The World Bank

Document of The World Bank

Public Disclosure Authorized Report No: ICR2015

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD-46650 IDA-36620)

ON A

Public Disclosure Authorized LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$463.0 MILLION

AND A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT

OF SDR62.5 MILLION (US$79.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF INDIA

Public Disclosure Authorized FOR A

MUMBAI URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT

December 8, 2011

Transport Unit Sustainable Development Unit South Asia Region

Public Disclosure Authorized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective April 30, 2002) Currency Unit = Indian Rupee (INR) 1 INR = US$0.020 US$1 = INR 48.00 FISCAL YEAR: April 1 -- March 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC Alternating Current MUAE Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment ATC Area Traffic Control MUTP Mumbai Urban Transport Project BEST Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply and Transport MVEC Motor Vehicle Emission Control Company CR Central Railway NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards DC Direct Current NGO Non-Governmental Organization EMS Efficiency Monitoring System NOX oxides of nitrogen EMU Electric Multiple Unit NPV Net Present Value ERR Economic Rate of Return PAH Project Affected Household GAAP Governance and Accountability Plan PAP Project Affected Person GoI Government of India PCC Project Coordinating Committee GoM Government of Maharashtra PDO Project Development Objectives IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and PIC Public Information Center Development ICF Integral Coach Factory PM Particulate Matter ICR Implementation Completion Report PMU Project Management Unit IDA International Development Association R&R Resettlement and Rehabilitation IMP Independent Monitoring Panel RAP Resettlement Action Plan IR Indian Railways RDSO Research Designs and Standards Organization JVLR Jogeshwari-Vikhroli Link Road RIP Resettlement Implementation Plan M&E Monitoring and Evaluation ROB Road over Rail Bridge MCGM Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai SATIS Station Area Traffic Improvement Scheme MHADA Maharashtra Housing Area and Development SC Special Commitment Authority MIS Management Information System SCLR Santa-Cruz-Chembur Link Road MMR Mumbai Metropolitan Region SOE Statement of Expenditure MMRDA Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development SPARC Society for Promotion of Area Resource Authority Centre MoU Memorandum of Understanding SPM Suspended Particulate Matter MRVC Mumbai Railway Vikas Corporation Limited TDR Transfer of Development Rights MSRDC Maharashtra State Road Development TMU Traffic Management Unit, MCGM Corporation MTR Mid-Term Review WR Western Railway Zone of Indian Railways

Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Country Director: N. Roberto Zagha Sector Manager: Michel Audigé Project Team Leader: Atul Agarwal ICR Team Leader: Binyam Reja

INDIA MUMBAI URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT TABLE OF CONTENTS Contents A. Basic Information ...... i B. Key Dates ...... i C. Ratings Summary ...... i D. Sector and Theme Codes ...... ii E. Bank Staff ...... ii F. Results Framework Analysis ...... ii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ...... vii H. Restructuring (if any) ...... vii I. Disbursement Profile ...... viii 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ...... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...... 10 3. Assessment of Outcomes ...... 20 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ...... 26 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ...... 26 6. Lessons Learned ...... 31 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies ...... 33 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ...... 34 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ...... 35 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ...... 38 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/ Supervision Processes ...... 41 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ...... 44 Annex 6. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ...... 46 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents ...... 58 Annex 8. Resettlement and Rehabilitation ...... 61

Maps IBRD-31931 IBRD-31949

INDIA MUMBAI URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT DATA SHEET

A. Basic Information

Country: India Project Name: Mumbai Urban Transport Project Project ID: P050668 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-46650,IDA-36620 ICR Date: 12/08/2011 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF INDIA Original Total USD 542.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 452.01M Commitment: Revised Amount: USD 532.12M Environmental Category: A Implementing Agencies: Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority Mumbai Railway Vikas Corporation Ltd. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply and Transport Company Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 05/11/1999 Effectiveness: 11/06/2002 11/06/2002 06/17/2008 09/30/2008 Appraisal: 03/05/2002 Restructuring(s): 12/30/2009 06/15/2010 04/27/2011 Approval: 06/18/2002 Mid-term Review: 10/17/2005 Closing: 06/30/2008 06/15/2011

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Performance:

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Rating Performance any) Potential Problem Project at Yes Quality at Entry (QEA): None any time (Yes/No): Problem Project at any time Quality of Supervision Yes None (Yes/No): (QSA): DO rating before Moderately Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status:

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Other social services 15 16 Railways 57 57 Roads and highways 28 27

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Municipal governance and institution building 25 25 Other social development 13 13 Other urban development 25 25 Pollution management and environmental health 13 13 Urban services and housing for the poor 24 24

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Mieko Nishimizu Country Director: N. Roberto Zagha Edwin R. Lim Sector Manager: Michel Audige Vincent Gouarne Project Team Leader: Atul Agarwal A.K. Swaminathan ICR Team Leader: Binyam Reja ICR Primary Author: Binyam Reja Jorge M. Rebelo

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) To facilitate urban economic growth and improve quality of life by fostering the development of an efficient and sustainable urban transport system including effective institutions in Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR).

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised Target approval Completion or Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : To reduce peak hour overcrowding, average loads in trains reduced Value quantitative or 4,500 3,500 3,600 4,016 Qualitative) Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 06/15/2011 06/15/2011 Comments (incl. % Partially Achieved (the reasons include increased ridership than projected). achievement) To reduce incidence and severity of pedestrian road traffic accidents in areas where Indicator 2 : facilities are proposed Value Deleted as part quantitative or 100% 90% of the Qualitative) restructuring Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 Comments Some of the subcomponents were undertaken: 2 PGSS were implemented within the (incl. % project, & MMRDA undertook the construction of numerous skyways outside the achievement) project. Indicator 3 : To increase peak hour average frequency for train services. Value quantitative or 13 15 16 16.1 Qualitative) Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 06/15/2011 06/15/2011 Comments (incl. % Achieved achievement) Indicator 4 : To increase train availability at peak Value quantitative or 91% 94% 91.5% Qualitative) Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 06/15/2011 Comments Not Achieved (Some of the old train sets are still operating in the system requiring more (incl. % maintenance. The value should improve once these are replaced by new trainsets being achievement) procured under MUTP2A). Indicator 5 : To reduce journey times by road on JVLR (from WEH to EEH). Value quantitative or 30 Minutes 24 Minutes 28 minutes Qualitative) Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 06/15/2011 Comments Not Achieved. The reasons include; (a) actual traffic was three times higher than the (incl. % forecast, and (b) some of the resettlement work was still underway at the time of achievement) evaluation. Indicator 6 : To reduce journey times by road on SCLR (from WEH & EEH). Value quantitative or 20 Minutes 16 Minutes 36 minutes Qualitative)

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Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 06/15/2011 Comments (incl. % Not Achieved because the construction works were not completed. achievement) Indicator 7 : To reduce delays at ATC controlled junctions Average reduction by 617 PCU hours/ hour 23.4% at 116 Value Reduction by (phase I:53 nodes)2,900 85 PCU hours/per intersections where quantitative or 10% PCU PCU hrs/ hour (phase II: hour new adaptive traffic Qualitative) hours/per hour 200 nodes) control system is functioning Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 06/15/2011 06/15/2011 Comments Achieved. The base line was originally set at 100 pcu hours/hour and revised as part of (incl. % the restructuring. achievement) Indicator 8 : To reduce working ratio (costs/incomes) of rail services. Value quantitative or 0.88 0.85 0.88 Qualitative) Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 06/15/2011 Comments (incl. % Not Achieved due to no changes in fare and significant increase in the operating cost. achievement) Indicator 9 : To increase cost recovery (income/costs) of bus services. Value quantitative or <0.9 >1 0.74 Qualitative) Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 06/15/2011 Comments Not Achieved due to (a) delay of depot commercialization, (b) unexpected popularity of (incl. % bus passes, and (c) increases in dearness allowance (due to inflation) and Voluntary achievement) Retirement Scheme payments for the abolished 530 posts. Indicator 10 : To increase % of PAH living in houses of at least 225 square feet. Value quantitative or 9% 100% 99.97 % Qualitative) Date achieved 11/06/2002 12/31/2007 06/15/2011 Comments (incl. % Achieved achievement) Indicator 11 : To increase % of PAH having access to individual tap water and toilets. Value quantitative or 1% 100% 99.97% Qualitative) Date achieved 11/06/2002 12/31/2007 06/15/2011 Comments (incl. % Achieved achievement) Indicator 12 : To increase the technical capacity of the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) in MCGM. Value Fully functional Training quantitative or No TMU. Training Completed TMU. Completed Qualitative) Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 06/15/2011 06/15/2011

Comments (incl. % Achieved achievement) To increase the technical capacity of transport planning, road maintenance and road Indicator 13 : safety so that new procedures to develop and implement the programs for which they are responsible are in place. Procedures in place for 15 qualified full time transportation professionals and planning and technical assistance New procedures in road safety. Value consultancies in place, to develop quantitative or Limited capacity place. and implement Road Qualitative) programs maintenance Road Maintenance study completed Management System and installed. recommendation accepted. Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 06/15/2011 06/15/2011 Comments (incl. % Achieved. The indicator was revised as part of the restructuring. achievement) Indicator 14 : To strengthen the ambient air quality monitoring and reporting system. Value Plan implemented as Three monitoring quantitative or No reliable reports per study stations being Qualitative) recommendations installed. Date achieved 11/06/2002 12/31/2004 06/15/2011 Comments (incl. % Achieved achievement) Indicator 15 : To develop capacity for management of resettlement implementation Reasonably well functional R&R MMRDA has division in established capacity MMRDA with to manage urban procedures in Value resettlement with Project R&R Unit created place. quantitative or rules and procedures with few staff in MMRDA Qualitative) in place; has been Various identified as the implementation nodal agency for procedures are R&R in Mumbai. adopted for non- MUTP projects. Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/15/2011 06/15/2011 Comments (incl. % Achieved. The indicator was added as part of the restructuring. achievement) Indicator 16 : To strengthen capacity for environmental management in urban infrastructure projects. Staffed trained Joint Project Director in in charge of Value environmental environment is in quantitative or No reliable reports. management place, working on Qualitative) with procedures MUTP and other in place. MMRDA

infrastructure projects. Other qualified staff is also intermittently available for environmental management. Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/15/2011 06/15/2011 Comments (incl. % Partially Achieved. The indicator was added as part of the restructuring. achievement)

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised Target approval Completion or Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : Complete DC to AC conversion of 645 line km. of suburban rail system. Value (quantitative 0 645 line km 645 line km or Qualitative) Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 06/15/2011 Comments Achieved. Despite the completion of the work, some sections cannot be commissioned (incl. % on AC traction because of non-availability of dual voltage AC-DC EMU rakes. achievement) Indicator 2 : Increase size of train fleet by 251 x 9-car rakes. Value 251 x 9-car rakes 285 x 9-car rakes (quantitative 200 x 9-car rakes (EMUs) (EMUs) (EMUs) or Qualitative) Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 06/15/2011 Comments (incl. % Achieved. achievement) Indicator 3 : Equip junctions with Area Traffic Control (ATC). Value 250 junctions 250 junctions (quantitative No junctions equipped. equipped. equipped. or Qualitative) Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 06/15/2011 Comments (incl. % Achieved. achievement) Indicator 4 : Increase length of urban arterial roads. Value 1. JVLR (only 4 lane road) 1. Additional 43 lane Additional 45 lane (quantitative 2. SCLR (portion not kms constructed. kms constructed or Qualitative) existing) 2. Works in progress Date achieved 11/06/2002 06/30/2008 06/15/2011 Comments 1. Achieved. (incl. % 2. Not Yet Achieved. achievement) Indicator 5 : Provide permanent housing with adequate physical amenities to 19,200 PAHs. Value N/A. 19,200 PAHs Total 1. 17,566 or 99.97%

(quantitative 19,394 PAHs families permanently or Qualitative) 1. 17,572 re-housed. households 2. 1,782 (97.8%) 2. 1,822 shops including 555 shops including large or medium size 566 large or shops. medium size shops Date achieved 11/06/2002 12/31/2004 06/15/2011 06/15/2011 Comments (incl. % Achieved. achievement)

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

Date ISR Actual Disbursements No. DO IP Archived (USD millions) 1 08/27/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 04/04/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 40.82 3 11/13/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 41.25 4 05/14/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 57.07 5 11/29/2004 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 78.17 6 05/24/2005 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 98.63 7 12/02/2005 Satisfactory 110.92 8 02/28/2006 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 133.88 9 10/04/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 178.64 10 04/11/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 194.73 11 08/20/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 198.05 12 04/04/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 214.50 13 09/18/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 232.09 14 03/12/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 279.37 15 09/17/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 327.02 16 04/15/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 375.43 17 11/21/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 422.08 18 05/27/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 437.25 19 06/27/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 439.36

H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Restructuring Disbursed at Reason for Restructuring & Key Approved PDO Date(s) Restructuring in Changes Made Change DO IP USD millions Interim extension for three months, from June 30, 2008 to September 06/17/2008 MS MU 226.59 30, 2008, to allow sufficient time to finalize the restructuring process. The Project was restructured in order to establish a more realistic 09/30/2008 Y MS MU 233.56 implementation schedule for the remainder of the project taking into account the reduced scope that can

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be financed by the IBRD loan as a result of the appreciation of the Indian Rupee compared to the US dollar. The closing date was extended to December 31, 2009. The closing date was extended to 12/30/2009 MS MS 347.61 June 15, 2010. The closing date was extended to 06/15/2010 MS MS 389.30 June 15, 2011. US$8 million was canceled from the IDA credit after the completion 04/27/2011 MS MS 431.49 of the components to be covered by the credit.

If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving body) enter ratings below: Outcome Ratings Against Original PDO/Targets Moderately Satisfactory Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets Moderately Satisfactory Overall (weighted) rating Moderately Satisfactory

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. At the time of appraisal of Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP), India’s urban population was growing and expected to increase from the 2002 level of 300 million to 410 million by 2010. The role of cities in the national economy was increasing, and the share of urban Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over national total had grown from 50 percent in the early 1990s to 60 percent in 2000. However, urban growth was also accompanied by a shift of poverty concentration from rural to urban areas. In 2002, about 70 million urban residents, accounting 23 percent of the total urban population, lived below the national poverty line.

2. The Indian urban transport sector was unprepared to face the issues accompanying rapid urbanization, namely: insufficient and inefficient public transport, fast motorization growth, heavy traffic congestion, poor road network and traffic safety, high transport-related pollution and above all very weak institutional arrangement to coordinate the work of government agencies within each metropolitan region. Furthermore, funding of the sector was insufficient. Urban infrastructure was primarily funded through budgetary support from the state budget and to a much lesser extent, local governments through their Five Year Plans. The private sector was not active in the sector in part due to lack of clear policy support and regulatory environment, as well as long gestation period and the massive size of capital investments.

3. Government’s Strategy: In 1998 the Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment (MUAE) endorsed a report entitled "Traffic and Transportation Policies and Strategies in Urban Areas in India", which reflected the current strategic thinking of the Union Government on urban transport issues. The Ministry of Urban Development (the successor to MUAE) adopted several of the key recommendations as their policy and decided to grant aid to cities which were ready to follow the policy. In a pioneer step in the country’s sector, the State Government of Maharashtra (GoM) accepted such conditions to improve the urban transport sector in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR).

4. Urbanization, Land Use and Transport System: MMR had a population of 14 million and an area of 1,467 sq. km. Its population was forecast to grow to 22 million by 2011. As the commercial and financial center of India, MMR generated about five percent of national GDP and contributed over one-third of India's tax revenues. At the center of MMR lies the City of Mumbai on an 18 km long peninsula running generally north to south. At the southern tip is the "island city" where the Central Business District (CBD) is located. This is a dominant employment center. The urban transport network is linear in a north-south direction along the peninsula, and there are very little east-west road links. Two suburban rail services and the three urban arterial roads were the backbones of MMR's transport system. Cross road links were less developed. The streets in most parts of Mumbai city were old and narrow, and their capacity was seriously

reduced by lack of adequate maintenance and appropriate management of traffic and parking. Public transport plays a dominant role in MMR. Rail and bus services combined carried 88 percent of the region's motorized personal trips. The suburban rail services carried a total of over six million passengers per day. Buses carried over 4.5 million passengers per day, 60 percent of whom transfer to rail.

5. Motorization, Future Travel Demand, and Comprehensive Transport Strategy: Responsibilities for the general direction of urban development and urban transport rested with the GoM through the Department of Urban Development and the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA), a regional agency in charge of land development and associated infrastructure services. To assess future travel demand and assist in policy formulation, a Comprehensive Transport Study (CTS) was carried out in 1994 under the auspices of MMRDA with Bank assistance. The objective was to develop a coherent transport strategy for 2011 linked with a rational land use plan. By 2011, motorized travel demand (and private car trips) were forecasted to increase by 50 percent over 1994 levels, with little change in mode share (excluding walking) for public transport (85 percent compared with 88 percent). The CTS considered four alternative strategies to meet the future travel demand: a "do minimum" strategy and three investment options. The investment options included two rail based options (comprising combinations of enhancement of existing corridors and construction of new corridors) and one road oriented option. All strategies were evaluated using economic, social, environmental, and performance criteria. The preferred strategy and a related short term implementation plan were then developed. The preferred strategy was to strengthen the public transportation system and put in place appropriate demand management measures in congested parts of MMR like the island city of Mumbai.

6. The GoM and Indian Railways (IR), Ministry of Railways accepted the general recommendations of the CTS strategy. CTS also evaluated and recommended a number of investment and policy actions for implementation. The priority actions included: (a) suburban rail capacity expansion; (b) improving east-west connectivity; (c) better parking controls and traffic demand management; and (d) improved road safety. The highest priority issues in Mumbai to be addressed by MUTP relate to the capacity and speed of rail services; decision making for rail services; and resettlement and rehabilitation (including land acquisition). The next priorities were east-west connectivity, traffic management, and road safety. Equally important issues, but of a lower priority, included bus services, pollution from motor vehicles, road maintenance, involvement of stakeholders, institutional and financing framework.

7. Capacity and Speed of Rail Services: Rail passengers suffered from some of the most severe overcrowding in the world (with 9 car trains carrying over 5,000 passengers at 16 persons per square meter against a normal capacity of 1,800) due to lack of track capacity, lack of trains etc. Squatter settlements near the rail right-of-way safety zone, and encroachers within it, seriously reduced train speeds, increased travel time, limited capacity and hampered track maintenance work. The fares for suburban rail service in Mumbai are among the lowest in the world on a passenger-km basis.

