that a change was taking place in Hittite society with the development of a son of 'feud2-I' aristocracy perhaps connected with the introduction of chariot warfare on the Milannian model. Previously the king was served by a body of fighting men and officials called the pankhus. Chief offici2-1s were often kinsmen of the king and held military commands as in later times. There was 2- body of high'ranking officers known as the ItJianuui}W and a royal bodyguard called the Intshtdi

THE HITTITE EMPIRE In his ' 1st Syrian war', Suppiluliumu I (1380-1346 BC) conquered the Slates of Khaleb (Aleppo), Alalakh, Tunip and Nukhuhshe in Nonhern Syria, which brought him into conOi d with the Mitannian Empire. In his '2nd Syrian war', Suppiluliumas marched through Mitanoi, plundered the capit2- 1 and crossed the Euphrates south ofCarchemish, to arrive in Egyptian territory. The M.itannian state began to collapse. This was followed by the 'Hurrian war', lasting six years, in which Carchemish fell, an Egyptian attack was defeated and l\.titanni was fmally destroyed (par. titioned between Hatti and Auyria). Suppiluliumas died of a plague brought back by his soldiers from Syria. He had established Hani as a foremost world power, which she remained until her collapse during the Sea-People distur­ bances around 1200 Be.

The Hittites were great imperialists. They were also highly competent in the ans of war and international diplomacy. War was imerpreted in legal terms. A form al ultimatum was issued before force was applied. Vassal states were bound by treaties which usually contained the following provisions; The ally was required to suppon the Hittite king on campaign, never give away information to an enemy, rush to the aid of the Hatti-Iand in time of attack or revolt, (and in return could request Hillite usinancc in similar circumstances), accommodate and supply Hittite garrisons and treat them as friends, an d had 10 extradite any fugitives (or dissidents) neeing from Hatti. The friends of the Hittites were to be: considered Ihe friends oftbe ally state, and similarly, Hittite enemies WeT( their enemics. An an nual tribute in gold or silver had to be paid to the Hittite king.

Soldiers were sworn into the army by an oath and the army had to be ritually cleansed before setting oul on ctlm· paign. This was achieved by marching between twO posts, wi th one half of II human sacrifice tied to each post. It wu assumed that no evil could pass through such a barrier. Perhaps this was an archaic ritual restrided [0 an early period of Hittite hiS[ory.

39 The supreme commander was the king, but command could be delegated to other members of the royal family. Beneath the king were governors of conquered territories, including royal princes set up as kings in front ier regions, and vassal rulers who led their own contingents. Commanders of smaller divisions were provided by the lesser nobility.

Unit organisation followed the decimal system, with commanders of Tens, Hundreds and Thousands.

T he chariotry were probably the most formidable part of the Hittite army. The Hittites learned the art of training horses to the yoke from the Hurrians. A Hittite version of a Hurrian training manual has actually been found, writ­ teo by an expert called Kikkuli.

A military aristocncy, maimained by land grants, formed the chariotry and are probably comparable to the maryanna of Syria and Mitanni. Maryanna were cenainly included in the allied contingems supplied by Syrian \"1Issal states. The Kadesh inscriptions mention maryanna ofNaharin (the Egyptian name for the region of Mitanni), Carchemish, Keshkc:sh (Kaska?) and Dardany, (so the Egyptians clearly classed some Anatolian chariotry as equivalent to maryanna).

Mili m y service was connected with land ownership. Estates were held from the king with an obligation to serve. Lesser classes of land ownen we re the 'Weapon.men', or 'Tool-men', who were probably craftsmen rather than soldiers. Terms of service fo r Ihis class we re ca lled sakhkhan, and the term for obligation (a concept pervading Hit­ tite society from vassa l princes downwards) was iskhuil, or ilkum.

Such obligations were taken very seriously by the Hittites and their allies, and were expected to be upheld to the full.

The Kadesh inscriptions and other Egyptian sources mention troops called tth" or ruhuytnl, possibly a Mitannian term. They formed an important part of the Hittite fo rces and the allied Syrian contingents. A king ofTunip once employed 329 of these soldiers. At Kadesh the two large bodies of infantry numbering several thousands arc ca ll ed 'fighting ruhuytnl', which might imply that it was a designation of status rather than a completely military term. There were also 'ruhuytnl of chariots' and ruhuytnl sh.ie1d·bearers at Kadesh, so they we re not exclusively infantry. A 'Leader of ruhuytnl' is found among the slain Hittite notables listed by the Egyptians.

Order of Battle of the Hittite Empire at Xadesh , 1300 BC It is possible to reconSt ruct the Hiuite order ofbaule at Kadesh from Ihe Egyptia n recorcb. It must be: an example of one of the largest armies eve r raised by the Hittites.

T he ChariOlry and infantry of the King of HaUl.

These ..... ere supported by Allied Contingents including infantry and chariotry from:

Naharin - mainly comprising the former kingdom of Mitanni but including territory west of the Euphrates. Anawa - located in Central Anatolia. Nahari n and were kuiroxlna states, enjoying preferred status in the Empire. Dardany - located in North-Western Anatolia, included maryalllla. Possibly associated with the Dardanoi of . Keskesh - probably the Kaska of Northern Analolia, included maryallna. Masa - 10000ted in Western Ana tolia. Pitassa - located in Central Anatolia. Arwen - or Arawanna, in Analolia, (possibly 'Ilion', the Egyptians rendered 'I' with the sign for 'r'). Karkisha - localed in South·Western Anatolia. Lukka - situated along the southern coast of Anatolia. Kiuuwatna - located in South-Easl Anatolia () providing maryanlla. Kedy - located north of Syria. Mushanet - location unknown. lnesa - locat ion unknown. lnenes - location unknown. Carchemish - located on the Euphrates in Syria. Ugaril - located on the Syrian coaSt. Nukhashshe - located in Northern Syria. Khaleb - Aleppo (modern Arabic ' Halb') in Syria. Kadesh - the land of Kinza, on the Orontes.

T he dose-order spearmen, called 'fighting ruhuytnl', formed two large formations of 18,000 and 19,000 men. The hieroglyph for '10,000' was missed on early tI'll nslations, leading 10 some sources quoting 8,000 and 9,000.

40 2,500 c.hadOls, organised intO four bodies, formed the first wave of chariotry, consisting of contingents from Haui, Anawa, Mau, and Pitassa, and included chariOl runners. A reserve or second wave of 1,000 chariots wall formed from the contingents of Arzawa, Mau, Arwen, Lukka, Dardany, Carchemish, Karkisha, and Khaleb, each led by thei r own commander, and Hittites led by brothers of Muwatallis.

In addition to these: there were troops manning the battlements of Kadesh, and lOme Anatolian infantry pos it ioned betwtcn the city and the meam that surrounded it (now Ihe EI Mubdiya brook).

Sea Power For naval operations the Hinies probably called upon the f1tcts of Ugaril, or the Lukka. A naval battle is rcalrded in the reign ofSuppiluliumas II at the end of Ihe 13th. t%ntury BC. The Hiuile f1tcl engaged the ships of Alashiya at sea and destroyed them with fire. Either Alashiya was attempting to break away from Hiuiu: control, or other enemies were operating from Alashiya, possibly Sca·Peoples. THE HITTITES and Neighbours

Hayasa

Azzi Aishe <..' v<' b~ ..(' ~" "

AnaloUao Stales Ahhiyawa was a maior rival of the Hittite Empire. Relations betwtcn the tWO powers arc more fully described in the section on . Although the Achaeans seem to be the most likely ca ndidates for identification wit h this state, it has also been interpreted as pan of Western Anatolia under Achaean influence, Crete, Rhodes and . This Sla le possessed chariotry, could mount seaborne ra ids and bad its own vassal states such as Millawanda.

T)le Kaska were the most dangerous and persistent enemies of Ih.e Hittites. They lived in the highlands nonh of the Halti·land and possessed no t%ntral govc.mmc.nt with which the Hiuies could treat. The ternin presented pro­ blems for Hitt ite armies which emphasised we of shock chariotry. Guerilla warfare Ilong the frontier was endemic, consisting of raid and cou nter·nlid which intensified whenever tbe main Hittite forces were OC"CUpied elsewhere. A line of fons was therefore buill along this frontier. The seri ousness of the threat from this quatter may be demonstrated by the remarkable concentration of power Muwatallis placed in the hands of his brother Hattusilis who had special responsibility for this region. Hmusilis led a contingent from this command on the Kad esh campaign.

Amwa WI5 a powerful slIIIe lind centre of a group of stiles including Min, Klupalla and the Sheb·river land, known IS the Anawa states. This principality was often a IOUtt% of trouble to ,be Hittites. It was Uhha·Zitish of Arzawa wbo ori ginally persuaded MiIlawaoda to switch allegiance to Ahhiyawa, a cause offuture conflicts. Mursilis II defeated Uhbi-Zitish with the usistant% of Sharre-Kushuke of Ca rchemish. He was a loyal ally of Hlui Ind

41 Mursilis's right-hand man for conuol of me Syrian states. This demonstrates that Syrian contingents could be called upon 10 serve in Anatolian campaigns. Further west lay . The Assuwan army consisted of 10,000 infantry and 600 'Lords of the Bridle:' (probably chariotry).

Wilusiya, Taruisha, Arv.'en (Au\\'llnna) and Dardany are all stales or peoplc::s that can be: placed in north-west Anatolia and sc:c:m 10 have some ronnection with Troy (Ilion). The case: for Wilusiya might be further rein forced by lhe mention in Hiuite rc:cords of a king called Alakhshandush (' Alc:x:aoder' being another name of Paris in Gr«k sources), This name occurs in a treaty made betwc:c:n Wilusiya and Halli.

THE SEA PEOPLES Ouring the 13th ce:nrury BC, for rusons not ytt fully understood, Aegean civilisation collapsed and many of the great citadels were destroyed. Thc:sc e\'ents did not come suddenly but occurred over one or two generations. At the same time in Western AnatolUimere are hints of political strife among the vassals and neighbours of the Hit· tites. The Hittite Empire was on me defensive against Assyria and, particularly, against the Kaska. The central authority howe\'c:T wu weakening. Egypt was friendly and Merenplah even desplltched 'grain in ships to kcc:p alive the land of Kheta (Hani)', for a famine was amiCiing lhat land. Pirate raids were becoming an increasing cause for concern in Alashiya (Cyprus) and at Ugarit.

Egypt was suffering from repeated Libyan incursions, probably forced out of their homelands as conditions bcc:ame drier. This later affected Egypt as Nile levds dropped and the economy became unsilble. In 1231 Be a massive Libyan Inack 'NaS beaten o£fby Merenptlh. With the Libyans had come the first wave of'$ca.Peoplc::s'; the Ekwesh, Terc:sh, l ulla, Sherden and Sheklc::sh.

Egyptian records Slate bluntly what h~ppcned in the yeus that followed; 'the Northerne.rs were disturbed in their islands. All loll once: nations were moving and scattered by 'Nar. No land stood before thcir anru, from Hani, Kade, Carchemish, Anawa and Alashiya, they were wasted'. It IPpears that two main bodies of people were on the move; one proceeding across Anatolia from the north·west, the other adVfmcing Iiong the roast of Anatolia from the south· west. Part of the lalter group were travclling by 5c:3 .

Correspondence found at Ugarit indicatc::s thaI H ittite forces attempted 10 ha.lt the onslaught in the Lulli lands, but were: taken by surprise by anacks from the north in which the capilal, Halluus, was destroyed. Response to Hinite requcsts for assistance Iud strippe:d their Syrian allics of any means to defend themselves. lc:nen from Ugarit addressed to Alasbiya, Slate that the Ugaritic army was sem to the Hatti·land and never returned, while their neet had sailed to the l ukka-lands. Meanwhile enemy ships Iud appc3.fed ofT the coast at Ugari! and shortly afterwards the city was destroyed.

According to the Egyptian account, the two groups joi ned up in Syria and se:t up a camp in the land of Amurru which they desolated. The combined forces comprised the Pelesel, Tjekker, Sheklesh, Dc:nyen and Wesbwc::sh. They planned a simultaneous assault on Egypt by land and Sc:I. AJ they advanced southwards 'the fire was prcplIred before them', possibly a reference to scorched-c:arth tactia.

Only by determined national e£fon were the onslaughu repulsed on the very frontiers of Egypt. The main strength oflhe la nd assault may have b«n the Pcleset who recoiled from the Egyptian border to carve OUt I state and become known to later history as the Philislines. Other St:a.Pc:oples dispersed throughout the Mediterranean leaving their tribal names as a record of their final places of SC:lllement.

Shert:ien The Sherden or Shardana are first recorded in the 14th century BC when they were known in Byblos. Early in the reign of Ramcsscs 11 some were caught while raiding the Delta and were placed in the Egyptian army. The characteristic helmet is ofa type: known in the Near EaS t and the Aegean. The long sword is possibly a devc:1opmem of a type: of levantine dagger rather than an Aegean type: . One possible place of o rigin is the Syrian coast north of Ugarit. After the attack on Egypt some ofmem setlled in Cyprus and eventually arrived in Sardinia, giving their name to the island.

Lukka The lulli appear among the Hillite allics al Kadesh and are well known from the rtcarded correspondence be:twc:c:n Ugaril and Aluhlya. They had a repUiation as early as the 14th «ntury BC as pirates and raiders, A king of Alashiya

42 once complained that they seized a small 10wn from his land every yeu. The original lands of the Lukka were on the southern coast of Analolia, and their name may be preserved in Ihe later name, .

The Lukka were themselves subjected 10 raids from further west. A document from Hittile archives called the 'Tawaglawas lener' was a request from the Hinile king 10 the king of Ahhiyawa 10 lake action concerning his vas~l , Piyama-ndus, who was niding the Lukka from Millawanda ().

Ekwu h The Ekwesh or Akawasha, as the name would suggest, may be Achaeans, and both Ekwesh and Achaeans may be connected with Ahhiyawa. One of the main arguments against the identification of the Ekwesh with Achaeans is thltthe former are considered 10 have been circumcised. This idea stems from Ihe fact that the Egyptians CUI off the hands of Ihe slain instead of the phalli as was done to the uncircumcised Libyans. This is probably I mis­ interpretation ofthe reason behind the Egyptian practice (see the comments on this in the section on New Kingdom organisation). The hands of the Ekwesh were taken because they were light-skinned. The phalli of the Libyans were taken as the only feature that reliably distinguished them from Egyptians.

Tene. h The Teresh or Tursha may be the Taruisha mentioned in a Hittite text, and their origi na l home could have been in nonh-western Anatolia . There may even be a connection with Troy, the Tyrrhenians and the Etruscans; the laner wefe anciently considered to have come from Anatolia.

ShekJesh

The Sheklesh aTe possibly associated with the Sikds of Sicily, who were thought 10 have come via Italy following the fa ll of Troy. They were probably originally an Anatolian people.

Pele.et T he Pdesct may be connected with tbe Pclasgians in the Homeric list of Trojan allies, and more cenainly with the Philistines. The Hebrews thought that they had come from Caphtor, which is probably Crete (Egyptian Ktftui and Akkadian Koptoro). Crete was probably only a siage in their migntion, thei r real origin being somewhere in Anamlia. The chancteristic: head-dress is associated with both regions. Philistine names are linguistically rebted to an ancient language of western Anatolia, (Luwian).

Tje"er The Tjekitcr eventually settled on the coan of Canaan nonh of the Philistines. The 'Repon of Wen am un', an Egyp­ tian Itxt dating to the end of Ihe New Kingdom, mentions Tjeitker pirates Still active in the: vicinity of Dor.

Denyen The Denyen probably came from the land of Danuns, 10000ted somewhere north of Ugarit and possibly as far u South·Western Anatolia. In the 8th century BC a Hiuite successor state bore the name Danuniyim, whose king claimed descent from Mepcsh (), a hero who mignted through Anatolia around the time of the . There may even be a connection with the tribe of Dan among the Hebrew uibes Ind the Danleoi, I name applied to some of the Achaean forces in the .

We. hwe. h The Weshwesh or Washwasha, are one of the most obscure of all the Sea·PeoplC$. They may have come from the land of Wil usiya 10000led in Anatolia, so a connection with Ilion cannot be ruled out.

THE NEO-HITTITES AND ARAMAEANS

The Neo-Hhtltet The Nco- Hittite kingdoms we re situated in Syria and Eutern Anatolia. These regions, formerly in the Hittite Em­ pire, were overrun by Anatolian peoples during the Sea-People disturbances foltowing the collapse of the Hittite Empire around 1200 BC. It is interC$ting to note that one Nco-Hittite king, Azitawadda of Adami (known to Assyria as Que), refers to his people as Danuna in one inscription. These Slates used the as yet undeciphered Hiuite hieroglyphic

43 script inSlead of the Hinite cuflciform used under the Empire. By the 12th century BC, the following states had come into existence; Tabal, II confederation of city'\State5 in the , , the capital of which was (), Kummuhu (Commagene), Carchemish. Arpad, YlI'diya (Zinjirl i), Hanina, also known as Unqi, Luhuti (Aleppo), Hamath, Til.Barsip, (Que) and Guzana (fell·Halaf). In the 11th century BC, Aramaean tribes stttied in Southern Syria, founding the kingdom of Aram, centered on Dimasqa (Damascus), and Aramaean dynasties established themselves in the Nco-Hittite states of Arpad, which became Bit·Agushi, Ya'diya, which bt:came Sam'al, TiI·Barsip, which btcame Bit·Adini, and GU1Jlna , which bt:ca.me Bit·Bahiani. Mushki Kam::~, ~ .~ Shupria !{fj N ai ri Kummuhu Urartu Sam'al Kue

' ADANA Arpad • ARPAD

Luhuti Assyria .KAPJ(. AR ~('(' . ASHU R

, HAMATH'" • Harnarh Aribi

NEO-HITTITE Aram KINGDOMS ' DAMASCUS 1100 - 700 Be

By the reign of Ashumasirpal of Assyria, these Stales became increasingly under threat of Assyrian conquest. Sometimes several Slates combined to resist Assyrian invasions, but during the intervals of respite bttwetn such attempts they often foughl each other. 1bt Bible and Assyrian annals show thatlsratl and Damascus could combint against Assyria, but when the threat passed, were ~n at war with each olher again. Ashurnasirpal conquered the '(lI.tCs east of the Euphratcs, and Shalmancser III conquered Carchemish, Hanina, Bit-Adini, and Sam'a!. Howtver, Hamath and Damascus defied Shalmaneser for the rest of his reign, supporttd by numerous Phocnc<:ian citY-Sillies and other allies, Shalmaneser's main offensive bting halted in the major baule ofKarkar. Damascus finally fell to Adad Nirari III (8 10-783 BC) in alliance with Zalr.ir of H amath, who records that Hazad of Aram had made war against him in alliance: with Bargush, Que, Umq) Gurgum, Sam'al and Mdid. Following this, a succession of weak rulen in Assyria allowed the Ne~ H ittite statcs of Kammanu, Gurgum, Sam'al, Hattina, Arpad, Carchemish, Kummuhu and Que to be won over by Sarduris II of Uranu. This coalition was def"ted in Kummuhu by Tiglath.Pileser III, who went on to re

Good representational evidence from these kingdoms, supported by Assyrian records, show that armies contai ned well-developtd chariotry and cavalry, infantry spearmen, including rcgul~r guards and light spearmtn, archt.rs, stingers and camdry. Tht good chariotry, cavalry and spearmen perhaps represented the Nco- Hittite dement while the light lroopS and camelry represented the Aramaean contribution. These Slates could field numerous and powerful armies, especially in coalition, and the forccs of Hamalh and DamuCU5 were effective on their own. The annals of Shalmaneser HI record the contingents making up the allied army that fought against him at Karbr in 853 BC in some detail. The overall commander wu Hadaezer of Damascus, and the order of battle is sct out below:

Damascus; 1,200 chariots, 1,200 caV11ry, 20,000 infantry. Hamath; 700 chariots, 700 cavalry, 10,000 infantry. Israel; 2,000 chariots, 10,000 infantry, (the number of chariots seems to be confirmed by israelite textual and ar­ chaeological evidence). Que; 500 infantry. Musri; 1,000 infantry, (perhaps I minor state in the Taurus Mountains rather than Egypt). Irqltana; 10 chariOts, 10,000 inflntry. ArplId; 200 infantry. Usanata; 200 infantry. Shian; JO chariotry, 10,000 infantry. The Anlbs of Gindubu; 1,000 camel·riders. Ammon; 1,000 or more infantry, (the figure is incomplete).

