Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats

CHANGING THE RISK PARADIGM FOR U.S. DIPLOMATS

JANUARY 2021

CONTENTS 4 5 9 13

Project Executive The Problem The Need for Participants Summary Congressional Advisory Assistance Group 15 19 25 28

Remedies Appendix A: Appendix B: Appendix C: Draft text for Project Table of amended 22 Supporters Abbreviations U.S.C. Chapter 58, Subchapter III Section 4831 PROJECT PARTICIPANTS

Project Director

The Honorable Gregory Starr

American Academy of Diplomacy Support Team

Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann, President Maria Reissaus, Program Director Destiny Clements, Program Associate

Una Chapman Cox Foundation Support Team

Ambassador Lino Gutierrez, Executive Director Nicole Brzozowski, Program Manager

Advisory Group

Dr. Graeme Bannerman Ambassador Thomas Miller The Honorable Eric Boswell Ambassador Ronald Neumann Ambassador Ryan Crocker Ambassador Richard Olson Ambassador James Cunningham Ambassador Anne Patterson Ambassador Gerald Feierstein Ambassador Charles Ray Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman The Honorable Gregory Starr Ambassador Robert Ford Ambassador Francis X. Taylor Ambassador Lino Gutierrez Dr. Michael Van Dusen Ambassador Hugo Llorens Ambassador Jacob Walles Ambassador Deborah McCarthy

Page 4 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

he State Department’s current risk aversion at higher-threat posts obstructs the performance of the most basic functions of a diplomat abroad — to influence host governments, explain, defend, and advance U.S. policies and objectives, and Tto correctly analyze political, social, and economic developments as well as the effectiveness of U.S. government programs. Each of these functions demands first-hand contacts and observations. Working only by telephone or an occasional meeting inside secure walls is not a substitute for developing the continuing contacts necessary with local officials and populations. In short, the formulation and execution of national security policy is hindered by the lack of access to foreign contacts at higher-threat missions. U.S. diplomatic and USAID development officers are rarely allowed to travel to meet sources, colleagues, or counterparts in less than fully secured areas or make unscheduled moves. Our U.S. military partners and members of the intelligence community are not encumbered by similar restrictions. Requests by Foreign Service Officers to discreetly meet with subjects and sources or to review remote programs are too often denied, and the ability to observe and report on a country they are expected to know with a high level of expertise is severely limited. Effective diplomacy to meet national interests requires a method to engage more broadly even in high-threat locations. We believe it is possible; but progress requires change in three simultaneous areas.

Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 5 1. The language and structure of the Accountability Review Board (ARB) requirement in the Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act of 1986 must change. The law is widely interpreted within the Foreign Service as creating an overriding requirement to find someone at fault when a security incident involves serious injury or loss of life. A broad selection of former ambassadors and assistant secretaries have reported that ambassadors, deputies, and regional security officers believe decisions to allow travel outside the mission that result in death or serious injury would be judged in terms of their accountability with the presumption that someone erred in their judgment. Too frequently, the decision is to avoid risk by denying travel or requiring an unattainable level of security. Technological advances, such as videoconferencing or teleconferencing can supplement traditional meetings; however, they are not a substitute for face-to-face meetings that build personal relations and trust with foreign contacts, without which real understanding of sensitive issues is not possible. This is particularly true when sensitivities concern internal foreign political concerns. The U.S. military, intelligence agencies, FBI and Drug Enforcement Agency each have different requirements for managing accountability and risk. The Academy does not equate the levels of acceptable risk for Foreign Service Officers abroad to the levels of risks acceptable for U.S. military assets engaged in combat operations. However, Foreign Service Officers are frequently assigned to high-threat diplomatic missions abroad. Currently, embassies are hampered by an out-of-date accountability process that essentially is at odds with the current requirement to take reasonable risks in the performance of duty. The Academy recommends a reformulation of the law to put in place a system similar to that of other national security agencies. The new system would utilize an internal review process to evaluate precautions taken against known risks and then evaluate the decision and identify any lessons learned in a report to the Secretary of State. The Secretary would, in turn, inform Congress of the results. The review would focus on whether reasonable actions were taken based on known risks at the time. This would bring the process more in line with that used by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the intelligence community (IC). Equally importantly, it would be a tangible message to the officers of the U.S. Foreign Service that Congress understands and supports the need to take reasonable risks in the performance of diplomatic and foreign aid operations abroad. It would signal that Congress wants to assist in developing a culture where the security of our personnel remains important, but the priority must be implementing the foreign affairs and national security policies and operations of the United States.

