Cross-National Analysis of Populist Media Oppression in the EU Csongor Bajnoczki Wright State University

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EUROPE’S PARALLEL MEDIA UNIVERSE: CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF POPULIST MEDIA OPPRESSION IN THE EU

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

CSONGOR BAJNOCZKI B.A., Wright State University, 2016

2018 Wright State University

WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

4/26/2018

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Csongor Bajnoczki ENTITLED Europe’s Parallel Media Universe: Cross- National Analysis of Populist Media Oppression in the EU BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts.

______Liam Anderson, Ph.D. Thesis Director

______Laura M. Luehrmann, Ph.D. Director, Master of Arts Program in International and Comparative Politics

Committee on Final Examination:

______Liam Anderson, Ph.D. School of Public and International Affairs

______Carlos Eduardo Costa, Ph.D. School of Public and International Affairs

______Lee Hannah, Jr, Ph.D. School of Public and International Affairs

______Barry Milligan, Ph.D. Interim Dean of the Graduate School

ABSTRACT

Bajnoczki, Csongor. M.A., International and Comparative Politics Graduate Program, Wright State University, 2018. Europe’s Parallel Media Universe: Cross-national analysis of populist media oppression in the EU.

This research is to show that populist parties in the European Union attempt to oppress the traditional established media as soon as they come in to power. The multiple regressions test the hypothesis of a negative relationship between the political power of populist parties and degree of media freedom. For the assessment and clarification of the relationship between the level of media freedom and the political power of populist parties, political rights and civil liberties country scores from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World reports, GDP per capita from World Bank, corruption perception indexes from Transparency International, and Grigorii

V. Golosov’s formula of effective number of parties are included as control variables. The proposed hypothesis enjoys empirical support in the context of Eastern Europe and both quantitative and qualitative data demonstrate that populist parties seek to tame the media as soon as they get the power to do so.

III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

1 INTRODUCTION……………………………………………….…………………….1

2 LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………………………..…………….7

3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS………………………………………………………23

3.1 METHODOLOGY………………………………………………………....23

3.2 DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION OF THE MODELS…………..…30

3.3 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS……………………..……………….…32

3.4 INTERPRETATION OF THE BEST MODEL……………………………35

4 CONCLUSION………………………………………………………...……….……42

APPENDICES……………………………………………………..………………………...…55

APPENDIX A…………………………………………...………………………..……55

APPENDIX B …………………………………………………….…………….………61

APPENDIX C …………………………………………………………..………………71

BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………...... 79

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1 Populist parties in Europe that gained parliamentary representation

after national elections between 2000 and 2013………...... 24

2 Coefficients and significances of variables plausibly affecting the

level of media freedom…………………………………………………………37

3 Lowest and highest scores of EU member states’ corruption scores

taking into account the 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015 Transparency

International’s corruption perception indexes……………………………….…40

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The European Union (EU) is more divided now than it ever has never been. A recent study shows that the European Union has been in decline since the collapse of the Soviet

Union, as there is no real geopolitical reason to preserve this economic community.1 There are not any necessary incentives for cooperation. European states have started prioritizing their national interests instead of contributing to the shared economic community that worked effectively until the early 1990s. In spite of the EU having the establishment of economic integration, its laws are the subjects of debate between the politicians of each member state. In addition to the disputes over EU laws, many European countries are still recovering from the

2008 financial crisis. Germany provided a bailout in 2015 in order to pull Greece out of its financial crisis. Spain has also had to apply for a €100 billion rescue package from the

European Stability Mechanism in 2012. The United Kingdom left the EU in July 2016 and has begun a formal process of separation.

Simultaneously, the EU has been facing one of its biggest challenges since its inception: the European migrant crisis that began in 2015. Even though Thies asserts that there has already been a coherent school of thought consisting of exaggerated claims, unexamined premises, and superficial comparisons about EU crises,2 the 2015 refugee crisis has posed a challenge that EU governments have yet to cope with properly. Millions of people started fleeing their homes from numerous countries in the Middle-East and Africa. Most of the migrants have been coming from Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, but the list of departure states consists of other countries as well. The migrants’ motives for leaving their countries are either political or economic for the most part. Wars such as the Syrian Civil War,

1 Sebastian Rosato, “Europe’s Troubles,” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011): 47. 2 Wallace J. Thies, “Is the EU Collapsing?,” International Studies Review 14, no. 2 (2012): 225-239.

the Iraqi Civil War, the War in Afghanistan, the War in Somalia, and the War in Darfur have been making people leave their homes since these inhabitants have no other place to live. Wars tore their countries apart. Economic migrants have been pouring in from the Western Balkans

(Kosovo, Albania), parts of West Africa (The Gambia, Nigeria), and South Asia (Bangladesh,

Pakistan) with the hope of having a more livable life in Europe.

The EU’s very survival partly depends on how the member states will be able to resolve the migrant crisis. As Castles and Miller contend, “migration is a central issue in international politics, and one of the most important questions of domestic politics in many countries.”3

Rayna Bailey refers to migration “as one of the key challenges facing the world today,”4 which can be evidently seen in the EU’s disjointed and, at times, hypocritical responses to the migration crisis. Even though the contemporary migration crisis is not limited to Europe,5 the mechanism of the EU relies on how policymakers respond to Europe’s most substantial crisis caused by the highest level of forcibly displaced persons since World War II.

As a side effect of these events, the EU has been witnessing the resurgence of populism in recent years. The parties challenging the status quo in western, central, and northern Europe tend to display a populist, anti-establishment, and anti-immigrant stance. Some contend that the influx of migrants to European countries have sparked the rise of new parties; more accurately, these right-wing populist parties are the ones that purport to defend a respective nation’s particular cultural values, because “immigration is the final frontier of globalization.”6 Natives have to interact with human beings from different parts of the world, which is why migration

3 Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration, (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1998), 14- 45. 4 Rayna Bailey, Immigration and Migration, (New York: Facts On File, 2008), 3-6. 5 Janos Besenyo and Endre Szenasi, “Unprecedented Migration Crisis Affecting Europe: Will Western or Russian Style De-radicalization save the European Way of Life? (Part 2),” AARMS: Academic & Applied Research In Military & Public Management Science 15, no. 2 (2016): 164. 6 Fareed Zakaria, “Populism on the march,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 6 (2016): 13.

might seem intruding and disruptive to many. Thus, this can give rise to fear, racism, and xenophobia.7

Ionescu and Luchian discuss the economic implications of the recent migrant wave that they declare to be “dramatic.”8 They claim that the wave of migrants could possibly help the

EU diminish its economic debts, however, they also highlight the threat it poses in terms of economic well-being of a country. In reference to the political impact, Mikuláš Dzurinda, former prime minister of Slovakia, draws attention to the phenomenon of the increasing number of votes cast in support of populist parties. He asserts that these parties come from diverse ideological backgrounds, but are linked by their characterization of politics as a fight between the good and the bad: the defenders of the oppressed citizens versus the supposedly corrupt elite. Making vast promises to their electorate, these parties challenge the central elements of democratic thinking and practice.9

Certain European populist leaders have already employed discursive means in order to tackle the sensitive topic of the migration crisis. They have tacitly fueled, through their emotional and solidarity-centered discourse, the intra-EU cleavages between the member states, as well as public attachment to far-right xenophobic ideologies based on the fact that the older population of Europe has been “traumatized by what it saw as an assault on the civilization and values it cherished and had grown up with. These people began to vote for populist parties and candidates that they believed would, above all, hold at bay these forces of cultural and social change.”10 According to recent findings,

the anti-migration platform has proved electorally successful both at national and European levels. For instance, Grabbe counted 114 members of anti-migration parties in the European Parliament (15.2% of MEPs) with explicit xenophobic views. In addition

7 Zakaria, “Populism,” 14. 8 Irina Ionescu and Larisa Luchian, “Economic Implications of the New Migration Wave in Europe,” Annals of The University Of Oradea, Economic Science Series 25, no. 1 (2016): 44. 9 Mikuláš Dzurinda, “The resistible rise of populism in Europe,” European View 15, no. 2 (2016): 171. 10 Zakaria, “Populism,” 13.

to that, Filippo Grandi, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, warned of a “climate of xenophobia” gripping Europe in 2016.11

Furthermore, four Central-European right-wing populist governments have been specifically using the migrant crisis in order to attack policies of the EU, while the popularity of these governments has been growing in direct proportion to the continuing influx of refugees. The case of Hungary certainly demonstrates this claim as the

opposition to the scheme is rather about the domestic politics of sovereignty and identity. Viktor Orban’s attack on the EU’s response to the crisis is a clear move to see off his main electoral threat, the far-right Jobbik Party, which is both anti-EU and anti- immigrant. A recent poll showed that his Fidesz Party’s ratings have indeed increased during the conflict over refugees. Orban and other nationalists across Europe claim that the Commission is using the crisis to push for further supranational powers, in an area that should remain a matter of national sovereignty.12

Scholars such as Yeung,13 Hampshire,14 Zakaria,15 and Mudde16 are mostly of the same opinion on the cause and effect of how populists come to power and gain popularity, because they generally claim that the support of populist right-wing parties have been growing due to increasing amount of migrants. The effects on Europe’s status and future from the social, political, and economic standpoints are also debated in the literature (economic: Ionescu and

Luchian; political: Dzurinda, Zakaria, and Yeung; social: Tausch, Zakaria).

Right-wing populist parties in Eastern Europe have sprung up with little opposition.

Viktor Orban’s Hungarian Civic Alliance, Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice, Boyko

Borisov’s Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria, and Andrej Babiš’ ANO 2011 right- wing populist parties rose to power with a similar agenda of anti-establishment, anti- immigration, anti-capitalist, and ethno-nationalist identity politics. In regards to Western

Europe, the Finns Party and the Danish People’s Party are already in the government as

11 Peter Yeung, “Refugee numbers hit record levels as 65 million forced to flee homes,” Independent (UK), June 21, 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/pugpig/7091316. 12 James Hampshire, “Europe’s migration crisis,” Political Insight 6, no. 3 (2015): 10. 13 Yeung, “Refugee numbers hit record levels.” 14 Hampshire, “Europe’s migration crisis.” 15 Zakaria, “Populism.” 16 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

minority coalition parties providing parliamentary support since 2015. The rise of upstart political parties across Europe is not simply a right-wing response to the rise of immigration, terrorism, and globalization. The political left is simultaneously rising alongside young left- leaning parties, who are now part of the ruling coalition in Greece, with the Coalition of the

Radical Left winning the Greek legislative election in September 2015. They have also taken significant numbers of seats in the parliament in Spain. As a result of populists gaining more power in the European governments, we can also see a significant decline in media freedom throughout the EU.

Even though there have been significant fallbacks in media freedom worldwide, there seems to be a greater decrease whenever populist candidates are elected in the EU.

Approaching the question deductively, populists want to tame the media not just because they want to keep people ignorant, but also because the media is dominated by liberals as well as elites of the establishment who generally hate populism. When people know less, then they also complain less; by oppressing the media, these parties are able to cut the negative voices out of media, thus people are not even able to express the problems with the government this way.

Looking at the relevance of the question from an inductive point of view, both quantitative and qualitative research on media freedom demonstrate noticeable issues in press freedom worldwide in the recent years, but the most significant fallbacks have been happening in

Europe where populists govern the country.

This study proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I attempt to provide a relevant literature review on media populism in the EU. I discuss governing populist parties’ effects on the traditional media in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Poland. Each case represents a different strategy of how the media has been oppressed due to the direct and indirect influences of these governments. Chapter 3 falls into four sections. First, I present the methodology of the research. Second, I describe and explain the statistical models. Third, I

discuss the results of the quantitative analyses. Fourth, I introduce and interpret the results of the model that works the best. Through a statistical cross-national analysis within the EU observing data in regards to the political power of populist parties and the level of media freedom since 1995, the hypothesis of

H1: THE GREATER THE POLITICAL POWER OF POPULIST PARTIES, THE

LOWER THE LEVEL OF MEDIA FREEDOM is tested in this research. Chapter 4 concludes the work with further implications for research.

The findings in the literature indicate a distinct trend that has been going on Western Europe, presenting interesting research opportunities for the future.

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

From the outset, it is important to differentiate between the terms ‘populism’ and ‘far right’ since both refer to parties that are anti-establishment and Eurosceptic; however, the two terms are not always the same. Cas Mudde defines populism as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’17 and argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people. This means that the underlying ideology of populists can be left, right, or center. For instance, Bernie Sanders is a populist politician, but he calls himself a democratic socialist. One of the main problems with the term arises from this example, because

Wróbel claims that politicians would rather define themselves as ‘liberals,’ ‘socialists’ or

‘nationalists’ than as ‘populists.’18 According to him, the reason is obvious since populism has a negative tone, reacts against elites and institutions, and is seen as anti-capitalist, anti-Semitic, anti-urbanism, anti-modernist, etc.19 Taking into account that extreme right ideology typically rests on nationalism, xenophobia, welfare chauvinism, and law and order,20 the “ideological core of the new ‘populist radical right’ ideology is a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism, of which nativism is considered the key feature.”21

17 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 41. 18 Szymon Wróbel, “Mourning Populism. The Case of Poland,” Polish Sociological Review 176 (2011): 438. 19 Ibid. 20 Kai Arzheimer and Elisabeth Carter, “Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success,” European Journal of Political Research 45, no. 3 (2006): 423. 21 Inta Mieriņa and Ilze Koroļeva, “Support for far right ideology and anti-migrant attitudes among youth in Europe: A comparative analysis,” Sociological Review 63, no. 2 (2015): 185.

Populist use of media

Even though there have been major fallbacks in media freedom worldwide, there seems to be a greater decrease wherever populist candidates are elected in the European Union (EU).