It will be seen that some of the allies sent only token forces or could only supply small numbers of chariol5. These may represent minor city·states of Phoenicia, and othu slates who perhap5 believed Hadaner would be defeated, and did not wish to lose their entire army with him. Losses were indeed heavy.

The sile of Hanina', army is demonsu'Ited by Shalmaneser Ill's record that he slew 2,900 of he r ... eteran soldiers and took a further 14,000 prisoners in one battle. In Shalmanesc:r's campaign against Huael of Damucus, Haza el lost 16,000 infanlry, 1,121 chariotry and 470 of his ca ... alry at the baule of Mount &nir (841 BC). lflhe figures given for the forces of Damascus at Kafkar represent the whole of her army, then at Mount Stnir Damascus lost most of her infanuy and ch.riotry, but, quite credibly perhaps, more than half of the ca ... alry escaped. Some idea of unit sizes may be gleaned from records of troops recruited by the Assyrians into the Itisir sllamlti from Nco­ H ittite states. Sargon recruited 200 chariots Ind 600 ca .... lry from Hamatb, and from Carchemish, 50 chariots, 200 ca ... alry and 3000 infantry (formerly the guard troops of Pisiri of Carcbemish). These figures would suggest group­ ings of 50, 100 or 200, assuming that the Assyrians wished to recruit existing unilS. T hey may, of course, simply reflect Assyrian unit sizes.

One of the most interesting features of the list of contingents at Karb r is that both Damascus and Hamath hive the same number of caV1lry in their armies as chariotry. This would suggest some connection betwccn ctu.riou and cavalry. The nature of this connection is unclear but possible ex planations might be (I) social- the horseman being a 'retainer' oftbe chariotccr, (2) economic - one c hariot and one borseman being maintained by a lind-grant or indi ... idual as a single unit or contribution, (3) logistical - equal numbers being the result of stabling or supply arrangements, (4) organisational- perhaps the ClIvalry formed pan of the chariotry units, or the borsemen originated as runners riding spare or outrigger chlriot horses, and (5) tactical - ca .... lry may hive bet.n required to optnte with chariotry, and a 1: I prop onion was considered best. In all probability, more than one of these reasons may lie behind this arrangement. T his may represent a stage in the process of development of cavalry from chariotry, similar to that talting place in Assyria and possibly also U ranu and Iran. It should be borne in mind that in Assyria cavalry at fi rst operated as a chariot crew, u if such a crew had actually been te-trained, thus creating a direa rela· tionship betwccn the numbers of ca .... lry Ind the potential number of chariots. Nco-H ittite SOUlCes usually show chariot crews comprising two men, al though one source shows I crew of four (in a ... ery heavy chari ot), whHe con­ temporary Assyrians, Egyptians and cartier Hittites used three-man crews. Perhaps the third crewman had become a cavalryman. The Nco-Hittites may have considered that I combin.tion ofewo-man, two-horse chariots and ca ... alry was a better tactical arrangement than three-man chariouy. In the figures of troops levied from Hamat h and Car­ chemish by Sargon (sevenl generations later than Karkar), the numbers of cavalry do not equal chariotry. This may be because the Assyri.ns considered cavalry to be more useful than chariotry and the ca ... alry may now ha ... e become completely separate, unless the connealon was never completely inflexib le.

The AramaeaDI The Ahklmu are fU'St mentioned in the El Amarna correspondence and laler as one of the allies in a confederation, together with H utrianl and Hittites, defeated by ShaLmaneser 1 of Assyria (1274-1245 BC). By the 11th century BC they were estlblished in Syria forming the states of Aram-Zobeh, Aram·Bc t-Rehob, Aram·Ma'akah, Geshur, Aram (Dimasqa-Damascus), Bit.Agushi, Bit-Adini, Bit-Bahiani, and large numben settling to the Wt of the Eupbrates

45 fonning Anm·Naluraim. The prefIX 'Bir ' means 'house' of a particular tribal anceslor and indicates the tribal origins of these Aramaean dynasties. The Aramaeans seem to bave originated as nomadic tribes in Babylonia. The first phase of their expansion began with raiding, probably inspired by famines. They seized key trading centres and became settled into states. From 1150 to 746 BC they are found allied witb Babylon against Assyria. During the 11th and 10th centuries BC Assyria found hersclfunder se rious pressure from the Aramaeans and the long period of warfare against them is often considered to luve contributed to Assyria's manial outlook. From 800 Be Aramaans began settling heavily in Babylonia, usurping cultivated land.

Tiglath·Pilescr III claimed 10 have conquered some 36 tribes in Babylonia who were settled along the Tigris and Euphrates as fu as the Gulf of Persia. These included the following tribes (the six most imporlanl being listed first); ltu'aya, Rubu'aya, Hamarami, Zi'tau, Puqudu, Gambulu, luhautu, Hatallu, Rubbu, Nasuni, GU1WiU, Nahatu, Ramqu, Rummulutu, Adile, Kipre, Ubudu, Gurumu, Huderi, Damanu, Dunanu, Nilqu. Ubulu, Qubi, Marusu, Haga, Hagal1lmi and Tu'muna. Many Itu'aya served in elite units of the Assyrian army.

Infonnation aboUl these tribes comes main ly from Assyrian sources. They were numerically smaller tban the Cbal· dean tribes, had ab!Orbed less of Babylonian culture, and possessed fewer cities. They were also not as unified as the Ch:llde:lns. Each tribe had up to six 'ullilcall~ or 'sheikhs', each over a sub-tribe or clan. These 'sheikhs' were appointed and could be deposed eas ily. T he economy was based on animal husbandry and agriculture. They kepI hones, mules, oxen, sheep, goalS and camels.

T iglath-Pileser III mentions an Aramaean 'battle-line', but usual tactics were feigned fligbts and ambushes. The Aramaean dynasties of Syria, however, took over much more sopbisticated military systems.

PHRYGIANS AND LYDIANS Little is known about Central and Western Anatolia following the fall of the Hittite Empire. Greeks began to seule heavily on the Aegean coast, and the interior seems to have been dominated by three main pcuples, the Phrygians, Karians and Lydians. Tbe Pbrygians are probably 10 be identified with the Mushki. who are recorded in Assyrian sources. Tiglath-Pileser accused them of invading Assyrian terri tory with 20,000 men, aDd inflicted a defeat upon them. They may have been mov ing into Anatolia during his lime. Rulers going by the name Mita (Midas?) figure on sevel'al occasions. and as T iglath·Pileser mentions five kings, they may have comprised a group of tribes.

Ashurbanipal described the l ydians, or Ludu as they were called by Ihe Assyrians, as 'a dinanl land whose name my ancestors had not heard'. Assyrian annals record Ihat Gyges of Lydia sent troops 10 help Psamtik I drive out the Assyrian garrisons from Egypt and defeat his Egyptian rivals. Because of this Ashurbanipal refused to help Gyges against the invading Cimmerian' who sacked Sardis, killed Gyges and devastated Lydia. Ardys. the son of Gyges. subsequenlly begged 10 be made an Assyrian vassal. The Cimmerians swept through Pbyrgia It around the same time, devastating tbal COUntry also. Its king.. Mita, committed suicide. Lydia survived 10 figbt against tbe Medes and the Persians, and fell to the laller under Cyrus the Grell!. Herodotus records tbese events and mentions dUlilhe Lydian cavalry were the cream oftheit army. The Persians held them in such respect that they countered them with baggage amels manned by soldiers in order to upset tbe Lydian cavalry hof$C$. The Lydians then dis· mounted to continue fighting on foot . At this time the cavalry were anned with a long spear and Greek armour. Croesus had tried to form an alliance with Babylon and Spana and revh-e the old alliance with Egypt, but Cyrus did not allow him enough time 10 receive any assistance from these quaners. Lydia feU in 547 BC.

URARTU

Uranu originlled as a number of small Slat~ in the highlands nonh of Assyria, siluated around lues Van and Unnia, centering on Mount Ararat. During the 9tb cel1lury BC tbese states were welded into a single nation. Shalmaneser III of Assyria conducted campaigns in this region against a cenain Arame who was attempting to unite these Jlal~. Ahhough Arame was defeated and his territories ravaged, I new, suong, dynasty, founded by Sarduri I, achieved power in Uranu. The inhabitants of Ihe land we re pe rhaps related 10 the Hurrians, and referred to the dominions of their king as Biaini!i (the kingdom of Van). Sarduri was able 10 extend his rule over the region of Nairi, bordering directly on Assyria.

46 Urartu was rich in metals and a source of good horses. A formidable army, with an especially good cavalry arm was developed, and Uranu 500n emerged as a serious riva l to Assyria. The Uranian kings auempted to uercise influence over the Neo-Hiuite and Aramaean Slates of Syria, and rhrough them 10 the ports of Phoenicia. Easl'.... ards, their influence cxtended imo Mannai and yet deeper intO Iran. These developments brought Uranu into direct conflict with Assy ria. The influence of Uranu reached its peak during the reigns of Menua (810-786 Be) and Argishti 1 (786-764 BC). U ratian kings also sought to subdue regions to the nonh; Argishti I reached lake $evan in the Caucasus, while Sarduri lJ (164·735 Be) led upeditions as far as Qulha (Colehis). Uranian urns thus penetrated into the lands of the bhqiyulu, the Uranian name for the Scythians. This apansion had benefited from a period of Assyrian weakness, but, with the accession of Tiglath-Pileser fll , Assyria went onto the offensive and Sarduri 1I and his Neo-Hittite allies were defeated in Kummuhu (Commagene). Soon, the Uranians btCllme preoccupied with evenrs on Iheir nonhern borders, for the Gimirrai (Cimmerians), and following them Ihe Scythians, were approaching their land.

Assyrian fromier posts followed these: proceedings closely. On one occasion, the young Sc.nnacherib, Ihen a gover· nor oflhe nortbem frontier, reponed to his falher, Sargon, that the Uranians had been severely defeated. Their king, Rusas I (735·7 14 BC), had escaped, but his commander·in-chief, Kallidanu, had been captured and three uniu wiped OUI in a battle with (he Cimmerians. Sargon look adv:unage of his neighbours' weakness and marched through Mannai, Media and around lake Urmia, defeating the combined forces ofUrartu and Zirkitu at Mount Simirra. This removed Uranu as a serious rival to Assyria.

Urartu, however, had borne Ihe brunt oflhe Cimmerian advanc~. Eventually Ihe Cimmerians divened westwards into Analolia, while the Scythians went east into Media. Uranu survived as an independent stage unlil absorbed by the Archaemenid empire, now on friendly terms with Assyria, and concentrating on devdoping her natural resources to a high degree. A region of Uranu, called Arme, may have been Ihe distant origin of the laler Armenia.

The kingdom of Uranu was divided intO provinces, each ruled by a governor drawn from among the royal family or the nobility. Each provincial capital wu also a fonified citadel, garrison and storehouse. The army was made up of the contingenlS of these: provincial governors augmenting the king's standing army of 5500 qurubuti in the reign of Rusas [I. The army consisted of chariotry, good-qualilY cavalry and infantry. Chariots were drawn by two horses and crewed by IWO men. Sargon II of Assyria was most impressed with the horsemanship of the Uranians and Slated in his annals that their horse trainers were unmatched in their skill with cavalry horses. Horses were specially bred for the Urartian royal contingents and trained never to break rank, whether advancing, wheeling or retreating. Cavalry were equipped with spear and shield, chariolry with spear and bow, and infantry consisted of archers and spearmen.

From the reign ofRusas I, Cimmerians and Scythians were probably employed as mercenaries. Scythian urowhC:ld..s have been found in Uranian arsenals as well as embedded in the walls of their fonresses. Sargon U records that the citadel of the wealthy Uraniao province of Mount Kispal was garrisoned by the most reliable troops in Uranu. Unfonunately the name of this contingent is incompletely preserved.

ELAM Ancient Elam comprised two geographical regions, Ihe plain of Susa and the highlands of Anshan, and 'King of Anshan and Shwhan' was I lille of the king, or tUl1kir, of Elam. He ruled over a confederation of p rovinces, each under II gO\'emor, or iJhshaJ/. Occasionally the king was known by the title mtnir, meaning a son of'feudal overlord'. During the Old Babylonian Period (1900· 1600 BC) the ruler was known as the sultkal·makh or 'gnnd·regent' who controlled Anshan directly, while under him were tv.'O sukkab, 'rcgenu', ofthe' provinces ofSusa and Simash. Elamite history can be divided into th ree main epochs, separated by dim periods of two or three ce nturies. The Old Elamite Period (2700-1500 BC) from which most of our knowledge ofE.1amite political organisation derives, a Middle Elamite Period (1300- 1120 BC) brought 10 an end by Nebuchadre%Ut of Babylon's victory al the river Ulai, and a Neo­ Elamite Period (800-639 BC) when a renewed and powerful Elamite Slate emerged, challenging Assyria until fmally ovenhrown by Ashurbanipal.

The Elamiles were traditional enemies of the Mesopotamians since the first mention of Elam in Sumerian records. Sumerian rulers and later, Akkadians, campaigned in Eillm and the Elamite region of Awan. Occasionally, Elamite forces invaded Sumer. Little is known about Elamile forces at this period. Drawings on pottery dating to before 3000 BC portray virtually naked archers, and archery was always to future as a sltongpoint of Elamite armies. A relief dating to around 2150 BC depicts archers with beards, pigails and wearing kilts.

47 Duriog the 'middle period' Elam emerged as a major military power, Shutruk-Nahhunte exp~ nded and consolidated an Elamite empire, made Susa ils capital, and led a devastating invasion of Babylonia. His son, KUl ir-Nahhunte, was established as governor of Babylon, which became an Elamite vassal. His successor, Shilkhak-Jn..shushinak. G1mpaignw further north, conquering Anmaean tribes betwetn the Tigris and the Zagros mountains, pcnetnting Assyria almOSI as far as Ashur. The Elamite umy at this rime was dearly very effective, but again little is known aboUi them. A bronze relief from Susa depicts archers wearing helmets and shon tunics, and bearing bow5 and curved daggers.

Much more is known about the army during the Neo-Elamite period, due to the Assyrian reliefs of Ashurbanipal and Assyrian royal re:e:ords. Elamite armies, sometimes led by the king himself, or by generals, frequently entered Babylonia to suppon rebels against Assyria. The Elamite armies Ilrt described as 'numerous' and accompanied by many allies. These included, on different occasions, Chaldean tribes, Arab tribes such as the Gambulu, and in one instlnce the Iranian region of Parsumash. Texts and reUefs provide evidence of chariOtry (heavy chariots with crews offour drawn by four mules, and light, two-mule types), cavalry armed with spear and bow and numerous archers, and there: are refe rences in Assyrian annals to ' heavily·armed archCfS' and 'men of the bow and the shield'. The Assyrian account ofthe bailie ofHalule refers to large numbers ofElamite nobles slain, and they may have provided the chariotry. The Elamite troops depicted in reliefs are remarkably unifonn in appearance and equipment, and pan of their forces may have bun organised as a regulir standing army, perhaps augmented by provincial forces. Towards the end of the peri od Elam fell into civil war, with rival claimants to the throne replacing each other in quick sucC:Cllsion, sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile to Assyria, until Teununan (fempt-Humban) was defeated by Ashurbanipal. Elam be:ame divided and was finally overthrown in a further campaign by Ashurbanipal. Even­ lUally the region was taken over by Kurash (Cyrus I) of Parsumash (Persia).

THE AEGEAN

The MinOIlD Tbalauoc:racy Between aboUi 2000 BC 10 around 1400 BC C rete was the dominant power in the Aegean. Political and eronomic administration was cemered on the 'palace'. The mosl imPOrtlLDl palaces were probably Knossos, PhaiSIOS, Mallia, Khania and Zakro, but Ihere were many smaller palaces. The island may have been divided into sevc.ral stales, or comprised a federation over which Knouos held sway. Cretan power probably exlended to pans of the Gre:dt mainland and Aegean islands, as suggttlled by the legend ofThC5C\ls. The figure of Minos might suggcst that there was a single king. Thucydides rerords the existence of an empire of Minos, based on sea power.

Crele was well positioned to exercise control over trade routes from the nonh and west to Ihe Levant and Egypt. Their main rivals at sea would be the Mainlanders, the coaslal states of the Levanl and Analolia, Cyprus and Egypl. There was certainly trade between Crete and the Levant and Egypt bur it seems that relations with these: areas were always friendly.

The fact lhat the palaces lack fonifica tion suggests internal peace and hints that defenu was achieved by control of the sea_ Frescoes depict scabome assaults on settlements and wuships equipped with rarm.

The most serious tbreat to Cre ta n power was destruction by eanhquake. The Cretan palaces were destroyed around 1700 BC and later rebuilt. They were destroyed ,pin around 1400 BC. The ause is generally considered to be nalUral rather than military. However, such events would so sc.riously disrupt the stale as to allow rival powers to take advantage of Cretan weakness. The massive volcanic explosion Ihat occurred at Santorini around 1400 BC would have created a tidal wave whicb could have wiped out most of the Cretan fleet and its pons.

