Elevating Development Assistance

Secretary of State Clinton has urged greater understanding between diplomatic and development communities U.S. Air Force (Jeremy Lock) Elevating Development Assistance BY J. BRIAN ATWOOD ecretary of State Hillary Clinton’s January 6 address at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC, called for the “elevation” of the development mission and an end to the S old debates that have divided the diplomatic and development communities. She urged a new “mindset” to “replace dogmatic attitudes with clear reasoning and common sense.” Her remarks were a welcome re"ection of this approach; they were based on sound development thinking and set forth a serious challenge for her State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) colleagues. What remains for Secretary Clinton and the administration of Barack Obama is to transform this articulate commitment into an operational reality. Two major studies, the Presidential Study Directive and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, presumably will address the dif!cult issues of strategy, means, and organization that remain. These more mundane but vital bureaucratic challenges must be addressed if the Secretary’s worthy vision is to become a reality. J. Brian Atwood is Dean of the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota. He served as Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development from 1993 to 1999. PRISM 1, no. 3 FEATURES | 3 How does the administration define the have begun to relate our security challenges word elevate in terms of resources, structure, directly or indirectly to the condition of pov- and policy? At this writing, we can only guess. erty. It helped to have a conservative President As someone who has held executive positions introduce the concept of the “3Ds”—defense, in both State and USAID, I want Secretary diplomacy, and development—as integral to our Clinton’s vision to be realized. However, there national security strategy. are hurdles to overcome. Our defense and diplomacy missions are overwhelmed with crises. Yet we devote few overwhelmed by earmarks and intrusive resources to prevention, which is what development is all about. The challenge today is to oversight, USAID has become risk averse organize the 3Ds to more effectively address the and less innovative than in the past crises while investing meaningful resources in an effective and focused prevention institution USAID, from its beginning in the Kennedy centered at USAID and State. administration, has been seen as the premier Secretary Clinton also stated in her January development agency within the international 6 address that mention of the word integration donor community. It led that community “sets off alarm bells.” Many, she said, interpret toward highly innovative interventions in eco- this as “giving up our long-term development nomic reform, health, education, democracy/ goals to achieve short-term objectives.” This governance, agriculture, and the environment. will not happen, she asserts. Rather, we will These interventions and the evolution of a “leverage the expertise of our diplomats and comprehensive, internationally accepted devel- military on behalf of development.” opment strategy, backed by !nancial commit- I believe that a degree of integration can ment, formed the basis of American leadership and should occur. However, it must be under- in development. taken with care and respect for the primary Over the past 20 years, that leadership functions of each of the Ds. The culture of capacity has eroded significantly, though not each institution is different, though global chal- entirely. Overwhelmed by earmarks and intrusive lenges have forced more convergence than ever oversight, USAID has become risk averse and before. It is now likely that Secretary Clinton less innovative than in the past. Administrations can achieve significant integration in crisis and congresses of both parties have viewed management and create a “culture of preven- development as less important in the post–Cold tion” at State and USAID by elevating long- War world, and they deemphasized and defunded term development goals and aligning diplomatic USAID. Meanwhile, particularly after the fall objectives with them. of the Berlin Wall, development resources were dispersed to domestic departments, creating Diplomatic Mission serious policy and program disconnects and a To accomplish these goals and objectives, huge coordination problem while at the same diplomats, always strapped for resources to time weakening USAID. influence behavior or leverage international The perceived importance of develop- agreements, will have to gain an appreciation ment has changed of late as political leaders for investments in long-term development. 4 | FEATURES PRISM 1, no. 3 Diplomats tend to work with shorter time themselves—both promotes American power frames, and much of their work is done with and serves American security interests. counterparts from foreign ministries or other embassies, not with civil society (though State Development Mission of!cers working on human rights issues are an The development professional’s relation- exception). They will have to become better ship with a foreign counterpart is different advocates for effective development by becom- from that of a diplomat. Ideally, the relation- ing better acquainted with long-evolved devel- ship should be devoid of tension in that it opment thought. involves a cooperative partnership to achieve Effective diplomats learn the language, a common goal. Strategies are developed with culture, and political and economic factors that governmental ministries and civil society form the interests of the host country. Their partners, and projects are designed and imple- task is to explain and promote U.S. interests mented after agreement has been reached as while informing the policy process through ana- lyzing and reporting on the host country. The relationship developed in this exchange need promoting U.S. interests in trade, not be adversarial, but will always require the finance, security, and cultural exchange, management of some tension. The national and, increasingly, supporting common interests of two nations never are fully compat- efforts to confront global problems are ible, even on an issue where both agree on a not achieved by goodwill alone common goal. There are other aspects of the diplomatic role, but the essence is successfully managing this tension. to the endstate. A good development profes- The diplomatic mission clearly is aided sional, like a good diplomat, understands the when there are resources available to smooth historical, cultural, political, economic, and over differences or to create a better climate. sectoral factors of the partner. Yet the goal is Promoting U.S. interests in trade, finance, mutual trust. The idea is to develop a long- security, and cultural exchange, and, increas- term, enduring relationship that will produce ingly, supporting common efforts to confront development change and results over time. global problems are not achieved by goodwill The success of the host country equals the suc- alone. A negotiation over a dispute can often cess of the development mission. be facilitated by the provision of some form Political environments in developing coun- of compensation. tries are complex, however; they are often char- As former career diplomat Chas Freeman acterized by power struggles, weak institutions, has written, “The joining of will to strength and social tensions created in part by poverty. and potential produces power.” The power of Development results mean positive change, at the United States has been heavily weighted least theoretically, but not all parties in a host toward political, economic, and military factors. nation welcome change. Gaining the acquies- Now, a consensus is emerging that leadership cence of a government to work with segments of in development—the effort to mitigate the society to achieve development goals often is an effects of poverty by helping poor nations help obstacle requiring diplomatic skill to surmount. PRISM 1, no. 3 FEATURES | 5 Outside pressure may even be needed, though Better coordination and effective integra- excessive pressure can undermine the partner- tion require development professionals to yield ship essential to achieve development results and change their culture as well. Too many want and, in the worst case, can even put a private to focus on the !eld project and are unwilling to group or an individual at risk. appreciate the broader policy challenge. They Diplomats and development professionals tend to be excellent technocrats, though many have to work out these issues. Usually this is have become superb program managers and a done at the Country Team level—a good forum few have become strong development policy for discussing the broad range of U.S. interests advocates. Yet the USAID voice is not often in a country. Yet it is not always easy to decide heard in policy circles in Washington. A strong that long-term reform should be promoted and administrator will help, and Dr. Rajiv Shah will leveraged when short-term objectives involving be that, but he will need an effective policy a particular U.S. interest might be negatively staff. When the State Department created the affected. A case in point is Egypt, where the position of Director of Foreign Assistance, the U.S. Government has important geostrategic USAID policy bureau was eliminated. This interests at stake, yet the Egyptian government

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