DOCSLIB.ORG

Conflict Assessment / 2014 Northern Kenya and Somaliland WRITTEN for DANISH DEMINING GROUP by DR

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Conflict Assessment / 2014 Northern Kenya and Somaliland WRITTEN for DANISH DEMINING GROUP by DR Conflict Assessment / 2014 Northern Kenya and Somaliland WRITTEN FOR DANISH DEMINING GROUP BY DR. KEN MENKHAUS, FINAL, CORRECTED VERSION, MARCH 2015 CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............ 1 7. APPENDIX / NORTHERN KENYA COUNTY CASE STUDIES ..................... 86 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............ 2 APPENDIX A / ISIOLO COUNTY .......... 86 1. INTRODUCTION ....................... 5 APPENDIX B / MANDERA COUNTY ..... 93 2. CONTEXTS ............................. 9 APPENDIX C / WAJIR COUNTY ......... 104 3. CONFLICT ASSESSMENT / APPENDIX D / GARISSA COUNTY ..... 111 NORTHERN KENYA ................ 16 4. CONFLICT ASSESSMENT / APPENDIX E / MARSABIT COUNTY .... 117 SOMALILAND ........................ 54 5. CONCLUSIONS ...................... 76 APPENDIX F / ELECTED OFFICIALS ....123 6. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ..... 81 REFERENCES ................................... 126 DANISH DEMINING GROUP Founded in 1997, the Danish Demining Group (DDG) is a specialised unit within the Danish Refugee Council. DDG works in more than 17 countries with the mission “to recreate a safe environment where people can live without the threat of landmines, explosive remnants of war, and small arms and light weapons”. Since 2008, DDG is applying a comprehensive approach to armed violence reduction under which the increasing problem of armed violence is addressed in five areas of intervention at mainly community, local and national levels. Each intervention area has a clear outcome and impact focus: • Security Governance: Enhancing Civic engagement in and influence over security governance • Security Provision: Strengthening effective, accountable and responsive security provision • Small arms and light weapons (SALW) management: Reducing the incidents with SALW • Mine Action: Reducing the incidents with mines and explosive remnants of war; and increasing the use of productive land • Conflict Prevention and Transformation: Strengthening effective conflict prevention and transformation. Photographs by Axel Fassio / Pete Muller ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study could not have been completed without the help of a great many people. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the field researchers Abdul Haro (DDG Kenya AVR Manager); Ahmed Hassan (DDG South Central Somalia AVR Manager); Gerald Wandera (Kenya School of Government); Mads Frilander (DDG Country Director, Kenya), Lucian Harriman (DDG Deputy Country Director for Somalia/Somaliland) and the DDG Somaliland field team (Abdirahman Warsame Nur (DDG District Safety Coordinator) and Muse Mohamed Muse (Monitoring and Evaluation Facilitator) in addition to four data collectors Abdirahman Ali Ahmed, Hamda Dahir Hassan, Abdiasiz Jama, Ased Mohamoud Mohamed), peer reviewers Sarah Bayne and Patricia Vasquez; and research managers Mads Frilander (DDG Country Director, Kenya) and Simon Rynn (DDG Regional Director, Horn of Africa and Yemen). Thanks as well to DDG’s Communications Assistant Angela Wachira for assistance with layout, DDG’s Victor Laktabai for the development of maps, and DDG’s Anab Hassan for administrative support. DDG and the author would further like to thank the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) for their patience and generosity in support of this effort and the Kenya School of Government for its support. Finally, thanks to the many civic and political figures in Somaliland and Northern Kenya who generously shared their time and ideas with us, and to the dozens of regional analysts on whose work we drew. The author is solely responsible for errors of fact or interpretation in this study. 1 | CONFLICT ASSESSMENT | NORTHERN KENYA AND SOMALILAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • Both eastern Somaliland and northern Kenya are experiencing spikes in political and social tensions, armed conflict, and communal clashes, and, in the case of northern Kenya, violent extremism. • Available evidence suggests that the trend toward greater levels of armed conflict is likely to intensify with the arrival of a combination of transformational changes in the regional political economy, including new county budget lines in northern Kenya and possible oil windfall revenues in both northern Kenya and Somaliland. • These changes are injecting or may inject substantial levels of new revenue into the national and regional economies, dramatically increasing the stakes over who controls local and national governments. • This anticipated influx of new revenue into state coffers is occurring in a context of poor economic governance, contested communal claims over rights to resources and revenues, and, in the case of northern Kenya, a new devolved political system with no established “rules of the game”. This is a dangerous combination and increases the odds that both regions could suffer destabilising levels of armed conflict. • Oil exploration is already setting in motion local reactions, including speculative land-grabbing, that increase the odds of violent conflict even if actual oil extraction is not viable in some areas. • Oil exploration may aggravate existing conflict issues, including contested communal and political borders, grievances over job and contract allocation, local anxiety over land loss, land-grabbing, disputed allocation of oil revenues to local constituencies, in-migration, and control over elected government positions. • In northern Kenya, large new county budgets have increased the stakes surrounding elections for top