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Jordanian Foreign Policy And The

By: Curtis R. Ryan

Abstract The Arab Spring may have begun in Tunisia in December 2010 with mass protests that ultimately toppled the regime of Zine El Abidin Ben Ali, but that same month, protesters also gathered in Amman's streets, demanding political change. The Jordanian demonstrations were never as large as those in Tunisia and were certainly not comparable to the mass protest rallies in Egypt's Tahrir Square. They also differed in focus, calling for reform but not for regime change or revolution. Initially, they demanded the ouster of the government of Prime Minister Samir Rifai, and succeeded. But even after the shift in royally appointed governments, protesters continued to gather almost every Friday for the next several years, calling for more reform within the Hashemite kingdom.

Ryan, C.R. (2014), Jordanian Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring. Middle East Policy, 21: 144-153. doi:10.1111/mepo.12064. Publisher version of record available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ doi/10.1111/mepo.12064 Middle East Policy, Vol. XXI, No. 1, Spring 2014

Jordanian Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring Curtis R. Ryan

Dr. Ryan is a professor of political science at Appalachian State University and author of in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah and Inter- Arab Alliances: Regime Security and Jordanian Foreign Policy.

he Arab Spring may have begun based in “East Banker” Jordanian commu- in Tunisia in December 2010 nities that have historically been bastions with mass protests that ultimately of regime support.2 These protests ranged toppled the regime of Zine El in focus from political goals (greater TAbidin Ben Ali, but that same month, pro- reform and democratization) to economic testers also gathered in Amman’s streets, goals. The latter tended to include opposi- demanding political change. The Jorda- tion to neoliberal economic policies, fear- nian demonstrations were never as large ing that privatization has proceeded too far, as those in Tunisia and were certainly not entailing severe social costs from a declin- comparable to the mass protest rallies in ing state commitment to subsidies, public- Egypt’s Tahrir Square. They also differed sector employment and social welfare. in focus, calling for reform but not for Jordan’s post-1989 move toward priva- regime change or revolution. Initially, they tization and neoliberalism had, in short, demanded the ouster of the government radically shifted the social and political of Prime Minister Samir Rifai, and suc- bases for Hashemite rule.3 Therefore, the ceeded. But even after the shift in royally economic and political aspects of the trem- appointed governments, protesters contin- ors of the Arab Spring were closely linked. ued to gather almost every Friday for the This would have been a difficult situation next several years, calling for more reform on its own, but Jordan exists — sometimes within the Hashemite kingdom.1 tenuously — in a very difficult neighbor- Jordan’s domestic protest movement hood, surrounded by more powerful states included traditional sources of opposition, whose problems seem continually to spill such as the kingdom’s relatively small over into the Hashemite kingdom. leftist and pan-Arab nationalist political Between 2011 and 2013, more than parties, as well as the much-larger Islamist half a million Syrian refugees crossed into movement, rooted in the Muslim Brother- Jordan to escape the horrors of the Syrian hood and its affiliated political party, the war, joining previous waves of refugees Islamic Action Front. But the protests also that had fled to Jordan since its indepen- drew strength from newer sources of op- dence in 1946: Palestinians (in several position, including youth-based popular waves) from the west, Iraqis from the movements (al-Hirak), most of which were east and now Syrians from the north. The © 2014, The Author Middle East Policy © 2014, Middle East Policy Council

