Secretary of State Clinton has urged greater understanding between diplomatic and development communities U.S. Air Force (Jeremy Lock) Elevating Development Assistance

BY J. BRIAN ATWOOD

ecretary of State Hillary Clinton’s January 6 address at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC, called for the “elevation” of the development mission and an end to the S old debates that have divided the diplomatic and development communities. She urged a new “mindset” to “replace dogmatic attitudes with clear reasoning and common sense.” Her remarks were a welcome re"ection of this approach; they were based on sound development thinking and set forth a serious challenge for her State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) colleagues. What remains for Secretary Clinton and the administration of Barack Obama is to transform this articulate commitment into an operational reality. Two major studies, the Presidential Study Directive and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, presumably will address the dif!cult issues of strategy, means, and organization that remain. These more mundane but vital bureaucratic challenges must be addressed if the Secretary’s worthy vision is to become a reality.

J. Brian Atwood is Dean of the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota. He served as Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development from 1993 to 1999.

PRISM 1, no. 3 FEATURES | 3 How does the administration define the have begun to relate our security challenges word elevate in terms of resources, structure, directly or indirectly to the condition of pov- and policy? At this writing, we can only guess. erty. It helped to have a conservative President As someone who has held executive positions introduce the concept of the “3Ds”—defense, in both State and USAID, I want Secretary diplomacy, and development—as integral to our Clinton’s vision to be realized. However, there national security strategy. are hurdles to overcome. Our defense and diplomacy missions are overwhelmed with crises. Yet we devote few overwhelmed by earmarks and intrusive resources to prevention, which is what devel- opment is all about. The challenge today is to oversight, USAID has become risk averse organize the 3Ds to more effectively address the and less innovative than in the past crises while investing meaningful resources in an effective and focused prevention institution USAID, from its beginning in the Kennedy centered at USAID and State. administration, has been seen as the premier Secretary Clinton also stated in her January development agency within the international 6 address that mention of the word integration donor community. It led that community “sets off alarm bells.” Many, she said, interpret toward highly innovative interventions in eco- this as “giving up our long-term development nomic reform, health, education, democracy/ goals to achieve short-term objectives.” This governance, agriculture, and the environment. will not happen, she asserts. Rather, we will These interventions and the evolution of a “leverage the expertise of our diplomats and comprehensive, internationally accepted devel- military on behalf of development.” opment strategy, backed by !nancial commit- I believe that a degree of integration can ment, formed the basis of American leadership and should occur. However, it must be under- in development. taken with care and respect for the primary Over the past 20 years, that leadership functions of each of the Ds. The culture of capacity has eroded significantly, though not each institution is different, though global chal- entirely. Overwhelmed by earmarks and intrusive lenges have forced more convergence than ever oversight, USAID has become risk averse and before. It is now likely that Secretary Clinton less innovative than in the past. Administrations can achieve significant integration in crisis and congresses of both parties have viewed management and create a “culture of preven- development as less important in the post–Cold tion” at State and USAID by elevating long- War world, and they deemphasized and defunded term development goals and aligning diplomatic USAID. Meanwhile, particularly after the fall objectives with them. of the Berlin Wall, development resources were dispersed to domestic departments, creating Diplomatic Mission serious policy and program disconnects and a To accomplish these goals and objectives, huge coordination problem while at the same diplomats, always strapped for resources to time weakening USAID. influence behavior or leverage international The perceived importance of develop- agreements, will have to gain an appreciation ment has changed of late as political leaders for investments in long-term development.