county positions. The political elite has successfully mobilised clans and tribes to vote in blocs to maximise odds of controlling county government revenues, and, as a result, elections are more likely to generate politically driven communal violence. • Major new development projects associated with Vision 2030 are generating potential both for expanded economic opportunity and for armed conflict across northern Kenya, as they exacerbate tensions over communal and county claims to valuable land. • Pastoral poverty, urban drift, and high urban unemployment in both eastern Somaliland and northern Kenya contribute to social frustrations that can facilitate recruitment of young men into armed criminal, tribal, or insurgency groups. The enormous refugee population in northern Kenya is an additional site of social frustration and recruitment. • Much of the worst communal and political violence in both regions can be traced back to violence entrepreneurs, including some individuals in positions in the government and others in the diaspora, who stoke communal tension and incite violence to advance their own political and economic interests. • Land disputes – conflicting communal claims over rangeland, private claims on rangeland, land grabbing, disputed and corrupted land titling systems in urban and peri-urban areas, and contested county borders – remain a major underlying cause of conflict. • While local resilience to conflict drivers in these areas has been very impressive over the past decade, it is now under unprecedented strain and is poorly equipped to deal with the new conflict dynamics in play. • In both locations, oil risks becoming a “resource curse” unless stronger social compacts are brokered between communities on land and resources; greater levels of trust are built between peripheral communities and the state; and more robust political regimes governing resource allocation and accountability are forged. • Violent extremism, in the form of Al Shabaab and its Kenyan affiliate, Al Hijra, is a rapidly mounting source of political violence in northern Kenya and a potential threat in eastern Somaliland. Oil extraction sites and related infrastructure, along with security sector personnel, civil servants, foreigners, and non-Muslim Kenyans, will all be attractive targets for these groups. This violence may deter investment in northern Kenya and is already impeding the retention of professional Kenyans engaged in health, education, and other vital sectors. • In the past, government security forces in northern Kenya have at times engaged in collective punishment and abusive behaviour. For local populations, such operations have been more a source of insecurity than protection. • One of the principal sources of resilience to drivers of armed violence in both Kenya and Somaliland has been their vibrant democracies, which allow grievances to be articulated and addressed through non-violent political processes. The governments of Kenya and Somaliland have, however, recently pursued policies and passed laws that risk eroding civil liberties in the name of national security. When abused, expanded state security, for whatever reasons, may exacerbate local grievances against the state and increase the risk of insurgency. CONFLICT ASSESSMENT | NORTHERN KENYA AND SOMALILAND | 2 MAP / NORTHERN KENYA Mandera Marsabit Wajir isiolo Garissa KEY Research Areas 3 | CONFLICT ASSESSMENT | NORTHERN KENYA AND SOMALILAND MAP / SOMALILAND TOGDHEER SOOL WAJIR KEY Research Areas CONFLICT ASSESSMENT | NORTHERN KENYA AND SOMALILAND | 4 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY This study assesses the conflict dynamics in two regions of the eastern Horn of Africa, namely, five counties in northern Kenya1 and Sool and southern Togdheer2 regions of Somaliland. It considers the full range of actual and potential causes of conflict in the two areas, as well as conflict dynamics in the wider region, but pays particular attention to the role of hydrocarbon exploration.3 The study also provides policy recommendations for mitigating the risks of armed conflict and building local resilience to conflict drivers. Both Kenya and
Load more

Recommended publications
  • S/2003/223 Security Council
    United Nations S/2003/223 Security Council Distr.: General 25 March 2003 Original: English Letter dated 25 March 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, and in accordance with paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1425 (2002), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Panel of Experts mandated to collect independent information on violations of the arms embargo on Somalia and to provide recommendations on possible practical steps and measures for implementing it. In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if this letter together with its enclosure were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council. (Signed) Stefan Tafrov Chairman Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia 03-25925 (E) 210303 *0325925* S/2003/223 Letter dated 24 February 2003 from the Panel of Experts to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia We have the honour to enclose the report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, in accordance with paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1425 (2002). (Signed) Ernst Jan Hogendoorn (Signed) Mohamed Abdoulaye M’Backe (Signed) Brynjulf Mugaas 2 S/2003/223 Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1425 (2002) Contents Paragraphs Page Abbreviations ................................................................. 5 Summary ..................................................................... 6 Introduction ......................................................... 1–13 11 Background to the current instability in Somalia ..........................