In their study of how institutional constraints jointly impact the so-called political budget cycles (PBCs) in the enlarged EU, Ademmer and Dreher argue that the EU shows substantial differences in the freedom of its media outlets: the younger Central and Eastern European democracies only established free press as a form of checks and balances on governmental behavior in the 1990s, and recent developments in Hungary, but also in old EU Member States such as Italy, call media freedom in the EU into question.22

They hypothesize that a strong media is likely to be an effective constraint to PBCs in the enlarged EU. They claim it increases the risk for incumbents to be detected and punished by the electorate when attempting to engage in PBCs, thus that is how they explain why there is a substantial variation in media strength within EU member states.23 Their study concludes that fiscal institutions may help limit PBCs in countries with a weak media environment, while a strong and powerful media capable of holding governments accountable and deterring PBCs is seemingly a more profound method to fully eliminate the occurrence of PBCs even in developed countries in the EU.24 Bajomi-Lázár also asserts that while governing parties in

Eastern and Central Europe might be weaker than parties in Western Europe, they tend to be more powerful than the opposition in their respective countries. In regards to media, this means

22 Esther Ademmer and Ferdinand Dreher, “Constraining Political Budget Cycles: Media Strength and Fiscal Institutions in the Enlarged EU,” Journal Of Common Market Studies 54, no. 3 (2016): 508-509. 23 Ademmer and Dreher, “Constraining Political Budget Cycles,” 511. 24 Ademmer and Dreher, “Constraining Political Budget Cycles,” 522.

that boards of media authorities could be easier designed to potentially empower the governing parties of being able to nominate and elect officials they desire.25

Rupnik and Zielonka explore the different approaches to the study of democracies in

East-Central European countries, their specific features and vulnerabilities, and provide an interpretation of the premature crisis of democracy in East-Central Europe in a broader trans-

European context. In respect of Hungary, they find that “there is a continuous, diffused overlapping of various functions and interests between the media, business, and political circles.”26 Àgh agrees that “the oligarchization has embraced and colonized all social sectors by turning them into the complete party empires,”27 which he calls the “democracy capture.”28

Moreover, Rupnik and Zielonka have also referenced the media tycoons and the suppression of media freedom in East-Central Europe; Bajomi-Lázár thoroughly discusses the case of

Hungary as do Rupnik and Zielonka.29 Krastev refers to creation of illiberal democracies in

Hungary and Poland, where the governing parties openly detest and criticize courts, central banks, and the media claiming that these “independent institutions cannot be trusted, because their independence is an illusion: either ‘we’ control them, or our enemies do.”30

In order to illustrate that not all leaders in East-Central Europe use their supermajority of mandates to establish a one party control over the media, Bajomi-Lázár brings up the case of

Gyula Horn, who was the Prime Minister of Hungary from 1994 to 1998. He and Orban had about the same amount of mandates in parliament; however, Horn was seeking to build a consensual media and making it possible for the opposition to have representatives in media

25 Péter Bajomi-Lázár, “The Party Colonisation of Media: The Case of Hungary,” East European Politics and Societies 27, no. 1 (2013): 77. 26 Jacques Rupnik and Jan Zielonka, “Introduction: The State of Democracy 20 Years on: Domestic and External Factors,” East European Politics And Societies 27, no. 1 (2013): 15-16. 27 Attila Àgh, “De-Europeanization and de-democratization trends in ECE: from the Potemkin democracy to the elected autocracy in Hungary,” Journal of Comparative Politics 8, no. 2 (2015): 12-13. 28 Ibid. 29 Bajomi-Lázár,“The Party Colonisation of Media,” 76. 30 Ivan Krastev, “The Unraveling of the Post-1989 Order,” Journal Of Democracy 27, no. 4 (2016) : 89.

regulatory bodies.31 On the other hand, the Hungarian Civic Alliance (FIDESZ) used its supermajority of mandates to “create a regime whereby the ruling party took all: multi-party media control gave way to one-party control.”32

A Freedom House report on Hungary notes that laws passed in 2010, when Orban’s

FIDESZ won the parliamentary elections, increased state regulation of the media and created new paths for political interference, which worsened the media environment further in 2015, particularly with the government closing down Hungary’s biggest independent newspaper.33

With the implementation of Act 82/2010, FIDESZ established the Media Council, a body within the National Media and Telecommunications Authority, with the main objective to track and implement the set of new media laws passed by the Parliament in 2010.34 Even though the pluralism and independence of the Media Council and the Media Authority are identified in the Media Act, “all five members of the Media Council were nominated and elected by FIDESZ”35 for 9-year terms. In terms of the political independence of the media,

Brouillette et al. find that state regulation of resources and support to the media sector is at the highest risk in Hungary. Their findings suggest that the media market is highly polarized with

TV and radio stations on the national, regional, and local levels being associated with either right or left politics, while the newspapers are also prone to a high level of political control. In short, “politicians and political parties exert direct and indirect influence and control over media via proxies, straw men, and oligarchs.”36

Poland’s status also declined from Free to Partly Free on Freedom House’s annual press freedom reports due to government intolerance toward critical reporting, excessive

31 Bajomi-Lázár, “The Party Colonisation of Media,” 85. 32 Bajomi-Lázár, “The Party Colonisation of Media,” 81. 33 “Freedom House on Hungary’s Freedom of the Press,” Freedom House, accessed August 8, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/hungary. 34 Amy Brouillette, Attila Bátorfy, Marius Dragomir, Éva Bognár, and Dumitrita Holdis, Media pluralism monitor 2016: monitoring risks for media pluralism in EU and beyond: country report: Hungary, (2017): 5. 35 Brouillette, Media pluralism monitor 2016, 5. 36 Brouillette, Media pluralism monitor 2016, 10.

political interference in the affairs of public media, and restrictions on speech regarding Polish history and identity, which have collectively contributed to increased self-censorship and polarization.37 In his comparative study of state media capture in Hungary and Poland, Kerpel notes that Jaroslaw Kaczyński’s Law and Justice party (PiS) changed the media law shortly after its election. Even though PiS promised to better and improve the quality of Poland’s public service media (PSM) during their election campaign, the ‘Small Media Act,’ enacted shortly after PiS’ election success, propounded a contrary future for Poland’s media building a direct reliance between the government and PSM as the Act declares that

 The Minister of the Treasury shall appoint and dismiss members of the Board of Management, including the President of the Board of Management (Article 1/2);  The regional branch shall be managed by a director appointed by the Board of Management (Article 1/5);  On the date the Act enters into force, the terms shall be shortened and mandates shall expire for the current members of the Management and Supervisory Boards of ‘Telewizja Polska - Spółka Akcyjna’ and ‘Polskie Radio - Spółka Akcyjna’ (Article 2/1).38

In a similar fashion to Hungary, the National Media Council was established in Poland, obtaining some serious responsibilities such as the nomination and election of the executive directors of the national media and other top directors and boards, outlined by the ‘Big Media

Law.’39 Finally, the Act on National Media Council outlines that

 [National Media Council] has the power to appoint and dismiss members of governing bodies of public radio and television broadcasting organisations and the Polish Press Agency (Article 2/1);  The Council shall consist of five members, of which three shall be appointed by the Sejm and two by the President of the Republic of Poland (Article 3).40

37 “Freedom House on Poland’s Freedom of the Press,” Freedom House, accessed August 8, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/poland. 38 “Small Media Act,” Republic of Poland, accessed March 12, 2018, http://www.krrit.gov.pl/Data/Files/_public/Portals/0/angielska/Documents/tekst-ze-strony_ustawa_en.pdf. 39 Beata Klimkiewicz, “State, media and pluralism: Tracing roots and consequences of media policy change in Poland,” Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 62, no. 2 (May 2017): 205. 40 “Big Media Law,” Republic of Poland, accessed March 12, 2018, http://www.krrit.gov.pl/Data/Files/_public/Portals/0/angielska/ustawa-o-radzie-mediow-narodowych-eng.pdf.

Klimkiewicz states that even though this might not seem like a serious issue at first, the composition of the body rather resembles political influence than regular social and cultural organizations.41

The Act also outlines that membership in the Council

may not be combined with: 1) functions in a body endowed with the executive power; 2) membership in a body of the local self-government; 3) employment in government or local self-government administration; 4) employment in the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland; 5) membership in the National Broadcasting Council or employment in the Office of the National Broadcasting Council.42

However, it did not stop the Sejm from appointing all three members for the National Media

Council from PiS: Krzysztof Czabański, Elżbieta, and Joanna Lichocka.43 Furthermore, PiS also benefits from supplementary support by Church organizations, such as Radio Maryja, which basically “guarantees a mobilization of the electorate on the level of tens of percentage.”44

In short, the PiS government succeeded in changing the nomination process to the

National Broadcasting Council and to other management boards of national Television and

Radio, since they were appointed by the council. The new members elected to the National

Broadcasting Council all had ties to the governing parties. As a result of changed supervisory and board structures, political pressure heavily influenced the news coverage of Polish media.45

The media environment has also been struggling in Bulgaria and Czech Republic.

Reporters face pressure and intimidation aimed at protecting economic, political, and criminal interests in Bulgaria, while the spread of concentrated media ownership, as well as its ownership by politicians, present limits to media pluralism and independence in both countries.

41 Klimkiewicz, “State, media and pluralism,” 207. 42 Poland, “Big Media Law.” 43 Klimkiewicz, “State, media and pluralism,” 208. 44 Arkadiusz Modrejewski, “Catholic and Nationalist Populism in the Current Poland,” Perspectives in Politics 10, no. 1 (June 2017): 28. 45 Aron Kerpel, “Pole and Hungarian Cousins Be? A Comparison of State Media Capture, Ideological Narratives and Political Truth Monopolization in Hungary and Poland,” Slovo 29, no. 1 (2017): 72.

Price contends that the main issues with Bulgarian media are unclear ownership and funding, which are due the undeniable association between business, politics, and crime figures.46 She further argues that the “Bulgarian Communist Party had made preparations for its survival.”47

According to her findings, the former nomenklatura drew “party funds abroad to secret foreign bank accounts…, which they reinvested in private enterprises and used to purchase or finance media outlets following the collapse of the regime”48 in the final stages of communism.

Andreev claims the privatization further helped the governing parties, as it was heavily manipulated to keep foreign investors away from contributing to a plagued and non-transparent media ownership in Bulgaria from the very beginning of democratization. 49

Kutseva asserts that there has been a “change in media representation of politics simultaneously with the change in the political status quo” upon the 2009 Bulgarian parliamentary election, when Bolyko Borisov’ Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria party (GERB) won the election, referring to the “‘mediatization’ of politics”50 in Bulgarian context. She finds that the complete merging of media and politics also took place as a result of the construction of the media image of Borisov, which goes along with Gurov and Zankina claiming that Borisov used the media for the creation of his political charisma through

“establishing a strong rapport with the media.”51 This kind of approach to mobilize support is not unusual in Bulgaria. Simeon II, the last reigning Bulgarian monarch and Prime Minister of

Bulgaria from 2001 to 2005, and Borisov both “skillfully use the mass media to amplify their charismatic appeal and increase their mass following, establishing a positive rapport with the

46 Lada Trifonova Price, “Journalists’ Perceptions of Nomenklatura Networks and Media Ownership in Post- communist Bulgaria,” Medijske Studije 6, no. 11 (2015): 28-29. 47 Price, “Journalists’ Perceptions,” 27. 48 Price, “Journalists’ Perceptions,” 27. 49 Svetlozar A. Andreev, “The unbearable lightness of membership: Bulgaria and Romania after the 2007 EU accession,” Communist And Post-Communist Studies 42, no. 3 (2009): 389. 50 Gergana Kutseva, “New Realities: ‘Mediatization’of Politics or ‘Politicization’ of Media Content,” Media and Politics (2011): 147. 51 Boris Gurov and Emilia Zankina, “Populism and the Construction of Political Charisma Post-Transition Politics in Bulgaria,” Problems Of Post-Communism 60, no. 1 (January-February 2013): 8.

media and saturating the media with frequent appearances.”52 Nevertheless, having a good relationship with the media and being regularly in the media are neither a crime nor undemocratic. However, there is the question of why Bulgaria is constantly ranked lower than any other EU member on the media freedom indexes of Freedom House and Reporters Without

Borders (RSF).

The reason why GERB enjoys unusual media comfort is mainly due to the close links of

Borisov and Emil Karanikolov, Minister of Economy, with the media mogul Delyan Peevski, a former head of Bulgaria’s main intelligence agency and owner of the New Bulgarian Media

Group. RSF finds that “his group has six newspapers and controls nearly 80% of print media distribution.”53 In addition to that, the first act of parliament of the second Borisov government, which was formed after the 2013 election, was to place Delyan Peevski for the post of chief of

National Security Agency.54 Even though GERB removed Peevski from his position, there have been too many questionable assignments in the Borisov governments. Keeping these in mind, it is not difficult to see how “years of rampant corruption and shady deals behind the back of the public” helped the government delay any structural reforms and pursue populist policies with “no critical headlines in the media”55 about Borisov and his government.

Císařová and Metyková demonstrate how the sale of Ringier Axel Springer CZ, Czech publishing house, to businessmen Daniel Křetínský, Patrik Tkáč, and Andrej Babiš led to a major rearrangement of Czech media.56 In order to illustrate the significance of the situation,

Mafra was founded in 1992 to become the largest publishing house in Czech Republic. It was first acquired in 1994 by the German group Rheinisch-Bergische Druckerei- und

52 Gurov and Zankina, “Populism and the Construction of Political Charisma,” 10. 53 “Reporters Without Borders on Bulgaria’s Freedom of the Press,” Reporters Without Borders, accessed March 10, 2018, https://rsf.org/en/bulgaria. 54 “A New Hope – #ДАНСwithme,” Borislav’s POV, accessed March 13, 2018, https://borislavkiprin.com/2013/07/15/a-new-hope-danswithme/. 55 Kutseva, “New Realities,” 155. 56 Lenka Waschková Císařová and Monika Metyková, “Better the Devil You Don’t Know: Post-Revolutionary Journalism and Media Ownership in the Czech Republic,” Medijske studije 6, no. 11 (2015): 11.

Verlagsgesellschaft GmbH, then in 2013 by a Czech holding group called Agrofert, which is owned by Andrej Babiš. Nicknamed the Czech Donald Trump, Andrej Babiš made his entry into Czech national politics in 2011, and was elected Prime Minister of the Czech Republic in

December 2017. Kim contends that “Babiš’ control over the largest holding company, influence in the government, and role as the owner of one of the most established media conglomerates pose a clear conflict of interest,”57 which displays contradictory alliance between the state and the media. Thereby, Císařová and Metyková propose that “Babiš’ purchase of the [Ringier Axel Springer CZ] publishing house needs to be seen in the light of his entry into Czech national politics in 2011.”58

In order to comply with the Czech conflict of interest law, he was required to put his agribusiness firm, Agrofert, into trusts. He had his wife, Monika, oversee it. Císařová and

Metyková also conducted an interview with Daliber Balsinek, a journalist who left a prestigious position in order to avoid working for an owner associated with plausible conflict of interests in business and politics, who perfectly sums up the difficulties of media pluralism in

Czech Republic stating that

there is a conflict of interests in the business, investment area, because he [Babiš] receives European Union funding through the [Czech state] budget. His grip on business is huge because he is one of the biggest employers in the country. And, well, it multiplies at an unbelievable rate when he owns a political party, which oscillates between the first and second place in popularity polls. And I could not at all imagine that under the circumstances I could work for them, for this publishing house, because what actually occurs then is if not outright censorship then quite significant self- censorship.59

After having staged a controversial auction to grant national broadcasting licenses,

Greece continues to struggle to end corruption and political influence on content published by

57 Min J. Kim, “Media Freedom in the Czech Republic,” Volume 34 - Post-Communist Reform in the Czech Republic: Progress and Problems, (2016): 104. 58 Císařová and Metyková, “Better the Devil You Don’t Know,” 11. 59 Císařová and Metyková, “Better the Devil You Don’t Know,” 13.

private and public outlets for the well-functioning of the country’s media.60 Even though the

Coalition of the Radical Left party (SYRIZA) claimed that the media law was implemented to crack down on corruption and to better regulate digital terrestrial television licensing based on the argument that having eight channels was no longer sustainable for a small country like

Greece, the liberal conservative New Democracy stated that government was seeking “absolute control” of the media, whereas the social democratic Panhellenic Socialist Movement “charged

SYRIZA with disrespecting democracy and freedom of speech.”61 In short, critics argued that the government’s main incentive was to adjust “established TV barons - who have opposed

Tsipras’ SYRIZA in the past - with more to his liking.”62

The widespread outcry and controversy were the result of the new media law

“bypassing the independent regulatory authority, Ethniko Symvoulio Radiotileorasis (ESR), and the arbitrary limitation of the number of licenses placed commercial television under the tutelage of the state and reduced pluralism.”63 Moreover, the Tsipras’ government also raised almost € 250 million from the broadcast license auction, which significantly worsened the

Greek citizens’ attitudes toward the public media, who believe that several journalists and media outlets are strongly associated with political and business corruption.64 On the other hand, the plenary session of the Council of State, Greece’s supreme administrative court, ruled that the new licensing law was unconstitutional, because the ESR is in charge of the licensing

60 “Reporters Without Borders on Greece’s Freedom of the Press,” Reporters Without Borders, accessed August 9, 2017, https://rsf.org/en/greece. 61 Niki Kitsantonis, “In Greece, a Fierce Battle Over TV Licenses,” New York Times, August 29, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/30/world/europe/greece-cracks-down-on-triangle-of-corruption-in-tv.html. 62 Mark Sweney, “Greece cuts TV channels from eight to four in controversial licence auction,” The Guardian, September 2, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/sep/02/greece-tv-channels-licence-auction. 63 Irini Katsirea, “Digital terrestrial television licensing in Greece: Curiouser and curiouser,” International Journal Of Digital Television 8, no. 2 (June 2017): 3. 64 Staff, “Greek Press Freedom is pronounced a “continued disappointment” by experts and public opinion,” Medium, June 4, 2017, https://medium.com/athenslivegr/greek-press-freedom-is-pronounced-a-continued- disappointment-by-experts-and-public-opinion-9ea15d0c7982.

procedure, not the government.65 RSF also heavily criticized the Greek media for their “attempt to meddle DOL, one of Greece’s most prominent newspaper groups, by appointing former

SYRIZA MP in charge for its rescue,”66 resulting in the Greek media being in the worst state in its history.