8. Decision making for Suburban Rail Services: Since the planning and provision of suburban rail services are the responsibility of IR, MMRDA had little influence over them. The allocation of resources for rail services is subject to the approval of the Planning Commission and IR. Two zonal railways, Western Railway (WR) and Central Railway (CR), operate within MMR as separate agencies with their own lines and no integration of services. These arrangements limited the responsiveness of the suburban rail system to users, as well as the participation of the state and city governments in the decision making process. During project preparation, the Mumbai Railway Vikas Corporation (MRVC), jointly owned by IR and GoM, was established to implement suburban rail improvement projects in MMR. A separate business and operating plan, including separation of costs for the suburban railway system, was developed with Bank assistance. The project design supported these initiatives to bring decision making for the suburban rail system closer to users and local authorities and to get the suburban railway system in Mumbai seen as a distinct business, with adequate funding. Setting up of MRVC was also considered as a first step towards eventual separation of the suburban services from main line operation.

9. Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R): Most infrastructure projects in MMR involve acquisition of land and consequently displacement of people, including residential and commercial squatters. Prior to MUTP, the state government did not have R&R policy and had limited institutional capacity for handling R&R matters. For MUTP, the planning for R&R measures started during preparation with a consultative process for developing a resettlement policy for the project. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) were engaged to assist in resettlement planning and to support implementation in view of their close engagement with slum communities in Mumbai. Given the large number of Project Affected Persons (PAP) to be relocated, the team initially considered to undertake the resettlement activity as a separate project. However, in order to align the resettlement activities with the civil works in an efficient manner, the resettlement activities were included in the project as a key component. This component of the project supported measures to improve the policy framework, institutional and implementation arrangements for R&R, as well as funding R&R activities. At Appraisal, the project was estimated to affect 19,228 households including both residential and commercial units.

10. Road Transport Issues in MMR: East-west road links were not well developed, and that limited the functionality of the overall primary road system. CTS recommended improving these as a priority action. In addition, the road system in Mumbai suffered from a lack of application of basic traffic management measures. The planning and implementation of traffic management schemes was a responsibility of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM). However the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) in MCGM had only just been re-established at project appraisal, and had little technical capacity for this important task without having Area Traffic Control (ATC) or operational manuals. The bus services within Mumbai were provided by a municipal company, the bus division of the Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking (BEST). BEST is considered to operate a good quality service when compared with similar undertakings in India with over 95 percent fleet utilization.

However, operating cost/km was high and cost recovery was around 80 percent (including provision for capital investment and depreciation). BEST bus operations were cross-subsidized by revenues from its electricity distribution business. Its management recognized the problems and prepared (at the Bank's request) a five year Business Plan, including measures to improve efficiency and reduce its costs as an operator. It instituted a series of cost-reduction measures, including "wet leasing" (bus with driver) or gross cost contracting out (BEST conductor collects the revenue) of bus operations and a Voluntary Redundancy Scheme (VRS). The project included Technical Assistance (TA) to assist BEST in developing and implementing these and other reform measures. The BEST bus fleet was aging and while existing buses were not gross polluters, emission levels were higher than desired standards. There was a need to develop a new generation of urban buses to better meet user needs and higher emission standards.

11. Pollution: Air quality in Mumbai is generally poor. Air quality monitoring showed that oxides of nitrogen (NOx) exceeded the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) at certain road junctions. Suspended Particulate Matter (SPM) and Particulate Matter (PM) less than 10 microns in size (PM 10) exceeded NAAQS at almost all residential and industrial locations and at road junctions. Motor vehicle emissions were estimated to be responsible for 70 percent of this pollution, however no systematic study existed. Existing vehicle emission standards were poorly enforced. In response to a Public Interest Litigation in December 1999, Bombay High Court had constituted a committee under the chairmanship of the Transport Commissioner to recommend measures for reducing urban air pollution in Mumbai.

12. Road maintenance: Within Mumbai, road maintenance rests with MCGM. Some of the arterials through the city are maintained by the PWD. About 6.5 percent to 7 percent of the total budget and expenditure of MCGM is for operating and maintaining roads, bridges and traffic management. Based on rough estimates for preparation of a report for quantifying road user charges it was estimated that budget provision by MCGM corresponded to about 5 percent of actual needs. MCGM lacked modern computer-based tools for maintenance planning and budgeting.

13. Institutional Weaknesses: It is not uncommon in a mega-city like Mumbai that many institutions are involved in urban transport. The central issue is that the responsibilities assigned to different agencies did not seem to effectively respond to the changing needs, and the mechanism for multi-agency coordination was weak. The institutional mechanisms for implementing the integrated CTS policies still needed to be developed.

14. Involvement of stakeholders: Mumbai has an active media and a vibrant civil society representing groups across the income spectrum. NGOs were able to contribute to effective consultation with the affected squatters living in slums. However, such interaction with NGOs was limited as the borrower had no established mechanism for engaging with CSOs and citizen groups on a sustained basis. The project authorities eventually recognized the scope for a deeper involvement of NGOs in implementation, monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

15. Funding: Funding arrangements for urban transport infrastructure and services in Mumbai are split between a number of national, state and local government agencies. No single agency had the role or responsibility for preparing integrated investment and operations budgets which meet travel demands and policy objectives, optimize the use of scarce resources, and are affordable. Overall levels of investment had been lagging demand (most notably on the railways).

16. Project Rationale: Transport development in a mega-city such as Mumbai is a complex, multi-faceted, continuous and long-term process. CTS’ recommended strategy and priority actions provided the framework for the design of this project. However, it was not possible for either the Bank or the Mumbai authorities to tackle all the issues in five years or in a single project. Decisions based on professional and value judgments had to be made. The project addressed, to varying extents, most of the key sector issues and the critical areas where actions needed to be initiated. It was particularly designed to support the urgently needed physical investments in the rail and road system, and to strengthen the institutional capacities required for sustainable transport development, particularly in traffic management, the bus system, road safety, emission control and R&R. The project was seen by the Borrower and the Bank, as the first in a series of loans through which the Bank would support transport and institutional development in a programmatic manner. The timing and volume of future loans would be based on evaluation of impacts of the project and the commitment of the counterpart agencies involved.

1.2 Original PDO and Key Indicators (as approved)

17. The PDO was to facilitate urban economic growth and improve quality of life by fostering the development of an efficient and sustainable urban transport system including effective institutions in MMR.

18. Key performance indicators: The achievement of the project development objective were measured through the ability of the project to (a) meet user needs; (b) improve system efficiency; (c) bring about sustainable improvements; and (d) make institutions more effective. The key performance indicators for these project-specific objectives were: (a) rail travel comfort, substantially improved; incidence and severity of pedestrian traffic accidents reduced; (b) suburban rail service frequency and train availability enhanced; road journey times and junction delays reduced; (c) improvement in public transport cost recovery; poor households resettled satisfactorily from hazardous slum/squatter areas to permanent housing with improved living condition; and (d) increased technical capacity for planning, traffic management, road safety, road maintenance, air quality monitoring and vehicle emission control. (See Section F of Data Sheet)

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

19. The PDO was not revised. The values of the Key Indicators were formally revised, however, during the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of October 17, 2005, and in the 2008 Project Restructuring to reflect the slow progress, elimination of some of the activities and to adjust them to better reflect the implementation.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

20. The primary target groups and benefits are presented below:

Benefits Beneficiaries Enhanced rail and bus system capacity, improved Rail commuters and other travelers in MMR efficiency and service quality. currently representing over 80 percent of the public traveling on motorized means of transport.

Reduced congestion, travel times and delays for All road users but in particular commercial vehicles road traffic on project corridors/areas on enhanced east-west roads and Road over Rail Bridges (ROB) and buses, and bus users through bus fleet and BEST enhancement. Provision of title to house with improved basic Families that had to relocate or will be affected amenities and opportunities for economic through displacement or through change in their rehabilitation. economic status due to the involuntary resettlement.

Reduced emissions from buses and other intensively Entire population of MMR but in particular, used road vehicles; improved safety conditions pedestrians and those living on or near main traffic routes. Enhanced institutional capacity to plan, operate, All involved institutions in the sector; benefits manage and maintain the transport system. should flow through to all transport users through better services.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

21. A summary of the main components of the project, together with their costs, are listed below. A detailed description by component is presented in Section F of Data Sheet.

(a) Rail Transport (US$ 654.30 million): This component aims to improve the capacity and performance of the suburban rail system through service efficiency improvements, (increasing existing track capacity, Direct Current (DC) to Alternating Current (AC) conversion, improving signaling, electrical and telecommunication systems), procurement of new rolling stock and upgrading of existing rolling stock, and expanding network capacity. The component would also support studies and TA, amongst other things, to improve the maintenance capabilities of IR for their railway tracks and rolling stock, the (FM) and control systems, the railway safety and Quality Assurance systems.

(b) Road-based Transport (US$ 183.00 million): This component will support increases in the capacity, efficiency and safety of the road network, better facilities for pedestrians, improvements to the operating efficiency and quality of bus services, and reductions in motor vehicle emission levels. It will also strengthen the capacity of the responsible agencies to plan, deliver, maintain and operate efficiently road based urban transport infrastructure and services. Subcomponents will: (i) support traffic management programs including ATC to optimize the functioning of traffic signals, pedestrian facilities, Station Area Traffic Improvement Schemes (SATIS) and parking control; (ii) increase the road network functionality by improving two east-west link roads and eliminating the main road level crossings across railway tracks; (iii) improve the bus system through support of organizational reforms, efficiency measures and procurement of environment and user friendly buses; and (iv) strengthen the capacity of transport agencies in Mumbai in road in traffic management, road maintenance, road safety, and communication, and air quality monitoring as well as providing TA for updating of the CTS, review of User Charges, and developing a Motor Vehicle Emission Control Strategy (MVECS).

(c) Resettlement & Rehabilitation (R&R) (US$ 100 million): This component will enable GoM to undertake the timely implementation of the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) and resettle those affected by investments under the rail and road based transport components. It will also provide assistance to those displaced to improve their overall living standards. This component is to be financed through IDA funding. It will provide for the procurement of about 19,200 housing units and shops to resettle PAHs. In response to the Bombay High Court Order to relocate encroachers on the Harbor Line by March 2001, actions were taken under agreed procedures, with the expectation by GoM of retroactive financing from the Bank. Actions taken before the start of the project included: (a) Already built houses had been purchased to permanently resettle 3,935 PAHs; (b) 6,125 transit houses had been built as an interim measure to provide transit accommodation for around three years; and (c) 107 petty shopkeepers were also offered alternative shops in the new sites to re-establish their lost shops. The other expenses under this component include the acquisition of a limited amount of land for civil works, reconstruction of some of the basic civic amenities for the left over population and payment of compensation for increased distance to work place and permanent loss of livelihood opportunities. The TA under this component includes consultancies for baseline surveys, preparation of Resettlement Implementation Plans (RIP), supervision consultants, NGO support for implementation, and training of project staff/NGOs involved with the implementation.

1.6 Revised Components

22. Revisions were made to the project components at the request of the Borrower. As a result of project restructuring of 2008, some of the subcomponents were dropped and a few added. The main revisions are summarized below:

23. Rail Component: (a) The track laying related to the addition of a 5th line on the Western Railway corridor between Santa-Cruz and Mahim was dropped and the scope of the project was limited to off-line works; (b) Modification of the Harbor Line flyover at Mahim was dropped. These activities are not financed by the Bank, but from counterpart funding.

24. Road Component: (a) SATIS was dropped. Six of them were included in the original scope and had been reduced to four at MTR because of cost increases. These schemes were still at the design stage; (b) Three ROBs that were meant to facilitate the elimination of level crossings along the Western and the Central Railway corridors were dropped. No construction works had yet been started for these facilities; (c) The number of PGSS was reduced from six to two (retained from the original 26 foreseen at the outset). The construction works for two of the deleted PGSS, which had significantly started, were stopped and the original condition of safety was restored; (d) Provision for traffic management improvements developed as part of the TA to TMU of MCGM was dropped. This activity had not started; (e) Assistance to be given to the traffic police to strengthen the accident recording system and black spot improvement scheme was dropped. This activity had not started; (f) TA to be given to the Transport Commissioner’s office for vehicular emission control was dropped; (g) Installation of an efficiency monitoring system (EMS) in all buses was added. It consists of procuring additional bus equipment intended to improve the efficiency of the fleet of BEST; and (h) Procurement of a Management Information System (MIS) for the operation of BEST transport department was also added.

25. R&R Component: Buildings that had been procured but will not be used to house project affected people were dropped. GoM reimbursed to MUTP IDA Credit the funds provided for procurement of these buildings. The remaining balance of IDA after disbursement for the activities planned as part of the R&R Component estimated at about US$23 million, including the amount freed up by the reimbursement related to the unused buildings, which is estimated at INR 310 million, i.e. US$8 million or SDR 5 million. US$23 million of the available IDA balance was to be used to finance activities under the Rail Component and the remaining balance for other eligible activities. The Borrower was to reimburse to IDA the amount of INR 310 million corresponding to the construction cost of the buildings dropped from the project. This reimbursement was to be effected before the same amount is made available by IDA for the rail activities and before December 31, 2008.

1.7 Other significant changes

26. Inspection Panel and Temporary Suspension of the Road and R&R components: Following several complaints by project affected persons to the World Bank’s Inspection Panel in 2004 the Panel, authorized by the Bank’s Board, undertook an inspection of MUTP (see also paragraphs 49 - 52). On March 28, 2006, the Executive Directors discussed the findings of the Inspection Panel’s Investigation Report and the Management Report and Recommendations on MUTP. The Board endorsed the Management Report’s Action Plan that had been prepared in close consultation with

GoM and requested a periodical update on progress made in its implementation. At the beginning of March 2006, Management had suspended funding of two components (Road and R&R) of the project, in light of concerns regarding the equitable R&R of the people affected by the road component.

27. The GoM substantially met the Bank’s conditions to address the outstanding issues, and the suspension was lifted on June 29, 2006. One condition, completion of negotiations with the Santa-Cruz-Chembur Link Road (SCLR) shopkeepers, was waived because: (a) the RIP for SCLR, including a satisfactory set of procedures for negotiation, had been finalized and disclosed; (b) negotiations had started; and (c) further extension of the suspension might have given shopkeepers unrealistic expectations of extensive rehabilitation beyond the set of alternatives agreed upon between the Bank and the GoM. However, Management informed the Borrower that it would maintain active supervision of the project and that it might have to seek remedies, including suspension of the balance of the loan, if resettlement activities were not carried out in conformity with the agreed procedures. Bank Management presented to the Board five progress reports on the implementation of the Action Plan with the last one submitted in November 2011. The progress reports noted that MMRDA had made noteworthy progress in reaching mutually-acceptable and compliant solutions with the shopkeepers and recorded the clear progress made on a number of management indicators related to: shifting of shopkeepers, registration of cooperative housing societies of the PAP, issuance of identity cards to PAPs, transfer of community facilities to cooperative societies and strengthening MMRDA’s management capacity by filling up key staff positions and outsourcing technical expertise for resettlement-related activities, and the efficient management of post-resettlement support activities including housing management training, and livelihood support for the resettled PAPs. The report also noted that the Independent Monitoring Panel (IMP) had been playing an important role in contributing to better outcomes, monitoring, and quality assurance.

28. Project Restructuring in 2008: On March 10, 2008, GoM submitted a request to restructure MUTP and extend the closing date. This request was transmitted to the Bank by the national government on March 31, 2008. After analysis of the request, the Project Agreement had a “second order restructuring” without changing the PDO. The proposed changes aimed at establishing a more realistic implementation schedule for the remainder of the project taking into account the reduced scope that can be financed by the IBRD loan as a result of the appreciation of the Indian Rupee compared to the US dollar. Progress had been slow in all components and most of the activities would require an extension of the implementation period beyond what is an acceptable extension of project closing date. Instead, the restructuring focused on the project activities that are critical for the achievement of the PDO and provided additional emphasis to complete the activities and ensure relevant outcomes within the extended period of the loan/credit. An interim extension for three months, from June 30, 2008 to September 30, 2008, was made to allow sufficient time to finalize the restructuring process, and the loan restructuring was approved by the Board on September 30, 2008, to extend the period by 15 months to December 31, 2009. Two additional extensions were granted on December 30, 2009 and

June 15, 2010 making the final closing date at June 15, 2011, and a minor restructuring was approved on April 26, 2011 cancelling a small part of the IDA credit

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

29. Project quality at entry was moderately satisfactory for the reasons described below: (a) The background analysis that supported the project design was solid because it was fully aligned with the FY02-04 Country Strategy by supporting its main pillars: equity, sustainability, competitiveness, and sound macro-economic management. It was also aligned with the GoM’s strategy for the sector and the priorities established in the CTS study for MMR. More specifically, the Project supported the infrastructure investments and policy reforms required to improve the level-of-service offered to public transport users, increase traffic safety and management, strengthen institutions involved in the sector thereby contributing to economic growth and poverty alleviation by improving accessibility of low-income segments of the population to jobs, educational and health facilities.

(b) The project incorporated in its design the lessons from several Bank-financed projects in urban transport in India, Brazil (where similar programs were underway) and elsewhere, such as the need to include institutional strengthening, institutional coordination, creating an enabling environment for private sector participation in the sector, fostering design and continuous updating of long-term integrated urban transport, land use and air quality strategies for MMR and ensuring adequate training and TA to increase the likelihood of sustainability of the proposed investments and policy reforms.

(c) The project team worked hard during preparation to ensure that the different levels of government were committed to the Project and, the team was partly responsible for the creation of MRVC, a pioneer milestone in India’s urban rail sector. Project preparation appropriately recognized that successful project implementation required extensive coordination of the several institutions involved in the project. However, the Project Appraisal Document might have underestimated the high cumulative risks faced when so many institutions from different levels of government are involved in project implementation under the umbrella of a nascent institution (MMRDA) which required probably more time to mature and be fully in charge of the project. Also the implementation delays due to the huge number of people to be relocated and procurement-related issues appear to have also been underestimated. Nevertheless, these risks are unavoidable in a metropolitan region with multiple agencies responsible for the transport sector and large concentration of people and businesses. Therefore, the risks can be mitigated only during implementation, leading to the delays experienced in the road component.