Page 6 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats 2. The Department of State must identify best practices and new techniques for operating in high-threat locations. Certain cadres of officers, to include political officers, economic officers, consular officers, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) field and project officers, would receive required training in advanced operational techniques and procedures to allow them to operate as safely as possible while accepting levels of increased risk. This will take a joint effort by the Foreign Service Institute, the Diplomatic Security Hard Skills Training Center (FASTC), and other agencies to determine best practices. Additionally, management-level officers at various levels will require additional training in managing threats and risk.

Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 7 3. Culture: To fully benefit from the legal changes and improved tactics and procedures, the foreign affairs agencies will have to take steps to change a culture of risk aversion that has developed over the years. Senior and mid-level officers, serving domestically and overseas, will require improved education in identifying and managing threats and risks while balancing the need to fulfill foreign affairs-related goals and objectives. Decision makers responsible for approving operations abroad that entail higher risk — typically deputy chiefs of mission and regional security officers — must have more than just new tools and training. They must also have confidence that the foreign affairs institutions and Congress understand that the highest priority is fulfilling major national security priorities, not solely keeping people safe. Careful judgment of the importance of individual policy objectives balanced against risk and threat mitigation measures will always be necessary and never clear cut. All aspects of the problem — importance of the goals, risk, and mitigation — must be considered when judgments are made and things go wrong.

Page 8 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats THE PROBLEM

n late 2019 and early 2020, a small group of senior STATE DEPARTMENT PHOTO retired U.S. ambassadors, all members of the American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD), engaged several members U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. of Congress and their staff in discussions on the growing Pompeo departs Ilevel of risk intolerance experienced in U.S. missions abroad Erbil, Iraq on with the consequence that American diplomats and aid January 9, 2019. practitioners could not effectively fulfill their mandates. Subsequent to these initial discussions, the Una Chapman Cox Foundation agreed to fund an AAD project to examine the issue of changing the risk paradigm for U.S. foreign affairs agencies. AAD formed an advisory committee of senior Foreign Service (retired) officers to guide the effort.

Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 9 By May 2020, the advisory group had agreed upon a project narrative that effectively described the problem.

“The risk mitigation paradigm currently employed for State Department personnel and those of other civilian U.S. government agencies at higher-threat posts is obstructing the performance of the most basic functions of a diplomat abroad — to influence host governments and other foreign interlocutors, to explain, defend, and advance U.S. policies and objectives, and to gain the information and access needed to analyze political, social, economic, and programmatic developments based on first-hand contacts and observations in a foreign country. Diplomacy is an incremental business in which numerous contacts and observations contribute over time to generate larger results. Diplomats are analysts, policy influencers, persuaders, and negotiators. Executing their mission only by telephone or an occasional meeting inside secure walls is not a substitute for developing the continuing contacts necessary with local officials and populations. In short, the formulation and execution of national security policy is hindered by the lack of access to foreign contacts at higher-threat missions. While acknowledging there are increased threats and dangers for staff operating in high-threat countries, the security versus risk equation for travel outside our missions is too heavily weighted toward eliminating risk to our personnel, often preventing them from successfully fulfilling their mission.