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timing of this new wave was even more ful domestic and foreign policy. This did problematic than usual. Even for a poor not mean, however, that top policy mak- country, Jordan was experiencing harsh ers, including the king himself, took the economic constraints, vast budget deficits, Arab uprisings lightly. To the contrary, the and economic austerity measures in com- regime responded by launching a series of pliance with the International Monetary domestic political reforms: amending the Fund (IMF). The latter policies had trig- constitution, establishing a constitutional gered protests and riots, most extensively court, revising electoral and party laws, and in November 2012.4 Now, just when the holding new rounds of national parliamen- kingdom was struggling to bring its own tary and municipal elections.6 King Abdul- economic house in order, it found itself lah emphasized the depth of reform in the dealing with the additional economic, so- kingdom, arguing that Jordan was unique: cial and political costs of hosting hundreds an Arab regime that was, in effect, reform- of thousands of desperate Syrian refugees. ing itself while the fires of unrest burned During the first three years of theArab elsewhere.7 For many reform activists, Spring, when Jordan’s economy remained however, the reforms remained limited at dismal and the political reform process in- best; far deeper change was needed to truly complete and highly contested, the Syrian transform and democratize Jordan.8 civil war threatened to drag the kingdom Even as internal debates over the depth into a conflict it was desperately trying and breadth of reform continued to rage, to avoid.5 Jordan may not have endured a the regime actively marketed its reform ef- revolution during the Arab Spring of 2011- forts to powerful Western allies, emphasiz- 13, but it did see political instability in ing what it saw as Jordan’s exceptionalism. the form of five different prime ministers Defusing potentially revolutionary pres- and six different governments in that time sures from within was part of the regime’s span. The Hashemite regime has historical- strategy, but equally important was using ly maintained stability by using a strategy foreign policy to ensure that the kingdom of coopting elites by bringing them into the would have powerful backers to help it ruling system. Prime ministers and govern- survive. These strategies are linked; key ments (all royal appointees) are reshuffled Western allies have placed only minimal periodically, effectively rearranging ruling pressure on the kingdom to pursue greater coalitions, so that many share a sense of domestic political reform. Internal reform having a deep stake in the status quo. efforts are designed in part to secure con- The kingdom has also relied on ex- tinued and even deepening support for the ternal sources of economic aid, as well as Hashemite regime, both inside and outside trade and investment relationships with the kingdom, including from the United more well-to-do states. As such, Jordanian States and the European Union. Thus even foreign relations are as vital to the king- as the regime tried, through domestic dom’s domestic stability as they are to its political reform, to create a “third way” regional and external security. When the between authoritarian rule and revolution, Arab revolutions and uprisings began, the it also relied heavily on foreign policy and regime viewed them as a contagion that external allies to ensure its own security could nonetheless be limited through care- and that of the nation.

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FOREIGN RELATIONS ternal opposition, as in Bahrain, in Yemen Jordan’s alliance patterns offer a sharp and, most dramatically, in Syria. contrast. Within the region, its foreign For Jordan, the Arab uprisings, revo- relations (especially in inter-Arab poli- lutions and civil wars triggered multiple tics) have been characterized by shifting policy shifts as the kingdom responded to alignments. Globally, however, it has ever-changing situations in Egypt and Syr- maintained close ties with the world’s ia, while renewing its attempt to join the most powerful Western states, including stronghold of Arab monarchies: the Gulf the United States, the United Kingdom Cooperation Council (GCC). As always, (the former mandatory power that drew Jordanian foreign policy also emphasized Jordan’s borders and even chose the shoring up alliances with global powers. Hashemites as rulers) and, collectively, the European Union (EU). In terms of The United States and the EU non-Arab regional powers, Jordan has In March 2013, U.S. President Barack maintained a peace treaty with the state Obama visited the Middle East to meet of Israel since 1994 and proper, if cold with the leaders of Israel, the Palestinian and mutually suspicious, relations with National Authority and Jordan. The presi- the Islamic Republic of Iran since the dential visit to Jordan helped underscore 1979 revolution. The kingdom had closer the U.S. role in supporting Jordan — and relations with Iran during the reign of the the Hashemite monarchy — politically, ec- last shah, when both states positioned onomically and militarily. Jordan has been themselves as conservative, anti-com- a strong ally of the United States since the munist and pro-Western monarchies. earliest days of the Cold War. During the With Turkey, Jordan has historically had long reign of King Hussein, Jordan posi- good relations, although these have been tioned itself as a conservative anti-commu- strained during the tenure of Prime Minis- nist bulwark in the region, making itself a ter Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist key recipient of U.S. foreign aid. This aid Justice and Development Party (AKP). has been vital to the kingdom, as it is not The Jordanian regime seemed to regard blessed with oil or other lucrative natural them effectively as a Turkish version of resources. With neighbors including Israel, the . Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the kingdom Prior to the outbreak of the Arab upris- is at all times deeply vulnerable, but it ings, Jordan had developed such strong is also geopolitically vital to any hopes relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia that for peace and stability in the region. This former Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher chronic insecurity, combined with the lack had coined the phrase “the Arab center” of natural resources, has led the regime to describe their moderate foreign poli- to place a premium on retaining power- cies (even as their regimes and domestic ful allies. Maintaining and deepening its politics remained starkly different).9 Dur- relationship with the United States remains ing the Arab Spring, however, inter-Arab a top foreign policy goal. Today, Jordan re- alliances and alignments across the region mains dependent on foreign aid, both eco- shifted several times, as regimes fell in nomic and military.10 For King Abdullah Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, while others II, who has pursued a series of neoliberal remained roiled by varying degrees of in- economic policies that have endeared the