Tbe AchaellDl or Mycenaean. After the Santorini disaster, the balance ofpowu in the Aegean passed to the mainland. Centered around the Pelopon­ nesc was II patchwork of small states. The 'Catalogue of Ships' comained in the lliad is probably derived from an actual Mycenaean document, and indiates the number and relative power of these SIllies in the later 13th century BC. held a position of panicular imponance by this time.

As in Crete the organisation of the state ceDlered on tbe palace. Interest in the military ans and the frequeDl occur­ rence of inter-state wa rfare is well attested. by archaeology and later legend. Most palaces we re fortified citadels.

48 Legend records sevual royal housn. descended from various heroes such as the ' Perseids' and later the ' Pelopids' at My~nae , the house orc:'dmus a, Thebes, the 'Epigoni' whoovt.nhrew Thebes (Cadmeis) and the 'HenkJeidae' who appear as rulen among the Dorian •.

Achaean influence wu ulended 10 Crele, and an Achaean Slate WI. probably established there afier the indigenous organisation wu disrupted by the uplolion of Santorini. II is possible that there wu military intefVention in Western Anllolia before the Trojan war. The rise of the Achaeans coincides with the appeann~ of the state of AhhiyaWi. or Ahhiya, in Hiuile records. This stile WlS clearly a mljor power whose ruler could be considered the equal of those of Hllti, Egypt and Assyril. 11 was .Ito I sea power and lay in Western Analolia or even funher west. It was cenainly some distan~ from its V1wl Slate of Millawanda (Mjletus). and there is archaeological evid~nce for My~naean colonies among the islands Ind on the coast of South· West Anatolia. It is difficult to adequately aplain this state 115 anything other than the Achaeans' U I whole or It least an Achaean state. If we accept another possible location such as Rhodes or Troy, then the great civilisation of the Mycenaeans will appear to have made no impact on its neighboun in the political, diplomllic and military fields . This s«m.5 unlikely considering the v.-ell·attested uading contact.

PAE ONES

AE G EAN

SEA ~

MAS A

./ ! THE AEGEAN .~ .:l " • in the Bron ze Age e RET

49 The Hinite records are wonh mentioning as there may have been military contact between the Hitties and Achaeans. Relations were friendly at first and rela tives of the king of Ahhiyawa were sent to the Hatti·land to learn chario! driving. Later, around 1300 Be, the Hittites requested the ruler of Ahhiyawa to prevent his vassal in Millawanda (generally regarded as Miletus) from attacking Tawaglawas, the Hiuite vassal in the Lukka-lands.

In the reign of Tuthalias IV (ascended 1265 Be) a ruler of Ahhiyawa began to interfere seriously with the states of Western Anatolia. This was Attarsiyas (Atreus?). Madduwatas was a fugitive from Attarsiyas who fled to the Hittite king. He was set up as a vassal prince in the territory ofZippasla. Anarsiyas, with 100 chariots and a force of infantry, attacked here. A Hittite force, despatched under a general. met Attarsiyas in battle and forced him to withdraw. Later Madduwatas began to work against the Hittites by attempting to unite the West Anatolian states in a confederation. He even fell in with Attarsiyas in raiding Alashiya.

The 'Catalogue of Ships' in the Iliad shows that for major military enterprises the Achaeans could act together in a coalition under the leadership of the most prominent state. The list of Trojan allies is probably also Mycenaean in origin. It displays only a vague knowledge of the region on the pan ofthe compilers and would be inconsistent with the situation in a later period. The allies seem to include West Anatolian states. The Trojan War might therefore be seen as a major confrontation between an Achaean and an Anatolian coalition, a later development of the son of hostilities recorded in the Hinite archives. The Trojan War is now usually placed about 1200 Be.

Minoan and Mycenaean Organisation Our knowledge of military organisation is based on information gleaned from the 'Linear B' tablets. These were contemporary records rompiled by the palace bureaucracy, and show that military organisation and maintenance of equipmellt was supervised from the palace. Individuals were under some obligation to provide equipment and render service in respect of their land holdings. Tablets were found al Pylos, Knossos and Mycenae. The tablets concerning military maners bear the tille o-kQ, possibly meaning 'units' or 'commands'. The tablets date to the period of Achaean supremacy.

Rcsiding in the palace as the ultimate owner of the whole state was the wanaka, or ' king'. An imponant official beneath him was the lawagela, variously interpreted as the commander·in-chief of the army, or a civilian official. Each owned a special personal C:5tate or lem ena. The pmirewe were regional officials residing in outlying towns. They were lords within their own territory hut owed allegiance to the king. They possessed a retinue, pmirwija, and were assisted by a council, kvasija. The Ivela were landowners, owing some son of'feudal' service. The marop­ pas held a 'share ' of land and could hold the position of unit commander. Of the various kinds of noblC:5 and of­ ficials, those with the most apparently military fu nction arc the tqela, or 'followers'. It is ce n ain from the Linear B tablets, that the eqtla possessed chariots, but there may also have been chariou y who were not of eqela status, since some it ems of chariot equipment are listed in the tablets as 'suitable for followers', implying perhaps that the best equipment was reserved for tile eqela. Two other designations for troops arc known; kek ide and kureftl(', although the exact type is not clear. It would see m likely that the lvela provided troops, perhaps chariotry, the eqela being the elite chariotry.

Unit organisation was based on the decimal system and trOOpS were conscripted on a regional basis. Units were known by regional or tribal designations. The Pylos tablets listing forces detailed to gua rd the coastline arc all small units comprising multiples of ten between 10 and 110. In this case the size of the forces is probably dictated by the function, and a unit of 10 may have been the basic unit of organisation.

Inf~"" The main pan of the infantry were spearmen. They were originally equipped with large body-1hields and long thrusting spears. The shields were large enough to conceal the bearer completely and were carried by means of a shoulder strap. This left both hands free to wield the spear. Representations of spearmen in action strongly suggest that they were drilled and fought in close form ation. A fr C:5co from Thera shows a body advancing in line.

Although ideally suited to hold off chariotry, long spears do nOI always require the stimulus of mounted troops to encourage their development . They were developed to improve the effectiveness of close-formation infantry against similar opponen lS in most historical instances. The spearmen were often well-cquippcd with elaborate bean'·tusk helmets. rfillest troops were DOl simply conscripted and then equipped by the state, but supplied their own weapons, they must have been recruited from a prosperous section of the community. The Linear B tablets do not mention shields and little that can be exclusively attributed to infantry (they seem to be mainly concerned with chariotry). Poorer sections of society arc probably reprcsented by the naked slingers, archers and stone-throwers shown defend­ ing a settlement from seaborne allack on the so-called 'siege rhyton', from Mycenae.

50 Light infanlfy consisted of archers, slingers and javelinmen. Well~uipped archers could operate from within the long·spear formations. Poorly-equipped archers and $lingers, probably drawn from the poorest peasants and tov.-nsmcn, provided skirmishers or dc:fenden of settlements in lime of emcrgency.lavelinmen were belter~uipped and organised. A fresco from Kncnsos depicts a line of clark·skinned troops bearing pain of ja\'dins and wearing IWO plumes in their hair. They were probably Libyan auxiliaries from North Mrica.

Whereas Afuioan sources and Minoan inspired works from the ~inland show long-spcar troops, frescoes from Pylos, Tiryns and Mycenae daling 10 the period of Achaean ascendancy depicllroops with shon spears or javelins and round shields.

Charlotry Knowledge of chariot warfare arrived in the Aegean during the 16th century BC. Chariotry became a wing of the armed forces oflhe state, provided by I clus of cha riot -owning nobles called tqtla, or 'followers'. Many tablets deal with the muster of chariots or parts of chariots, indicating that the readiness of the chariot force was closely supervised by the palaCl:. Men providing a complete chariot are mentioned by name only, otherwise Ihe relevant chariot pans are listed. It is clear that many people co uld only supply incomplete vehicles or pans. The role of the palace adminislrlnion was to organise the various contributions into a battle·ready force. It has often ~n assumed dUll the tablets represent a chariot force in a poor state of readiness which wu being mustered due to some emer· gency. In fact it could indicate that the palace was attempting to organise an adequate and efficient chariot rorce from the contribUlions or many people individually lacking sufficient wealth to provide compiete chariots.

The Knossos tablets would allow for a maximum or 400 chariots to be produced rrom the mUSler. Pylos could produce 82. Only 100 chariots accompanied Altarsiyas to Zippasla (if we assume Ahhiyawa to be an Achaean sute).

During the 13th and 12th centuries BC the design of chi riOtS and the equipment of the crcw changed dramatically. A change in keeping with the contemporary changes occu rring among infantry as well. This almost cenainly accom· panied a change in tactics and most probably a change in the organisation or armies. This was the period in which the palace economies of the Aegean began to collapse, new peoples began 10 move into Greect: from the north-west, and the Sea.People disturbances began in Anatolia. It seems likely that the military organisation represented by the Linear B tablets, dependent on regulation by a literale scribal class on the Ncar Eastern model, was replaced by something betler suited to the times.

Coastal Defen ce It is clear from the Catalogue of Ships that most Achaean slates had access 10 the sea and were capable or mounting seaborne allacks. This implies that they would have to prepare for a threat from this direction themselves and make arrangements to guard Ibeir coastlines. The Pylos tablets record a ,000 eXlmple of such arrangements. Pylos had a long coastline to protect. The tablets date 10 shortly before the final deslruction of the palace and have often bttn interpreted as wt-minute preparations made in response 10 a new and unexpected threal. The roren, however, arc small and comprise patrols or observation posts only. They probably represent normal arrangements.

The coastline at Pylos W3S divided into 10 sectors. Each sector was allocated a small detachment of 'watchers'. The units are always multiples of 10 varying from 1010 110. They bear regional designations and were conscripted from local settlements. Each group had its own commander and an attached 'follower'. The lauer served 1$ a chariot· mounted courier. These OUlposts were too small to resist more than one or IWO shiploads or raiders and were almost cenainly backed up by more substantial forces inland. The followers were. requited to report to these force.!. It is perhaps more probable thaI the back-up rorce was the Pylian fleet . Tablets record the mUSler of rowers, and the natural harbour at Navarino bay is located near to Pylos. Over 600 rowers are recorded and each ship required 30 men (20 ships). The Thera fresco sbows ships crewed by 42 men. In the 'Catalogue' NeSlor of Pylos is credited with 90 ships, second only to the contingent of Agamemnon.

The preparations al Pylos are dated 10 the spring month of POr(ltDtlO, meaning 'sailing time'.

T be Catalogue of Ships The $O-C:alled 'Catalogue of Ships' and the list of Trojan allies contained in Book II of the mad are now oOen con· sidered 10 be derived from a Mycenaean source. The political geography portrayed seems to belong 10 the context of the Late Mycenaean period rather than any later lime. The 'Catalogue' indicates Ihe number and relalive power or the Achaean states which had joined IOgether in a temporary coalition. In the Iliad the Mycenaean Greeks as

51 :I. whole are considered to be composed of tWOmain peoples, the Achaioi and the Danaoi. The continge nts are listed below:

I. Boiotoi; under 5 lead!:rs wilh 50 ships uch carrying 120 men. Th!: mention of many leaders and [owns, with the notabl!: eJ:.ccption of Th!:bes (s.ack!:d before the Trojan War) might suggest a loose tribal organislllion. 2. Aspledon and Minyaean Orchomenusj on Ihe coaSt north of Boiotia, under two leaders with 30 ships. 3. Phokeeis; under twO leaders with 40 sbips. 4. Lokroi; under the 'Lesser Aju'. with 40 shi ps. 5. Abantes; from Euboea, with 40 ships. A fierce tribe described as swift, with hair falling in locks at the back and wielding ashen thrusting·spears. 6. Alhenaoi; under Menesl henes, a skilled commander like Nestor, with 50 ships. 7. Salamis; under the 'Greal Ajax', with 12 ships. S. Argos and Tiryns, under Diomedes, wilh 80 ships. His terrilory included pan of the Argive plain, ACle and Aegina. 9. Mycc.nae. under Agamemnon, with 100 ships. His realm included Ihe Nonh of the Argive plain and territory along the Gulf of Corinth. 10. Spana; under Menelaus, brOlhe r of Agamemnon, with 60 ships. II. Pylos; under Nestor, with 90 ships. Nestor was considered a good chariou}' commander who knew older tac· tical mel hods. His realm was divided int o S wstric" in bolh the Iliad and Pylas tablets, but the names do nOI correspond. 12. Arcadians; enough men to fill 60 ships supplied by Agamemnon, as they knew nothing of seafaring. They were trained in han d·ta-hand fighting. 13. Epeioi; from the Nonh-West Peloponnesc, under four leaders with 10 ships each. 14. Epeioi; from the Echinun Islands, wilh 40 ships. 15. Kephallenesj from hhab.. Kephalle nia and Zakynlhos, under Odys,seus wi th 12 'Crimson' ships. 16. Aetoli, with 40 ships. 17. Cretans; under the 'spearman' Idomeneus, with SO ships. IS. Rbodes; 3 tribal disuicts under a single leader wilh 9 ships. 19. Syme; an Island near Rhodes, a small contingent with 3 shi ps. 20. South Sporades Islands; wilh 30 ships. 21. Myrmidones, Hellenes Ind Achaioi of the region around Pelasgian Argos, under Achillel, with 50 ships. 22. Four towns on the Thessalian coast under Protelil aus, with 40 ships. 23. Four towns on the coaSt nonh of ProtuihlUS, under Eme1us, with II ships. 24. Four towns on the coast to the nort h of Eme1us under Philoctetel, with 7 ships, each carrying 50 archers. 25. Thessalian plain; 3 [Owns under tWO leaders with 30 ships. 26. Thessalian plain; 3 towns, with 40 ships. 27. Thessalian plain; 5 towns, under twO leaden, with 40 ships. 28. Ensenes and Pera ebians of the Dodona region, wirh 22 ships. 29. Magnetel; from the re gion around Mount Pelion, with 40 ships.

The contingent s are each under a si ngle commander unlelS otherwise stlled. Overall command seems to have been given 10 AgQmemnon on account of him being th~ single mosl·powerful ruler.

The Trojanl a nd Tbeir Allies The list of Trojan alliel in Book II of the Iliad may well be derived from I Mycenaean source as it cOnlains less detail than the 'Catalogue of Ships' an d shows only a vague knowledge of regions of Ana tolia. It probably dates to a time before the Greek settlemenl in , (which occurred before 1000 BC). Some of these allies may possibly be identified wilh Welt Anatolian !Ialel known from Hin ite records. The contingents are listed below:

1. Trojans; under Hector, son of Priam. They were the most numerous force, described 15 good spearmen. They DUly be the Taruisha oflh~ Hin ite records. The name Ilion may co rrespond to Wilusiya, (Muwallilis oncc made a trelty with its king, Alwhandush). 2. Dardanoi (Dardlny); under Aeneas and his two subordinutel. 3. Troops ftom Zelia, I TrOjan cla n, led by . 4. Troops from Adresteia. iQC:Ited neat to Troy, under tWO leaders. 5. T roops from the Dardanelles area, under Asi us.

52 6. Tribes of Pelasgi~n spearmen, from thc rcgion juS[ 50mh of T roy, undcr two leadcrs, (pcluct?). 7. Thraces; allies from the European sidc of the Hellespont, under twO leaders, (feucri, T jekkern. 8. 'Warlike' Cicones, also from Europe. 9. Paeones; archers from the river Axius region in Europe. 10. Paphlagone5; from the lands of the EneLi, where wild mules lived, possibly somewhere in the Pontic region. II. Alil:ones; under twO leaders, from beyond thc river Halys. 12. Mysi; undu two leaders, (Masa?). 13. Phryges; from 'remote Ascania', under twO leaders. 14 . Meiones; under tWO leaders, from West Anatolia. IS. lUirts; from the region ofthc river Maeander, who held Milet05 (Milia wanda), under Amphimachus and Nastes. Probably to be identified with Karkisa. 16. Lycii, from the region of the river Xanthus, under Sarpe

A confederation ofWes[ Anatolian Slates including Taruisna, Wilusiya, Karkisa and Luili, known 35 Ihc Assuwan alliance rebelled against the Hittite king. Tudkhaliash IV. This list may represenl a similar but later confederation, formed as the H inites lost control of the area, whose main enemy was now the Ac hacans.

THE INDUS VALLEY Berween 2500 BC and around 1750 BC, a civilisation flourished along the Indus river, extcnding for a vasl area from the Punjab to the Arabian sea. The culture was fairly homogeneous and possibly comprised a single slate for much of this time. The main cities were Mohenjo-Da ro in the south and Harappa in the nonh. They may navc exercised dual control unless Harappi developed as an alternative to Mohenjo-Daro, which was subjected to sc.rious flooding. The Indus valley was in tnding contact with Mesopotamia through Magan and Dilmun.

Such a vast area probably required military activity of some son to C5tablish control in the first place and then maintain it. The wealth resulting from well-organised agricuhure and trade would have bce.n a tcmptation to out­ siders, and s«urity of the fronLiers would require a mililaty organisation of some kind. Until the script is deciphered we arc dependent on archaeological evidence regarding the Indus fOTces.

Material evidence demonslnltes the existence ofslingers, archers and spcannen. Side-arms included shon swords, axes and maces. Some animals may have been used for war. An elephant, possibly wearing a cloth or harness, is shown on one seal standing before a manger. The principle of the wheel was understood and models of ox-cans have ei ther two or fou r solid wheels and sometimes eve n a roof. Thw chariotty and elepnantry cannot be ruled out.

TACTICAL METHODS

EGYPT

O ld and Middle Kingdom. Egyptian forces in this period wcre exclusively infantry. Tactics were based on the usc: of massed formations of close-order archers and hand·to-nand fighters. Archers formed up in lines sc.veral ranks deep. The front ranks shot from a kneeliag position while those behind stood.

Troops armed for hand-to-hand combat countered the missiles with a bull-hide shield which could often be large cDough to cover 1he bearer completely. The characteristic shape of the Egyptian shield deve. loped around the time of the unificalion. It was ideally suiled 10 allow closc.-o rder troops to form a continuous wall of shields. The flll base: allowed it to be. rcsted finnly on the ground to form a palisade (the battlements of Egyptian fonresses imitated such a palisade in harder material).

Very little in the way ofbattlc reliefs and inscriplions nave. survivc.d frnm these periods compared to the New Kingdom. Such evidence is a major source for tactical methods. Royal monument s such as the pyramid temples and causeways we re decorated with such re liefs but we re largely destroyed by laler kings and the blocks were re-used. Private tombs and inscriptions can provide much delail but lend to reflect minor local activities.