(d) The project was otherwise solidly conceived from a technical standpoint. Several project alternatives were considered and the reasons for their rejection were clearly spelled out. Amongst the project alternatives analyzed were : (i) project scope, by evaluating the best priorities set out in the 1994 CTS; (ii) size of project was discussed to find the most adequate package of investments to attack the most pressing needs but recognizing that there would be much more to do in the sector; (iii) R&R matters on whether they should or should not have been included in the project or treated separately; (iv) selection of rail schemes that would maximize ridership and increase level-of-service and safety; (v)selection of road schemes that would maximize east-west connectivity; (vi) reform of rail operations, particularly the options to make MRVC as autonomous as possible from IR; (vii) reform of bus operations by considering options to improve BEST level-of-service and cost efficiency; (viii) Air Quality Management options to design a strategy and monitor air quality; and (ix) the options and timing for the creation of a Mumbai Metropolitan Transport Authority

30. A broad variety of risks were evaluated during project preparation and appropriate mitigation measures were considered, among the most important:

(a) Delays in the procurement of consultants, contractors and suppliers: This was mitigated by ensuring that procurement plans prepared were realistic and bid documents for first year project components were already prepared and close monitoring of the procurement process. Despite all these mitigation measures procurement both in the rail and road components was often protracted either because Bank guidelines were not well known or because of changes requested by the implementation agencies which were not in line with the guidelines; or in other cases such as MRVC because of the very long process of procurement clearance which involved several levels of IR up to the Minister’s office;

(b) Delays in the transfer of funds from GoM and IR to MMRDA and MRVC: The adequate funds flow was agreed at negotiations and this seems to have been satisfactory;

(c) Delayed delivery of quality works, services and equipment: Use of independent engineers and supervision consultants to review and audit quality of works and work program. This mitigatory measure was insufficient to ensure quality particularly at MCGM;

(d) Weak cooperation of several agencies involved: The mitigation measure was the creation of a high-powered Steering Committee and a Project Coordinating Committee (PCC). In retrospect, this was not enough and maybe would have worked better if MMRDA had been supported by a full time Project Management Oversight Consultant as later was done for the SCLR;

(e) Non commitment of IR to agree action plans: The mitigatory action was the creation of MRVC as an implementing agency for the rail component. This was

clearly not enough because MRVC could not approve major projects without clearances from all levels of IR and the process was fraught with delays and disagreements;

(f) Risks which were overlooked were project costs and time overruns due to several reasons, such as delays, and currency fluctuation; lack of capacity and empowerment of MMRDA to manage aggressively all the components and takeover any component such as the road component when MCGM and Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC) were not delivering. Finally, although efforts were made to have the first year program ready by project appraisal, the risks of poor coordination of engineering design and R&R, and the risk of weak project engineering design were possibly underestimated.

31. On balance, the quality at entry is judged as moderately satisfactory because some of the risks were underestimated, although as mentioned above, they were unavoidable.

2.2 Implementation

32. The Board approved the Loan and Credit for MUTP on June 18, 2002 for US$463 million and SDR 62.5million respectively, equivalent to US$542 million. The loan became effective on November 6, 2002. A MTR was held on October 17, 2005 and a “second order” restructuring of the project was approved on September 30, 2008. As mentioned above, Management suspended temporarily the road and R&R components on March 2006 and after a thorough Inspection Panel investigation, the suspension was lifted on June 2006. The original closing date was June 30, 2008 and the actual closing date was June 15, 2011, therefore roughly 3 years later than originally planned. The DO was only once considered unsatisfactory in 2006 but the IP was unsatisfactory or moderately unsatisfactory from 2006 to 2008, when the restructuring took place. Since the restructuring and the lifting of the suspension, the IP rating has been moderately satisfactory.

33. During the 2006-2008, the Project at Risk status applied. The MTR was very thorough and resulted in very specific recommendations for action by GoM. There was no Quality of Supervision Assessment by QAG. The main implementation problems faced by the project were: (a) Long delays in the procurement process particularly in the rail component which delayed the availability of the new trains and the conversion of DC to AC; (b) Weak coordination between road engineering design and the R&R component which affected both the JVLR and the SCLR road links, particularly the latter which was not concluded at project closure; (c) Lack of a project management oversight consultant at MMRDA level capable of quickly identify potential delays, weak implementation links and assistance to MMRDA on how to deal with the issues at a higher level; (d) Inability of MRVC or IR to use the “empowered committee” status to simplify procurement process of the rail component and make quicker decisions; and (e) inefficient project engineering design by outside consultants who often overlooked important aspects such as the proper identification of utility networks, thereby choosing the wrong construction methods.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

34. M&E Design: Achievement of the PDO was measured through the ability of the project to (a) meet user needs; (b) improve system efficiency; (c) bring about sustainable improvements; and (d) make institutions more effective. The key performance indicators for these project-specific objectives were: (a) rail travel comfort substantially improved; incidence and severity of pedestrian traffic accidents reduced; (b) suburban rail service frequency and train availability enhanced; road journey times and junction delays reduced; (c) improvement in public transport cost recovery; poor households resettled satisfactorily from hazardous slum/squatter areas to permanent housing with improved living conditions; and (d) increased technical capacity for planning, traffic management, road safety, road maintenance, air quality monitoring and vehicle emission control. Annex 2 provides a summary of these output indicators by subcomponent and Section F of the Datasheet aggregates them into the three components of the project.

35. M&E Implementation and Utilization: The Project team appropriately used the physical and financial output indicators to supervise the progress of the works and the delivery of equipment. To measure the institutional development progress and compliance with related covenants, the semi-annual monitoring reports included useful updates on the progress of the studies and TA financed by the project. The ISRs were timely and the main ones included a comprehensive aide-memoire as an attachment, and they systematically reported on the M&E indicators to support recommendations or inform management decision making.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

2.4.1 Procurement

36. The project closed with a moderately satisfactory rating on procurement implementation. The procurement component was well designed and supervised but the capacity of some of the implementing agencies involved adequately to follow procurement process schedule and clearance deadlines agreed at appraisal caused some delays. In some cases, the procurement processing agreements made at appraisal were not followed. For example, the award decisions of several contracts were taken beyond the agreed schedules. MRVC, as the major implementation entity in the project, was delegated authority by Indian Railway to take procurement decisions for contracts up to a value of Rs. 1,000 million (US$20 million). Most of the contracts except the one for the procurement of Electrical Multiple Units (EMUs) and kits were within the threshold of the US$20 million. Bids within this limit were to be evaluated by a tender committee consisting of 3 officers constituted by MRVC (empowered committee) and the recommendations approved by the Director of the Corporation. MRVC had agreed on a timetable for completion of the evaluation within 75 days of bid opening. In the case of the Electric Multiple Unit (EMU) contract, valued over US$200 million, the bid evaluation would be carried out by a committee of MRVC and Research Designs and Standards Organization (RDSO) and forwarded to Indian Railway Board for review and

approval of recommendations. MRVC/IR agreed on a timetable for completion of various stages of the bid evaluation and award of contract to ensure that the contract would be awarded within 150 days of bid opening. Unfortunately, most contracts including the Procurement of EMU Rolling Stocks took much longer than the 75- 150 days. The EMU contract got stuck because of disagreements with the supplier which took quite a long time to resolve, despite clearances provided by the Bank, resulting in serious delays in project completion. The time to complete the procurement processes were long and affected the outcome of the project. They should have been corrected through high-level communication between the high level officers of MMRDA and IR. Also, it seems that, at times, lack of clarity on applying Bank guidelines being different from procurement practices in IR had contributed to confusion, and requests were made that the Bank could not approve, and in some cases led to mis-procurement.

37. In the case of other agencies such as MCGM and MSRDC the procurement lead times were also much higher than expected. In the case of the ATC procurement the process had to be repeated because the first attempt was non-responsive and the second took long due to anonymous complaints about the award which needed to be investigated. Several procurement reviews of contracts without prior review were undertaken by the team to ensure compliance with Bank guidelines. It appears that despite a well prepared procurement plan and agreements made at appraisal, some of the major procurement that started early enough could not be taken to conclusion due to cost considerations resulting in inordinate delays in implementation. Subsequent procurement also got delayed substantially as a result. In other areas, like the SCLR, work orders were given sometimes before resettlement was completed and this resulted in delays to make available the work zone to the contractor. Contracts Management potential was also an issue that contributed to the large cost and time overruns in several cases.

2.4.2 Financial Management

38. FM of the project was handled mainly by two agencies: MRVC (responsible for the rail component) and MMRDA (responsible for the road component and R&R). MMRDA also had the role of coordinating with MRVC and BEST, MCGM and MSRDC. In terms of FM compliance, acceptable FM reports and annual project audit reports were submitted regularly by both agencies and reviewed by the Bank. In some cases, audit reports were submitted with delays resulting in temporary Statement of Expenditure (SOE) based suspensions of disbursement of the road component.

39. MRVC showed sufficient FM capacity except for some instances of miscommunication with the Bank in respect of allocation of Special Commitment (SC) payments between GoM and MoR and misunderstanding of general financial rules of the Government of India (GoI) which required MRVC to deposit the rupee equivalent of SC payments with Controller of Aid Accounts and Audit (CAAA) in time. The internal controls in MRVC were strengthened by entity wide internal audit.

40. MMRDA struggled with FM issues early during project implementation, but improved in the later part of the project. The root causes were (a) insufficient institutional capacity in part due to the delay in appointing accounting professionals; (b) complex funds flow mechanism which resulted in funds transfers between the implementing agencies and book adjustments in order to apportion the funds and expenditure equally between GoM and MoR; and (c) financial arrangements with participating executing agencies (MCGM, BEST and MSRDC) which required timely and proper reconciliations. MMRDA appointed an accounting professional towards project closing and also intensified their efforts on FM with the Bank’s support.

41. The Bank’s FM team played an active and hands-on role in training and guiding the implementing agencies in the proper implementation of the Bank’s FM requirements. The ISR rating moved between moderately satisfactory and moderately unsatisfactory (at the time of SOE suspension), closing as moderately satisfactory.

2.4.3 Environmental Safeguards and Management

42. The project closed with a moderately satisfactory performance on environmental aspects due to the mixed performance from the implementing agencies to a well-thought- out and balanced set activities that were expected to be implemented / supported under the project.

43. During project preparation it was determined that the activities triggered OP4.01 Environmental Assessment, OP4.04 Natural Habitats, and OP4.11 Cultural Resources. The project envisaged a substantial thrust in improving air quality management in Mumbai, in addition to protecting the mangrove habitat and management of construction related adverse impacts, including safe working practices in congested urban settings. Separate environmental management plans were prepared and adopted for each activity and the project was selected for a Green Award for its treatment of environmental issues in the preparation phase.

44. For the Road Component, the deployment of environmental officers by the Construction Supervision Consultants helped the contractors confirm the implementation of the Environmental Management Plan (EMP) aspects related to their works in a timely manner for the initial phases. MMRDA and MSRDC were pragmatic in dealing with short-comings and worked with the Contractor teams to ensure that key environmental responsibilities were discharged in a timely manner, including taking extreme steps such as removal of errant sub-contractors for tree plantation/transplantation. However, some issues like the continued delay in monitoring of construction sites for air quality and provision of adequate facilities for workers in contractors’ camps persisted during latter half of project implementation. In particular, the removal of a batching plant which was temporarily sanctioned for the project became an issue and the site continued to be used by another contractor despite the original agreement on its removal following completion of works in that stretch of the road. The tree transplantation from JVLR and by the Railways received positive feedback even from local journalists and environmental activists. The compensatory plantation for the mangroves and trees in lieu of those

adversely impacted by the project has been successful to a considerable extent. For instance, for JVLR I and III, out of the total of about 1,550 transplanted trees, over 1,400 survived, and out of the about 2,200 planted as compensation, the survival was just under 2,000 trees.

45. For the Rail Component, MRVC benefited substantially from the capacity building initiative on environmental aspects under the project and in addition to the practical training for staff, the assignment also sensitized the organization to environmental management issues. During implementation of MUTP, MRVC’s management system has been separately confirmed to be adequate for ISO 14001 certification. MRVC was also successful in planting more than 12,000 mangroves.

46. For R&R component, following the action plan agreed in response to the findings of the Inspection Panel, a detailed monitoring mechanism for ensuring key environmental facilities was implemented. Due to the proactive collaboration between its R&R and Environmental Cell, MMRDA has confirmed that almost all the activities have been implemented before the handover to MCGM began. In one temporary rehabilitation site or transit camp in Mankhurd, the action plan implementation for compliance with the Coastal Regulatory Zone notification with regard to the removal of toilet block within the zone continued to be delayed due to the fact that the site is still utilized by MMRDA for other projects.

47. The use of environmental management capacity building consultants was quite effective in parts where MRVC was involved, and where studies/pilots for MMRDA were carried out. However, the continued augmentation of environmental management capacity at MMRDA has been a challenge due to the multiple responsibilities handled by Joint Project Director for Environment during the course of project implementation and lack of support staff in the cell. MMRDA partially overcame this by deploying qualified staff to the Environment Cell, but their frequent rotation/movement, as more interesting opportunities were available to them, both within MMRDA and beyond, remained a persistent issue. Procurement of 3 ambient air quality monitoring stations, which are to be installed in the project influence area to support the development and operation of a Mumbai-wide ambient air quality monitoring network, was also completed. The noteworthy feature of this activity is the close collaboration between MMRDA and the Maharashtra Pollution Control Board, which would receive the data simultaneously and share the costs of equipment in the operation and maintenance (O&M) period, contributing to the sustainability of this activity.

2.4.4 Social Aspects

48. At the time of appraisal in 2002, the magnitude of displacement triggered by MUTP was unprecedented in an urban context in India. At the time of Appraisal, it was estimated that the project would displace 19,228 households, or roughly 100,000 people, a majority of whom lived in informal settlements in challenging circumstances along roads and railway tracks. In view of its size, it was initially planned to undertake the resettlement activity as a separate project, however, it was retained as a component of

MUTP in order for better alignment with civil works, In compliance with the Bank’s Policies, the GoM adopted a project specific R&R policy to provide compensation and assistance to the affected people. A project RAP summarizing the magnitude of resettlement impacts on various socio-economic and land use categories, results of baseline surveys, entitlement framework, and implementation arrangements including grievance redress, monitoring and evaluation was prepared. Based on the RAP, specific RIPs were prepared for each sub-project prior to undertaking civil work. Consultations with the affected population groups were an important element in the process of planning and designing the project. The affected communities were involved at different stages of project preparation and implementation. A special Resettlement Cell was established manned with professional staff and led by senior officer and services of NGOs long engaged in urban slums hired to facilitate consultation with and participation of PAP groups in R&R on an ongoing basis. A two stage grievance redress system was established comprising representatives from the implementing agencies and NGOs with IMP appointed for overall quality monitoring. Public Information Centers (PICs) were established at the PMU (MMRDA) and at different project locations offering access to key project documents and information brochures. These included key documents such as RAP, RIP, other notifications, Implementation Manual and the list of eligible PAPs, which were also disclosed on MMRDA’s web site. The Project was able to relocate quickly over 6,000 households living along railway tracks with the help of community mobilization support from NGOs. However, as the implementation progressed, the client’s relative inexperience and the NGOs’ limited capacity stymied efficient management of complexities associated with relocating large shopkeepers, land owners and religious structures. (See Annex 8 for more details.)

49. Requests for Inspection triggered by resettlement grievances. The implementation of R&R, especially for the road projects, experienced delays due to difficult situations on the ground. The Inspection Panel received four Requests for Inspection submitted on behalf of several hundred residents and shopkeepers in 2004. The Requests questioned: (a) adequacy of resettlement options and income restoration opportunities provided in the MUTP R&R Policy, especially for shopkeepers; (b) suitability and quality of resettlement sites; (c) poor housing and living conditions in the resettlement sites; and (d) access to information, disclosure, consultation, and grievance redress process.

50. Panel Investigation. The Inspection Panel undertook an investigation and issued its findings in its December 2005 Investigation Report and found areas of noncompliance by the Bank with various aspects of its operational policies concerning environmental assessment (OD 4.01), involuntary resettlement (OD 4.30), investment lending-identification to Board presentation (OP/BP 10.00); economic evaluation (OP/BP 10.04), project supervision (OD/OP/BP 13.05), project appraisal (OMS 2.20) and the Bank policy on disclosure.

51. Management Report and Action Plan. Management in its Response prepared an Action Plan to improve the quality and outcome of R&R implementation. The Action Plan was included in the Management Report and Recommendation submitted to the

Board and was discussed and approved by the Executive Directors on March 28, 2006. The Action Plan focused on implementation issues, including the resettlement procedures for shopkeepers with medium- and large-size shops, restoration of incomes, post- resettlement services, baseline data, grievance redress mechanisms, and the quality of supervision. The Board endorsed Management’s Action Plan, which was prepared in close consultation with GoM, and agreed that an update report would be provided periodically on progress made in its implementation. The Bank has been implementing the Action Plan in collaboration with the Borrower, GoM, since March 2006.

52. The Bank suspended disbursements in March 2006, in part due to concerns regarding equitable resettlement and rehabilitation of the PAPs. The Bank and GoM worked during the suspension period to resolve the issues raised by the Inspection Panel and the suspension was lifted in June 2006 following implementation by the borrower of a 10-Point Action Plan, which substantially addressed outstanding R&R issues. The few instances of evictions, especially along SCLR, were resolved in a timely manner with appropriate remedial measures. Several steps were taken to improve the quality of the R&R process, including finalization and disclosure of implementation Manual, improved data base management, disclosure of updated baseline surveys and RIPs prior to relocation, regular implementation reporting, distribution of identity cards among the PAPs, establishing procedures for relocating affected religious/ community structures through negotiations, streamlining of the grievance redress committees, strengthening of the post resettlement support to PAPs and reconstitution of IMP, which has effectively monitored the resettlement activities.

53. To date Management has submitted five progress reports on the implementation of the Action Plan to the Board. The latest report submitted in November, 2011, has confirmed that the measures listed in the Action Plan were for the most part completed before the Project’s closing date of June 15, 2011 and recorded the few remaining actions which include 40 shopkeepers, six residence and three religious structures.

