Introduction 1 the Nuclear Program of the Shah (1957–79)

Notes

Introduction 1. MWt and MWe are common units of measure for the output of a nuclear reactor. MWt stands for megawatts of thermal output, while MWe means megawatts of electrical output. In a nuclear power plant, the ﬁssion chain reaction generates heat (thermal output), which creates steam to drive a turbine to generate electricity (electrical output).

1 The Nuclear Program of the Shah (1957–79) 1. Newton, David E., Nuclear Power, New York: Facts on File, 2006, p. 26. 2. Krige, John, “Atoms for Peace, Scientific Internationalism, and Scientific Intelligence,” Osiris, Vol. 21, no. 1, 2006, pp. 161–181. 3. Participating in the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held in Geneva on August 8–20, 1955, were more than 1,400 delegates from 73 different countries. Abraham, Itty, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State, London: Zed Books, 1998, p. 9. 4. Krige, “Atoms for Peace,” p. 29. 5. “Atoms for Peace Agreement with Iran,” The Department of State Bulletin, Washington, DC, Vol. 36, no. 927, 1957, p. 629, . 6. Most of the bilateral agreements proposed by the United States under the “Atoms for Peace” program included unclassified information on the design, construction, and commissioning of research reactors, in addition to the supply of a few kilo- grams of nuclear fuel and a starting allowance of about $350,000. 7. Sanjian, Ara, “The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, no. 2, 1997, pp. 226–266. 8. McKay, H. A. C., “The Cento Institute of Nuclear Science in Tehran,” Nature, Vol. 186, no. 4724, May 1960, pp. 513–515. 9. Ibid.; Ghannadi-Maragheh, Mohammad, “Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, London, September 4–6, 2002, . 220 ● Notes

10. Poneman, Daniel, Nuclear Power in the Developing World, London: Allen & Unwin, 1982, p. 84. 11. In the early 1970s, with an installed capacity of about 360 MWe, the Iranian electrical grid could not sustain the operation of even one nuclear reactor. Barzin, Nader, L’Iran Nucléaire, Paris: l’Harmattan, 2006, p. 20. 12. From 1956 to 1966, the Iranian population grew at an average rate of 3.1 percent, reaching 26 million. Azizi, Mohammad Mehdi, “The Provision of Urban Infrastructure in Iran: An Empirical Evaluation,” Urban Studies, Vol. 32, no. 3, April 1995, pp. 507–522. 13. Afkhami, Gholam Reza, The Life and Times of the Shah, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009, p. 339. 14. US Embassy Tehran Airgram A-69 to State Department, “The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” May 11, 1977, declassiﬁed on June 25, 2008, . 15. Sobhe, Khosrow, “Educational Planning for Engineering Schools: A Study of Iran Between 1962 and 1982,” Higher Education, Vol. 12, no. 1, January 1983, pp. 61–76; Leslie, Stuart W., and Robert Kargon, “Exporting MIT,” Osiris, Vol. 21, no. 1, 2006, pp. 110–130. 16. “Nuclear Plan Started,” Kayhan International, December 19, 1972, p. 2, . 17. Mahvi, Pascal, Deadly Secrets of Iranian Princes: Audacity to Act, Victoria, BC: Friesen Press, 2010, p. 51; Mahvi, Abolfath, “40-Year-Old Dream,” Iranian.com, January 6, 2009, . 18. Ibid. 19. In October 1963 Akbar Etemad received a Ph.D. in nuclear physics at the University of Lausanne. Two years later he returned to Iran where he worked at the Plan and Budget Organization, with particular responsibility to complete the construction of the Tehran Research Reactor. Besides teaching at the Tehran University, in 1973 he became rector of the new Abu-Ali Sina University in Hamadan. Milani, Abbas, Eminent Persians: The Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941–1979, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2008, p. 137; Patrikarakos, David, Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State, London: I.B. Tauris, 2012, pp 16–19. 20. Barzin, L’Iran Nucléaire, pp. 70–72. 21. Ibid. 22. US Embassy Tehran Airgram A-69 to State Department, “The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” p. 3. 23. Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah, p. 359. 24. US Embassy Tehran Airgram A-69 to State Department, “The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” p. 7. 25. Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah, p. 345. 26. US Embassy Tehran Airgram A-69 to State Department, “The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” p. 7. 27. Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah, p. 346. 28. The “turnkey” agreements included the training of technicians in the functioning of the nuclear plants, the supply of nuclear fuel, and the creation of the Notes ● 221

infrastructures required to complete the facilities. The foreign suppliers had only to guarantee the participation of an Iranian partner in the projects. 29. Iran ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on February 2, 1970, finalizing the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA on December 13, 1974. IAEA, “The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/214, December 13, 1974. 30. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to Secretary of Defense, “Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Iran (U)—Action Memorandum,” June 22, 1974, declassified on August 10, 2008, . 31. US Embassy Paris cable 15305 to Department of State, “Interview with Shah,” June 24, 1974, declassified on December 3, 2005, . 32. US Embassy Tehran cable 5192 to Department of State, “Shah’s Alleged Statement on Nuclear Weapons,” June 25, 1974, declassified on May 30, 2005, ; US Embassy Tehran cable 5389 to Department of State, “Iran’s Intentions in Nuclear Matters,” July 1, 1974, declassified on May 30, 2005, . 33. Wohlstetter, Roberta, The Buddha Smiles: Absent-Minded Peaceful Aid and the Indian Bomb, Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics, 1977, p. 32; Pathak, Kanwal Kishore, Nuclear Policy of India: A Third World Perspective, New Delhi: Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980, p. 49; Perkovich, George, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001, p. 29. 34. IAEA, “Communication Received from Members Regarding the Export of Nuclear Material and of Certain Categories of Equipment and Other Material,” INFCIRC/209, September 3, 1974. 35. For example, an agreement signed between the Federal Republic of Germany and Brazil in 1975 provided the supply of eight reactors, a uranium enrichment plant, and a fuel reprocessing plant. Similar plants were included in other agreements defined by France with South Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa between 1975 and 1976. Krass, Allan S. et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation, New York: Taylor & Francis, 1983, pp. 203–257. 36. Poneman, Nuclear Power in the Developing World, p. 88; New York Times, June 28, 1974, p. 1, col. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, . 37. Ibid. 38. Mahvi, Deadly Secrets of Iranian Princes, pp. 120, 491. 39. Mahvi, “40-Year-Old Dream.” 40. “Iran into Uranium in Big Way—Etemad,” Kayhan International, November 30, 1974, . 41. The reduction of Iran’s oil revenues in real terms derived from the devaluation of the US dollar. As for the Iranian inflation rate, it grew by 12.7 percent in 1975. Avery, Peter, G. R. G. Hambly, and C. Melville, eds., The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 7: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 67. 222 ● Notes

42. Poneman, Nuclear Power in the Developing World, pp. 91–92. 43. US Embassy Tehran, Airgram A-69 to State Department, “The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” p. 6. 44. The United States–Iran Joint Economic Commission, sponsored by the United States, was established after the OPEC crisis in 1973 to provide Washington with privileged access to the Iranian oil market and revenues. 45. “Summary of Developments in Secretary’s Absence,” May 30, 1974, in Digital National Security Archive, . 46. NSC Under Secretaries Committee to Deputy Secretary of Defense et al., “US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy,” December 4, 1974, declassified on May 25, 2002, . 47. “Report of the NSSM 219 Working Group, Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Iran,” April 1975, declassified on December 8, 1999, ; US Embassy Tehran cable 3437 to Department of State, “Draft Agreement on Atomic Energy,” April 15, 1975, declassified on July 5, 2006, . 48. For the official text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), see: IAEA, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/140, April 22, 1970, . 49. Burr, William, “A Brief History of US–Iranian Nuclear Negotiations,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 65, no. 1, January 2009, pp. 21–34; Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah, p. 355. 50. Newton, Nuclear Power, p. 95. 51. Poneman, Nuclear Power in the Developing World, p. 87. 52. “Report of the NSSM 219 Working Group, Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Iran,” p. 6. 53. Department of State Briefing Paper, “Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation,” May 1975, declassified on February 28, 1998. . 54. Tehran Embassy cable 11089 to State Department, “Shah’s Interview by Business Week Given Prominent Coverage by English Language Kayhan,” November 13, 1975, declassified on July 6, 2006, . 55. Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah, p. 353. 56. Burr, “A Brief History of US–Iranian Nuclear Negotiations,” pp. 25–26. 57. To see the official text of this document: IAEA, “Model Protocol Additional to the Arrangement(s) between State(s) and International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of Safeguards,” INFCIRC/540, September 1997, . 58. US Embassy, Tehran, Cable 1232 to State Department, “Nuclear Power: Comments of Head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI),” February 7, 1977, . 59. US Embassy Tehran, Airgram A-69 to State Department, “The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” p. 11. Notes ● 223

60. Poneman, Nuclear Power in the Developing World, pp. 91–92. 61. Ibid. 62. Gaietta, Michele, “La Dorsale Nucleare Iraniana,” Storia Urbana, Vol. 34, no. 131, 2011, pp. 71–100. 63. “Uranium in Namibia,” World Nuclear Association, ; Star (Johannesburg), May 21, 1987, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, . 64. Sheppard, David, “Goldman Puts ‘for Sale’ Sign on Iran’s Old Uranium Supplier,” Reuters, February 11, 2014, ; International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment, London: Taylor & Francis, 2005; IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003, Annex 1, p. 2. 65. Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah, p. 355. 66. Branigin, William, “Iran Set to Scrap $34 Billion Worth of Civilian Projects,” The Washington Post, May 29, 1979, in Lexis-Nexis, . 67. Although the contract signed with the Lischem Company was deﬁned in 1975, the laser enrichment laboratory was abandoned in the early 1980s, before it became fully operational. A second contract for a laboratory to study MLIS laser enrichment technology was signed in the late 1970s. However, with the outbreak of the Islamic revolution in 1979 the delivery of the related equipment was ulti- mately terminated. The laser enrichment projects within the TNRC were super- vised by Mojtaba Taherzadeh, the then director of this center, and by Esanollah Ziai. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, GOV/2004/60, September 1, 2004, Annex, p. 6–7; Segal, David, “Atomic Ayatollahs; Just what the Middle East Needs, an Iranian Bomb,” The Washington Post, April 12, 1987. 68. Krosney, Herbert, Deadly Business: Legal Deals and Outlaw Weapons: The Arming of Iran and Iraq, 1975 to the Present, New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1993, pp. 11–30. 69. Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah, p. 356. 70. Quester, George H., “The Shah and the Bomb,” Policy Sciences, Vol. 8, no. 1, March 1977, p. 23; Leslie and Kargon, “Exporting MIT,” p. 126. 71. Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah, p. 349. 72. US Embassy Tehran, Airgram A-69 to State Department, “The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” p. 7. 73. Kifner, John, New York Times, April 27, 1975, p. 16, col. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, . 74. US Embassy Tehran, Airgram A-69 to State Department, “The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” p. 12. 75. Ibid. 76. Redaelli, Riccardo, L’Iran Contemporaneo, Rome: Carocci, 2009, pp. 29–32; Sabahi, Farian, Storia dell’Iran, Milan: B. Mondadori, 2003, pp. 155–156. 224 ● Notes

77. Poneman, Nuclear Power in the Developing World, p. 92. 78. Avery et al., The Cambridge History of Iran, p. 636. 79. Branigin, “Iran Set to Scrap $34 Billion Worth of Civilian Projects.” 80. Mahvi, Deadly Secrets of Iranian Princes, pp. 65–75. 81. US Consulate Shiraz Airgram A-16 to Department of State, “The Persepolis Conference on Transfer of Nuclear Technology: A Layman’s View,” April 18, 1977, declassiﬁed on June 25, 2008. 82. Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah, p. 362. 83. Burr, “A Brief History of US–Iranian Nuclear Negotiations,” p. 31. 84. Strasser, Steven and Martin, Paul, “Iran, Carrot and Stick,” United States Edition, September 25, 1978, p. 48, in Lexis-Nexis, . 85. Milton, Benjamin R., “Iran Cuts Back Nuclear Plans to Save Money; Iran Cuts Back Nuclear Power Plans in Financial Squeeze,” The Washington Post, October 23, 1978, in Lexis-Nexis, . 86. Poneman, Nuclear Power in the Developing World, p. 97. 87. “German Concern Ends A-Contract,” Facts on File World News Digest, August 3, 1979, p. 586, in Lexis-Nexis, .

2 The Impact of the Revolution (1979–89) 1. Branigin, “Iran Set to Scrap $34 Billion Worth of Civilian Projects,” p. 22. 2. Ibid.; “Yazdi’s Interview in Shiraz,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 25, 1979, in Lexis-Nexis, . 3. “Iran: In Brief; Cost of Cancellation of Bushehr Nuclear Project,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 13, 1979, in Lexis-Nexis, . 4. “Nuclear Stake Frozen,” Facts on File News Digest, December 31, 1979, p. 976, in Lexis-Nexis, . 5. Wall Street Journal, June 11, 1982, p. 28, in Lexis-Nexis, . 6. Milani, Eminent Persians, p. 138. 7. Desutter, Paula A., Denial and Jeopardy Deterring Iranian Use of NBC Weapons, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997. 8. “The Purge at the Tehran University,” BBC Summary of World Broadcast, March 21, 1979, in Lexis-Nexis, . 9. Segal, “Atomic Ayatollahs.” 10. Redaelli, L’Iran Contemporaneo, p. 53. 11. According to the famous Iranian thinker, Abdolkarim Soroush—then a member of the Cultural Revolution Committee of the provisional Islamic government— some 700 out of a total of 12,000 university lecturers and assistants and about 200,000 students were dismissed during the “cultural revolution.” When the universities were reopened in late 1983, only half of the approximately 20,000 pro- fessors and assistants employed before the revolution remained in ofﬁce. Razavi, Reza, “The Cultural Revolution in Iran, with Close Regard to the Universities, and Its Impact on the Student Movement,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 45, no. 1, 2009, pp. 1–17; Mazyar, Lotfalian, “The Iranian Scientiﬁc Community Notes ● 225

and Its Diaspora after the Islamic Revolution,” Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 82, no. 1, 2009, pp. 229–250. 12. Patrikarakos, Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State, p. 133. 13. Razavi, “The Cultural Revolution in Iran,” pp. 1–17. 14. “Iran and Nuclear Power,” The British Broadcasting Corporation, June 2, 1981, in Lexis-Nexis, . 15. Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah, p. 355. 16. Branigin, “Iran Set to Scrap $34 Billion Worth of Civilian Projects,” p. 22. 17. Goodarzi, Jubin M., Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East, London: I.B. Tauris, 2006, pp. 59–132; Takeyh, Ray, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 94. 18. “New Head of Atomic Energy Organization,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 19, 1982, in Lexis-Nexis, . 19. Cole, Juan Ricardo, Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi’ite Islam, London: I.B. Tauris, 2002, p. 202. 20. “Iranian Nuclear Power Project,” BBC World Summary of Broadcasts, July 6, 1982; Johns, Richard, “Middle East’s Uneven Nuclear Progress,” Financial Times (London), June 16, 1982, p. 28; “Iran; Nuclear Power Agreement with FRG Firm,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 6, 1982, in Lexis-Nexis, . 21. “Iran Seeking Way to Finish Bushehr Plant but Bonn Denies Exports,” Neuclonics Week, October 30, 1986, pp. 4–5, in Lexis-Nexis, . 22. Leglu, Dominique, Liberation (Paris), April 27, 1984, p. 23, in “Iran Nuclear Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), . 23. IAEA, “Cable Addressed to the Director General by Mr. R. Amrollahi, Deputy Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” INFCIRC/339, February 10, 1987, . 24. Cooper, Tom, and Farzad Bishop, “Target: Saddam’s Reactor; Israeli and Iranian Operations against Iraqi Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons,” Air Enthusiast, Vol. 110, 2004, pp. 2–12, . 25. Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2008/15, May 26, 2008, Annex, para. 6. 26. Cooper and Bishop, “Target: Saddam’s Reactor”; Parsi, Trita, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008, p. 107. 27. Karsh, Efraim, The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002, p. 37. 28. Albright, David, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies, New York: Free Press, 2010, p. 72. 226 ● Notes

