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JORDAN and SAUDI ARABIA AFTER the ARAB SPRING Lucas Winter

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JORDAN and SAUDI ARABIA AFTER the ARAB SPRING Lucas Winter JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA AFTER THE ARAB SPRING Lucas Winter Foreign Military Studies Office This paper examines the effects of the Arab Spring on Jordan and Saudi Arabia along four dimensions: political, economic, social, and regional/international. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. The effects of the 2011 Arab uprisings will continue to be felt throughout the region, both in countries that have experienced major political change and those that have not. The former include Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Libya, while Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, and the Gulf monarchies thus far comprise the latter; Bahrain is an intermediate case. The effects of the Arab Spring will here be examined with respect to two countries, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Pressures on these countries’ ruling regimes will be examined along four dimensions: political, economic, social, and regional/international. These four dimensions are interdependent – they overlap and interact in different ways in each country, producing varying impacts across time and space. The political dimension looks at domestic pressures on the ruling regime, both from below (popular mobilization) and from within (elite cohesion). The economic dimension considers both the availability of state resources and the way in which they are distributed. The social dimension considers historically formed societal cleavages and political constituencies. Finally, the regional/international dimension focuses on external political pressures particularly through the lens of regional strategic alliances and political spillover from neighboring countries. Why did the popular mobilization of 2011-2012 fail to “break the barrier of fear” in Jordan and Saudi Arabia? Which pressures will be strongest in each country in 2013? PART ONE: Overview of Jordan and Saudi Arabia’s Failed Arab Springs Jordan Jordan was one of the first countries to which Tunisia’s popular mobilization spread. Jordan in 2010 was characterized by vigorous political mobilization, including protests by teachers and organized labor, public criticism of the government by a group of retired officers, and a broad opposition boycott of what were generally viewed as sham elections.1 After long-time rulers 1 For more on the criticism by retired officers, see: Assaf David, “The Revolt of Jordan’s Military Veterans,” Foreign Policy, 6/16/10. Available at: http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/15/the_revolt_of_jordans_military_veterans (accessed 2/28/13). 1 were toppled in both Tunisia and Egypt, Jordan seemed a good candidate to be next in line.2 Yet by the summer of 2011 Jordan’s Arab Spring had blown over.3 The key turning point in Jordan’s Arab Spring came on March 24, 2011. Protests had ebbed and flowed since January, and despite significant numbers of protestors, political pressure did not escalate as it had in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain.4 The Arab Spring’s signature slogan, “al-shaab yurid isqat al-nizam” (the people want regime overthrow), remained largely absent from Jordan’s protests, which focused mostly on economic and, particularly, political reforms.5 On March 24 Jordanian protesters, using the #march24 hashtag,6 attempted to emulate Egypt’s Midan Tahrir popular takeover by camping out in front of the Interior Ministry, only to be dispersed by pro-government thugs.7 The repression of March 24 proved fatal to Jordan’s Spring 2011 protests, but was nevertheless followed by political and economic concessions – a new cabinet and the injection of capital directly into the economy. Cosmetic political concessions became commonplace (there have been four other prime ministers since then), but the economic largesse required outside revenues, given the country’s growing internal debt. Saudi Arabia, wary of disturbances in the neighboring monarchy, was happy to be of assistance. 2 More on why Jordan seemed a good Arab Spring candidate available at: Pete Moore, “Why not Jordan?” MERIP Middle East Report, 11/13/12. Available at: http://www.merip.org/why-not-jordan (accessed 2/28/13). 3 The March 2012 eruption of civil war in neighboring Syria made Jordan appear newly vulnerable. A year later, the kingdom’s ambiguous policy toward Syria appeared a smart choice, and the feared economic and social impacts of the civil war appeared contained. These pressures, however, remain and may intensify. 4 The week leading up to March 24 was pivotal throughout the region: protests in Bahrain were crushed, the Yemeni regime split, towns in several parts of Syria erupted in protest and Qaddafi’s troops closed in on Benghazi. For more on this see chapter 6 in: Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising (Public Affairs: 2012). 