    [Show full text]
  • Transcript of Oral History Interview with Ali K. Galaydh
    Ali Khalif Galaydh Narrator Ahmed Ismail Yusuf Interviewer February 10, 2014 Shoreview, Minnesota Ali Khalif Galaydh -AG Ahmed Ismail Yusuf -AY AY: I am Ahmed Ismail Yusuf. This is an interview for the Minnesota Historical Society Somali Oral History Project. I am with Ali Khalif Galaydh. We are in Shoreview, Minnesota. It is February 10, 2014. Ali Khalif Galaydh is a talented Somali politician, educator on a professorial level, and at times even a businessman. As a professor he taught at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota and the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. He was a fellow at Weatherhead Center of International Affairs and Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University. In Somalia he had several titles, but the highest office was when he became the fourth-ever Somali prime minister in 2000. In Somali circles Ali is also known for his intellectual prowess and political versatility. Ali, welcome to the interview—third time again. AG: Thank you very much, Ahmed. AY: Okay, I want to start from where were you born and when were you born, even though we don’t actually acknowledge that at all. AG: Somalis normally don’t celebrate birthdays, so there is now quite an always heated discussion about who is older than who. But in my case, my father was in the British Merchant Marine, and he therefore recorded when I was born. There was no birth certificate, but I was born October 15, 1941. AY: Wow, so you do have the recorded date, at least.
    [Show full text]
  • SOMALIË Veiligheidssituatie in Somaliland En Puntland
    COMMISSARIAAT-GENERAAL VOOR DE VLUCHTELINGEN EN DE STAATLOZEN COI Focus SOMALIË Veiligheidssituatie in Somaliland en Puntland 30 juni 2020 (update) Cedoca Oorspronkelijke taal: Nederlands DISCLAIMER: Dit COI-product is geschreven door de documentatie- en researchdienst This COI-product has been written by Cedoca, the Documentation and Cedoca van het CGVS en geeft informatie voor de behandeling van Research Department of the CGRS, and it provides information for the individuele verzoeken om internationale bescherming. Het document bevat processing of individual applications for international protection. The geen beleidsrichtlijnen of opinies en oordeelt niet over de waarde van het document does not contain policy guidelines or opinions and does not pass verzoek om internationale bescherming. Het volgt de richtlijnen van de judgment on the merits of the application for international protection. It follows Europese Unie voor de behandeling van informatie over herkomstlanden van the Common EU Guidelines for processing country of origin information (April april 2008 en is opgesteld conform de van kracht zijnde wettelijke bepalingen. 2008) and is written in accordance with the statutory legal provisions. De auteur heeft de tekst gebaseerd op een zo ruim mogelijk aanbod aan The author has based the text on a wide range of public information selected zorgvuldig geselecteerde publieke informatie en heeft de bronnen aan elkaar with care and with a permanent concern for crosschecking sources. Even getoetst. Het document probeert alle relevante aspecten van het onderwerp though the document tries to cover all the relevant aspects of the subject, the te behandelen, maar is niet noodzakelijk exhaustief. Als bepaalde text is not necessarily exhaustive.