4 | FEATURES PRISM 1, no. 3 Diplomats tend to work with shorter time themselves—both promotes American power frames, and much of their work is done with and serves American security interests. counterparts from foreign ministries or other embassies, not with civil society (though State Development Mission of!cers working on human rights issues are an The development professional’s relation- exception). They will have to become better ship with a foreign counterpart is different advocates for effective development by becom- from that of a diplomat. Ideally, the relation- ing better acquainted with long-evolved devel- ship should be devoid of tension in that it opment thought. involves a cooperative partnership to achieve Effective diplomats learn the language, a common goal. Strategies are developed with culture, and political and economic factors that governmental ministries and civil society form the interests of the host country. Their partners, and projects are designed and imple- task is to explain and promote U.S. interests mented after agreement has been reached as while informing the policy process through ana- lyzing and reporting on the host country. The relationship developed in this exchange need promoting U.S. interests in trade, not be adversarial, but will always require the finance, security, and cultural exchange, management of some tension. The national and, increasingly, supporting common interests of two nations never are fully compat- efforts to confront global problems are ible, even on an issue where both agree on a not achieved by goodwill alone common goal. There are other aspects of the diplomatic role, but the essence is successfully managing this tension. to the endstate. A good development profes- The diplomatic mission clearly is aided sional, like a good diplomat, understands the when there are resources available to smooth historical, cultural, political, economic, and over differences or to create a better climate. sectoral factors of the partner. Yet the goal is Promoting U.S. interests in trade, finance, mutual trust. The idea is to develop a long- security, and cultural exchange, and, increas- term, enduring relationship that will produce ingly, supporting common efforts to confront development change and results over time. global problems are not achieved by goodwill The success of the host country equals the suc- alone. A negotiation over a dispute can often cess of the development mission. be facilitated by the provision of some form Political environments in developing coun- of compensation. tries are complex, however; they are often char- As former career diplomat Chas Freeman acterized by power struggles, weak institutions, has written, “The joining of will to strength and social tensions created in part by poverty. and potential produces power.” The power of Development results mean positive change, at the United States has been heavily weighted least theoretically, but not all parties in a host toward political, economic, and military factors. nation welcome change. Gaining the acquies- Now, a consensus is emerging that leadership cence of a government to work with segments of in development—the effort to mitigate the society to achieve development goals often is an effects of poverty by helping poor nations help obstacle requiring diplomatic skill to surmount.

PRISM 1, no. 3 FEATURES | 5 Outside pressure may even be needed, though Better coordination and effective integra- excessive pressure can undermine the partner- tion require development professionals to yield ship essential to achieve development results and change their culture as well. Too many want and, in the worst case, can even put a private to focus on the !eld project and are unwilling to group or an individual at risk. appreciate the broader policy challenge. They Diplomats and development professionals tend to be excellent technocrats, though many have to work out these issues. Usually this is have become superb program managers and a done at the Country Team level—a good forum few have become strong development policy for discussing the broad range of U.S. interests advocates. Yet the USAID voice is not often in a country. Yet it is not always easy to decide heard in policy circles in Washington. A strong that long-term reform should be promoted and administrator will help, and Dr. Rajiv Shah will leveraged when short-term objectives involving be that, but he will need an effective policy a particular U.S. interest might be negatively staff. When the State Department created the affected. A case in point is Egypt, where the position of Director of Foreign Assistance, the U.S. Government has important geostrategic USAID policy bureau was eliminated. This interests at stake, yet the Egyptian government badly debilitated the leadership capacity of USAID among donors and virtually eliminated its policy role within the U.S. Government. if development is to be truly elevated, Administrator Shah will restore this vital of!ce. its professionals will need to step up Development assistance is an essential and lend their voices and professional part of the solution, but coherent, reinforcing expertise to the policy debate policies in the international trade, !nance, agri- culture, and environmental areas are equally important. If development is to be truly ele- does not want USAID to fund organizations vated, its professionals will need to step up and that promote democratic change. (Egyptian lend their voices and professional expertise to government restrictions on USAID funding the policy debate. This has to happen at all lev- have been somewhat circumvented by the State els, from the Embassy to the White House. Too Department’s Middle East Peace Initiative pro- often, major decisions affecting the develop- gram, which funds local organizations directly.) ing world have been made without hearing the There are other more nuanced tensions positions of those who understand the impact between diplomatic needs and development on developing countries. objectives, but work in the democratic/gover- There is a strong correlation between con- nance area arguably produces the most strain. ditions of underdevelopment and various forms The best way to resolve this situation is to of violent conflict. A 1997 study examined make clear to diplomats and development pro- race and class segregation in poor Chicago fessionals alike that supporting human rights neighborhoods and concluded that poverty and democratic reform is the default posi- was an obstacle to “collective efficacy,” or tion for U.S. foreign policy. It is an overrid- social cohesion among citizens.1 Paul Collier’s ing value, though its pursuit always must take research for his book The Bottom Billion con- other factors into account. !rms the existence of a “con"ict trap” in areas