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regime still further to Washington, the U.S. parliamentary government and a constitu- relationship provides the economic under- tional monarchy.13 pinnings of both the state and the regime. As for the economic aspects of These include not only extensive foreign Jordanian-EU relations, Jordan signed an aid, but also U.S. investment in the devel- Association Agreement with the EU in opment of the kingdom, as well as trade re- 1997. This became official in 2002, initiat- lations (which have increased, particularly ing a kind of 12-year probationary period. since the establishment of the U.S.-Jordan That period has now come to a successful Free Trade Agreement in 2002).11 end, marking the start of Jordanian-EU Perhaps ironically, given the depth of negotiations to move toward the next step: the U.S.-Jordanian alliance, it has at times an EU-Jordan free-trade agreement (FTA). been a mixed blessing for the Hashemite The Jordanian government views a po- regime. The Jordanian monarchy has ben- tential FTA with the EU as another clear efitted immensely from extensive U.S. aid, marker of its own status, deeply imbedded to be sure. But Jordan’s close relations with in a web of Western or Western-led eco- the U.S. government also link the Hashem- nomic institutions, from the International ite kingdom to the many very unpopular Monetary Fund (IMF) to the World Bank American policies toward the Middle East and World Trade Organization (WTO). and are something of a liability, in terms of This international position is perhaps made domestic and regional legitimacy. But for even clearer by the choice of Jordan to the regime itself, the benefits far outweigh host multiple annual meetings of the World any costs and are, in fact, essential to the Economic Forum (WEF) at the Dead Sea. economic development as well as the na- But the linchpin to all these key economic tional security of the state. relationships remains close alignment with Jordan has long had close ties to the the United States and the EU. former colonial power Britain, but has also steadily increased its ties to the European The Gulf Cooperation Council Union. Today, the EU is Jordan’s larg- In terms of local alliances, Jordan est trading partner. The kingdom is also a (along with Morocco) had received an invi- member of the EU Union for the Mediter- tation to join the Gulf Cooperation Council ranean and a participant in the European (GCC), an alliance of Arab oil monarchies: Neighborhood Policy. As part of the Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Action Plan for the Neighborhood Policy, Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The the EU has pressed (and also provided initiative appeared to have come from a financial support) for Jordan to move worried Saudi regime, in particular, at the further on three areas of special concern height of the uprisings that toppled Saudi to the EU: rule of law, good governance allies in Tunisia and Egypt. After the fall of and human rights.12 It is not accidental , the Saudis were angered that Jordan’s recent reform efforts have that the United States hadn’t backed up the emphasized changes to the constitution Egyptian regime. Saudi policy appeared and the creation of a constitutional court, to be marked by reactionary and sectar- an independent electoral commission, ian concerns about the impact of the Arab new laws for parties and elections, and at Spring on both monarchies in general and least initial discussions regarding eventual Sunni-led regimes in the region.