29. Nuclear News, March 1985, pp. 117–118, in “Iran Nuclear Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), . 30. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities – A Net Assessment, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2011, p. 52; IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/65, Annex 1, p. 3. 31. Krass, Allan S. et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation, New York: Taylor & Francis, 1983, pp. 158–173. 32. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2004/83, November 15, 2004, para. 23. 33. Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards, Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2007/58, November 15, 2007, para. 5. 34. In 1986, as president of Iran, Khamenei visited Pakistan to discuss a series of deals also related to the nuclear field. The next year, the president of the AEOI, Reza Amrollahi, and the director of the Pakistani Atomic Commission, Munir Khan, signed an agreement for the training of Iranian technicians in two Pakistani institutes: the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology and the Nuclear Studies Institute. This technical cooperation was carried out with the collaboration between Iran and the supplier network of A. Q. Khan. Corera, Gordon, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Khan Network, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 64; Nuclear Developments, July 13, 1988, p. 19, in “Iran Nuclear Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), . 35. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment, pp. 93–116. 36. Tertrais, Bruno, “Not a ‘Wal-Mart’, but an ‘Imports–Exports Enterprise’: Understanding the Nature of the A. Q. Khan Network,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 6, no. 5, August 2007, . 37. Albright, Peddling Peril, p. 72. 38. In the 1970s, Masud Naraghi gained a Ph.D. in Plasma Science and Technology at the Case Western University. After a few months spent in the United States to increase his knowledge on vacuum technologies, he finally returned to Iran in the late 1970s, where he took office at the Plasma Physics Deparment of the TNRC. Koch, Egmont R., “Der Physiker der Mullahs,” Frankfurter Rundschau, January 18, 2007, . 39. Albright, Peddling Peril, pp. 72–75; Lavoy, Peter R., “Nuclear Proliferations Over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy Responses,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, no. 3, November 2006, p. 441. 40. Albright, Peddling Peril, p. 77. 41. IAEA Director General, GOV/2007/58, November 15, 2007, para. 10. Notes ● 227

42. Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. 65. 43. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2006/15, February 26, 2006, para. 16; IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2005/87, November 18, 2005, para. 6. 44. Albright, Peddling Peril, p. 78. 45. Ibid., pp. 80–81, 93–94. 46. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2008/4, February 22, 2008, para. 17; Albright, David, and Paul Brannan, “Iranian Smuggling for Military Nuclear Programs: From Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group to the Physics Research Center,” Institute for Science and International Security, May 16, 2012, . 47. Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, p. 88; Redaelli, L’Iran Contemporaneo, p. 55. 48. Abrahamian, Ervand, A History of Modern Iran, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 178, 210. 49. Amirahmadi, Hooshang, Revolution and Economic Transition: The Iranian Experience, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990, p. 89; Katzman, Kenneth, “The Pasdaran: Institutionalization of Revolutionary Armed Force,” Iranian Studies, Vol. 26, no. 3–4, July 1993, pp. 389–402. 50. Karsh, The Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988, p. 19; Schahgaldian, Nikola, and Gina Barkhordarian, The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1987, p. 26. 51. Katzman, “The Pasdaran,” pp. 389–402; Ferdows, Emad, “The Reconstruction Crusade and Class Conﬂict in Iran,” MERIP Reports, no. 113, March 1, 1983, pp. 11–15. 52. Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, p. 178. 53. Schahgaldian and Barkhordarian, The Iranian Military, p. 60; Katzman, “The Pasdaran,” p. 395. 54. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/75, p. 11; International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities, p. 52.

55. Of the approximately 70 kg of U3O8 and UO2 imported in the 1970s by Iran, about 50 kg were exempted from safeguards by the IAEA in 1978. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/75, Annex 1, p. 2. 56. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2004/60, September 1, 2004, Annex 1, p. 2. 57. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2007/58, November 15, 2007, para. 12. 58. Segal, “Atomic Ayatollahs.” 59. IAEA, “Cable Addressed to the Director General by Mr. Reza Amrollahi, Deputy Prime Minister of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of 228 ● Notes

Iran,” INFCIRC/339, February 10, 1987; IAEA, “Telex Message from the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” INFCIRC/346, November 19, 1987. 60. IAEA Director General, GOV/2007/58, para. 4. 61. Kessler, Richard, Nucleonics Week, May 14, 1987, pp. 6–7; Kessler, Richard, and Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, November 12, 1987, pp. 6–7, in “Iran Nuclear Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), . 62. Van England, Claude, “Iran Defends Its Pursuit of Nuclear Technology,” The Christian Science Monitor, February 18, 1993, p. 7, in Lexis-Nexis, . 63. Garver, John W., China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World, Washington, DC: University of Washington Press, 2007, p. 139. 64. Hunter, Shireen T., Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order, Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010, p. 119. 65. Hibbs, Mark, Nucleonics Week, May 2, 1991, pp. 1, 10–11, in “Iran Nuclear Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), ; Garver, China and Iran, p. 145. 66. New York Times, December 19, 1991, p. A11; Hibbs, Mark, Nucleonics Week, November 21, 1991, pp. 2–3, in “Iran Nuclear Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), . 67. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/75, Annex 1, p. 11; IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/60, Annex, p. 7. 68. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, p. 5, para. 27. 69. Eventually, the US pressure led to the cancellation of several deals between China and Iran in the nuclear ﬁeld including the supply of four 300 MWe Quinshan Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) that Tehran intended to build in the site of Bushehr, in addition to a 27 MWt research reactor, a heavy water production plant, and a uranium conversion facility. Garver, China and Iran, pp. 155–162. 70. Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, pp. 95–107. 71. Ibid. 72. Deheshiri, Mohammad Reza, and Mohammad Reza Majidii, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-Revolution Era: A Holistic Approach,” The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 21, no. 1, 2008, pp. 101–114. 73. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 134; Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, pp. 73–74. 74. UN Security Council, “Resolution 479 (1980),” S/RES/479 (1980), September 28, 1980. 75. UN Security Council, “Resolution 514 (1982),” S/RES/514 (1982), October 4, 1982; Karsh, The Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988, pp. 35–37. 76. UN Security Council, “Resolution 598 (1987),” S/RES/598 (1987), July 20, 1987; Ali, Javed, “Chemical Weapons and the Iran–Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, no. 1, 2001, pp. 43–58. 77. Parker, John W., Persian Dreams: Moscow and Tehran Since the Fall of the Shah, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2009, p. 110. Notes ● 229

78. UN Security Council, “Resolution 598 (1987),” S/RES/598 (1987), July 20, 1987.

3 Progressive Consolidation (1989–98) 1. Takeyh, Ray, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic, New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2007, pp. 31–59. 2. Guolo, Renzo, Generazione del fronte e altri saggi sociologici sull’Iran, Milan: Guerini e Associati, 2008. 3. Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, pp. 111–159. 4. Ibid. 5. Redaelli, L’Iran Contemporaneo, pp. 71–73. 6. Ibid. 7. Nichiporuk, Brian, Jerrold D. Green, Frederic Wehrey, Alireza Nader, and Lydia Hansell, The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 2009, pp. 59–64. 8. Ibid. 9. The potential uniﬁcation between the Pasdaran and the regular armed forces encountered the strong opposition of Khomeini. Cordesman, Anthony H., Iran’s Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999, p. 32. 10. Ibid., p. 31; Byman, Daniel L., Shahram Chubin, Jerrold Green, and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 2001, p. 36. 11. Chubin, Shahram, “Iran’s Strategic Aims and Constraints”, in Clawson, Patrick, ed., Iran’s Strategic Intentions and Capabilities, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1994, pp. 70–71. 12. Ibid. 13. Fathi, Nazila, “An Old Letter Casts Doubts on Iran’s Goal for Uranium,” The New York Times, October 5, 2006, ; Porter, Gareth, “When the Ayatollah Said No to Nukes,” Foreign Policy, October 16, 2014, . 14. Ali, “Chemical Weapons and the Iran–Iraq War,” p. 55; Byman et al., Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. 15. “Tehran Nuclear Research Center,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), . 16. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/75, Annex 1, p. 2. 17. IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/60, Annex, p. 2 18. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2003/63, August 26, 2003, p. 5, para. 21; IAEA Director General, GOV/2006/15, p. 5, para. 21. 19. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/75, p. 6. 20. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2005/67, September 2, 2005, p. 7. 230 ● Notes

21. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, p. 4. 22. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, p. 3; IAEA Director General, GOV/ 2007/58, p. 3. 23. The rectors of the Sharif University of Technology between 1985 and 1995 were Abbas Anvari (1985–1989), Ali Akbar Salehi (1989–1993), and Seid Mohammad Etemadi (1993–1995). See ; IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, p. 3. 24. IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/83, p. 22, para. 100. 25. Porter, “When the Ayatollah Said No to Nukes.” 26. UN Security Council, “Resolution 1929 (2010),” S/RES/598 (2010), June 9, 2010, p. 12. 27. IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/83, p. 22, para. 100; IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/60, Annex, p. 10. 28. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, para. 4. 29. Ibid., p. 3; IAEA Director General, GOV/2006/15, p. 7. 30. Hibbs, Mark, Nuclear Fuel, March 28, 1994, pp. 10–11; Herbert Krosney, “Deadly Business, Four Walls Eight Windows,” 1993, in Mark Gorwitz, “Foreign Assistance to Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs,” Nuclear Treat Initiative (NTI). 31. Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel; Albright et al., “The Physics Research Center.” 32. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, pp. 3–4. 33. Albright et al., “The Physics Research Center.” 34. As for the telexes potentially related to the enrichment activities carried out at Department two of the PHRC, see “PHRC Telex Appendix,” ISIS, telex no. 621, 624, 660, 668, 680, 686, 1043, 1200. For information concerning the conversion activities allegedly carried out at Department three of the PHRC, see ibid., telex no. 666, 670, 668, 667, 670, 298, 376, 222, 224, 267, 18, 425, 553, 367, 548; “The Telexes: Front Company Kala Naft,” Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), May 16, 2012, telex no. 188, 262, . 35. For some telexes potentially related to the project for the production of heavy water (Department ﬁve of the PHRC), see “ALKH telexes,” ISIS, telex no. 154, 214, 3, 276, 42, 285, 68, 1064. For the mining activities (Department eight of the PHRC), see “ALKH telexes,” ISIS, telex no. 317; “PHRC Telex Appendix,” ISIS, telex no. 671, 753, 1261, 1953. 36. Ibid. telex no. 1098; Bergman, Ronen, The Secret War with Iran: The 30-Year Clandestine Struggle Against the World’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Power, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008, p. 301. 37. IAEA Director General, GOV/2007/58, para. 12. 38. Follath and Stark, “A History of Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions.” 39. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/75, Annex 1, p. 9. 40. Albright, Peddling Peril, p. 96. 41. IAEA Director General, GOV/2007/58, p. 4, para. 15. 42. Albright, Peddling Peril, pp. 96–97. 43. Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. 70. 44. IAEA Director General, GOV/2007/58, para. 15. 45. IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/83, para. 34. Notes ● 231

46. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/75, Annex 1, p. 2. 47. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/63, p. 6. 48. IAEA, “The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), June 1972. 49. The 1972 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement model covers the following activities of the fuel cycle: conversion, fuel fabrication, enrichment, rector operations, spent fuel storage, and reprocessing. IAEA, “The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/153, June 1, 1972; Carlson, John, “Changing the Safeguards Culture, Safeguards in a Broader Policy Perspective: Verifying Treaty Compliance,” INMM/ESARDA (Institute Nuclear Material Managements/European, Safeguards Research Development Association) Workshop, November 30, 2005, ; IAEA, INFCIRC/140, September 22, 1970, Art. III. 50. IAEA, “The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/214, December 13, 1974, Art. 39–40. 51. IAEA, “Model Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy for the Application of Safeguards,” INFCIRC/214, September 1997. 52. For a brief summary of Iran’s failure to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement until November 2004, see IAEA Director General, GOV/2005/67, September 2, 2005, para. 2. 53. Carlson, John, and Russell Leslie, “Special Inspection Revisited,” INMM 2005 Symposium Phoenix, July 2005, . 54. Richard, Charles, and Robert Block, “Inspectors Give a Clean Bill of Health,” The Independent, London, November 30, 1992, p. 10; Rubin, Michael, “Iran’s Burgeoning WMD Program,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 3, no. 2, March/April 2002, in “Iran Nuclear Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), . 55. IAEA, “Communication Received from the Islamic Republic of Iran,” INFCIRC/406, July 14, 1992; “No Evidence of Nuclear Weapons Programme,” Moneyclips, February 12, 1992, in “Iran Nuclear Chronology” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), . 56. Tyler, P. E., “Rebuilding Plan to Cost $15 Billion, Tehran Says,” Washington Post, July 3, 1989; “Cost of Completing Bushehr Nuclear Plant Being Assessed,” British Broadcasting Corporation, July 18, 1989, in Lexis-Nexis, . 57. Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 110. 58. “Moscow, Iran Sign Economic Pacts, Hint Future Arms Deals,” Los Angeles Times, June 22, 1989, in Lexis-Nexis, ; Orlov, Vladimir Andreevich, Roland Makhmutovich Timerbaev, and Anton Viktorovich Khlopkov, Nuclear Nonproliferation in U.S.-Russian Relations: 232 ● Notes

Challenges and Opportunities, Moscow: PIR Center, 2002, p. 117; “USSR/ Iran: Iranians Say Soviets Will Aid in Nuclear,” Nucleonics Week, March 15, 1990, p. 18. 59. Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, pp. 146–147. 60. “Iran Threatens Siemens,” Middle East Defense News, August 17, 1992, in Lexis- Nexis, . 61. Khlopkov, Anton, and Anna Lutkova, “The Bushehr NPP: Why Did It Take So Long?,” Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), August 21, 2010, . 62. Rubin, “Iran’s Burgeoning WMD Program”; Albright, David, “An Iranian Bomb?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 51, no. 4, 1995, pp. 21–26. 63. For some information of the “Russian–American Commission for Economic and Technological Cooperation” (also known as Gore–Chernomyrdin Commission), see . 64. Romanenkova, Veronica, “Novosibirsk Plant to Supply Iran with Nuclear Fuel,” ITAR-TASS (Moscow), February 7, 1996, in FBIS Document FTS 19960207000836, February 7, 1996. 65. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, p. 5; IAEA Director General, GOV/ 2007/58, p. 2. 66. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities, p. 50. 67. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, p. 5. 68. Albright, David, Jacqueline Shire, and Paul Brannan, “Is Iran Running Out of Yellowcake?,” ISIS Report, February 11, 2009, . 69. UN Security Council, “Resolution 1803 (2008),” S/RES/1803 (2008), March 3, 2008, p. 6. 70. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, p. 5. 71. Ibid., para. 30. 72. Ghannadi-Maragheh, Mohammad, “Iranian Nuclear Fuel Cycle Experience,” World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, London, September 3–5, 2003, . 73. “Yellowcake Production Plant at Ardakan to Come on Stream on Tuesday,” IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency), April 13, 2013. ; Mostaghim, Ramin, “Iran Says It’s Now Fully Self- sufﬁcient at Producing Uranium,” Los Angeles Times, December 5, 2010, . 74. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, p. 3. 75. Ibid., p. 5. The declaration of the site of Gchine occurred few days after the implementation ad interim of some measures deﬁned in the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement in force between Iran and the IAEA, including the declaration of uranium extraction and milling activities. 76. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, para. 25–34. Notes ● 233

77. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2011/65, November 8, 2011, Annex, para. 25. 78. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/75, Annex 1, p. 9; International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Nuclear, p. 54. 79. Saeidi, Mohammadi, “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities in Iran,” World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, London, September 7–9, 2005, . 80. Lewis, Jeffrey, “Inside the Iran’s UCF,” Arms Control Wonk, August 14, 2005, . 81. As for the Iranian companies sanctioned by the United States and the European Union for their involvement in the Uranium Conversion Facility of Esfahan, SUREH (Nuclear Reactor Fuel Company) was also mentioned in 2011 as a subsidiary company of the AEOI which in turn used other intermediary companies, such as the Sun Middle East FZCO, to procure sensitive goods. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/75, p. 5; EU Council “Council Implementing Regulation No. 503/2011 of 23 May 2001, Implementing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 on Restrictive Measures against Iran,” Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union, May 24, 2011, L 136/29. 82. The AEOI division was known as the “Nuclear Fuel Production Division (NFPC)” and was headed by Hossein Faqihian. EU Council, “Council Decision of 23 April 2007 Implementing Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 423/2007 Concerning Restrictive Measures against Iran,” Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union, April 23, 2007, L 106/53; Ghannadi-Maragheh, Mohammad, “Iranian Nuclear Fuel Cycle Experience.”