5 Prime Minister Samir Rifai was pre-emptively pushed aside in February 2011 (after having been appointed in the wake of the November 2010 Parliamentary Elections). While this appeased some elements of the Jordanian protest movement, others were unsatisfied with what had become a predictable tactic. 6 Arab Spring protests in each country were associated with a particular date and hashtag. Some of the more prominent ones include: #feb14 (Bahrain) #jan25 (Egypt), #14jan (Tunisia) and #17feb (Libya). 7 The layout of Amman does not lend itself to the type of centralized protest that occurred in Cairo, Tunis, or Sana’. For more on this see: Jillian Schwedler, “The Politics of Protest in Jordan,” FPRI Newsletter, 3/13/12. Available at: http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1701.201203.schwedler.politicsprotestjordan.html (accessed 2/28/13). It is also important to note that these protesters are generally different from those organized by the “loyal opposition,” most prominently the Muslim Brotherhood, which is able to mobilize the largest number of people without representing a challenge to the regime. 2 Jordan’s political system has proven more malleable and resilient than that of most “Arab Spring” countries.8 The likelihood of mass mobilization devolving into the type of segmented contention that has occurred in Syria appears unlikely. The challenges facing Jordan are nonetheless enormous. Saudi Arabia As much as anywhere in the region, mass mobilization to voice political demands was hard to imagine in Saudi Arabia. Like only a handful of states in the region, the Saudi regime is based on a legitimating ideology (Wahabbism).9 As a consequence, the regime is able to portray broader Arab Spring trends as foreign, contrary to the alleged natural order of Saudi Arabian society and Islam in general.10 Furthermore, extensive oil rents allow the regime to invest heavily in mechanisms for averting mobilized dissent. When it comes to containing or repressing political dissent, Saudi Arabia’s regime has a broad array of tools at its disposal.11 In the wake of the region-wide euphoria – or concern for some – following the popular overthrow of Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine ben Ali, some Saudi groups openly sought substantial reform. As with other countries in the region, activist Facebook pages mushroomed and social media became a key tool for mobilization. A Facebook group claiming significant popular support planned a mass protest for March 11 (#march11).12 Yet with the exception of the country’s Shi’a-majority Eastern Province, where protests broke out shortly after events in Tunisia, nothing of significance materialized. Reasons given for the absence of broad 8 Some have attributed this to its monarchical government, spawning a mini-debate among political scientists. See: “The Arab Monarchy Debate,” POMPEPS Briefings 16, 12/19/12. Available at: http://pomeps.org/wp- content/uploads/2012/12/POMEPS_BriefBooklet16_Monarchies_web.pdf (accessed 2/28/13). 9 Post-1979, where Khomeini’s Revolutionary Shi’ism underpins state legitimacy, could be similarly characterized. Other Arab regimes (including Qaddafi’s Libya), despite the revolutionary pretensions of their leaders, can hardly be called ideological. 10 Because the Wahhabi-legitimated Saudi state is a modern innovation, portraying Wahhabism as indigenous or at least “natural” to the whole of Saudi Arabian territory is key to the regime’s legitimacy. 11 A cocktail of repression and economic incentives of varying strength is not its only means of quelling dissent. Saudi Arabia controls many of the key newspapers and TV stations in the region and – along with Qatar – has a strong influence on the way stories are reported. This is a third and crucial tool in the Saudi toolbox. 12 Over 30,000 had expressed support on Facebook for the March 11 “Day of Rage,” but few actually showed up. See: Rani Abouzeid, “Saudi Arabia's 'Day of Rage' Passes Quietly,” Time 3/11/11. Available at: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2058486,00.html (accessed 2/28/13). 3 mobilization included the layout of Saudi cities, a lack of major economic grievances, the generally conservative and self-policing nature of Saudi society, and the kingdom’s low level of tolerance for open dissent. With regard to the latter, Saudi Arabia’s even modest mobilization movement, as compared to that of other countries, was remarkable. Saudi Arabia’s Arab Spring revolved around three main axes: regional Shi’a mobilization, rights-based urban protest and cyber-dissent.13 Small protests among the country’s eastern Shi’a population began as early as February 2011 and continued throughout the year.14 Tensions spiked in the fall, when armed clashes between residents and security broke out in the restive town of al-‘Awamiyya.15 The cycle of protest and repression continued through 2012, peaking again in July, when prominent Shi’a religious leader Shaykh Nimr al-Nimr was wounded by a gunshot to the leg during his arrest. Since then, low-level protests have continued in several Shi’a-majority towns in the country’s east although not in the mixed Sunni-Shi’a urban centers.
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