53 Inrantry lactics were probably similar to those used in Ihe New Kingdom, since Ihe Egyplians or Ihat lime did not ru ndamenlally ahcr the mdilional inrantry types but de\'dopcd Ihem.

The army would be dh'idcd into len and right wings and c ~tre . There could be a vanguard and rearguard or first line and reserve. The commander, or king if he was present, would be positioned in the centre or the first line with his relainer'. Command or the rearguard or reserve was entrusted 10 Ii second-in-command with anolher body or retainers. This s«ms 10 have been the arrangement at Sekmem. The centre or the ballle·line would be composed or close-rormation spearmen and hand-to-hand fighters in rectangular columns or deep lines. supponed by close­ order archers in line. The flanks or the army would be rormed by lighler and more mobile troops such as ja\'din skirmishers and roreign auxiliaries. These troops could also be detached as an adva nce guard and doubtless also rear and flank screens if required.

T he role or the IlTchers on the battlefield was to maintain a massive volume or missiles as the close-combat troops advanced inlo contact. The function or the latter was to engage Ihe enemy and prevent their own archers rrom being engaged . There is no evidenct ror the usc ormil:ed rormations, probably because the Egyptians considered that it would strengthen neither shooters nor hand-to-hand troops and may even weaken both. By keeping the twO basic trOOP IYPC' in sepanue massed rormations. the close combat trOOPS were giv~ sufficient density to be dTecrive and the archers could kccp clear or close combat, retaining the option to maintain shooting at any enemy formation throughout the battle.

Archer rormations were probably deployed betwccn cJose-combat bodies, or as a Kfccn in front (using high standards of drill to accomplish any evasive manoeuvres required).

The Middle K ingdom fortresses of Nubia display a sound understanding orthe principles or crossfire and enfilade, SO WI: can expca these principles 10 have been PUt into dfttt in Open battle also.

In drawing up the baule-lines attention would also be given to the posilions of the various grades of troops. The raw levies would be flanked and scrccned by more aperi~ctd troops. Retainers and shock.troops would hold the positions of greatest danger.

Ampbiblous OperatioDs Military action in Egypt or Nubia would of necessity centre around the Nile, Ihe main line of communicalion. Connol or Ihe river in the area of operations would be vital to allow uoops to be transponed rrom one side to the other in order to clear bOlh banks or enemy and ensure secure flanks for funher advance. The simplest and easiest method of moving a large number or lroops wilhin Egypt would be by rivercraft. Often the King and his dite troops moved by river while columns proceeded along each bank. Cities could be CUI off or relieved by sending a flcct as nearly every important point in the Nile valley was accessible by water. Consequently there were often amphibious actions accompanying sieges. Garrisons in the Nubian fortS we re supplied by river and ela borate arrangc:meOls were made to ensure year-round access. Covered quays linked the fons 10 the river bank.

Other considerations regarding the amphibious aspcc! of Egyptian warfare arc that the prevailing wind blows upsttcam while the current flows nonhwards, and that Egypt experienced an annual inundation when large areas of the valley were submerged and shallow-draft vessels would be invaluable for communication. As work in the fields then CC2Scd, rhis was also Ihe time when most manpower was available for conscription.

The New Kingdom

Wantry T actics As in earlier ti mes, arche rs drew up in closc-order linear formations. Against mainly unarmoured or shieldlcss opponents, Ihe massed volle)'s were sufficient to hill! anacks alone. Against such foes, archers would lead !he advance with close-combat troops following behind as a supponing line. These tactics arc shown in use against Ihe Libyans in reliefs in the monuary temple of Ramcsses III lit Medinet Habu, Thebes.

Againn bellCI-cquippcd enemies the close·combat troops would be required to engage in hand-to-hand fighl ing. The rol.e ofthe archers was then 10 screen the approach and 'sorten·up' the opposition. Closc-combat trOOPS usually drew up in linear formations unless advancing in the vicinity or enemy chariotry, in which case they formed dense rectangular columns and were screened and esconed by their own chariotry in line abreast. Such a formation could

54 present a front to an auack from any direction by II simple tum and could not be burst through by a detennined onslaught. The accompanying charimry might be able to hold orr enemy troops while the column deployed inlO battle formation. These tactics are shown being used by the Army of Pt(J1t in the Klldesh reliefs.

There is no evidence for the combination ofdose-formation ardlen and spearmen in the same body during this period.

Infantry advanced at II rapid pace, often with their shields slung on their bacb, leaving both hands fr~ to grasp side·arms and a spear. In the fa ce of enemy missiles the shields would presumably be swung round to form II solid wall and the pace would become slower and steadier. On contact with the enemy the spears were either discharged and followed up by a rush into hand-to-hand combat with side-anns, or retained to be thrust overarm. Reliefs display evidence of both pfllctices.

Perhaps maners such IS this and the arrangement ofunilS into banle formations were the preserve of the 'Assauh Officers'.

It is tempting to view the 'Greatest ofTen' as I file-leader or end-marker ofa flink, depending on whether II detp column or linea.r forffillltion was adopted. Each platoon of 50 could be convened from a column of 10 ranks of 5 men into II line, with a depth of 5 ranks of 10 men, by a si mple tum and whet!' The Standard-Bearer could easily signal these manoeuvres, for which the typical flat standards of rea:angulu and fan shape were probably designed. Large scale manoeuvres by greater formations were probably signalled by the trumpet.

There are no representations of formed Egyptian c1ose-order infantry receiving an enemy chariot charge. Such were seldom attempted. They would only be vulnerable to such an attack while unformed. such as when crossing fords and pitching camp. if surprised while strung out in column of match, or if morale and discipline gave out in the face of determined attack. However, harassment from skirmishing chanotry would impede rapid movement. rule out complex manoeuvres and reduce numbers by attrition. It was therefore necessary for the Egyptians to have their own chariotry in order to campaign in Asil. Enemy charimry had to be prevented from cunailing the efficien· cy of the Egyptian infantry.

Chariotry Tactics The introduction of the chariot during the H yksos period added a new dimension to Egyptian tactics. The Egyp­ tians rapidly developed their own chariot force. They acquired the relevant tt<:hnology and materials from ..... estem Asia but adapted organisation and tactics 10 their own requirements. By the mid·18th Dynasty the charimry emerge as a fully deve.loped arm with its own organisation and hierarchy of command. However the infantry remained the most numerous and impanant pan of the army. Chariotry were used to suppan and prott<:t the infantry II well as adding long nlOge and mobility to operations. This stands in contfllst to the pfllctice in Canaan and Syria, where chariotry became pre-cminent and supported by the infantry. There are good reasons for this; Egypt had a high population and maopower was always her most valuable resource. The Egyptians were long experienced in the organisation and discipline of large bodies of men as pan of daily life and were naturally good at it. The basis of a professional standing army was inherited from the earlier period; il was of course: infantry.

A body of well· armoured Egyptian chariOtry in line abrea.st is depicted charging into a similar line ofHinite chariotry in reliefs of the battle ofKadesh at Abu Simbel. This provides I good illustration ora chariotry engagement. Against enemy chariotry, the Egyptians would charge towards them attempting to cause as many casualties as possible from arrows at long range. and light javelins at close range. They would endea.vour 10 avoid roming 100 close to the enemy, where the heavier spears and more numerous crew of the Hittites would give them the advantage.

As vehicles would be well·spaced to avoid collision and to eDable turning manoeuvres, the melee would involve interpenetration of the opposing lintS. There would be much wheeling and turning as the chariOts reformed for successive charges.

If the Egyptians could force their opponents to break ofT. they could cause heavy casualties from shooting during the punuit. The main di5advantage to the Egyptians would be the danger of being swept away by their heavier opponentS in the initial charge.

An account of Amunhotep JI's prowess at archery provides an insight into Egyptian charimry training methods. The chariOt had to be driven at full gall op past copper targets set on poles and placed 12 metres apall. The chariot archer had to try and send a shaft clean through a target, or pierce it with more than one arrow. The spacing of the targets may reflea: the expected frequency with which one might be approached by II m(J,),ClIInu assailaot in " a chariOt engagement. While the archer concentrated on shooting. his driver concemrated on driving the vehicle. This was probably regarded as being more efficient than anything that could be achieved by a single horseman at this time.

Chariot RUDDCI'" Integral to the organisation of the chariotry were the runners. These were light troops equipped with javelins or bows. AJ, the name SUggestl, runners were expected to try and keep pace with the chariotry. They could perform several tactical functions such as screening the chariotry, foll owing up a charge to despatch or capture fallen enemy crewmen, clearing and holding any terrain impassable to chariot! and rescuing wounded friendly crewmen.

A body of runners following some distance behind their chariotry, could also engage enemy cbariots who had passed through them and were attempting to rally for a second charge. Enemy chariotry would then be caught between the runners and rerurning friendly chariotry. Clashes between opposing bodies of runners could also be e:lpeeted in the vicinity of chariotry engagements.

When (harlotry were pursuing routed troops or ch~r ging into lOOSely-formed enemy infantry, tbey we re accom­ panied by runneu and other loose-formation troops such as Sea-People auxiliaries. This is shown in reliefs ofthe banle against the land onslaught of the Sea- Peoples at Medinet Habu. These troops would give greater weight 10 the attack. Chariotry alone would not have sufficient density to be successful and could be overwhelmed by force of numbers.

Battlefield De ploymeDt Egyptian commanders paid great attention to initial deployment. Many Pharaohs and commanders boast ofthcir prowess in drawing up the 'battle-line'. The army was considered to have left and right wings and a cemre. On the march a vanguard and rearguard could be detached as required to secure passage througb difficult terrain.

Chariotry and loose-formalion infantry were deployed on the flanks of the anny while close-formation troops were positioned in successive lines in the centre.

Despite the numerous archers in the Egyptian army, tactiC$ seldom took the form of static defence behind linear obstacles or on high ground. In battlcs against the Libyans, archers may have been deployed on the banks of canals, such as the 'waters ofRe', or western canal, at Hauho, but other pans of the army were used offensively. Archers do not figure prominently in the Kadesh reliefs which are dominated by chariOtI)' and spearmen_ In all battles at least part oflhe army was intended to act offensively. When the Libyans were hailed by the volleys or the archen, chariotry were despatched to complete the rout Ind destroy the Cflemy by I vigorous punuit. Such action ..,.. ould set back their opponents for years to come.

Field Armin Each of the four field armies would be a self

On major campaigns the field armies would invade enemy territory together. They could then separale to attain different objectives, and later rendezvous at any point in o rder to outflank the enemy or bring overwhelming force to bear. AJ, the Egyptian battle plln at Kldesh was made before Ramesses II was misled by the enemy, his armies appear to have been intended to let in this way against for~ drawn up in the plain before the city. The Hittite ploy subverted these plans somewhat by encouraging Ramesses to try Ind take the city before the enemy arrived, aUowing him to be CUI off. However, Ramesses held OUt desperately, knowing that more of his forces were to arrive shonty.

The armies could advance by the same route, but spaced some distance apart, in order to give mutual support if attacked. The Kadesh inscriptions record that the armies were spaced I JUT (approximately 10.5 km) apart. It is more likely that this information was lifted from an official daybook or manual than that it was worked out from the geography by a scribe. One advantage nf these: arrangements WliIIS that the whole fnrce could not Ix: destroyed by a well-

Thutmosc IV records b.is order of march on a Nubian campaign in an inscription from Konosso. The Pharaoh advanced upstream on board ship together with his shtmsu (retainers). The Mfru marched on the adjacent river banks with the naklP.ru-QQ on their outer flanks. The infantry recruits were thus supponed by seasoned c1osc-combat infantry occupying tbe most vulnerable and exposed position. The Pharaoh was positioned where he could most easily e:nrcise control of troops on either bank.

Naval Tactics The reliefs of a naval battle at Medinet Ha bu provide an example of naval tactics against an enemy flett, in thill case that of the Sea-Peoples. The design and equipment of the Egyptian warsb.ips were obviously the result of long development, and the tactics used we re planned Ind precise. Although many ships were requisitioned in readiness for this battle, those depicted in the reliefs Ire purpose-built warships. Earlier engagements 'gainst the maritime powers of Phoenicia and the Hyksos must have contri buted to the development of a navy as depicted in these reliefs. The navy wn a branch of the 'rmy. drawing its personnel an d equipment from there and not conceived of as a separate force.

In the Medinet Habu reliefs the Egyptian vessels possess both oars and sails. unlike the vessels of their Sea'People opponents. The IIH~r appear to use sails only and would be less manoeuverable. It is possible that the Egyptians were deliberately trying to depict their technical superiority and represent the enemy as inferior. In many battle scenes only enemies are ever shown dead or wounded and sometimes una.rmoured and without weapons. Peoples such as the Lilla may have betn es:puienced in techniques of sea warfare. and such expertise and wanhips could have been acquired from Abshiya or Phoenicia.

Unlike Egyptian merchant ships on which the sails were lowered to the deck when not in use. those of the warships we re raised clear of the deck. The Egyptian ships were: rowed in close to the enemy ships while archers and slingers raked their deckl with missiles, causing heavy loss among the crowded warriors. At close quartets, a marine posi· tioned in the prow hurled a grappling hook in tO the enemy rigging. The enemy ship was then capsized as the Egyp­ tian rowers rapidly reversed their vessel. Another method of Iliad: was to board the enemy vessel. Marines armed with long boa rding pikes fended off enemy warriors lIS the vessels collided. The low prow of the Egyptian ship could smash into the hull, raing and disabling the enemy ship. They could not ram below the waterline. Javelin­ anned marines boarded the vessel, supponed by the shooting of archers in the fore and aft castles and a slinger in the crow's nest. The grappling hooks could be used to hold the ships together u the boarding took place.

Later Egyptian Tactica The policy of dividing up the forces and despatching armies to different objectives seems to igve continued ioto the Libyan period for we fInd Sheshonq I employing such tactics against Israel. Following the death of Solomon, the Pharaoh seiud hill opportunity to de·stabilise Egypt's nearest rival and potential threat. Forces were sent into the Negev to destroy Israelite outposts and cut Israel oIT from Ezion Geber at the head of the Gulf of Aquaba (a potential threat to Egypt'S Red-Sea coaSt). The main army advanced through Judah to collect tribute and ultimately lay waste to Israel. This was simply a rauia IS Egypt does not see m to have been strong enough to impose lasting conuol of this area.

The division of Egypt into principalities imposed constnlintS on the strategy adopted by Tefnakht against the Kushite king Piye's invasion. The progress of the enemy could be impeded ifimponant cities could be fortified and held long enough to allow the contingents of vassal princes to be mustered. T he success of the Nonh in defending itself would depend on the qualities ofleadership possessed by the foremost prince. Allies would soon desen to the mhu side if help wu not guarlnt~d and there would alwa)'$ be delays in metting threats, surrendering the initiative

57 to vigorous IHackers, such as Piye and later the Assyriuu. Piyc's tactics reflect the weaknesses of his opponems in that he was always anxious to reduCt: enemy strongholds quickly by using siege machines or direct assault. Enemy reinforcemems would be intercepted on the river and the troops wert encouraged to pursue the campaign with fan:lticism. Obviously Piye bore in mind the shon length of the campaign season and the great length of the Nile valley.

A stela sct up by Piye to commemorate his conquest describes the campaign in great tactical detail. Piye issued the following instructions to his army 3$ to how they should conduct lhe war: They wert not to delay in their military preparations by day or night or waSle time in battles of manoeuvre. The enemy wert to be engaged immediately on sigbt and forced to give baltic. If Ihe enemy holding a position had called up support from another city, Piye's generaLs we re 10 allow them 10 join up. No doubt Piye preferred to destroy them in one decisive bailie r.IIther than become 'bogged-down' in a succession ofsiegcs (which looked like happening It one point in the ca.mpaign~ However if such supporting princes remained in their cities, the army was to scize the opponunity to gain ground. In battle the troops were to give priority to attacking the forces of the supporting princes and the 'Libyans and favourite soldiers' of Tefnakhte (this could be a refereDCt: to the M tJlIfDtJh). The intention here was to attack the wcalr.est clements ofthc enemy forces and cause atuition on their mongest elemems. Fmally, Piyc demOflSl:r.IIled the 'crusading' character of the campaign when he exhoned his men not to heed the clamour of the enemy as they deployed for battie. but to form their own ballle·line in confidenCt:; 'thou knowest Ihat Amun is the god that has sent us'.

The use of close1)rder native infantry (which exisled by the time of the Persian period, but may have been allowed to lapse afier the New Kingdom). combined with large numbers of Greek mercenariu, would provide Saile and Persian period armies with a solid infantry clement 10 form Ihe cemre of the bailIe-line. Chllriony had become heavier and no doubt cavalry had usurped atlthe skirmishing and scoming functions of this arm.

In his fictional 'Cyropaedia', Xtnophon describes the Egyptian infantry tactics in usc during the Persian period. The Egyptians form up in dense columns of 10,000 men with 100 ranks and files. They are armed with shields extending to their feet and long spears. The shields arc applKlltly ideally suited for fi ghting in close formation. The troops arc tOO densely formed to al low intricate manoeuvres, such 3$ rttnction of nnb and files from the path of charging scythed chariotry. Despite inflicting many casualties, such an auack faits to break up the formation and the chariots arc ove rwhelmed by force of numbers. The Egyptians are dcscribed as fighting with tenacity and determination. This description would seem to be based on some degree of personal observation and it is interesting to note that Xenophon assumes that these troops would actually stand and recc.ive a chariot attack, and that such an attack delivered by chariotry specialised for breaking up ma.ssed infantry formations like no earlier chariotry had eve r been, could be successfully held. Perhaps he was trying to make the point that with such a dense infantry formation, it would not be necessary to make evasive manotuvres, as contemporary Hoplitcs were doing, possibly on account of less deep columns.