    [Show full text]
  • Ethiopia Eritrea Somalia Djibouti
    COUNTRY REPORT Ethiopia Eritrea Somalia Djibouti December 2000 The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent St, London SW1Y 4LR United Kingdom The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For over 50 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The EIU delivers its information in four ways: through our digital portfolio, where our latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising conferences and roundtables. The firm is a member of The Economist Group. London New York Hong Kong The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent St The Economist Building 25/F, Dah Sing Financial Centre London 111 West 57th Street 108 Gloucester Road SW1Y 4LR New York Wanchai United Kingdom NY 10019, US Hong Kong Tel: (44.20) 7830 1007 Tel: (1.212) 554 0600 Tel: (852) 2802 7288 Fax: (44.20) 7499 9767 Fax: (1.212) 586 1181/2 Fax: (852) 2802 7638 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.eiu.com Electronic delivery This publication can be viewed by subscribing online at http://store.eiu.com Reports are also available in various other electronic formats, such as CD-ROM, Lotus Notes, online databases and as direct feeds to corporate intranets. For further information, please contact your nearest Economist Intelligence Unit office London: Jan Frost Tel: (44.20) 7830 1183 Fax: (44.20) 7830 1023 New York: Dante Cantu Tel: (1.212) 554 0643 Fax: (1.212) 586 1181 Hong Kong: Amy Ha Tel: (852) 2802 7288/2585 3888 Fax: (852) 2802 7720/7638 Copyright © 2000 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited.
    [Show full text]
  • Macro Report Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 4: Macro Report September 10, 2012
    Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1 Module 4: Macro Report Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 4: Macro Report September 10, 2012 Country: Kenya Date of Election: 4 March 2013 Prepared by: Matthias Krönke, Abel Oyuke and Robert Mattes Date of Preparation: 23 November 2016 NOTES TO COLLABORATORS: . The information provided in this report contributes to an important part of the CSES project. The information may be filled out by yourself, or by an expert or experts of your choice. Your efforts in providing these data are greatly appreciated! Any supplementary documents that you can provide (e.g., electoral legislation, party manifestos, electoral commission reports, media reports) are also appreciated, and may be made available on the CSES website. Answers should be as of the date of the election being studied. Where brackets [ ] appear, collaborators should answer by placing an “X” within the appropriate bracket or brackets. For example: [X] . If more space is needed to answer any question, please lengthen the document as necessary. Data Pertinent to the Election at which the Module was Administered 1a. Type of Election [] Parliamentary/Legislative [X] Parliamentary/Legislative and Presidential [ ] Presidential [ ] Other; please specify: __________ 1b. If the type of election in Question 1a included Parliamentary/Legislative, was the election for the Upper House, Lower House, or both? [ ] Upper House [ ] Lower House [X] Both [ ] Other; please specify: __________ Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2 Module 4: Macro Report 2a. What was the party of the president prior to the most recent election, regardless of whether the election was presidential? Party of National Unity and Allies (National Rainbow Coalition) 2b.
    [Show full text]
  • State-Making in Somalia and Somaliland
    The London School of Economics and Political Science STATE -MAKING IN SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND Understanding War, Nationalism and State Trajectories as Processes of Institutional and Socio-Cognitive Standardization Mogadishu ● Dominik Balthasar A thesis submitted to the Department of International Development of the London School of Economics (LSE) for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy September 2012 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 105,510. I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Sue Redgrave. Cover illustration: Map source, URL: http://tinyurl.com/97ao5ug, accessed, 15 September 2012, adapted by the author. 2 Abstract Although the conundrums of why states falter, how they are reconstituted, and under what conditions war may be constitutive of state-making have received much scholarly attention, they are still hotly debated by academics and policy analysts. Advancing a novel conceptual framework and analysing diverse Somali state trajectories between 1960 and 2010, this thesis adds to those debates both theoretically and empirically.