Regarding the first populist media tycoon, Padovani represents the context of Italian media legislation and media concentration that have favored the interests of Silvio Berlusconi, and the role of progressive agency - media professionals, citizens’ groups - as they worked within those constraints to keep alive the flames of democracy during the ‘Berlusconi era’.67

Statham argues that the free press is essential to reach political pluralism. It is also supposed to help citizens decide on their party preference prior to elections. However, the election of

Berlusconi in March 1994 raised serious concerns toward the political objectivity of the Italian news media, because Fininvest corporation, controlled by Berlusconi, “owns a near monopoly of publicity and private television channels in Italy.”68 Needless to say that his political opponents were constantly criticizing him and his party, Forza Italia, for threatening political objectivity displayed in the media and for making it nearly impossible for other parties to effectively participate in the market of political campaign messaging.

Italian law outlines that politicians are not allowed to own newspapers, which

Berlusconi resolved by handing over his newspaper, il Giornale, to his brother Paolo, who has been under house arrest due to charges of corruption.69 On top of having a continual conflict of public and private interests by retaining a monopoly holding of national television and media resources, Berlusconi also designed a guideline for political competition, which is now

65 Katsirea, “Digital terrestrial television licensing in Greece,” 3. 66 Reporters Without Borders, “Greece.” 67 Cinzia Padovani, “’Berlusconi’s Italy’: the media between structure and agency,” Modern Italy 20, no. 1 (2015): 41-57. 68 Paul Statham, “Berlusconi, the Media, and the New Right in Italy,” Harvard International Journal Of Press/Politics 1, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 88. 69 Statham, “Berlusconi, the Media, and the New Right in Italy,” 93.

widespread throughout the world. Instead of outlining detailed policy recommendations like regular politicians do, “Berlusconi used the language of the ‘person in the street’… - for example, he would cut public spending without raising taxes” without any further explanation of how the public deficit would be minimized or that “he was the only alternative to communism.”70 Statham contends that Forza Italia’s electoral victory only two months after of its formation is strongly associated with Berlusconi’s power in media outlets. He finds that

“Forza Italia alone just spent less than half of the total expenditure on political campaigning by all political parties…, and accounted for just less than 70% of the total expenditure on airtime.”71

Natale and Ballatore state how Italy’s other contemporary populist politician, Beppe

Grillo, initiated an actual media “war between the old, analogue, unfair, polluting world, and the digital, ecological, web-centric, and just world.”72 They find that Grillo’s blog extensively discusses that there are two diverging blocks in Italy: “one which finds information on the

Web, and the other which finds disinformation in newspapers and television.”73 Natale and

Ballatore demonstrate how the incentives of Grillo’s ongoing criticism and discrediting struggle against traditional media are the results of his past experience in the media in the

1990s. They claim that his career and character were heavily influenced by his dismissal from

RAI and exclusion from television and the printed press.74 Grillo, thus, identified the objectives of his Five Star Movement (M5S) matching his own struggles to bring down the political establishment and the old media.

Grillo’s strategy also goes along with the findings of Hameleers and Schmuck, who contend that social media channels contribute to the success of populism by providing an

70 Statham, “Berlusconi, the Media, and the New Right in Italy,” 91. 71 Statham, “Berlusconi, the Media, and the New Right in Italy,” 94. 72 Gianroberto Casaleggio and Beppe Grillo, Siamo in guerra. Per una nuova politica (Milan: Chiarelettere, 2011). 73 Simone Natale and Andrea Ballatore, “The web will kill them all: new media, digital utopia, and political struggle in the Italian 5-Star Movement,” Media Culture & Society 36, no. 1 (January 2014): 116. 74 Natale and Ballatore, “The web will kill them all,” 117.

attractive environment for both politicians and ordinary citizens to spread their political ideas.

Building on previous research, this study argues that attributing blame to others, such as immigrants or the political elites, for causing major societal problems facing the ordinary people is central to populism.75 They employed a 2 × 2 between-subjects comparative survey experiment to investigate the effects of these blame attributions in populist online messages on citizens’ exclusionist and anti-establishment populist attitudes in two Western European countries, Austria and the Netherlands (N = 646). Furthermore, the authors distinguished between populist politicians and ordinary citizens as communicators of populist messages.

They find that the messages blaming elites or immigrants bolstered citizens’ populist attitudes, but only for those who supported the source of the message. On the other hand, for those who opposed the source, populist blame attributions reduced populist attitudes. These findings reveal how the core elements of pervasive populist messages, attributing blame, affect the populist attitudes of citizens.

Grillo and Casaleggio, co-founders of the M5S, further claim that television is the most

“dreaded symbol of the corrupt political establishment,” and they also view newspapers as

“part of the corrupt analogue ancien régime.”76 Grillo’s ultimate goal is a type of cyber-utopian theory, in which the web will eventually “kill” the media as well as ‘old’ party politics resulting a digital direct democracy.77 Ironically, Grillo used to smash a computer at the end of each performance portraying how computer is a tool of globalization, worsening people’s welfare and social justice, when he was touring in theatres with a show attacking corruption and turbo capitalism.78

75 Michael Hameleers and Desirée Schmuck, “It’s us against them: a comparative experiment on the effects of populist messages communicated via social media,” Information, Communication & Society 20, no. 9 (2017): 1425. 76 Natale and Ballatore, “The web will kill them all,” 116. 77 Natale and Ballatore, “The web will kill them all,” 117. 78 “The internet and corruption - Transparency and accountability online,” Global Information Society Watch, accessed March 7, 2018, http://akgul.bilkent.edu.tr/GISW/GISWatch12_web.pdf.

In short, the literature indicates a significant decline in media freedom in the EU allegedly as a result of populists gaining more power in Eastern European governments. In the meantime, populist parties “have won 28 per cent of the seats in the European Parliament”79 in conclusion of the 2014 European Parliament election, thus it is presumable that populists gaining more power in the European Parliament negatively affects media freedom throughout the EU.

Overall, there have been a wide range of strategies how EU populist politicians attempt to tame the media once they are in power as outlined in the literature. This phenomenon is observable throughout the EU with scholars discussing corruption in the media, which could be media laws in Hungary, Poland, and Greece, TV channel auctions in Greece, an open war against the traditional media in Italy, or media oligarchs in Italy, Czech Republic, and Bulgaria.

The literature review provides anecdotal evidence from various countries about populist parties oppressing the media. The literature, however, is missing a comprehensive study embracing every EU populist party’s behavior toward the media as a whole in the EU.

This research aims to fill this gap by examining every EU member state’s populist party’s political power stance and the level of media freedom toward the established media since 1995. Taking into account that the number of cases is high both in contexts of domestic,

N=110, and European Parliament elections, N=83, quantitative analysis is an appropriate way to proceed with the research. Since most of the empirical evidence in regards to media populism is anecdotal and usually relates to individual cases, quantitative analysis is an adequate way to overcome the possibility of these cases being deviant in order to demonstrate the generalizability of populist media oppression in the EU. Statistical analysis can also highlight whether media freedom is in danger throughout the EU or media pluralism is in

79 Oliver Treib, “The voter says no, but nobody listens: causes and consequences of the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 European elections,” Journal Of European Public Policy 21, no. 10 (2014): 1551.

decline exclusively in the countries, where populist parties rise to power. The con for quantitative research, however, is that it is insufficient to get specific details that we might be able to achieve with qualitative research. Thus, the function of the literature review is also part of creating an ideal research by complementing the use of quantitative analysis and building a strong theoretical foundation.

Gunther and Mughan,80 Klimkiewicz,81 and Karppinen82 argue that media pluralism is essential for the existence of legitimate and healthy democracy. Keeping this in mind, this research strives to strengthen the external validity and applicability of the widespread school of thought that populism, generally speaking, is a threat toward democracy83 by oppressing the media. Moreover, the inclusion of control variables in the research such as corruption, GDP per capita, political rights, civil liberties, and the number of effective parties could also specify implications for plausible future research whether any of these variables influence the level of media freedom.

It is noticeable that the majority of the literature discusses populist media oppression in the Eastern European context with the exception of Italy being the only Western European EU member state electing a populist party since 1995. However, we cannot automatically suppose that Western European populist parties tame the media as Eastern European populist parties do based on the single example of Italy, because it could be an outlier, deviant case.

Moreover, this work also briefly outlines a different trend that has been going on in

Western Europe with respect to populist parties being in control of social media platforms, which possibly increases their popularity. Populist parties’ growing support should not be considered as a surprise taking into account the effect of echo chamber, meaning that Twitter

80 Gunther and Mughan, “The Media in Democratic and Nondemocratic Regimes,” 1. 81 Klimkiewicz, “Is the clash of rationalities leading nowhere?,” 45. 82 Karppinen, “Making a difference to media pluralism,” 9. 83 Bart Bonikowski, “Ethno-nationalist populism and the mobilization of collective resentment,” British Journal Of Sociology 68, no. 1 (November 2017): 181.

accounts held by politicians with ideologically extreme views have a greater number of followers than their peers with moderate views. This phenomenon further polarizes respective populations, because confirmation bias and selective attention in search for information increases sense of rightness and social support for views, and lack of viewpoint diversity to challenge views. The divergence of political approaches and positions between parties also leads to the loss of ideological overlap between parties, making the existence of a healthy democracy more difficult.

CHAPTER 3

Quantitative Analysis

This chapter falls into four sections. First, I present the methodology of the research.

Second, I describe and explain the statistical models. Third, I discuss the results of the quantitative analyses. Fourth, I introduce and interpret the results of the model that works the best. Formally stated, the working hypothesis to be tested is:

H1: THE GREATER THE POLITICAL POWER OF POPULIST PARTIES,

THE LOWER THE LEVEL OF MEDIA FREEDOM

3.1. Methodology

In terms of conceptualizing the term populist party, I use Stijn van Kessel’s definition asserting that “populism is generally associated with a Manichean vision of society (pitting the good ‘people’ against the corrupted ‘elites’), a conception of ‘the people’ as a homogeneous entity, and a defense of popular sovereignty;”84 even though populism is also habitually associated with xenophobic politics and parties of the extreme or radical right in the European context, his research also considers populist parties beyond the radical right. In his book of

Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent?, van Kessel provides a table indicating populist parties across Europe that gained parliamentary representation after national elections between 2000 and 2013, thus I automatically implement the parties he identifies in the table, and use his definition to determine populist parties for the other periods of the research. The data in Table 1 presents his findings.

84 Stijn van Kessel, Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent? (New York: Springer, 2015), 10.

Table 1: Populist parties in Europe that gained parliamentary representation after national elections between 2000 and 201385

Country Party Elections* Austria Freedom Party (FPÖ) 2002-2013 Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) 2006-2008 Team Stronach (TZ) 2013 Belgium Flemish Interest (VB) 2003-2010 National Front (FN) 2003-2010 List Dedecker (LDD) 2007-2010 Bulgaria National Movement Simeon the Second (NDSV) 2001 Attack Party (Ataka) 2005-2013 Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) 2009-2013 Law, Order and Justice (RZS) 2009-2013 Croatia Croatian Laborists - Labour Party (HL-SR) 2011 Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević (HSP-AS) 2011 Cyprus - - Czech Republic Public Affairs (VV) 2010 ANO 2011 (ANO) 2013 Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit) 2013 Denmark Danish People’s Party (DF) 2001-2011 Estonia - - Finland True Finns (PS) 2003-2011 France National Front (FN) 2002-2012 Germany Party of Democratic Socialism/The Left (PDS/Linke) 2002-2013 Greece Popular Orthodox Party (LAOS) 2004-2012 Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) 2004-2012 Independent Greeks (ANEL) 2012 Hungary FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Alliance (FIDESZ-MPSZ) 2006-2010 Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) 2006-2010 Iceland Citizens’ Movement (BF) 2009 Ireland Sinn Féin (SF) 2002-2011 Italy Forza Italia (FI)/People for Freedom (PdL) 2001-2013 Northern League (NL) 2001-2013 5 Star Movement (M5S) 2013 Latvia All for Latvia! (VL) 2006-2010 Lithuania Labour Party (DP) 2004 Order and Justice Party (TT) 2004-2012 Luxembourg Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR) 2004-2013 Malta - - Netherlands List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) 2002-2006

85 van Kessel, Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent? (New York: Springer, 2015), 89-90.

Liveable Netherlands (LN) 2002-2003 Freedom Party (PVV) 2006-2012 Norway Progress Party (FrP) 2001-2013 Poland Self Defence (SO) 2001-2007 Law and Justice (PiS) 2005-2011 Portugal - - Romania Greater Romania Party (PRM) 2000-2012 People’s Party-Dan Diaconsecu (PP-DD) 2012 Slovakia Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) 2002-2012 Direction (Smer) 2002-2006 Slovak National Party (SNS) 2002-2012 Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OL’aNO) 2012 Slovenia Slovenian National Party (SNS) 2000-2011 Spain - - Sweden Sweden Democrats (SD) 2002-2010 Switzerland Swiss People’s Party (SVP) 2003-2011 League of Ticinesians (LdTi) 2003-2011 Swiss Democrats (SD) 2003-2011 Geneva Citizens' Movement (MCG) 2007-2011 UK - - *This column indicates in which elections between 2000 and 2013 an individual party has participated as a populist party. This does not mean that the party has also won seats in the given election years.

To operationalize the independent variable - populist parties’ performance in European

Parliament elections and domestic elections -, I rely on data from the website of the European

Parliament,86 the Norwegian Centre for Research Data’s European Election Database,87 Nohlan and Stover’s book of Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook,88 and the various Ministries of

Interior of European Union (EU) governments.

In terms of the methodology, I use multiple regressions to test the hypothesis of a negative relationship between the power of populist parties and degree of media freedom. To measure the power of populist parties, I rely on election results. Since elections can take place

86 “European Parliament Elections,” European Parliament, accessed October 1, 2017-December 10, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu. 87 “European Election Database,” Norwegian Centre for Research Data, accessed October 1, 2017-December 10, 2017, http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/about. 88 Dieter Nohlen and Philip Stover, Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2010)

in different years and more frequently among the some EU member states than others, I use the closest and most recent domestic election results of the years of 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and

2015 for the independent variable in order to achieve consistency throughout the work. For example, Italy held general domestic elections in 2006 and 2008 between the data points of

2005 and 2010, so I disregarded the election results of 2006 and considered the election results of 2008 for the 2010 data point.