With the aid of Congress, the Department has made great progress in replacing old, insecure, and highly vulnerable facilities abroad with safe and secure embassies and consulates. The risk of losing an entire diplomatic platform and suffering massive loss of life and heavy injuries has been greatly reduced. Congress has generously funded additional security assets such as security officers, armored vehicles, and bodyguards to enhance mobility and travel outside our secure platforms. The Department has a remarkable record of conducting literally millions of moves outside the secure perimeter at our highest-threat posts with few losses, albeit using helicopters or heavily armed and armored convoys. Despite these successes, at high-threat posts Foreign Service and USAID officers are rarely allowed to travel to meet sources, colleagues, or counterparts in less than fully secured areas, nor allowed to move to unscheduled locations or travel outside of secured perimeters. The ability to meet discreetly with subjects and sources or review remote programs is very limited, as is the ability to observe and report on a country they are supposed to know with a high level of expertise. This is not the case with our U.S. military partners or members of our intelligence community.”

Page 10 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats The AAD advisory group agreed that a major factor keeping STATE DEPARTMENT PHOTO diplomats cloistered is the language and structure of the Accountability Review Board (ARB) requirement in the Deputy Secretary of State Antony “Tony” Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act of 1986. The law is widely Blinken speaks with interpreted within the Foreign Service as possessing an residents during his overriding requirement to find someone at fault if there is a tour of the Baharka security incident involving serious injury or loss of life, i.e. Camp for Internally Displaced Persons in the first determination after identifying whether injury or Erbil, Iraq, on Nov. 23, loss of life is a security issue is whether the security systems 2015 and security procedures for that mission were adequate and who was accountable. Based on their previous experience as ambassadors and assistant secretaries in the Department of State, the advisory group members found that Chiefs of Mission (COM), Deputy Chiefs of Mission (DCM), and Regional Security Officers (RSO) believe decisions made to allow travel outside the mission in high-threat environments that result in death or serious injury would be judged in terms of their accountability with the presumption that someone erred in their judgment. Too frequently the decision by COMs, DCMs, and RSOs is to avoid risk by denying a travel request because the deciding officials feel compelled to demonstrate the purpose of the travel outweighs the risk of injury, something that is difficult to do when the request is to travel outside the perimeter for normal diplomatic and

Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 11 programmatic activities as opposed to high-priority visits to secured compounds using heavily protected convoys. As the second major factor, the AAD advisory group strongly believes the foreign affairs agencies will have to take steps to change a culture of risk aversion that has taken hold within our organizations. This will require both education and hard skills training. Senior and mid-level officers, serving domestically and in overseas positions, will require improved education in how to identify and manage threats and risks while balancing the need to fulfill foreign affairs-related goals and objectives. These decision makers require new decision tools and confidence in the foreign affairs institutions and Congress that the highest priority is fulfilling national security priorities. These two major themes were considered essential by the AAD advisory group, but it was thought prudent to widen the group of experts viewing the problem and possible solutions beyond the initial advisory group. The project narrative was circulated among additional Department of State retirees, senior retirees from USAID, and former U.S. military generals with experience in high-threat theaters working closely with U.S. diplomatic missions. Without hesitation, those contacted signed on in support of the project based on their first-hand observations about the growing level of risk intolerance exhibited by colleagues in the field and their own experiences. Appendix B includes a list of approximately 50 senior U.S. government officials who support this initiative. Additionally, three organizations — The American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), the American College of National Security Leaders (ACNSL), and the USAID Alumni Association’s Board of Directors — endorse the call to expand the risk paradigm and amend the ARB process.

Page 12 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL ASSISTANCE

PHOTO BY ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL

he Department of State and USAID cannot alter the trajectory of growing risk intolerance at high-threat U.S. diplomatic missions abroad by solely implementing internal changes. Congressional assistance will be required. TAAD recommends that the ARB language, first promulgated as part of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act of 19861, now stated in law as Section 22 of USC 4831-48352, be amended. Originally written when Congress had little confidence that the Department of State was taking security threats and the need for security countermeasures seriously, the law prescribes a very specific and singular investigative method that must be utilized in any case

1 Public Law 99-399, Aug. 27, 1986, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 22 USC 4801, Title III – Performance and Accountability, Section 301 – Accountability Review, Section 302 – Accountability Review Board, Section 303 – Procedures, Section 304 – Findings and recommendations by a Board, Section 305 – Relation to other proceedings

2 United States Code Title 22 – Foreign Relations and Intercourse; Chapter 58 – Diplomatic Security; Subchapter III – Performance and Accountability, Sections 4831-4835 (22 U.S.C.4831-4835, as amended, 2013

Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 13 of serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property at or related to a U.S. government mission abroad, if deemed a security incident. The ARB process, while necessary at the time and useful for several decades thereafter, is now proving to have consequences that are counterproductive to the activities of the Foreign Service. As enacted, the references require one single specific investigative and evaluation process, an ARB, for any security incident that results in loss of life, serious injury, or significant destruction, with an implicit expectation that an error in judgment allowed for the security incident and, therefore, someone must be held accountable. This conclusion is evident from the name of the process, “the Accountability Review Board,” and the judgments of a wide group of senior officers about the influence of the ARB process on accountability and personnel recommendations. The effect over many years of implementation has been to encourage a reluctance to take acceptable levels of risk in approving field operations for Foreign Service Officers abroad. No other department or agency of the federal government operating abroad has specific language in law that requires such a specific and singular investigative response. The two other legs of the U.S. Foreign Affairs triad — the Department of Defense (DoD) and the intelligence community (IC) — follow internally developed investigative procedures when serious incidents occur that take into account the need to accept levels of risk to their personnel in order to achieve success for necessary operations. AAD and the supporters of this recommendation do not equate the levels of acceptable risk for Foreign Service Officers abroad to the levels of risks acceptable for U.S. military assets engaged in combat operations. However, U.S. Foreign Service Officers are frequently assigned to high-threat diplomatic missions abroad, often in conflict zones, with the full support and understanding of the executive branch and Congress. While there are frequent examples of Foreign Service Officers accompanying military combat personnel performing civilian-political missions, the much larger issue is the need for individual Foreign Service Officers to have greater movement and access to individuals and organizations in various places in high-threat countries. Yet should there be a Foreign Service casualty, the Department of State is mandated to activate an extensive and out-of-date accountability process that has put senior Department of State officials authorizing such actions at odds with the need to take reasonable risks in the performance of duty. Congress itself recognized the incongruous nature of the law when the U.S. Foreign Service was called to staff embassies and consulates in Afghanistan and Iraq. Understanding that U.S. diplomats had a crucial role to play in these two war zones, Congress passed amendments to the ARB legislation for limited exemptions from the requirement for an ARB, stating that the process need not be used when serious security incidents — serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property — took place at these two diplomatic missions during specific periods.

Page 14 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats PHOTO COURTESY OF AMBASSADOR ANNE PATTERSON

Foreign Service officer talks with an Afhgan leader in the REMEDIES Paktika province of Afghanistan.

he Academy believes Congress should amend the language from Title III of Public Law 99-399, the Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, now 22 USC 4831-4835, to direct the Secretary of State to develop and use internal investigative procedures into the facts surrounding Tserious security incidents; convene a high-level internal panel to evaluate the investigation and the incident; and then provide a report of the incident to the Secretary. The Secretary in turn would provide a report of the incident to appropriate congressional committees. This would streamline the serious incident investigation process to a model more in line with that used by DoD and IC. More importantly, it would be a clear message to the officers of the U.S. Foreign Service that Congress understands and supports the need to take reasonable risks in the performance of diplomatic and foreign aid operations abroad. Replacing the ARB language and process, both in name and substance, with methods more typically found in the U.S. government will help reverse a trend toward risk intolerance by

Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 15 signaling that Congress wants to assist in to better balance the risk versus reward developing a culture where the security of paradigm that currently skews toward our personnel remains important, but the avoiding risk. priority must be implementing the foreign affairs and national security policies and To replace the current ARB process, AAD and the supporters of this project suggest that operations of the United States. a leaner internal process as outlined below Further, the Department of State, in should be the basis for moving forward. consultation with others, must identify best The advisory group recommends the law practices and new techniques on how to be amended to instruct the Department of operate in high-threat locations. Certain State to institute an internal process specific cadres of officers, to include political and to the Foreign Service, but with similarities economic officers, consular officers, USAID to the processes used by DoD and IC when field and project officers, should receive reviewing serious incidents. The internal mandatory training in advanced operational process should include timely reporting techniques that would allow them to better requirements; an inquiry and investigative fulfill their missions at high-threat posts. phase; and a separate analysis and review Advanced training, enhanced operational process with a report to the Secretary, with procedures, and appropriate technical and a subsequent report to the chairmen of the communications equipment would allow four foreign affairs committees of Congress. them to operate as safely as possible while An internal Department of State process accepting levels of increased risk. This will to investigate and review serious security take a joint effort by the Foreign Service incidents should include: Institute, the Diplomatic Security Hard Skills A. An initial requirement for Training Center (FASTC), and other agencies an immediate report of the to determine best practices. incident, followed within three days by a more detailed Senior Department officials and mid-level report of the incident from the Foreign Service Officers in management mission involved. positions will require additional training in managing threats and risk — identifying B. An investigation of the risks and weighing those risks against the incident by Diplomatic Security imperative to conduct diplomacy and foreign (DS) using personnel trained in aid programs in volatile and sometimes incident investigation as well dangerous countries. The continuing as security operation abroad, conduct of diplomatic and foreign aid but which must also include programs must be given a higher priority and agents from the internal affairs/professional emphasis relative to the general threat levels, responsibility unit. DS would produce a

Page 16 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats report of the incident/report of inquiry/ posts with any/all relevant additional investigation within 60 days. The report evidence and information (CCTV recordings, must provide an account of what occurred; movement logs, interviews) would be made evidence of who perpetrated the attack, if available for review and full consideration. known or suspected; and whether applicable The voting committee members would security procedures were followed. In the include: event that the security incident was an attack on a U.S. Diplomatic Compound, • The representative of the Under motorcade, residence, or other facility, the Secretary of Management, the head of report would determine if adequate security M/SS countermeasures were in effect. If the attack • The Assistant Secretary responsible for was on an individual or group of officers the region where the incident occurred conducting an approved operation outside the mission, the report would determine • The Assistant Secretary of Diplomatic and report if a proper process was followed Security in evaluating the requested operation and weighing the risk of the operation. The report • The Assistant Secretary for the Bureau would not seek to assign accountability for of Intelligence and Research the incident unless there was an observation • The Assistant Secretary for Consular that an official breached their duty. At Affairs the discretion of the Secretary, additional personnel can be assigned to the incident • An Assistant Secretary Representative investigation team. from a United States government (USG) agency if that agency was C. A Serious Security Incident involved Permanent Coordinating Committee (SSI/PCC) would Other attendees (non-voting) at the SSI/PCC be convened and chaired providing advice, additional information, or by the head of the Office of counsel, would include: Management, Strategy and • The Department of State legal advisor Solutions, (M/SS). The SSI/PCC would be or deputy legal advisor specifically charged with reviewing serious security incidents resulting in deaths, serious • A representative of the Director injury, or significant destruction of property. of National Intelligence (DNI), if Submission of the DS Report of Investigation appropriate along with all reporting from the diplomatic

Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 17 The SSI/PCC would receive all relevant Nothing in this process would preclude the information on the incident, including Secretary of State from convening a follow- all reporting from post or other sources, up public board of inquiry comprised of the DS report, any pertinent intelligence notable persons to investigate any security information, and receive a briefing from the incident if it was of such magnitude or DS unit conducting the inquiry. The PCC significance that an internal process was would determine: deemed insufficient to understand and investigate the incident. All the materials • If the account of the incident is fully gathered in the normal internal process described would be provided to any Board of Inquiry • If security systems and procedures the Secretary convenes. pertinent to the incident were in place The Department of State, and functioning within 90 days of the • If there is evidence that anyone did completion of the report not fulfill their duties, and if there is a to the Secretary of State, need for anyone to be referred to the would provide a report of the Director General for malfeasance or incident to the chairmen of breach of duty the relevant congressional foreign affairs committees. • Whether there are relevant lessons or outcomes that should be relayed to The Department of State Inspector General other U.S. diplomatic missions and/or should not be a part of the incident units within the Department of State investigation for security incidents but would fulfill their mandated role through • If there are follow-up measures the inspections or reviews to ensure the Department or other agency involved Department follows the proper procedures should take for addressing serious security incidents. D. The SSI/PCC findings Nothing in this report or suggested would be reported by M/SS, legislation should in any way alter the along with a copy of the DS responsibility of the Department of Justice incident investigation, in a to investigate and take appropriate action report to the Secretary. At the regarding any such incident. discretion of the Secretary, the report would be provided to the Deputy The American Academy of Diplomacy, the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary for Una Chapman Cox Foundation, and our Political Affairs, the Under Secretary for supporters, in Appendix A, have provided a Management, and the Deputy Secretary proposed amended text for Section 22 U.S.C. or equivalent of any agency who had an 4831-4835, for consideration by relevant employee or was otherwise substantially congressional personnel and committees. involved in the incident.