    [Show full text]
  • Změny a Doplňky 2017
    ZM ĚNY A DOPL ŇKY ZA ROK 2017 ABCHÁZSKO 12.3. v 1. kole parlamentních voleb do Lidového shromážd ění se 35 členy bylo za volební ú časti 53,12 % zvoleno 12 poslanc ů, kte ří získali nadpolovi ční po čet odevzdaných hlas ů; 2. kolo prob ěhne ve 22 obvodech, kde nebyl zvolen žádný poslanec, resp. v jednom obvod ě, kde došlo v 1. kole k porušení volebního zákona 26.3. prob ěhlo 2. kolo parlamentních voleb, které rozhodly o 34 mandátech Lidového shromážd ění 12.4. předsedou Lidového shromážd ění byl zvolen Valerij KVAR ČIA 14.5. opakované parlamentní volby v obvodu Gaudata ACEH 5.7. úřad nastoupil nový guvernér Irwandi YUSUF ADYGEJSKO 12.1. ruský prezident jmenoval ú řadující hlavou republiky p ředsedu vlády Murata Karalbijevi če KUMPILOV-a, nebo ť stávajícímu nejvyššímu p ředstaviteli republiky 13.1. skon čí mandát 10.9. hlavou republiky byl Státní radou-Chase zvolen Murat Karalbijevi č KUMPILOV, pro kterého hlasovalo všech 48 p řítomných poslanc ů (inaugurace 12.9.); další kandidáti Aleksandr Loboda a Šamsudin Pšizov neobdrželi ani jeden hlas AFGHÁNISTÁN 17.3. RB OSN p řijala rezoluci č. 2344 (2017) o prodloužení mandátu mise OSN UNAMA do 17.3.2018 20.5. poté co byl obvin ěn, že na řídil únos, bití a sexuální zneužívání politického rivala, odjel ze zem ě do Turecka viceprezident generál Abdul Rašíd Dóstum 21.8. prezident USA potvrdil, že americká vojska budou i nadále operovat na území Afghánistánu a pomáhat jeho vlád ě v boji proti terorist ům; v sou časné dob ě tam působí americké síly v po čtu 8 400 žen a muž ů ALBÁNIE 13.3.
    [Show full text]
  • Akiwumi.Rift Valley.Pdf
    CHAPTER ONE TRIBAL CLASHES IN THE RIFT VALLEY PROVINCE Tribal clashes in the Rift Valley Province started on 29th October, 1991, at a farm known as Miteitei, situated in the heart of Tinderet Division, in Nandi District, pitting the Nandi, a Kalenjin tribe, against the Kikuyu, the Kamba, the Luhya, the Kisii, and the Luo. The clashes quickly spread to other farms in the area, among them, Owiro, farm which was wholly occupied by the Luo; and into Kipkelion Division of Kericho District, which had a multi-ethnic composition of people, among them the Kalenjin, the Kisii and the Kikuyu. Later in early 1992, the clashes spread to Molo, Olenguruone, Londiani, and other parts of Kericho, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu and many other parts of the Rift Valley Province. In 1993, the clashes spread to Enoosupukia, Naivasha and parts of Narok, and the Trans Mara Districts which together then formed the greater Narok before the Trans Mara District was hived out of it, and to Gucha District in Nyanza Province. In these areas, the Kipsigis and the Maasai, were pitted against the Kikuyu, the Kisii, the Kamba and the Luhya, among other tribes. The clashes revived in Laikipia and Njoro in 1998, pitting the Samburu and the Pokot against the Kikuyu in Laikipia, and the Kalenjin mainly against the Kikuyu in Njoro. In each clash area, non-Kalenjin or non-Maasai, as the case may be, were suddenly attacked, their houses set on fire, their properties looted and in certain instances, some of them were either killed or severely injured with traditional weapons like bows and arrows, spears, pangas, swords and clubs.
    [Show full text]
  • Somalis the Cruel Consequences of Kenya's Passbook System
    Screening of Ethnic Somalis The Cruel Consequences of Kenya's Passbook System Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 The Procedure is Set in Place .............................................................................................. 3 Arbitrary Criteria Used to Determine Qualifications ......................................................... 4 Doubts about the Legal Basis of Screening Panels ........................................................... 5 Facilitating the Exploitation of Local Rivalries ................................................................. 6 Women at a Disadvantage ............................................................................................... 7 The Abandoned Children ................................................................................................ 8 The Deportations .............................................................................................................. 10 At the Border ................................................................................................................. 12 Over the Border ............................................................................................................. 15 Stranded and Stateless in Mogadishu, Somalia............................................................. 17 Internal "Deportations" .................................................................................................. 21 Screening
    [Show full text]
  • Republic of Kenya the National Assembly Eleventh
