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Impact of Terrorism in Peace and Security in Post 9/11Era: a Case Study of Kenya

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Impact of Terrorism in Peace and Security in Post 9/11Era: a Case Study of Kenya “IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN PEACE AND SECURITY IN POST 9/11 ERA: A CASE STUDY OF KENYA” BY JOSEPH NDWIGA MBOGO R52/81174/2012 A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SEPTEMBER, 2014 i DECLARATION This research study is my original work and has not been presented for the award of a master’s degree in this University or any other Institution of higher learning for examination. Signature………………….…….. Date…………..………………. JOSEPH NDWIGA MBOGO R52/81174/2012 This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor. Signature ………………………………… Date…………… MARTIN NGURU ii DEDICATION I hereby dedicate this research project to my family, colleagues and friends who have continuously been a source of encouragement and offered their endless support during the entire time I was writing this research project and even when at times I felt defeated and all hope seemed lost. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would like to first and foremost acknowledge and appreciate my supervisor for all the advice and guidance given unto me as I was writing this project. I would also like to acknowledge my friends and colleagues who all participated and offered their much valued input into this project. This research project would not have been a success if it had not been for you. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................ ii DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................... iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................................. iv ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER ONE ............................................................................................................................. 2 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY ............................................................................................. 2 1.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 2 1.1 Background of the Research Problem................................................................................... 3 1.2 Statement of the Problem ...................................................................................................... 4 1.3 General Objective ................................................................................................................. 6 1.3.1 Specific Objectives` .................................................................................................. 6 1.4 Justification of the Study .................................................................................................. 6 1.4.1 Academic Justification ....................................................................................................... 6 1.4.2 Policy Justification ............................................................................................................. 7 1.5 Literature Review.................................................................................................................. 7 1.5.2 Understanding Terrorism: The New, the Old, and Al Qaeda ........................................ 7 1.5.3 Peace and Security ......................................................................................................... 9 1.5.4 Terrorism in Kenya ...................................................................................................... 16 1.5.5 Counter - terrorism Efforts in Kenya ........................................................................... 17 v 1.6 Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................................... 22 1.7 Hypotheses ..................................................................................................................... 24 1.8 Research Methodology ........................................................................................................... 24 1.9 Scope and Limitations of the Study ............................................................................... 25 1.10 Chapter Outline ................................................................................................................. 25 CHAPTER TWO .......................................................................................................................... 27 THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PROCESS THAT CREATED THE CONSTITUTION ............. 27 2.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 27 2.1 Defining Terrorism ............................................................................................................. 29 2.2 State, Security and Constitutionalism ................................................................................. 36 2.2.1 Perception of Security .................................................................................................. 37 2.3 Securing Justice through Legal-Criminological-political Strategies .................................. 39 2.3.1 Frameworks of Securing Justice .................................................................................. 39 2.3.2 Suppression of Terrorism Bill, Politics and Policing................................................... 40 2.4 Ties to the West .................................................................................................................. 44 2.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 45 CHAPTER THREE ...................................................................................................................... 47 KENYA’S LEGAL SYSTEM ON PROSECUTION OF TERRORIST RELATED CASES IN THE POST 9/11 ERA ................................................................................................................... 47 3.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 47 vi 3.1 The Terrorism Bill Of 2003 .................................................................................................... 51 3.2 The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012 ................................................................................... 52 3.2.2. Terrorism Offences and Sentencing.................................................................................... 55 3.2.3 Declared Terrorist Organizations (Specified Entity) ........................................................... 56 3.2.4. Law-enforcement Powers ................................................................................................... 58 3.2.5 Powers of Police Officers .................................................................................................... 59 3.3 Terrorism Financing................................................................................................................ 61 3.4 Communications Interception ................................................................................................. 62 3.5 Fundamental Rights in Relation to the Constitution of Kenya ............................................... 63 3.6 Challenges in Terrorism Laws in Kenya ................................................................................ 63 3.7 Impact of Terrorism in Kenya................................................................................................. 66 3.8 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 69 CHAPTER FOUR ......................................................................................................................... 71 IMPACT OF TERRORISM ......................................................................................................... 71 4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 71 4.2 Al-Shabaab’s and Al-Qaeda’s Recruitment and Propaganda Strategies ............................... 72 4.3 Kenya Government Counter-Propaganda Strategies ............................................................. 75 4.4 Impact of Terrorism in Kenya................................................................................................. 78 4.4.1 The Economic Ramifications of Terrorism ......................................................................... 81 4.4.2 Effect of Terrorism on Kenya’s Securities Market .............................................................. 84 vii 4.4.3 Effects of the ‘War’ on the International System ................................................................ 85 4.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 89 CHAPTER FIVE .......................................................................................................................... 91 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................................... 91 5.1 Summary ................................................................................................................................
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