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UKRAINE Packer Collegiate Institute UKRAINE ­ Packer Collegiate Institute Intro: This is a new age for Ukraine. Coming from the ashes of protest and corruption, Ukraine hopes to come out a more independent nation with the aspirations of a new democracy. It will not stand for its neighbor’s imperialist aggression. Russia has taken its land and has fueled the separatist chaos that continues to disrupt the peace Ukraine seeks. So Ukraine comes to this conference looking to Europe and the United States to help back their fight for a stronger democracy. Ukraine is opening its arms to the West, ready to establish more open trade especially concerning natural gas as well as continuing a path towards European Union membership. Unstable and at mercy, Ukraine still continues to fight against oppression and in defense of freedom. Key Points: 1. Removing Ukraine’s oil dependency on Russia 2. Ending the conflict with the separatists, preferably through peace 3. European Union membership 4. Prevent Russian invasion 5. Regaining Crimea 6. Military support and backup from the West (in case Russia tries to re­annex all of Ukraine) 7. Suppress the unrest in Donbass 8. Maintain human rights Background: Once the center of the first eastern slavic state in the 10th and 11th century, Ukraine now finds itself warding off neighbors and trying to heal its disemboweled government. During the 10th and 11th centuries when Ukraine arguably was in its prime, it was known as Kylvan Rus, the largest and most powerful state in all of continental Europe at the time. As time went on, Kylvan Rus was increasingly weakened by internal struggles and Mongol invasions. Although weakened, the cultural and religious legacy of Kylvan Rus paved the way for the strong sense of Ukrainian nationalism that we see today. It was not until the latter part of the 18th century though, that the majority of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory was absorbed by their powerful neighbor to the east, the Russian Empire. In 1917, after the fall of czarist Russia, Ukraine achieved independence. This period of independence was short lived though, coming to an end in 1920 and then repossessed by the their recharged neighbor, Soviet Russia. Shortly after Soviet Russia absorbed Ukraine, they punished the Ukrainian people by putting them through forced famines in 1921 to 1922 and 1932 to 1933, which resulted in the death of eight million people. Ukraine saw the loss of millions more of its people during World War II through violence between German and Soviet forces. Ukraine did not regain independence, and this time for the long term, until the fall of the USSR in 1991. Although separated from the fallen Communist empire, democracy remained elusive because of corruption which stalled economic reform, privatization, and civil liberties. Democracy seemed a distant dream to the Ukrainians until the Orange Revolution which swept the nation in 2004. The peaceful mass protest called for the end of rigged and corrupt presidential elections and asked for an internationally monitored vote, which elected president Viktor Yushchenko. Yushchenko's successor Yanukovych rose to power after internal problems in the government, allowing him to win a rada position ­ Ukrainian equivalent of parliament, prime minister, and then president. Yanukovych's presidency did not go unscathed by scandal and conflict. In October of 2012 Rada elections were criticized by western observers for favoring ruling party candidates, interference with media access, and harassment of opposition candidates. Beyond allegations of corruption and interference in the democratic process, widespread discontent took the nation by storm when in 2013 Yanukovych backpedaled on his agreement to enter trade and cooperation agreement with the European Union as opposed to continuing close economic ties with the Russian Union. The Ukrainian people consumed with anger and distrust, turned to protesting in Kyiv’s central square for three months, culminating in the destruction of the nation’s capital. Yanukovych struck back at dissenters through the use of government forces which led to all out battles between civilians and troops. Eventually, Yanukovych flees the country and seeks refuge in Russia where Putin welcomes him with open arms. In 2014, an interim Ukrainian government called for presidential elections to take place in May. Putin, hungry for more land, took advantage of the lack of leadership in Ukraine and ordered troops to invade Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula on March 1st, just one week after the overthrow in Kyiv and three weeks shy of elections. Cimmerians, Scythians, as well as Greek colonists called Crimea home. Later occupiers included the Romans, Goths, Huns, Bulgars, Khazars, among others. From 1449 to 1779, the Crimean Peninsula was a vassal state of the Ottoman empire called Crimean Khanate. In 1571, Crimean Tatars attacked Moscow leaving everything torched but the Kremlin. Unlike the late 1700s, Tatars sustained a massive slave trade with the Ottoman Empire exporting millions of slaves from Ukraine and Russia over a two hundred