Jordanian Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring

Archived version from NCDOCKS Institutional Repository http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/ Jordanian Foreign Policy And The Arab Spring By: Curtis R. Ryan Abstract The Arab Spring may have begun in Tunisia in December 2010 with mass protests that ultimately toppled the regime of Zine El Abidin Ben Ali, but that same month, protesters also gathered in Amman's streets, demanding political change. The Jordanian demonstrations were never as large as those in Tunisia and were certainly not comparable to the mass protest rallies in Egypt's Tahrir Square. They also differed in focus, calling for reform but not for regime change or revolution. Initially, they demanded the ouster of the government of Prime Minister Samir Rifai, and succeeded. But even after the shift in royally appointed governments, protesters continued to gather almost every Friday for the next several years, calling for more reform within the Hashemite kingdom. Ryan, C.R. (2014), Jordanian Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring. Middle East Policy, 21: 144-153. doi:10.1111/mepo.12064. Publisher version of record available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ doi/10.1111/mepo.12064 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XXI, NO. 1, SPRING 2014 JORDANIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ARAB SPRING Curtis R. Ryan Dr. Ryan is a professor of political science at Appalachian State University and author of Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah and Inter- Arab Alliances: Regime Security and Jordanian Foreign Policy. he Arab Spring may have begun based in “East Banker” Jordanian commu- in Tunisia in December 2010 nities that have historically been bastions with mass protests that ultimately of regime support.2 These protests ranged toppled the regime of Zine El in focus from political goals (greater TAbidin Ben Ali, but that same month, pro- reform and democratization) to economic testers also gathered in Amman’s streets, goals. The latter tended to include opposi- demanding political change. The Jorda- tion to neoliberal economic policies, fear- nian demonstrations were never as large ing that privatization has proceeded too far, as those in Tunisia and were certainly not entailing severe social costs from a declin- comparable to the mass protest rallies in ing state commitment to subsidies, public- Egypt’s Tahrir Square. They also differed sector employment and social welfare. in focus, calling for reform but not for Jordan’s post-1989 move toward priva- regime change or revolution. Initially, they tization and neoliberalism had, in short, demanded the ouster of the government radically shifted the social and political of Prime Minister Samir Rifai, and suc- bases for Hashemite rule.3 Therefore, the ceeded. But even after the shift in royally economic and political aspects of the trem- appointed governments, protesters contin- ors of the Arab Spring were closely linked. ued to gather almost every Friday for the This would have been a difficult situation next several years, calling for more reform on its own, but Jordan exists — sometimes within the Hashemite kingdom.1 tenuously — in a very difficult neighbor- Jordan’s domestic protest movement hood, surrounded by more powerful states included traditional sources of opposition, whose problems seem continually to spill such as the kingdom’s relatively small over into the Hashemite kingdom. leftist and pan-Arab nationalist political Between 2011 and 2013, more than parties, as well as the much-larger Islamist half a million Syrian refugees crossed into movement, rooted in the Muslim Brother- Jordan to escape the horrors of the Syrian hood and its affiliated political party, the war, joining previous waves of refugees Islamic Action Front. But the protests also that had fled to Jordan since its indepen- drew strength from newer sources of op- dence in 1946: Palestinians (in several position, including youth-based popular waves) from the west, Iraqis from the movements (al-Hirak), most of which were east and now Syrians from the north. The © 2014, The Author Middle East Policy © 2014, Middle East Policy Council 144 Ryan.indd 144 2/24/2014 11:24:41 AM RYAN: JORDANIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ARAB SPRING timing of this new wave was even more ful domestic and foreign policy. This did problematic than usual. Even for a poor not mean, however, that top policy mak- country, Jordan was experiencing harsh ers, including the king himself, took the economic constraints, vast budget deficits, Arab uprisings lightly. To the contrary, the and economic austerity measures in com- regime responded by launching a series of pliance with the International Monetary domestic political reforms: amending the Fund (IMF). The latter policies had trig- constitution, establishing a constitutional gered protests and riots, most extensively court, revising electoral and party laws, and in November 2012.4 Now, just when the holding new rounds of national parliamen- kingdom was struggling to