R&R Implementation Status (October 15, 2011)

Unit Type Totals (Baseline) Revised Totals Resettled Remaining cases (Baseline) (as of 10/15/11) Households 17,572 17,566 6 17,378 100.0% 99.97% 0.03% Shops 1,822 1,782 40 2,469 100.0% 97.8% 2.20% of which 566 555 11 800 > 225 sq.ft. 100.0% 98.06% 1.94% 19,394 19,348 46 Total 19,847 100.0% 99.76% 0.24%

54. There was a paradigm shift in the Approach to Resettlement Management with Several Adjustments and Improvements in the Policy Procedures during Project Implementation. The implementing agency substantially changed its approach to resettlement after 2006 in order to break the deadlock with large shopkeepers, resident land owners and custodians of religious/community structures. This involved several steps including substantial readjustments in policy procedures; improvements in services provided to the PAPs during and after relocation; and changes in implementation management strategies. Some of the changes in policy procedures broadening resettlement options beyond the MUTP R&R Policy include: (a) offering equal alternative built up area to resident shop owners and acquiring land through Memorandum of Understanding (MoU); (b) approving resettlement of large shopkeepers and legal residents through private redevelopment schemes through negotiations between PAPs and developers; (c) in situ resettlement of multi-storey residential buildings providing almost double the existing floor area; (d) offering commercial/residential tenements of equivalent area to displaced community facilities (schools, libraries, prayer halls) in resettlement colonies through redevelopment; (e) provision of alternative housing for squatters in host communities and construction assistance for relocating religious structures; and (f) re-establishing grievance redress procedure with scope of jurisdiction and time frame. New implementation procedures established include: (a) procedure for resettling PAPs for sub-projects dropped from project scope as part of restructuring; (b) procedure for resettlement of shopkeepers in the event of failure of negotiations; (c) procedure for allowing retention of partially affected structures; (d) exit strategy for handing over the resettlement buildings to the PAPs; and (e) consultation with PAPs regarding relocation and Bank’s prior review of lists of people to be resettled in order to ensure policy compliance.

55. A central feature of the MUTP R&R process was measures taken to promote self-management of resettlement buildings and sites by the PAPs. Services provided to the PAPs in resettlement sites include: schools, health care/community center, roads and street lights, water supply and transport, and drainage. The project authorities provided mainstreaming support to the PAPs after relocation, enabling them to access municipal services including health care, education, electricity, waste management, public distribution systems, and citizen (voter) identity cards. The PAPs were relocated to multi-storey buildings at several sites, which they will have to own and manage collectively as a part of housing cooperatives. A post-resettlement support strategy was prepared and implemented with the help of a professional consultant, emphasizing registration of PAP housing cooperatives and provision of training and financial assistance for ensuring their self management. The support provided for livelihood and income activities through formation and training of women cooperatives has been remarkable. Mechanisms were established to hear and address site specific and complaints and issues.

56. Overall, the quality of compliance in R&R improved considerably over the life of the project and towards the latter part of project implementation, the focus of technical support and monitoring gradually moved to strategic implementation issues. The efforts by the Bank and the borrower in response to the R&R challenges led

to a significant improvement in both MMRDA’s capacity and the R&R process, which is now recognized in India and abroad for its innovative approach. During the course of this project, MMRDA has created a permanent unit within MMRDA to manage the resettlement impacts. MMRDA is successfully employing the approaches to R&R that were developed under MUTP in subsequent infrastructure projects that require resettlement.

2.5 Post completion operation/Next Phase.

57. The vast majority of the components financed by the Project were successfully completed. Components to improve railway services, road traffic management programs and bus services have been essentially completed and operational and maintained by respective agencies.

58. The resettlement implementation is nearly completed. The remaining pending actions include the relocation of the remaining shops and residences along SCLR and the three religious structures (two along SCLR and one along JVLR); completion of a few remaining land acquisition cases; integrating the resettlement sites into the urban service network of the city and formally completing the Exit Strategy for the resettled PAP cooperative societies. The Bank’s monitoring of these remaining R&R process has been discussed with the borrower during the ICR mission and the process for implementation, reporting and monitoring of the remaining activities was agreed upon.

59. The project has assisted PAPs to improve their quality of life and work by resettling nearly 19,000 households from squalid and dangerous environments to new apartment blocks. The final number of families displaced by the project remained more or less the same as estimated at the time of appraisal (only 0.86 percent higher) indicating that the resettlement impacts were identified accurately at the outset. By project closing date, resettlement implementation was nearly completed, with 19,348 of the revised target of 19,394 households (99.8 percent) successfully resettled into new housing or shops (or decided to resettle in partially affected structures or opted to settle under non-MUTP resettlement/housing schemes or private in-situ redevelopment schemes). The remaining 40 shopkeepers and six residences whose relocation is pending have been delayed due to court litigations and administrative procedures associated with the land and property acquisition. The total resettlement costs are 8.2 percent of the project cost (US$92 million against the total project cost of about US$1,123 million). This does not include expenditures incurred for post resettlement support by the project authorities from their own sources.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

60. The PDOs remained relevant throughout the life of the project and did not require changes in response to changing government priorities and external conditions. The main objective of “facilitating urban economic growth and improve quality of life by fostering

the development of an efficient and sustainable urban transport system” was in line with the main priorities of the Country Strategy for 2002-2005 and 2005-2008 which aimed at improving the infrastructure bottlenecks to help sustain rapid economic growth and poverty reduction which is aligned with GoI's own development priorities mentioned in the Tenth-Five Year Plan (2002-2007). A quality and affordable urban transport system is a good investment in infrastructure that promotes urban competitiveness and efficiency (by requiring fewer resources to move passengers) and thus promotes growth. Because most of the users of the public transport system are low-income, improvement of level- of-service enhances their ability to access employment, education and health facilities. The PDOs are also in line with the current Country Strategy for India which provides a framework to deal with the challenges of achieving rapid, inclusive growth, ensuring sustainable development, and improving service delivery, with a cross-cutting focus on improving the effectiveness of public spending and achieving monitorable results, all of which will help scale up the impact of Bank assistance. The overarching objective of the current Country Strategy is to help India achieve the long-term vision encapsulated in the Eleventh Plan of a country free of poverty and exclusion. Finally, the PDOs are also in line with the latest Bank Urban Transport Strategy (Safe, Clean and Affordable Transport, 2008).

61. The Project design also remained relevant throughout the life of the project, although it underwent several amendments at the request of the Borrower to facilitate project implementation under changing macroeconomic conditions (exchange rate appreciation) and slower than expected implementation progress. These amendments involved changes to the project components as described above, reallocation of credit or extensions of the closing date to complete implementation, showing an appropriate level of flexibility by the Bank. However, in hindsight, given the complexity of the R&R component, the original implementation period of five-and-a-half years ending in 2008, turned out to be much too short given the complexity of the project, the absorptive capacity of some of the institutions involved, and other risks known during project preparation. The Bank could have relaxed the usual practice of keeping the project period to five years for such a complex project.

62. The overall rating for relevance is Highly Satisfactory based on the fact that the project objectives and components remained relevant during the long implementation period and continue to be so. In addition, the project was one of the few projects in the Bank that attempted to address the urban transport problem of a mega city like Mumbai.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

(a) Infrastructure Development

63. Achievement of the PDO was measured through the ability of the project to (a) meet user needs; (b) improve system efficiency; (c) bring about sustainable improvements; and (d) make institutions more effective. The key performance indicators for these project-specific objectives were: (a) rail travel comfort, substantially improved; incidence and severity of pedestrian traffic accidents reduced; (b) suburban rail service frequency and train availability enhanced; road journey times and junction delays

reduced; (c) improvement in public transport cost recovery; poor households resettled satisfactorily from hazardous slum/squatter areas to permanent housing with improved living conditions; and (d) increased technical capacity for planning, traffic management, road safety, road maintenance, air quality monitoring and vehicle emission control.

64. In the rail component: The indicators for the rail services improved significantly, but the targets were achieved only to some extent. The peak hour overcrowding was reduced from 5,400 to 4,016 but the target of 3,600 was not achieved because demand increased more than expected, in part due to the faster-than-project economic growth in India during the project period. Rail service demand in Mumbai went up from 6.1 million to 7.2 million passengers per day between project start and closure. The target to increase the average peak hour frequency of the suburban trains was achieved thereby increasing availability. The target to increase train fleet availability at peak hour (94 percent), that is, the number of trains that could be available to be put into operation, was not achieved and remained around 91.5 percent because old trainsets are still operating in the system and require more maintenance. The ongoing procurement of new EMU trainsets under MUTP2A will increase the availability of train fleet at peak hour, which contributes to the achievement of the target.

65. In the road component: The reduction of journey times in the JVLR road link was 5 minutes higher than the target of 24 minutes mainly because the actual traffic is 3 times higher than the forecast and also because some resettlement is still under way. Nevertheless, this link provides a viable east-west connection which has improved the mobility of road users and public transport services. The reduction of journey times in the SCLR road link did not materialize because the works were not completed. Based on the last supervision mission in May 2011, this link should be ready by 2013 and will alleviate the traffic in JVLR with a good probability of achieving the journey time target despite an expected increase in traffic.

66. Traffic Management (Area Traffic Control): The target to reduce delays at ATC controlled junctions was substantially achieved. This has resulted in improving traffic flow and waiting at intersection. Generally, the ATC has been well received by users and the press. The ATC system was given “Best Intelligent Transport System Project Award” by the Ministry of Urban Development.

67. Pedestrian road traffic safety: the target to reduce the incidence and severity of pedestrian road traffic accidents was not achieved. During Project restructuring this component was substantially reduced to only two pedestrian crossings which have been completed. This number was 30 at appraisal.

68. BEST acquired all the buses as planed to replace 644 used or over-aged buses, which provided additional seats for users and improved their level-of-service. Acquired buses were newer EURO III compliant, single-deckers, and the pass-by noise levels reduced to 78dBA. Older buses were also upgraded to EURO II standards.

(b) Strengthening of institutions

69. Rail: The financial strengthening of the suburban railway services measured by the working ratio (costs excluding depreciation and interest/income) was 0.88 and did not achieve the target of 0.85 because the tariff surcharge was not implemented. In this case just the creation of MRVC was a major institutional achievement to improve the organizational structure for the institution in charge of suburban railway.

70. BEST (buses): The target of >100 percent to increase the cost recovery of bus services (income/cost) was not achieved because of additional operating costs particularly due to the “dearness allowance” and Voluntary Retirement Scheme payments. At project closure, cost recovery was 74 percent but is projected to increase in 2011 to 85 percent. Although the target was not achieved, the project was able to provide BEST with the tools to better manage its finances through improved MIS and fuel monitoring devices. The cost-recovery (lack thereof) is now more transparent and GoM can make informed decision about supporting BEST.

71. MCGM (traffic management in municipal government): The target of increasing the technical capacity in MCGM to manage traffic as per the modified MCGM Act was fully achieved.

72. MCGM (transport planning, road maintenance and road safety): the target to increase the technical capacity of MCGM in these areas was achieved by the training of 15 professionals.

73. Air Quality Monitoring: To strengthen air quality monitoring and reporting system: this target has been achieved.

74. Capacity to Handle Resettlement: The target to develop capacity for management of resettlement implementation was fully achieved with MMRDA taking similar complex resettlement activities for other projects and prepared to undertake future jobs of this nature for Bank financed projects.

75. Housing area: The target of increasing the percentage of PAH living in houses of at least 225 square feet was almost fully achieved with 17,566 of 17,572, or 99.97 percent of the residential PAPs have been resettled in permanent buildings, joined other redevelopment schemes or have retained their partly affected houses beyond the road alignment. Only six cases remain to be resolved, and these involve legal cases. All resettled residential PAPs have access to individual tap water and toilets. The rating for the resettlement component is considered Satisfactory in view of the successful negotiation with and resettlement of 97.8 percent shopkeepers including 98 percent of the large- and medium shopkeepers and 99.97 residences in a complaint manner; and remarkable post-resettlement support provided for self-management of the resettlement

sites. The MUTP resettlement experience has been highlighted for several innovations discussed in the section dealing with social safeguards.

76. On the basis of the above, the project contributed towards the development of an efficient and sustainable urban transport system and the strengthening of institutions since most targets were substantially achieved or will be achieved in the medium-term, as it is the case of the SCLR road link. Since the improvement of urban transport and related institutions increase mobility and access in a safe, affordable and cleaner way, the project improved the quality of life of users and their access to employment, health and education facilities, thereby contributing to the economic growth of MMR. The only problem in meeting the PDO were the higher than expected delays which affected the expectations of the targeted population.

77. In conclusion, the overall achievement of PDOs is rated Moderately Satisfactory because targets were substantially achieved, albeit later than planned. This rating is consistent with 18 of the 19 ISRs submitted.

3.3 Efficiency

78. Economic analyses have been carried out using the actual costs incurred with the project components each year and the actual traffic at the end of 2010. Future traffic has been estimated using the models developed at appraisal stage with the current data on speed, fare, inflation rate and number of trainsets in service in a given year. Under the most likely traffic growth and anticipated completion of the SCLR road component, the estimated Economic Rate of Return (ERR) for rail component is 60 percent with a Net Present Value (NPV) of Rs. 8,321 million, for road component excluding ATC, 27 percent with an NPV of Rs. 3,325 million and, for ATC, 19 percent with an NPV of Rs. 40 million. The overall ERR for the project will be 53.7 percent with an NPV of Rs. 11,686 million. (See Annex 3 for details.)

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

79. This rating results from: (a) the relevance of the project objectives and design; (b) a substantially achieved the development objective; (c) a comprehensive quality at entry, albeit with a long preparation time; and (d) a robust economic efficiency of the project- financed investments.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

80. The independent resettlement impact assessment study carried out in 2007-8 covering the Anik, Mankhurd and Majas resettlement sites indicated that more than 80 percent of the households were satisfied with their new houses, held their previous jobs, and retained their monthly incomes. The mean income levels of resettled PAPs

interviewed remained unchanged. The average income levels seemed to have doubled. Most resettled houses have added new assets such as TVs and mobile phones, and some undertook interior decoration and remodeling. Their expenditures had increased due to the need to pay for water and electricity, which affected the vulnerable households. Secure tenure was likely to benefit shopkeepers in the long run, however, initially they faced challenges in re-establishing their business after relocation. The offer of formal housing and shops provided the beneficiaries with secure tenure and provided them opportunities for better economic planning at the household level. While the loss of supplementary incomes (due to relocation) and new expenditures (due to formal possession of housing) presented a burden to PAPs, the improved access to the formal sector has added to the overall household incomes.

81. Gender Aspects: Gender and social development considerations were integrated into the overall project implementation process. The baseline survey provided gender disaggregated data. This helped to allot flats to women headed and vulnerable households. Each resettlement building has a women center, offering a forum for women group activities, including self-help, thrift and savings. Women workers who lost their supplementary incomes had access to micro-credit groups, some of them provided with vocational training. Over 10,000 women have been engaged in such group activities. MMRDA has formed an industrial co-operative which provides income opportunities to some 1,000 women. The resettled women expressed greater satisfaction regarding the new houses compared to men because of the different appreciation of greater privacy and enhanced personal security. Each building has a children’s center, where pre-school and day care offers allow women to engage in productive activities. Women’s participation in the management of the resettlement buildings has been guaranteed by reserving membership in the housing cooperative executive committees. Some women have formed community police groups focusing on resolution of domestic violence, marital conflicts, and financial transactions involving woman and their role has been formally recognized by the police department.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

82. The creation of MRVC was a major improvement for providing suburban railway service in Mumbai. MRVC, although it is still evolving, is a good institutional instrument to improve the coordination decision making between IR and GoM. The project also lead to the position of MMRDA being a key agency responsible for major transport and land development in Mumbai.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

83. A beneficiary survey was carried out for the R&R component, and is provided in Annex 5.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

84. The risk to development outcome of this operation is moderate for the following reasons:

(a) The infrastructure and rolling stock acquired under the project are now in full operation by the Western and Central Railways. The risk of this infrastructure and rolling stock not being properly maintained and fleet periodically renewed due to improper allocations for maintenance and depreciation of equipment is low, because the railway is highly used and thus visible to all levels of the communities in Mumbai.

(b) The sustainability of the JVLR and SCLR which, once completed, will be maintained by MCGM, is dependent on an adequate maintenance program of these two roads. Given the condition of the majority of the urban network of MMR and the apparent budgetary difficulties of MCGM, it is likely that after the first few years, the two east- west links will not have the adequate maintenance they require. As such, mitigation measures must be sought to increase the likelihood of having a maintenance backlog which will increase the vehicle operating costs and the road accidents. There is therefore a moderate risk associated with the road component. The sustainability of the ATC system which will also be under MCGM will depend on adequate maintenance budgets and also on the ability to maintain highly trained staff in the operation control center of the Traffic Police and TMU. The ATC component has been very visible in Mumbai, with the press reporting on its efficacy in reducing travel time. As such, it is likely that MCGM will continue to maintain the system and there is a low risk that the good operation of the ATC system may be disrupted in the future.

(c) BEST is struggling to improve its coverage ratio and may continue to depend on cross subsidies. As such, there is a moderate risk that there will be deferred maintenance of the buses if the subsidies are not continued, and the busses’ useful life could be shorter and they will not provide as good a level-of-service as they would if properly maintained.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

85. At entry, the Task Team designed an urban transport operation that entailed sound and innovative features that are still very much valid and appropriate today. These included: (a) targeted investments in buses, rolling stock and rail and road infrastructure to support improved services, modal integration, and streamlined operations; (b) it included a separate R&R component recognizing that the infrastructure investments would not be possible without the adequate relocation of over 19,000 PAHs; and (c)

institutional development to promote metropolitan transport coordination through capacity building and studies.

86. Project alternatives were carefully evaluated and the reasons for their rejection clearly documented. Amongst them were: (a) Project Scope by evaluating the best priorities set out in the 1994 CTS; (b) Size of Project was discussed to find the most adequate package of investments to attack the most pressing needs but recognizing that there would be much more to do in the sector; (c) R&R matters on whether they should or should not have been included in the project or treated separately; (d) selection of rail schemes that would maximize ridership and increase level-of-service and safety; (e) selection of road schemes that would maximize east-west connectivity; (f) reform of rail operations , particularly the options to make MRVC as autonomous as possible from IR; (g) Reform of Bus Operations by considering options to improve BEST level-of-service and cost efficiency; (h) Air Quality Management options to design a strategy and monitor air quality; (i) the options and timing for the creation of a Mumbai Metropolitan Transport Authority; and (j) whether the financing instrument should have been an Adaptable Lending Operation or a series of Conventional Lending Operations.