6 | FEATURES PRISM 1, no. 3 in"icted with extreme poverty.2 The conclu- but they invariably revealed weaknesses and sion drawn is that the greater the effect of recommended changes in approach. USAID resource deprivation, the stronger the corre- cannot perform its role as a leader in develop- lation to the level of violence. This linkage ment if it is not self-critical. The agency should should not be ignored by military personnel, demand intellectual honesty and urge both the diplomats, or development professionals. Executive and Congress to hold it account- USAID of!cers are sometimes reluctant to able for achieving results. This applies as well see their contribution in the context of crisis at the mission level, where some percentage of prevention. Overall, what they do contributes resources should be devoted to evaluation. to progress and stability, but too often a crisis dismantles the development objective. In a Defense Mission poor, developing country, these breakdowns Generally speaking, military personnel occur often, but some are avoidable. Being more have made greater strides in understanding effective crisis prevention agents means having development than have diplomats because they a better appreciation of a society’s fault lines have had to try their hand at it. The acceptance and fragilities. Where, for example, over the of “stability operations” as part of mainstream span of a coming decade, are weaknesses most military doctrine and the availability of abun- likely to cause civil unrest? What are the anti- dant resources have encouraged the military dotes to a future crisis? Stronger governmen- to take on projects that have fallen more typi- tal institutions? Reduced child mortality rates? cally within the USAID mission. While many Micro-economic systems that support higher retired military commanders—and Secretary growth rates? of Defense Robert Gates himself—have raised Development missions with stronger ties serious doubts about the merit of these kinds to civil society and a better appreciation of the of operations becoming military missions, it is relationship between institutions and citizens quickly becoming a part of the personal con- have the information they need to do this kind stitution of modern military officers. Young of analysis. However, their priorities are more West Point graduates are in some cases more often dictated by earmarks and, more narrowly, enthusiastic about “doing good” in this way sector-based country strategies. Analysis of a than they are about fighting traditional wars society’s fault lines is discouraged, sometimes (of which there are few any more). They have by diplomats afraid of offending the sitting gov- embraced the mission, and they have a dif!cult ernment, and sometimes by risk-averse develop- time seeing the downside in terms of broader ment professionals. U.S. interests. Finally, USAID must develop the capacity The military contributes to development to measure results and to evaluate its programs. in postcon"ict societies by providing security, The agency’s evaluation of!ce was eliminated assisting relief efforts, and reconstructing infra- during the George W. Bush administration. structure (when this activity can be rationalized This staff was able to look into projects and as part of the security mission). These activities approaches to development with a construc- can enhance the image of the Armed Forces tively critical eye. Often their reports created and facilitate interactions with civil society. consternation on the part of the implementers, However, military members’ involvement in