THE UBVANS AND NUBIANS

The Libyan and Nubian tribes were almost entirely infant ry an d generaily less wtll-tquipped than their Egyptian neighbours. Tactics were restricted to skirmishing, ambushes or mac king in muscd waves of loose-formation tribesmen. Like the colonial powers of more recenl times, the Egyptians relied on discipline an d volume of missiles 10 halt their massed attacks. These allaclts would be effective enough if their opponenlS' discipline or nerve fallered. or their sbooting ability was impaired. Thus we find the Libyans on one occasion attempting a dawn attack to achieve surprise and pe rhaps utilise the half-light (they were coming from the west). AgainSl tbe Nubians, who were also mainly bowmen, the Egyptians may have been forced to close in for hand·to-hand combat, rather than cs:change missiles with more dispersed and bcuer-concealed opponents. The most powerful Nubian peoples lived along the Nile an d probably made USt of large war canoes similar to predynastic Egyptian types. This would aplain the concern of the Egyptians (or defending the river approaches of their fons and scruring their lines of communi~· tion. Perhaps the best tactics that could be employed by the Libyans and Nubians would be to retreat into the vastness of their domains and allow their enemies to succumb to the hu t,lhirst and distance, combined with cons­ tant harassment. At the end of the New Kingdom the Libyans began to auao: Egypt in such strength that the Egyp· tians were unable to prevent large sca le SCttlement. The region of Libya extended from the as far as Nubia, and Libyan incursions took plaCt: along this entire frontier, although the main alfacks wt re in Ihe north. The detailed records of the Necropolis workmen at Thebes show that on occasion men wtre toO often afraid 10 walk the shon distance over tht hills to the Valley of Kings, fot fut of the Libyans. The population of Thebes shut themselves up in the wall ed enclosures of the great rnonuaty temples which lined the west bank of the Nile. to escape the marauding bands of Libyans and disaffccted SOldiery.

58 SUMERIAN TACTICS

Only the vaguest hints of Sumerian battlefield tactics are provided by contemporary textual sou rces, though rather more may be gleaned from anistic sources. It appears thai the main baule-line of close· order infantry was preceded by skirmishers armed with bows, slings and javelins. The close-order trOOps relied for protection on thick felt or leather cloaks. Around 2500 B.C. a large bodyshield was introduced which sccms to have been cuned by a special shield.bearer, leaving both of the spearman 's hands free to usc his spear.

The chariots were probably originally used as a shock.force, charging down on the enemy infantry and driving them from the field . However il appears thaI the long two-handed spear of Ihe infantry was adopted to kcep chariOIS II a distance, relegating the chariOtry to the pursuing of an enemy already beaten by infantry combat. It is also to be expected that the nature of the terrain in Sumer, with its many irrigation ditches and canals prevented the usc of chariotry to its full potential.

Spearmen seem to have formed up six-deep. The spearheads of the rear ranks protruded beyond the front rank. The 'commanders of 10' formed up on the left of each rank. The famous 'stela of the Vultures' shows I unit of 60 men drawn up in this way.

The large shield and long spear continued in usc throughout the Akkadian period and intO the Third Dynasty of Ur. However the large shield and chariotry were often discarded during the Akkadian empire, probably because armies were increasingly required to operate far afield in difficult terrain. The victory stela of Narim·Suen shows infantry armed with long SpOI'S, but without shields, advancing up wooded mountain slopes, supponed by archers.

THE OLD BABYLONIAN AND OLD ASSYRIAN KINGDOMS 1894·1595 B.C.

Troops we re divided into two categories; sabum Itibirum, or 'heavily·armed troops' and sabum qallarum, or 'light troops'. The laller were able to mount ambushes while the former may have formed up in banle lines and used holding tactics.

The main body of the army adVlIDC'ed in II 'b:mle-formation', preceded by II vanguud known as a sabum tardj,um or sabum ra fum . One source: mentions a vanguard of 1000 men preceding a main force of 3000. Another source memions a vanguard of Hana lIibesmen numbering 1500.

Light contingents could include tribal troops; a letter requesting thaI a sabum qallatum be sent out to ambush an enemy column resulted in the despatch of 600 troops consisting of 150 Hana, 50 Sutu, 100 men from the 'banks of the Euphrates' and }()O Babylonians. They were sent OUt in alternate groups of 150.

Shamshi·Adad and hhme-Dagan appear to ha\'e been good tacticians. Shamshi·Adad advised his son in one lener to beware of the faUacy of a pa5Sive enemy - while he was manoeuvering against the enemy the enemy would be a!templing 10 do the same to him. Tactics included ambushes, skirmishing with ma rching enemy columns, com· bined attacks by several allied armies from differem direa:ions, and even sending troops to hide in enemy territory in order to attack them on their return ma rch when least e:xpeaing it.

Many of these tactical methods required good scouting and advlDce warning to be effective. A repon survives rrom a frontier commander 'on the banks of the Euphrates' describing the initial response to a possible threat. Reports were received that 2000 Habiru were massing on the opposite bank of tbe Euphrates. Two local commanden hurried to the spot with their contingents and made a fonified position opposite the enemy, described as 'thiny fields' away. This created enough time for the rest of the area to begin mobilising. In this case the enemy did not attack.

Siege techniques were already well-developed, as was the ;n offon ificllion. Apan from the city walls that already existed, made yet more formidable by the greal 'tells' or mounds on which the older cities stood, angled gateways and the glacis appear at lhis time. This was probably to counteract the bane-ring ram, known at Mari as the ytUhibum,

59 and also re:Cerred 10 in Old Hiu ile sources where iI is consuuaed in the ' Hurriao manner'. Cities coul d be funher defe nded by ClJning a bilumin·lined dyke from the nCllrest river. Apart from rams, methods ofanack included siege towers, or gis!! dim/14m, in which a ram might be mounted, and burning arrows. At Mari siege engines were con· nruaed at th:n city and then transponed to the scc:ne of 3ction. One machine was called 'wild donkey', and such engines m3Y ha\'e resembled later Assyrian types, which were often made to look like animals.

THE MIT ANl'\'IANS AND KASSITES

The tactics of the Syrians, Canaanites and Hinites, of which we know much more, were probably, like their military organisation, closely related to those of Milanni. It Stems probable that the Mitannians invented the maryanM system and so probably also the chariotry tactics that went with it. The elite and heavilY'armed maryanna were the cream of the army. T he infantry were intended to suppor! them in bailie. Chariolry probably formed the ",ings of the army, as indicated in the inscription of Lakti·Morduk. His account also shows that an attack by one of these wings at a decisi ve moment could win a battle, and refers to the great confusion that resulted from the combat of massed chariotry. In such circumstances, well.d,rilled and disciplined chariotry, with a good tactical organisation, would prevail. The account referred to above seems to indica te that the opposing centres engaged first.

This account might also suggest that the cen tre of the army would adwnce to engage the enemy centre, while the wings would attack the opposing enemy wings and attempt to sweep away their t hariotry. They could then faU on the flanks of the enemy centre. The centre would probably comain most of the infantry, but smail detachments ofloose·formation in fmlry, probably armed with missile weapons, may havt: been used in dose SUPPOr! oft..be charimry.

The capture of the royal or army standards belonging to Mitannian and Kusite armies is recorded in Assyrian sources as if to show a measure of the viClory. In the confusion of a massed chariotry bailie, such standards, mounted in chariots, would provide a useful rallying·point. The standard of the king, perhaps located with the elite chuiotry in the centre, would indicate to the ehariotry on the wings the point to which they should turn having defea ted their opponents. Similarly, such standards on the wings would show the commander the progress of his flank charimry so that he would know from which direction support would come and warn him of the danger of envelopment should they be seen moving back. This is aaaly the son of information that the Egyptian king and his army com­ manders would have required in a battle such as Kadesh, (and prohably did have).

THE ASSYRLANS

General The main infanlTy battle·line would have cavalry and chariots on the wings for pincer movements and efforlS to overwhelm and turn the enemy flan k. For this the cavalry and chariOts would anempt to break through the enemy line, creating a breach which the cavalry could exploit, riding behind the enemy line and allacking the rear. The infantry would then rush up behind to engage along the whole front and to maintain and widen the ga p in the enemy front.

Chariotry The large, four· horse Assyrian chariot was primarily used in a 'shock-charge' capacity. II was a deve lopmem from the earlier, lighler vehicles which had to be multi·purpose reconnaissance, despatch and shock-charge vehicles. The first tWO roles had been increasingly taken ovtr by the developing cava lry arm since the 10th ce ntury B.C., cavalry being both cheaper and more efficient in these roles. With these limitations upon weight removed, the chariot could beeome far more specialised to mee t the purpose for which it was best luited, to deliver an mack by heavily-armed elile !Toops with speed and mobility. A1> CllVlllry began to become effective as mobile missile troops and, to a limited extent, close-combat troops, the number of the crew, the amount of proteaion and the size of the chariot were increased to the detriment of manoeuvrability, and li mited further the terrain on which it could be used.

The chariot units would form up on the wings of the Assyrian battle-line, supported by cavalry to guard the vulnenble flanks and rear. They would then rumble toward the enemy, the shield·bearers holding their shields high ovtr the heads of their companions to guard against enemy arrows descending al long ranges. The sight of tbese ve:hicles thundering across a plain might well have been enough to cause any untrained enemy le vies to flee. Those that stood firm would have little hope:, unless they had sufficient volume of missiles to break the Assyrian charge by killing the vulnerable chariot hor5t$ (often well protected enough to make this ineffeaive). If they failed to bait the charge, yet their nerve held until the shock, the resultant clash might ruin them as " fight ing unit. To be fu ll y ~fTective, howev~r, chanolS wer~ limited to open baule on fairly nat plains or gentle slopes, as at tbe battles of the U lai, Halule and during Ashurbanipal's Arab wars wh~r~ th~ speed ofth~ ~nemy cam~Js prov~d insuf­ ficient to escapc a rombined for~ of Assyrian chariots and cavalry.

When campaigning in diffiC\l ltterrain, such as the mountainous regions to the north and cast of Assyria, the chariotry w~re oft~n left behind, or only a small force of chariou was taken. Sometimes only one chariot, that of the king him:iClf, would proceed, accompanied by guard eavalry, probably as a command vehicle. Even then, it might need to be hauled up the mountainsides with ropes.

Cavalry

Horsemen, used as scouts or messeng~rs, had long b«n known in the Nur EaSt, but by the 10th century B.C. tttle cavalry make their appearance in sev~ r al r ~gion! of the Near East, such as th~ Aramoean and Neo-Hittite states, Iran and possibly Egypt. Th~ first usc of cavalry in Assyria occurs during th~ 9th century B.C. At first cavalry operated in pairs ronsis!ing of an archer and a shield·bearer, the laner holding the reins of the other's horse and screening him with the shield while he shoots. This gives the impression of a cha riot crew and horses operating as a unit while the vehicle itsclfha! been dispensed with. By the lime ofTiglath·Pileser JII the cavalry still operate in pairs but cormol their own ho rses. By the 7th ~ntury B.C., however, cavalry equipped with both spear and bow, armoured, and ridiog armoured horses were in usc, although the shield had been d.iscarded by AS5yrian cavalry during this prot"ess of development.

The cavalry team of archer and shield-bearer would have the advantage of being able to operate in le rrain that would have rutricted or prevented the usc: of chanotry and were able to carry out the funclion of mobile missile troops. \Vi th the introduction of armour and the cavalry spear, some degree of shocK-charge ability was added, making eavalry a reall y viable replacement for chariotry in any but the most fa\'ourable terrain fo r chariotry, and against any but the most heavily-armed and densely formed enemies. Apan from the general trend in Ihis dircttion in the Ncar East, and the possible «

The reliefs ofScnnacberib's pa lace give many good examples of cavalry operating in hill-country, forests and charg­ ing up hill·sides. One such charge is shown in a very advanced style of composition predaling the Ulai reliefs of Ashurbanipal (and the ir 'Egyptian' influence). The complete scene, sub-divided by a stream and hills in the bottom register, shows an Assyrian cavalry charge against Elamite archers. UnfoTlunately, the original re lief was losl but a dTllwing of it survives, showing 22 Assyrian ho rsemen and 43 Elamitcs, witb some damage to the top of the slab making the scene incomplete. The Assyrians are shown unarmourCi1, which might be due to an «

The Ulai battle re liefs of Ashurbanipal show a combined chanot and cavalry charge upon the Elamite left flank. Unfortunately the slab dealing with the first impact oflhe charge is fragmentary. However, large numbers ofarmoured cavalry we re involved. The Assyrians use the overarm thrust wilh the spear, using it to Slab rather than impaie like a lance. The spearmen are again supporled by horse archers. In hill-count ry mixed heavy/medium infantry appear formed in tWO lines running in open order.

Cavalry could not be used in sieges unless some of the heavy archers shown shooting up al the baulements were dismounted horse archers. However they must have proved invaluable for quick raids, securing lines of communica· tion and armed reconnaissance.

Infantry The Assy rian dose-ordcr spearman is nearly al w3y1 shown using a downward overarm thrust in combat, while his raised shield covers his face: and body. Occasionally an underarm thrust is shown. There is little information on training methods bUI a suong imprClSion is given that discipline was rigo rous. " Reliefs often show a front line of spearmen with a second line of light or hea vy archers. That this is not purely 11 ba ttlefield arrangement is shown by the line of guards esconing Sennacherib at a stone quarry, and with Ashur­ banipal on a lion-hunt . Lines of spearmen bearing shields stand at attention with archers safely behind them. The te rm 'lines' is used here rather than 'ranks' as it is not certain whether or not units were actually raised as mixed arc hers and spearmen.

II is clear from the reliefs that the infantry made up the greater pan of the army and bore the brunt of the fighting. Heavy infantry units would probably be screened and supponed by auxiliary archers and spearmen. Missile suppor! for the spearmen would be provided by the archer units anached to them, possibly both on a pe rmanent and semi­ pe rmanent basis. This ar rangement would be especially useful to break the impetus of a charge, and mainlain allri­ tion on the enemy when the spearmen were unable 10 cl ose in for hand·to-hand combat.

Use of combinations of infantry types was not necessarily restricted to archers and spearmen as slingers arc sometimes shown directly behind archers in reliefs. They seem to be shooting at a high angle and the combinati on in this case may have been intended to counteract the effect of the enemy shields. Their opponents would not be able to shield themselves from low angle archery without leaving their heads and bodies exposed to a hail of heavy Assyrian slingshot.

T he Assyrian use of subject and tribal levies was extensive. Howeve r, such tribal levies could often provide only light skirmishers. For this reason their use was restricted to skirmishing before the battle-lines met, at which point they would retire or plunder the dead. Other more successful uses were in holding strategic routes or river-crossings for the main army, or raids into enemy territory. Some levies would be given limited training, but their natural skills would often be useful in themselves, especially in difficult te rrain. Subject troops, recruited from the armies of conquered nations, were often incorporated into the kisir sharruti to become professional soldiers in the Assyrian army, equipped and trained on Assyrian lines.

Siege Techniques Assyrian st rategy required that cities be reduced very quickly. Ifmost of the campaign season was to be spent simply in besieging the first few cities which refused 10 submit, then campaigns would have to be given very limited objec­ tives, thus wasting much of the effort and expense of theiT prepaTlltion. Ingenious siege engines an d effective siege techniques were thus an essen tial pan of the Assyrian military organisation. For the same reasons it was also their intention to reduce unnecessary casualties by protecting troops with large shields and covered rams.

Assyrian siege techniques were very methodical . The detailed reliefs of the siege of Lachish show the mel hods used against a major lown. A timber-laced and revetted earth ramp was Ihrown up against the wall. Sometimes mud-brick could be used in the construction. Upon the I1Imp a wooden trackway was laid down, on which the siege engines would advance. Funher back, armoured slingers and armoured archers, positioned be hind large r«d pavises, shot at the defenders on the walls. The defenders tried 10 stop the engines by dropping flaming torches on them but each engine had a crewman with a long-handled ladle dows ing the machine wilh water. They might even try to ovenum Ihe siege-tower by cat ching the ram in a chain, hung down from the battlements. Finall y the Assyrian auxiliary infantry assaulted the wall with scaling ladders with light arcbers shooting in support, or poured through the breacb. In the Lachish relief, the defenders had in vain heightened the wall wilh a framework of wood and shields in an attempt to defeat the ramp.

THE BABYLONIANS

Very li llie is known about the tactics employed during the Neo-Babylonian Empire, but they were probably similar to those used by the Assy ri ans. We know more about the period immediately preceding this due to the Assyrian records concerning the wars fought against Baby lonian rebels. The Babylonians used the difficulties and nalUral obstacles of their countryside to good effec\. Large partS of Southern Babylonia were marshland in which fugilives could hide with their retinues, emerging when Assyrian forces had gone home, or proceeding to exile in Elam. Merodach-Baladan was once hunted fo r five days in these marshes and there are Assyrian reliefs depicting Iheir troops weeding out resistance in these regions by means of reed boats. Funher nonh, the countryside was scored by numerous irrigation ditches and canals. Skilful choice of defensive positions was thus a fealUre of Babylonian tactics at this time. At Dur-Papsukal, the Babylonian rebel Marduk-balatsu-ikbi, supponed by Elamites and Chal­ deans, took up a position surrounded by an 'expanse of waters' which the Assyrians described as difficult to approach. A similar lactic was used by Merodach-Baladan at Our-Yakin. The Babylo nians CU t a channel from the

62 Euphrates 200 cubils wide and broke down irrigation dilches in order to nood lhe fields with waler. They then pitched their camp in the middle of this swamped area and awailed the Assy rian army. Howcver, the Assyrians were undaunted and sent elite troops across the defences, while ardiel'S shot ovcr the waters into the Babylonian camp.

The Babylonians may have found it difficult to mustet thc:ir troops quickly, for there arc twO occasions when Babylonian armies turned up late for a battle, their allies having fought and won it on their own. This happened at Dcr, where the Elamites forced an Assyri an relrelU, and when Nineveh fell to the Medes alone. If i01e01ional, lhis must rank among the moS( astute of military tactics!

THE ELAM.ITES

The Elamites are usually credited in contemporary sources with possessing \'ery large armies, probably numbering tens of thousands, most of which would be infantry archers. Such forces could be: quite effective in themselves, but by the 7th century B.C. at the [;uest, their effectiveness had ~n greatly enhanced by mcans oflarge, four-horse or mule, chariOtS, capable of carrying up to three archeI'S in addition 10 the driver. The effect of the missiles discharged by a unit ofsucb chari

The Elamilcs often fought as allies of Babyloni2n rebels agai nst Assyria, Ind their suppon could usually be: relied upon. If the main Elamite army ilsc:lfwas not present, there might be forces positioned in Babylonia under Elamite commanders (in one ase, 7,500 men). The Elamites were quite prepared 10 mett the Assyrians in pitched SC:1'piece battles (understandable ifthe:y had a superiority in archers, duriots and possibly cavalry), and the lkabylonian chronicle tells us that this Strategy often brought resulu. Alternatively, forces, such as light troops and avairy, could be detached in order to hold up an enemy army, pe rhaps to create time for a combined Elamite and Babylonian army to assemble.