87. In this context, the Bank and the Borrower prepared the project by (see also section 2.1): (a) carrying out a solid background analysis; (b) evaluating lessons learned from previous similar operations and appropriate alternatives; (c) holding detailed missions with specialized teams of consultants; (d) designing a technically well- conceived project; (e) evaluating a range of risks and proposing appropriate mitigation measures; (f) paying attention to institutional aspects, such as the need to create a coordination body ; and (g) gathering support from all levels of government and asking them to show commitment.

88. The Task Team also tried to ensure that the institutional framework of the project would work and that the coordination of institutions by MMRDA would be feasible. The Task Team should be commended for the effort made during preparation in the creation of MRVC which was supposed to be the precursor of an autonomous suburban railways entity fully in charge of suburban railways in MMR. The risk of institution coordination was appropriately rated as “high” and the lack of coordination indeed proved to be an implementation problem.

89. Despite careful preparation, it can be argued that project preparation took too long. In addition, although the risks in dealing with such a complex project, while properly identified, the mitigation measures taken to deal with them were not effective and caused delays in implementation and disbursement. Therefore, the rating of “Moderately Satisfactory” reflects the need to be more realistic in assessing risks and proposing effective mitigation measures, especially when several institutions with different implementation capacities are involved in project implementation and there is a longer than usual delay in project preparation.

(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory

90. Bank supervision is rated “Satisfactory” on the following: (a) prompt and sound identification of implementation problems such as R&R and delays; (b) working diligently to respond to the Inspection Panel investigations and working with the borrower to implement the Action Plan and recommendation of the Inspection Panel report; (c) high-quality advice and proposed solutions to the Borrower to address the implementation problems, for example by agreeing to reallocate Bank financing of some components when the US dollar devalued in relation to the Indian Rupee; (d) using local consultants based in Mumbai to help supervise technical and procurement issues; (e) frequent supervision missions (19 ISRs filed between August 2002 and June 2011 not including FM, Social Development and Procurement supervision missions which took place at least once every year); (f) appropriate and prompt Bank follow-up actions; and (g) strong management support and budget allocations.

91. The Inspection Panel investigation and the subsequent implementation of the Action Plan to address issues of noncompliance have presented an additional challenge where the Task Team and the Bank’s corporate units have provided critical support to the client. The enhanced supervision that was triggered by the Action Plan focused on improving the quality and outcome of R&R implementation, and in particular on facilitating improvement in: (a) resettlement procedures for shopkeepers with medium- and large-size shops, (b) restoration of incomes, (c) post-resettlement services, (d) quality of census and baseline data; and (e) grievance redress mechanisms. As a result, there has been a significant improvement in MMRDA’s capacity and the MUTP R&R process, which is now recognized in India and abroad for its innovative approach.

92. Overall, the Task Team showed profound knowledge of the client’s needs, excellent engagement, and appropriately adapted the project to ensure maximum relevance and achievement of PDOs in light of changing macroeconomic conditions and local priorities. Two other relevant aspects of the Quality of Supervision were the very thorough MTR and follow-up letter to the Borrower with recommendations; and Management’s decision to temporarily suspend the road and R&R components followed by an Inspection Panel investigation. Management reacted quickly to the Task Team recommendations and the team provided all the information required for the Inspection Panel investigation. This quick response allowed the lifting of the suspension in less than four months. Finally, the Task Team provided outstanding support to the client and was very responsive in processing the loan restructuring in 2008. The Bank Country and Sector Management also provided excellent support to the Task Team, and allocated adequate budget to supervise the high-risk, high-profile project. The Management kept the Board informed through periodic (five) Progress Reports of the implementation of the agreed action plans following the Inspection Panel investigation.

93. The Bank assisted the Borrower in the adequate preparation of the project. The Bank also actively addressed implementation problems thanks to a careful and proactive supervision. This helped adapt the project to changing circumstances and resulted in the substantial achievement of the PDOs, albeit with 3 years delay. Because of the extraordinary support the project supervision team provided the implementing agencies, the Bank was able to maintain a good working relationship with the client throughout Inspection Panel investigation and implementation of its recommendations. The improved relationship led to the GoM to request a follow up project (MUTP2A).

Overall, Bank Performance is therefore rated Satisfactory.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

94. During project preparation, GoI and the GoM performed well by supporting the necessary studies, estimating the investment needs, recognizing institutional weaknesses based on previous experiences with Bank operations, and initiating reforms such as the creation of MRVC and the empowerment of MMRDA to implement the project.

95. However, during implementation, there were significant delays related to protracted procurement in key contracts of the rail component in which GoM could have approached at a very high level the Chairman of IR for faster decision-making and resolution. GoM could have alerted GoI (Minister of Railways) for the excessive delays in proceeding with the contracts and the opportunity cost of such delays, particularly when the processes were dragging for a period longer than three months. In fact, the need for periodic consultations between GoM and the Chairman of IR to speed up the resolution of this type of issue is a lesson to be learned for the ongoing MUTP2A. Agreement at a high-level may unblock the lack of decisiveness at lower levels.

96. GoM showed strong commitment to the project through MMRDA and was able to quickly satisfy the requests made during the Inspection Panel and took careful steps to ensure that most of the resettlement and environmental management was carried out according to Bank guidelines. GoM took notice of the recommendations of the MTR and subsequently requested the loan restructuring in view of the slow progress of some of the components and the currency fluctuation. GoM should also be applauded for supporting this pioneer effort to improve the level-of-service in MMR with a multimodal project.

97. Overall, both GoI’s and GoM’s performance are rated Moderately Satisfactory because they were ready to react when asked by the project implementation agency. However, they should have maintained a channel of communication obstacles such as the ones faced during the implementation of the rail component.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

98. MMRDA: Since this was one of the first projects of this type handled by MMRDA, there was a learning curve. Initially MMRDA was not fully equipped to handle R&R, but later on its capacity to handle R&R and environmental management to coordinate with other implementation agencies did improve. However, MMRDA’s ability to coordinate the various agencies was weak, in part because it lacked a clear authority to do so, and in part due to the fact that the other agencies are equally powerful within GoM’s structure and political environment, and thus MMRDA’s ability to influence change on the other agencies is limited. For example, with MSRDC, MMRDA was not able to pressure MSRDC to improve its performance or to take over the construction of the JVLR and SCLR despite the long delays and continued poor performance by MSRDC. Finally, MMRDA’s performance could have been enhanced if it had hired a Project Management Oversight Consultant to oversee the project and identify the areas in which high level coordination could speed up the project. In view of the extraordinary effort made by MMRDA to build up its capacity to manage R&R and environmental management, and despite the above shortcomings, MMRDA’s performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

99. To a large extent, MRVC completed the railway component and carried out the activities assigned to it although its performance is marked by long procurement delays due to the numerous clearances required to clear the bids and the evaluation reports. As a result, its performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

100. MCGM successfully completed the implementation of the ATC component and ensured the provision of good training to itself, including TMU, and Traffic Police which operates the ATC control center. MCGM was unable to complete the Road Maintenance Management System by project closure, and the delays in the construction of the pedestrian crossing led to the substantial reduction of the number of crossing to be included in the project. Overall, the rating for MCGM performance is Moderately Satisfactory because it has implemented the most important activity, ATC.

101. BEST acquired the buses planned, improved its MIS and installed fuel consumption monitoring devices in their buses. It was unable to increase its financial coverage costs due to added expenses. BEST’s performance is rated as Satisfactory because it implemented all the activities that were assigned albeit with minor delays. In addition BEST is poised to undertake reforms to be more cost-efficient and improve its cost covering ratio in the medium term.

102. MSRDC was in charge of implementing the JVLR and SCLR road links. These links took longer than expected because of R&R problems which in some cases were also caused by engineering design changes. It appears that coordination between MMRDA and MSRDC, who received a fee from MMRDA to implement the links, was not very good and caused several problems. Also, the coordination with MRVC and IR was at best very inefficient as demonstrated by the several changes in the location of Pier 5, a SCLR

pier which needed to be built on rail right-of-way and which is not yet built because of protracted discussions on its location. MSRDC’s performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory because it was unable to properly coordinate with MMRDA the engineering design and the resettlement plans, and did not respond effectively to difficult implementation problems.1

103. Overall, the performance of the implementing agencies is rated Moderately Satisfactory. The project was complex and difficult for many of the agencies to implement. Many of them had no previous experience with Bank project, and others were completely new (MRVC). Despite the complexity and the difficult implementation environment, many of the agencies came through and implemented their respective activities albeit with some delays.

104. The overall Borrower performance is Moderately Satisfactory based on the performance GoI and GoM, and the performance of the implementing agencies.

6. Lessons Learned

105. Similar projects should be designed in a way that inter-agency coordination does not become an obstacle in the implementation of key activities. One of key reasons explaining the slow pace of MUTP implementation was the complex project design with ambitious implementation arrangements which involved multiple implementing agencies without effective coordination. Five project implementing agencies were involved in the implementation of the project (MMRDA, MRVC, MCGM, BEST and MSRDC) maybe without sufficient power vested in the coordinating agency (MMRDA) to ensure effective progress. Inordinate delays in project components such as SATIS and ROB, requiring greater inter-agency coordination, forced the removal of these subcomponents from MUTP as part of project restructuring. In order to minimize such delays due to weak cooperation and ineffective inter-agency coordination, future projects should be designed with fewer agencies involved in implementation, and with very clear roles and responsibilities defined for each agency involved as well as enough power vested in the coordinating agency. The implementation arrangements for the follow-up project (MUTP2A) have been planned in a manner that progress will not be constrained by challenges of inter-agency coordination. At the actual implementation level, the project is sought to be focused on a limited set of important interdependent activities for enhancing the efficiency of suburban rail services with MRVC reaming as the key implementing agency.

106. The project design should adequately focus on capacity building of the client, especially in new areas, and leave space for implementation arrangements to evolve, instead of being frozen in time, to achieve greater efficiency. The nature and

1 MSRDC has submitted comments on the evaluation in the draft ICR, which is attached in Annex 6.

significance of some major resettlement difficulties were appreciated by the client during the process of implementation. Through very active Bank involvement, MMRDA gradually evolved its mindset for resettlement from a bureaucratic to a more sustainable and consultative approach. It developed capacity for managing a large scale and complex resettlement process. The same was needed from other agencies such as MRVC and IR to change their mindset and reinforce their capacity to address difficult and sensitive challenges, such as the safety of trespassers and users, environmental management and financial sustainability.

107. Mechanisms for strengthening transparency, accountability, and good governance should be planned upstream and integrated in the project design in order to enhance implementation quality and outcomes. Successful implementation of social safeguards, the most challenging issue in MUTP, was due to establishing effective institutional mechanisms including IMP for third party monitoring and a transparent and accountable grievance redress mechanism for resolution of complaints and disputes. Measures for transparency, accountability, and good governance including third party monitoring and dispute resolution are incorporated in the follow-up project (MUTP2A) as a part of the Governance and Accountability Plan (GAAP).

108. User Satisfaction with the project: A project of this nature should have included a user survey to be undertaken by an independent entity before the proposed investments were completed and after the entry in operation of some of the investments. This would allow gauging the impact of the project components on different segments of the population and start building up a philosophy that the users must be heard periodically in MMR.

109. Importance of Long-term involvement of the Bank in MMR: The Project was able to achieve its successful outcome despite very difficult challenges because MMRDA and the Bank were committed to overcome a complex R&R program and changing macro-economic conditions. At appraisal, it was recognized that MUTP was a large intervention but did not address all the issues. Also, as seen by the traffic growth in the railways and also in JVLR, it is clear that that there is a dormant demand and that longer- term involvement of the Bank in MMR is justified as it was in the São Paulo Metropolitan Region where a long-term program in urban transport leveraged the State’s plans and increased private sector participation in the operation and investment of the system, thereby decreasing the burden on government. Therefore, the strategy should be to plan for long-term involvement in MMR’s urban transport sector to serve as a demonstration project that can be replicated in other major Indian metropolitan areas.

110. Transition from an administrative “compensation” approach towards a “win- win” negotiated approach. GoM adopted a set of alternative solutions for shopkeepers within the MUTP R&R Policy, but in many cases went beyond these alternatives by being willing to negotiate and agree upon schemes, which entailed numerous discussions and offered more than what the MUTP policy prescribed. This approach included the introduction of entitlement and market based solutions. Provision of free-of-cost alternative housing with ownership title had a significant empowering effect on the resettled PAPs and supported their ability to access the formal sector.

111. Streamlining of grievance redress through independent and recognized committees. This helped to quickly resolve entitlement-related complaints at the project level and reduced the transaction costs to achieve this for both parties. The project authorities have established weekly complaint hearing systems, which help to address a wide range of issues. The introduction of IMP further helped MMRDA in resolving issues and contributed to the successful outcomes of the R&R implementation process. The panel monitored the post resettlement implementation activities, and key implementation and broader policy issues.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies

112. Some of the implementing agencies carried out their own evaluation for their respective project components. Their summary is enclosed in Annex 6.

113. The borrower/implementing agencies received a draft of the ICR. MSRDC expressed its disagreement on the Unsatisfactory rating for the performance. Acknowledging some of the arguments, the rating has been modified to Moderately Unsatisfactory. MSRDC’s comments are attached in Annex 6.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in US$ Million equivalent)

Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (US$ millions) Appraisal (US$ millions) Rail Transport Component 654.27 848.47 130% Non-Rail Transport Component 183.02 143.95 79% R &R Component 92.00 127.68 139% P.P.F. Reimbursement 3.00 3.00 100% Total Baseline Cost 940.37 1,123.10 119% Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 0% Front-end fee IBRD 4.63 4.63 0% Total Financing Required 945.00 1,127.73 119%

(b) Financing Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds Estimate (US$ millions) Appraisal (US$ millions) Borrower 403 674 167% IBRD 463 371 80% IDA 79 83 105% Total 945 1,128 119%

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Table: Intermediate Outcome Indicators

KEY PERFORMANCE BASELINE END of PROJECT Achievement INDICATORS Status Intermediate Outcome Target Actual Indicators Original Revised 5 Railway Components 5.1 Complete DC to AC 0 645 line km 645 line km Achieved2 conversion of 645 line km. of suburban rail system 5.2 Improve signaling and 0 3 corridors 3 corridors Achieved telecom systems for the suburban railway system (3 corridors) 5.3 Construct new 0 8 facilities 8 facilities Achieved maintenance facility for suburban train fleet (1 new plus 7 upgradation) 5.4 Increase size of train fleet 200 x 9-car 251 x 9-car 285 x 9-car Achieved by 251 x 9-car rakes rakes (EMUs) rakes (EMUs) rakes (EMUs) 5.5 Replace/Convert to dual No train 179 trains 196 trains Achieved3 voltage operation trains in operating on replaced or replaced or the existing fleet dual voltage converted converted 5.6 Increase the length of 0 Additional 93 93 line km Achieved suburban train tracks line km added 5.7 Increase technical 0 11 studies 11 studies Achieved capacity through undertaken and completed completion of 11 results technical studies completed 5.8 Implement separate 0 Separate Separate Achieved accounting and financial systems for systems for management systems MRVC MRVC established for MRVC established established

2 Despite the completion of the work, some sections cannot be commissioned on AC traction because of non availability of dual voltage AC-DC EMU rakes. 3 Target exceeded as additional trains sets were procured through separate contract by Ministry of Railways.

Table: Intermediate Outcome Indicators (Continued)

KEY PERFORMANCE BASELINE END of PROJECT Achievement INDICATORS Status Intermediate Outcome Target Actual Indicators Original Revised 6 Road Based Transport Components4 6.1 Equip junctions with Area No junctions 250 junctions 250 junctions Achieved Traffic Control (ATC) equipped equipped equipped 6.2 Construct pedestrian Facility does not 2 schemes 2 schemes Achieved grade separation schemes exist implemented implemented by (subways or bridges) MCGM.

2 subways and 13 FOBs delivered by MMRDA on JVLR. 6.3 Implement SATIS at 6 0 6 Deleted - - stations 6.4 Develop annual TM N/A Annual Deleted - - program for MCGM program developed 6.5 Increase length of urban 1) JVLR (only 4 Additional 43 Achieved arterial roads Lane road) lane kms Additional 45 constructed lane kms 2) SCLR constructed Works in Not Yet (portion not progress Achieved existing) 6.7 Develop Annual Business No Annual Business plan Annual Achieved Plan for BEST operations Business Plan developed as Business Plan part of annual prepared budget process 6.8 Procure low emission and 0 450 buses 644 buses 644 buses Achieved user friendly buses for complying with BEST EURO III norms procured Procure and install MIS 0 System Implementation Partially installed in progress Achieved Procure and install fuel 0 Equipment 644 Fuel Partially Efficiency Monitoring installed efficient busses Achieved System (EMS) deployed5

4 Some of the indicators were deleted in accordance with the deletion of the component as part of the restructuring. 5 Best has decided to procure only CNG buses and to phase out diesel buses once they have served for a certain period of time.

Table: Intermediate Outcome Indicators (Continued)

KEY PERFORMANCE BASELINE END of PROJECT Achievement INDICATORS Status Intermediate Outcome Target Actual Indicators Original Revised 6.9 Complete training of staff TMU On-the-job Training Achieved in MCGM's Traffic established in training to be completed Management Unit (TMU) 2001 completed 6.10 Establish satisfactory No management System Road Partially maintenance management systems in established Maintenance Achieved systems in MCGM MCGM Management System being installed 6.11 Upgrade CTS Nil CTS upgraded CTS upgraded Achieved 6.12 Develop multi year N/A Program Deleted - - blackspot improvement developed and road safety program 6.13 Implement MMRDA Strategy does Strategy Strategy Achieved Communication Strategy not exist implemented implemented 6.14 Establish Road User Policy does not Policy Draft policy Not Achieved Charge Policy exist established by being discussed MMRDA by government and stakeholders 7 R &R Components 7.1 Provide permanent N/A 19,200 PAHs Total 1) 17,566 or Achieved housing with adequate 19,394 PAHs 99.97 % physical amenities to 1) 17,572 families 19,200 PAHs households permanently resetteled 2) 1,822 2) 1,782 Achieved shops (97.8%) shops including 566 including 555 large or large or medium size medium size shops shops 7.2 Ensure that Cooperative Societies do not 188 fully 182 housing Achieved Societies are functioning exist registered societies fully registered; 188 society buildings occupied and functioning

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

1. Ex-post Economic Evaluation

1. Economic analyses were made using the actual costs incurred within the project components and the actual traffic at the end of 2010. Future traffic was estimated using the models developed at the appraisal stage with the current data on speed, fare, inflation rate and number of train sets in service in a given year.