83. The initial low quality of the UF6 produced at the UCF derived from the pres- ence of several impurities, like molybdenum hexaﬂuoride and other heavy metals

in the UF4. The UF6 production line tested in 2004 was made up of three units (101K, 101B, 101C), which converted the yellowcake into ammonium uranyl

carbonate (AUC), the AUC into uranium tetraﬂuoride (UF4), and ﬁnally the

UF4 into uranium hexaﬂuoride (UF6). Among the 800 experts involved in the project of the UCF, 2 leading names are Abdollah Solat Sana, Managing Director, and Hamid-Reza Mohajerani, who was involved in the production management at this facility. IAEA Director, General, GOV/2004/60, p. 9; EU Council, “Council Decision of 23 April 2007 Implementing Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 423/2007 Concerning Restrictive Measures against Iran,” Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union, April 23, 2007, L 106/54.

84. The 550 tons of natural UF6 produced at the UCF have been so far enough to sustain the enrichment activities of the enrichment plants of Natanz (FEP and PFEP) and Fordow, which from February 2007 to November 2014 consumed

about 150 tons of natural UF6. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2014/58, November 7, 2014, Annex III, p. 17. 85. IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/83, para. 56. 234 ● Notes

86. IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/60, p. 7. 87. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/75, Annex 1, p. 11; International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Nuclear, p. 76. 88. EU Council “Council Implementing Regulation No. 503/2011,” L 136/28. 89. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/75, Annex 1, pp. 10–11. 90. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, para. 46; IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2014/10, February 20, 2014, para. 13. 91. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2011/54, September 2, 2011, para. 54. 92. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Nuclear, p. 78. 93. “China Agrees to End Nuclear Trade with Iran When Two Projects Completed,” NuclearFuel, November 3, 1997, p. 3; Barber, Simon, “U.S. Seeks Assurance on Atomic Energy Plant Sale to China,” Business Day (Johannesburg), December 18, 1997, in “Iran Nuclear Chronology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), . 94. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2013/40, August 28, 2013, para. 45; IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2014/43, September 5, 2014, para. 55. 95. IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/83, p. 15. 96. Hibbs, Mark, “Iran Sought Sensitive Nuclear Supplies from Argentina, China,” Nucleonics Week, September 24, 1992, pp. 2–3. 97. For these reasons, India, Pakistan, and Israel had used heavy water reactors with an average power of 40–50 MWt to develop their nuclear military program. Einhorn, Robert, “Iran’s Heavy-Water Reactor: A Plutonium Bomb Factory,” Arms Control Association, November 9, 2006, . 98. Hibbs, “Iran Sought Sensitive Nuclear Supplies”; “Moscow to Supply Iran with Nuclear Reactor,” Global News Wire, February 24, 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, . 99. Gertz, Bill, “Russia Warned on Nuclear Deals with Iran,” Washington Times, December 15, 1998. 100. Gordon, Michael R., “Russia to Offer US Deal to End Iran Nuclear Aid,” New York Times, March 17, 1999. 101. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2003/40, June 6, 2003. 102. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Nuclear, p. 80.

4 Expansion and Disclosure (1998–2003) 1. Redaelli, L’Iran Contemporaneo, pp. 71–78. 2. Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, pp. 202–204. Notes ● 235

3. Chubin, Shahram, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace, 2006, pp. 24–42; Mohammadi, Mehdi, “Nuclear Case from Beginning to End in Interview with Dr Hasan Rowhani (Part 1): We Are Testing Europe,” Keyan, July 26, 2005. 4. “Rafsanjani Presidency Seen as Only Chance for Negotiating End to Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Global Security Network Newswire, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), June 15, 2005, . 5. Ali Shamkhani, former chief of IRGC navy, headed the Ministry of Defense (MODAFL), while Ayatollah Ghorbanali Dorri-Najafabad headed the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS). These ministries and their related powers orchestrated the intimidating campaign against the reformist movement. The campaign peaked in July 1999, when the protests at the University of Tehran led 24 high ofﬁcials of the Pasdaran to publish a letter in the conservative newspaper Kayhan asking for the intervention of Khatami to address this turmoil, before it would be too late. It is interesting to note that this letter—in which the Pasdaran showed their intention to be more involved in the Iranian political process—was made public in parallel to the construction of new nuclear sites, with the help of some companies allegedly related to the military apparatus. 6. Mohammadi, “Nuclear Case”; see also Nader, Alireza, “Inﬂuencing Iran’s Nuclear Decision,” in Etel Solingen, ed., Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 220–222. 7. Mukhatzhanova, Gaukhar, “Pride and Prejudice: Understanding Iran’s Nuclear Program,” in Potter, William, and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 2. A Comparative Perspective, Stanford: Stanford Security Studies, 2010, pp. 42–75. 8. Rouhani, Hassan, “Beyond the Challenges Facing Iran and the IAEA Concerning the Nuclear Dossier,” Text of speech by Supreme National Security Council Secretary Hassan Rohani to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, Rahbord, Center for Strategic Research, September 30, 2005, pp. 7–38. Available at . 9. “Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy toward Iranian Nuclear Development,” Report of the Independent Task Force, Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2008, p. 4. 10. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, p. 5. 11. Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, p. 189. 12. Ebrahimi, Youssef, “OPEC Reaches New Deal to Cut Oil Production,” New York Times, June 25, 1998. 13. Quester, “The Shah and the Bomb.” 14. “Full Text of Iran–India Joint Communique,” Iran Almanac (Tehran: The Echo of Iran, 1974), p. 176; Cahn, Anne Hessing, “Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran,” in Marwah, Onkar, and Ann Shulz, eds., Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries, Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1975, p. 193. 15. Abraham, Itty, South Asian Cultures of the Bomb: Atomic Publics and the State in India and Pakistan, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009, p. 5. 236 ● Notes

16. Asher, Wallfish, “Indian Official: Delhi Ignored Iranian Request for Nuclear Reactor,” The Jerusalem Post, March 26, 1993. 17. Reed, Thomas C. and Danny B. Stillman, The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation, Minneapolis: Zenith Imprint, 2010, pp. 240–241. 18. Kapur, Ashok, Pakistan’s Nuclear Development, New York: Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 35–36; Rehman, Shahidur, Z. A. Bhutto, A Man in Hurry for the Bomb, Long Road to Chagai, Islamabad: Print Wise Publication, 1999, p. 22. 19. Solingen, Etel, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 165. 20. Reed and Stillman, The Nuclear Express, p. 252; Haqqani, Husain, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p. 282. 21. Nuclear Developments, July 13, 1988, p. 19, in Al-Watan (Kuwait), June 13, 1988, p. 1. 22. Tertrais, Bruno, “Not a ‘Wal-Mart’, but an ‘Imports–Exports Enterprise’: Understanding the Nature of the A. Q. Khan Network,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 6, no. 5, August 2007; see also Braun, Chaim, and Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security, Vol. 29, no. 2, 2004, pp. 23–26. 23. IAEA Director General, GOV/2005/67, para. 6; Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. 74. 24. “Iran Denies Charge on Nuclear Technology Transfer,” Xinhua News Agency, June 9, 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, ; “N-technology Never Passed on to Other Countries: Zaki,” The News International, September 21, 1999, ; “Pakistan Strongly Rejects Allegation of Sale of Nuclear Technology,” Jang (Rawalpindi), August 22, 2001. 25. Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy, p. 145. 26. Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, p. 249. 27. IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/60, p. 5. 28. Rouhani, “Beyond the Challenges.” 29. As for the companies related to the Novin Energy Company we should mention Modieriat Saakht Niroogahaye Atomi Iran (MASNA), Surena Company, and Equipment Supplier for Nuclear Industries Corporation (ESNICO). UN Security Council, “Resolution 1747 (2010)”; EU Council “Council Imple- menting Regulation of 26 July 2010 Implementing Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 423/2007 Concerning Restrictive Measures against Iran,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 27, 2010, L 196/28–31. EU Council “Council Implementing Regulation No. 503/2011,” L 136/29. 30. EU Council, “Council Implementing Regulation No. 1245/2011 of 1 December 2011, Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 961/2010 on Restrictive Measures against Iran,” Official Journal of the European Union, February 2, 2010, L 319/13; EU Council, “Council Implementing Regulation No. 503/2011,” L 136/28. 31. Albright, “The Physics Research Center,” p. 2. 32. Farayand Technique has maintained capabilities suitable for the testing and assembling of nuclear centrifuges. To this end, this company obtained from the Notes ● 237

Kalaye Electric Company some precision equipment used to calibrate the rotors produced by 7th of Tir, which is located about 20 km south-east of Farayand Technique. 33. EU Council, “Council Implementing Regulation of 26 July 2010 Implementing Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 423/2007,” L 195/36; IAEA Director General, GOV/2007/58, p. 5. 34. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2004/11, February 24, 2004, p. 8; IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/83, p. 11. 35. IAEA Director General, GOV/2007/58, p. 4. 36. Connell, Michael, “Iran’s Military Doctrine,” The Iran Premier, United States Institute of Peace, . 37. Karbasian, Mahidi and Saeedi Abedi, “Multiple Objective Nonlinear Programming Model for Site Selection of the Facilities Based on the Passive Defense Principles,” International Journal of Industrial Engineering & Production Research (IJIEPR), Vol. 22, no. 4, December 2011, pp. 243–250. 38. Gaietta, “La Dorsale Nucleare Iraniana,” pp. 71–100. 39. Ibid. 40. According to what was specified in the sanctions implemented by the European Union and the United Nations, the following Iranian actors were associated with the Natanz project: Ehsan Monajemi, “construction project manager” of this plant; Amir Moayyed Alai, who was awarded by President Ahmadinejad in August 2006 for his role in managing the assembly and engineering of the centrifuges; Abbas Rashidi, allegedly linked to the Kalaye Electric Company, who received the same award for his management and role in the successful operation of the 164-centrifuge enrichment cascade; and Sayed Jaber Safdari, manager of the enrichment facilities, assisted by Mohammad Fedai Ashiani, Houshang Nobari, and Dawood Agha-Jani, manager of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). 41. The disclosure of Natanz and Arak was confirmed by George Tennet—former CIA director—and by other US officials. According to them, the United States gave the IAEA the geographic coordinates of these nuclear sites toward mid- 2002. Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. 174; Hibbs, Mark, “U.S. Briefed Suppliers Group in October on Suspected Iranian Enrichment Plant,” Nuclear Fuel, no. 26, December 23, 2002, p. 1. 42. Lewis, Jeffrey, “NCRI Did Not Discover Natanz,” Arms Control Wonk, October 28, 2006, . 43. Albright, Peddling Peril, pp. 188–198. 44. Fathi, Nazila, “Iran Says It Has Developed Ability to Fuel Nuclear Plants but Won’t Seek Weapons,” The New York Times, February 10, 2003, . 45. For Iran the communication to the IAEA of the mining and milling plant of Gchine was not binding in 2002, because it was excluded from the Safeguards Agreement. From a legal point of view, even the construction of the Natanz and 238 ● Notes

Arak facilities did not constitute a violation of this agreement, since Iran had to declare these facilities only 180 days before they were scheduled to receive nuclear material. These violations instead occurred for the declaration of the activities carried out at the Kalaye Electric Company, and at the laser enrichment laboratories of TNCR and Lashkar Abad. See IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/75, p. 9. 46. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/40, p. 4. 47. Ibid., p. 2; Rouhani, “Beyond the Challenges.” 48. “Press Conference of Iran’s Clandestine Nuclear Projects,” NCRI, February 20, 2003, . 49. “Iranian Regime’s Programs for Biological Weapons,” NCRI, May 15, 2003, . 50. Rouhani afﬁrmed that Iranian technicians were not aware of the traces of uranium imported with the Pakistani centrifuges, and were therefore amazed by the results of the IAEA inspections. Rouhani, “Beyond the Challenges.” 51. Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. 162. 52. In March 2003, Libyan president, Muammar Gaddaﬁ, opened a complicated bargain with the United States and Great Britain to dismantle the nuclear program in his country—that was based on the acquisition of the Pakistani centrifuges—for the normalization of the international status of Libya and the improvement of the diplomatic relations with Washington. Braun and Chyba, “Proliferation Rings,” pp. 5–49. 53. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2003/69, September 12, 2003, p. 2. 54. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/63, p. 7. 55. “Press Release by Inspector-General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya’s Uranium Enrichment Programme,” The Star Online, February 21, 2004; Lewis, Jeffrey, “Urs Tinner,” Arms Control Wonk, July 30, 2006, ; Broad, William J., David Sanger, and Raymond Bonner, “A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network,” New York Times, February 12, 2004. 56. Mohammadi, “Nuclear Case.” 57. Ibid. 58. Rouhani, “Beyond the Challenges Facing Iran and the IAEA Concerning the Nuclear Dossier.” 59. Iran was ready to sign the Additional Protocol and cooperate on other strategic regional issues—such as the stabilization of Iraq or the implicit recogni- tion of Israel—in exchange for similar commitments by Washington to end support for the regime change in Iran and to suspend the sanctions implemented against this country. Glenn, “2003 Memo Says Iranian Leaders Backed Talks,” The Washington Post, February 14, 2007. The alleged Iranian proposal is available at . Notes ● 239

5 Diplomacy at Work (2003–05) 1. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/75, p. 4. 2. Ibid., Annex 1, p. 2. 3. Ibid., Annex 1, p. 1. 4. Mousavian, Seyed Hossein, Iran–Europe Relations: Challenges and Opportunities, London: Routledge, 2008, p. 149. 5. Ibid., p. 159. 6. IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2003/69. 7. “Statement by the Iranian Government and Visiting EU Foreign Ministers,” Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 21, 2002, . 8. Ibid. 9. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/75, Annex 1, para. 36. 10. IAEA Director General, GOV/2003/81, p. 3. 11. IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/11, para. 77. 12. Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. 206. 13. IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/11, p. 8. 14. Ibid., para. 46. 15. Ibid.; IAEA, “Communication of 5 March 2004 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran Concerning the Report of the Director General Contained in GOV/2004/11,” INFCIRC/628, March 5, 2004, para. 11. 16. Rouhani, “Beyond the Challenges.” 17. IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/60, p. 3. 18. “Former IAEA Representative Says Iran Should Quit NPT,” AFP, May 9, 2004, . 19. “Supervision of Military Organs on Mullah’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” NCRI Press Conference, Brussels, April 24, 2004, . 20. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2004/90, November 29, 2003. 21. IAEA, “Communication Dated 26 November 2004 Received from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom Concerning the Agreement Signed in Paris on 15 November 2004,” INFCIRC/617, November 26, 2004. 22. IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/83, p. 24. 23. Mousavian, Iran–Europe Relations, p. 180. 24. Dombey, Daniel, “EU Worries That Iran Expects Too Much Too Soon from Nuclear Arms Agreement,” Financial Times, February 4, 2005. 25. See the text of the proposal put forward by Iran on July 17, 2005: “History of Ofﬁcial Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” Arms Control Association, . 26. Dombey, “EU Worries.” 27. See the text of the Iranian proposal presented in Paris on March 23, 2005: “History of Ofﬁcial Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” Arms Control Association, . 240 ● Notes

28. The text of the Iranian proposal presented in London on April 29, 2005, is available at “History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” Arms Control Association, . 29. Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, p. 230. 30. Harrison, Frances, “Iran Issues Nuclear Warning to US,” BBC, May 1, 2005, . 31. Hafezi, Parisa, “Iran to Pursue Nuclear Fuel Cycle – Rafsanjani,” Reuters, April 29, 2005. 32. These modifications were mentioned in a final message released by Rouhani to the European negotiators on July 18, 2005. Talt, Rober, “Iran’s Nuclear Talks in Doubt,” The Guardian, July 7, 2005, ; “History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue” Arms Control Association, . 33. El Baradei, Mohamed, The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times, New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011, p. 144. 34. IAEA, “Communication Dated 8 August 2005 Received from the Resident Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the Agency,” INFCIRC/651, August 8, 2005. 35. A draft version of the EU3 proposal was delivered to Iran on July 29, but was promptly rejected by Tehran. IAEA, “Communication Dated 1 August 2005 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency,” INFCIRC/648, August 1, 2005. 36. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2005/64, August 11, 2005. 37. Kerr, Paul, “Questions Surround Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Arms Control Association, March 2006, . 38. IAEA Director General, GOV/2006/15, para. 22. 39. IAEA Director General, GOV/2005/67, p. 7. 40. The agency has been able to confirm that the Iranian attempts to acquire beryllium metal were in the end vain. Ibid., p. 9; “Iran Took Chinese Beryllium for Nuclear Weapons,” NCRI, September 21, 2006, . 41. According to some sources, the documentation of the “alleged studies” was found in a laptop computer belonging to an Iranian engineer who allegedly came into contact with German intelligence. For other versions, the documents were mainly in electronic form acquired by intelligence sources of different countries. Linzer, Dafna, “Strong Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case against Iran,” The Washington Post, February 8, 2006, . 42. Lewis, Jeffrey, “Iranian Nuclear Test Shaft,” Arms Control Wonk, February 12, 2006, . 43. Lewis, Jeffrey, “Iran’s Underground UF4 Plant,” Arms Control Wonk, February 19, 2006, . Notes ● 241

44. Borger, Julian, “US Iran Intelligence ‘Is Incorrect’,” The Guardian, February 22, 2007, . 45. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2005/77, September 24, 2005. 46. El Baradei, The Age of Deception, p. 146. 47. IAEA, “Communication Date 4 November 2005 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency,” INFCIRC/661, November 17, 2005, Attachment, p. 6.