Page 18 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats APPENDIX A

Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 19 Draft Text for amended 22 U.S.C. Chapter 58, Subchapter III - PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY Section 4831 INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS SECURITY INCIDENTS (formerly Accountability Review Boards)

(a) In general (2) Department of Defense facilities and personnel; (1) Convening the Serious Security Incident Investigation and The Secretary of State is not required Permanent Coordinating Committee to convene a Security Incident process; Inquiry in the case of an incident described in paragraph (1) that In any case of any serious security involves any facility, installation, or incident involving loss of life, serious personnel from the Department of injury, or significant destruction Defense with respect to which the of property at, or related to, a Secretary has delegated operational United States Government (USG) control of the overseas security diplomatic mission abroad, and functions to the Secretary of Defense in any case of a serious breach pursuant to Section 4805 of this of security involving intelligence title. In any such case, the Secretary activities of a foreign government of Defense shall conduct an directed at a USG mission abroad, a appropriate inquiry. The Secretary of Security Incident Inquiry (SII) into Defense shall report the findings and the event shall be convened by the recommendations of such inquiry, Department of State and a report and the action taken with respect produced for the Secretary providing to such recommendations, to the a full account of what occurred; Secretary of State and Congress. whether security provisions pertinent to the incident were in (b) Deadlines for convening a Serious place and functioning; whether any Security Incident Investigation and malfeasance or breach of duty took Permanent Coordinating Committee place that materially contributed process: to the outcome of the incident; and relevant security improvements or (1) In general follow-up measures that might be The Secretary of State shall recommended. A Security Incident convene the Serious Security Inquiry need not be convened where Incident investigation and then the Secretary determines that a the subsequent Permanent case clearly involves only causes Coordinating Committee process unrelated to security. (SSI/PCC) not later than 60 days after the occurrence of an incident

Page 20 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats described in subsection (a)(1) of Section 4832. Security Incident Investigation this section, except that such 60- and Permanent Coordinating Committee day period may be extended for one additional 60-day period if (a) The Serious Security Incident the Secretary determines that the inquiry process will consist of two additional period is necessary; distinct elements: a security inquiry investigative phase, and a review (2) Delay in cases involving intelligence panel phase conducted by high-level activities Department of State officials. With respect to breaches of security involving intelligence activities, the (1) The security investigation Secretary of State may delay the process will utilize Diplomatic establishment of a SSI/PCC if, after Security resources and any other consultation with the chairman of investigative personnel deemed the Select Committee on Intelligence necessary. A Report of Investigation of the Senate and the chairman of will be prepared at the conclusion the Permanent Select Committee of the investigation which will on Intelligence of the House of describe what, when, and where the Representatives, the Secretary security incident occurred; who was determines that the establishment involved; an accurate account of of a SSI/PPC would compromise the casualties, injured, and damage intelligence sources or methods. done; and a review of security The Secretary shall promptly advise procedures in place at the time of the chairman of such committees the attack. of each determination pursuant (2) The Serious Security Incident to this paragraph to delay the Permanent Coordinating Committee establishment of a SSI/PPC. (SSI/PCC) will meet to review the (c) Notification to Congress report, all other reporting relevant Whenever the Secretary of State to the incident, and evidence convenes an investigation and SSI/ available (such as video recordings). PCC in response to a serious security The SSI/PCC will, upon completion incident, the Secretary shall promptly of their review, provide a report inform the chairman of the Committee to the Secretary of State on the on Foreign Relations of the Senate and incident, outcomes, and any possible the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs recommendations. The SSI/PCC will Committee of the House. be primarily composed of Assistant Secretary-level personnel in the Department, and at a minimum include:

Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 21 (A) The representative of the Under (2) The Serious Security Incident Secretary to Management and inquiry process typically commences chair of the SSI/PCC, the head upon reporting of the incident of the Office of Management, from the diplomatic mission where Strategy and Solutions (M/SS); the event transpired, followed by detailed reporting within three days (B) The Assistant Secretary that provides additional details and responsible for the region where information. the incident occurred; (3) The Diplomatic Security Service (C) The Assistant Secretary to shall assemble an investigative team Diplomatic Security; to establish what occurred; report (D) The Assistant Secretary for on evidence of who perpetrated the Bureau of Intelligence and the attack, if known or suspected; Research; and whether applicable security procedures were followed. In the (E) The Assistant Secretary for event the security incident was Consular Affairs; an attack on a US Diplomatic Compound, motorcade, residence, (F) An Assistant Secretary-level or other facility, the report shall representative from any involved determine if adequate security USG agency; countermeasures were in effect. (G) Other personnel may be If the attack was on an individual added as deemed necessary or or group of officers, employees, appropriate. or family members conducting operations or movements outside Section 4833. Investigation and Inquiry the mission, the investigation must Procedures determine whether proper security briefings and procedures were (a) Regarding requirements for an internal in place and whether adequate investigation, analysis, and reporting consideration of threat and weighing system for Serious Security Incidents as of risk of the operation or movement outlined in Section 4831: took place. (1) The Department of State shall (4) If during the investigation, evidence develop an internal investigative comes to light that an employee protocol to ensure the proper did not fulfill their duties and this investigation of security incidents breach contributed in a material described in Section 4831, which fashion to the incident, the shall be referred to as the Serious investigative team shall include Security Incident Investigation these observations or reports in the process, and shall be promulgated in Report of Investigation. relevant foreign affairs manuals.

Page 22 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats (5) Confidentiality: During the of a foreign government directed at investigative process, the a United States government mission Department shall adopt such abroad and shall make written findings procedures with respect to determining: confidentiality as deemed necessary, including procedures relating to the (1) If the incident abroad did constitute conduct of closed proceedings or the a serious security incident as submission and use of evidence in determined in Section 4831, and that camera, to ensure in particular the the incident was security related; protection of classified information (2) If the incident involved a diplomatic relating to national defense, foreign compound, motorcade, residence, policy, or intelligence matters. The or other mission facility, whether DNI shall establish the level of the security systems, security protection required for intelligence countermeasures, and security information and for information procedures operated as intended, relating to intelligence personnel and whether such systems worked contained in the report. Members to materially mitigate the attack of the SSI/PCC will respect these or were found to be inadequate to measures, though the level of the mitigate the threat and attack; classification of the final report to the Secretary will be determined by (3) If the incident involved an individual the SSI/PCC, taking into account the or group of officers conducting material therein. an approved operation outside the mission, the SSI/PCC would Section 4834. Findings and determine and report if a valid Recommendations by the SSI Permanent process was followed in evaluating Coordinating Committee the requested operation and (a) Findings weighing the risk of the operation. The DS Report of Investigation, all The report would not seek to assign evidence and reporting, and any other accountability for the incident relevant information shall be provided unless there was a conclusion that to the Serious Security Incident an official breached their duty. Permanent Coordinating Committee (4) The impact of intelligence and (SSI/PCC). The SSI/PCC shall information availability, and examine the facts and circumstances whether the mission was aware surrounding the serious injury, loss of the general operating threat of life, or significant destruction of environment or any more specific property at or relating to a United threat intelligence or information States government mission abroad and took that into account in or surrounding the serious breach of ongoing and specific operations; security involving intelligence activities

Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 23 (5) Such other facts and circumstances Section 4835. Relation to Other Proceedings that may be relevant to the appropriate security management of (a) Nothing in this subchapter shall be U.S. missions abroad. construed to create administrative or judicial review remedies or rights (A) Reporting findings of action not otherwise available by The SII/PCC shall submit a report law, nor shall any provision of this of the findings (which may be subchapter be construed to deprive classified to the extent deemed any person of any right or legal defense necessary by the committee) and, which would otherwise be available if made, any recommendations to that person under any law, rule, or to the Secretary of State. After regulation. suitable consideration, and within 90 days of receipt of the (b) Nothing in this process would report, the Secretary of State preclude the Secretary of State shall provide a report of the from convening a follow-up public incident and findings to the board of inquiry made up of notable chairmen of the Senate Foreign persons to investigate any security Relations Committee and the incident if it was of such magnitude or House Committee on Foreign significance that an internal process Affairs. was deemed insufficient to understand and investigate the incident. All the (B) Personnel Recommendations materials gathered in the normal Should the SII investigative internal process would be provided team find reasonable cause to to any Board of Inquiry the Secretary believe any individual described convenes. in Section 4833 (b)(1)(C) has breached the duty of that individual or uncovers lesser failures in performance related to the incident, it shall be reported to the SSI/PCC. If the SSI/PCC members find reasonable cause as well, it shall be reported to the Director General of the Foreign Service for appropriate action.

Page 24 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats APPENDIX B

Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 25 AAD FS Risk Paradigm Change Project Supporters

As of December 20, 2020

Aarnes, Anne, USAID Feltman, Jeffrey D., Amb. Allen, John R., Gen. USMC Ford, Robert S., Amb. Arellano, Hilda M. “Bambi”, USAID Garber, Larry, USAID Bever, James A., USAID Hammink, William P., USAID Bodde, Peter W., Amb Hill, Christopher R., Amb. Brownfield, William R., Amb. Jones, Deborah K., Amb. Campbell, John F., Gen. U.S. Army Jones, Stuart E., Amb. Connelly, Maura, Amb. Kennedy, Patrick J., Amb. (M) Cohen, David, USAID Llorens, Hugo, Amb. Crocker, Ryan C., Amb. McCarthy, Deborah, Amb. Crowley, Christopher, USAID McChrystal, Stanley A., Gen. US Army Cunningham, James B., Amb. McKinley, P. Michael, Amb. Dunford, Joseph F., Gen. USMC McMaster, H.R., Lt. Gen. US Army

Eikenberry, Karl, Lt. Gen US Army/Amb. McNeill, Dan K., USArmy Feierstein, Gerald M., Amb. Miller, Thomas J., Amb.

Page 26 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats Myers, Desaix “Terry”, USAID Sisson, Andrew, USAID Neumann, Ronald E., Amb. Stall, Thomas H., USAID Nicholson, John W. Jr., US Army Starr, Gregory B., Asst. Sec. DS Olson, Richard G., Amb. Stephenson, James “Spike”, USAID Patterson, Anne W., Amb Thomas-Greenfield, Linda, Amb. Pickering, Thomas R., Amb. Van Egmond, Alan, USAID Ray, Charles A., Amb. Votel, Joseph L., Gen. US Army Rodriguez, David M., Gen US Army Walles, Jacob, Amb. Romero, Peter F., Amb.

Groups that support American Foreign Service Association American College of National Security Leaders USAID Alumni Association’s Board of Directors

Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats • Page 27 APPENDIX C

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAD American Academy of Diplomacy ACNSL American College of National Security Leaders AFSA American Foreign Service Association ARB Accountability Review Board COM Chief of Mission DCM Deputy Chief of Mission DG Director General DNI Director of National Intelligence DoD Department of Defense DS Diplomatic Security IC Intelligence Community

M/SS Office of Management, Strategy and Solutions ROI Report of Investigation RSO Regional Security Officers SII Security Incident Inquiry SSI/PCC Serious Security Incident Permanent Coordinating Committee

Page 28 • Changing the Risk Paradigm for U.S. Diplomats