PRISM 1, no. 3 FEATURES | 7 longer term institution-building is inhibited by of programs we run, but measure the results— several factors: the lasting changes that those dollars and pro- !! they are a conspicuous extension grams have helped achieve.” Today, unlike of American policy, which in these when I started my tenure at USAID, results- instances is based on a need to use measurement matrices and sector indicators are force at some level much more sophisticated. To achieve tangible results, an aid agency needs a strong program !! they are not trained to work with management orientation and a command and foreign cultures and languages, control structure that assures responsiveness especially at the civil society level throughout. The agency needs long-term bud- (despite the good efforts of generals gets it can count on, as well as strong strategic such as David Petraeus and Stanley thinking that connects projects to programs to McChrystal to prepare them for country strategies (owned by host governments) counterinsurgency missions) to the people of the host country. !! they are not civilians and thus have USAID can be innovative, but in recent a harder time relating to civil society years it has become risk averse. The revitaliza- !! regardless of training, their knowledge tion of the agency requires leadership to encour- of the long-term development mission age new policy and programmatic approaches is limited. and share those approaches in the !eld and with other donors. As Secretary Clinton stated, there Elevating Development is a need not just for project implementers, but also for development diplomats—individuals Development thought has evolved over the who have deep development knowledge and the past 50 years, and development professionals capacity to work with others to pursue what is are a special breed. They are the only group of in their best interest. professionals in the U.S. Government whose Dr. Shah possesses these qualities. His success is measured by the success of their for- technical expertise is beyond question, and he eign partners. Their timeline for an exit strategy combines it with a passion for development that is much longer. A great deal can be done to comes from personal experience. He cannot increase appreciation of development by mili- do it alone, but his obvious commitment and tary and diplomatic of!cers, but expecting that energy are a good start in returning the United this type of expertise will be interchangeable States to its previous leadership role. among the 3Ds is unrealistic. The elevation of development requires not Integration only a deeper respect for the mission, but also Where does this leave us with regard to a signi!cant degree of management autonomy. the issue of integration? Secretary Clinton has The best way to think of this is to imagine the argued it well. She refers to two missions oper- needs of an organization whose success or failure ating more in sync than before. She expects will be measured by results. Secretary Clinton diplomats to take up the cause of development was correct when she stated, “We must not sim- by letting their counterparts know that the ply add up the dollars we spend or the number U.S. Government is going to lead in poverty

8 | FEATURES PRISM 1, no. 3 eradication. She expects development profes- preoccupation in this phase, planning to pre- sionals to promote innovative thinking, to be pare for the succeeding stage should already development advocates, and to encourage other be under way. This involves a combination of donors to work with the United States on the security in the form of a peacekeeping military new global challenges. contingent and humanitarian relief carried out I was impressed recently, for example, by the work of a USAID officer in Beijing if there is such a thing as a “normal” who helped organize a meeting between transition from a conflict environment, representatives of the Organisation for it generally unfolds as a continuum, Economic Co-operation and Development’s with one primary mission overlapping Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and Chinese aid officials. More USAID another, each one predominant for a presence is needed in countries that can period of time contribute as donors. In addition, the DAC, the institution that gave the world the by relief agencies. In the U.S. Government, Millennium Development Goals (MDG), this task falls to the Department of Defense should be a primary vehicle for promoting (DOD) and USAID (and its of!ces of Foreign innovation in development. The DAC should Disaster Assistance and Food for Peace). These be reinvigorated and elevated. The MDGs humanitarian operations traditionally have will soon reach the 2015 deadlines. A new been well coordinated with DOD, and often mandate on development is needed, and the military officers and personnel from other best results matrices should be applied, so the agencies are seconded to USAID to help. The world knows what has been done and where recent Haiti relief operation illustrates this efforts have fallen short. cooperation well. Even more integration, joint training, The next phase involves initiatives to bring and coordination must take place in transi- about reconciliation and efforts to reconstruct tional situations and in postcon"ict, postdisas- the society physically, socially, and politically. ter, or postauthoritarian rule. Each of the 3Ds Here, development professionals should work plays a crucial role in these scenarios, though hand in glove with diplomats familiar with the responsibilities vary according to circum- the terms of the peace agreement and with stance. We have made considerable progress in the political entities that negotiated them. handling postcon"ict transitions, but both the USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives has international community and U.S. Government gained a great deal of expertise in programming could do more. to bring about reconciliation within previously If there is such a thing as a “normal” con"icted societies and in implementing aspects transition from a conflict environment, it of the peace agreement. generally unfolds as a continuum, with one The final phase, which should also be primary mission overlapping another, each planned well in advance, involves the devel- one predominant for a period of time. The opment of the social, economic, and political initial phase involves a diplomatic effort to systems. Here, once again, USAID should be resolve the con"ict. While diplomacy is the in the lead on the program side, working closely