6 Sanctions and Tensions (2005–08) 1. Guolo, Generazione del Fronte. 2. Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, p. 233. 3. Baktiari, Bahman, “Seeking International Legitimacy: Understanding the Dynamics of Nuclear Nationalism in Iran,” in Yaphe, Judith S., ed., Nuclear Politics in Iran, Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 2012, p. 24. 4. Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, pp. 237–260. 5. Mousavian, Seyed Hossein, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012, p. 187. 6. Redaelli, L’Iran Contemporaneo, p. 116. 7. MacAskill, Ewen, “Iran’s London Envoy Sacked as President Purges Ofﬁcials,” The Guardian, November 1, 2005, . 8. Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, p. 241. 9. “Iran’s Statement at IAEA Emergency Meeting,” Mehr News Agency, August 10, 2005; “Iran, Holder of Peaceful Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technology,” IRNA, August 11, 2005. 10. “Iran Report: November 23, 2004,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, November 23, 2004, ; Eisenstadt, Michael, and Mehdi Khalaji, “Nuclear Fatwa: Religion and Politics in Iran’s Proliferation Strategy,” The Washington Institute, September 2011, . 11. Mousavian, Iran–Europe Relations, p. 185. 12. “President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Dr. Mahmood Ahmadinejad Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, September 17, 2005,” Acronym Institute, . 13. IAEA Director General, GOV/2006/15, pp. 4–5. 14. IAEA, “Communication Dated 13 January 2006 Received from the Permanent Missions of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the Agency,” INFCIRC/662, January 18, 2006. 15. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2006/14, February 4, 2006, p. 3. 16. IAEA Director General, GOV/2006/15, pp. 1–2, 6. 242 ● Notes

17. Ibid. 18. Iran stated that, although the documentation suggested the involvement of the PHRC, the equipment had actually been intended for a laboratory at a technical university, where the head of the PHRC worked as a professor. IAEA Director General, GOV/2006/15, p. 8. 19. UN Security Council, “Statement by the President of the Security Council,” S/PRST/2006/15, March 29, 2006. 20. “Iran Declares Key Nuclear Advance,” BBC, April 11, 2006, . 21. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2006/27, April 28, 2006, p. 7. 22. “Ahmadinejad’s Letter to Bush,” The Washington Post, May 9, 2006, . 23. El Baradei, The Age of Deception, p. 194. 24. The proposal put forward by the 5+1 in May 2006 reaffirmed the intention to establish a political, economic, and technological cooperation with Iran, recog- nizing Iran’s right to put its nuclear power plants online. The strength of this proposal, compared to the one presented by the EU3 in August 2005, derived from the direct involvement of the United States in its formulation. 25. IAEA, “Communication Dated 24 January 2006 Received from the Permanent Missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” INFCIRC/665, January 27, 2006. 26. Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, pp. 243–244. 27. “Iran Nuclear Response in August,” BBC, June 21, 2006, . 28. UN Security Council, “Resolution 1696 (2006),” S/Res/1696 (2006), July 31, 2006. 29. “Iran Defiant on Nuclear Deadline,” BBC, August 1, 2006, . 30. El Baradei, The Age of Deception, pp. 199–204. 31. “No Nuclear Halt, Warns Khamenei,” BBC, August 21, 2006, . 32. Islamic Republic of Iran, “Islamic Republic of Iran’s Response to the Package Presented on June 6, 2006,” August 22, 2006, available at . 33. IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2006/14, p. 2. 34. The individuals who received a special award from President Ahmadinejad on August 27, 2006, were Amir Moayyed Ali, Mohammad Fedai Ashiani, Haleh Bakhtiar, Mortareza Behzad, Javad Karimi-Sabet, Hamid-Reza Mohajerani, Houshang Nobari, Abbasi Rashidi, and Abollah Solat Sana. EU Council “Council Decision of 23 April 2007 Implementing Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 423/2007 Concerning Restrictive Measures against Iran,” L 106/53, 55; EU Council, “Council Implementing Regulation of 26 June 2008 Implementing Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 423/2007 Concerning Restrictive Measures against Iran,” Official Journal of the European Union, June 24, 2008, L 163/31. Notes ● 243

35. IAEA Board of Governors General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2006/53, August 31, 2006, para. 28. 36. UN Security Council, S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2–4, 12. 37. “Iran Accuses Media of Inflaming S-300 Dispute,” RIA Novosti, August 14, 2012, . 38. In the UN Security Council Resolution 1737, three high officials of the Pasdaran were sanctioned: Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, General Hosein Salimi— Commander of the Air Force—and Lieutenant General Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri, rector of Malek Ashtar University of Technology. UN Security Council, S/RES/1737 (2006), p. 8. 39. El Baradei, The Age of Deception, pp. 244–245. 40. IAEA Director General, “Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency in the Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006),” GOV/2007/7, February 9, 2007. 41. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2007/8, February 22, 2007, para. 23. 42. “Iran Threatens to Limit Nuclear Inspection If Sanctioned,” AFP, October 15, 2006; MacAskill, Ewen, and Richard Norton-Taylor, “UN Poised to Pass Iran Sanctions Despite Threat,” The Guardian, December 22, 2006, . 43. UN Security Council, “Resolution 1747 (2007),” S/RES/1747 (2007), March 24, 2007, para. 2, 6, 7. 44. Ibid., Annex 1, pp. 5–6. 45. “Press Conference on Iran’s Project to Build a Neutron Initiator,” NCRI, February 3, 2005, . 46. “Iran Hosts Holocaust Conference,” IRNA, December 11, 2006, ; El Baradei, The Age of Deception, pp. 246, 272, 304. 47. Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, pp. 279–285. 48. “Top Cleric: Iran Has Right to ‘Special Weapons’,” Associated Press, June 14, 2010, . 49. Chua-Eoan, Howard, “Why Iran Seized the British Marines,” Time, March 23, 2007, . 50. The clashes between rival factions caused 1,949 civilian deaths in April 2007, in addition to significant losses for US and UK military forces. This death toll rep- resented the highest level since the beginning of the military operation in March 2003, “Iraq War in Figures,” BBC, December 14, 2011, . The repatriation of Afghan refugees was also correlated to macroeconomic factors of the Islamic Republic of Iran. About 85,000 Afghan refugees left Iran after mid-April 2007. Montero, David, “Afghan Refugee Crisis Brewing,” Christian Science Monitor, May 17, 2007, . 244 ● Notes

51. “Iran to Mark National Day of Nuclear Technology,” Irandiplomacy, . 52. Morley, Jefferson, “Halliburton’s Man in Iran,” The Washington Post, September 16, 2005, ; “Cyrus Nasseri Arrested,” Iran Press Service, July 29, 2005, . 53. “Mussavian’s Arrest: National Security Risk or Domestic Political Ploy?,” in WMD Sight, CNS, no. 16, June 2007, p. 25, . 54. Mousavian collaborated with Hassan Rouhani at the Centre for Strategic Research, headed by Rouhani himself from 1991 to 2013, . 55. Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, p. 278. 56. Redaelli, L’Iran Contemporaneo, pp. 122–126. 57. The appointment of Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh to the Ministry of Oil was imposed by Khamenei in August 2005, after the Majlis’ rejection of three candidates presented by Ahmadinejad. O’Toole, Pam, “Iran Replaces Key Ministry Chiefs,” BBC, August 13, 2007, . 58. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2007/22, May 23, 2007, para. 5. 59. Ibid., para. 12. 60. IAEA Director General, GOV/2007/22, para. 14. 61. Sanger, David E. “Inspectors Cite Big Gain by Iran on Nuclear Fuel,” The New York Times, May 15, 2007, . 62. El Baradei, The Age of Deception, pp. 250–252. 63. IAEA, “Communication Dated 27 August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Concerning the Text of the ‘Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues’,” INFCIRC/711, August 27, 2007. 64. El Baradei, The Age of Deception, p. 270. 65. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2007/48, August 30, 2007, para. 9. 66. Ibid. 67. Mazzetti, Mark, “U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work,” The New York Times, December 3, 2007, . 68. “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007, . 69. Stolberg, Sheryl Gay, “Nuclear-Armed Iran Risks World War, Bush Says,” The New York Times, October 18, 2007, . Notes ● 245

70. Fingar, Thomas, “Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence and National Security Using Intelligence to Anticipate Opportunities and Shape the Future,” Stanford University, October 21, 2009, . 71. El Baradei, The Age of Deception, pp. 210–213. 72. Ibid.; Lewis, Jeffrey, “More on the Iran NIE,” Arms Control Wonk, December 4, 2007, . 73. El Baradei, The Age of Deception, pp. 273–274. 74. According to Tehran, the contamination of the vacuum pumps resulted from repairs carried out by an Iranian technician, who had previously worked on other tests with nuclear centrifuge components obtained from Pakistan. As these state- ments were consistent with the sample’s analysis on these components, the Agency considered this question to be no longer outstanding. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, para. 11. 75. Ibid., para. 20–24. 76. Ibid., para. 25–34. 77. Ibid., para. 35–42. 78. Resolution 1747 of March 24, 2007, gave Iran about 2 months to comply with the requests put forward by the UN Security Council and the IAEA. UN Security Council, “Resolution 1803 (2008),” S/RES/1803 (2008), March 3, 2008. 79. After Resolution 1803, new sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council, the European Union, and the United States targeted other ﬁnancial institutions related to Bank Sepah (Post Bank, Export Development Bank of Iran), to Bank Melli (Arian Bank, Assa Corporation, Bank Kargoshaee, Bank Melli Printing and Publishing Company, First Persian Equity Fund, Future Bank BSC, Melli Investment Holding International, Bank Melli Iran Investment Company), and to Bank Sederat (Arian Bank—in joint venture with Bank Melli—Future Bank, Europaisch-Iranische Handelsbank, Onerbak ZAO). 80. “Iran Installing New Centrifuges,” BBC, April 8, 2008, . 81. IAEA, “Communication Dated 4 March from the Governor for the Russian Federation and the Resident Representatives of China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America Concerning UN Security Council Resolution 1803 (2008),” INFCIRC/723, March 5, 2008. 82. To consult the text of the Iranian proposal of May 20, 2008, see “History of Ofﬁcial Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue” Arms Control Association, . 83. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2008/15, May 26, 2008, para. 16. 84. El Baradei, The Age of Deception, pp. 282–284. 85. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/15, Annex A–B. 86. Ibid., para. 24. 87. IAEA, “Communication Dated 25 June 2008 Received from the Resident Representative of the United Kingdom to the Agency Concerning a Letter and 246 ● Notes

Offer of 12 June 2008 Delivered to the Islamic Republic of Iran,” INFCIRC/730, October 1, 2008. 88. Ibid. 89. “The Modality for Comprehensive Negotiations (Non paper),” in “History of Ofﬁcial Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” Arms Control Association, . 90. UN Security Council, “Resolution 1803 (2008),” S/RES/1835 (2008), September 27, 2008.

7 Possible Military Dimensions (1989–2003) 1. IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/83, p. 22; IAEA Director General, GOV/ 2011/65, para. 19; Hibbs, Mark, Nuclear Fuel, March 28, 1994, pp. 10–11. 2. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, p. 3. 3. Albright, David, Paul Brannan, Mark Gorwitz, and Andrea Stricker, “ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Part II—Iran Work and Foreign Assistance on a Multipoint Initiation System for a Nuclear Weapon,” ISIS Report, November 13, 2011, . 4. Gorwitz, Mark, “Revisiting Vyacheslav Danilenko: His Origins in the Soviet Nuclear Weapons Complex,” ISIS Report, September 17, 2012, . 5. The private company established by Vyacheslav V. Danilenko was named “ALIT” and was located in Zhytomyr, Ukraine. Shenderova, Olga A., and Dieter M. Gruen, Ultrananocrystalline Diamond: Synthesis, Properties, and Applications, Norwich: William Andrew, 2006, pp. 498, 592. 6. Among the publications of Danilenko, see Vaolkov, K. V., V. V. Danielenko, and V. I. Elin, “Diamonds Synthesis from Detonation Carbon,” Fiz. Goren. Vzryva, Vol. 26, no. 3, 1990, pp. 123–125; Vyskubenko, B. A., V. V. Danilenko, E. E. Lin, V. A. Merzanov, T. V. Serova, V. I. Suharenko, and A. P. Tolonthko, “The Inﬂuence of Scale Factors on the Size and Yield of Diamond in Detonation Synthesis,” Fiz. Goren. Vzryva, Vol. 28, no. 2, 1992, pp. 108–109. 7. Since 2005, the Sharif University of Technology has been the leading center for nanoscience and nanotechnologies in Iran, including research on nanodiamods. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 44. 8. Ibid., para. 53. According to other sources, the Monte Carlo N-particle transport (MCNP) code was also used by researchers at Malek Ashtar University of Technology since 1989. Albright et al., “The Physics Research Center.” 9. IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/83, para. 101. 10. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/65, para. 12–16. 11. Ibid., para. 20. 12. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/65, Annex, p. 8; IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2014/28, May 23, 2014, para. 58. Notes ● 247

13. Ibid., para. 48. 14. Albright, David, and Paul Brannan, “Early Satellite Image Shows Foundation for High Explosive Test Chamber at Parchin Site in Iran: What Was the Chamber for?,” ISIS Report, April 10, 2012, . 15. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 47–51; Albright et al., “ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report.” 16. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/65, Attachment 1: List of Departments, Projects and Centres. 17. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2008/15, May 26, 2008, Annex A.1, document 1. 18. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/4, para. 35. 19. Albright et al., “The Physics Research Center.” 20. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/15, Annex A.2, document 3. 21. Ibid., para. 20. The results of tests on the detonation of the EBW detonators were reported in a paper presented in 2005 by two Iranian scientists who had links with the Malek Ashtar University of Technology and the “Air Defense Industries Group of Tehran.” IAEA, Director General, GOV/2011/65, para. 39. 22. Warrick, Joby, “Russian Scientist Vyacheslav Danilenko’s Aid to Iran Offers Peek at Nuclear Program,” The Washington Post, November 12, 2011. . 23. According to the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), the IAEA obtained information from member states on this multipoint initiation system, labeled as “R265 shock generator system.” Albright et al., “ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Part II.” 24. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/65, para. 43. 25. Ibid. 26. IAEA Director General, GOV/2006/53, para. 14. 27. Ibid., para. 35. 28. UN Security Council, “Resolution 1737 (2006),” S/RES/1737 (2006), December 27, 2006, p. 8. In 2011, Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri became Iran’s deputy minister of science, research and technology, which was headed by Kamran Daneshjoo. “Iran to Make University Courses More Islamic,” Reuters, May 6, 2011, . 29. For example, Tayyebi, P., and F. Abbasi Davani, “Design and Construction of Deuterium Target for Fast Neutron Production International Workshop on Real Time Measurement,” Instrumentation and Control, Toronto, June 25–26, 2010; Abbasi Davani, F., G. R. Etaati, H. Afarideh, R. Koohi Fayegh, and G. R. Aslani, “Neutron Spectrum Measurement in D + Be Reaction,” IJPR, Vol. 3, 2002, pp. 101–107. 30. Uranium deuteride has quite exclusive military uses as a neutron initiator for a nuclear weapon, as made by Pakistan. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/29, 248 ● Notes