For the dependent variable, I use Freedom House’s Freedom of Press reports of 1995,

2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015. Freedom House’s dataset is the most ideal choice for the data collection of media freedom, because “Freedom of the Press is the most comprehensive data set available on global media freedom and serves as a key resource for policymakers, international institutions, journalists, activists, and scholars worldwide.”89 Another reliable source for the measurement of media freedom is Reporters Without Borders’ (RSF) annual word press freedom indexes. However, RSF changed the methodology and the scale for the measurement of press freedom in 2015, as well as not every EU member state’s press freedom are analyzed in the early years of RSF. Nevertheless, Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press “receives no governmental funding,”90 thus the objectivity and validity of media freedom scores are assured.

In order to maximize the number of cases for analysis, I code all 28 EU countries’ media freedom scores and the political power of their populist parties in the years of 1995,

2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015, however, countries are only included once they joined to the EU.

For instance, the Czech Republic joined the EU in 2004, thus their media freedom scores and the political power of their populist parties are analyzed only in the years of 2005, 2010, and

2015. This step is motivated by the Copenhagen Criteria, which define whether a country is eligible to join the EU. The criteria state that

89 “Freedom of the Press,” Freedom House, accessed April 15, 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/report- types/freedom-press. 90 “Freedom of the Press,” Freedom House.

Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.91

Thus, it is presumable that an EU member state’s media freedom along with other democracy indicators are strong and stable by the time the country is part of the EU. As a matter of fact, the suppositional transparency and accountability of the EU should actually weaken this research in an idealistic world based on the requirements outlined by the Copenhagen Criteria.

Overall, this yields 110 data points for the domestic election models: 5 years of media freedom scores and the political power of populist parties x 15 countries that have been part of the EU before 1995: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,

Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (=75) + 3 years of media freedom scores and the political power of populist parties x 10 countries that have been part of the fifth enlargement in 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,

Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia (=30) + 2 years of media freedom scores and the stance of the political power of populist parties x 2 countries that have joined the EU upon the sixth enlargement: Bulgaria and Romania (=4) + 1 year of media freedom scores and the stance of the political power of populist parties x 1 country the EU as a conclusion of the seventh enlargement: Croatia (=1) = 110).

With respect to the European Parliament election models, the 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections are taken into account for analysis to observe whether populist parties are capable of taming the media throughout the EU yielding a total of 83 data points: 3 years of media freedom scores and the political power of populist parties x 27 countries that have been part of the EU as of 2004: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,

91 “Copenhagen Presidency conclusions,” European Council, accessed April 15, 2018, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf.

Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,

Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia Spain, Sweden, United

Kingdom (=81) + 2 years of media freedom scores and the political power of populist parties x

1 country that have been part of the seventh enlargement in 2013: Croatia (=2) = 83. However, it is important to mention that Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007 and held European

Parliament elections in 2007, 2009, and 2014, and this research consists of all these data points.

Consequently, both of Croatia’s European Parliament elections are included in the study even though they took place in consecutive years (2013 and 2014). Logically, these years’ level of media freedom was considered for analysis.

In order to assess and clarify the relationship between the level of media freedom and the power of populist parties, control variables also need to be included in the study. Solis and

Antenangeli argue that as governments become more corrupt, governmental efforts to censor both forms of media - traditional (print and broadcast) and new (Internet) - are likely to increase.92 Abed Masrorkhah and Lehnert’s study suggests that it might be beneficial to look into economic growth and development as control variables; they find that economic agents in an ‘unfree’ media environment would have more discretionary powers to disclose good news immediately, while hiding bad news or releasing bad news slowly. They argue that this discretion affects stock prices and that stock markets in countries with a free press should be better processors of economic information.93 Based on a deductive argument that the smaller number of effective parties in a country, the easier it is to pass legislations that could

92 Jonathan A. Solis and Leonardo Antenangeli, “Corruption Is Bad News for a Free Press: Reassessing the Relationship Between Media Freedom and Corruption,” Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell) 98, no. 3 (2017): 1112-1137. 93 Sara Abed Masrorkhah and Thorsten Lehnert, “Press Freedom and Jumps in Stock Prices,” Economic Systems 41, no. 1 (2017): 152.

potentially oppress the media, Grigorii V. Golosov’s formula for effective number of parties is taken into account.94 The formula proposed by Golosov95 is

푛 1 푁 = ∑ 푥2 1 + ( ) − 푦 푖=1 푦

Here, n is the number of parties, y is each party’s proportion of all seats, and x is the square of the largest party’s proportion of all seats. Lastly, Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin indicate that media freedom also depends on the level of democracy.96

In short, political rights and civil liberties country scores from Freedom House’s

Freedom in the World reports,97 GDP per capita from World Bank,98 corruption perception indexes from Transparency International,99 and Grigorii V. Golosov’s formula of effective number of parties100 are included as control variables in order to isolate the independent effect of the main independent variable (the power of populist parties) and the dependent variable

(level of media freedom). It is important to mention that Transparency International’s corruption perception index scales used to range from 1-10. However, they changed the scale for a range of 1-100 in 2012. In order to achieve consistency, I adjusted the post-2012 scales to scales that range from 1 to 10. For example, Germany’s corruption scale in 2015 is 78, so I changed it to 7.8. In other words, I simply divided the post-2012 scores by 10.

94 Grigorii V. Golosov, “The Effective Number of Parties: A New Approach,” Party Politics 16, no. 2 (March 2010): 171-192. 95 Golosov, “The Effective Number of Parties,” 188. 96 Egorov Georgy, Guriev Segei, and Sonin Konstantin, “Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data,” The American Political Science Review 103, no. 4 (2009): 647-648. 97 “Freedom in the World,” Freedom House, accessed October 1, 2017-December 10, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world. 98 “GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$),” World Bank, accessed October 1, 2017-December 10, 2017, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD. 99 “Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency International, accessed October 1, 2017-December 10, 2017, https://www.transparency.org/. 100 Golosov, “The Effective Number of Parties,” 188.

3.2. Description and explanation of models

a) Regular models

In terms of coding my independent variable for domestic elections, there are models with five different coding schemes. First, a 4-value variable model to be able to differentiate populist parties with no seat in the parliament (1), with some seats in the parliament (2), as a minority partner in a governing coalition (3), and being in power (4). Second, a 3-value variable model when populists have either no seat or some seats in the parliament (1), as a minority partner in a governing coalition (2), and are in power (3). Third, a 2-value variable model to distinguish populists with no seat in the parliament (1) from parties either with some seats in the parliament, as a minority partner in a governing coalition, and from being in power

(2). Fourth, a 2-value variable model differentiating populists with either no seat or some seats in the parliament (1) from parties either as a minority partner in a governing coalition or being in power (2). Lastly, a 2-value variable model to distinguish populists with either no seat, some seats, or as a minority partner in a governing coalition (1) from being in power (2). The model with the most levels is the most sophisticated, and logically, the fewer levels a model has the less sophisticated it is. The variation in the variables is to determine the extent and scope of populist power influencing media freedom.

In the case of European Parliament elections, there are models with three different coding schemes. First, a 3-value variable model differentiating populist parties with no seat in the parliament (1), some seats in the parliament (2), and being in plurality (3). Second, a 2- value variable model when populist parties have either no seat or some seats in the parliament

(1), and are in plurality (2). Lastly, another 2-value variable model to distinguish populist parties with no seat in the parliament (1) from having either some seats in the parliament or are in plurality (2). Once again, the model with the most levels is the most sophisticated, and the

variation of the levels is to determine the extent and scope of populist parties having an impact on media freedom.

b) Lagged models

There are some instances when populist parties’ power changed (e.g. from some seats in the parliament (2) to being in power (4)) at the time of one of the five data points (1995, 2000,

2005, 2010, or 2015) as domestic elections occurred during one of those times; for example, the Hungarian Civic Alliance came to power in 2010 after the Hungarian Socialist Party

(MSZP) governed the country for eight years, thus the incoming populist party ‘inherited’ the media freedom score of MSZP. Since it might be difficult to execute plausible media oppressing legislation in the first year of governance for a new governing party and based on the theoretical assertion that the hypothesis and mechanism work better the more time happens,

T+1 and T+2 lagged models are favorable to conduct.

With respect to these models, the value of the dependent variable (the power of populist parties) remains the same as it is in the original data point, while for the values of the independent variable (Freedom House’s media freedom score) and the control variables, data from one (T+1) and two years (T+2) after the original data point are taken into account for analysis. In other words, lag models are used to predict the dependent variable’s value and magnitude based on both the regular values of the independent and control variables and the lagged (T+1 and T+2) values of these variables. There are a total of ten cases for T+1 and T+2 models: 6 for the year of 2015 and 4 for the year of 2010. However, Transparency International and World Bank did not publish their corruption index and GDP/capita data for the year of

2017 at the time of data collection, which took place from October 2017 to December 2017, thus T+2 models are not essential to conduct for only four cases out of a total of 110.

3.3 Discussion of the results

a) Domestic elections models worked; European Parliament election models did not -

why?

The hypothesis holds well in the case of domestic elections, however, the results for the

European Parliament elections are not as good as previously anticipated. A logical explanation for this incident is that even though populist parties are on the rise and in a plurality in several

EU member states, they are still a minority ideology in the European Parliament thus they cannot pass media oppressing legislation, as easily as they can domestically, that could possibly affect the EU as a whole (see Appendix A for the European Parliament election models). The populist presence variable is statistically insignificant, p > 0.05, with weak β and t-values in all three European Parliament election models. The number of effective parties variable works fairly well being statistically significant, p < 0.05, in all three models with reasonably strong β and t-values. The political rights variable is the strongest indicator for the level of media freedom in all three European Parliament election models being statistically significant, p <

0.05, with the largest β and t-values in all three models. In short, the European Parliament election models indicate that the populist presence variable does not have an effect on the level of media freedom, while the political rights and the number of effective parties variables have noteworthy influence toward media pluralism in the context of European Parliament elections.

b) Lagged models work better than regular

Reflecting on the regular 2-value variable domestic election models, the variation of the values indicates that the more power populist parties have the more influence they have on the level of media freedom and aligns with the proposed hypothesis. In terms of these models, the populist presence variable is statistically significant, p < 0.05, in four out of five cases, however, it has the largest β and t-value only in the case of a the 2-value variable model distinguishing populists with either no seat, some seats, or as a minority coalition in the

government (1) from being in power (2). The corruption variable works satisfactorily in every regular domestic election model being statistically significant, p < 0.05, in all five models with the largest t-value in three models and the second to the largest β in two cases. The political rights variable works well in the context of the regular domestic election models as well. The variable is statistically significant, p < 0.05, with the largest β in four out the five models along with a relatively large t-value.

In accordance with the presumption that the hypothesis and mechanism work better the more time happens with populist parties being in power, the T+1 models are the best performing models as they produce slightly stronger outcomes than do the regular models (see

Appendix B for the regular, non-lagged domestic election models). However, it is important to highlight that the even though the overall performance of the lagged models is better than the non-lagged ones - the adjusted R2s of the T+1 models are higher -, the coefficients themselves on the regular (non-lagged models) are higher, thus the regular models have greater push (β) and pull (t-value). Nevertheless, considering that this study is interested in better explaining populist presence having an effect on media freedom, picking the best model is based on the value of the adjusted R2.

c) T+1 lagged models

As previously anticipated, the T+1 models work the best, and the T+1 2-value variable model produces the highest adjusted R2, showing the greatest explanatory power, and the highest coefficients out of all the models conducted in this research (see Appendix C for the rest of the T+1 lagged domestic election models). The results indicate that populist parties, generally speaking, indeed attempt to oppress the media once they are in power. Moreover, the striking difference between the 2-value variable models also signifies that the more political power a populist party has the lower the level of media freedom. The 2-value variable models distinguishing populists with no seat in the parliament (1) from parties with some seats in the

parliament, as a minority coalition in the government, and being in power (2) does not work, while the 2-value variable model differentiating populists with either no seat or some seats in the parliament (1) from parties either as a minority coalition in the government or being in power (2) works better, but not as good as the 2-value variable models to distinguish populists with either no seat, some seats, or as a minority coalition in the government (1) from being in power (2). Consequently, media freedom is relatively stable and high, where populists have no seat in the parliament, have some seats in the parliament, or are a minority coalition in the government. The next section introduces and interprets the results of the model that works the best.

3.4 Introduction and interpretation of the model that works the best

a Coefficients

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) -2.551 5.203 -.490 .625 Populist Presence 7.237 1.394 .249 5.191 .000 Corruption 1.800 .498 .387 3.614 .001 Civil Liberties -.389 1.029 -.022 -.378 .707 Political Rights 3.827 1.648 .125 2.322 .023 Effective Parties -.123 .349 -.023 -.352 .726 GDP per Capita -6.082E-5 .000 -.141 -.729 .468 Year2000 -1.337 1.027 -.055 -1.302 .197 Year2005 -1.823 1.317 -.091 -1.384 .171 Year2010 1.022 1.326 .053 .771 .443 Year2015 2.050 1.487 .107 1.379 .172 Austria -1.561 1.613 -.039 -.968 .337 Belgium -7.206 2.550 -.180 -2.826 .006 Bulgaria 11.286 4.058 .180 2.781 .007 Croatia 24.261 4.050 .275 5.991 .000 Cyprus 4.900 2.657 .095 1.844 .069 Czech Republic 4.478 2.973 .087 1.506 .136 Denmark -10.449 2.466 -.260 -4.237 .000 Estonia -2.329 2.852 -.045 -.817 .417 Finland -9.793 2.004 -.244 -4.886 .000 France 6.715 1.614 .167 4.160 .000 Germany -2.102 1.543 -.052 -1.362 .177 Greece 16.537 2.929 .412 5.645 .000 Hungary 10.064 3.263 .196 3.084 .003 Ireland -2.014 1.841 -.050 -1.094 .278 Italy 14.404 2.603 .359 5.534 .000 Latvia 6.736 3.512 .131 1.918 .059 Lithuania 4.420 3.316 .086 1.333 .187 Luxembourg -5.361 5.287 -.134 -1.014 .314 Malta 3.114 2.500 .061 1.246 .217 Netherlands -7.653 2.088 -.191 -3.665 .000 Poland 5.472 3.315 .107 1.651 .103 Portugal -1.030 2.187 -.026 -.471 .639 Romania 20.292 4.120 .324 4.925 .000

Unstandardized Coefficients35

Model B Std. Error Standardized Sig. t Coefficients Slovakia 5.385 3.169 .105 1.699 .094 Beta Slovenia 4.913 2.500 .096 1.965 .053 Spain 5.043 1.945 .126 2.593 .012 Sweden -10.977 1.943 -.273 -5.649 .000 a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom

Model Summary

Adjusted R Std. Error of the Model R R Square Square Estimate a 1 .974 .949 .923 2.32748

a. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Effective Parties, Year2005, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Italy, Year2000, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Year2010, Netherlands, France, Greece, Year2015, Populist Presence, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Belgium, Corruption, GDP per Capita

a ANOVA

Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. b 1 Regression 7297.682 37 197.235 36.409 .000 Residual 390.036 72 5.417 Total 7687.718 109

a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom b. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Effective Parties, Year2005, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Italy, Year2000, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Year2010, Netherlands, France, Greece, Year2015, Populist Presence, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Belgium, Corruption, GDP per Capita

The data in Table 2 summarizes the coefficients and significances of the variables for the interpretation of the results of the T+1 2-value variable model distinguishing populists with either no seat, some seats, or as a minority coalition in the government (1) from being in power

(2).

Table 2: Coefficients and significances of variables plausibly affecting the level of media freedom

T+1 2-variable model (Constant = -2.551) β t Sig.