bring its own tary and municipal elections.6 King Abdul- economic house in order, it found itself lah emphasized the depth of reform in the dealing with the additional economic, so- kingdom, arguing that Jordan was unique: cial and political costs of hosting hundreds an Arab regime that was, in effect, reform- of thousands of desperate Syrian refugees. ing itself while the fires of unrest burned During the first three years of theArab elsewhere.7 For many reform activists, Spring, when Jordan’s economy remained however, the reforms remained limited at dismal and the political reform process in- best; far deeper change was needed to truly complete and highly contested, the Syrian transform and democratize Jordan.8 civil war threatened to drag the kingdom Even as internal debates over the depth into a conflict it was desperately trying and breadth of reform continued to rage, to avoid.5 Jordan may not have endured a the regime actively marketed its reform ef- revolution during the Arab Spring of 2011- forts to powerful Western allies, emphasiz- 13, but it did see political instability in ing what it saw as Jordan’s exceptionalism. the form of five different prime ministers Defusing potentially revolutionary pres- and six different governments in that time sures from within was part of the regime’s span. The Hashemite regime has historical- strategy, but equally important was using ly maintained stability by using a strategy foreign policy to ensure that the kingdom of coopting elites by bringing them into the would have powerful backers to help it ruling system. Prime ministers and govern- survive. These strategies are linked; key ments (all royal appointees) are reshuffled Western allies have placed only minimal periodically, effectively rearranging ruling pressure on the kingdom to pursue greater coalitions, so that many share a sense of domestic political reform. Internal reform having a deep stake in the status quo. efforts are designed in part to secure con- The kingdom has also relied on ex- tinued and even deepening support for the ternal sources of economic aid, as well as Hashemite regime, both inside and outside trade and investment relationships with the kingdom, including from the United more well-to-do states. As such, Jordanian States and the European Union. Thus even foreign relations are as vital to the king- as the regime tried, through domestic dom’s domestic stability as they are to its political reform, to create a “third way” regional and external security. When the between authoritarian rule and revolution, Arab revolutions and uprisings began, the it also relied heavily on foreign policy and regime viewed them as a contagion that external allies to ensure its own security could nonetheless be limited through care- and that of the nation. 145 Ryan.indd 145 2/24/2014 11:24:41 AM MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XXI, NO. 1, SPRING 2014 FOREIGN RELATIONS ternal opposition, as in Bahrain, in Yemen Jordan’s alliance patterns offer a sharp and, most dramatically, in Syria. contrast. Within the region, its foreign For Jordan, the Arab uprisings, revo- relations (especially in inter-Arab poli- lutions and civil wars triggered multiple tics) have been characterized by shifting policy shifts as the kingdom responded to alignments. Globally, however, it has ever-changing situations in Egypt and Syr- maintained close ties with the world’s ia, while renewing its attempt to join the most powerful Western states, including stronghold of Arab monarchies: the Gulf the United States, the United Kingdom Cooperation Council (GCC). As always, (the former mandatory power that drew Jordanian foreign policy also emphasized Jordan’s borders and even chose the shoring up alliances with global powers. Hashemites as rulers) and, collectively, the European Union (EU). In terms of The United States and the EU non-Arab regional powers, Jordan has In March 2013, U.S. President Barack maintained a peace treaty with the state Obama visited the Middle East to meet of Israel since 1994 and proper, if cold with the leaders of Israel, the Palestinian and mutually suspicious, relations with National Authority and Jordan. The presi- the Islamic Republic of Iran since the dential visit to Jordan helped underscore 1979 revolution. The kingdom had closer the U.S. role in supporting Jordan — and relations with Iran during the reign of the the Hashemite monarchy — politically, ec- last shah, when both states positioned onomically and militarily. Jordan has been themselves as conservative, anti-com- a strong ally of the United States since the munist and pro-Western monarchies. earliest days of the Cold War. During the With Turkey, Jordan has historically had long reign of King Hussein, Jordan posi- good relations, although these have been tioned itself as a conservative anti-commu- strained during the tenure of Prime Minis- nist bulwark in the region, making itself a ter Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist key recipient of U.S. foreign aid. This aid Justice and Development Party (AKP).

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