May 24, 2011, para. 35; Khan, Abdul Qadeer, Syed Shabbir Hussain, and Mujahid Kamran, Dr. A. Q. Khan on Science and Education, Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1997, cited by Lewis, Jeffrey, “Uranium Deuteride Initiators,” Arm Control Wonk, December 14, 2009, . 31. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/65, para. 31–47. 32. Pollak, Joshua, “Iran’s Neutron Initiator Test at Parchin?,” Arms Control Wonk, April 14, 2012, . The text of this document also contained the translation of the following article: Krüger, Paul-Anton, “Neue Vorwürfe im Nuklear-Streit: Iran soll Zünder für Atombombe getestet haben,” sueddeutsche.de, April 14, 2012. 33. Ibid. According to information disclosed by the German newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung, these experiments could have been carried out at the Parchin site around 2003 under the direction of di Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani and Majid Shahriari. Both had in common not only membership in the Shahid Beheshti University but also specialization in neutron sources and transport. Among Shahriari’s publications on this topic, we mention one written with Ali Akbar Salehi, who was his professor at the Sharif University of Technology. Vosoughi, Naser, Ali Akbar Salehi, Majid Shahriari Majid, and Enzo Tonti, “Direct Discrete Method and Its Application to Neutron Transport Problems,” Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection, Vol. 18, no. 2, 2003, pp. 12–23. For other research on the “Monte Carlo” methodology see Jafari, Hamid, and Majid Shahriari, “Neutron Radiography System Collimator Design via Monte Carlo Calculation,” Journal of Energy and Power Engineering, no. 5, 2011, pp. 1168–1172; Sanger, David E., “The Secret War with Iran,” The New York Times, November 5, 2011. 34. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/15, Annex A.2, document 2. 35. From 2004, Iran developed a few variants of this missile, such as the Shahab-3M with a “triconic” design, wider ballistic range (about 1,600–2,000 km), and a payload of about 750 kg. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011; Forden, Geoffrey, “Iranian Warhead Evolution,” Arms Control Wonk, June 9, 2010, . 36. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities; Lewis, Jeffrey, “More on Libya’s Bomb Design,” Arms Control Wonk, October 8, 2005, . 37. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/15, Annex A.3, documents 3, 1. In 2003, the SHIG was led by Nasser Maleki, who was sanctioned with the UN Security Council Resolution 1747. UN Security Council, S/RES/1737, p. 6. 38. Ibid. 39. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/15, Annex A.3, documents 6, 8, 10–13. 40. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/38, para. 15. 41. IAEA Director General, GOV/2009/55, August 2009, para. 23. Notes ● 249

42. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 22. 43. IAEA, Director General, GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 60–62. 44. Albright et al., “ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Part II.” 45. IAEA, GOV/2011/65, para. 64–65. 46. Ibid., Attachment 2: Analysis of Payload. 47. Ibid., para. 62. 48. Ibid., para. 23. 49. The name of “Dr. Kamran” mentioned in the document obtained by the IAEA could refer to Kamran Daneshjoo, an Iranian professor at the Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST), who headed the Ministry of Science and Technology from 2009 to 2013. In his curriculum are mentioned several publications related to the aerospace industry: . 50. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/15, Annex A.3, documents 2, 7. 51. IAEA Director General, GOV/2005/67, para. 39. 52. Ibid. 53. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 23. 54. Mohammadi, “Nuclear Case.” 55. Ibid. 56. Lewis, “The Ayatollah’s Pregnant Pause.” 57. Ibid. 58. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/65, Attachment 1: List of Departments, Projects and Centres. 59. Ibid., Annex, p. 5. The diagram of the IAEA uses the word “Complex” in refer- ence to the different complexes of the Malek Ashtar University of Technology. 60. The name “Modjeh site” is attributable to a road that ran along the area of the site, in which signiﬁcant changes between 2000 and 2005 could be detected from satellite images. Ibid., para. 25. 61. In a press conference held by the NCRI on April 28, 2008, a center called “Lavizan-2” built along Mojadeh Street was mentioned. “Supervision of Military Organs on Mullah’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” NCRI, April 28, 2004, . 62. Philp, Catherine, “Leaked Memo Identiﬁes Man at Head of Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” The Times (London), December 14, 2009; Philp, Catherine, “Discovery of UD3 Raises Fears Over Iran’s Nuclear Intentions,” The Times (London), December 14, 2009; “Farsi and English Versions of Document on Neutron Initiator,” ISIS Reports, December 14, 2009, ; “Documents Assessing the Organizational Structure of FEDAT,” ISIS Reports, December 14, 2009, . 63. The Institute of Applied Physics (IAP) was allegedly included in the Centre for Readiness & New Defense Technologies. “Farsi and English Versions of Document on Neutron Initiator.” 250 ● Notes

64. Ibid. 65. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/29, para. 35; IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 56. 66. Ibid., para. 53. 67. Coughlin, Con, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards ‘Overseeing Huge Expansion of Country’s Nuclear Programme’,” Telegraph.co.uk, July 17, 2012, ; Zenko, Micah, “Politics, Power, and Preventive Action: Would We Know If Iran Decides to Build a Bomb?,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 2, 2012, .

8 Negotiations and Pressures (2008–12) 1. UN Security Council, S/RES/1803. 2. A call for dialogue between Iran and Iraq was put forward in 2007 by the Iraqi Study Group: a bipartisan research group of the U.S. Congress in charge of monitoring the political and strategic situation in Iraq after the U.S. military operation. The Iraq Study Group, Baker III, James A., and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward – A New Approach, New York: Vintage, 2006; “GW Hosts Secretaries of State in Historic Forum Offering Advice to the Next President,” George Washington University, October 2008, . 3. Gordon, Michael R., and Jeff Zeleny, “Obama Envisions New Iran Approach,” The New York Times, November 2, 2007, . 4. “Obama Stands by Plan to Talk with Iran,” CNN, July 23, 2009, . 5. Erdbrink, Thomas, “Ahmadinejad Congratulates Obama, Urges ‘Real’ Change,” The Washington Post, November 7, 2008, . 6. “Obama Sent Second Letter to Khamenei,” The Washington Times, September 3, 2009, ; “Obama Sent Letter to Khamenei Before the Election, Report Says,” The Guardian, June 24, 2009, . 7. Landler, Mark, “Clinton Wants to Include Iran in Afghan Talks,” The New York Times, March 6, 2009, . 8. “Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo,” The New York Times, June 4, 2009, . 9. “Obama Hails Historic Resolution to Rid World of Nuclear Weapons,” The Guardian, September 24, 2009, ; UN Security Council, “Resolution 1887 (2009),” S/RES/1887 (2009), September 24, 2009. Notes ● 251

10. “Obama Under Pressure to Get Tough on Iran,” Spiegel Online, June 10, 2009, . 11. “U.S. Changes Should Be Observed in Actions,” Fars News Agency, March 21, 2009, . 12. Sadjadpour, Karim, “Setting the Scene: Iran’s Presidential Elections,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2, 2009, . 13. McManus, Doyle, “Talking with Iran and Sending a Message,” Los Angeles Times, November 1, 2009, . 14. “Iranian Nuclear Chief Steps Down,” BBC, July 16, 2009, . 15. “Rafsanjani Presidency Seen as Only Chance for Negotiating End to Iran’s Nuclear Program,” GSN-NTI, June 14, 2005, . 16. “Iranian Nuclear Chief Steps Down,” BBC; Black, Ian, “US-Educated Scientist to Lead Iranian Atomic Energy Drive,” The Guardian, July 17, 2009, . 17. “Wikileaks Cable: Mixed Expectations for Salehi’s Return to IAEA Scene,” UNVIE (United Nations): Wikileaks, November 3, 2009, . 18. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2009/8, February 19, 2009, para. 14. 19. “Obama, Sarkozy, and Brown on Iranian Nuclear Facility,” The White House, September 26, 2009, . 20. IAEA Director General, GOV/2009/74, November 16, 2009, para. 7–17; “Salehi: Thousands of Centrifuges Will Be Installed in Qom Facility,” IRNA, September 27, 2009, . 21. IAEA Director General, GOV/2009/74, para. 13. 22. El Baradei, The Age of Deception, pp. 298–295. 23. Albright, David, and Paul Brannan, “Critique of Recent Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Article on the Fordow Enrichment Plant,” ISIS Report, November 30, 2010, ; Barzashka, Ivanka, and Ivan Oelrich, “Response to Critiques Against Fordow Analysis,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, December 16, 2009, . 24. Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, p. 351. 25. IAEA Director General, GOV/2009/74, para. 9; IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/29, May 24, 2011, para. 19; IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/54, September 2, 2011, para. 20–27. 252 ● Notes

26. IAEA Director General, GOV/2010/46, September 6, 2010, para. 15–17. 27. IAEA Director General, GOV/2010/10, February 18, 2010, para. 14. 28. UN Security Council, “Resolution 1929 (2010),” S/RES/598 (2010), June 9, 2010, p. 14. 29. The European Union has sanctioned other Iranian companies for their alleged involvement in the enrichment plant of Fordow, namely: Fulmen, Bargh Azaraksh, Eyzad Technic, Saman Tose’e Asia (SATA). EU Council, “Council Implementing Regulation of 26 July 2010,” L 195/29–31; EU Council, “Council Implementing Regulation No. 503/2011,” L 136/29; EU Council, “Council Implementing Regulation No. 1245/2011,” L 319/13–15. 30. “New Satellite Image Further Narrows Fordow Construction Start Date,” ISIS Reports, November 18, 2009, . 31. El Baradei, The Age of Deception, pp. 293–304. 32. Rozen, Laura, “When Iran’s Saeed Jalili Met One-on-One with US Diplomat Bill Burns,” The Back Channel, May 22, 2013, . 33. Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, pp. 350–364. 34. Gaietta, Michele, “Iran e P5+1: Le Condizioni Tecniche Di Un Possibile Accordo,” Aspenia Online, December 22, 2010, . 35. El Baradei, The Age of Deception, pp. 314–315. 36. “Iran Deﬁant on Sanctions Threat,” BBC, December 12, 2009, ; Worth, Robert F., “Iran Avows Willingness to Swap Some Uranium,” The New York Times, December 13, 2009, . 37. Fitzpatrick, Mark, “The Fragile Promise of the Fuel-Swap Plan,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 52, no. 3, June–July 2010, pp. 67–94. 38. IAEA Director General, GOV/2010/10, para. 8. 39. “Text: Powers Dismiss Iran Fuel Offer Before U.N. Vote,” Reuters, June 9, 2010; “Text of the Iran-Brazil-Turkey Deal,” The Guardian, May 17, 2010, . 40. “US Embassy Cables: New UN Chief Is ‘Director General of All States, but in Agreement with US’,” The Guardian, December 2, 2010, . 41. El Baradei, The Age of Deception, pp. 286–298. 42. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/15, para. 16. 43. IAEA Director General, GOV/2010/10, para. 40–45. 44. IAEA, “Communication Dated 1 March 2010 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran,” INFCIRC/786, March 2, 2010. 45. Sanger, David E., Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power, New York: Crown, 2012, p. 196; Lewis, Jeffrey, “On Spinning Notes ● 253

Libyan Centrifuges,” Arms Control Wonk, January 26, 2008, ; Lewis, Jeffrey, “US Spinning Libyan Centrifuges,” Arms Control Wonk, February 15, 2011, . 46. Sanger, David E., “Obama Order Speed Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,” The New York Times, June 1, 2012, ; Albright, David, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond, “Stuxnet Malware and Natanz: Update of ISIS December 22, 2010 Report,” ISIS Reports, February 15, 2010, . 47. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Stuxnet: Targeting Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” Strategic Comments, Vol. 17, no. 2, 2011, pp. 1–3. 48. The frequency converters used in the enrichment plant of Natanz have been allegedly acquired by two suppliers: the Finnish company Vacon and the Iranian Fararo Paya. Ibid. 49. Falliere, Nicolas, Liam O. Murchu, and Eric Chien, “W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” Symathec, February 2011, p. 45, . 50. Erdbrink, Thomas, “Ahmadinejad: Iran’s Nuclear Program Hit by Sabotage,” The Washington Post, November 29, 2010; Nasseri, Ladane, “Ahmadinejad Conﬁrms Several Iran Centrifuges Affected by Computer Virus,” Bloomberg, November 29, 2010, . 51. “417 data-structures=cascade structure=reported damage,” Langner – The Last Line of Cyber Defense, December 29, 2010, . 52. Bell, Randolph, “Targeting Iran? The Mahdi Malware Mystery,” IISS Experts Commentary, August 3, 2012, ; “Iran’s N. Facilities Vaccinated Against Malwares,” Fars News Agency, September 23, 2012, ; “Iran Uncovers Espionage Virus,” BBC News, April 25, 2011, . 53. Hosseinian, Zahra, “Iran: ‘Massive Cyber Attack’ Detected on Nuclear Facilities,” Msnbc.com, June 21, 2012, . 54. “Information Technology Organization and Passive Defense Organization Sign Agreement to Expand Cooperation in Cyber Security,” Iran Daily Brief, July 24, 2012; “Iran Is Formulating Strategic Cyber Defense Plan: Ofﬁcial – Tehran Times,” Tehran Times, June 15, 2012, . 55. Dahl, Fredrik, “Iran Says Saboteurs Cut Power to Nuclear Plant,” Reuters, September 17, 2012, . 254 ● Notes

56. “Siemens Denies Iranian Nuclear Sabotage Claims,” Reuters, September 23, 2012, . 57. “Iranian Scientist Killed in Blast,” BBC, January 11, 2012, . 58. Jahn, George, “AP Exclusive: Police Investigate Iran Nuke Expert,” The Guardian, September 19, 2011, . 59. Putz, Ulrike, “Mossad Behind Tehran Assassinations, Says Source,” Spiegel Online, February 8, 2011, ; “Iran Shooting Victim Was Student, Not Nuclear Scientist,” Hufﬁngton Post, July 23, 2011, . 60. Raviv, Dan, and Yossi Melman, Spies Against Armageddon, First edition, New York: Levant Books, 2012, p. 11. 61. Worth, Robert F., and Artin Afkhami, “Iran Mourns Missile Commander Killed in Blast,” The New York Times, November 14, 2011, . 62. Markon, Jerry, and Karen DeYoung, “Iranian Charged in Terror Plot,” The Washington Post, October 11, 2011, . 63. “General Assembly Adopts Text Deploring Plot to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Envoy to United States; Calls on Iran to Help Bring Perpetrators to Justice,” GA/11176, November 18, 2011, . 64. Pomeroy, Robin, “Iranian Protesters Storm British Diplomatic Compounds,” Reuters, November 29, 2011, . 65. UN Security Council, S/RES/1929. 66. Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, pp. 389–393. 67. Ibid.; Solingen, Etel, ed., Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 310. 68. Gladstone, Rick, “Iran’s Rial Plummets Against the Dollar,” The New York Times, October 1, 2012, . 69. “102 Majlis Members Signed a Motion to Summon Ahmadinejad to the Majlis to Answer Questions About Iran’s Foreign Exchange Rates,” Iran Daily Brief, October 11, 2012, . 70. “Ahmadinejad Appoints 4 Special Envoys,” PressTV, August 22, 2010, . 71. In the “parallel diplomacy” envisioned by Ahmadinejad, Esfandiyar Rahim- Mashaei would have been appointed as Special Envoy for the Middle East. “President Appoints Mashaei Special Envoy for Mideast,” Mehrnews, August 22, Notes ● 255

