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Plato and Hobbes: on the Foundations of Political Philosophy Plato and Hobbes: On the Foundations of Political Philosophy Jan Dejnoñka May 1, 1992; edited for the Web, November 11, 2005 (new final paragraph of main text added July 22, 2006) There is a certain philosophia prima on which all other philosophy ought to depend... --Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan Jan Dejnoñka, Plato and Hobbes: On the Foundations of Political Philosophy (1992). A theory of the state based on theory of human nature and theory of value, with Hume’s is-ought inference problem solved. Philosophers and others discussed include Aristotle, Epicurus, G. W. F. Hegel, Immanuel Kant, Frances Hutcheson, Abraham Maslow, John Paul Scott, Richard E. Leakey, Raymond Dart, Robert Ardrey, Leo Strauss, Panayot Butchvarov, H. P. Grice, P. F. Strawson, C. D. Broad, W. T. Stace, Ernest Barker, Robert Lodge, Henry Teloh, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, C. B. MacPherson, Herbert W. Schneider, Richard, S. Peters, Mortimer Adler, Irving R. Copi, Alan Gewirth, Charles Hampden-Turner, Wilhelm Windelband, Stewart Umphrey, Miriam M. Reik, Martin A. Bertman, Ernest Nagel, Richard Taylor, A. E. Taylor, John Searle, John H. Hick, Joseph Raz, C. S. Lewis, Robert Nisbet, Russell Kirk, and James Bond Stockdale. Table of Contents Preface Introduction 1. The State A. A Pros Hen Theory of Politics B. Defining the State 2 C. Plato’s Definition of the State D. Hobbes’ Definition of the State E. Is the State a Fiction? 2. Values A. Values as Properties B. Against Radical Ethical Relativism C. Plato and Hobbes on Moral Relativism 3. Human Nature A. An Evolutionary Theory of Human Nature B. An Evolutionary Theory of Politics C. A Need-Hierarchy Theory of Values D. A Need-Hierarchy Theory of Personality E. Plato on Man’s Place in Nature F. Hobbes on Man’s Place in Nature 4. Why Obey the State? A. The Turn from Ancient Idealism to Modern Realism B. Resolving the Idealist-Realist Conflict C. Why Be Good At All? D. Transcending the Is-Ought Dichotomy 3 E. Theory of Justice F. The Foundation of Political Obligation G. The Ontological Foundation of Political Philosophy Notes Preface Hobbes began the study of geometry at the age of forty; I begin the study of Hobbes and political philosophy at forty. Rather than study a narrow topic, I have chosen to draw a big picture, a basis for further systematic thinking. But I have worked to deepen my view of the relationship of my fields of specialization, ontology and metaphysics, to the human things. Introduction I shall discuss the ontological and metaphysical foundations of political philosophy. This seems Quixotic, since political philosophy seems largely to rely on a common sense picture of the world. It seems especially foolish to ask whether things concerning politics exist or “really” exist. [As Nietzsche says, “What does a drowning sailor care for the chemical composition of the sea?”] Nonetheless, Plato is a star example of the opposite view, and the Hobbist alternative to Plato seems important to the extent that Hobbes’ metaphysic differs from Plato’s. What is there to be good or valuable except what you admit as having being? And does not what is good for us depend on our nature and on the nature of the world around us? For 4 instance, water is physically necessary to human life. Yet for obvious reasons, theft of water is reasonably punishable by death in desert cultures, while in our own culture it is not. Thus water seems both an absolute human good as fixed by human nature and a relative good shifting as human culture (or water scarcity) shifts.1 This interpenetration of real and relative values is no surprise. In general, real things must exist for there to be relativity to anything, just as real things must exist for there to be any distinctions in reason. Real distinctions and distinctions in reason (between aspects or collections of things) interpenetrate on every level of the world’s structure. Similarly, the real and relative values of water are distinct only in reason. The relative cultural value of water is a function of its absolute natural value to us. I omit the value of certain nonbeings: the utility of doughnut holes, the beauty of some musical pauses, the adventure of Conan the Barbarian, and the intellectual illumination of logical constructs or ideal cases. Even doughnut holes, musical pauses, and fictional heroes seem in some sense(s) both in the world around us and good for us. But then, in some sense, such items seem not absolutely nothing. This is much more important to political philosophy than one might think. Both Plato and Hobbes arguably assign the state a very low ontological status indeed. For Hobbes, the social contract is arguably like a doughnut hole: both seem mere logical constructs. For Plato, the state