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While neither Morocco nor Jordan Just as important, the Jordanians felt were Gulf states, both were hereditary that they had something significant to offer Sunni monarchies, like most of the GCC in return. As one of only two Arab states states. The Hashemite king shared the fears holding a peace treaty with Israel and as a of GCC monarchs that a more power- close ally of the United States and Britain, ful Iran would meddle in the domestic Jordan was in a position to talk to just affairs and internal stability of the Arab about anybody. It could credibly act as a monarchies. Jordan had so often turned mediator in regional disputes. And while it to the wealthy GCC states to bail it out of might be poor in capital and resources, it difficult economic situations, that it had a was rich in a highly educated workforce. vested interest in the stability and survival The kingdom also had one of the region’s of its sometime-allies in the GCC. Jordan’s most sophisticated intelligence services, concerns with Iranian power and influ- the General Intelligence Directorate (GID). ence date back to the Iranian revolution And while its armed forces were small, itself and King Hussein’s decision to back they were among the best-trained in the Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in its eight-year Arab world, so adept in fact, that they had war with Khomeini’s Iran. In the years of developed the regional specialty of training the Abdullah II regime, Jordanian officials other countries’ police and special forces. have feared that Iranian power has seemed The Jordanians flatly rejected the idea to be marching steadily closer to Jordan. that a seat at the GCC table would amount In 2003, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the to charity. While the Jordanians did indeed new Shia-led government in Baghdad en- desire the many economic benefits of joyed close relations with Iran, already the joining such a rich bloc, they felt that in main backer of Hezbollah in Lebanon and return they could offer a talented work the Assad regime in Syria. For the Jorda- force, as well as extensive security sup- nians, this suggested a rising Iranian threat port to the GCC. Some Jordanian officials not only across the Gulf, but also across even complained that Jordan was already Jordan’s eastern and northern borders. helping the GCC states in these security Given its dire economic straits and stra- areas, with little reward, and that full tegic and security concerns regarding Syria, GCC membership would simply codify an Iraq and Iran, Jordan gratefully grasped the already existing relationship.15 Yet after possibility of joining the GCC. Despite the the initial urgency seemed to wear off, the general regional ridicule that accompanied GCC offer noticeably cooled, becoming this proposal for expanding it to become an mired in committees and subcommittees even larger club of Sunni Arab monarchies, and various forms of bureaucracy designed the Jordanians took the offer seriously. Jor- to slow the accession process. dan’s foreign ministry worked extensively The initial GCC offer seemed to have on the issue, even as the GCC later seemed been pushed by a nervous Saudi Arabia in to cool on the idea. For Jordan, the GCC the early days of the Arab uprisings; other offered the potential of oil at more conces- states had been cool to the idea all along, sionary prices, aid, investment and trade.14 including Qatar. Jordanian-Qatari relations GCC membership might revive the mori- had been problematic for years, oscillating bund Jordanian economy and help secure between periods of rapprochement and re- both state and regime. crimination. Since Qatar maintained strong