2010, ; Ghajar, Shayan, “Khamenei’s Rebuke to Ahmadinejad Gains Widespread Support,” insideIRAN, September 8, 2010, . 72. Ibid.; Sinaiee, Maryam, “Ahmadinejad Angers Parliament,” The National, September 9, 2010, . 73. “Ahmadinejad’s Special Envoys Become ‘Advisers’,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, September 16, 2010, ; “Iran’s Foreign Minister Is Sacked,” BBC, December 13, 2010, . 74. “Tehran Times: Majlis Approves Salehi as Foreign Minister,” August 11, 2011, . 75. IAEA Director General, GOV/2008/15, Annex A.3, document 2. 76. EU Council, “Council Implementing Regulation No. 1245/2011,” L 319/12. In 2001, General Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri was appointed by Ahmadinejad as deputy minister of science, research, and technology. As a former of rector of Malek Ashtar University of Technology, in 2006 he was sanctioned under UN Security Council Resolution 1737. UN Security Council, S/RES/1737, p. 8. 77. “Iran’s Khamenei Rejects Minister’s Resignation: Report,” Reuters, April 17, 2011, . 78. Sadjadpuor, Karim, “The Rise and Fall of Iran’s Ahmadinejad,” Washington Post, July 13, 2011, . 79. Ghajar, Shayan, “Khamenei Attempts to Calm Rising Tension Between Ahmadinejad and IRGC,” insideIRAN, July 5, 2011, . 80. Worth, Robert F., “In Iran Rivalry, Khamenei Takes on Presidency Itself,” The New York Times, October 26, 2011, . 81. Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, pp. 407–410. 82. “Oman ‘Happy to Receive’ U.S. Hikers Freed by Iran Months after Handing down Eight-Year Jail Terms,” Alarabiya News, November 21, 2011, ; Quinton, Sophie, “Oman Foots $1 Million Bail to Free U.S. Hikers,” The Atlantic, September 22, 2011, . 83. “Transcript of the Ahmadinejad Interview,” The Washington Post, September 14, 2011, ; Ferguson, Charles D., and Ali Vaez, “An Iranian Offer Worth Considering,” The New York Times, September 29, 2011, . 256 ● Notes

84. IAEA Director General, GOV/2012/9, February 24, 2012, para. 6. 85. Crail, Peter, “P5+1 and Iran Hold ‘Positive’ Talks,” Arms Control Association, May 2, 2012, . 86. Barry, Ellen, and Rick Gladstone, “Setback in Talks on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” The New York Times, June 19, 2012, . 87. “Iran Offers Package of Proposals in Baghdad Nuclear Talks,” Xinhua, May 24, 2012, . For the Iranian proposal of 3 July see: . 88. “Some Facts Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Talks with the 5+1, 3 July 2012,” . 89. IAEA Director General, GOV/2012/37, August 30, 2012, para. 42. 90. Ibid., para. 43. 91. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of the Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2012/50, September 13, 2012, p. 1. 92. “Iran: No Talks with P5+1 before US Polls,” PressTV, October 31, 2012, . 93. “Ahmadinejad: Iran’s Nuclear Dispute Should Be Resolved by Direct Tehran- Washington Talks,” IRNA, November 8, 2012, . 94. Rezaian, Jason, “In Speech, Ahmadinejad Reiterates Willingness for Direct Talks with U.S.,” The Washington Post, February 11, 2013, . 95. IAEA Director General, GOV/2012/23, May 25, 2012, para. 38. 96. Sanger, David E., and James Risen, “Iran’s Slowing of Enrichment Efforts May Show It Wants Deal,” The New York Times, December 27, 2012, . 97. IAEA Director General, GOV/2013/6, February 21, 2013, para. 64; “Remarks by Deputy Director General Herman Nackaerts,” IAEA, February 14, 2013, . 98. “Iranian Oil Revenues Plunge 45%,” BBC News, January 8, 2013, . 99. Takeyh, Ray, “A First Step with Iran,” The New York Times, January 25, 2013, . 100. Rozen, Laura, “US Diplomat: Six Powers to Outline ‘Clear Path’ for Iran Sanctions Relief,” February 25, 2013,

index.php/2013/02/4548/us-diplomat-there-is-a-path-forward-for-iran- to-get-sanctions-relief-nuclear-power/>. 101. “How Iran and the US came to the negotiating table over time,” Iran Front Page, April 11, 2105, ; Charbonneau, Louis, and Hafezi Parisa, “Special Report: Iran, the United States and ‘the Cup of Poison,’” Reuters, June 12, 2013, . 102. Rozen, Laura, “US, Iran Nuclear Teams to Istanbul for Technical Talks,” The Back Channel, March 15, 2013, . 103. Davenport, Kelsey, “History of Ofﬁcial Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” Arms Control Association, May 14, 2014, . 104. Peterson, Scott, “Nuclear Talks: Iran Unmoved by World Powers’ Latest Proposal.” Christian Science Monitor, March 19, 2013, ; Rozen, Laura, “‘Most Substantive’ Iran Nuclear Talks to Date, but Narrow Area of Agreement,” The Back Channel, March 26, 2013, . 105. “Iran Issues Statement on Almaty 2 Talks,” PressTV, April 6, 2013, ; Davenport, Kelsey, “History of Ofﬁcial Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” Arms Control Association, .

9 Rouhani’s Prudence and Hopes 1. “Iranian Inflation Accelerates, Posing Headache for New President,” Reuters, July 25, 2013, . 2. “Iran’s Oil Exports Not Expected to Increase Significantly Despite Recent Negotiations,” Energy Information Administration (EIA), December 20, 2013, . 3. Khajehpour, Bijan, “Decoding Iran’s ‘Resistance Economy’,” Al-Monitor, February 24, 2014, . 4. Samaha, Nour, “The Brothers Larijani: A Sphere of Power,” Aljazeera, June 9, 2013, . 5. Dehghanpisheh, Babak, “Iran’s President Defies Supreme Leader to Safeguard His Future,” Reuters, February 8, 2013, . 258 ● Notes

6. Dehghanpisheh, Babak, “Insight: Iran’s Khamenei Seen Tightening His Grip in Vote to Replace Ahmadinejad,” Reuters, March 6, 2013, . 7. “Ahmadinejad Rejects UN Sanctions,” BBC, December 24, 2006, ; Elaine Kurtenbach, “President Hits Back at ‘Worthless’ Sanctions,” The Independent, December 6, 2010, . 8. Vick, Karl, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Tightens Grip After Disqualifying Two Top Presidential Candidates,” Time, May 22, 2013, . 9. “Velayati Will Not Withdraw Candidacy in Favor of Other Principalist Candidates,” TehranTimes, June 2, 2013, . 10. “Khatami, Reformists Endorse Rohani in Presidential Election,” TehranTimes, June 11, 2013, . 11. Sayah, Reza, “Rouhani: The Man to Revive Iran’s Reformist Movement?,” CNN, June 7, 2013, . 12. “High Turnout for Election Will Dash Enemy’s Hopes: Leader – Tehran Times,” TehranTimes, June 11, 2013, . 13. Erdbrink, Thomas, “Iran’s President Puts New Focus on the Economy,” The New York Times, August 3, 2013, . 14. Ardalan, Siavash, “Can Hassan Rouhani Break Iran Nuclear Impasse?,” BBC News, July 21, 2013, . 15. Memarian, Jahandad, “New Iranian Cabinet Nominees: Building Bridges Between Factions to Yield Reform,” Hufﬁngton Post, August 8, 2013, . 16. Kourosh, Avaei, “Will Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Reduce Economic Role?,” Al-Monitor, September 19, 2013, . 17. Rouhani, Hassan, “President of Iran Hassan Rouhani: Time to Engage,” The Washington Post, September 19, 2013, . 18. Zarif, Mohammad Javad, “What Tehran Really Wants,” Foreign Affairs, April 17, 2014, . 19. “New Team to Head Nuclear Talks,” The Iran Premier, September 23, 2013, . Notes ● 259

20. “Rouhani Picks a ‘Moderate’ Nuclear Negotiating Team,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, August 27, 2013, . 21. “Hassan Rouhani Tweets: Iranian President Elect Digs Up 2003 Photo Highlighting Openness Towards West,” Huffington Post, June 18, 2013, . 22. “Oman Relays No Mediation Message,” PressTV, August 25, 2013, ; Solomon, Jay, and Carol E. Lee, “U.S.-Iran Thaw Grew from Years of Behind-the-Scenes Talks,” Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2013, . 23. “Iran Calls New U.S. Sanctions a Wrong Move at a Wrong Time,” TehranTimes, August 2, 2013, . 24. Klapper, Bradley, “Why US Senators Want Tougher Sanctions on Iran’s New President,” Christian Science Monitor, August 3, 2013, . 25. Byrne, Malcolm, “CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup,” The National Security Archive, August 19, 2013, ; Harris, Shane, and Matthew M. Aid, “Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran,” Foreign Policy, August 26, 2013, . 26. “Nuclear Chief Confirms Delay in Commissioning of Arak Reactor,” TehranTimes, August 30, 2013, . 27. “Cautious Optimism over Iran as Rouhani Comes to UN,” BBC News, September 23, 2013, . 28. “I Approve of ‘Heroic Flexibility’ in Foreign Policy: Leader,” TehranTimes, September 17, 2013, . 29. Gearan, Anne, “Kerry, Iran’s Zarif Hold Unusual Private Meeting on Sidelines of Nuclear Talks,” The Washington Post, September 26, 2013, . 30. Carter, Chelsea J., “It’s a Three-Decade First: Presidents of U.S., Iran Talk Directly, If Only by Phone,” CNN, September 28, 2013, . 31. “5+1’s Almaty Proposal Has Faded into History: Iranian FM,” OANA, October 7, 2013, . 32. “Kerry Sees Potential for Iran Nuclear Talks,” Aljazeera, October 13, 2013, . 260 ● Notes

33. Pawlak, Justyna, “Iran, Powers to Have Expert-Level Nuclear Talks in Vienna October 30–31,” Reuters, October 25, 2013, . 34. IAEA, “Communication Dated 12 September 2013 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Report of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran,” INFCIRC/854, September 26, 2013. 35. Ibid., para. 48. 36. IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of the Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2013/56, November 14, 2013, para. 5. 37. “Time Needed to Lift Sanctions: Rouhani,” TehranTimes, November 4, 2013, . 38. “Iran, 5+1 on Verge of Nuclear Deal,” TehranTimes, November 8, 2014, . 39. “IAEA, Iran Sign Joint Statement on Framework for Cooperation,” IAEA, November 11, 2013, . 40. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/54, para. 5. 41. IAEA Director General, GOV/2014/10, para. 13. 42. IAEA Director General, GOV/2010/46, para. 18, 33; IAEA Director General, GOV/2013/27, May 23, 2013, para. 60–63. 43. IAEA Director General, GOV/2013/56, para. 47. 44. “Israel Working with Saudi Arabia on Iran’s Nuclear Contingency Plan: Report,” TehranTimes, September 17, 2013, . 45. Massumi, Sara, “Back Channel US-Iran Talks Contributed to Successful Negotiation,” Iranian Diplomacy, December 3, 2013, . 46. “Iran Denies Claim It Is Building Secret Nuclear Site,” TehranTimes, November 19, 2013, ; “Iran Dismisses MKO Allegation of Secret Nuclear Site near Tehran,” PressTV, July 12, 2013, . 47. “Iranian Students Form Human Chain around Fordo Nuclear Site,” Payvand Iran News, November 20, 2013, ; “MPs Seeking to Pass Motion to Protect Iran’s Nuclear Rights,” TehranTimes, November 19, 2013, . 48. For the text of the Joint Plan of Action signed between Iran and 5+1 in Geneva, Switzerland, on November 24, 2013, see: . 49. “Extent of Enrichment Depends on Our Needs: Iranian President,” TehranTimes, November 30, 2013, . Notes ● 261

50. Dahl, Fredrik, “IAEA Asks Member States to Pay Extra Cost of Iran Nuclear Deal,” Reuters, January 17, 2014, ; “U.S. Pledges $1 Million to Help Pay for IAEA’s Extra Iran Work,” Reuters, February 26, 2014, . 51. White House, “Summary of Technical Understandings Related to the Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Office of the Press Secretary, January 17, 2014, . 52. “Additional Treasury and State Designations Targeting Networks Linked to Iranian WMD Proliferation and Sanctions Evasion,” Department of State, The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, December 12, 2013, . 53. “Obama Would Veto Additional Sanctions on Iran: White House,” TehranTimes, December 20, 2013, . 54. IAEA Board of Governors, “Monitoring and Verification in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2014/2, January 17, 2014, para. 12. 55. Council of the European Union, “Council Lifts Certain EU Sanctions on Iran,” Foreign Affairs Council, January 20, 2014, ; Rezaian, Jason, and Anne Gearan, “U.S., Europe Lift Some Iran Sanctions under Nuclear Deal,” The Washington Post, January 20, 2014, . 56. Erdbrink, Thomas, “Sanctions Eased, Iran Gets Feelers from Old Trading Partners,” The New York Times, January 17, 2014, . 57. “Iran, Britain Resume Direct Diplomatic Contacts – Tehran Times,” TehranTimes, February 21, 2014, . 58. “Iran Billionaire Zanjani ‘Arrested’,” BBC News, December 30, 2013, . 59. “Top Ahmadinejad Aide Indicted on Corruption in Connection to Businessman Zanjani,” Daily News, March 18, 2014, ; Bozorgmehr, Najmeh, “Iran: Rogue Trader,” Financial Times, June 5, 2014, . 60. Khalaji, Mehdi, “President Rouhani and the IRGC,” The Washington Institute, January 8, 2014, ; Dehghanpisheh, Babak, “Insight: Nuclear Deal Heightens Tension between Iran President and Guards,” Reuters, February 9, 2014, 262 ● Notes

; Avaei, “Will Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Reduce Economic Role?”; Ramezani, Alireza, “Rouhani Seeks to Limit IRGC Role in Politics, Economy,” Al-Monitor, April 2014, . 61. Dehghanpisheh, “Insight: Nuclear Deal Heightens Tension.” 62. “Iran Determined to Reach Final Nuclear Deal, Seeks Investment: Rouhani,” TehranTimes, January 24, 2014, . 63. “Iranian Oil Minister Reveals Extent of Financial Frauds,” Payvand, February 20, 2014, . 64. IAEA Director General, GOV/2014/10, para. 13. 65. Dahl, Fredrik, “U.N. Nuclear Agency May Press Iran on Rare Isotope in Probe,” Reuters, February 3, 2014, . 66. “Iran Denies Polonium on Agenda for Talks with U.N. Agency,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), February 6, 2014, . 67. IAEA Board of Governors, “Monitoring and Veriﬁcation in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2013/40, August 28, 2013, para. 36. 68. Solomon, Jay, “Iran Nuclear Talks Turn to Missiles,” The Wall Street Journal, February 18, 2014, . 69. “Iran, 5+1 Agree on Nuclear Talks Framework,” TehranTimes, February 21, 2014, . 70. “Iran: New Nuclear-Processing Gear Is More Capable,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), February 11, 2014, . 71. IAEA Director General, GOV/2014/10. 72. “Iran Deal Will Permit Enrichment Program: Sherman,” TehranTimes, February 23, 2014, . 73. “West’s Concerns over the Arak Reactor Not Genuine: Nuclear Chief,” TehranTimes, February 7, 2014, . 74. Norman, Laurence, “Iran Talks May Extend Beyond Six-Month Goal,” The Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2014, . 75. “Ashton Confers with Velayati,” IRNA, March 9, 2014, . 76. Saul, Jonathan, and Parisa Hafezi, “Iran, Russia Working to Seal $20 Billion Oil- for-Goods Deal: Sources,” Reuters, April 2, 2014, ; “Iran, Russia to Discuss Construction of New Nuclear Plant,” TehranTimes, March 10, 2014, Notes ● 263

. 77. “US Stance on Aboutalebi ‘Unacceptable’,” PressTV, April 9, 2014, . 78. Norman, Laurence, Nour Malas, and Benoit Faucon, “Iran Can’t Withdraw Much Oil Revenue Under Interim Nuclear Deal,” The Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2014, . 79. Rozen, Laura, “In Iran New Year’s Address, Khamenei Questions Holocaust,” The Back Channel, March 21, 2014, ; “Resistance Economy, Long-Term Strategy,” PressTV, March 11, 2014, . In a decree issued on February 19, Ayatollah Khamenei outlined the general policies of the country’s “resistance economy,” according to which the government must take action to expand the production and exportation of knowledge-based products, increase domestic production of strategic goods, and develop markets in neighboring countries. “Resistance Economy must be More Than a Slogan: Leader,” TehranTimes, May 25, 2014, . 80. “European Parliament Resolution on the EU Strategy towards Iran,” European Parliament, March 31, 2014, ; “Iranian MPs: European Parliament Resolution Can Have Negative Effect on Nuclear Talks – Tehran Times,” TehranTimes, April 7, 2014, . 81. “PressTV-Iran Must Build 30k Centrifuges: AEOI,” PressTV, April 13, 2014, . 82. Balali, Mehrad, “Iran Admits Nuclear Agency Reshufﬂe to Pave Way for 5+1 Talks,” Reuters, April 22, 2014, . 83. “Nuclear Talks Have Not Reached a Deadlock: Leader’s Advisor,” TehranTimes, May 18, 2014, ; Rozen, Laura, “‘Sticker Shock’ Meeting: Wide Gaps as Negotiators Start Drafting Iran Accord,” Al-Monitor, May 16, 2014. . 84. “Iran Should Budge on Centrifuges for Talks to Succeed: French FM,” TehranTimes, June 10, 2014, . 85. IAEA Director General, GOV/2014/28, para. 55–57. 86. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/65, Annex, Section C, para. 41–46, 52–54. 87. IAEA, “Communication Dated 4 June 2014 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding the Report of the 264 ● Notes

Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran,” INFCIRC/866, Section II, para. 7; “Iran’s Atomic Chief Decries IAEA Failure to Close Detonator Probe,” TehranTimes, June 20, 2014, . 88. IAEA Director General, GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 7. 89. Amano, Yukiya, “Atoms for Peace in 21st Century,” IAEA, June 9, 2014, . 90. Solomon, Jay, “U.S. May Use ‘Secret’ Team to Cinch Iran Nuclear Deal,” WSJ Blogs – Washington Wire, May 23, 2014, . 91. “Russia Positively Assesses Efforts to Agree Comprehensive Agreement on Iranian Nuclear Dossier,” The Voice of Russia, June 12, 2014, . 92. “Iran Made Detailed Proposal on Uranium Enrichment in Last Nuclear Talks: Zarif,” TehranTimes, June 14, 2014, ; Porter, Gareth, “Zarif Reveals Iran’s Proposal for Ensuring Against ‘Breakout’,” Inter Press Service, June 13, 2014, . 93. “Iran’s Atomic Chief Decries IAEA Failure to Close Detonator Probe,” TehranTimes, June 20, 2014, . 94. Charbonneau, Louis, “Russia Says Next Iran Atom Talks to Be Marathon, Slams U.N. Experts,” Reuters, June 25, 2014, . 95. Karami, Arash, “Chief of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization Clariﬁes Nuclear Needs,” Al-Monitor, July 9, 2014, . 96. Karami, Arash, “Iran’s Foreign Minister Reports to Parliament on Nuclear Talks,” Al-Monitor, July 22, 2014, . 97. Richter, Paul, “Iran’s Chief Nuclear Negotiator Zarif Employs a Disarming Charm,” Los Angeles Times, July 13, 2014, . 98. U.S. Department of State, “Extension of Iran Nuclear Talks,” Bureau of Public Affairs, July 18, 2014, . 99. “Iran Nuclear Talks to Resume in Early September: State TV,” Reuters, July 23, 2014, .

Conclusion 1. “IAEA Director General Comments on Visit to Iran,” IAEA, August 17, 2014, . Notes ● 265

2. Fitzpatrick, Mark, “Forecasting an ‘Interim Deal-Plus’ for the Iran Nuclear Talks,” IISS, December 4, 2014, . 3. Charbonneau, Louis, “Nuclear Deal Elusive as Iran, Six Powers Resume Talks in New York,” Reuters, September 17, 2014, . 4. Mostaghim, Ramin, “Iranian Conservatives, Reformists Unreceptive to U.S. Nuclear Proposal,” Los Angeles Times, September 21, 2014, . 5. “IAEA and Iran Hold Technical Meetings in Tehran,” IAEA, October 9, 2014, . 6. “Breakthrough Still Eludes Iranian Nuclear Talks,” Al-Monitor, November 11, 2014, . 7. “Russia to Build Eight More Reactors in Iran,” World Nuclear News, November 11, 2014, . 8. Jahn, George, “Iran, U.S. Reportedly Closer To Nuclear Deal,” Associated Press, January 3, 2015, . 9. “Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif Switzerland,” European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service), February 4, 2015, . 10. “Iran to Fulﬁll Promises If P5+1 Does,” PressTV, March 4, 2015, . Bibliography (Books and Journals)

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7th of Tir, 83–84, 86, 122, 141, 194 letter to George W. Bush, 118 message to Obama, 154 A. Q. Khan network negation of Holocaust, 114, 124 deals with Iran, 39, 58–59, 80, 81, nuclear club, 118 106–7, 129, 143 Rouhani’s nuclear diplomacy, 112, 126 dismantling, 88, 98 symbolic value of nuclear program, Libya, 107, 144, 145 121, 124, 125 Abbasi-Davani, Fereidoun, 101, 124, TRR fuel swap proposal, 160–61 143–44, 167, 170 Ahmadi-Roshan, Mostafa, 167 “alleged studies”, 143, 170 Akhavan-Fard, Massoud, 83 appointment as head of AEOI, Alborzi, Reza, 97 170–71 Alimohammadi, Massoud, 167 attempted murder, 144, 167 “alleged studies”, 107–8, 119, 131–132, Aerospace Industries Organization 134, 137, 144 (AIO), 122, 124, 145 AMAD Plan, 140–49 Afghanistan, 79, 81, 125, 134, 155 alleged halt, 147–49 Agha-Jani, Dawood, 122, 237n40 alleged launch, 140 Aghazadeh, Gholam Reza, 77, 82, 89–90, alleged relation with PHRC, 141 95–96, 118, 122, 131, 157 Amano, Yukiya, 153, 163, 191, 193, appointment as head of AEOI, 35 201, 213 declaration of nuclear activities, “alleged studies”, 164 95–96, 99 Joint Statement on a Framework for reorganization of AEOI, 82–83 Cooperation, 193, 201 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 105, 111–15, tensions with Iran, 163 118, 119, 121, 124, 133, 135, Amini, Amil, 6 155–57, 166, 173, 181–83 Amir Kabir University of Technology, after 2009 election, 155–57 43, 60, 90, 131, 151 confrontational diplomacy, 113, 124 Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries direct talks with US, 175 Group (AMIG), 84–85 elections, 112, 156 Amouzegar, Jamshid, 27–28, 29 foreign policy, 112–13, 170, 183 Amrollahi, Reza, 35–36, 39, 43, 53, 80, international sanctions and self- 226n34 sufﬁciency, 113 appointment as head of AEOI, 35 Khamenei, 125–26, 156, 170–71, nuclear program development, 37, 82 182–83 Ansari, Houshang, 16, 18 Larijani, 126, 182–83 Arabian, Ghassem, 11, 23 274 ● Index

Araghchi, Seyed Abbas, 114, 187, Brussels Agreement, 99–100 190–92, 199, 204, 210 Burns, William, 160, 178, 188, Arak Heavy Water Production Plant 209, 214 (HWPP), 72, 88, 120, 193 Bush administration, 94, 147, 183 Arak heavy water research reactor, 69, 72, axis of evil, 94, 147 83, 95, 188, 196, 202, 203, 206 cyber warfare, 165 Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant El Baradei, 127, 163–64 (YPP), 66, 83, 202 Iran’s enrichment activities, 103, 123 Aryamehr University of Technology, 26, threat of regime change and 34. See also Sharif University of preemptive attack against Iran, Technology 94, 128, 130, 155 Asgarpour, Behman, 122 Bush, George W., 118, 130, 154, Ashton, Catherine, 175, 192, 195, 155, 164 204, 212 Bushehr nuclear power plant, 14, 16, assassination of Iranian nuclear 21, 27–28, 29, 30, 34, 36, 43, scientists, 144, 167 62–65 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran fuel need, 88, 197, 206, 211 (AEOI), 2, 14, 15, 16, 20–24, Iraqi attacks, 36, 42–43 29, 36, 43, 55, 58, 66, 69, 138, resumption works, 30, 32, 36, 63–64 141, 157, 206 collaboration with private companies, Carter, Jimmy, 19, 28–29, 33 11, 65, 66–67, 72, 74, 83–84 Central Bank of Iran, 169, 182 establishment, 10, 24 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 88, organization and resources, 11, 25, 188. See also US intelligence 29, 33, 82–84, 206 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), procurement activities, 39–40, 55, 7, 9 74, 83, 84, 86, 100 CENTO Institute of Nuclear Science, Atoms for Peace program, 5–6, 80, 7, 80 219n6 China, 50, 64, 76, 79, 107, 118 nuclear cooperation with Iran, Baghdad Pact Nuclear Training Centre, 44–45, 65, 67, 68, 69–70, 71, 7, 80 108, 116, 145, 228n69 Bakhtiar, Shahpour, 30 uranium compounds provided to Bani Sadr, Abol-Hasan, 41 Iran, 54, 67, 68–69, 90–91 Bank Melli, 133, 241n79 Cold War, 6, 7, 35, 46 Bank Saderat, 133 Middle East strategic balances, 6, 7, 46 Bank Sepah, 124, 133, 241n79 Bazargan, Mehdi, 30, 32–33 d’Estaing, Valery Giscard, 14, 15 BBC China, 93, 98 Daneshjoo, Kamran, 147, 171, 249n49 centrifuge components, 93 Danilenko, Vyacheslav V., 138–39, 142 interception, 93, 98 Darkhovin, 15–16, 21, 29–30, 32, 64, Bechtel, 9, 16 115, 141 beryllium, 54, 99, 107, 143–44 Dastjerdi, Ahmad Vahid, 122 Biological Study Centre, 139–40 Defense Industries Organization (DIO), Blix, Hans, 43, 61–62 41, 55–56, 86, 102, 124, 141 Brazil-Turkey, TRR fuel swap proposal, 163 Education Research Institute, 55, “breakout” nuclear capability, 3, 158, 132, 137 162, 195 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 5–6 Index ● 275

El Baradei, Mohamed, 90, 93, 95–97, Fars Research Reactor, 209 99, 106, 108–9, 120–21, Fayazbakhsh, Ahmad, 83 122–23, 127–28, 131, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). 160, 164 See Germany “alleged studies”, 131, 134, 164 Ford, Gerald, 18 double suspension proposal, 121, 123 Fordow enrichment plant, 157–59, possible military dimensions, 131, 164 167, 172, 177–79, 194, 196, Resolution 1696, 120 203, 204 TRR fuel swap proposal, 160, 162 20 percent enrichment, 172, 176, 196

Enriched UO2 Powder Plant, 70, 203, construction timing, 159 209, 213 declaration and location, 157–59 Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center Framatome, 15, 21 (ENTC), 26, 30, 34, 37, 42, 44, France, 13, 23, 30, 32, 45, 96, 127, 53, 67, 70, 209 158, 160–61, 192, 196 Etemad, Akbar, 14, 15, 18–20, 24, nuclear cooperation with Iran, 28–29, 33, 35, 220n19 14–16, 26, 30, 68 appointment as head of AEOI, 10 TRR fuel swap proposal, 160–61 discrimination of Iran within NPT, fuel cycle, 12, 17, 35, 37, 53, 54, 19, 28, 53 65–72 dispute with US on reprocessing 1990s and beyond, 65–72 activities, 18–20 early development, 20–24 EU3, 96–101 Iran’s right to, 20, 17, 97, 106, 120 Brussels Agreement, 99–100 self-sufﬁciency, 35, 37 formation, 96 Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL), 42, suspension of Iran’s enrichment, 53–54, 69 96–97, 99 Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP), 69, Tehran Declaration, 97 72, 83 EU3/EU, 102–6 Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant, 70 August 2005 proposal, 105–6 formation, 102 Gchine uranium mine and mill, 65–67, Paris Agreement, 102–6 78, 101, 107, 131–32, 192. See EURODIF, 14, 27, 32 also uranium ore concentration European Union (EU), 204, 205 (UOC) plant Joint Plan of Action, partial sanctions Germany, 13, 14, 36, 58, 36, 96, 118, relief, 196–97, 200 221n35 sanctions against Iran, 83, 169–70, Ghannadi-Maragheh, Mohammad, 174, 176, 182, 233n81, 252n29. 82–83, 122 See also international sanctions Great Britain, 6–9, 13, 38, 76, 88, 91, against Iran 96, 125, 168, 188, 238n52 exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonators, A. Q. Khan network, 88, 92–93, 107 140, 142, 202, 203, 206, 208 diplomatic relations with Iran, 76, 168, 188, 200 Fabius, Laurent, 192, 198, 214 intelligence and MI6, 88, 91–92, 158 Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, Mohsen, 124, 140, 142, 143, 145, 146, Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor, 44, 71 148–50, 171 Heinonen, Olli, 90, 131, 134 Faqihian, Hoseyn, 83, 233n82 high explosives, 107, 138, 140, 142, Farayand Technique, 83, 85–86, 115, 208, 213 122, 236n32 Hosseini-Tash, Ali, 113–14 276 ● Index

Hoveyda, Amir Abbas, 8, 10, 11, 27 May 2014, 209 Hussein, Saddam, 45, 46, 52, 188 September 2014, 213 founds on Iran’s veriﬁcations, 198 Imam Hossein University, 41 Gchine uranium mine and mill, 67, implosion nuclear device, 107, 138, 132, 201 141–44, 146 inspection activities, 61, 89, 123, India, 43, 113, 116, 186 128, 196 nuclear tests, 12, 13, 78–79 Arak, 89, 193, 199, 201 Institute for Applied Physics, 132, 139, Gchine, 101, 201 144, 150, 249n63 Kalaye Electric Company, 91, 93 Institute for Science and International Kolandouz, 98 Security (ISIS), 56–57, 89, 150 Lashkar Abab, 69, 202 International Atomic Energy Agency Lavisan-Shian, 101 (IAEA), 2, 36, 57, 89–91, 92, Natanz, 81, 89, 90, 92 93, 98–101, 120, 142, 144–45, Parchin, 103, 107, 115–16, 140, 151, 158, 190–94, 198, 200, 146–47, 173, 203 206, 208 Iran’s case on the agenda of Board of Additional Protocol, 18, 61 Governors, 96, 103, 106, 116 “alleged studies”, 129, 131–32, 134, Iran’s enrichment activities, 69, 137, 151, 164 90–92, 95–96, 98, 99, 115, 129, Board of Governors resolutions 131, 158–59, 199 September 2003, 92, 96–97 Iran’s failure to declare/report/provide November 2003, 98, 102 information on nuclear activities, March 2004, 99 42, 54, 59, 68–69, 89–91, June 2004, 100 95–96, 100, 107–8 September 2004, 101 Iran’s non-diversion of declared September 2005, 108–9, 115 nuclear material, 2, 61, 102–3 February 2006, 116 Iran’s plutonium experiments, 54, 95, September 2012, 175 107, 128 Director General reports Iraq nuclear program, 52, 60 June 2004, 100 Joint Plan of Action, 196, 209 November 2004, 102 Joint Statement on a Framework for November 2005, 115 Cooperation, 193, 201–2, 206, February 2006, 116–18 208, 213 August 2006, 121 nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, February 2007, 123 92–93 May 2007, 127 modiﬁed Code 3.1 of Subsidiary August 2007, 128 Arrangements, 127, 159 February 2008, 131, 132 “outstanding issues”, 117, 119, 128, May 2008, 134, 164 131, 173, 191–92 February 2010, 164 possible military dimensions, 134, May 2011, 144, 151 137–47, 149–51, 164, 190, 203, November 2011, 139, 141, 142, 206 151, 164, 168, 208 referral to UN Security Council, August 2012, 174–75 108, 116 August 2013, 190 relations with Iran in the 1990s, 60–61 November 2013, 193–94 structured approach with Iran, 173, February 2014, 202–3 175, 176, 190–91 Index ● 277

uranium metal documentation, 129, procurement activities, 38–40, 55–57, 134, 143 69, 74, 100 “work plan”, 128–29, 131–32 providing information to IAEA, international sanctions against Iran, 72, 95–96, 100, 101, 107, 115–16, 83, 120, 121–24, 132–35, 159, 128–29, 131–32, 140, 142, 143, 163, 168, 169–70, 171, 174, 176, 203, 206, 208, 213 182, 188, 233n81, 234n38, ratiﬁcation of NPT, 9, 17, 60, 245n79, 248n37, 252n29 221n29 Iran. See also Islamic Republic reprocessing activities, 12, 17, 18, 24, Additional Protocol, 95, 97, 116, 29, 97, 104 100, 102, 122, 196 role of the military in the economy, Brussels Agreement, 99–100 50–52, 113, 182, 200 cyber warfare, 165–67 Safeguards Agreement’ signing, 90 discrimination within NPT, 13, 17, 53 seismic risk, 20–21, 63 domestic balance of power and Tehran Declaration, 97–98 nuclear program, 10–11, 76–77, threat of withdrawal from NPT, 93, 114, 126, 148–49, 156–57 100, 109 estimated output of nuclear energy, US direct talks, 114, 118, 154, 160, 2, 10, 21, 30, 53, 70 175, 178, 189 fuel cycle. See fuel cycle Iran Air Cargo, 133 impact of international sanctions, Iranian Nuclear Energy Company 170, 174, 176, 182 (INECO), 9, 11 Iraqi nuclear program, 52, 61 Iran-Iraq war, 35, 45–46, 111–12 Joint Plan of Action, 216, 217, 222 Bushehr attacks, 36, 42–43 modiﬁed Code 3.1 of Subsidiary chemical weapons, 37, 45–47 Arrangements, 127, 159, 172, failed international condemnation, 196, 209 46, 111–12 negotiation proposals Iran’s nonconventional capabilities, May 2003, 94 41–42, 47, 51–52 January 2005, 105 Iraq, 6–7, 8, 35–37, 41–42, 45–46, 50, March 2005, 105 52, 53, 94, 125, 147, 188 April 2005, 105–6 nuclear program, 52, 58, 60 August 2006, 120 Islamic Republic, 30, 40, 45 May 2008, 134 cold war, 35 July 2008, 135 constitutional reforms, 34, 49 June 2012, 174 early debates on nuclear program, April 2013, 179 30–35, 37 September 2013, 189 political isolation, 45–46, 52–53 October 2013, 190 revolution, 30–32 nonconventional capabilities, 41, 47, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, 51–53, 82 133, 169 Paris Agreement, 100–6 Israel, 37, 53, 87, 128, 165, Pasdaran (Islamic Revolutionary 194, 216 Guard Corps), 40–42, 50–51, assassination of Iranian nuclear 113, 124, 182 scientists, 144, 167–68 possible military dimensions, accuse cyber warfare, 165 of forged documentation, 108, opposition to long–term nuclear 132, 146, 213 deal, 214, 239 278 ● Index