CANAAN AND SYRIA; from the Hylr.sol 10 Solomon

Canaanite tactics and strategy depended on the use of high quality chariotry to maximum effect. The primary role of the chariot r)' was to skirmish with the enemy and reduce him with atttition by a massive volume of missiles. The speed, manocuverabilily and heavy armour oflhe maryaltna would enable them to do this without scvere losses from enemy missiles. Unsupponed enemy chariOtry would probably be charged outright. Surprise: attacks and flanking manoeuvres by massed chariotry were particularly desirable. To attack the enemy when he was stretched. out in column of march or otherwise poorly deployed could be most effective. The Canaanite confederation led by the king of Kadesh clearly intended to employ such lacties against Thutmosc 1II at Megiddo. Their forces were posi­ tioned to cover the nonhem and southern entry points into the Vale of Esdraelon. They could have engaged the Egyptian army as it marched into the valley b)' surprise attack, or impeded its progress by continuous skirmishing. If this failed there wasstillthe walled city of Megiddo into which they could withdraw. An Egyptian army which had alrClldy suffered sc\'erely might abandon tbe idea ofbe:sieging them (much as Rllmesscs II later withdrew from Kadesh). The Canaanitcs had plnced their camp outside the city, be:twetn their two divisions. Thutmosc: foiled Ihis plan by advancing tbrough the difficult but lightly- hdd pass of Aruna. He emerged opposite the Canaanite camp, completely surprising his opponent.

Despite the Egyptians' Strength in infantry they appreciated. the need for good charlotry in order to deal with Canaanite opponents. An infantry army would be cxltemely vulnerable whenever it attempted to move, C\'en though it might prevail in a sct-piece bailie on a rcstricted battlefield. Chariotry were in fact an exctllent form of defenn for the Canaanite cities. They could impede the movement ofinvading forces, ketp the initiative with Ihe defenders as long as possible, and were able to engage Ihe enemy far awa), from the city and ilS supponing cultivation, ketping supply lines open. Enemies who could counter the chariotry with their own, would simply flfld themselves fighting on the same terms witb chariot specialists.

In the early Stages of the Hebrew SC1tlement of Canaan, the Hebrews were: vinually restricted to the: highlands because of the Canaanite strength in chariOiry. The Hebrews were successful when they cou ld lure their opponents into operating in terrain unsuitable for chariotry. This ploy was used by Barak againsl Siscra. If a victory was achieved, " the houghing of captured chariot horses, rather than abandoning them if they could not be carried off, might render an opponenl5' military power weaker for years to come. Unlike armies based on masses of infantry. each chariot represented I complex an d a:pensive unit. Losses could not be readily replaced.

With the apansion of the Hebrew kingdom inloan empire, embracing lowland plains and with long caravan roUt es and frontiers to police, it was ntceuary for Solomon (%0-930 B.C.) to develop his own chariotry. They were placed in strategic positions and the logistics of their maintenance were carefully planned. In doing tbis he was following Canaanite military tradition.

The Canaanites, in placing their emphasis on chariotry, were opting for defence in depth with mobile forces. It is an ideal option for areas with a comparatively low population but ronsiderable wealth. Other methods of defence would require placing trOOpS on the frontiets (for which there might be insufficient men) or defending the cities at their walls (thereby surrendering their means of support to the enemy). The Canaanites allowed themselves to be besieged only as a Ian reson.

The Hebr-ew Order of March The Book of Numbers comains details of the arrangement of the Hebrew camp and order of march during the exodus from Egypt. It provides an example of how a large group of nomads or dispossessed people such as the Sea-Peoples. would move as an entire nation, prepared to fight at any time. Each tribe was allocated a panicular fixed area of the camp and position in the line of march. Each man was to pitch his tent near the standard of his tribe or cla n. The shrine (!'he Ark of the Covenant, in the case of the Hebrews. but other peoples would have had their tribal gods which they carried with them), was positioned in the centre of the camp and the middle of the line of march. The tribal host Wi! alerted to danger by trumpet signals, for which tWO silver trumpets were used. One blas t with both trumpets gathered all the n ibal commanders 10 the leader to receive instructions. A special signal, called the 'Alarm', signalled the advance of one wing of the host when sounded once. Sounded twice, it signalled the other wing to advance. The wings acknowledged the signal with answering blasts. There was probably a system whereby the line of march turned itself inlo a ballic formation facing the di rection of the threat, with the non-combatants falling back to the rear or being protected in the centre of a defensive formation.

The tribes of Judah, Issachar and Zebulun were positioned on the east side of the CIImp and were to form the h! division in the column of march. Reuben, Simeon and Gad were located on the south side of the camp and were to form the 2nd division. They were followed by the Ark accompanied by the Levites from the centre of the camp. The WC$! side was occupied by Ephaim, Mannseh and Benjamin who formed the 3rd division and the north side was occupied by Dan, Asher and Naphl3.li forming the hindmost division. This arrangement was adopted during the nodus rrom Egypt and may be similar to contempol'2ry Egyptian military pr.actice. for txample; the organisa' tion into four bodies.

HITTITE T ACTICS

General Whatever the area of operation, great emphasis was placed on lurprise attacks, rapid movement and forced marches. The Hittites generally show an ability to use initiative and imlgination. Surprise could be accomplished by march· ing at night, feigned retreats and use of scoutS to mislead the enemy . Hinite scouting seems to have b«n good (their plans often relied on knowing [he exact whereabouts of the enemy before they suspected the presence of the Hittite army). "\,('hen an advantage had been gained there was In inclination to press it n far as possible. This attitude applied to grand strategy as well as battles and is demonstrated by the sack of Babylon and the seizure of Egyptian territory following the successful defence of Kadesh and withdrawal of the Egyptians.

In Syria In this area Hillite allies were states whose. contingents included large numbers of high -quality chariotry. Thetac­ tics employed were based on Ihe offensive use of chariOtry, with infantry in a supporting role. Baule plans we re similar to those of the Canaanite.5 and Syrians. The army would be deployed for a set-piece battle in a strategically imponant plain into which the enemy musl advance. A massed chariotry onslaught would be despatched against the enemy before they could properly deploy their forces. Another option would be to sweep away any opposing chariotry, (Hittite charlotry were designed for close.-combat) and use·their own chariotry's mobility to surround the enemy army on the battlefield. Close-formation spearmen remained in reserve in large bodies. Against enemies " who were also Strong in chadony they could be used to resist c hariot allad!s and act ~ a second line or rallying point for their own chariotry. Against opponents with good infantry they rould be used where chariot attacks would not be decisive.

1110 An3colia In Anatolia there were more occasions when chariolry «mid not be used effectively, such as in highland regions against the Kaska. Infantry would be employed offensively wil.h chariotry held in reserve.

In his campaigns in Anatolia, Mursilis II (I ]46-1]20 B.C.) used a 'flying column', perhaps ronsisting of light infan· try which were sent out ahead of his muchi ng columns 10 dear the way of enemy ambushes. This force was also used to screen the fear of the army and opente on the flanks.

CbariolTy There appears 10 have been some variation in chariot design ;md chariot tactics within the H illite Empire, reflecting the different regions from which comingems were drawn . The H ittites and, alleast, their allies from Anawa, Masa and Pitaua, used three·man chariots. This may have developed from allowing a runner to ride in the chariot to increase mobility and eventually became standard tactics. Many Hiu ite chariots were more robust in design ttun Syrian and Egyptian types; with eight-spoked wheels and the axle placed further forward (betler suited to ca rry the extn wei ght), suggesting that chariot design altered to accommodate this development. Some chHiot crews in· duded ao archer and others comprised only twO crewmen. These: were probably allies from Syria.

Against enemy ( hariotry, the Hittite chariotry ....'Quld charge iOl o dose comba t. The H ittites would attempt to get close to their opponenl$ to d ischarge their spears or thrust with them. Against lighter chariotry, the heavier spears and more numerous crew would Ic ll. A Ihird crewman meanl that a "chicle could afford 10 lose a man withoul becoming ineffective. A chariot charge into loosely·formed or poor-quality infanlry might also be successful. T he greater number of crew would give I greater density of attack and allow some !Toops to lighl on fOOl without grea tl y reducing the effectiveness of the chariol. The extra mounted fighler could fulfil many of the functions for which runners would be required. with the additional advllntage of being certain to keep up with the chari ot.

THE NEO·HITTITES AND ARAMAEANS

The Nco-Hittite, Anmaean st~tcs of Syria, and Ihe kingdoms ofLsnel and Judah used similar tactics, 35 their armies were ofsimilar o rganisation and composition. C hariotry were still the most important part of the army, many stales supplementing these with good cavalry. Cavalry may hlIve been developed rrom chariotry by mounting chllriol pt.r· sonnel on spare hones instead ofincreasing the size of the crcw, or perhaps mounting troops who would previously have been cha riot runners. The process seems 10 have followed a pattern similar 10 thai in Assyria, freeing the ehariotry from many roles requiring speed and mobility (skirmishing, reconnaissance, courier duties for example) and allow· ing greater specialisation in shock tactics. Such shock tact ics would be rendered all the more effective if the chariotry we re closely supponed by cavalry to protect their fl anks and rear. Various formations and manoeuvres involving the use or lines of ClI\'lIlry following behind or screening the front ofc hariou would become possible. Auyrian records mention the Capture of 'royal cities' which were apparently centres for supply and garrisons. ThtlC would have bcf: n nccc:ssary for the maintenance ofa chari ot force, as they were in the Israelite organisation of Solomon and Ahab.

Infantry consisted of spearmen. of which some were c1ite troops, archen, slingers and javelin armed men, most of which were probably light, loose·formation troops of Aramaean type.

Scvenll St~ t es would sometimes combine in a (:O;Ilition in order 10 have sufficient military strength to resist oppo­ nents such as Assyria. The most notable example of this being at Karkar in 853 B.C. T htlC conlingents were pro­ bably subordinate to an acknowledged overall commander, such as Hadadew. When Israel and Judah combined in a campaign against Damascus, Jehashaphat placed himself under the command of his ally, Ahabj 'my horses (a re) as thy hones'.

Occasionally, in the wan between these: states, sieges took place. Zakir of Hamalh records that Hazael of Damascus besieged his Cif), with a 'wall' and a 'moat'. Usually rulen preferred to meet their opponentS on ground of their own choosing, often near 10 a royal city inlo which they could re tire if defealed. These cities were difficult 10 take, having large reserves of supplies and deep wells sunk within their walls. They might even be able to hold out for sc:vc:ral years. Damascus, Jerusalem and Samaria all defied the Assyrians for long periods. If a siege could be withstood

65 for long enough Ihe besieging forces would be required to abandon Ihe siege as Ihe campaign season ended or because ,hey were needed elsewhere. These: considerations no doubl encouraged the Assyrians (0 de velop a large standing army and highly developed siege techniques.

THE MINOANS AND MYCENAEANS

ChanOI Warfare Although the Aegean Slates could nOl mUSlcr as many chariolS as could their Near·Eastern neighbours II is likely thai chariotry were formed and foughl in organised units in Near·Eastern fashion. Much has been made of the so-called ' Homeric Warrior' who fought as an individual and used his chariot as battlefield transpon. These lactiC'S may well apply to a laler period but do nOl seem 10 comply with the high level of organisation portnyed in the Linear B tablets. There arc also references to other methods of chariot warfare in the Iliad which tend to be overlooked. It is only to be expected that a work concerned wi th the exploits of heroes shoul d emphasise their individual com­ bat. This does nOI mean that such combat was Iypical, nor would it be completely incompaJiblc wilh massed chariOI tactia.

Even in the Near EUI where masK

Part of the Iliad which mentions massed chariot tactics is the description of how Nestor drew up his forces for battle. Ncslor is gid to be old and experienced. He had experience, acquired in ballies in his youth, of lactics lhal were later falling OUI of use. This sounds ralher like a device to introduce inlO the work a memory of autbenlic Mycenaean practice on the pan ofllaler poet. NeSlor placed dtariotry at the from and a mass of infantry behind them. The chariotry were instrucled to keep connol of their hOTSe6lnd not to become entangled in the melee ('keep in line'). BrlIvery and skill did not emilie .ny man to break nnb and fighl the enemy alone, in Neslor's doctrine. No one was 10 drop back and so weaken the force. When a chariOI came within reach of an enemy vehicle, a spear thrust should be allempted. This ma lerial could have been deliberalely worked imo the Iliad from a Mycenaean source in order 10 comraSI with the methods ofihe other heroes. An image on a Mycenaean carved gemStone from Vapheio shows a chariot fighter using a long spear exactly as Nestor advises.

Other commeOlS in the Iliad hint at the existence of sophisticated chariot tactics. Chariots appear to operate in the space between the lines of opposing inflnlry and withdraw rapidly as the infantry clash. If this implies skir­ mishing, then it refers 10 a time when the javelin had superseded the chariot lance. It could also indicate screening of the advancing infantry (moving chariotry would raise a lot of noise and dust), or utempllto break up the enemy bailie line to creale advanllge for Iheir own infantry. The rampan built 10 protect the Achaean ships from Troian allack incorporliled a ditch and Slakes to ObslruCI c:hariolry, so perhaps subslantial chariotry macks were c:r;pected.

A detailed reconstruction ofa chariot melee serves to demonstrate Ihal I degree ofindividull comb:al cannOI be ruled out. In the opening phases of a bailie, or on the flanks of the main action, enemy chariotry might allempt 10 impede deployment or allempt 10 break up the bailie line by Ihrcatening the flanks of the infantry bodies.

They would need to be countered, engaged and driven off by friendly chariotry. Clearing away enemy chariolry would gain respile, while dcsltoying them would gain the initiative. As a troop of CharlOlry advanced into combat with an enemy body, they would initially keep in formation, (probably line abreast). The gaps between vehicles would be wide enough for each to 'aboul lurn'. A second rank would scrvc no useful purpose, whereas I second troop of chariotry or a body of infantry followi ng some distance behind, would render invaluable suppon.

As the clash approached, each charioteer would concentrate on Sleering his car towards the enemy vehicle opposite him. The chariot lancer would brace himself, perhaps !runing in plate armour 10 deflect the thrust of his opponent, against whom bis own spear would be levelled. He might lau nch a javelin 10wardS Ihe opposing line before adopting this position. As Ihe lines imerpenelrated, Ihe can would veer past each O1her and either chariot fighter could be knocked from his vehicle by a well-aimed thrust. T his action would be repealed all along the line. After the forma­ tions had passed through each other, many crewmen on both sides wou ld have been killed or dismounted. T he chariots would Ihen aucmpi 10 tum about and engage in funher combal. Drivers might try to rescue Iheir fallen

66 crewmen. Some crewmen might dismounlto despatch fallen opponenls, or engage them on foot . The melee: would bc:come confused and there would be ch3nces for a wamor 10 win renown by seeking OUI and slaying a notable enemy. The undisciplined mighl wasle time dismounting 10 1001 or take captives. If either formation was baded up by a $«Ond wave of chatiotry or infantry, their a"ival al this time could be decisive. finally the remnants of the worsted formation would retire pursued by those: who have not stopped to loot or rescue friends. tfthey should reach the prolection of their own infantry the pursuers could be: repulsed by volleys of missiles or dele"ed by a mass of spears.

A change in chariot tactics probably took place: towa rds the end of the 13th century B.C. when chariOl design ahuc:d and a less robust vehiclc called the 'rail-<:hari

Infantry Tactin The Minoans developed drilled close:-order formations equipped with very long spears and large body-shields. The shields wcre initially rectangular, allowing them to mec:t edge-to-edge 10 fonn a continuous wall. This would nOI only render tbe front ranks almost invulnerable to missi les, but prc:venl many missiles from passing inlO the rear ranks, which smaller shields could not do so efTecti~ly . These are cc.nainly the shields of close: order troops. At­ chef$ operated from within the spear-fonnalion. no dO\lbl deriving $Orne protection from Ihe $hields. The S1«: of the shields suggests a considerable missile exchange bc:fore contact. The rectangular shield was later accompanied and possibly superscded by the 'figure-of-dgbt' type:. This had ce:nain advantages in that it was dec:per, increasing its defl«:tive quality and the 'waist' provided a gap allowing spears to protrude at a lower level from the shield-wall and greater opportunity to use the thrusting sword in the cramped ci rcumstances ofa closely packed body. This shield also had a long central rib or 'boss' allowing it 10 be used ofTen!ively to pTC$$ apan the shields oftbe opposi­ tion and break into their shield-wall. Sources show 'eight-shields' and the rectangular 'tower-shields' in usc within the same formation. h seems a reasonable taaical arrangement to equip a proponion of each body with each type. Alternatively, the variation may be due to personal preference.

With the rise of Mycenaean power, this Iype of infantry gave way to troops equipped with shon spears or javelin! using smaller, round shields. formalions may have bc:come less rigid and styles of fighting more individual. This required use of body annour such as greaves and cuirass. The:re was thus a mo~ towards the 'Sea-Pcoples' type of warrior, whicb was almost complete by the time of the famous 'Warrior-vasc' from Mycenae. Possible reasons for this change: might be an inability to train and organise long-spear fonnations or that they were rendered obsolete by the nec:d5 of the time (such as possible increase in seaborne raiding, or the evolu tion of fUler moving and less formal battlC5 under the inOuem;e of chariotry).

The Iliad describes combat by both types of speannen, those with man-covering shields slung on shoulder straps and thost; with. round shields combined with cuirass. No doubt a VlIIriety of sources were drawn upon by laler poets, but there would also have been transitional phases in the development of tactics.

MlssUe Tr-oopa The Iliad makes scveralreferences to archery, and there were: contingents on both sides at Troy which arc said to be archer specialists. There is also good material and piaorial evidence for archery. Some archers fonned up wit h the long-spear fonnations. They probably shot from between the ranks and files of the spearmen in order 10 benefit from the shields rather than represcnting an integral pan of the unit organisation.

Armies might bring wit h them various poorly-equippcd and untrained levies. These provided skirmisbing slingers, archers and stone-throwers on the battlefield. They were held in low esteem by their social and military superiors. Nestor placed his inferior troops between the chariOtry and a rearguard of good infantry to discourage them from shunning the fight. If a 5c:ttlement was attacked by surprisc, such as might happen in a seaborne raid, the majority of the defenders would be: such troops. suppaning any more substantial forces that might be stationed there. This may be the cue in the scene on the so-called 'siege-rbyton' from Mycenae. Here a small group oflarge shield·bearers make a rather forlorn stand assisted by hordes of Daked archers, slingers and stone-throwers.

THB MOUNTAIN KINGDOMS

These: include Uranu, Mannai, Madai (Media) and Slates of lesser imponance: such as Namri, Zikinu, Na'iri. It was difficult for the Assyrians to condua campaigns into these regions. Chariotry were often made inelTeaive by

67 the na rure oftbe terrain, requiring (hem to be left behind, dragged up mounlainsides by ropes or even forcing the Assy rians to cut roads for them with the chisel. Funher problems we re caused by the weather conditions, raging mountain torrenlS which defied eve n the Assyrian's river-crossing abilities, and gue rilla lIt'lirfare on the pan of the inhabitants. In some ofthcsc regions there was no real unity, simply large numbers ofsenlements and ciudels in inaccessible places.