*Populist Presence 7.237 5.191 .000

*Corruption 1.800 3.614 .001

**Civil Liberties -.389 -.378 .707

*Political Rights 3.827 2.322 .023

**Effective Number of Parties -.123 -.352 .726

**GDP per capita -6.082E-5 -.729 .468

* p < .05 and positive direction ** negative direction

Values of the populist presence variable: 1-2 (1: no seat in parliament + some seats in

parliament + minority coalition in the government; 2: in power)

Values of the corruption variable: 1-10 (1: most corrupted; 10: least corrupted)

Values of the political rights variable: 1-7 (1: most free; 7: least free)

In order to interpret the results thoroughly and look beyond the meaning of data and results, the evaluation of likely media freedom values given different levels of populist presence, corruption, and political rights needs to take place. This can be done by building several equations from the T+1 2-variable model’s results, which looks as the following: Y =

α + β of populist presence x possible values (1-2) + β of corruption x possible values (1-10) +

β of political rights x possible values (1-7). The alpha is the constant. The variables of civil liberties, effective number of parties, and GDP per capita are not included in the equation, because they are not significant (p < .05). The following equations aim to demonstrate the strength and impact of each variable.

Variation of the values of the populist presence variable (keeping the values of the other two variables constant - corruption at 5 and political rights at 4 -, while varying the values of populist presence between 1 and 2):

Y = -2.551 + (7.237 x 1) + (1.800 x 5) + (3.827 x 4)

Y = -2.551 + 7.237 + 9 + 15.308

Y = 28.994

Y = -2.551 + (7.237 x 2) + (1.800 x 5) + (3.827 x 4)

Y = -2.551 + 14.474 + 9 + 15.308

Y = 36.231

Variation of the values of the corruption variable (keeping the values of the other two variables constant - populist presence at 1 and political rights at 4 -, while varying the values of corruption between 3, 6, and 9):

Y = -2.551 + (7.237 x 1) + (1.800 x 3) + (3.827 x 4)

Y = -2.551 + 7.237 + 5.4 + 15.308

Y = 25.394

Y = -2.551 + (7.237 x 1) + (1.800 x 6) + (3.827 x 4)

Y = -2.551 + 7.237 + 10.8 + 15.308

Y = 30.794

Y = -2.551 + (7.237 x 1) + (1.800 x 9) + (3.827 x 4)

Y = -2.551 + 7.237 + 16.2 + 15.308

Y = 36.194

Variation of the values of the political rights variable (keeping the values of the other two variables constant - populist presence at 1 and corruption at 4 -, while varying the values of political rights between 1, 4, and 7):

Y = -2.551 + (7.237 x 1) + (1.800 x 5) + (3.827 x 1)

Y = -2.551 + 7.237 + 9 + 3.827

Y = 17.513

Y = -2.551 + (7.237 x 1) + (1.800 x 5) + (3.827 x 4)

Y = -2.551 + 7.237 + 9 + 15.308

Y = 28.994

Y = -2.551 + (7.237 x 1) + (1.800 x 5) + (3.827 x 7)

Y = -2.551 + 7.237 + 9 + 26.789

Y = 40.475

At first glance, the populist presence variable - in spite of having the largest β (7.237) and t-value (5.191) - is the weakest indicator for the level of media freedom due to its small variation. The strongest indicator is the political rights variable with a β of 3.827 and a t-value of 2.322, because its relatively large β is supported by a fairly notable variation. Even though the corruption variable can vary the most out of these three usable coefficients, its β is too small to make noteworthy impacts. On the other hand, the actual strength of the coefficients alters if we interpret the results accordingly by looking beyond the raw number of the coefficients and equations and focusing more on what has actually been going on in the EU in the past 25 years.

It is important to keep in mind that it is highly unlikely that an EU member state’s political rights value would substantially vary between 1 and 7. However, even just a 2-degree alteration of the political rights variable has a bigger impact on media freedom than the

populist presence variable could possibly have. On the same note, none of the EU member states’ political rights value varied more than one degree since 1995. More precisely, political rights values changed from 1 to 2 only in three countries: Greece, Hungary, and Latvia.

Keeping this mind, the political rights variable has not affected the level of media freedom in the EU since 1995 as strongly as it potentially could have with being the strongest indicator based on the raw data.

In regards to the corruption variable, it is also strongly implausible that an EU country’s corruption score would thoroughly vary between 1 and 10. The largest corruption value variation since 1995 took place in Poland, where it changed almost 3 values between

2005 and 2016, but the corruption variable - generally speaking - has only varied only around

1.1 degrees throughout the EU. Furthermore, a country’s corruption score needs to alter at least 4.1 degrees to make a bigger impact than the variation of the populist presence variable.

In other words, the corruption variable has not influenced the level of media freedom either as intensely as it could have with having the widest range of variation. The data in Table 3 represents the lowest and highest scores of EU member states’ corruption scores taking into account the 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015 Transparency International’s corruption perception indexes, as well as the difference between these scores.

Table 3: Lowest and highest scores of EU member states’ corruption scores taking into account the 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015 Transparency International’s corruption perception indexes

Lowest Highest Difference Austria 7,1 8,7 1,6 Belgium 6,1 7,7 1,6 Bulgaria 3,6 4,1 0,5 Croatia 5,1 5,1 0 Cyprus 5,7 6,3 0,6 Czech Republic 4,3 5,6 1,3 Denmark 9,1 9,8 0,7 Estonia 6,4 7 0,6

Finland 8,9 10 1,1 France 6,7 7,5 0,8 Germany 7,6 8,2 0,6 Greece 3,5 4,9 1,4 Hungary 4,6 5,1 0,5 Ireland 7,2 8,57 1,37 Italy 2,99 5 2,01 Latvia 4,2 5,6 1,4 Lithuania 4,8 5,9 1,1 Luxembourg 6,85 8,6 1,75 Malta 5,6 6,6 1 Netherlands 8,4 8,9 0,5 Poland 3,4 6,2 2,8 Portugal 5,56 6,5 0,94 Romania 3,7 4,6 0,9 Slovakia 4,3 5,1 0,8 Slovenia 6 6,4 0,4 Spain 4,35 7 2,65 Sweden 8,87 9,4 0,53 United Kingdom 7,6 8,7 1,1 Average difference=1.0910714

Taking into account that five out of twenty-eight EU member states have experienced their governments led by populist and non-populist parties in the past twenty-five years and a

2-degree variation of political rights and a 4.1-degree variation of corruption variables have not occurred in the EU since 1995, the populist presence variable has had the largest impact on the level of media freedom. Nonetheless, it is important to re-emphasize that the more pervasive variation of the political rights and corruption variables are plausible in practice; however, taking into account what has been happening in the EU in the past twenty-five years and the EU being a democratic institution, a more extensive variation of these variables is highly unlikely in theory. As for future reference, it is expected that the presence of populism variable has the most substantial impact on the level of media freedom.

CHAPTER 4

Conclusion

Yayaweera defines media pluralism as “the end of monopolies of any kind and the existence of the greatest number of newspapers, periodicals and broadcasting stations reflecting the widest possible range of opinion within the community.”101 Creating direct and indirect dependency between the government and the established media is not only harmful towards media pluralism, but also detrimental towards the level of democracy. Gunther and

Mughan argue that the “mass communications media are the connective tissue of democracy.

They are the principal means through which citizens and their elected representatives communicate in their reciprocal efforts to inform and influence.”102 Klimkiewicz contends that

media pluralism is one of those terms in European media policy that generates broad respect for its undisputed merits, and its importance for the process of democracy and identity formation at the European level is generally agreed upon. Media pluralism contributes to the richness of European public opinion and identity formation.103

Karppinen theorizes that “citizens’ access to a wide range of information in the public sphere is unarguably a key condition”104 when it comes to the relationship between media and democracy. In short, free and independent media is vital for democracy. Based on the literature, populist parties in the Eastern European context do not guarantee these basic circumstances, which inevitably questions the legitimacy, and affects the stance of democracy in Eastern European member states.

101 Wijayananda Yayaweera, “Vibrant democracy needs independent and pluralistic media,” interview with Yayaweera, May 3, 2005, http://topics.developmentgateaway.org. 102 Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan, “The Media in Democratic and Nondemocratic Regimes: A Multilevel Perspective,” in Democracy and the media: a comparative perspective, ed. Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1. 103 Beata Klimkiewicz, “Is the clash of rationalities leading nowhere? Media pluralism in European regulatory policies,” in Press freedom and pluralism in Europe: Concepts and conditions, ed. Andrea Czepek, Melanie Hellwig, and Eva Nowak (Bristol, UK and Chicago, USA: Intellect, 2009): 45. 104 Kari Karppinen, “Making a difference to media pluralism: a critique of the pluralistic consensus in European media policy,” in Reclaiming the media: communication rights and democratic media roles, ed. Bart Cammaerts and Nico Carpentier (Bristol, UK and Chicago, USA: Intellect, 2007), 9. 42

This study showcases that populist parties in the European Union (EU) attempt to oppress the traditional established media as soon as they come in to power. Based on the theoretical explanation outlined in the literature review, the results of the multiple regressions of the domestic election models support the proposed hypothesis, that the more political power a populist party has, the larger the decreases in levels of media freedom. In terms of the domestic election models, the T+1 2-value variable model works the best out of all ten models.

It is also important to outline that populist parties oppressing the media is not a

European phenomenon. Kitzberger argues that “the media in Latin America developed into more autonomous political institutions… making the media a potential topic of political debate, while their elitist bias made them a theme for democratization agendas.”105 He finds that one of the ways how leftist Latin-American parties respond to the demands of media democratization is the populist outsider path. Kitzberger states that rather than being due to the governments’ leftist orientation, the “cause has predominantly been said to be the populist or authoritarian character of the heads of government, viz., Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales,

Néstor Kirchner, and Rafael Correa.”106 Even though this work primarily focuses on

European populist media oppression, the fact that populist media oppression seems to be more than a regional phenomenon might provide interesting research opportunities for the future.

This research shows that populist parties in the EU attempt to oppress the traditional established media as soon as they come in to power. Based on the theoretical explanation outlined in the literature review, the results of the multiple regressions of the domestic election models support the proposed hypothesis that the more political power a populist party has, the larger the decreases in levels of media freedom. In terms of the domestic election models, the T+1 2-value variable model works the best out of all ten models.

105 Philip Kitzberger, “The Media Politics of Latin America’s Leftist Governments,” Journal Of Politics In Latin America 4, no. 3 (2012): 136. 106 Kitzberger, “The Media Politics,” 124. 43

The fact that the 2-value variable models distinguishing populists with either no seat, some seats, or as a minority coalition in the government (1) from being in power or (2) are the strongest models, further strengthens the hypothesis and demonstrates why the variation of the values is necessary and advantageous. On the other hand, none of the European Parliament election models work in spite of the preceding expectations. This could be due to the fact that populist parties only make up around one quarter of the European Parliament,107 thus it is strongly implausible for an underrepresented, minority ideology to be able to tame the media throughout the EU.

The results indicate that populist parties, generally speaking, indeed attempt to oppress the media once they are in power, especially in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, media freedom is relatively stable and high, where populists have no seat in the parliament, have some seats in the parliament, or are a minority coalition in the government. It is uncertain whether the level of media freedom would suffer from having populist parties in power in

Western Europe due to the scarcity of cases since Western European EU member states have not experienced their government exclusively ran by populist parties with the exception of

Italy. Even though the results from both the qualitative and quantitative analyses indicate that the Italian media environment has significantly dropped whenever Berlusconi’s right-wing populist party, Forza Italia, was in power, it would be inappropriate to build an argument for

Western European populist media oppression around a single case, which could be deviant.

The quantitative analyses indicate that other variables affect media pluralism, offering promising research opportunities for the future. The results of the European Parliament election models signify that political rights and the number of effective party variables potentially influence the level of media freedom. Simultaneously, the results of the domestic election results show that the political rights and corruption variables also correspond with

107 Oliver Treib, “The voter says no, but nobody listens: causes and consequences of the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 European elections,” Journal Of European Public Policy 21, no. 10 (2014): 1551. 44

change in media pluralism along with the political power of populist parties. Revealing other variables also affecting the level of media freedom makes the research more relevant and robust, considering that the results of the statistical models do not indicate the superiority of the presence of populist parties variable.

As a matter of fact, the political rights variable is a stronger indicator than the presence of populist parties variable for the level of media freedom if we take into account the results of every model. However, it is important to keep in mind that this research primarily focuses on the probable causal relationship between the political power of populist parties and media liberty, thus there is not a strong theoretical foundation backing up the raw numbers of the statistical analysis for the control variables. In other words, there simply might be only correlation between the political rights, number of effective parties, and corruption variables and the level of media freedom. Nevertheless, an in-depth qualitative research could possibly determine whether there is causal relationship between these variables.

It is unexpected to see how much stronger of an indicator the political rights variable is in comparison to the civil liberties variable since both variables are indicators for the level of democracy. However, the political rights variable works and is statistically significant, p < .05, in every model, whereas the civil liberties variable is statistically insignificant, p > .05, in every model as one of the weakest indicators for the level of media freedom along with the economic variable, GDP per capita. The economic variable is also statistically insignificant, p > .05, producing inconsistent results throughout every model. Even though it seems that the economic performance of a country does not affect media liberty, scholars argue that the rise of populism is due to financial crises.

Lewandosky discusses a team of German economists showing that “over a period of nearly 150 years, every financial crisis was followed by a ten-year surge in support for far-

right populist parties.”108 The latest financial crisis took place exactly 10 years ago, and populism is more widespread than ever in the EU. It seems that Eastern European populist parties attempt to preserve their resurgence and extend and cement their position in power by taking over the media. As opposed to Lewandosky’s assertion, my prediction is that populism will not fall back this time, particularly in Eastern Europe, where populists govern five countries as of 2018 - ten years after the latest financial crisis. The recent reelection of the

Hungarian Civic Alliance (FIDESZ) in Hungary in April 9, 2018 demonstrates that Orban’s party has strengthened and created such a vast support base, partly due to a polarized media environment, in the past eight years that reelected him and his party for the third consecutive term winning a two-thirds majority in parliament. FIDESZ’s domestic domination is not deviant from the rest of Eastern Europe.

Other Eastern European populist parties have also recently got elected with ANO 2011 coming to power in the Czech Republic at the end of 2017, Law and Justice (PiS) winning the

2015 Polish parliamentary elections and being up by more than 20% in recent opinion polls,

Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) getting reelected for the fifth consecutive term at the end of 2017, and Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) falling six seats short of an absolute majority upon the victory of the 2015 Greek legislative election. These election results strongly suggest that populism in Eastern Europe is here to stay regardless the economic performance of these countries. As for Western European populism, parties recently fell short coming to power in France, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland, though the 2016 Brexit vote is a warning sign that Western European populism is also capable of bringing people around.