1.1 Rail Component

2. For the rail component the actual traffic carried by the suburban rail, its operating cost, level of comfort were considered from 2002 to 2010 along the actual expenditure on investments. The actual data on carried passenger was compared with the output of model using the fare structure over the period from 2002 to 2010. Since the estimated number of passengers according to the model was within 5 percent of the actual traffic, the same model was used to estimate the traffic until 2010, after which the crowding level in the trains reaches the same level as prevailed before 2002. It was assumed that traffic would not grow any further on the rail system unless new rakes are introduced. The result of the analysis is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: ERR and NPV for Rail Component

NPV Scenario ERR at closure ERR at Appraisal (INRs. million) Base case 60% 8,321 36.40% Benefit reduced by 49% 5,952 n/a 20%

3. The ERR for the rail component increased from 36.4 percent at appraisal to 60 percent at closure mainly due to non-increase in the passenger fare. The second surcharge was also not implemented. It resulted in more passengers carried by the rail and larger diversion from the bus.

1.2 Road Component

4. For the road component, only three subcomponents, JVLR and SCLR, ATC, and two pedestrian subways, were implemented under the project. The economic analysis for the ATC component has been separately done and the result is in section 1.3. The analysis for pedestrian subways was not done because the cost comprised only about 1 percent of the total cost of the road component.

5. The results of the economic analysis for JVLR and SCLR subcomponents are summarized in Table 2 and the details are in Table 4.

Table 2: ERR and NPV for Road Component (JVLR and SCLR)

NPV Scenario ERR at closure ERR at Appraisal (INRs. million) Base case 27% 3,325 39.75% Benefit reduced by 24% 2,357 n/a 20%

6. The ERR for these subcomponents, JVLR and SCLR, reduced from 39.75 percent at appraisal to 27 percent at closure mainly due to almost 50 percent increase in the cost, at constant 2002 prices, of the two roads and delay of over 4 to 6 years in completion of the project. However, the project is still economically viable at completion.

1.3 ATC Subcomponent

7. Milestone 1 which included installation of Fully Adaptive Traffic Control (FATC) for 53 signal junctions reduced the number of stops experienced by traffic. It resulted in the reduction in the transportation cost and drivers exhaustion.

8. Estimates of the benefits obtained by the installation of an ATC system were calculated by the TRANSYT modeling. The calculation was made based on the costs of stops and delays derived from information supplied by MMRDA supplemented by data from UK Highways Economic Note 2.

9. The cost benefit analysis was done covering only Milestone 1 junctions because of the availability of data. The maintenance costs that were considered in the analysis include the maintenance cost of the system, the equipments and the software.

10. The cost and benefit are calculated for a period of five years with a general experience that the traffic management tools will need revision or a fresh review after five years in order to account for any changes in the network or traffic characteristics. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: ERR and NPV for ATC Subcomponent

NPV ERR at Scenario ERR (INRs. million) Appraisal Implementation of Fully Adaptive 19% 39.6 116%6 ATC for Milestone I

11. The calculation assumed VOC as the only source of benefit and the installation of optimized signal system as opportunity cost. ERR before deducting the opportunity cost

6 Some of the assumptions were different such as including benefit from VOT.

is 63%. If VOC is considered along with VOT as another source of benefit, ERR would be 163%, in which case, ERR before deducting the opportunity cost is 375%.

1.4 Summary of the Analysis on Components

12. Overall ERR of above three components and subcomponents, calculated by the weighted average of each ERRs according to its component/subcomponent cost, is 53.7% with total NPV of Rs. 11,686 million.

Table 4: Economic Analysis for Road Component (JVLR and SCLR)

Year JVLR SCLR JVLR SCLR

Net Economic Maintenance Economic Maintenance VOC VOT VOC VOT Benefits 2002 0 0.0 0 0.0 2003 116.01 0.0 17.28 -133.3 2004 230.13 0.0 190.35 -420.5 2005 244.71 0.0 99.63 -344.3 2006 266.04 0.0 202.77 -468.8 2007 107.73 0.0 84.69 -192.4 2008 138.33 0.0 179.19 -317.5 2009 227.79 0.0 177.39 -405.2 2010 64.44 0.0 205.2 728.5 290.8 749.7 2011 0 0.0 176.31 808.2 318.3 64.71 106.25 1,121.2 2012 0 0.0 28.5 896.7 348.5 66.16 107.71 1,390.5 2013 0 27.0 28.5 896.7 381.4 67.65 109.19 1,399.5 2014 0 0.0 28.5 896.7 417.6 69.16 110.69 1,465.6 2015 0 0.0 28.5 896.7 457.1 70.72 112.21 1,508.2 2016 0 27.0 28.5 896.7 500.3 81.84 120.67 1,544.1 2017 0 0.0 28.5 896.7 547.7 94.71 129.76 1,640.4 2018 0 0.0 28.5 896.7 599.6 109.61 139.55 1,716.9 2019 0 27.0 28.5 896.7 656.3 126.86 150.07 1,774.4 2020 0 0.0 28.5 896.7 718.4 146.81 161.38 1,894.8 2021 0 0.0 28.5 896.7 786.4 169.91 173.55 1,998.1 2022 0 27.0 28.5 896.7 860.9 196.64 186.63 2,085.4 2023 0 0.0 28.5 896.7 942.4 227.57 200.70 2,238.8 2024 0 0.0 28.5 896.7 1031.6 263.37 215.83 2,379.0 2025 0 27.0 28.5 896.7 1031.6 263.37 215.83 2,352.0 2026 0 28.5 896.7 1031.6 263.37 215.83 2,379.0 2027 0 28.5 896.7 1031.6 263.37 215.83 2,379.0 2028 -279.036 27.0 28.5 896.7 1031.6 263.37 215.83 2,631.0 2029 0 -289.512 28.5 263.37 215.83 740.2

ERR 26.8 NPV 3,325.03

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/ Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members (i) Lending Names Title Unit A.K.Swaminathan Task Team Leaders SASEI Zhi Liu Transport Economist SASEI K Mukundan Sr. Urban Specialist SASEI Arnab Bondyopadhyay Highway Engineer SASEI Jit Sondhi Consultant SASEI Sameer Akbar Environment Specialist SASES Bilal Rahill Environment Specialist SASES I.U.B.Reddy Social Development Specialist SASES Reidar Kvam Resettlement and Rehabilitation Specialist SASES Ellen Schaengold Resettlement and Rehabilitation Specialist SASES Alok Bansal Transport Economics SASIN Arun Mokashi Consultant SASIN Gladys Stevens Program Assistant SASIN Sangeeta Anand Team Assistant SASIN Christopher Hoban Operations Advisor SACIN Sumir Lal Communications Specialist SAREX Rajat Narula Financial Management Specialist SARFM N Raman Procurement Specialist SARPS P Illangovan Environment Specialist ASTEN Edward Dotson Co-Task Team Leaders EASTR Richard Podolski Urban Transport ECSIN Raj Soopramanien Legal Counsel LEGAF John Flora Transport Economist TWUTD Lou Thompson Railway Adviser TWUTD John Cracknell Consultant TWUTD

(ii) Supervision/ICR

Names Title Unit Atul Agarwal Sr. Transport Specialist SASDT Hubert Nove-Josserand Operations Advisor SASDT Binyam Reja Sr. Urban Transport Specialist SASDT Arnab Bandyopadhyay Sr. Transport Engineer SASDT Shigeyuki Sakaki Sr. Urban Transport Specialist SASDT Jorge Rebelo Lead Transport Specialist /Consultant SASDT Bogdan Filip Popescu E T Temporary SASDT Sujit Das Consultant SASDT Krishnan Srinivasan Consultant SASDT A.K. Swaminathan Consultant SASDT Sangeeta Anand Sr. Program Assistant SASDE Sonia Chand Sandhu Sr. Environmental Specialist SASDI Gaurav D. Joshi Environmental Specialist SASDI Vaideeswaran Sankaran Consultant SASDI Ritu Sharma Program Assistant SASDO Gizella Díaz Program Assistant SASDO I. U. B. Reddy Sr. Social Development Specialist SASDS Satya N. Mishra Social Development Specialist SASDS Sudip Mozumder Sr. Communications Officer SAREX Ramola Bhuyan Sr. Financial Management Specialist SARFM Priya Goel Sr. Financial Management Specialist SARFM Manmohan Singh Bajaj Sr. Procurement Specialist SARPS Jitendra Sondhi Consultant AFTEG Rakhi Basu Transport Specialist EASIN Frederick Edmund Brusberg Consultant ECSS4 Sumir Lal Manager EXTOC Sally L. Burningham Operations Adviser LCSDE Guang Zhe Chen Sector Manager LCSUW Stephen F. Lintner Sr. Adviser OPCQC Qays Hamad Sr. Operations Officer OPCQC Marc Jean-Claude Pierre Sr. Urban Transport Spec. TWITR Davy

(b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle US$ Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY98 0 49.15 FY99 0 143.98 FY00 58 302.82 FY01 42 188.00 FY02 79 256.67 Supervision/ICR FY03 66 204.05 FY04 55 169.19 FY05 72 207.34 FY06 90 400.07 FY07 98 368.40 FY08 102 455.26 FY09 68 343.08 FY10 82 314.00 FY11 51 114.00 FY12 22 0.00 Total 1,369 3,516.01

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

1. Resettlement Impact Assessment Studies. Three impact assessment studies were carried out during project implementation to assess the impact of R&R implementation and make mid stream alterations through remedial measures as appropriate. The first one was carried out at the time of project approval in 2002 to determine which PAPs were already resettled prior to project approval. Two more studies were carried out, in 2003 and 2008. Based on the results, MMRDA prepared remedial measures to address the study findings and recommendations. Remedial measures included, inter alia, the improvement of water supply, rectification of defects in the sewer systems, improvement in garbage disposal services, construction of boundary walls, repair of lifts to bring to them to working condition, expediting the completion of registration of housing cooperatives, transfer of maintenance funds and creation of community revolving funds for economic rehabilitation.

2. The initial study carried out in 2002, prior to Board approval of the project, indicated that eligible affected people had been provided with alternative houses and shops and none had rented out or sold their houses, indicating the initial success of resettlement implementation. Some of the positive impacts indicated by the PAPs, who had been moved from squatter locations along the railway tracks, included: improvement in physical living conditions; better access to basic amenities; security of permanent houses; relief from police harassment and criminal attack, elimination of accident risk; and reduced impacts from noise pollution.

3. The next study, conducted in 2003, confirmed that more than 90 percent of PAPs expressed satisfaction with both delivery of entitlements and the participatory process, which was exemplary in the context of urban resettlement. Permanent housing, improved access to basic amenities and security against eviction, accidents and thefts were perceived as major gains of resettlement. The disadvantages reported include increased distance from workplace, loss of supplementary income opportunities and increased maintenance charges. The change in location did not affect occupations for the majority of the main earners of the family; 85 percent of the main earners retained their employment. Average incomes fell marginally mainly due to loss of supplementary job opportunities for women at the new sites. Access to basic amenities was improved for 77 percent of PAPs over their previous location and neighborhood relations remained more or less the same or were improved for the majority of households. The physical environment in terms of light, water, noise, garbage removal and overall health conditions were reported to be comparatively better than previous locations. Pertaining to the transit resettlement arrangements the report indicated that overall living conditions in transit housing were generally poor.

4. The latest study, carried out in 2007-08, by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) at the major resettlement sites of Mankhurd, Anik and Majaj sites showed that over 80 percent of PAPs, especially women, were happier after relocation in view of much improved safety, privacy and increased self-esteem. The 20 percent who expressed a lack of satisfaction did so due to the greater distance from their place of employment,

loss of established social networks, and loss of supplementary income sources (informal work done mostly by women). The study found that about 50 percent of families had bought new household assets such TVs, fans, mobile phones, cooking gas, etc. It confirmed an approximate 50 percent increase in average monthly household incomes and 80 percent job retention among the relocated PAPs. The study also noted the loss of supplementary incomes by women earlier employed in mixed communities, building repair issues, etc. MMRDA initiated remedial measures, including establishment of a Livelihood Cell; repair works in several resettlement buildings; and allotment of shopping kiosks/work sheds to poor PAPs.

5. Consultations with different stakeholder groups. During the ICR mission, the Bank Team met with different PAP groups to ascertain their feedback and benefits received from the project. The feedback from these groups is very positive and encouraging. A section of United Shop Owners Association mentioned that it had entered into a tripartite agreement with MMRDA and the builder for their alternative shops, which are now ready for allotment and expected to be distributed soon. The consultations with affected legal apartment owners reveal that they are satisfied with the outcome of the long consultations with MMRDA and the Bank and are happy that they will soon get their alternative houses. They also expressed that frequent changes to the alignment delayed finalization of their plans but noted that the R&R team at MMRDA and consultations have yielded results.

6. The discussions with the shop owners at Powai Shopping Plaza reveal a success story for the land owners, who received alternative shops of area equivalent to that lost to the project. All the shop owners have rented out their shops to various specialized institutions and are receiving the rent. They are more than happy with the outcome of the long process of consultation and negotiation that they engaged in with MMRDA and the Bank. They are now pursuing some of the issues such as registration of ownership of their allotted shops and tax assessment.

7. The discussions with the groups who have successfully relocated the religious structures such as temples and mosques show that the approach followed by MMRDA in providing alternative space along the alignment of the road, relocating those who were willing and supplementing with cash assistance for re-construction of the affected religious structures, has created satisfaction, as it enabled them to undertake in-situ reconstruction of their places of worship and ensured that these are available to all who are living nearby.

8. The discussions with the supervision consultants reveal that managing the needs and expectations of different stakeholders, including political parties and builders, during project implementation involving complex R&R actions and coordination with civil works, is a major challenge in the urban context and requires a great deal of cooperation and support from stakeholders.

Annex 6. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

1. As part of the Borrower’s evaluation of the project, some of the implementing agencies, as listed below, responsible for the various components of the project carried out their own evaluation for their respective project components.

(a) Evaluation for Rail Transport component by MRVC (b) Evaluation for ATC subcomponent by MCGM (c) Evaluation for BEST component by BEST (d) Evaluation for SCLR I & II by MSRDC’s Consultant

2. MSRDC’s comments on draft ICR are attached at the end of this annex.

(a) Evaluation for Rail Transport component7

1. ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTED PROJECT

3. The rail component of MUTP has been at last very successful because of the following visible outputs.

1.1. Capacity enhancement of EMU Services

4. First new EMU trains was received in Mumbai on 22.07.2007. Since, then more than 1400 coaches (including Ministry of Railways contract) were in the period of three & half years. Because of additional services it has been possible to introduce 418 services on Central & Western Railway 944 services have been augmented from nine-car trains to twelve-car.

5. More than 31 percent additional carrying capacity has been generated and also over-crowding level has come down by more than 20 percent for the first time in Mumbai Suburban Rail Network. The salient features provided on new AC-DC dual voltage trains under MUTP have been appreciated by Press, Media & Mumbai Suburban Commuters at large.

1.2. Resettlement & Rehabilitation (R & R)

6. For expansion of Suburban Railway Network, it was decided that each and every project affected households (PAH) will be given a house of 225 sq. ft. at different locations. 15,000 new flats have been constructed and all the PAHs have been resettled. The works of vacating encroached land were expedited under MUTP due to clearance of encroachment and R&R of PAPs under the separate framework of R&R policy formulated by GoM/MMRDA based on WB guidelines. With removal of encroachments,

7 An expanded version of this summary evaluation by MRVC is in the Project File.

3.2 lakhs sq. meters of encroached railway land both on Central and Western Railways has been vacated.

1.3. Internal & External Audit

7. Due to strict guidelines of WB procedure and constant supervision, monitoring and proper guidance, it has been possible that no serious irregularities were observed by both Internal as well as External Auditors during the execution of MUTP.

1.4. Strengthening of knowledge in World Bank procedures

8. It has a real experience for MRVC officials in dealing with World Bank and their procedures. During implementation of MUTP, MRVC acquire and strengthen the knowledge on bank procurement procedures, banking transactions related to goods and services, taxation issues while dealing with International suppliers etc.

9. During execution of all the projects new accounting and finance manual was developed by MRVC in keeping with the World Bank emphasis on having a proper documented internal control system and for improving the knowledge of staff and officers working in Accounts Department of MRVC.

2. CHALLENGES FACED DURING EXECUTION

2.1 Dispute between EMU Contractor and MRVC on contract provisions

10. A dispute between M/s Siemens and MRVC occurred when MRVC, while accepting the M/s Siemens’s bid, decided to delete the software item worth US$15 million (60 Crore). World Bank also did not agree for this proposed item without supplier’s agreement. This issue involved MRVC, Ministry of Railways, M/s Siemens and World Bank seriously affecting the progress of the MRVC project.

11. The agreement between Indian Railways high level team and M/s Siemens in April 2007 enabled MRVC to solve the following major problems:

 M/s Siemens agreed to delete the software item costing US$15 million (60 Crore) of clause 1.11 of schedule 4 (a).  On the basis of agreement between MRVC and M/s Siemens, World Bank also agreed to approve the change order for deletion of software.  World Bank agreed to issue change order to permit M/s Siemens to commission all the trains being manufactured through MRVC contract.  With the approval of common design for MoR contract and MRVC contracts duplication of mandatory tests was avoided.  Design clearances for both contracts were obtained expeditiously and a time delay of one year was made up.

 A cordial relationship between MRVC, Railway Board, M/s Siemens and World Bank was established.