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ties to Jordan’s large Muslim Brotherhood nian salafi jihadists once the war was over. organization, and hence ties to the single The Jordanian regime was concerned that largest opposition group in the kingdom, unrest would, in effect, be imported into Jordanian-Qatari relations were at all times the kingdom through either Islamist mili- tenuous, with Jordan by far the more vul- tancy or Baathist sleeper agents, activated nerable party. by a Damascus regime angered by Jordan’s alleged support for the rebels.19 Syria The Jordanian government insisted Even as the Jordanians continued that it was neutral in the , their push to maintain rapprochement with though media reports suggested that GCC Qatar, and hence to keep their GCC mem- countries — especially Saudi Arabia and bership bid alive, Syria descended into Qatar — were purchasing arms for the Syr- years of brutal civil war.16 The Jordanians ian rebels and funneling them into Syria urged a negotiated settlement, suggesting from both Turkey and Jordan.20 Media that Assad should leave power, but that a reports in the West continually discussed gradual negotiated transition would be best CIA training in Jordan of Syrian rebel for Syrians and their neighbors. A lengthy fighters, despite Jordanian government de- civil war, they warned, risked turning Syria nials. Syria’s President Assad complained into another Afghanistan, Iraq or even that Jordan was meddling in Syrian affairs, Somalia, where years of unrest, instability warning that this was playing with fire. His and terrorism followed war. The Jordani- comment followed joint military exercises ans were particularly worried, as Damas- conducted in Jordan, near the border with cus was so close to Amman, and thousands Syria, that involved the armed forces of of Syrian refugees were pouring across the 18 other countries, including the United border to flee the violence in their country. States. Jordanian officials noted, correctly, By the end of 2013, Jordan — a country that these were the third-annual “Eager of 7 million — was already hosting more Lion” exercises, planned before Syria’s than 600,000 Syrian refugees. The Zaatari war began. Nonetheless, they drew notice refugee camp had become the fourth-larg- and anger in Damascus. est “city” in Jordan. Even when the exercises ended, the Jor- The Jordanian dilemma about Syria danian government asked the United States was certainly rooted deeply in the refugee to leave behind Patriot Missile Defense crisis.17 But the regime was also worried batteries and F-16 jet fighters to bolster the about potential Islamist ascendancy in Jordanian-Syrian border. Washington did Damascus after the war, even suggesting so and left several hundred troops as well, that a Muslim Brotherhood axis, of new nominally to maintain the missile batteries Islamist-led regimes, might be emerging and planes. These were sensitive matters in the region. The same regime that had within Jordanian domestic politics, how- earlier feared a Shia axis including Leba- ever, and both pro-regime and opposition non, Syria, Iraq and Iran was now visual- figures condemned any continued U.S. or izing a potential Sunni axis, but not one other foreign deployment on Jordanian soil. marked by Jordanian-style moderation.18 The regime found itself continually denying The Jordanians also feared rising Islamist that Jordan would serve as a “launchpad” militancy in Syria, and the return of Jorda- for any U.S. or Western attack on Syria. Yet,

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as fighting raged in and near Daraa, just sounding increasingly alike. On Syria, across the border, Syrian missiles and artil- however, the lengthy civil war had become lery shells landed in Jordan several times. something of a wedge issue, sharply divid- Jordan’s defensive moves to shore up ing even the traditional sources of opposi- its border also increased its internal and tion. Many secular leftists backed Assad, external security dilemmas in two ways. arguing that the crisis was a Western-led First, how to increase defenses without un- conspiracy against the leading state in the intentionally provoking Syria; and second, “resistance” to Israeli and Western impe- how to ensure external security without rial ambitions. Yet Jordan’s large Islamist raising the ire of internal opposition.21 movements, ranging from the long-estab- Conservative nationalists were sensitive to lished Muslim Brotherhood to a smaller any slights to Jordanian sovereignty and but resurgent salafi movement, called for continually rejected any internationally the ouster of the Assad regime. Other Jor- brokered deal that would make Jordan the danian Islamists called for direct support “alternative homeland” (al-watan al- for the rebel movement in Syria. In private badeel) for the Palestinian people, or for capacities, some salafi fighters crossed Syrian or Iraqi refugees, for that matter. over from Jordan to fight Assad. Islamists, leftists and pan-Arab nationalists The Hashemite regime itself, mean- just as routinely criticized Jordanian policy while, saw all potential outcomes in for being too close to Western powers, re- Syria as problematic in varying degrees. A actionary Arab states and especially Israel; hostile Assad would be a danger to Jordan, and they too warned of alleged conspira- but so would an unstable post-Assad Syria, cies about an alternative homeland. especially if it became another Islamist re- When King Abdullah returned from gime or perhaps a failed state wracked by Washington in April 2013, having worked sectarian violence. As it tried to deal with to shore up U.S. support, he was met by the internal and external pressures gener- a third major “manifesto” from a set of ated in part by the Syrian civil war and one thousand opposition figures.22 Previ- the Arab uprisings, the Jordanian regime ous manifestos, from tribal leaders and attempted, as usual, simply to weather the retired army officers (both traditionally storm. But it faced intense pressure from pro-Hashemite constituencies), had harshly Assad to stay out and from its own allies criticized the regime’s domestic economic (especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the and political agenda. The new one, whose United States) to do more. signatories included leftists, nationalists, It would be difficult to exaggerate the Hirak representatives and trade unionists, security challenges to Jordan today, yet as well as tribal leaders and retired army many liberal and progressive reformists officers, decried plots to undermine Jorda- fear that the regime’s security concerns will nian sovereignty, condemned the neoliber- derail Jordan’s own already limited and al economic policies of the state and once incomplete political reform process.23 But again rejected any plans for Israel to solve even as the regime and its opponents wor- the Palestinian issue at Jordanian expense ried about the different impacts of regional (“the Jordanian option”). crises on their internal politics, the very On many of these issues, left- and tangible challenge of the refugee crisis con- right-wing opposition within Jordan were tinued to increase. The strains on Jordan’s