Based on what has been happening to the Finns Party and the Danish People’s Party, the most optimal way to deal with European populist parties is to bring them into government

108 Stephan Lewandosky, “Why is populism popular? A psychologist explains,” The Conversation, June 21, 2016, https://theconversation.com/why-is-populism-popular-a-psychologist-explains-61319. 46

as minority parties. Following the Finnish parliamentary election of 2015 and cabinet discussions, the Sipilä Cabinet coalition government consisting of three parties - the Centre

Party, the National Coalition Party, and the Finns Party - was formed. For the first time in its existence, the Finns Party situated themselves into government, however, they did not last for long. Milne states that “the True Finns had become the main example in Europe for how populist parties could lose support after being brought into government,”109 because the party lost its identity and failed to live up to its campaign promises once they came into government. Ahponen outlines that the Finns promised to cut immigration and bolster the welfare state, however, “the party introduced budget and wage cuts and failed to prevent thirty thousand asylum seekers reaching Finland in 2015,”110 which resulted the halving of the

Finns popularity in the polls from 17.7 percent at the last elections to 8 percent at recent opinion polls for the 2019 Finnish parliamentary elections. The Finns Party ended splitting up in 2017 after internal conflicts left no choice for the moderates to separate themselves from the hardliners. In short, the split in the Finns Party - the second-biggest force in Finland’s parliament - underlines the risks for populist groups seeking to move from protest to power.111

The Danish People’s Party offers a somewhat different example, because they have been providing parliamentary support for the fourth time in the 2000’s after the party received

21% of the vote in the 2015 general election. Even though the party did not lose its identity and ideology after they were brought into government, it seems highly unlikely that a populist party would be in absolute power and govern Denmark in the near future. The party has been sitting on the sidelines upon the latest Danish general election, while providing parliamentary support to the Lars Løkke Rasmussen II and III Cabinets. On the other hand, it is important to

109 “Finnish government avoids collapse as True Finns split,” Financial Times, accessed May 20, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/9d4ed4be-d73f-3942-817c-59b1ab48f338. 110 “True Finns, False Hopes,” Jacobin, accessed May 20, 2018, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/04/true- finns-finland-timo-soini-nationalists-far-right-xenophobia-elections. 111 “True Finns split holds lesson for Europe’s populists,” Financial Times, accessed May 20, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/fe376512-51b8-11e7-bfb8-997009366969. 47

keep in mind that Babis’ ANO 2011 was in coalition after getting 18.65% of the total votes upon the 2013 Czech legislative election 2 years after its establishment. However, Babis already had the media in his hand at that time, thus ANO 2011’s victory upon the 2017 Czech legislative election did not come to a surprise.

The examples of FIDESZ, GERB, PiS, SYRIZA, Forza Italia, and ANO 2011 demonstrated that European populist parties are capable of coming to power, as well as keeping up with their popularity on their own. In addition to that, these parties are amongst the most popular EU countries as of 2018, and their position in power seems more stable than governments anywhere else in Europe. However, the Finns Party offers an example that it seems possible to contain populist ideologies in coalition governments. A leading Finnish businessman stated that the Finns Party’s failure in government is “a textbook case of give them a bit of rope and they will hang themselves. I don’t think they ever should have been let into government.”112 Thus, the most ideal way to deal with populists is to give them a bit of leeway.

Implications for further research

a) Populist use of social media

After studying the media environment within 28 EU countries, the different strategies of populist parties have become evident. The proposed hypothesis of this work - the greater political power of populist parties, the lower the level of media freedom - is plausible and enjoys empirical support in the context of Eastern Europe and both qualitative and quantitative data demonstrate that populist parties seek to tame the media as soon as they get the power to do so. On the other hand, a different trend has been going on in Western Europe, where populist parties have apparently been gaining popularity due to their exploitation of

112 “True Finns split holds lesson for Europe’s populists.” 48

social media. It is crucial to bear in mind temporal precedence, because populist parties in

Eastern Europe attempt to tame the media and ‘take control’ of the news after being elected, while populists in Western Europe gain popularity due to the effective use of social media; in other words, Eastern European populists get elected before oppressing the media, whereas

Western European populists tend to increase in popularity after being successful on social media. Why is it the case? Why do Western European populists focus on capturing social media, while Eastern European populists oppress established media? Why is it a trend in

Eastern Europe to tame the media once elected?

Ernst et al. explore how politicians in four countries (Austria, Switzerland, Italy,

United Kingdom) use Facebook and Twitter for populist purposes. The scholars provide an in-depth analysis of populism on social media to demonstrate five key elements of populism: emphasizing the sovereignty of the people, advocating for the people, attacking the elite, ostracizing others, and invoking the ‘heartland’.113 Their qualitative text analysis reveals that populism manifests itself in a fragmented form on social media. Populist statements can be found across countries, parties, and politicians’ status levels. They also find that while attacks on the economic elite are preferred by left-wing populists, attacks on the media elite and ostracism of others are predominantly conducted by right-wing speakers. Overall, the paper shows that social media give populist actors the freedom to articulate their ideology and spread their messages much more easily to their followers.

Hameleers and Schmuck also contend that social media channels contribute to the success of populism by providing an attractive environment for both politicians and ordinary citizens to spread their political ideas. Building on previous research, this study argues that attributing blame to others, such as immigrants or the political elites, for causing major

113 Nicole Ernst, Sven Engesser, Frank Esser, and Florin Büchel, “Populism and social media: how politicians spread a fragmented ideology,” Information, Communication & Society 20 (2017): 1110. 49

societal problems facing the ordinary people is central to populism.114 They find that the messages blaming elites or immigrants bolstered citizens’ populist attitudes, but only for those who supported the source of the message; on the other hand, for those who opposed the source, populist blame attributions reduced populist attitudes. These findings reveal how the core element of pervasive populist messages (attributing blame) affects the populist attitudes of citizens.

b) Populist polarization

Taking into account the plausible effects of echo chamber, a comparative study examining how polarized EU member states are where populists are in control of social media, could provide promising research opportunities for political psychologists. The disappearance of the ideological overlap between opposing ideologies in the United States has already been noted by Carmichael, recalling a recent Pew Research poll finding that “88 percent of Republicans approve of President Trump, while just eight percent of Democrats approve.” She further claims that this phenomenon is partly due to the fact that “we are all vulnerable to psychological heuristics like anchoring, the halo effect and confirmation bias, which can exacerbate tendencies to take on an ‘us versus them’ mentality.”115 Even though

Carmichael discusses the American case of polarization, President Trump ran a presidential campaign extremely similar to European populist party platforms, vehemently promising for an anti-immigration, anti-globalization, and anti-establishment presidency. Furthermore, the

‘us versus them’ mentality Carmichael mentions represents the Manichean vision of politics that populists favorably rely on in regards to populist mobilization.

Media is a source and mirror of polarization leading to polarized votes. The polarization of the masses automatically leads to ethnocentrism, dividing the world into an

114 Michael Hameleers and Desirée Schmuck, “It’s us against them: a comparative experiment on the effects of populist messages communicated via social media,” Information, Communication & Society 20 (2017): 1425. 115 Chloe Carmichael, “Political Polarization Is A Psychology Problem,” Huffington Post, November 8, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/political-polarization-is-a-psychology- problem_us_5a01dd9ee4b07eb5118255e5. 50

‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’. The literature indicates that populist politicians have a good sense channeling and magnifying fears as demonstrated by the most recent Hungarian parliamentary elections with FIDESZ running almost exclusively on an anti-immigration campaign.

Furthermore, mean world syndrome, defined by political psychologists, stems from those watching more than three hours of TV per day perceive a meaner world than those watching less, as well as programming reinforces worst fears. Reuters recently went to a small

Hungarian town called called Ercsi, where a FIDESZ supporter stated that “I have never met

(any refugees)… But I watch television all the time so I’ve learned a lot. We do not need them here.”116 This example illustrates how easily voters can be intimidated, especially since Orban continuously claims that “Europe is now under invasion… Their (the opposition’s) task is to win power and implement the grand plan: to break Hungary, which stands in the path of immigrants.”117 Considering that the Hungarian government spent “HUF 85 billion (USD 293 million) in 2016 operating six public television and seven public radio channels”118 including

24-hour news channel M1 (Hungarian Television) and Orban’s allies own three-fourths of regional papers,119 Csaky finds that the Orban administration was able to solidify FIDESZ’ dominance with ethno centrist and xenophobic statements through controlling the national print and broadcast market. Keeping these in mind, it should not come as a surprise that

FIDESZ generally wins the elections with such a tremendous gap thanks to a polarized and one-sided media environment in Hungary. The most recent rise of populism and polarization of traditional and social media offer several favorable research topics for the future.

116 Krisztina Than, “Fear of migrants galvanizes PM Orban’s supporters in rural Hungary,” Reuters, March 21, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-election-orban-voters/fear-of-migrants-galvanizes-pm- orbans-supporters-in-rural-hungary-idUSKBN1GX1HW. 117 Than, “Fear of migrants galvanizes PM Orban’s supporters.” 118 Staff, “Politics has taken over Hungarian media,” The Budapest Beacon, February 8, 2017, https://budapestbeacon.com/politics-taken-hungarian-media/. 119 Zselyke Csaky, “How Orban Redrew Hungary’s Media Map to Solidify His Power,” World Politics Review, March 7, 2017, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/21440/how-orban-redrew-hungary-s-media- map-to-solidify-his-power. 51

Unilateral news could potentially lead to biased, irrational, and subjective perception of the citizens, as well as to polarization of political positions. The literature review of this research indicates that Eastern European populist parties do not permit media pluralism to flourish in terms of allowing the “existence of the greatest number of newspapers, periodicals and broadcasting stations,” 120 thus there are not the broadest possible range of opinions circulating in Eastern European countries populist parties govern. Karppinen argues that

“citizens’ access to a wide range of information in the public sphere is unarguably a key condition”121 when it comes to the relationship between media and democracy. Based on the literature and the statistical results of this research, populist parties in the Eastern European context do not guarantee these circumstances, which inevitably question the legitimacy of democracy of Eastern European EU member states. Unilateral news also has the potential to distort perceptions of others, which could lead to ethnocentrism, dividing the world into

‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’.

Zielonka states that “a free media system independent of political interference is vital for democracy.”122 He emphasizes that “young and emerging democracies are particularly vulnerable to media capture by political and corporate interests because of their fragile institutions, polarized civil society, and transnational economic pressures.” However, the example of Italy demonstrates that more industrially developed, Western European countries are also prone to the decline of media freedom. A comparative study of post-Soviet states’ media environments contrasting media pluralism with and without the governance of populist parties could further demonstrate the hypothesis of the more political power populist parties

120 Wijayananda Yayaweera, “Vibrant democracy needs independent and pluralistic media,” interview with Yayaweera, May 3, 2005, http://topics.developmentgateaway.org. 121 Kari Karppinen, “Making a difference to media pluralism: a critique of the pluralistic consensus in European media policy,” in Reclaiming the media: communication rights and democratic media roles, ed. Bart Cammaerts and Nico Carpentier (Bristol, UK and Chicago, USA: Intellect, 2007), 9-30. 122 Jan Zielonka, “Introduction: Fragile Democracy, Volatile Politics, and the Quest for a Free Media,” in Media and politics in new democracies: Europe in a comparative perspective, ed. Jan Zielonka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1. 52

have the lower the level of media freedom as it offers interesting research potentials for the future.

c) Soft news versus hard news and public versus commercial ownership

Iyengar finds that public versus commercial ownership of broadcast media has significant effects on media liberty; publicly owned media tend to “provide sustained levels of public affairs programming, and to represent a diversity of regions, cultures, and viewpoints,”123 while commercial broadcasting lacks ‘serious’ news. According to him, this has serious implications for media democracy, because most normative models of democracy depend on an informed citizenry.124 Thus, it would be crucial to involve the ratio of public to commercial broadcasting. Iyengar, meanwhile, also suggests that the citizens’ knowledge of soft news - celebrities, reality shows, etc. - and hard news have further connections to media liberty since the supply of news can contribute to civic competence.125

Even though Iyengar legitimately argues public versus commercial ownership of broadcast media and citizens’ knowledge of soft news versus hard news have severe effects toward media freedom, there is not enough data to include these two variables as control variables in my research. However, the issue of not having reliable data on the ratio of soft vs. hard news could be overcome with survey methodology to develop a better picture of media populism in the EU. Another dimension of a plausible future research agenda is to use statistical techniques (multiple regressions) to test the hypothesis of a positive relationship of effective use of social media and an increase in the popularity of populist parties in the EU.

Based on the results of the quantitative analysis, the use of qualitative research is necessary in order to explicate possible deviant cases. Quantitative and qualitative data complement each other since the quantitative research allows the examination of a larger sample size that is more representative, while the qualitative research permits analysis of underlying causality,

123 Shanto Iyengar and Jennifer McGrady, Media politics: A citizen's guide, (New York: WW Norton, 2007), 30. 124 Iyengar and McGrady, 34. 125 Iyengar and McGrady, 34-37. 53

opinions, and motivations as it is more context-sensitive. In short, case studies and regression analysis are compatible and complementary.

It is worthwhile and helpful knowing how populist leaders in Western Europe, where the freedom of the press is relatively high in comparison to other (European) countries, have found their way around established media and gained popularity through social media. This work does not have the aim to research why populist parties fail to come to power in Western

Europe with the exceptions of Forza Italia and Five Star Movement in Italy, however, taking charge of social media might be the most adequate method to increase their popularity taking into account the polarizing population of the EU. Keeping this in mind, it might be beneficial to look into the cultural aspects and behavior of each of the EU member states’ population in order to accurately research why it is the case to the contrary of Eastern Europe, where the established media has seemingly been taken over by populist parties.

APPENDIX A

European Parliament election 2-variable model (1: no seat; 2: some seats + plurality)

a Coefficients

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 23.458 9.449 2.482 .017 Populist Presence -.478 1.251 -.026 -.382 .704 Corruption .085 .085 .045 1.001 .322 Civil Liberties .349 1.853 .015 .188 .851 Political Rights 6.859 1.615 .244 4.248 .000 GDP per Capita .000 .000 -.820 -1.640 .108 Effective Parties .833 .363 .149 2.297 .026 Year2009 1.661 .754 .086 2.203 .033 Year2014 3.769 .927 .195 4.066 .000 Austria -.958 2.402 -.020 -.399 .692 Belgium -15.821 3.319 -.323 -4.766 .000 Bulgaria -1.251 7.105 -.026 -.176 .861 Croatia 7.351 7.262 .123 1.012 .317 Cyprus -5.000 5.148 -.102 -.971 .336 Czech Republic -8.297 5.262 -.170 -1.577 .122 Denmark -3.120 4.585 -.064 -.680 .500 Estonia -12.965 6.080 -.265 -2.132 .038 Finland -10.006 2.454 -.204 -4.078 .000 France 2.029 2.078 .041 .977 .334 Germany -3.095 2.091 -.063 -1.480 .146 Greece 8.333 4.080 .170 2.042 .047 Hungary -4.255 6.264 -.087 -.679 .500 Ireland -.879 3.146 -.018 -.279 .781 Italy 9.921 2.557 .203 3.880 .000 Latvia -11.961 6.711 -.244 -1.782 .081 Lithuania -12.300 6.626 -.251 -1.856 .070 Luxembourg 15.456 14.632 .316 1.056 .296 Malta -5.080 4.759 -.104 -1.068 .291 Netherlands -7.376 3.103 -.151 -2.377 .022 Poland -7.076 6.663 -.145 -1.062 .294 Portugal -10.836 4.673 -.221 -2.319 .025 Romania 4.172 7.341 .085 .568 .573 Slovakia -7.081 5.961 -.145 -1.188 .241 Slovenia -4.175 4.578 -.085 -.912 .366

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Spain .899 3.076 .018 .292 .771 Sweden -8.537 3.369 -.174 -2.534 .015 a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom

Model Summary

Adjusted R Std. Error of the Model R R Square Square Estimate a 1 .978 .956 .924 2.536

a. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Year2014, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Portugal, Croatia, Poland, Netherlands, Malta, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Latvia, Italy, Ireland, Hungary, Greece, Germany, France, Finland, Estonia, Denmark, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Year2009, Belgium, Austria, Corruption, Political Rights, Effective Parties, Populist Presence, Civil Liberties, GDP per Capita

a ANOVA

Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. b 1 Regression 6621.369 35 189.182 29.414 .000 Residual 302.294 47 6.432 Total 6923.663 82

a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom b. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Year2014, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Portugal, Croatia, Poland, Netherlands, Malta, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Latvia, Italy, Ireland, Hungary, Greece, Germany, France, Finland, Estonia, Denmark, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Year2009, Belgium, Austria, Corruption, Political Rights, Effective Parties, Populist Presence, Civil Liberties, GDP per Capita