Uranu, Mannai and the Medes appear to ha ... e been the better-o rganised states. Uranu rose to prominence as a great power and rival to Assyria, but lillie is known of Uran ian tactics. It would appear thaI chariolry we re of lesser importance as the mobile arm oflhe army than the cavalry which were highly developed. However, at the battle of Moun t Simirra, Sargon II encountered the Uranians and their allies from Zikinu deployed in a mOUnlain pass with their infanlrY to the fore and their cavalry behind them, somewhat restricted by the position. This would appear to be odd tactics to choose considering the respect wilh which the Assyrians viewed Uranian cavalry, and the Uran ians were on this OCClIsion, de feated. T he comingent from Zikinu may have remained sepanle from Iheir allies, allowing the Assyrians to break through what would otherwise ha ... e been a strong position. When defeated or forced to retreat from their stronghold, the forces of these mountain kingdoms frequently chose to hold on the slopel of some high peak, forci ng the enemy to fight them in temin to which their trOOpS were naturally accustomed. ManlUi possessed chariots, ca ... alry and infantry, but li1r.e Uranu, the chariotry remained the two-horse, light type and probably played a less impon ant pan than the other twO arms. Some of the plaques from Hasanlu show cavalry and infantry archers operating together with chariotry. O ne plaque shows two lines or ranir.s of three Mannaean cavalry. Infantry consisted of archers and spearmen. Arche rs arc sometimes shown shooting in a kneeling position. IU to the Medes, we ir.now very li ttle of their tactics, al though their SUCC'CSS against Assyria would suggest that they were quite we ll-developed. Herodotus 5tates tha t they were the fint 10 separate the various military arms such as archers, spearmen and cavalry, whereas prev iously these had fought mixed together. He may have heard garbled accounts of Assyrian and Babylonian mixed units, but it docs indicate that the Medes were more than a me re horde. Both the Mannai and Medes employed Scythian allies or mercenaries, pe rhaps a force which had moved on from Uranu, led by a cenain Samdaksharru.

THE NOMADS

The nomadic peoples of the Neu Easl, of which there were ... ery many, may be divided up according 10 their prin­ cipal beut of bu rden. This would, to a large extent innuence their methods of warfare.

The term 'donkey-nomads' may be applied to tribes wandering on Ihe fringes of Mesopotamia lind Syria during the 3rd and 2nd Millennia B.C. These include the Amorites, Sum, Hana, Banu-Yamin, Shauu, and 'Apiru. Most of these were probably branches of the same great movement of peoples. The Amorites and their sub-tribes were known by various names such as Man u, Tidnum and Aamu_ The 'Apiru arc pe rhaps not strictly nomads, but in­ cluded YlIIriI)UJ Killed pc-oples, dispossc~d clementi and bandits, The (erms Habbalu, S A, GAZ and Hapiru Ire all associated with this group. These peoples moved on fOOl or donkey, and were feared and despised by more civilised peoples. Their tactics consisted of massing for large·scale raids which disrupted agriculture and trade. Uncontrolled settlement could completely break up the political organisation of more civilised statcs which were already in decline. IU many ofthese tribes assimilated the cultures into which they had infitrrated, they began to provide new ruling dynasties. Their tribal organiution, skirmishing weaponry and raiding tactics made them less ofa threat against those Stales which maimained their vigilance and kept up mi litary pressure upon them.

The ca mel was domesticated around the end of the 2nd MiUennium B.C., and was brought into the old civilisation of the Ncar East by such ·camel·nomads' as the Midianites, Amale1r.itcs, Ahlamu and Aribi. This added mobility added increased range and surpri.sc to their attacks. The AssyriaN seem to have fou nd the answer to these nomads, for in his Arabian campaign Ashurbanipal stationed troops at their wells and altacked with mobile forces of combined chariotry and oV1lry. Dc.nied access to their normal watering places and pushed into the desen, their movements we re tunailed and tbeir numbers began to dwindle.

The last group to make their appearance we re the 'horse-nomads', namely the Gimerraya, or Cimmerians and the Scythian!, known in Auyria as the Isbkuzaya. They we re, perhaps, really westem and eastern hranches oftbe same P«Iple. They appeared in the 81h century B.C., the Cimmerians passing through Uranu into Anatolia, leaving severe destruction in their wue. They were followed by the Scyths around the end oflhe 7th century who fought with the Medes and Babylonians as mercenaries and ass isted in the destruction of Assyria. Their arrowheads turn up in a11 the main regions of conflict a! this time. As most N ear·Eastern nations had been in the process of replacing chariotry with effective ClV1lry for the last few centuries, the sudden arrival of such cavalry specialists must have made a great military impact, hastening the end of the 'charint age' in tbe Ncar East. 6. MAJOR BATTLES OF THE PERIOD

ELAM c. 2630 B.C.

Mebarngesi, the King of Kish and overlord of Sumcr, dcfclllC:d an El3mitc raid and pillaged Elam.

URUK c. 2600 B.C.

Gilgamesh, the King orUruk, had rebelled against Kish in the reign of Mebinlgtsi and gained Uruk's indepc:ndcJlce, Gilgamesh having himself captured seven 'heroes' of Kish in baule.

Alier the datil of Mcbaragesi his $On, Agg:!, sent envoys to Uruk to demand the city'S submission. Gilgamesh refused to submit to K ish, though the older men orUruk's assembly wc~ willing 10 do so, :and mustered the young men for the militia.

However, within five days Agga and his army arrived bero~ Uruk having travelled the one hundred and sixty kilometres (100 miles) from Kish by boat down the Euphnnes. Taken by surprise and unable to break the siege GiJgamesh sought teTms and acknowledged Agga" ovcrlordship.

Both Kish Dnd Uruk we(e ovenhrown by Mesannepadda of Ur around 2500 B.C.

THE BATTLE OF THE GU-EDINA c. 2450 B.C.

The city-states of Umtrnl and Lagash had long disputed the ownership of the GU.EDINA ('e-dge of the desen') an area ofvaJuable impted land on their rommon border. The arbitralion of Mesalim, Ihe King ofKish, had resuhe-d in Lagash gaining the land some one hundred years before.

Umtrnl however re~ted this settlemem in Lagash's favour and during the reign ofEannatum ofLagash the soldiers of Umma inv::aded the GU.EDINA and threw down the boundary stelae. Eannatum raised his army and adVlllnced to m«t the Ummaites on Ihe disputed land.

In me battle thai followed Eannatum WlIS victorious, and Ush, the ruler ofUmtrnl, and many of his soldiers were slain. During Ihe banle EannalUm fought on foot in Ihe fronl rank of his spearmen unlil he was wounded by an arrow shOl by an Ummaile skirmisher.

The Lagashilcs raised twenty burial-mounds Ove r the enemy dead, re-dug the GU.EDINA's boundary dilc.h and replaced the s te lae thai trnIrked it. Eannatum de-dicated several shrines for Ihe vicrory and allowed the Ummaitts barl ey from the GU.EDINA in rerum for a heavy tlX.

THE FIELDS OF NINGlRSU c. 2425 B.C.

Following Eannatum's death Umma continue-d 10 harass Lagash over the ownership of the GU.EDINA by diver­ ting the water supply of the fields and leaving unpaid the tn: imposed by Eannarum.

Evenrually, Ur·lumma, the ENSI of Umma, led a combine-d army of Ummaites and allics (possibly from M ari) into Ihe disputed territory, destroying the shrines and stelae erected by Eannarum. The army of Lagash was le-d by Entemena, and it fought wilh the limmailes on the lands farme-d by the Temple of Ningirsu.

Umma was again defeated, and the fleeing Umm.aites wcre pursue-d into the city orUmma itself. Ur-Iumma's elite chariot squadr on of sixty teams was trappe-d on the bank oftbe LUMMAGIRNUNTA canal and wa.s wiped out. Five burial mounds were raised over Ihe dead Ummaites.

However, disputes rominue-d over the Umma·Lagash frontier. especially after the weakened Umm.a feU under the control of Zabalam. This situation was remedie-d to some eXlent through Lagash entering into a tTCaty offriendship wi th Lugal·kinishN!udu, the King of U ruk and Uf.

69 THE UNIFIC ATION OF SUMER c. 2316 B.C.

Lugal.zaggesi the King ofUruk and overlord ofSumer would seem to have gained control over Mui and possibly achieved enough influence in Syria for him to proclaim their vawlage.

In the twenty-founh year of his reign, however, Sargon (SharTU./tin, 'Legitimate King') the King of Kish, moved against Uruk and destroyed it. Lugal-zaggesi mustered a mighty army containing the forces of fifty ENSIs in orde r to crush Sargon's rtvolt but was himself defeated, taken prisoner and exhibiled in I nedt-sulCk at die Enlil gate in Kish.

Sargon foughl and won thirty·four battles 10 subdue Sumer, sacking Ur, Lagash and UmlTli. and washed his weapons in the waters of the Arab Gulf 10 signal his triumph.

'ANTELOPE' S NOSE' Reign of Pepi I 2289·2255 B.C.

Weni, commanding an Egyptian army of'many tens ofdiousands', intended to ~gage an army of Nomadic tribesmen in Southern Canaan. Weni divided his forces and despatched pan of the army nonhwards by land while the rt­ mainder made a seaborne landing at a point on the Canaanite coaSt called the 'Antelope's Nose' (probably near Mount Cannel). These: troops landed behind the: enemy, who wert CIIught between two Egyptian armies and defeated.

THE REVOLT O F BARHASHE, ZAKHARA AND ELAM e. 2272 B.C.

The short reign ofSargoo', 500 and suCtt5sor, Rimush, was almost entirely spent in suppressing the widespread revohs which broke OUt throughout the Empire on Sargon's death. In his inscriptions Rimush describes the defeat and sacking of seyeral major cities in Sumer and Akkad, including Ur, Adab, Umma and Df:r.

The reconquest of Df:r once more gave the Akkadians control of the main route to Elam, which ....'U in coalition with the smaller Stlltes of Barhashe and Zlikhara., (in south·west Iran).

AdYancing from Der, Rimush and the Akkadian army met the combined forces ofZakhara and Elam on the Kerkha river between Awan and Susa and heayily defeated them, killing 16,212 (variant: 17,211 ) and taking 4,216.prisoners. The purruit continued all the way to Susa, whicb was ClIIprured and its walls apin demolished. Two burial mounds were heaped up oyer the rebel dead, one lit the site of the battle and the other near Susa where most of the fleeing Elamites were cut down.

The revolt continued until the following year when a second Akkadian victory finally crushed the rebels, resulting in 9,624 El3Jllites killed and captured.

Rimusb was killed in 11 palace conspiracy in 2270 B.C. when his servantS 'killed him with their tablets'l Whether this refers to 11 wrillen character assassination or to his actually hllYing been beaten to death with large, clay tablets is uncenain. What is certain is that the unfonunate Rimush was succeeded by his brother, Manishtushu.

CO NQ UEST OF OMAN e. 2260 B.C.

After campaigning in south-west Iran to subdue the states of Anshan and Shirikum, ManishlUshu 'crossed the Lower Sea in ships' to secure the yitaltrade route that passed through Dilmun (modern Ba hrain) and Mapn (Oman ?).

Manishlllshu fought and defeated a coalition army of]2 kings drawn up for battle, seizing the rich silyer mines and transponing quantities of stone back 10 Sumer and Akbd.

THE THEBAN REVOLT e. 2133 B.C.

The end of the Old Kingdom in Egypt was brought about by an increase in the power and independence of the Nomarchs and 11 decline in the authority of the Pharaoh. In 21]] B.C. the Theban Nomarch, Menthuhotep I, ceas· ed to acknowledge the king of the Tenth Dynasty, residing at Herakleopolis in Nonhern Egypt, as his overlord. In respons.e, T efibi, Nomarch of Asyut, attacked the Thebans on behalf of the king, Wahbre.

Tefibi defeated the Thebans in a river battle and CliIptured the Nome of 'Ab.ydos '. Howeyer his troops were allowed to taY1lge the: ancimt ccmttery of Abydos, sacred through the supposed burial there of Osiris. Wahlwc deeply regretted this action and was convinced it would bring retribution.

70 The new Theban Nomarch, Inyotef II, counter-anacked with all the more determination bec:luse of this outnge, driving the enemy OUI of the Nome: of Abydos and pushing north to the Nome of Aphrodilopolis. Soon afte r, a new king, Merykare, nce:nded the throne and Akhtoy 11 !>tcame Nomuch of Asyut. Both made ptRtt with the Thebans.

THE UBERATION OF SUMER c. 2120 B.C.

Following the death of the deified Naum-Suen and his successor, Shar-bli-sh3rri ('King of all Kings'), the Akka­ dian Empire rapid ly collapsed into anarchy, due to successful revolts in Elam and Sumer and because of damaging raids by the Guti and Lullubi tribesmen in the east, the Hurrians in the north, and by the Amorit e:s in the west. For this pe riod the Sumerian King List states: 'Who was king? Who was not king?'

For a pe riod of abou t a hundred y~ r s Sumer was dominated by the Gutia ns who look advantage of the rurmoil in the country to sack Ag3de and establish a loose: overlordship. In general, Sumer's c.ilies were left 10 themselves (Gudea, the ENSI of Lagash, fought a ca mpaign in Anshan during this period) though the country wn poor, with little foreign trade and an insecure coumryside. Utuhegal, the king of Urnk, invoked the help of the gods and the semiodivine Gilgamesh to inspire the citizens of Uruk to fight the Gutians. Having pic ked his soldiers from the men of Uruk, Utuhegal marched to the major shrines of Sumer in tum to rally support, which he apparemly received since Tirigan, the King of Gutium and overlord ofSumer, se nt twO ambassadors to scc:k terms. Utubegal would not listen and imprisoned Tirigan's envoys. The king ofGutium had by tben mustered his forces and advanttd to meet Utuhegal who defeated him and cap­ tured bis officers and chiefs. Tirigan fled to Dubrom, but he and his fami ly were su rrendered to tbe victorious King of Urnk who set his fOOl upon Tirigan', neck.

THE REBELLION OF THEBES e. 2046 B.C. On !>th3lf of his overlord in Heraklcopolis, the Nomarch, Ankhtify,led the Nomes ofHic.rakonpolis and Edfu against Thebes, which wn allied wi th Koptos. Ankhtify rc.scued the town of Hermonthis which was under threat from the Thebans and invaded the Theban Nome on both ba nks of the Nile. Ankhtify desnoyed che town orVushen­ shen, a few miles north of Thebes.

The Thebans, under Menthuhotep II, fought back and conquered the Nome of Asyut. They advanced nonh,through the Hare Nome where there was much fighting, and the Oryx Nome where there was lillie resistantt, to r~ch Hentkltopolis which fe ll in 2040 B.C. The last outposts of resista nce were suppressed in the Delta and the Oam, whi le the frontiers were secured (the South as far as Nubia was alrady p:1rI of the Theban coalition du.ring the war against Hentk.lcopolis). Mcnthuhotep II took the title 'Smalawy', meaning 'Unite! of the Two Lands', and bcC2me Pharaoh of all Egypt and founder of the Middle Kingdom. The southcrn Nomarchs were abolished. The Nomarchs of middle Egypt were left alone for the lim e being, to be suppreucd by later kings.

'DAY OF SHEDYETSHA' e. 2046 B.C. During the civil wa rs between Thebes and Heraklcopoiis there was great diSlrcss in Egypt due to famine and the uvagcs of the opposing armies. When Menthuhotep [J marched into the Hare Nome (KI","m), the royal forces marched in to oppose him. The local Nomarch was Ncheri, who was chief-of-slafl" to Heukleopolis and commander of one of the lWO divisions of ber army. He resolved to save his Nome from the deprcdacions of both sides.

Neheri 's son, Kay, mobilised the young me n to fight in companies and formed II 'rearguard' in ShedyelSha con· sisting only of his followers. Here they foughl successfully againsl the forces or Uppcr and Lower Egypt, which included Medjay Nubians and Asiatic alUiliaries. Kay's young troops prOl:cctcd Ihe people ofche Nome who had ned into Ihe swamps, while che older men would not take the field againsl the royal forces. Kay opened his own house co refugees from the figh ting.

M~nwhile, Neheri's other son, Thutnakhte, held Slt:ldy in a fierce battle witb the kin g'5 troops. These actions were remembered in the Nome as the 'Day of Shedyetsh3'. Shortly afterward s Neheri decided to join the: Theban side.

71 THE FALL OF UR c. 2004 B.C.

The exertions of Shu·Suen ensured that Ihe Sumerian empire of the Third Dynasty of Ur remained more or less imact. Ebla, Mari, TUllul and Abarnum in the north·west, and Shubur 'on the shores of the Upper Lakes', tOgether with Magan, seem to have remained loyal, these areas being the extreme limits of the Empire at the best of times. However, shortly ancr the accession of Shu-Sucn's son, Ibbi-Sin, large areas of the empire began to break away, Eshnunna in his second year, Susa in his third, Umma in year five.

Also, in year five, the Amorites, or MAR. TV, broke through the 'Rampan of the West' and its fortresses, penetnlting to the hean of the Empire (as the defection of Umma at this lime shows). The Amorite incursions cut Ihe roads and broke down the vi tal chain ofcommunicalion in the Empire, removing the supervision of the king from his ENS/s. As Ibbi·Sin proved unable 10 help the ENSIs were thrown on their own resources and, one by one, declared their independence.

From his sixth 10 his eighth years, Ibbi·Sin built 'great walls' about Nippur an d Ur, the two most prestigious cities of his collapsing empire, whilst Lagash and even the administrative cemfe of Puzrish·Dagan broke away.

Elamite raiders cont ributed to the confusion in the country which resulted in a $evere famine. In order 10 secure ample supplies of gnltn for Ur, Ibbi-Sin sent an expedition under one of his generals, Isbbi·Erra, to Isin. Ishbi·Erra was successful in buying enough grain to feed thc population ofUr for fifteen years (though at a price some sixty times that of normal) however he then wrote to Ibbi-Sin 10 say that the Amorites com rolled the roads to Ur and prevented his return, unless it were by boat along the canals. To ensure the safe return of the gnlin Ishbi·Erra asked for 600 large boats and the governorship of Isin and Nippur. Ibbi·Sin was not in a position to refuse, though by the eleventh year of his reign the wily Is hbi-Ernl had proclaimed himself king of Isin and controlled much of the nonh of the country.