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economy, social services, water resources these developments. If anything, Jordan’s and political stability were severe, especial- Muslim Brotherhood had been biding ly in the context of an economic recession its time, expecting an eventual Islamist in a deeply indebted country. victory in Syria to consolidate with the Islamist success in Egypt. Many Jordanian Egypt Islamists felt that their patience since Jor- In July 2013, domestic attention in Jor- danian independence in 1946 would soon dan shifted dramatically from the Syrian pay off. They had strenuously avoided war to yet another regime change in Egypt, participating in the regime-led reform when a military coup d’état forced out the process, boycotting both national and local Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Islamist elections and rejecting the entire project President . The military as a sham. The eventual collapse of Assad move, led by Defense Minister el-Sissi, and the rise of successful Islamist regimes had followed a massive public-protest in both Cairo and Damascus, however, campaign against the Brotherhood govern- might have empowered the Brotherhood ment in Cairo. The “Tamarod” campaign against the Hashemite monarchy, forcing had mobilized millions, including even more dramatic change. But now, with the more demonstrators in Tahrir Square than ouster of the Brotherhood in Egypt and the the protests that generated the January Hashemite regime’s active endorsement 25, 2011, revolution in the first place. Yet of the move, Jordan’s Islamist movement many secular activists would quickly find was once again in disarray. This deepened that secular military authoritarians were the split between the dovish and hawk- just as dangerous to their democratic goals ish wings of the movement and, to some as the Muslim Brotherhood seemed to extent, splits along lines of identity. have been. If the Jordanian regime felt insecure For Jordanian foreign policy, how- during the early months of the Arab upris- ever, there was no wavering whatsoever in ings in 2011— and perhaps especially so reacting to regime change in Egypt. King during the November 2012 riots triggered Abdullah made a personal visit to Cairo by economic austerity measures — it was immediately after the ouster of President noticeably more confident in 2013 and Morsi, endorsing the new secular regime 2014. Jordan had managed to survive, as and the ouster of the Brotherhood and usual, without a revolution of its own. But cementing a renewed close relationship domestic and regional tensions persisted. between Jordan and Egypt. In October Despite Jordan’s attempts to avoid the 2013, Egypt’s “interim president,” Adly Syrian conflict, the kingdom remained Mansour, paid a state visit to four key Arab under considerable pressure from both its allies — Jordan, Kuwait, Saud Arabia Gulf and Western allies to play a larger and the UAE — to shore up support for role. Jordanian foreign policy is predicated the new Egyptian regime. In Jordan, this on maintaining multiple economic, politi- simply reinforced the warming of relations cal and military allies at the regional and after the ouster of President Morsi and the global levels; yet these were allies who Muslim Brotherhood. were difficult to ignore and were vital as The kingdom’s own Islamist move- guarantors of Jordanian economic viability, ment reacted with alarm and even horror to political stability and security.