    REPUBLIC OF KENYA THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELEVENTH PARLIAMENT (FOURTH SESSION) MOTIONS TRACKER 2016 The Motions Tracker provides an overview of the current status of all Motions before the National Assembly during the year. NO. SUBJECT NOTICE OF PROPOSER SECONDER DIVISION DEBATED REMARKS MOTION AND CONCLUDED 1. 0THAT pursuant to the provisions of Standing 9/2/2016 Hon. Katoo Ole Hon. Thomas 9/2/2016 Adopted 1Order No. 171(1)(d), this House approves the Metito, MP Mwadeghu, 0appointment of Members to the House Business (Majority Party MP (Minority 1 Committee in addition to the Members specified Whip) Party Whip) under paragraph (a) (b) & (c). 2. 0THAT, notwithstanding the provisions of 10/2/2016 Hon. Aden Hon. Chris 10/2/2016 Adopted 0Standing Order 97(4), this House orders that, Duale, MP Wamalwa, 2each speech in a debate on Bills sponsored by (Leader of the MP (Deputy a Committee, the Leader of the Majority Majority Party) Minority Party or the Leader of the Minority Party be Party Whip) limited as follows:- A maximum of forty five (45) minutes for the Mover, in moving and fifteen minutes (15) in replying, a maximum of thirty (30) minutes for the Chairperson of the relevant Committee (if the Bill is not sponsored by the relevant Committee), and a maximum of ten (10) minutes for any other Member Status as at Monday, 15th August, 2016 1 The National Assembly NO. SUBJECT NOTICE OF PROPOSER SECONDER DIVISION DEBATED REMARKS MOTION AND CONCLUDED speaking, except the Leader of the Majority Party and the Leader of the Minority Party, who shall be limited to a maximum of fifteen Minutes (15) each (if the Bill is not sponsored by either of them); and that priority in speaking be accorded to the Leader of the Majority Party, the Leader of the Minority Party and the Chairperson of the relevant Departmental Committee, in that Order.
    [Show full text]
  • Parliament of Kenya the Senate
    April 25, 2013 SENATE DEBATES 1 PARLIAMENT OF KENYA THE SENATE THE HANSARD Thursday, 25th April, 2013 The Senate met at the Kenyatta International Conference Centre at 2.30 p.m. [The Speaker (Hon. Ethuro) in the Chair] PRAYERS QUORUM CALL AT COMMENCEMENT OF SITTING The Speaker (Hon. Ethuro): Order, hon. Senators. We need to determine if we have quorum. It seems we have a quorum. Let us proceed. COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHAIR PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED ON CONCLUSION OF DEBATE ON MOTION ON PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS The Speaker (Hon. Ethuro): Order, hon. Senators. I have a Communication to make with regard to the Motion on the Presidential Address, this being the third and final day. Before we conclude the Motion, I wish to draw your attention to the provisions of Standing Order No.69(1), which states as follows:- “When the Senate is to vote on any matter other than a Bill, the Speaker shall rule on whether the matter affects or does not affect counties. (2) The Speaker’s ruling under paragraph (1) shall be made after conclusion of debate on the matter but before the question is put. (3) When the Senate votes on a matter that does not affect counties, each Senator has one vote.” Hon. Senators, I, therefore, rule that the subject matter of the Motion being proposed is one of general interest and application. It is, therefore, not affecting counties within the meaning of Article 123 of the Constitution. It, therefore, follows that to the question on this Motion, each Senator is entitled to one vote.
    [Show full text]
  • Diplomatic Manoeuvre and Kenya's Military
    Africa Amani Journal Vol. 1 | Africa Amani Journal (c) Copyright © 2014 Africa Amani Journal Chief Editor: Mumo Nzau (AAJ) Web: www.aaj.ipstc.org Editing Oversight: International Peace Support Vol. 1 Issue 1| July 2014 Training Centre Email: [email protected] Diplomatic Manoeuvre and Kenya’s Military Campaign in Somalia Author; Mumo Nzau Corresponding author; Maj. Gen. (Rtd) Charles Mwanzia Abstract From time to time, states resort to armed engagements with others for various reasons. War is mostly considered the last resort in the pursuit of the national interests of states. Throughout the modern nation- state system and more so since the end of the Second World War, states have been slow to resort to war. More often than not they may opt to interact with their potential adversaries through peaceful means before to armed campaigns. Such adversaries may take the form of state or non-state actors, which may include sub- national groups, belligerent movements or any other formation(s) perceived to be a threat to state survival. It was under such circumstances that Kenya sent its troops to Somalia in pursuit of the Al Qaeda-linked terror organization, Al Shabaab in mid-October 2011. In practical terms, Kenya did not declare war on Somalia but rather she invoked her right to self-defence against a threat emanating from her important neighbour, Somalia. Invoking Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Kenya proclaimed self-defence as an inherent right and declared that she had to do whatever was necessary to keep her borders secure from terrorism and economic sabotage.
    [Show full text]