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Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats

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Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats CHANGING THE RISK PARADIGM FOR U.S. DIPLOMATS JANUARY 2021 CONTENTS 4 5 9 13 Project Executive The Problem The Need for Participants Summary Congressional Advisory Assistance Group 15 19 25 28 Remedies Appendix A: Appendix B: Appendix C: Draft text for Project Table of amended 22 Supporters Abbreviations U.S.C. Chapter 58, Subchapter III Section 4831 PROJECT PARTICIPANTS Project Director The Honorable Gregory Starr American Academy of Diplomacy Support Team Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann, President Maria Reissaus, Program Director Destiny Clements, Program Associate Una Chapman Cox Foundation Support Team Ambassador Lino Gutierrez, Executive Director Nicole Brzozowski, Program Manager Advisory Group Dr. Graeme Bannerman Ambassador Thomas Miller The Honorable Eric Boswell Ambassador Ronald Neumann Ambassador Ryan Crocker Ambassador Richard Olson Ambassador James Cunningham Ambassador Anne Patterson Ambassador Gerald Feierstein Ambassador Charles Ray Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman The Honorable Gregory Starr Ambassador Robert Ford Ambassador Francis X. Taylor Ambassador Lino Gutierrez Dr. Michael Van Dusen Ambassador Hugo Llorens Ambassador Jacob Walles Ambassador Deborah McCarthy Page 4 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats EXECUTIVE SUMMARY he State Department’s current risk aversion at higher-threat posts obstructs the performance of the most basic functions of a diplomat abroad — to influence host governments, explain, defend, and advance U.S. policies and objectives, and Tto correctly analyze political, social, and economic developments as well as the effectiveness of U.S. government programs. Each of these functions demands first-hand contacts and observations. Working only by telephone or an occasional meeting inside secure walls is not a substitute for developing the continuing contacts necessary with local officials and populations. In short, the formulation and execution of national security policy is hindered by the lack of access to foreign contacts at higher-threat missions. U.S. diplomatic and USAID development officers are rarely allowed to travel to meet sources, colleagues, or counterparts in less than fully secured areas or make unscheduled moves. Our U.S. military partners and members of the intelligence community are not encumbered by similar restrictions. Requests by Foreign Service Officers to discreetly meet with subjects and sources or to review remote programs are too often denied, and the ability to observe and report on a country they are expected to know with a high level of expertise is severely limited. Effective diplomacy to meet national interests requires a method to engage more broadly even in high-threat locations. We believe it is possible; but progress requires change in three simultaneous areas. Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 5 1. The language and structure of the Accountability Review Board (ARB) requirement in the Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act of 1986 must change. The law is widely interpreted within the Foreign Service as creating an overriding requirement to find someone at fault when a security incident involves serious injury or loss of life. A broad selection of former ambassadors and assistant secretaries have reported that ambassadors, deputies, and regional security officers believe decisions to allow travel outside the mission that result in death or serious injury would be judged in terms of their accountability with the presumption that someone erred in their judgment. Too frequently, the decision is to avoid risk by denying travel or requiring an unattainable level of security. Technological advances, such as videoconferencing or teleconferencing can supplement traditional meetings; however, they are not a substitute for face-to-face meetings that build personal relations and trust with foreign contacts, without which real understanding of sensitive issues is not possible. This is particularly true when sensitivities concern internal foreign political concerns. The U.S. military, intelligence agencies, FBI and Drug Enforcement Agency each have different requirements for managing accountability and risk. The Academy does not equate the levels of acceptable risk for Foreign Service Officers abroad to the levels of risks acceptable for U.S. military assets engaged in combat operations. However, Foreign Service Officers are frequently assigned to high-threat diplomatic missions abroad. Currently, embassies are hampered by an out-of-date accountability process that essentially is at odds with the current requirement to take reasonable risks in the performance of duty. The Academy recommends a reformulation of the law to put in place a system similar to that of other national security agencies. The new system would utilize an internal review process to evaluate precautions taken against known risks and then evaluate the decision and identify any lessons learned in a report to the Secretary of State. The Secretary would, in turn, inform Congress of the results. The review would focus on whether reasonable actions were taken based on known risks at the time. This would bring the process more in line with that used by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the intelligence community (IC). Equally importantly, it would be a tangible message to the officers of the U.S. Foreign Service that Congress understands and supports the need to take reasonable risks in the performance of diplomatic and foreign aid operations abroad. It would signal that Congress wants to assist in developing a culture where the security of our personnel remains important, but the priority must be implementing the foreign affairs and national security policies and operations of the United States. Page 6 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats 2. The Department of State must identify best practices and new techniques for operating in high-threat locations. Certain cadres of officers, to include political officers, economic officers, consular officers, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) field and project officers, would receive required training in advanced operational techniques and procedures to allow them to operate as safely as possible while accepting levels of increased risk. This will take a joint effort by the Foreign Service Institute, the Diplomatic Security Hard Skills Training Center (FASTC), and other agencies to determine best practices. Additionally, management-level officers at various levels will require additional training in managing threats and risk. Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 7 3. Culture: To fully benefit from the legal changes and improved tactics and procedures, the foreign affairs agencies will have to take steps to change a culture of risk aversion that has developed over the years. Senior and mid-level officers, serving domestically and overseas, will require improved education in identifying and managing threats and risks while balancing the need to fulfill foreign affairs-related goals and objectives. Decision makers responsible for approving operations abroad that entail higher risk — typically deputy chiefs of mission and regional security officers — must have more than just new tools and training. They must also have confidence that the foreign affairs institutions and Congress understand that the highest priority is fulfilling major national security priorities, not solely keeping people safe. Careful judgment of the importance of individual policy objectives balanced against risk and threat mitigation measures will always be necessary and never clear cut. All aspects of the problem — importance of the goals, risk, and mitigation — must be considered when judgments are made and things go wrong. Page 8 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats THE PROBLEM n late 2019 and early 2020, a small group of senior STATE DEPARTMENT PHOTO retired U.S. ambassadors, all members of the American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD), engaged several members U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. of Congress and their staff in discussions on the growing Pompeo departs Ilevel of risk intolerance experienced in U.S. missions abroad Erbil, Iraq on with the consequence that American diplomats and aid January 9, 2019. practitioners could not effectively fulfill their mandates. Subsequent to these initial discussions, the Una Chapman Cox Foundation agreed to fund an AAD project to examine the issue of changing the risk paradigm for U.S. foreign affairs agencies. AAD formed an advisory committee of senior Foreign Service (retired) officers to guide the effort. Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 9 By May 2020, the advisory group had agreed upon a project narrative that effectively described the problem. “The risk mitigation paradigm currently employed for State Department personnel and those of other civilian U.S. government agencies at higher-threat posts is obstructing the performance of the most basic functions of a diplomat abroad — to influence host governments and other foreign interlocutors, to explain, defend, and advance U.S. policies and objectives, and to gain the information and access needed to analyze political, social, economic, and programmatic developments based on first-hand contacts and observations in a foreign country. Diplomacy is an incremental business in which numerous contacts and observations contribute over time to generate larger results. Diplomats are analysts, policy influencers, persuaders, and negotiators. Executing their mission only by telephone or an occasional meeting inside
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