Jalali, Gholamreza, 87, 167 Khan, Munir Ahmad, 80 Jalili, Saeed, 126, 131, 135, 160, 174, Khansari, Majid, 83 184, 204 Kharrazi, Kamal, 93, 96 appointment as top nuclear Khatam al-Anbiya (KAA), 51, 57, negotiator, 141 159, 200 Jannati, Ali, 205 Khatami, Mohammad, 74–77, 78, 89, Jannatian, Mahmoud, 83 99, 100, 113 Javadi, Ali Hakim, 167 contradictory foreign and nuclear Javedan Mehr Toos, 83 policies, 76–77 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action foreign policy, 75–76 (Joint Statement), 1, 215–16 Khazaneh, Reza, 26, 34 Joint Plan of Action, 194–98, Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 30, 199–201 33–35, 39, 41, 45–47, 49, 53, extensions, 212, 214–15 56, 62 long-term agreement negotiations, early dismissal of nuclear program, 34 197, 202, 203–10, 214–16 nonconventional weapons, 41, 47, 52 sanctions relief, 196–97, 199–200, Kimia Maadan, 66–67, 108, 132, 141 206, 212, 216 Ki-moon, Ban, 134 Joint Statement on a Framework for Kissinger, Henry, 16, 18, 19, 154 Cooperation, 193, 201–2, Kolahdouz, 109, 115 206, 213 Kraftwerk Union (KWU), 14, 16, 21, 30, 31–32, 34, 36, 43, 63–64. Kalaye Electric Company, 59, 81, 83, See also Germany 84–87, 89–91, 93, 95, 122, 159 Kamalvandi, Behruz, 187, 206 Larijani, Ali, 109, 112, 114, 118, 123, Karaj Nuclear Research Center for 125–26, 128, 155, 161 Agriculture and Medicine, 26, Ahmadinejad, 126, 182–83 43, 44 appointment as top nuclear Karaj Waste Storage Facility, 54, 69 negotiator, 112 Karimi-Sabet, Javad, 83, 242n34 message to Condoleeza Rice, 118 Kaveh Cutting Tools, 83, 85, 141 “work plan”, 128–29, 131–32 Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh, 127 Lashkar Abad, 68–69, 91, 202 Kerry, John, 189, 214 Lavisan-Shian, 100–1, 139, 147. Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali, 35, 49, 75, See also Physics Research Centre 76, 93, 105, 112, 120, 124, 131, (PHRC) 149, 154, 155, 185, 189, 192, Lavrov, Sergei, 172, 214 206, 211 Leifeld, 38, 39 Ahmadinejad, 125–26, 156, 170–71, Leilabadi, Ali Hajinia, 72, 122 182–83 Leybold-Heraeus, 38–39 fatwa on nuclear weapons, 114, 131 Libya, 59, 88, 92–94, 107, 144, 145, resistance economy, 182, 201, 205, 238n52 263n79 Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor, 44 Rouhani’s diplomatic initiative, Lischem Company, 26, 223n67 189, 192 TRR fuel swap proposal, 161 Mahvi, Abolfath, 9, 15, 28 US direct talks, 178 Malek Ashtar University of Technology, Khan, Abdul Qadeer (A. Q.), 38, 58, 41, 56, 86, 139, 143, 150 80, 92 Marou Sanat, 83, 223n83 Index ● 279

Mashaei, Esfandiar Rahim, 170, 171, modified Code 3.1 of Subsidiary 183, 184, 254n71 Arrangements, 60–61 Mesbah Energy Company, 72, 83, 122 Safeguards Agreements, 60, 231n49 Miniature Neutron Sources Reactor, 44 North Korea, 88, 89, 82, 94, 145 Modern Industries Technique Novin Energy Company, 83, 236n29 Company, 72 Nuclear centrifuges Mogherini, Federica, 215 advanced models, 133, 194, 196, Monajemi, Ehsan, 122 202, 203, 211 Monfared, Ali, 113–14 IR-1 components, 39–40, 58–60, Moslehi, Heydar, 167, 171 84–86 Mottaki, Manouchehr, 112, 123, 127, IR-1 research, 57–60, 83 131, 134, 161, 162, 170 IR-2 components, 99, 100 Mousavi, Mir-Hossein, 35, 39, 47, IR-2 research, 59, 86, 132 156, 161 Nuclear Suppliers Group, 12, 28 Mousavian, Hossein, 97, 113, 114, 125–26, 244n54 Obama, Barack, 154, 155, 156, 157, Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), 102, 194 165, 175, 189, 199 multipoint initiation system, 142, 146 contacts with Rouhani, 189 Musharraf, Pervez, 92–93 diplomatic overtures towards Iran, 154–55, 188 Najafi, Reza, 187, 191 dual-track policy, 155 Naraghi, Masud, 33, 38, 58, 226n38 elections, 154, 175 Nasseri, Cyrus, 97, 114, 126 letters to Khamenei, 154 Natanz OPEC, 9, 27, 78 construction, 86–88 Organization of Defense Innovation and disclosure, 77, 81, 88–89 Research (SPND), 150 Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), 87–88, 90, 117, 123, 127–28, P5+1, 118–21, 123, 134, 173, 174, 130, 134, 193, 203 177–78, 189, 192, 199, cyber attacks, 165–67 204–6, 214 Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), formation, 118 83, 87, 90, 92, 98, 117–18, Joint Plan of Action, 194–97, 200 196, 203 negotiation proposals 20 percent enrichment, 176, 199 May 2006, 118–20 first Iranian enrichment, 118 June 2008, 134 suspension of enrichment activities, May 2012, 173 97–99, 102, 115–16 February 2013, 177 National Council of Resistance of Iran March 2013, 179 (NCRI), 69, 72, 88–89, 90, 91, Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah, 1, 6, 98, 101, 107, 148, 150 8–10, 12, 14, 29–30, 33 Nejad Nouri, Mohammad Mehdi, 143, alleged nuclear military ambitions, 243n38, 247n28, 255n76 12, 24, 37 Niazmand, Reza, 11 concerns on Iraq, India and Pakistan Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 9, 17, nuclear programs, 37, 79–80 53, 60, 79 nuclear program and economic crisis, Additional Protocol, 61 26–28 India’s nuclear test, 12, 60 nuclear program, 10, 25, 26–27, Iran’s ratification, 9, 17, 60, 221n29 29–30 280 ● Index

Pahlavi—continued appointment as top nuclear symbolic aspects of nuclear energy, 79 negotiator, 93 US nuclear cooperation, 17 contacts with Obama, 188, 189 Pakistan, 8, 17, 19, 38, 58, 79–81, election, 185 92, 134 foreign policy, 186 nuclear cooperation with Iran, 38, government, 185–86 226n34 international sanctions, 185 nuclear tests, 60, 78, 80–82 Joint Plan of Action, 198, 205 Parchin, 103, 107, 115–16, 140, 143, nuclear diplomacy, 96, 187, 192 175, 203 Rouhi, Mansour, 35 Paris Agreement, 102–6 Russia, 50, 75, 108, 115, 116, 118, Pars Trash Company, 83, 86, 99, 116, 122, 211, 214. See also USSR 122 negotiation proposals Partial Test Ban Treaty, 17 November 2005, 115, 118 passive defense, 87 July 2011, 172–73 Passive Defense Organization (PDO), nuclear cooperation on Bushehr, 157, 159, 167 62–65, 88, 122, 157 Physics Research Centre (PHRC), nuclear cooperation with Iran, 62–65, 55–58, 117, 121, 131, 137–39. 66, 68, 71–72, 204–5, 214 See also Biological Study Centre TRR fuel swap proposal, 160–61 and Institute for Applied Physics and SADAT and SPND Saeedi, Mohammad, 97, 114 Pioneer Energy Industries, 66, 67, 74, 83 Saghand mine, 65–66, 202 polonium-210, 54, 99, 107, 131, Sahabi, Fereydun, 30, 31–32, 35–36 143, 201 Salehi, Ali Akbar, 109, 157, 160–61, 170, 188, 193, 206, 211 Qaboos bin Said al Said, Sultan of appointment as head of AEOI, Oman, 178, 187 157, 187 Qalibaf, Mohammad Baqer, 112, 184 Arak heavy water research reactor, Quihillalt, Oscar Armando, 25 188, 204, 205, 206, 213 US direct talks, 178 Raﬁghdoost, Mohsen, 41, 52 Sarkozy, Nicholas, 157, 162 Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi, 36, 44, Sarram, Mehdi, 11, 28, 33 47, 49–51, 53, 58, 62, 74–75, Saudi Arabia, 35, 45, 76, 168, 194, 216 112, 125, 184 Section for Advanced Developments election, 49 Application and Technologies foreign policy, 50, 62, 75 (SADAT), 149–50 Rajai, Mohammad-Ali, 34 Shahab-3 ballistic missile, 107–8, 142, Raka, 159 144–47 Rastkhah, Nasser, 83 Shahid Beheshti University, 150, 151 Ray, Dixie Lee, 17 Shahid Hemmad Industrial Group Rezaeinejad, Darioush, 167 (SHIG), 40, 55, 145 Rezai, Mohsen, 47, 52, 161, 184 Shahmoradi Zavareh, Seyed Abbas, Rice, Condoleeza, 118, 134 55–56, 117, 137–39 Roghani Zanjani, Masoud, 58 Shahriari, Majid, 144, 167 Rouhani, Hassan, 77, 92, 95–98, 99, Shamkhani, Ali, 93, 187, 204, 235n5 103–5, 113, 148–49, 161, Sharif University of Technology, 34, 183–86, 187, 200, 204 55–58, 121, 137, 138 Index ● 281

Sherman, Wendy, 189, 203, 214 United States (US), 45–46, 51–52, 70, Solana, Javier, 102, 104, 118, 76, 80–81, 94, 113, 165, 173, 120–21, 134 214, 216 Soleymani, Ghasem, 65 Brazil-Turkey TRR fuel swap Soltanieh, Ali Ashgar, 109, 187 proposal, 163 Sotoodehnia, Ahmad, 11, 15, 20, dual-track policy, 119, 188 29–30, 34 direct talks with Iran, 96–97, 160, STUXNET, virus, 165–67 178, 189 Sullivan, Jake, 178, 214 intelligence A. Q. Khan network, 88–89, Taherzadeh, Mojtaba, 33 92–93 Tahir, B. S., 45, 39, 58, 106, 108, “alleged studies”, 107–8 119, 129 AMAD Plan, 147–48 Takht-Ravanchi, Majid, 187, 188, 210 Iran’s nuclear sites, 91, 158, 165 Tehran Declaration, 95–97, 99, 102 National Intelligence Estimate Tehran Nuclear Research Center (NIE), 130–31, 147, 149 (TNRC), 7, 23, 34, 42, 44, Joint Plan of Action, 196–97, 199, 53–55, 107 206, 209 Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose nonproliferation policies, 17, 18, Laboratories, 42, 53–54, 67, 91 19, 28 Laser Spectroscopy Laboratory and nuclear cooperation with Iran, 1, 6, Comprehensive Separation 9, 16–20, 25–26, 29, 68 Laboratory, 68, 100 positions against third countries’ Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon nuclear cooperation with Iran, Radioisotope Production Facility, 44, 64–66, 67, 68, 70–72, 79, 53, 91 228n69 Plasma Physics Building, 53, 58 sanctions against Iran, 72, 83, Radiochemistry Laboratories, 169–70, 174, 176, 182, 188, 53–54 233n81. See also international Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), 7, 54, sanctions against Iran 69, 91, 99, 128, 216 Tehran embassy hostages crisis, 33 fuel swap proposal, 159–63 threat of military attack against Iran, modiﬁcation of reactor core, 87, 128, 148 43–44, 70 TRR fuel swap proposal, 160–61 Tehran University, 7 TRR providing fuel for, 7, 43–44 Tinner, Urs, 92–93 veto on Iran’s reprocessing activities, Turkey, 7, 8, 162, 163 13, 18, 29 uranium United Kingdom. See Great Britain 20 percent enrichment, 128, 162, United Nations Security Council 195, 203 Iranian referral threat, 96, 97, 98 stockpile’s conversion, 175, 195, Resolutions against Iran 199, 206, 212, 214 1696, 120 suspension, 195, 199, 203 1737, 121–23 conversion activities, 37, 42, 54, 1747, 123–24 67–68, 96, 102, 104–6, 108, 1803, 132–34 175–76, 179–80, 209, 212 1835, 135, 153 resumption, 104–6 1929, 163, 169–70 suspension, 102 282 ● Index uranium—continued Uranium Conversion Laboratory enrichment activities, 24, 37–38, (UCL), 37, 43, 53, 67 58–60, 68–70, 92, 117–18, uranium ore concentration (UOC) 166, 195 plant, 66, 141, 193 multilateral option, 115, 118, 134 URENCO, 38, 81 provisional suspension, 97–99, Uriran, 11, 23 102, 115–16 USSR, 35, 46, 50, 52, 62 fuel related activities, 23–24, 69–70, 162, 175, 179, 212 Vaidi, Javad, 114 gas centrifuge enrichment, 38–40, Velayati, Ali Akbar, 93, 184, 204 58–60, 84–86, 92, 98, 117–18, 127–28, 158, 165–67, 193–94, Yarsanat, 83 195, 199 Yazdi, Ebrahim, 32 procurement activities, 39–40, Yazdi, Mohammad Taqi 85–86, 92, 100 Mesbah, 125 suspension, 97–99, 102 yellowcake, 23, 37, 42, 66, high-enriched uranium (HEU), 44, 100, 105 68, 92, 93, 121, 128, 130 Younessi, Ali, 93 laser enrichment, 23, 37, 44, 68–69, 91, 96, 100, 223n67 Zarif, Mohammad Javad, 97, 186–89, low-enriched uranium (LEU), 24, 202, 204, 205, 215 68, 92, 93, 160, 162, 190, 193, appointment as top nuclear 195–96, 202, 209 negotiator, 206 mining and milling activities, Joint Plan of Action, 195, 212 65–67, 78 negotiation proposals resources, 22–23, 35, 65 October 2013, 190 Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF), May 2014, 207 67–68, 70, 83, 91, 100, 105 Zirconium Production Plant, 70