seems largely an imitative and illusory kingly art, having almost the lowest possible ontological status on the Divided Line-- almost as low as Conan the Barbarian. Yet despite the virtual nonbeing of the state, states are, in some sense, in the world around us, and they seem in many ways good for us. If we knew the ultimate nature of reality, then presumably we would know the answer to every fundamental question, including how to live. If God were the ultimate reality, surely our 5 lives would be very different from what they would be if physical mass-energy were the ultimate reality. Yet there are at least three objections to this claim. First, many data of ethics seem so clear and specific (murder is bad, justice is good) that our theories of reality seem best judged adequate in part by their ability to conform to and elucidate the ethical data. To that extent it seems not to matter what our theory of reality is; we might all still remain in largely the same state under largely the same scheme of values. Indeed, each of the two theories of ultimate reality just mentioned is professed by many Americans, so the United States seems an actual case in point. Second, ultimate reality might be unknowable or theories about it might prove cognitively meaningless, yet ethics and political philosophy be feasible. Even the two “Bibles of logical positivism,” Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, perhaps self-defeatingly, professed some ethical views. Third, there is Hume’s problem of inferring values from matters of fact, or “ought” from “is”. As to the first two objections, my replies are these. First, our theory of reality should not be influenced by preconceptions of what reality “ought” to be like. That is question-begging. Ethical data are data like any others, and can be overruled. Second, if we do have a theory of reality, then the second objection becomes irrelevant. I shall resolve Hume’s problem in Part 4, sections D and G. Perhaps because they lived in philosophically simpler times, Plato and Hobbes based their ethics and politics on their theories of ultimate reality. Plato is not far from the “God” theory, and Hobbes is not far from the mass-energy theory. The differences between Plato and Hobbes must not obscure their striking similarities. Both are philosophers committed to the use of reason. Both are influenced by geometry as a model of reason, and both seek a justification of the state independent of religion. Both consider 6 ontology and metaphysics the basis of their political philosophies. Within metaphysics, both make theory of man basic to political philosophy. Both consider men as profitlessly going about in every individual direction if without suitable guidance. Also within metaphysics, both consider the problem of universals as especially important to political philosophy. Both have similar lists of virtues, such as courage and justice; both subscribe to the Golden Rule; and both find some ‘timeless or eternal’ aspect to their values. Both have naturalistic theories of values. Both value an anti-democratic strong ruler; both were influenced in this by war in their own time and by the Peloponnesian War (for Plato, these coincided). Finally, both make the state in some sense an “artificial man” which is a means to certain ends. The main differences are perhaps no less striking. Plato’s conception of reason as dialectical transcends Hobbes’ merely geometrical model. (I speak of explicit views; Hobbes does not fail to engage rival views dialectically.) Plato is a realist; Hobbes is a modified nominalist. For Plato, men are souls; for Hobbes men are machines. For Plato, men’s going about in every direction if without guidance is mainly due to their ignorance of the good. For Hobbes, it is mainly due to their self-interest and fear of domination by each other. For Plato, values are eternal natures to be grasped by the intellect. For Hobbes, it is the natural laws concerning sentiments which are eternal. For Plato, the ideal ruler is one who knows what goodness is. For Hobbes, the ideal ruler is one who has absolute power. For Plato, the end of the state is to promote the Good. For Hobbes, the ends of the state are prudential. The paper concerns four issues. (1) What is the state? (2) What are values? (3) What are human beings? (4) In light of (1)-(3), can we justify obeying the state? I discuss these four issues in the four sections to follow. In each section, I include my own views for perspective. 7 1. The State A. A Pros Hen Theory of Politics Like the word “being,” the word “political” is said in many ways. Whether or not the following are irreducibly political, we often speak of political: --entities, processes, events, structures --identities or essences --realities, appearances, constructions, or fictions --problems, puzzles, paradoxes,
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