European Parliament election 2-variable model (1: no seat + some seats; 2: plurality)

a Coefficients

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 21.649 9.525 2.273 .028 Populist Presence .882 1.280 .037 .689 .494 Corruption .078 .085 .042 .924 .360 Civil Liberties -.341 1.957 -.015 -.174 .863 Political Rights 6.754 1.619 .241 4.171 .000 GDP per Capita .000 .000 -.768 -1.520 .135 Effective Parties .755 .345 .135 2.188 .034 Year2009 1.537 .745 .080 2.061 .045 Year2014 3.457 .955 .179 3.618 .001 Austria -.540 2.476 -.011 -.218 .828 Belgium -14.968 3.398 -.306 -4.406 .000 Bulgaria -.377 7.182 -.008 -.052 .958 Croatia 8.241 7.322 .138 1.125 .266 Cyprus -3.779 5.166 -.077 -.731 .468 Czech Republic -7.462 5.263 -.152 -1.418 .163 Denmark -3.502 4.614 -.072 -.759 .452 Estonia -11.642 6.136 -.238 -1.897 .064 Finland -9.546 2.382 -.195 -4.008 .000 France 2.003 2.071 .041 .967 .338 Germany -2.809 2.120 -.057 -1.325 .192 Greece 9.350 4.276 .191 2.186 .034 Hungary -3.636 6.299 -.074 -.577 .567 Ireland -.713 3.105 -.015 -.230 .819 Italy 10.350 2.580 .212 4.011 .000 Latvia -10.032 6.928 -.205 -1.448 .154 Lithuania -11.322 6.759 -.231 -1.675 .101 Luxembourg 14.629 14.642 .299 .999 .323 Malta -4.020 4.782 -.082 -.841 .405 Netherlands -6.926 2.989 -.142 -2.317 .025 Poland -6.440 6.720 -.132 -.958 .343 Portugal -9.698 4.677 -.198 -2.074 .044 Romania 6.262 7.719 .128 .811 .421 Slovakia -6.174 6.101 -.126 -1.012 .317 Slovenia -2.998 4.563 -.061 -.657 .514

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Spain 1.698 3.084 .035 .551 .584 Sweden -8.037 3.163 -.164 -2.541 .014 a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom

Model Summary

Adjusted R Std. Error of the Model R R Square Square Estimate a 1 .978 .957 .924 2.527

a. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Year2014, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Portugal, Croatia, Poland, Netherlands, Malta, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Latvia, Italy, Ireland, Hungary, Greece, Germany, France, Finland, Estonia, Denmark, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Year2009, Belgium, Austria, Corruption, Populist Presence, Political Rights, Effective Parties, Civil Liberties, GDP per Capita

a ANOVA

Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. b 1 Regression 6623.462 35 189.242 29.628 .000 Residual 300.201 47 6.387 Total 6923.663 82

a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom b. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Year2014, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Portugal, Croatia, Poland, Netherlands, Malta, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Latvia, Italy, Ireland, Hungary, Greece, Germany, France, Finland, Estonia, Denmark, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Year2009, Belgium, Austria, Corruption, Populist Presence, Political Rights, Effective Parties, Civil Liberties, GDP per Capita

European Parliament election 3-variable model (1: no seat; 2: some seats; 3: plurality)

a Coefficients

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 22.714 9.463 2.400 .020 Populist Presence .168 .859 .013 .196 .845 Corruption .082 .085 .044 .965 .340 Civil Liberties .033 1.978 .001 .016 .987 Political Rights 6.887 1.614 .245 4.267 .000 GDP per Capita .000 .000 -.819 -1.630 .110 Effective Parties .766 .361 .137 2.119 .039 Year2009 1.575 .760 .082 2.073 .044 Year2014 3.611 .975 .187 3.702 .001 Austria -.901 2.435 -.018 -.370 .713 Belgium -15.421 3.428 -.315 -4.498 .000 Bulgaria -1.036 7.167 -.021 -.145 .886 Croatia 7.636 7.327 .128 1.042 .303 Cyprus -4.308 5.271 -.088 -.817 .418 Czech Republic -7.828 5.323 -.160 -1.471 .148 Denmark -3.094 4.595 -.063 -.673 .504 Estonia -12.277 6.216 -.251 -1.975 .054 Finland -9.635 2.459 -.197 -3.918 .000 France 2.020 2.080 .041 .971 .336 Germany -3.021 2.113 -.062 -1.430 .159 Greece 8.631 4.214 .176 2.048 .046 Hungary -4.100 6.302 -.084 -.651 .518 Ireland -.655 3.134 -.013 -.209 .835 Italy 10.118 2.595 .207 3.898 .000 Latvia -11.075 6.987 -.226 -1.585 .120 Lithuania -12.133 6.699 -.248 -1.811 .077 Luxembourg 16.026 14.559 .328 1.101 .277 Malta -4.494 4.863 -.092 -.924 .360 Netherlands -6.926 3.076 -.142 -2.252 .029 Poland -7.073 6.686 -.145 -1.058 .296 Portugal -10.171 4.785 -.208 -2.125 .039 Romania 4.925 7.655 .101 .643 .523 Slovakia -6.972 6.025 -.142 -1.157 .253 Slovenia -3.462 4.693 -.071 -.738 .464

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Spain 1.361 3.161 .028 .430 .669 Sweden -7.938 3.286 -.162 -2.416 .020 a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom

Model Summary

Adjusted R Std. Error of the Model R R Square Square Estimate a 1 .978 .956 .924 2.539

a ANOVA

Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. b 1 Regression 6620.676 35 189.162 29.343 .000 Residual 302.986 47 6.447 Total 6923.663 82

APPENDIX B

Non-lagged 2-value variable domestic election model (1: no seat; 2: some seats + minority coalition in government + in power)

a Coefficients

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 5.678 6.462 .879 .382 Populist Presence .630 1.009 .036 .625 .534 Corruption 1.664 .633 .360 2.629 .010 Civil Liberties .172 1.338 .010 .128 .898 Political Rights 4.602 2.331 .144 1.974 .052 Effective Parties .276 .436 .051 .634 .528 GDP per Capita .000 .000 -.390 -1.625 .108 Year2000 -1.168 1.286 -.048 -.908 .367 Year2005 -.393 1.639 -.020 -.240 .811 Year2010 2.225 1.650 .115 1.349 .182 Year2015 3.790 1.844 .199 2.056 .043 Austria -2.834 2.141 -.071 -1.324 .190 Belgium -10.673 3.195 -.268 -3.340 .001 Bulgaria 12.477 5.169 .201 2.414 .018 Croatia 19.285 5.021 .221 3.841 .000 Cyprus 1.993 3.311 .039 .602 .549 Czech Republic .680 3.673 .013 .185 .854 Denmark -9.515 3.165 -.239 -3.006 .004 Estonia -6.106 3.509 -.120 -1.740 .086 Finland -10.833 2.636 -.272 -4.110 .000 France 6.516 2.020 .164 3.226 .002 Germany -2.861 2.057 -.072 -1.391 .169 Greece 16.742 3.688 .420 4.540 .000 Hungary 8.890 4.049 .175 2.196 .031 Ireland -1.368 2.342 -.034 -.584 .561 Italy 16.259 3.177 .408 5.117 .000 Latvia .970 4.413 .019 .220 .827 Lithuania -.568 4.097 -.011 -.139 .890 Luxembourg .167 6.521 .004 .026 .980 Malta 1.111 3.136 .022 .354 .724 Netherlands -7.454 2.630 -.187 -2.834 .006 Poland 4.046 4.043 .079 1.001 .320 Portugal -2.770 2.745 -.070 -1.009 .316 Romania 14.692 5.209 .237 2.821 .006

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Slovakia .987 3.972 .019 .248 .805 Slovenia 1.790 3.090 .035 .579 .564 Spain 3.664 2.440 .092 1.502 .137 Sweden -10.006 2.432 -.251 -4.115 .000 a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom

Model Summary

Adjusted R Std. Error of the Model R R Square Square Estimate a 1 .959 .919 .878 2.91298

a. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Effective Parties, Year2005, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Italy, Year2000, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Year2010, Netherlands, France, Greece, Populist Presence, Year2015, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Belgium, Corruption, GDP per Capita

a ANOVA

Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. b 1 Regression 6955.738 37 187.993 22.155 .000 Residual 610.953 72 8.485 Total 7566.691 109

a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom b. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Effective Parties, Year2005, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Italy, Year2000, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Year2010, Netherlands, France, Greece, Populist Presence, Year2015, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Belgium, Corruption, GDP per Capita

Non-lagged 2-value variable domestic election model (1: no seat + some seats; 2: minority coalition in government + in power)

a Coefficients

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 4.954 6.115 .810 .421 Populist Presence 2.498 1.028 .120 2.430 .018 Corruption 1.528 .600 .330 2.547 .013 Civil Liberties -.406 1.308 -.023 -.310 .757 Political Rights 5.059 2.229 .158 2.269 .026 Effective Parties .033 .432 .006 .077 .939 GDP per Capita .000 .000 -.300 -1.291 .201 Year2000 -1.235 1.233 -.051 -1.001 .320 Year2005 -1.125 1.610 -.057 -.698 .487 Year2010 1.570 1.607 .081 .977 .332 Year2015 2.985 1.793 .157 1.665 .100 Austria -3.172 1.970 -.080 -1.610 .112 Belgium -8.835 3.106 -.222 -2.844 .006 Bulgaria 11.346 5.005 .183 2.267 .026 Croatia 18.700 4.835 .214 3.868 .000 Cyprus 2.619 3.182 .051 .823 .413 Czech Republic .082 3.549 .002 .023 .982 Denmark -10.732 3.058 -.270 -3.510 .001 Estonia -4.851 3.424 -.095 -1.417 .161 Finland -10.380 2.429 -.261 -4.274 .000 France 6.457 1.947 .162 3.317 .001 Germany -2.197 1.866 -.055 -1.178 .243 Greece 17.023 3.555 .428 4.788 .000 Hungary 8.005 3.921 .157 2.042 .045 Ireland -1.558 2.231 -.039 -.698 .487 Italy 15.570 3.073 .391 5.066 .000 Latvia 2.216 4.280 .044 .518 .606 Lithuania -.455 3.924 -.009 -.116 .908 Luxembourg -1.562 6.329 -.039 -.247 .806 Malta 1.255 3.000 .025 .418 .677 Netherlands -7.469 2.527 -.188 -2.956 .004 Poland 3.611 3.879 .071 .931 .355 Portugal -2.731 2.626 -.069 -1.040 .302 Romania 15.685 5.033 .253 3.116 .003

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Slovakia 2.042 3.836 .040 .532 .596 Slovenia 2.827 2.998 .056 .943 .349 Spain 3.793 2.345 .095 1.617 .110 Sweden -10.042 2.341 -.252 -4.289 .000 a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom

Model Summary

Adjusted R Std. Error of the Model R R Square Square Estimate a 1 .962 .925 .886 2.80801

a. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Effective Parties, Year2005, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Italy, Year2000, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Year2010, Netherlands, France, Greece, Populist Presence, Year2015, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Belgium, Corruption, GDP per Capita

a ANOVA

Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. b 1 Regression 6998.977 37 189.162 23.990 .000 Residual 567.714 72 7.885 Total 7566.691 109

a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom b. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Effective Parties, Year2005, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Italy, Year2000, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Year2010, Netherlands, France, Greece, Populist Presence, Year2015, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Belgium, Corruption, GDP per Capita

Non-lagged 2-value variable domestic election model (1: no seat + some seats + minority coalition in government; 2: in power)

a Coefficients

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) -1.843 5.550 -.332 .741 Populist Presence 7.526 1.389 .261 5.420 .000 Corruption 1.755 .526 .379 3.335 .001 Civil Liberties -.257 1.132 -.015 -.227 .821 Political Rights 4.030 1.957 .126 2.059 .043 Effective Parties .145 .368 .027 .395 .694 GDP per Capita .000 .000 -.283 -1.396 .167 Year2000 -.902 1.080 -.037 -.835 .407 Year2005 -.867 1.385 -.044 -.626 .533 Year2010 1.845 1.382 .096 1.336 .186 Year2015 3.117 1.535 .164 2.030 .046 Austria -2.103 1.704 -.053 -1.234 .221 Belgium -9.124 2.677 -.229 -3.409 .001 Bulgaria 8.324 4.435 .134 1.877 .065 Croatia 21.955 4.250 .251 5.165 .000 Cyprus 3.137 2.782 .062 1.127 .263 Czech Republic 2.455 3.120 .048 .787 .434 Denmark -9.840 2.619 -.247 -3.758 .000 Estonia -4.521 2.980 -.089 -1.517 .134 Finland -10.430 2.129 -.262 -4.899 .000 France 6.707 1.707 .168 3.929 .000 Germany -2.285 1.634 -.057 -1.399 .166 Greece 16.879 3.115 .424 5.418 .000 Hungary 5.942 3.465 .117 1.715 .091 Ireland -1.509 1.951 -.038 -.773 .442 Italy 13.160 2.743 .331 4.797 .000 Latvia 3.578 3.750 .070 .954 .343 Lithuania 1.797 3.461 .035 .519 .605 Luxembourg -2.050 5.525 -.051 -.371 .712 Malta 1.933 2.633 .038 .734 .465 Netherlands -7.429 2.214 -.187 -3.355 .001 Poland 1.143 3.441 .022 .332 .741 Portugal -2.107 2.306 -.053 -.914 .364 Romania 17.712 4.431 .285 3.997 .000

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Slovakia 3.257 3.370 .064 .966 .337 Slovenia 3.245 2.619 .064 1.239 .219 Spain 4.309 2.059 .108 2.093 .040 Sweden -10.418 2.054 -.262 -5.071 .000 a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom

Model Summary

Adjusted R Std. Error of the Model R R Square Square Estimate a 1 .971 .942 .913 2.46157

a ANOVA

Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. b 1 Regression 7130.421 37 192.714 31.805 .000 Residual 436.270 72 6.059 Total 7566.691 109

Non-lagged 3-value variable domestic election model (1: no seat + some seats; 2: minority coalition in government; 3: in power)

a Coefficients

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 4.623 5.763 .802 .425 Populist Presence 2.552 .652 .192 3.918 .000 Corruption 1.582 .566 .342 2.796 .007 Civil Liberties -.551 1.230 -.031 -.448 .655 Political Rights 4.804 2.103 .150 2.285 .025 Effective Parties -.024 .404 -.004 -.059 .953 GDP per Capita .000 .000 -.267 -1.216 .228 Year2000 -1.178 1.163 -.049 -1.013 .315 Year2005 -1.330 1.510 -.067 -.881 .381 Year2010 1.370 1.507 .071 .909 .366 Year2015 2.656 1.681 .139 1.580 .118 Austria -3.094 1.844 -.078 -1.678 .098 Belgium -8.382 2.917 -.211 -2.874 .005 Bulgaria 9.901 4.752 .160 2.084 .041 Croatia 19.496 4.554 .223 4.281 .000 Cyprus 3.126 3.006 .061 1.040 .302 Czech Republic .662 3.343 .013 .198 .844 Denmark -11.019 2.860 -.277 -3.853 .000 Estonia -4.276 3.229 -.084 -1.324 .190 Finland -10.408 2.294 -.261 -4.537 .000 France 6.517 1.839 .164 3.545 .001 Germany -2.145 1.761 -.054 -1.218 .227 Greece 17.056 3.357 .428 5.081 .000 Hungary 6.964 3.719 .137 1.872 .065 Ireland -1.700 2.105 -.043 -.807 .422 Italy 14.449 2.927 .363 4.936 .000 Latvia 3.223 4.051 .063 .796 .429 Lithuania .245 3.708 .005 .066 .947 Luxembourg -2.398 5.973 -.060 -.401 .689 Malta 1.633 2.836 .032 .576 .566 Netherlands -7.513 2.386 -.189 -3.149 .002 Poland 2.503 3.682 .049 .680 .499 Portugal -2.425 2.482 -.061 -.977 .332 Romania 16.816 4.768 .271 3.527 .001