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CONCLUSIONS bers of the Security Council. In December The Jordanian regime continues to 2013, Jordan was elected to the UNSC for view itself as a bastion of moderation, 2014-16, marking yet another key foreign- stability, political reform (including limited policy move to ensure the survival of the liberalization) and especially of neoliberal kingdom even amidst a particularly tumul- economic policies such as privatization, tuous time in regional politics.24 free trade and openness to foreign invest- The Arab Spring had shaken Jordan ment. Despite its misgivings regarding at a time when the kingdom already had U.S. priorities (such as launching the Iraq its hands full with its own struggles over War and neglecting the Israeli-Palestinian domestic political reform and an economic peace process), the Hashemite regime crisis. The arrival of the regional upheavals regards its alliance with the United States exacerbated both dilemmas, while adding and its burgeoning relations with the intensely to external-security constraints. European Union as key strategic interests While supporters of the Hashemite regime and sees itself as in sync with both on most heralded the regime-led reform process foreign policy issues. Jordan even views and its various achievements, its opponents itself as a model for the region regarding decried the reforms as minor and cosmetic policy areas of deepest concern to West- at best. Many activists charged, further, ern governments and Western-led global that the kingdom’s own allies were a major institutions: supporting neoliberal eco- source of concern, arguing that the United nomic politics, pursuing domestic political States and the EU were satisfied with small reform, combating militant Islamism and procedural reforms rather than democrati- terrorism, stabilizing Iraq, bringing an end zation, while local allies — such as Egypt, to the Syrian civil war, and restoring the Saudi Arabia, and the other GCC mon- Arab-Israeli peace process. archies — might exercise a reactionary Jordan played on its own reputation for influence on Jordan’s reform program.25 moderation when, in late 2013, it became a Regardless of which of these interpreta- surprise candidate for membership on the tions one accepts, it seems clear that much UN Security Council (UNSC). The General more needs to be done. Assembly had actually elected Saudi Arabia The regime and, indeed, the country to the seat, but even as congratulations were itself are by no means able to rest on the being sent to Riyadh, the Saudis refused domestic status quo. To ensure greater to accept their own election, decrying the security for both regime and society, ineffectiveness of the UNSC, especially in deeper political and economic reform is regard to the Syrian civil war and the plight needed; even deft use of foreign policy of the Palestinian people. The Jordanians as a tool to ensure domestic security will quickly seized the opportunity, as a very ac- not be enough in the long term. Yet, as the tive member of the United Nations (includ- Arab uprisings continue to rock the Middle ing in global peacekeeping operations) and East, the Hashemite regime will attempt ran for the seat themselves. This took deft to use its foreign-policy ties to regional diplomacy; Jordanian officials carefully and global powers to solidify both the made sure that the kingdom would have monarchy and the state in order to survive the support of Saudi Arabia and other Arab yet another series of internal and external states, as well as all five permanent mem- threats to Jordan’s security and survival.