Ibbi·Sin stubbornly resisted the growing pressure from Isin and Elam and achieved some successes against the Amorilesj and, through Ihen enlisting their support, launched counter-auacks on Elam and Anshan in years eleven and twelve. In fact Ur, the capital and finally the only city of Ibbi·Sin's empire, continued the struggle fo r another rv.. e1ve years before eventually being captured and sacked by an Elamite army, with ibbi·Sin himselfled captive to Elam.

Within a few years Ishbi·Ernl managed to recapture Ur and was thcrefore able to assume the prestigious title: 'King of Ur, King of Sumer and Akkad'.

SEKMEM Reign of Senusret III

This battle was fought during a campaign of Sen us ret 1Il (1818-1841 B.C.) in Retjennu. The enemy were engaged al Sc:kmem. The Egyptian deployment included a vanguard led by the king and a rearguard under Sc:bek-khu, a commander of the royal retainers. The course of the battle is not recorded exactly but the rearguard was eventually brought into action.

ASHUR c. 1808 B.C.

The city of Ashur was ruled by a native dynasty following the fall of the Third Dynasty of Ur until the throne was seized by Ilukabhbu, the sheikh of an Amorite tribe that had settled in the }azirah. On his dealh the throne passed to his elder son, Aminu, while Shamshi.Adad, his other son, fled to Babylon, gathered a following of merttnaries, and captured Ekallati, a town on the T igis north of Ashur ,hat was part of the kingdom of Eshnunna.

Shamshi-Adad reigned there for three years before he succC(:ded in capturing Ashur.

ARRAPHA, QABRA AND ARBELA

Moving against the small kingdoms to the north-east and east of Ashur, Shamshi-Adad I (1813-1781 B.C.) allacked and reduced the fonresses of Arrapha in spring. Afler celebnlting the 'Festival of Heat' in Arrapha itSClfthe Assyrian army moved north, crossing the river Zab, and ravaged the harvest of the la nd of Qabra before macking tbe land of Arbela in late summer.

Shamshi-Adad I reorganised Arrapha and Arbela as Assyrian provincts and established his own governors.

72 THE SEALAND c. 1739 B.C.

Hammurapi's son and successor, Samsu·iluna (1749.1712 B.C.), faced a maior revolt in Sumer in c. 1740 B.C. in· stigated by I1uma·ilu who claimed descent from the last king of bin. This 'Dynasty of the Sealand' probably ruled from Uruku, near Lagash, and controlled the trade routes from Babylon to [he Arab Gulf.

A Kassite invasion prevented Samsu·iluna from reacting to this threat from the south until c. 1739 when he sacked Ur, Uruk and Kish.

The Se:aland Dynasty survived safe in the swamps of southern SUIDe! where the kings of Babylon were unable to reach them. In a vain elTon to trap Iluma·ilu, Abi~buh (1711 .1684 B.C.) dammed tbe Tigris to dry OUt the swamps! The Sealand maintained itself as a thre1llt to Babylon, with varying degrees of success, and was only finally con· quered by the Kusile king U1amburiash c. 1460 B.C.

THE SIEGE OF URSHU c. 1623 B.C.

The Hiuite king, Hattusilis I (c. 1650-1621 B.C.), was campaigning in Nonhern Syria attempting to defeat the Amoritc state ofYamldUld (centered on Aleppo). During these operations he was forced to conduct a long and bitter siege of tbe ciry of Urshu on the Euphnlles. The forces ofCarcbemish (possibly allies of Urshu) were occupying high land nearby.

The siege operations were conducted by a general, Sanw, and supervised by the king. These were alre1lldy going badly when the battering ram broke, whereupon Hmusilis ordered. new balledng ram, 'in the Hunian fuhion', to be made from timber in the mountains of Hassu, and a siege ramp to be constructed. However, the battering ram, and also a siege tower, were unfonunately delivered 10 the wrong place!

Eight attacks were mounted against the city without success, the delays involved resulting in unnecessary lou of life. It was found that the city was able to maintain contact with allies oU lside so the king ordered it to be more closely invested. In order 10 do this eight separate forces and eighty chario(S were positiooed around the city. However, a fugitive from Unhu revealed that this was still not isolating the city.

The fmal outcome of the siege is not clear, but tbe conquest of Yamkhad and Ca rchemish was finally achieved by Hallwilis's adopted son, Mursilis I, following Hattusilis's death in banle against Yamkhad.

BABYLON c. 1595 B.C.

After the capture of Carche:mish, Munilis I led a Hiuite army 5OU1h-ea5I, following the coursc of the Euphrates, on a raid deep intO foreign territory. The small kingdoms on Ihe Euphrates seem to have submilled 10 Munilis I withoul a struggle, allowing the Hittites 10 arrive unexpectedly at Babyloo.

Samsu..wtana, the King of Babylon, was taken completely by surprise by the Hittite attack.. Babylon was captured and $licked, and the statues of the national go d, Marduk, and his conson, the goddess Sarpanitum, were taken away as hocMy by the Hittites.

Having gained great prestige from his taking of Babylon, though not having the milimy rcsour~ to keep his con· quest, Mursilis retreated back up the Euphrates le1IIving tbe statue of Marduk at the city of Hana 00 tbe middle Euphrates.

Following the withdrawal of the Hittites, the throne of Babylon was seized fint by Gulkishar, the king of the Sealand, and theo by the Kassite kiog, Agum 11 (kakrime), in c. 1570 B.C. It is possible thatlhe Kauites helped Mursilis I in his attack on Babylon, thougb once established in Babylon Agum II made clear his intention to rule as a good Mesopotamian monarch by bringing back the smue of Muduk. and restoring the shrines of the gods destroyed by the Hitlites.

KAMOSE'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HYKSOS c. 1576 B.C.

Against the advice of his nobles, who were quite cootenl with the status quo, the Theban Pharaoh, Kamose, was delermined to re-unite Egypt and break the power of the Hyksos ruler, Apophis.

73 Kamos sailed nonh with a fleet, wbile his army marched on the banks of the Nile, pre~ed by an advance guard of scouting Medjay Nubians. Teti, an Egyptian noble, and one of the many that supponed the Hytuos, was besieged in his stronghold of Nefruisi. The Mediay were sent ahead to hold ofT any Hyksos reinforcements that might be sent. Nefruisi wa s taken by a dawn attack and its walls were destroyed. Kamose proceeded to Per·Shak, which was in panic (unfortunately pan of the account is lost and it is not known exactly what took place there). Kamose con· tinued his advance to Per·Djedken and the 'depot of going South', which was apparenlly a Hyksos naval base. To mack this position, Kamose formed his fleet in tine u tern, 'arrayed one aner anmber'. The bodyguard was on the river and Kamose was at the head of the line in a 'ship of gold'. A mtk·ship was despatched to probe the desen edge, followed by a dftlr·ship, (these presumably being special types of warship).

The Hyksos fleet was found to be in the base, the ships being l~ded with produce from Retjennu. It was here that Kamose is recorded as boasting that he would 'take over the cllariotry'. The entire nett was seized and Kamose. advanced into the Nile Delta. Here he desolated the lands of the nobles who had coliaboT1llted with or supponed the Hyksos. At this point Apophis sent a message to the King of Kush, an aUy of the Hyksos, requt:$ting him to attack Egypt from the south. Ramose intercepted this message and had it relurned to Apophis.

Turning south, Kamose ravaged the Nome of Cynopolis because it was the personal propeny of Apophis. While there, he took up a position at Sako to protect his rur from rebels (Egyptians serving the Hyksos), and sent a strong foret: overland 10 lay waste the 8ahariyeh Oasis, west of Cynopolis.

Following this Kamose continued south, crushing every rebel he found until he reached Thebes amid gmlt jubilation.

THE FINAL DEFEAT OF THE HYKSOS c. 1567 B.C.

II was len to Kamose's brother, Ahmose, to complete the expUlsion of the Hyksos. Kamosc had retann most of Egypt and Ahmose commenced the siege of Avaris, the Hyksos capital.

During the investment of the city. amphibious operations took place in the canal called Pa.Djedku and in the area to the south of Avaris. Following these evenu.. Avaris was captured. Ahmose advanced into Palestine and besieged the Hyksos monghold ofSh:Jruhen for three years before it fell, leaving the way clear for future Egyptian advance into Asia.

Ahmose then turned againsl his southern enemies, defeating the Nubians at Khenthennefer and the forces of Aala, an enemy from further south, at Tint·IO-Amun. On returning nonh, Ahmose defeated the last of the: Egyptian rebels, Tety·an.

Ahmose may have penetrated as far as Fenkhu (Phoenicia?) during the course of his reign.

MEGnmO 1481 B.C.

A coalition of Canaanite and Syrian princes, led by the king ofKadesh, rebelled against Egyptian rule. They prepa~ to block the advanet: of the Egyptian army, led by Thutmose III, al Megiddo in the plain of Esdradon.

The rebels were deployed ready to repel an entry into the plain from north or south. The Egyptians held a council of war at Yehem. Against the advice of hi s generals, Thutmose decided to approach through the narrow pass of Arona, which crossed the hills between the non hem and southern roultS to Megiddo. AdVancing on foot al the head of his troops, Thutmose led his forces through the pus. Fortunately for the Egyptians, the rebels had nOI prepared an ambush. The only action was a ski rmish fought by the rearguard of the column at Aruna.

The rebel coalition was completely unprepared to meet an advance from this direction and the Egyptians were able to get their entire force into the plain, and even make camp for the night, while the rebels were altering their deployment.

Early next morning the Egyptian army advanced. The southern wing was on a hill south of 'the brook of Kina', Ihe northern wing was in position north·west of Megiddo, the Pharaoh was in the cenlre.

The rebels were swe pt away by the onslaught and ned towards Megiddo. The inhabitants had closed the gates of the city and had to tie their clothes together to make ropes in ord er to haul the routers up the walls to safety. The Egyptian soldiers were more concerned with looting the enemy amp than taking advantage of their vulnerability.

74 After the bailie Thutmosc rebuked the soldiers for Ihis breakdown in discipline. Mcgiddo was surrounded by a timber palisade and the crops wert harvested by Ihe Egyptians. Faced with starvation the cit)' surrendered.

ALALAKH c. 1480 B. C. While in hi s yo uth, Idrimi an d his family were fo rced to nee Khlliba (Aleppo) and kek refuge with his uncles at Emar (Meskene) on the Euphrates nellir Carchemish. Finding lilltc honour in Ii\'ing on the charit y of his mother's fami ly, Idrimi lefl to seck hi s fonune with only his horses, his chariot and his groom. After a journey lhat took him through the lands of Ihe SU IU uibesmen Idrimi arrived in Canaan, where natives of Khalba and nellirby territories nocked to join the son of their old ruter, forming a band of habiTlI.

Idrimi lived with his habim for seven years before deciding 10 rcturn home, building ships to carry his men to the land of Mukish by sea. On landing in his homeland Idrimi gained the submission of his people, though had to fight for seven years against Ihe forces of Pn:lIarna, Ihe King of M ilanni and overlord ofldrimi's lands of Mukish, Niy and Ama'u. Eventually, Paratama accepted Idrimi as his vassa l and gave him charge of the city of Alalakh. As a vassa l of Mitanni Idrimi fought against the Hinites, destroying seven town s, and forced the Sutu within his borders to se nle in villages.

NAHARIN 1470 B.C. After an engagement on the ' heights of Wan', west of Aleppo, Thutmose HI reached the 'great bend of Naharin' (the EuphratCi south of Carchemish). T hutmosc was determined to cross the river as his grandfather, Thutmosc I, had done, but this time in greater foret, to anack the kingdom of Naharin (Mitanni). Many of the Sy rian stales that had hitherto opposed Thutmosc ....'Cre Mitannian vasuls. Thutmose ordered the tran!ponalion of ships overland by ox-ca rt from the coast, in order to make his crossi ng. The Egyptian army crossed over and engaged the forces of Naharin at Senur, whe re the Egyptians were victorious. This es tablished the limits of the Egyptian Empire on the Euphrates and earned its recognition by the other great powers of the Ncar East. Thutmosc remrned through the wi lderness ofNiy where he was able to hunt Etephan ts (later bunted by Assyrian kin ~ in this region). He was rescued from an angry beast by the commander of Ihe Iltnyt ('braves'), Amenemhab.

NUZI c. 1450 B.C. Border raids and skirmishcs were comm on between the kingdoms of Assyria and Arrapha even though both slates owed allegiance to Ihe king of Mitanni . One Assyrian raid on the Arraphan province of Nuzi rcsuhed in seven dimali, or manors, being anacked, Iheir sheep and oxtn seiud and the unharvested barley being burnt in the fiel ds. The A ssy ri~n ! took away 42 prisoners for ransom or s!:lvery, having kill ~d Ihree men in the mack.

IRRITA e. 134 8 B.C. Tushra113, King of Mitllnni, had bc1::n murdered by Shunarna who had Ihen usurped Ihe throne. The dead lUng's son, Man iwal.a, IIppealed 10 the Hin ite king, SuppiJuliumas, for hdp. The Hittites seil:Cd the opportunily to inslal a vassal regime in Milanni and supplied Maniwaza with equipment. The Hinile prince, Piyassilis, was placed in charge of the expcdilion. The IWO leaders met al Ca rchemish, on the front ier wilh Mitanni, and anempled 10 con· tact the town of Irrila. This town had been bribed 10 remain 10y.Jl to Shunama and would not allow Maniwaza to re-cnler the country. The combined forces of Mattiwlza and the Hillile$ then crossed the Euphrates and defeat ed the infantry and chariotry of Irrita which opposed them. This encouraged other cities in Milanni to acknowledge Maniwaza, except for the capital, Washshuganni, which had to be re·taken by force .

.KARDUNIASH c. 1340 B.C. Kadeshman·Kharbe, the King of Babylon (al this time known as Kar·Duniash) and the grandson of the Assyrian king, Ashur·uballit I, fought and defeated the SU leans on the fringes of the Arabian Desert as well as strengthening the fortresses in the area during the early part of his reign. However, the Kassite! rebelled agai nst him and killed him, placing the Kass it e, Shuzigash, on the throne. Ange red by the murder of his daughter's son, Ashur·ubaltit mustered his army lind marched soulh, defeating the Kanite army and killing Shuzigash. Following his victory , Ashur-uballit placed Kurigalzu, K:lIdeshman·Kharbe's son, on the throne of Kardunias h.

75 ASTARPA 133& B.C.

Mursilis II moumed a major campaign to conquer Anawa. The Hiuite: forces wefe mustered at Sallapa. where they were joined by the comingenl of the King of Care he m ish, a brothe r of Mursil is. The army croued. the river Schiriya (sangarius) and marched on Arz.:awa. At this point tbe troops witnessed a meteorite pass OV(T them, convinc· ing them dUll the slonn·god approved of their cause (tbis anC(:dote is probably Hittite propaganda). They were lhen joined by the King of Min, who luId r«'emly be:uen ofT an Arz.:awan attack. He informed Mursilis that the Arzawan king, Ukha-zitish, lay in his palace at Apsus (Ephesusn, having been injured when the meteorite landed, and that the Arzawan anny under his son, Piy:Hn:a·ndus, .... -:15 forming up at the river Astarpa on the frontier of Aruwa.

Further elated, the Hittite forces engaged those of Anawa on the Ast:lrpa and defe:ued them_ During the pursuit and mopping up following the bailie, Ukha·zitish and somc fugitives Oed o ... ersellS, while OIhers fled into the moun· tains of Arinnanda. Here they had to be surroundcd and starved OUI as Ihe terr.ain was impassable for horses. 15,000 were deported to Hani as forced labour.

Some refugees Oed into the highlands of Puranda, ruled by a son of Ukha-litish, Tapala·zunaulis. He led his forces OUI to attack the: Hittites but was defealed and pur.;ued back into the hills. Puranda was besieged and its water supply cut ofT. Tapala-lunaulis attempled to escape by night but was o\'ertaken by pur.;uing Hinile chariolry.

PIGGAINA.RESSA 1330 B.C.

Intending to Ic:ad a camp;!ign into the land of Aui·Hayasa, Mursilis II was mel atlhe city ofT egar.ama by officers, including gcncnl Nuwanus. Being advised by them that it WII~ tOO late in the yeu 10 anack this region, the king decided 10 make a punith'e expedilion inlo the land of Pigianllreua which had been raiding Hittilt ICTritOry. The army mustered at Harnna, and by forced marching al night Ihe inflln lry and chariotry entered steahhily into enemy lerritory. Scver.altowns we re allacked and razed. The inhabitants surrendered and become allies of the Hittites, supplying troops as infantry and chariot·warriors.

HUTUPIYANZAS' DEFENCE OF PALA 1324 B.C.

Prince HmupiYlln..:as had been given command of the region of Pal a b)' the father of Mursilis n, Arnuwan das II. lt was an undeveloped region without fortified tOWn5, and the prince did nOI luI ... e an anny at his disposal. Despite this, Hutupiyan..:as held Pala against de\'asuting Kukac:an allacits wilh only a small group of relainers operating from hide-outs in the mountains. Every attack was defutcd, ..... hile fortifications were gradUlllly established. Next spring Mursilis II marched in with the Hittite army. Making a baggage depot ncar the Kaskaean frontier, he advanced 10 capture the city of Tum manna which guarded a pass into Kaskac:an terrilory. The: enemy adv:mct; guards were surprised by a feigned retrtat and night ma rch, allowing their forces to be defc:atcd and pursued to Mount Kassu.

MT KASSU 1324 B.C.

The Hillite army of Munilis II (c. 1346·1320 B.C.) was campaigning in the Kaska·lands, which lay 10 the north of the Haui-Iand. The Kaskaeans hlId been pursued to the foot of M t Kassu ..... here they took up a defensive position on the SICCP slopes knowing that the (ernin was impassable to the Hittite chariotry.

Mursilis personally led an assault by his infantry up the mounlain, and the position was laken with hc:avy loss inflicted on the Kl5beans.

Aft er the ba ule, the enemy livestock in Ihe area was plundered, and the Hittites returned to their ma rching camp which had been set up nearby.

SUGAGA Reign of ED UI -Duari

Assyrian and Babylonian sources dirrer as to the date and outcome of the battle of Sugaga, near the city of Sugaga on the Tigris. However, it seems mosllikeiy that Enlil·nar.ari (1329-1320 B.C.), son of Ashur-uballit I and the King of Assyria, campaigned in the south aga inst Kurigailu II, King ofKarduniash. Kuriga lzu marched nonh to prevent (his and fought the Assyrians at Sugaga, inflicting a hcavy defeat on Enlil·narari who 1051 large numbers of soldiers killed and many officers caplUred. h appear.; thai later in Enlil·narari's reign the Assyrians defeated Kurigalzu in tWO battles.

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