2.2 Coordination with large numbers of Stakeholders

12. It was noticed that to execute the rail project, proper and continuous coordination with more than 40 independent agencies was required to be made by MRVC. With a view to find out possible worktable solutions, action was also taken at MRVC to identify the existing problematic issues between the various project implementing agencies. With the effective coordination and negotiable approach with all the Stakeholders, it has been possible to expedite the progress of MUTP works.

2.3 Difference of opinion with World Bank

13. The bids for the World Bank funded Package-3 of Virar Car Shed consisted of three lots: LOT-1 for Track works; LOT-2 for Ballast supply; and LOT-3 for OHE. The World Bank had different views from those of the implementing agency on the bids for LOT-1.

14. The bid considered at first quoted with a substantial discount but was subject to the consideration of awarding LOT-2 in addition to LOT-1. Because their bid for LOT-2 was considered unreasonably high, it was not awarded to the bidder.

15. The next bid considered did not provided the validity of the bid security (Bank guarantee) within 45 days as desired in terms of Clause 16.2 ITB of bid document. The Evaluation Committee deliberated on the deviation in detail and decided not to consider this as material deviation. The committee recommended bid for award, but it was not agreed by the World Bank.

16. The third bid was then evaluated and recommended for award by the Evaluation Committee with satisfactory credit worthiness. However, the World Bank did not agree with recommendation on the ground that the bidder did not provide liquid assets and or availability of credit facility in the format provided in the bid document. The Evaluation Committee finally recommended discharging the bid.

17. The bids under NCB with counterpart fund were re-invited and finalized on 28.07.08. There was a saving of more than 2 Crores over the previous case and the work was completed within the original validity of the contract.

3. LESSON LEARNED AND SUGGESTIONS

3.1 Lessons Learned

(i) Liberal Advances

18. In contracts financed by World Bank, the advances (mobilization, equipment, etc) are granted interest free. Even in non Bank funded contracts, a nominal interest of 6 percent is charged by MRVC. Due to policy of liberal advance in MRVC, most of the contractors avail of this facility and effectively utilize in execution of works.

(ii) Milestones monitoring

19. Unlike conventional system of contracting wherein only one completion date is specified in contracts, in MRVC’s contracts intermediate milestones or sectional completions dates are also specified. Failure to achieve Milestone target results in penalties and therefore contractors are encouraged to work effectively during entire stipulated construction period rather than planning and executing works at per his own convenience.

(iii) Mandatory provisions of Environmental Management (EMP)

20. In all MRVC contracts, it is mandatory to follow the Environmental Management Plan (EMP) and an EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) of the project is done, which takes up environmental issues such as health and hygiene at labour camps, safety regulations for labour/public, pollution controls. This results in adoption of better construction practices.

(iv) Reimbursement/recovery for statutory change in statutory taxes

21. Changes in tax rates after the contract can put high burden on contractors. After such incident, a clause for reimbursement/recovery due to change in statutory taxes/royalties/VAT etc. was added in all contracts, and it has been looked as a positive and rational feature in successful contract implementations.

(v) No risk and cost

22. Risk and Cost (R&C) tenders have well know problems including time consuming reinvitation of tenders with possibilities of poor or nil responses and difficulties in the process of recovery often involving lawsuits and/or arbitration. In MRVC contracts, if the contract is terminated due to breach of contract by contractor, a fixed percentage (usually 20 percent) applied on the cost of work not completed is recovered from contractor and all liabilities of the contractor will close after the payment of above amount. No R&C tender is required to be floated. This system tides over all the limitations of R&C tenders and losses and project delays due to contract failure are

minimal. Learning with past experience, railways also have now done away with R & C tenders.

(vi) Additional Performance Security for unbalanced bid

23. In tenders, unfairly low rates for some items or schedule can be quoted and the contractor desists from or even abandons these items. In MRVC contracts, safeguard provisions against such eventualities have been provided. If the bid of successful bidder is seriously unbalanced as compared to Employer’s own assessment of estimates in respect of some of the items, then contractor is required to furnish additional performance security for low rate. In contract of Type V flats at Nirmal Park, the bidder quoted low rates for Electrical schedule. In Virar Car shed work, the rate of Fusion Bonded Epoxy Coating is much below market price. In both the cases, additional performance securities have been taken from the contractors and these low rate items are successfully being executed.

(vii) Credit facility certificate from Bank

24. The bidders are required, in bidding stage, to produce a credit facility letter from bank certifying to provide overdraft/credit facilities to meet working capital requirements for executing the contract. This ensures the funding needs for the work.

(viii) Compulsory insurance to minimize risk

25. The GCC of MRVC bid documents mandates contractors to be insured for unforeseen events such as (a) loss of or damage to the Works, Plant and Materials; (b) loss of or damage to Equipment; (c) loss of or damage of property in connection with the Contract; and (d) personal injury or death. This insurance minimizes the risk of contract failure.

(ix) Compensation for delayed bill payments

26. As per contract conditions, if the Employer makes a late payment, the Contractor shall be paid interest on the late payment. In MRVC, both executive and finance teams work hard to make timely payments of bills and the bill position is uploaded on website. To date, there has not been a single instance of contractor claiming interest charges for delayed payment.

3.2 SUGGESTIONS:

(i) The World Banks should allow submission of bid documents that are downloaded from website. It is allowed by all the government departments in India.

(ii) The World Bank should accept credit facility documents in non-standard format as long as there is only a minor deviation.

(iii) The format of the B.G. should be as per commercially acceptable practice considering banks often add a few qualifying sentences to safeguard their interest.

(iv) The experience of the bidder as a subcontractor or a partner in a J.V. should be considered or clearly brought out in I.T.B.

(v) As per the Clause 38.1 of conditions of contract, the rates are not liable to change, if the change for a particular item is less than 1 percent of the initial contract price regardless of the value of the contract. It needs to be properly addressed to regulate variation of small value items in large value contracts.

(vi) As per Clause 60.1 of conditions of contract, if the contract is terminated because of the fundamental breach of the contract by the contractor then, the payment to the contractor is reduced by a percent to be applied to the component of the work not completed. In case the work is completed to the extent of initial contract price, but the work is still going on account of variation, then, how much value is to be recovered is to be specified.

(vii) There should be suitable clause to increase the value of the performance guaranty and retention money in case the contract value is revised on account of variation.

(viii) In the standard format of B.G., there is no specific mention of the date up to which B.G. should be valid. Often contractor submit B.G. in parts with different validities assuming that recovery will be effective accordingly and then value of B.G. will reduce as per the outstanding recoveries. Though it is a good practice from contractor’s point of view, it often results in tedious accounting of B.G. and its validity.

(ix) In case of NCP (W2) bidding documents, the price variation was to be calculated quarterly, but the definition of a quarter is not properly given. It was disputed it should be financial quarter or three months immediately preceding the month of opening of bids. Further, in case of negotiated bids, it should be clearly mentioned that the Base quarter will be decided as per the month of negotiated bid.

(x) As per Clause 29.5 of I.T.B., the amount of performance security is to be suitably increased in case of unbalanced bid to protect interest of the employer. A definite method maybe given to work out the level of unbalanced bid and amount to be increased.

(b) Evaluation for Area Traffic Control (ATC) subcomponent8

1. PDO and Project Beneficiaries

27. The reduction in junction delays overall was to the tune of 20 percent to have 1,800 pcu-hr/hr compared to the target value of 15 percent reduction to have 2,440 pcu- hr/hr. This also improved the journey speed of the network to the tune of 8 to 10 percent at the various corridors in the city.

28. The main beneficiaries were the road users of the city, whose travel time and junction delays were significantly reduced, despite the very high congestion levels generally seen in the city.

29. In addition, the safety aspects in the signal system (including red lamp monitoring) helped reduce the uncertainties in the junction for the users, thereby increasing the safety levels.

30. The green wave facilities introduced in the new system provides better movement for the VVIPs, which also reduces the problems for the general users who were otherwise blocked off for considerable period of time.

31. The Secondary level beneficiaries included the Traffic Police personnel and the MCGM officers who were trained in the implementation, O&M management of the system.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

32. The original bid and contract for traffic detector was approved with induction loop system which was to be placed beneath the road surface. Immediately after the implementation, it was noted that about 30 percent of such loops were damaged due to external factors. The proposal was made by the Authorities to change the detection mode to video based one. Also, in the control rooms, video walls were proposed to be implemented. The net cost increase was 1,219,022.28 which was approved in January 2010. Due to the changes in junction geometry of various signal junctions there was increase in quantity of civil works and cables. This resulted in additional cost of INR 7,614,355.79 which was approved on 1st April 2011.

33. Direct interactions with the suppliers and sub-contractors were held for increasing the speed of implementation, and two milestones in the original contract were merged into one. Despite all these, the project took considerable time to complete. The major reasons are as follows:

8 An expanded version of this summary evaluation by MCGM is in the Project File.

(i) Restriction of working hours in the City: The traffic levels in the city road do not allow the Contractor to work in the day time. Working in the night time also was restricted in view to avoid noise, pollution and disturbance to the community. (ii) Terror Attack in Mumbai: The terror attack happened in November 2009 in Mumbai created substantial hurdles to the project development as the Police insisted on verification of all personnel including the labourers working on the project. (iii) Prolonged monsoon period in the City: The City had almost 4 months of monsoon, during which any kind of civil works were not allowed on the street. (iv) The frequent festivals and VVIP movements in the city: There are many festivals celebrated in the city which restricted the work on the streets severely. The frequent movement of VVIPs in the city also put restrictions on the work of the Contractor, especially after the terror attack.

34. The following actions from the various stake holders have helped in the successful delivery of the project:

(i) Commitment of the Employer: The Employer formulated a dedicated team of about 10 engineers to handle the project. The involvement of the Employer’s team during the late night working (to pacify the disturbed community), the dialogues between the main contractor and their suppliers/sub contractors for speeding up the works etc. have substantially helped to deliver the project. The speed of the decision making by the Employer also is commendable, which avoided major road blocks normally found in these types of works. The blanket permission given directly by the headquarters to the contractor for carrying out the works also was a major boost. (ii) Commitment of the Traffic Police; The Traffic Police also formed a dedicated team which helped substantially to move the project in a fast pace. They also helped in managing the traffic for carrying out the works and got involved directly in the implementation of the project. (iii) Commitment of Engineer; The Engineer also went beyond their normal duties in setting up, calibrating and fine-tuning the system. These tasks involved informal training of contractor’s personnel about the safe practices and imparting their local knowledge about traffic pattern and behavior. (iv) Continuity of the project team; Most of the team members from the implementing agency and the Bank remained the same from project inception and throughout the extended implementation period. This promoted close cooperation between the Bank and the client, while building stronger ownership and commitment to the project among the local authorities’ staff.

3. Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

35. The Employer and the end users are operating and maintaining the project facility in a satisfactory manner. This is ensured by way of proper training at the implementation stage. The Employer after seeing the benefit of the implementation has approached for a further expansion of the project to cover the entire signals within the city.

4. Assessment of Outcomes (Efficiency)

36. A summary of the economic analysis for the ATC subcomponent is shown in the table below.

ERR NPV Payback period Scenario (%) (INRs. millions) (Months) Implementation of Fully Adaptive ATC 19 39.6 30.0 for Milestone I (VOC only)

5. Lessons Learned

37. One of the predicaments in the project was that the civil works dominated the time schedule and also contributed to the delays, which indirectly affected the performance of the main contractor who are electronic / system based companies. From this experience it seems that the installation / implementation of ATC system shall be disconnected from the civil works.

38. The experiment of the JV with an expatriate and Indian firm also did not work well in the project as the lead firm (which was an expatriate) could not have full control on the quality and timely delivery of its Indian partner. Ideally, JVs of similar nature should not be allowed.

1. Procurement of Buses

39. BEST has procured 644 buses under MUTP-II and put them in service between 1.9.2005 and 19.6.2006. As a result of this addition, the average age of the bus fleet was significantly reduced from 9.28 in 2004-05 to 5.56 in 2005-06, which led to reduction in cost of maintenance of old buses. Buses procured under the project complied with Bharat Stage III emission norms made applicable from the year 2005.

2. Challenges faced

(i) It was for the first time that such a large no. of buses were procured that too fully built. It was a challenge to carry out stage-wise inspection at the location of multiple bus body builders. To overcome this challenge several teams were formed comprising of officers working at the Depot and Workshop. A satisfactory level of quality was maintained and the buses were put in service within a record time of less than 10 months. (ii) BS-III compliant norms were implemented for the first time in India. The technology used to achieve BS-III norms consisted of auto electronics and various sensors. This was not only a challenge for the manufacturer but also for BEST who had to understand the technology and design practices to effectively maintain the buses. A team of senior and middle level engineers were trained at the premises of the vehicle manufacturer to understand the technology better.

3. ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTED PROJECT

40. The BEST Undertaking keeps on shuffling the buses that are operated in a particular route. As a result of this, some part of the fleet operated on a particular route always keeps on changing. 644 buses procured under MUTP were a small proportion of this total fleet of the Undertaking which was around 3400 in June 2006. Hence, no independent bus user survey was conducted to assess the impact.

(d) Evaluation for Santacruz Chembur Link Road I & II

41. A brief evaluation for the sections I and II of SCLR on their alignment and construction implementation was provided by MSRDC’s consultant and shared with the bank. It is stored in the Project File.

9 An expanded version of this summary evaluation by BEST is in the Project File.

(Comments from MSRDC on draft ICR)

Maharashtra State, Road Development, Corpn. Ltd. ( A Govt. of Maharashtra Undertaking ) To, Date 10-11-2011 Atul Aggrawal Transport Specialist The Wold Bank

Sub: Draft Implementation Completion and Results Report for Comments.

Ref.:- Michel Andige, sector Manager Transport, South Asia Region Letter Dated 21st November 2011

Sir,

With reference to the World Bank letter dated 21st November- 2011 this office having a strong objection on the points referred in ICRR as under. 1) As referred by the bank on point b) page no. 31, the relevant close coordination were tendered by the MSRDC to the Employer i.e. MMRDA. It is very unfortunate to hear from your end that, MMRDA not able to pressure MSRDC to improve its performance or to take over the construction of JVLR and SCLR, despite the long delays and continuous poor performance by MSRDC. 2) Can this office request to go through the previous minutes and site visits were commented by your official which indicates the proactive initiative was taken by MSRDC as a result the JVLR was completed and SCLR is also in a good shape. 3) MSRDC had played a vital role in completion of JVLR and SCLR which are urban infrastructure projects and having unique challenges like Co-ordination of Utility Agencies, Implementation of MOU in between IIT and MMRDA, etc. which were tackled by MSRDC.

4) MSRDC was not directly involved in R&R part. Due to delay in R&R and Govt. policies the projects were delayed for which MSRDC is not responsible which is agreed by bank in Para-108 Page No. 32.

This office also having strong objection on the comments issued by Bank in para 108 where MSRDCs performance was rated unsatisfactory. The bank officials are well aware in this regards for the performance which may kindly be verified and corrected at your level.

Thanking you,

Regards,

S.B.Nage

(Chief Engineer MSRDC)

Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

A. Project Implementation Plan 1. Mumbai Urban Transport Project: Borrower's Project Implementation Plan - Main Volume and Annexes

B. Bank Staff Assessments 1. Aide Memoires, Management Letters and BToRs of Preparation Missions for MUTP 2. Aide Memoire of the Maharshtra Economic and Fiscal Study missions 3. Procurement Capacity Assessment Report - South Asia Procurement Hub - New Delhi. 4. Financial Management Assessment Report - South Asia Region Financial Management Unit 5. Quality Enhancement Review - Quality Assurance Group, World Bank, November, 2000.

C. Other 1. Comprehensive Transport Plan study - Final Report (July 1994) 2. Consolidated Environment Assessment Report and individual component related EMPs - March -May, 2002 3. Resettlement Action Plan and individual component implementation plans - March- April, 2002 4. Study Report for preparation of Business and Development Plans for BEST - Final Report, January, 2002 5. MUTP Accident Study - Final Report, January, 2000 6. Draft Report on Road User Charging System for Mumbai - prepared for the consideration of the Working Group set up by GoM 7. The Indian Railways Report 2001: Policy Imperatives for Reinvention and Growth - Expert Group on Indian Railways, New Delhi. 8. Rapid Impact Assessment of Initial Resettlement under Mumbai Urban Transport Project, May, 2002

D. Supervision 1. Project Appraisal Document, 2002 2. Conformed Copy - C3662 - Mumbai Urban Transport Project - Loan Agreement, 2002 3. Conformed Copy - C3662 - Mumbai Urban Transport Project - Development Credit Agreement, 2002 4. Conformed Copy - C3662 - Mumbai Urban Transport Project - MRVC Project Agreement, 2002 5. Conformed Copy - C3662 - Mumbai Urban Transport Project - Maharashtra Project Agreement, 2002 6. Environmental Impact Assessment (Vol. 1 of 14): Consolidated environmental assessment (English), 2002 7. Environmental Impact Assessment (Vol. 2 of 14): Consolidated environmental assessment - executive summary, 2002