PRISM 1, no. 3 FEATURES | 9 USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah (left) will need effective development policy advocates to ensure that the agency’s voice is heard U.S. Air Force (Prentice Colter)

with diplomats who are working the political evolution under the terms of the peace agreement and its subsequent iterations. These transitional situations now occur often enough to warrant far more training and prepara- tion than commonly occur within the U.S. Government. DOD and USAID have held joint exercises in the past, but more collaboration is needed. Moreover, State’s training facility should get involved. Ideally, the United States should have certi!ed cadres ready to deploy from each of the 3Ds. As the concept of enhanced integration is pursued, architects should keep in mind the need to strengthen each of the three missions. Requirements to expand the core need not detract from the central missions of defense, diplomacy, and development. Several considerations come to mind:

!! Standards for promotion to which career aspirations are tied are different in each of the three cultures. Modi!cations can and have been made to encourage the development of dif- ferent competencies, but over the years, none of these has changed the primary motivations of individual military, diplomatic, or development of!cers. Soldiers get ahead by leading combat units. Diplomats are promoted when they manage a major crisis or participate in a key negotiation. Development professionals get to the top by managing programs well and comprehending the linkages among sectors in the context of a local partnership. !! The institutions within which each mission resides have their own “DNA.” They are either hierarchical or "at in structure. They either exercise great control from Washington, or they

10 | FEATURES PRISM 1, no. 3 delegate to the !eld. These tendencies is results that can be measured, evaluated, and are not just the result of bureaucratic then advertised, especially by recipient govern- culture; to a great extent, their core ments and donor agencies. mission dictates how they operate. The absence of coordination and policy !! The structural and operational changes coherence within the U.S. Government, as that emerge from the Presidential acknowledged by the Secretary, has made it Study Directive and Quadrennial impossible to pursue a viable overall develop- Diplomacy and Development Review ment strategy. Our political culture, which must be sustainable over time. Future rewards immediate grati!cation and effective leaders may have different priorities crisis management, mitigates the creation of a based on politics and ideology. The long-term strategy. We tend to direct our pas- risk is that a change made now may sion toward the various elements of develop- take an entirely different form in a ment rather than the broader goal of poverty future administration. An example was the creation of the International our political culture, which rewards Development and Cooperation immediate gratification and effective Administration (IDCA) to coordi- crisis management, mitigates the nate all development activities in creation of a long-term strategy the Carter administration. IDCA was abandoned in the Reagan years. Yet its continued existence in law later mitigation, a goal that requires the appropriate created strains in the State-USAID integration of sector interventions. While there relationship, as its statutory direc- are certainly key initiatives whose advancement tor reported directly to the President by high-level leaders can sensitize the inter- (the administrator of USAID served national community—such as the empower- as director of IDCA in the absence of ment of women—development results are best a Presidential appointee). achieved by responding to host country needs, achieving local buy-in, and creating trust in In her January 6 address, Secretary Clinton local partners that their goals are our goals. once again demonstrated her strong commit- Secretary Clinton made all these points, ment to elevating the development mission. and she made them well. She has created great The time is right for a major reform of our for- expectations that the means, structures, and eign aid delivery system. Her speech acknowl- operational details of her vision will !t well edged the criticisms of poverty reduction with her philosophy and commitment. It is efforts that have been heard from foreign aid now up to the dedicated professionals in all opponents. These critical views cover a spec- three of the Ds to make this concept work. trum from a recommendation to eliminate all Congress can provide an important impetus for assistance, to concerns about dependency, to reform by enacting a new mandate for develop- a reading of data that indicates that aid has ment that sets forth broad goals and requires not, in fact, made an impact on either growth results-reporting and objective evaluation. If rates or poverty. The antidote to this criticism Secretary Clinton achieves the right mix of

PRISM 1, no. 3 FEATURES | 11 integration, alignment, and operational independence—if she reinvigorates the effort to prevent crisis through development and proactive diplomacy—she will leave a legacy as important as a signed peace agreement. PRISM Notes 1 Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls, “Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Ef!cacy,” Science, August 15, 1997, 918–924. 2 See Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

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