year period. In 1783, under the rule of Catherine the Great, Russia conquered the peninsula. Eventually, during World War II, the native Crimean Tatars were forced from their homes in fear they were collaborating with Nazi forces. Most of the deportees, who made up a fifth of the peninsula’s population, settled in Uzbekistan. In 1954, at the result of an internal political action by Communist Party General Secretary Khrushchev, the peninsula became a territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Following the Ukranian Revolution of 2014, the Crimean Peninsula again became the center of Russian­Ukrainian politics, with its sovereignty being disputed between the two nations. At the beginning of the crisis, unmarked pro­Russian and Russian forces occupied several locations. In the spring, the Supreme Council of Crimea and Sevastopol City Council adopted a declaration of independence and declared themselves the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. Following the declaration of independence, Russia asked for a referendum to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation. This referendum was condemned and is not recognized by the Ukrainian government, Crimea, the European Union, United States, or UN General Assembly. Although Russia withdrew its forces from the region this past December, this action has caused fighting to cease, in fact destruction and despair ensues. Most recently, a ceasefire was agreed upon at Belarus talks after a marathon of overnight negotiation. Sovereignty: Ukraine hopes to assert itself and govern its territorial holdings without the threat of a modern day imperialist country taking away land. For this reason, Ukraine is vehemently against the annexation of Crimea for it displays a frank disregard for the integrity of not only our borders, but the borders of countries around the world and may mark the beginning of a new wave of imperialism and the redrawing of geographical boundaries. It has become clear that Russia is making a power play for the Crimean Peninsula and every satellite state should be extremely frightened and ready to take any measures necessary for protection. To ensure that neither Ukraine nor any neighboring country is in danger of this sort of hostile takeover, major sanctions should be enforced that prevent any possibility of this assertion of power in the future. The most radical of these sanctions would be the shrinking of Russia’s immense land mass. The implementation of these sanctions requires cooperation and support from prominent and powerful foreign actors. These external actors may show signs of trepidation, worry about infringing on rights to freedom in the region. Security: Ukraine’s primary security concerns are Russian military intervention, unmarked armed militias, and protests. Russia has previously stated that they have the capability to strike at any moment and protests have not only turned aggressive but even violent. Russian supporters have taken over government buildings and cause chaos in the streets. Fighting between Ukrainian military members and unmarked soldiers is quite common in the eastern parts of Ukraine. The Ukrainian army is outmanned and outgunned against the numerous enemy forces. Separatists, armed by the Russian government, are equipped with heavy artillery and serious weaponry. Without major support from the United States and/or NATO, Ukraine will not be able to withstand for much longer. The United States has offered Ukraine airlifts, intelligence as well as other important support but has not yet been willing to offer anything lethal such as soldiers or weapons. However with the increase in violent militia outbreaks, President Obama is reconsidering that. With America’s military assistance, Ukraine would stand strong against Russian forces however that is unlikely to happen. NATO has offered similar resources as the United States with exception of a newly developed ‘Spearhead’ force of 5,000 soldiers which would be deployed to Ukraine in the near future. While these soldiers will certainly aid the Ukrainian efforts, it is only a slight alleviation to the greater symptoms of the Russian­Ukrainian crisis. Although not the biggest threat to Ukranian security at the moment, Ukraine has experienced cyber attacks. While not officially part of the Ukrainian government, there is a Ukrainian hacker called Eugene Dokunun, who is the self­proclaimed Chief Commander of the Ukrainian Cyber Army. The Ukrainian government has allocated few funds to pursuing cyber security. The lone­wolf cyber militia mentioned earlier has already frozen three million in Russian assets as well as blocked over 170 PayPal accounts used to fund separatists. Furthermore, the Ukrainian Cyber Army has hacked the Russian Ministry of Interior and revealed classified information concerning Kremlin sponsored transactions for separatists in Ukraine. This is only a fraction of what this group has accomplished and is preparing to do. With the Belarus Peace Talks and Cease Fire fresh in the memories of Ukrainians, hopes for a stable and peaceful country make security a top priority for the nation.
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