8. Environmental Impact Assessment (Vol. 3 of 14): EA/EMP report of JVLR (Jogeshwari - Vikhroli Road) project under MUTP: Mumbai, 2002 9. Environmental Impact Assessment (Vol. 4 of 14): Environmental audit of DC to AC conversion project of railways, 2002 10. Environmental Impact Assessment (Vol. 5 of 14): Environmental audit of Santacruz - Borivali fifth railway line project, 2002 11. Environmental Impact Assessment (Vol. 6 of 14): Environmental audit of Borivali - Virar quadrupling of railway tracks, 2002 12. Environmental Impact Assessment (Vol. 7 of 14): Environmental audit of Kurla - Thane fifth and sixth railway line project, 2002 13. Environmental Impact Assessment (Vol. 8 of 14): Community environmental management plan for transit resettlement sites at Mankhurd, Turbhe Mandale and Wadala: final report, 2002 14. Environmental Impact Assessment (Vol. 9 of 14): Final report of community environmental management plan for transit resettlement site at Kanjurmarg, 2002 15. Environmental Impact Assessment (Vol. 10 of 14): Framework of community environmental management plan for permanent resettlement site at Ghatkopar (English), 2002 16. Environmental Impact Assessment (Vol. 11 of 14): Community environmental management plan for permanent resettlement sites at Dharavi, Antop Hill, Wadala, and Mankhurd, 2002 17. Environmental Impact Assessment (Vol. 12 of 14): Final report of community environmental management plan for permanent resettlement site at Kanjurmarg, 2002 18. Environmental Impact Assessment (Vol. 13 of 14): Community environmental management plan for permanent resettlement sites at Plot No. CTS 190 (pt.) Majas Village, 2002 19. Environmental Impact Assessment (Vol. 14 of 14): Final report of community environmental management plan for permanent resettlement site at MSRDC at Dindoshi, 2002 20. Inspection Panel Request for Inspection, 2004 21. Simultaneous Processing of Requests for Inspection, 2004 22. Inspection Panel Report and Recommendation, 2004 23. Processing of Additional Requests for Inspection related to the Project: India - Mumbai Urban Transport Project, 2004 24. Resettlement Action Plan (Vol. 2 of 11): Resettlement Implementation Plan: Borivali - Virar quadrupling of rail subproject - volume 1: main report, 2005 25. Resettlement Action Plan (Vol. 3 of 11): Resettlement Implementation Plan: Borivali - Virar quadrupling of rail subproject - volume 2: annexures, 2005 26. Resettlement Action Plan (Vol. 4 of 11): Resettlement Implementation Plan: Fifth Line Mahim - Santacruz subproject - volume 1: main report, 2005 27. Resettlement Action Plan (Vol. 5 of 11): Resettlement Implementation Plan: Fifth Line Mahim - Santacruz subproject - volume 2: annexures, 2005 28. Resettlement Action Plan (Vol. 6 of 11): Supplementary Resettlement Implementation Plan for Jogeshwari Vikhroli Link Road, 2005 29. Resettlement Action Plan (Vol. 8 of 11): Business Needs Study, 2005 30. Inspection Panel Investigation Report, 2005

31. Resettlement Action Plan (Vol. 7 of 11): Resettlement Implementation Plan for the Santacruz Chembur Link Road, 2006 32. Resettlement Action Plan (Vol. 9 of 11): Final Report Mumbai Urban Transport Project, Business Needs Study, 2006 33. Disposition of additional claim to the Panel related to MUTP, 2006 34. Progress Report on Implementation of the Action Plan, 2007 35. Inspection Panel Progress Report, 2007 36. Resettlement Action Plan (Vol. 10 of 11): Jogeshwari Vikhroli Link Road (JVLR), 2007 37. Progress report on Implementation of the Action Plan, 2007 38. India - Mumbai Urban Transport Project: Restructuring Paper, 2008 39. Resettlement Action Plan (Vol. 11 of 11): Guidance Note on Urban Resettlement, 2009 40. Third Progress Report on Implementation of the Action Plan, 2009 41. Powai: Request for Inspection, 2009 42. Inspection Panel Report and Recommendation on a Request for Inspection, 2009 43. Fourth Progress Report on Implementation of the Action Plan, 2010 44. India - Mumbai Urban Transport Project: Restructuring Paper, 2010 45. Implementation Status Results Report: Sequence 17, 2010 46. India - Mumbai Urban Transport Project: Restructuring Paper, 2011 47. Fifth Progress Report on Implementation of the Management Action Plan in Response to the Inspection Panel's Report and Recommendation, 2011 48. Implementation Status Results Report: Sequence 18, 2011 49. Implementation Status Results Report: Sequence 19, 2011

Annex 8. Resettlement and Rehabilitation

1. Land acquisition and R&R are dominant issues in Indian cities: a large share of the urban population lives in slums or as encroachers and in the past that has been a major impediment to developing the infrastructure network. In this context, MUTP is a landmark project as it is the first attempt to resettle such a large number of people in an urban area. MUTP is the largest urban R&R project of the Bank and the largest in India to date.

2. Overall Assessment. The project involved displacement of population of 19,394 households (about 100,000 people). The status of resettlement implementation at the time of ICR preparation, shortly after project closure, is summarized below.

Table. Resettlement Datasheet (October 15, 2011)

Unit Totals Revised Resettled Resettled Resettled Resettled Resettled Resettled Remai Type (Baseline) Totals (as of (as of (as of (as of (as of (as of ning (Baseline) 01/31/06) 12/31/06) 09/01/07) 02/01/09) 02/01/10) 10/15/11) cases House 17,378 17,572 13,877 15,315 15,784 16,580 17,134 17,566 6 holds 100.0% 79.0% 87.2% 89.8% 94.4% 97.5% 99.97% 0.03% Shops 2,469 1,822 369 752 1,104 1,437 1,490 1,782 40 100.0% 20.3% 41.3% 60.6% 78.9% 81.8% 97.8% 2.20% of 800 566 N/A 84 227 419 419 555 11 which 100.0% N/A 14.84% 40.11% 74.03% 74.03% 98.06% 1.94% > 225 sq.ft. 19,394 14,246 16,067 16,888 18,017 18,624 19,348 46 Total 19,847 100.0% 73.46% 82.85% 87.08% 92.90% 96.03% 99.76% 0.24%

3. Long term benefits and impacts. This resettlement has translated into positive impacts in the form of secured housing with title and improved basics amenities, which in turn has improved the overall living standards of PAPs in the form of better housing, access to running water, separate sanitation facilities, etc. One of the long term impacts is the increased expenditures on recurring costs of maintenance and municipal services for housing cooperative societies. To offset this impact, the implementing agency has contributed INR 20,000 (ca. US$500) for each household as a Maintenance Fund and the interest earned on this amount can be used for payment of taxes and maintenance. The shifting of a large number of affected people away from the railway tracks had a significant impact in the form of increased speed and frequency of local trains in Mumbai, besides reducing accidents and improving safety.

4. Quantification of resettlement benefits. PAPs are provided with a house or shop of up to 225 sq. ft, free of cost, and cash assistance towards one time maintenance charges, shifting charges and a contribution towards a community revolving fund, to be

managed by the respective cooperative societies. In the absence of land cost, the ready reckoner rates10 used for registering a property when sale transition takes place are used to estimate the costs involved for each household resettled under the project. The data indicates that the project incurred expenditure between INR 333,000 - 785,000 (US$6,800 - US$16,000) for each residential household, consisting of alternative houses, cash assistance and technical assistance for different sites. In the case of commercial households, the expenditure incurred varies between INR 506,000 and INR 1,714,000 (US$10,300 - US$35,000) for a unit size of 225 sq. ft. for each commercial household, consisting of alternative shop, cash assistance and technical assistance for different sites.

5. Resettlement of shopkeepers. A shopping mall (The Powai Plaza shopping complex) was developed in order to offer more attractive resettlement option to the shopkeepers along JVLR, many of whom owned shops on private land with formal or informal land title and were therefore refuse to be treated at par with squatters on public land. This shopping complex contains high quality shops that were provided to some of the affected shopkeepers to reestablish their businesses. It was constructed by a private developer in exchange for Transfer of Development Rights (TDR).11

6. Income Restoration Measures. MMRDA also took several measures to strengthen income restoration and livelihood activities with a special focus on poor resettled women. It established the Livelihood Cell in 2008 to promote income generating activities among the resettled women groups. As a result of various initiatives undertaken by the Cell, women have engaged in a number of businesses which afford them financial independence and secured education for their children. The Sankalp Mahila Audyogik Sahkari Sanstha, set up by Livelihood Cell, runs canteens at many institutions including MMRDA, produces and sells office stationary, gift and seasonal items and also offers housekeeping to various public and private organizations. In addition, 64 Self Help Groups and eight Livelihood Groups were formed to enable about 1,000 women to secure sustainable monthly incomes and improve their living standards. The presence of these vulnerable women engaged in gainful economic activities has had a positive demonstrative influence on other resettled women. In various resettlement sites, over 10,000 women are now enrolled in different group based income activities through Self Help Groups.

7. Resettlement of Apartment Owners. Another highlight of the resettlement process is the resettlement of affected legal owners of residential apartment buildings through MoUs. Under this process, MMRDA is constructing the houses for this category of people under a redevelopment scheme close to the affected area and the PAPs will be provided with apartment space almost double that of their previous houses. During the transition period of 3 years or until the houses are built and the shift takes place, PAPs are being paid a rental allowance (at market rate and inflation adjusted) of about INR 10,000

10 Ready Reckoner Rates are used to calculate stamp duty for real estate property. 11 Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) is a development permit which makes available certain amount of additional build up area in lieu of the area relinquished or surrendered by the owner of the land, so he can use the extra build up area either himself of or transfer it to a third party.

per month (about US$200). A total of 444 households residing in 19 Maharashtra Housing Area Development Authority (MHADA) buildings have opted for such private in-situ redevelopment schemes. These people have reached or are in the process of reaching an agreement with MMRDA according to which MMRDA will redevelop their buildings and provide flats almost double the size of their previous houses in the same locality.

8. Key issues encountered during implementation. The key issues encountered during project implementation were: (a) resettlement of medium and large size shopkeepers; (b) management of post resettlement issues such as registration of cooperative societies, adequate water, transport, schooling facilities, etc.; (c) lengthy and complex land acquisition process; (d) relocation of religious and community structures; and (e) resettlement of legal residential apartment owners.

9. Institutional Capacity. The implementing agency has greatly progressed in addressing these issues, with the active support and advice of IMP. MMRDA developed substantial capacity over the life of the project. It created a permanent unit to manage resettlement impacts of various projects in the city. The R&R unit in MMRDA is headed by a Chief Officer reporting to the Additional Metropolitan Commissioner. The Chief Officer is assisted by several specialists. With the increase in work related to post resettlement, a new position, Chief Office (Post Resettlement), was created and a Senior Officer has been assigned to it. The two NGOs with long experience of working in the slums of Mumbai have provided complementary support for implementation of resettlement activities.

10. IMP. In addition to the above arrangements, IMP, headed by a former Metropolitan and Municipal Commissioner and consisting of members from fields of journalism, legal and academics, regularly met and reviewed progress in key activities and also undertook field visits to assess improvement in the resettlement colonies and to hear from PAPs.

11. Grievance redresses process. A two stage grievance redress process was established at the beginning of project appraisal which was streamlined during implementation. The Grievance Redress committees (Field Level and Senior Level), handled complaints and grievances from PAPs and were administered by independent persons not associated with the project implementation. The field level committee heard and resolved 3,704 cases and the senior level committee resolved 902 cases. The independent impact assessment study carried out in 2008 recorded a high degree of PAP satisfaction with the grievance redress process.

12. Post-resettlement Support. The post resettlement support in this project can be considered as best practice. The support includes: (a) assistance with registering PAP cooperative societies; (b) support for Community Management Funds (CMF) and Maintenance Funds; (c) undertaking building repairs; (d) training in building management and provision of maintenance manuals; (e) allotment of additional locations for common facilities; (f) strengthening of basic services such a community halls, health

centers and schools; and (g) establishment of the Livelihood Cell to support and monitor income activities.

13. MMRDA’s overall post-resettlement activities have been notable, despite the delay in implementing the exit strategy. The progress MMRDA has achieved in registering and training of 95 percent of PAP cooperatives and enabling them to responsibly self-manage their affairs after program exit gives confidence that the post- resettlement strategy can be concluded in a sustainable manner.

14. The remaining aspects of the post-resettlement strategy involve formal handing over of the resettlement buildings to the cooperative societies. The preparatory work for this, namely housing society registration and training, has been substantially completed. The mainstreaming of the resettlement sites into the urban services network remains a challenge even as MCGM provides the basic services. MMRDA is pursuing the matter with GoM and MCGM regarding long term sustainability of the basic services provisions to the resettlement sites.

15. The sustainability of building management was noted during the field visits of the ICR mission. The discussions with some of the cooperative societies revealed that they have issued share certificates to their members and audited their financial reports and also maintain substantial reserve fund balance for unforeseen expenditures. They are carrying out minor repairs of the buildings and regularly paying the electricity dues and property taxes, ensuring the security of the buildings, maintaining details of flat owners and the building.

64 S

E To Virar

A V I R O B 23

THANE

I k L e A e V r I C BORIVALI R i r O o n B a - M M I

M MALAD N E E

W T

N I L

H T 5 22 30 JOGESWARI ROB (NORTH)

S E IN JOGESWARI L ROB (SOUTH) F J O O R G I E A S P

W L A A Malad Creek 21 R N I IO - IT V D I

R D 29 K A

H E

R N O A H L I T L - EASTERN EXPRESSWAY WESTERN EXPRESSWAY IN A L K R R O U A K D

ANDHERI ARABIAN VIKHROLI ROB SEA 20

GHATKOPAR SATIS

PROPOSED PEDESTRIAN SUBWAY LOCATIONS 27 1 MANTRALAYA SANTA CRUZ 2 GPO

Thane Creek 3 METRO R LINK BU R 4 NANACHOWK NTA C EM O S A RUZ - C H A D 5 J.J.HOSPITAL, HUME SCHOOL 26 6 BHATAT MATA CHEMBUR MAHIM 7 HIND MATA 19 8 KATARIA JUNCTION, L.J. ROAD CHEMBUR KURLA 9 STRELING APARTMENT, ACROSS BANDRA PEDDAR ROAD 18 10 PODDAR HOSPITAL, A.B. ROAD 17 MANKHURD HARBOUR LINE 11 WORLI NAKA 24 12 SIDDHIVINAYAK JUNCTION 16 25 13 PLAZA CINEMA JUNCTION 14 SHIVAJI PARK, KEKUSKAR RD. SOUTH Mahim Bay 9 VEER SAVARKAR MARJ JUNCTION 15 WORLI 8 GADKARICHOWK NEAR SENA BHAVAN BANDRA 16 LINK DADAR MAHIM CHURCH SATIS 17 NEAR BADA MAJID, S.V. ROAD 14 BANDRA (WEST) 15 13 18 NEAR LUCKY RESTAURANT, S.V. ROAD BANDRA (WEST) 12 19 LOTUS TANK, S.V. ROAD 20 BARIFIWALA LANE FLYOVER 10 7 21 ACROSS S.V. ROAD, NEAR JOGESWARI STATION (WEST) 22 RATNA HOTEL, S.V. ROAD GORESGAON (WEST) 11 23 CHANDAVARKAR LANE, S.V. ROAD BORIVALI (WEST) 6 01245 3 24 MAITRE YA PARK, CHEMBUR KILOMETERS 25 CHEMBUR NAKA 26 BAIGANWADI ACROSS GHATKOPAR- MANKHURD LINK ROAD Panvel Creek 27 L.B.S. MARG, HIRANAND DESAI MARG GHATKOPAR WESTERN RAILWAY CENTRAL RAILWAY 28 L.B.S. MARG, ADISHANKARACHARYA MARG, KANJURMARG 29 L.B.S. MARG AND BHANDUP STATION ROAD, ATC BHANDUP (WEST) PILOT 5 PROJECT 30 L.B.S. MARG AND DR. RANJENDRA PRASAD MARG, MULUND 4

3 2 INDIA CHURCHGATE CST MUMBAI URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT

MUMBAI 1 Rail and Road Components

RAIL AND ROAD PROJECT COMPONENTS: EXISTING:

STATION AREA TRAFFIC IMPROVEMENT SCHEME RAILWAY STATIONS (RAILWAY STATIONS) FLYOVERS ROAD IMPROVEMENTS This map was produced by the Uran LOCAL ROADS Map Design Unit of The World Bank. AREA TRAFFIC CONTROL PILOT PROJECT The boundaries, colors, denominations MAIN ROADS and any other information shown on RAIL (5TH LINE)

this map do not imply, on the part of ROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION IBRD 31931

MAY 2002 The World Bank Group, any judgment RAIL (PAIR OF LINES) on the legal status of any territory, or RAILROADS any endorsement or acceptance of ROAD OVER RAIL BRIDGE (ROB) such boundaries. MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES To Virar

S RAIL AND ROAD PROJECT COMPONENTS:

I L STATION AREA TRAFFIC IMPROVEMENT SCHEME F

O (RAILWAY STATIONS)

A P ROAD IMPROVEMENTS L

O AREA TRAFFIC CONTROL PILOT PROJECT I

D RAIL (5TH LINE)

R RAIL (PAIR OF LINES) I

L ROAD OVER RAIL BRIDGE (ROB)

A V I R O B EXISTING:

RAILWAY STATIONS

I k L e A FLYOVERS e V r I C BORIVALI R i r O o LOCAL ROADS n B a - M M I MAIN ROADS H

A M ROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION MALAD N E E RAILROADS W T

BE MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES E

N I L

H T

5 THANE JOGESWARI ROB (NORTH)

S E IN JOGESWARI L ROB (SOUTH) F J O O R G I E A S P

W L A A Malad Creek R N

I IO - IT V D I

R D

K A

H E

R N O A H L I T L - EASTERN EXPRESSWAY WESTERN EXPRESSWAY IN A L K R R O U A K D 8

ANDHERI VIKHROLI ROB

GHATKOPAR SATIS

SANTA CRUZ

Thane Creek

R LINK BU R NTA C EM O S A RUZ - C H A D

CHEMBUR

MAHIM CHEMBUR 1 BANDRA KURLA MANKHURD ARABIAN 5 HARBOUR LINE SEA 2

Mahim Bay 4 6 WORLI BANDRA LINK DADAR SATIS 3

01245 3

KILOMETERS

Panvel Creek WESTERN RAILWAY CENTRAL RAILWAY INDIA

ATC PILOT MUMBAI URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT PROJECT Resettlement Component

TEMPORARY PERMANENT RAIL SUBCOMPONENTS HOUSING SITES HOUSING SITES OPTIMISATION OF HARBOUR LINE:

CHURCHGATE CST KURLA - MANKHURD 5 MANKHURD 1 MANKHURD MUMBAI MAHIM - BORIVALI 5TH LINE 6 TURBHE MANDALE KURLA - THANE 5TH & 6TH LINES: GHATKOPAR - VIKROLI OPTIMISATION OF HARBOUR LINE: KING CIRCLE MAHIM 2 DHARAVI OPTIMISATION OF HARBOUR LINE: This map was produced by the Uran Map Design Unit of The World Bank. CST KURLA 7 WADALA KOKARI AGAR 3 WADALA The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on 4 ANTOP HILL this map do not imply, on the part of IBRD 31949

MAY 2002 The World Bank Group, any judgment KURLA - THANE 5TH & 6TH LINES: on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of VIKROLI - BHANDUP 8 KANJUR MARG such boundaries.