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Slovakia 2.769 3.629 .054 .763 .448 Slovenia 3.303 2.831 .065 1.167 .247 Spain 4.063 2.217 .102 1.833 .071 Sweden -10.211 2.212 -.256 -4.616 .000

a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom

Model Summary

Adjusted R Std. Error of the Model R R Square Square Estimate a 1 .966 .933 .899 2.65185

a. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Effective Parties, Year2005, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Italy, Year2000, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Year2010, Netherlands, France, Greece, Populist Presence, Year2015, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Belgium, Corruption, GDP per Capita

a ANOVA

Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. b 1 Regression 7060.366 37 190.821 27.135 .000 Residual 506.325 72 7.032 Total 7566.691 109

a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom b. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Effective Parties, Year2005, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Italy, Year2000, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Year2010, Netherlands, France, Greece, Populist Presence, Year2015, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Belgium, Corruption, GDP per Capita

Non-lagged 4-value variable domestic election model (1: no seat; 2: some seats; 3: minority coalition in government; 4: in power)

a Coefficients

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 4.638 5.931 .782 .437 Populist Presence 1.666 .510 .181 3.265 .002 Corruption 1.783 .585 .386 3.050 .003 Civil Liberties -.217 1.256 -.012 -.173 .863 Political Rights 4.284 2.167 .134 1.976 .052 Effective Parties .033 .414 .006 .081 .936 GDP per Capita .000 .000 -.339 -1.514 .134 Year2000 -1.379 1.199 -.057 -1.150 .254 Year2005 -1.187 1.553 -.060 -.765 .447 Year2010 1.311 1.561 .068 .840 .404 Year2015 2.519 1.752 .132 1.438 .155 Austria -4.038 1.953 -.101 -2.067 .042 Belgium -9.896 2.957 -.249 -3.347 .001 Bulgaria 10.720 4.868 .173 2.202 .031 Croatia 18.802 4.687 .215 4.011 .000 Cyprus 3.400 3.111 .067 1.093 .278 Czech Republic .612 3.437 .012 .178 .859 Denmark -11.449 2.984 -.288 -3.837 .000 Estonia -4.847 3.307 -.095 -1.465 .147 Finland -11.665 2.392 -.293 -4.877 .000 France 6.493 1.890 .163 3.436 .001 Germany -3.402 1.834 -.085 -1.855 .068 Greece 16.820 3.450 .422 4.875 .000 Hungary 7.492 3.814 .147 1.964 .053 Ireland -2.161 2.182 -.054 -.990 .325 Italy 14.725 3.009 .370 4.893 .000 Latvia 3.048 4.173 .060 .730 .468 Lithuania -.700 3.811 -.014 -.184 .855 Luxembourg -1.800 6.133 -.045 -.293 .770 Malta 2.066 2.932 .041 .705 .483 Netherlands -7.824 2.457 -.197 -3.185 .002 Poland 2.312 3.806 .045 .607 .546 Portugal -2.037 2.564 -.051 -.794 .430 Romania 16.621 4.907 .268 3.387 .001

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Slovakia 1.730 3.711 .034 .466 .642 Slovenia 2.519 2.893 .049 .871 .387 Spain 4.235 2.285 .106 1.854 .068 Sweden -10.324 2.276 -.259 -4.536 .000

a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom

Model Summary

Adjusted R Std. Error of the Model R R Square Square Estimate a 1 .964 .929 .893 2.72604

a ANOVA

Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. b 1 Regression 7031.639 37 190.044 25.574 .000 Residual 535.052 72 7.431 Total 7566.691 109

APPENDIX C

T+1 2-value variable domestic election model (1: no seat; 2: some seats + minority coalition in government + in power)

a Coefficients

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 3.789 6.012 .630 .531 Populist Presence .430 .951 .024 .452 .653 Corruption 1.557 .591 .335 2.636 .010 Civil Liberties -.428 1.205 -.024 -.355 .724 Political Rights 6.595 1.841 .216 3.583 .001 Effective Parties -.109 .409 -.020 -.267 .790 GDP per Capita -6.739E-5 .000 -.157 -.684 .496 Year2000 -1.708 1.204 -.070 -1.419 .160 Year2005 -1.831 1.544 -.092 -1.186 .240 Year2010 .922 1.562 .047 .590 .557 Year2015 2.049 1.762 .107 1.163 .249 Austria -2.089 2.016 -.052 -1.037 .303 Belgium -7.986 3.029 -.199 -2.636 .010 Bulgaria 14.115 4.709 .226 2.997 .004 Croatia 22.898 4.767 .260 4.804 .000 Cyprus 4.223 3.122 .082 1.352 .181 Czech Republic 3.212 3.473 .063 .925 .358 Denmark -10.451 2.938 -.260 -3.557 .001 Estonia -3.041 3.336 -.059 -.911 .365 Finland -9.906 2.454 -.247 -4.036 .000 France 6.319 1.887 .157 3.348 .001 Germany -2.525 1.922 -.063 -1.314 .193 Greece 16.219 3.430 .404 4.729 .000 Hungary 12.721 3.775 .248 3.370 .001 Ireland -2.369 2.180 -.059 -1.087 .281 Italy 17.354 2.978 .432 5.828 .000 Latvia 3.705 4.058 .072 .913 .364 Lithuania 3.052 3.917 .059 .779 .438 Luxembourg -5.377 6.190 -.134 -.869 .388 Malta 2.482 2.938 .048 .845 .401 Netherlands -7.727 2.452 -.193 -3.152 .002 Poland 8.892 3.839 .173 2.316 .023 Portugal -1.590 2.569 -.040 -.619 .538 Romania 16.170 4.733 .258 3.416 .001

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Slovakia 2.974 3.696 .058 .805 .424 Slovenia 3.998 2.933 .078 1.363 .177 Spain 4.433 2.278 .110 1.946 .056 Sweden -10.828 2.276 -.270 -4.758 .000 a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom

Model Summary

Adjusted R Std. Error of the Model R R Square Square Estimate a 1 .965 .930 .895 2.72464

a. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Effective Parties, Year2005, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Italy, Year2000, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Year2010, Netherlands, France, Greece, Populist Presence, Year2015, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Belgium, Corruption, GDP per Capita

a ANOVA

Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. b 1 Regression 7153.215 37 193.330 26.042 .000 Residual 534.504 72 7.424 Total 7687.718 109

a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom b. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Effective Parties, Year2005, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Italy, Year2000, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Year2010, Netherlands, France, Greece, Populist Presence, Year2015, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Belgium, Corruption, GDP per Capita

T+1 2-value variable domestic election model (1: no seat + some seats; 2: minority coalition in government + in power)

a Coefficients

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 3.205 5.695 .563 .575 Populist Presence 2.312 .965 .111 2.396 .019 Corruption 1.493 .558 .321 2.674 .009 Civil Liberties -.787 1.169 -.044 -.673 .503 Political Rights 6.242 1.761 .205 3.545 .001 Effective Parties -.307 .403 -.056 -.761 .449 GDP per Capita -4.235E-5 .000 -.098 -.449 .655 Year2000 -1.765 1.157 -.072 -1.526 .131 Year2005 -2.390 1.507 -.120 -1.586 .117 Year2010 .414 1.516 .021 .273 .785 Year2015 1.425 1.706 .074 .835 .406 Austria -2.496 1.844 -.062 -1.354 .180 Belgium -6.505 2.921 -.162 -2.227 .029 Bulgaria 13.548 4.543 .217 2.982 .004 Croatia 22.010 4.587 .250 4.798 .000 Cyprus 4.785 3.007 .093 1.591 .116 Czech Republic 2.592 3.356 .050 .772 .442 Denmark -11.560 2.839 -.288 -4.072 .000 Estonia -2.051 3.239 -.040 -.633 .529 Finland -9.636 2.261 -.240 -4.262 .000 France 6.332 1.819 .158 3.481 .001 Germany -2.016 1.743 -.050 -1.157 .251 Greece 16.429 3.305 .409 4.971 .000 Hungary 12.025 3.647 .234 3.297 .002 Ireland -2.434 2.079 -.061 -1.171 .246 Italy 16.723 2.877 .417 5.813 .000 Latvia 5.159 3.958 .101 1.304 .196 Lithuania 2.921 3.737 .057 .782 .437 Luxembourg -6.432 5.980 -.160 -1.076 .286 Malta 2.664 2.819 .052 .945 .348 Netherlands -7.739 2.356 -.193 -3.285 .002 Poland 8.319 3.670 .162 2.267 .026 Portugal -1.489 2.465 -.037 -.604 .548 Romania 17.628 4.603 .282 3.830 .000

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Slovakia 4.091 3.564 .080 1.148 .255 Slovenia 4.854 2.832 .095 1.714 .091 Spain 4.592 2.191 .114 2.095 .040 Sweden -10.800 2.192 -.269 -4.927 .000

a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom

Model Summary

Adjusted R Std. Error of the Model R R Square Square Estimate a 1 .967 .935 .902 2.62581

a. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Effective Parties, Year2005, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Italy, Year2000, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Year2010, Netherlands, France, Greece, Populist Presence, Year2015, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Belgium, Corruption, GDP per Capita

a ANOVA

Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. b 1 Regression 7191.287 37 194.359 28.189 .000 Residual 496.431 72 6.895 Total 7687.718 109

a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom b. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Effective Parties, Year2005, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Italy, Year2000, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Year2010, Netherlands, France, Greece, Populist Presence, Year2015, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Belgium, Corruption, GDP per Capita

T+1 3-value variable domestic election model (1: no seat + some seats; 2: minority coalition in government; 3: in power)

a Coefficients

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 3.292 5.397 .610 .544 Populist Presence 2.368 .628 .176 3.769 .000 Corruption 1.589 .531 .342 2.995 .004 Civil Liberties -.774 1.105 -.044 -.700 .486 Political Rights 5.279 1.705 .173 3.096 .003 Effective Parties -.320 .378 -.059 -.846 .400 GDP per Capita -4.169E-5 .000 -.097 -.466 .643 Year2000 -1.661 1.098 -.068 -1.513 .135 Year2005 -2.412 1.421 -.121 -1.698 .094 Year2010 .407 1.429 .021 .285 .777 Year2015 1.367 1.607 .071 .851 .398 Austria -2.445 1.737 -.061 -1.408 .163 Belgium -6.298 2.757 -.157 -2.285 .025 Bulgaria 12.579 4.328 .201 2.907 .005 Croatia 22.345 4.338 .254 5.151 .000 Cyprus 5.073 2.854 .099 1.778 .080 Czech Republic 2.968 3.177 .058 .934 .353 Denmark -11.673 2.670 -.291 -4.372 .000 Estonia -1.808 3.069 -.035 -.589 .558 Finland -9.707 2.147 -.242 -4.521 .000 France 6.462 1.728 .161 3.740 .000 Germany -1.969 1.654 -.049 -1.190 .238 Greece 16.526 3.139 .412 5.265 .000 Hungary 11.106 3.479 .216 3.192 .002 Ireland -2.372 1.973 -.059 -1.202 .233 Italy 15.703 2.756 .391 5.698 .000 Latvia 6.229 3.772 .121 1.651 .103 Lithuania 3.273 3.545 .064 .923 .359 Luxembourg -6.437 5.671 -.160 -1.135 .260 Malta 2.926 2.678 .057 1.093 .278 Netherlands -7.745 2.237 -.193 -3.462 .001 Poland 7.090 3.512 .138 2.019 .047 Portugal -1.263 2.342 -.031 -.539 .591 Romania 19.045 4.399 .304 4.330 .000

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Slovakia 4.845 3.394 .094 1.428 .158 Slovenia 5.132 2.687 .100 1.910 .060 Spain 4.822 2.083 .120 2.315 .023 Sweden -10.860 2.082 -.271 -5.217 .000 a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom

Model Summary

Adjusted R Std. Error of the Model R R Square Square Estimate a 1 .970 .942 .912 2.49360

a. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Effective Parties, Year2005, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Italy, Year2000, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Year2010, Netherlands, France, Greece, Populist Presence, Year2015, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Belgium, Corruption, GDP per Capita

a ANOVA

Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. b 1 Regression 7240.020 37 195.676 31.469 .000 Residual 447.698 72 6.218 Total 7687.718 109

a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom b. Predictors: (Constant), Sweden, Effective Parties, Year2005, Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Italy, Year2000, Spain, Finland, Portugal, Year2010, Netherlands, France, Greece, Populist Presence, Year2015, Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Belgium, Corruption, GDP per Capita

T+1 4-value variable domestic election model (1: no seat; 2: some seats; 3: minority coalition in government; 4: in power)

a Coefficients

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 3.242 5.554 .584 .561 Populist Presence 1.531 .497 .165 3.083 .003 Corruption 1.746 .551 .376 3.170 .002 Civil Liberties -.568 1.134 -.032 -.501 .618 Political Rights 5.298 1.770 .174 2.993 .004 Effective Parties -.283 .389 -.052 -.727 .470 GDP per Capita -6.995E-5 .000 -.163 -.761 .449 Year2000 -1.828 1.130 -.075 -1.617 .110 Year2005 -2.307 1.461 -.116 -1.579 .119 Year2010 .332 1.477 .017 .225 .823 Year2015 1.217 1.667 .063 .730 .468 Austria -3.344 1.849 -.083 -1.809 .075 Belgium -7.661 2.807 -.191 -2.729 .008 Bulgaria 12.846 4.450 .205 2.886 .005 Croatia 21.732 4.479 .247 4.852 .000 Cyprus 5.255 2.947 .102 1.783 .079 Czech Republic 2.845 3.269 .055 .870 .387 Denmark -12.036 2.781 -.300 -4.328 .000 Estonia -2.371 3.146 -.046 -.754 .454 Finland -10.824 2.245 -.270 -4.822 .000 France 6.403 1.777 .160 3.604 .001 Germany -3.118 1.724 -.078 -1.809 .075 Greece 16.309 3.227 .406 5.054 .000 Hungary 11.373 3.578 .222 3.179 .002 Ireland -2.849 2.039 -.071 -1.397 .167 Italy 15.929 2.837 .397 5.614 .000 Latvia 5.725 3.874 .112 1.478 .144 Lithuania 2.350 3.659 .046 .642 .523 Luxembourg -5.925 5.828 -.148 -1.017 .313 Malta 3.230 2.765 .063 1.168 .247 Netherlands -8.014 2.304 -.200 -3.478 .001 Poland 6.845 3.646 .133 1.877 .065 Portugal -1.002 2.416 -.025 -.415 .680 Romania 18.334 4.511 .293 4.065 .000

Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients

Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Slovakia 3.615 3.463 .070 1.044 .300 Slovenia 4.351 2.750 .085 1.582 .118 Spain 4.929 2.146 .123 2.297 .025 Sweden -10.963 2.141 -.273 -5.119 .000

a. Dependent Variable: Media Freedom

Model Summary

Adjusted R Std. Error of the Model R R Square Square Estimate a 1 .969 .938 .907 2.56447

a ANOVA

Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. b 1 Regression 7214.209 37 194.979 29.648 .000 Residual 473.509 72 6.577 Total 7687.718 109

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