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1 An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, October 10-13, 2013. 2 Sean L. Yom and Wael al-Khatib, “Jordan’s New Politics of Tribal Dissent,” Foreign Policy, August 7, 2012, http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/07/jordans_new_politics_of_tribal_dissent; and Curtis R. Ryan, “Political Opposition and Reform Coalitions in Jordan,” British Journal of Middle East Stud- ies 38, no. 3 (2011): 367-390. 3 Curtis R. Ryan, Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002). 4 Jordan’s IMF austerity measures and the resultant riots were reminiscent of earlier episodes in both 1989 and 1996, detailed in the pages of this journal. See Curtis R. Ryan, “Peace, Bread, and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund,” Middle East Policy 6, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 54-66. 5 Expanding on an earlier essay: “Jordan’s Security Dilemmas,” Foreign Policy, May 7, 2013, http://mideast- africa.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/01/jordans_security_dilemmas#sthash.92FfWeWZ.dpbs. 6 Curtis R. Ryan, “Jordan’s Unfinished Journey: Parliamentary Elections and the State of Reform,” in the Project on Middle East Democracy’s Policy Briefing, March 2013, http://pomed.org/wordpress/wp-content/ uploads/2013/03/POMED-Policy-Brief-Ryan.pdf. 7 King Abdullah II, interview by Curtis R. Ryan, Amman, Jordan, May 21, 2012. 8 Julien Barnes-Dacey, “Jordanian Tremors: Elusive Consensus, Deepening Discontent,” in the European Council on Foreign Relation’s Policy Memo no. 68, November 2012. 9 Marwan Muasher, The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 10 Robert Satloff and David Schenker write on Jordanian stability and U.S. policy options in “Political Insta- bility in Jordan,” Contingency Planning Memorandum no. 19, Council on Foreign Relations, October 2013, http://www.cfr.org/jordan/political-instability-jordan/p30698. 11 The classic study of economic determinants in Jordanian foreign policy is that of Laurie A. Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance-making (Columbia University Press, 1994). 12 Peter Seeberg, “European Neighborhood Policy, Post-Normativity and Legitimacy. EU Policies towards Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria,” Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies, Working Paper Series no. 14, November 2008. See also, European Commission Memo, “EU’s Response to the ‘Arab Spring’: The State-of- Play after Two Years,” February 8, 2013. 13 On both the extent and limitations of the reform process, see Ryan, “Jordan’s Unfinished Journey.” 14 Officials at the Foreign Ministry of Jordan, interviews by Curtis R. yan,R Amman, Jordan, May 2012. 15 Former and present policy makers, interviews by Curtis R. Ryan, Amman, Jordan, May 2011. 16 On the international relations dynamics of the Syrian war and why it is reminiscent of the old Arab Cold War, see Curtis R. Ryan, “The New Arab Cold War and the Struggle for Syria,” Middle East Report, no. 262 (Spring 2012): 28-31. 17 King Abdullah II, interview by Curtis R. Ryan, Amman, Jordan, December 18, 2012. 18 In interviews in 2012 and 2013, some Jordanian officials noted specifically the rise of Islamist regimes -in cluding an-Nahda in Tunisia, a semi-Islamist coalition in Libya, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and even the AKP in Turkey. 19 As the Jordanians predicted when they argued against a U.S. invasion of Iraq, political violence and ter- rorism followed the invasion and occupation, eventually spilling over into Jordan itself. Al-Qaeda in Iraq emerged as a force (led for a time by a militant Jordanian national, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) and struck the country in what Jordanians consider their “9/11.” On November 9, 2005, suicide bombers struck three luxury hotels in Amman, killing more than 60 people. 20 Dale Gavlak and Jamal Halabi, “Officials: Arms Shipments Rise to Syrian Rebels,” Associated Press, March 27, 2013. 21 Ryan, “Jordan’s Security Dilemmas.” 22 Saraya News, April 30, 2013, http://www.sarayanews.com/index.php?page=article&id=196518#.UX- fw1fvjaY.facebook. 23 Osama al-Sharif, “Jordan’s Reform Agenda on Hold,” al-Monitor, October 28, 2013, http://www.al-moni- tor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/jordan-focus-economic-security-reform-syrian-crisis.html. 24 Curtis R. Ryan, “Jordan’s U.N. Security Council Debate,” Foreign Policy, November 20, 2013, http://mid- eastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/12/jordans_excellent_un_adventure#sthash.RAb5taLm.dpbs. 25 I have heard such arguments consistently from diverse reform activists.

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