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Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Support Operations

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Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Support Operations TARGET BOSNIA: INTEGRATING INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS NATO-LED OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA DECEMBER 1995-1997 Acknowledgments This project was made possible through a grant from NATO Individual Research Fellowship and the sponsorship of Evidence Based Research Inc. (EBR) and the National Defense University (NDU). The French Service d’Information et de Relations Publiques des Armées (SIRPA) facilitated a three-week observation trip to Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1996. The author returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina under NATO auspices in March-April 1997. Many people assisted in this study, agreeing to interviews, providing documents, and reviewing portions of this monograph. The author greatly appreciates this support without which the study would have been impossible. In particular, I want to thank my husband , Adam B. Siegel, for his assistance and advice. In the end, the author bears full responsibility for any faults that remain. The views expressed within are the author’s and do not necessarily represent official views of NDU (U.S. government), SIRPA (French government) or NATO. About the author. Pascale Combelles Siegel is an independent researcher based in Arlington, Virginia where she works on media and defense issues. She has worked with Evidence Based Research since Fall 1996, focusing on the subject matter of this monograph. In support of NDU, Mrs. Siegel directed the NATO Joint Analysis Team’s lessons learned analysis of public information and information campaign during IFOR operations and participated in analysis of Civil-Military Cooperation during the first four months of SFOR operations. Mrs. Siegel’s work on military-media issues has appeared in books and journals on both sides of the Atlantic. She is currently completing her dissertation , which is entitled “Ideological Conflict and Practical Reliance: The US military-media relationship in times of conflict since Grenada.” 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Chapter 1: Background on NATO-led operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina Chapter 2: The Public Information Campaign Chapter 3: The Psychological Operations Campaign Chapter 4: The CIMIC Information Activities Chapter 5: Coordinating Information Activities Chapter 6: Assessing Information Activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina Chapter 7: Identifying Lessons from the Bosnia Experience Appendix 1: Local and International Responsibilities in the General Framework Agreement for Peace implementation Appendix 2: Map of Bosnia-Herzegovina as Agreed Upon at Dayton Appendix 3: Milestone in Implementation of Annex 1A of the General Framework Agreement for Peace Appendix 4: Multinational divisions areas of responsibility Acronym List Glossary of NATO terms Sources 3 INTRODUCTION “No matter how brilliantly you fight, what matters is the actual packaging.”1 With each day that passes drawing us further down the path from the Industrial to the Information Age, many officers are convinced that victory is no longer determined on the ground, but in media reporting. This is even more true in peace support operations (PSO) where the goal is not to conquer territory or defeat an enemy but to persuade parties in conflict (as well as the local populations) into a favored course of action. This monograph examines the role of information in PSO and its impact on command and control through the prism of NATO-led op erations in Bosnia-Herzegovina from December 1995 into 1997. Following the signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement on 14 December 1995, which put an end to a four-year long war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN mandated NATO to oversee and enforce a durable cease-fire between the former belligerents. 2 On 20 December 1995, a NATO-led multinational force, called the Implementation Force (IFOR) started OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOUR. On 20 December 1996, a smaller 1 Lawry Philips, chief media operations at the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). Interview with the author, PJHQ, Northwood, UK, 12 August 1997. The PJHQ is (approximately) the UK equivalent of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2 This came after over three years of NATO operations related to the war in Bosnia. Since July 92, NATO naval forces had monitored (and then enforced starting in November) the UN arms embargo (Operation SHARP GUARD). Since October 92, NATO forces had monitored (and then enforced starting in April 1993) the UN-imposed no-fly zone over Bosnia (Operation DENY FLIGHT). In June 1993, NATO offered close air support to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Problems in the command and control arrangements for this close air support heavily influenced the structure for the international implementation of the DPA starting in December 1995. Starting 30 August 1995, NATO executed operation DELIBERATE FORCE, a series of air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets. For a discussion of NATO and the UN operations in the Forme Republics of Yugoslavia, see: Dick A. Leudijk, “Before and After Dayton: The UN and NATO in the former Yugoslavia,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 18, no 3, 1997, pp. 457-470; Gregory L. Schulte, “Former Yugoslavia and New NATO,” Survival, vol. 39, no 1, Spring 1997, pp. 19-42. 4 NATO coalition called the Stabilization Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR. In operation JOINT GUARD, SFOR received an eighteen month mandate to oversee and enforce the cease-fire. In Bosnia, IFOR and then SFOR ran an information campaign designed to “seize and maintain the initiative by imparting timely and effective information within the commander’s intent.”3 The term information campaign refers to the coordinated and synchronized use of different information activities within the command. The campaign had three components. • A public information (PI) campaign designed to establish NATO’s credibility with the international media to gain support from the contributing nations for the mission. Public Information Officers executed this mission. • A psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign designed to influence the local population and its leaders in favor of IFOR troops and operations. PSYOP units (mainly American) undertook this aspect of the campaign. • A Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) information campaign designed to inform audiences about civil-military cooperation and to release information to aid the local populations. CIMIC elements (mainly U.S. Army) undertook this mission. In this monograph, information activities refers to the different components of the campaign, and information campaign refers to the coordination of the various elements. 4 3 Colonel Tim Wilton, UKA, ARRC Chief Information Officer (CIO), Sarajevo, 12 October 1996. Although this definition applied principally to IFOR operations, it also seemed to accurately reflect what SFOR did. 4 Indeed, the ARRC (IFOR’s land component) defined the information campaign as “the synchronized and coordinated application of public information and psychological operations.” Interview with Col. Tim Wilton, UKA, ARRC Chief Information Officer, Sarajevo, 12 October 1996. 5 This terminology was adopted in part to avoid confusion with a new fashionable term: information operations. According to the U.S. Army’s FM 100-6, information operations refers to operations linking together public affairs, civil affairs, psychological operations, command and control warfare, and electronic warfare. Such all- encompassing information operations did not take place during N ATO-led operations in Bosnia.5 During the planning of operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR, NATO commanders and political leadership thought that information activities would make a critical contribution to mission accomplishment. In particular, they expected a successful public information campaign to contribute to building and preserving public support for the military operation. Indeed, media reporting affects how the world and the local communities assess the events of peace operations, as it provides the basis for the world’s—including many in the political elite—judgment as to the success or failure of a peace operation. As the main interface between the command and journalists, the public information officers’ role was deemed crucial. Information activities were also expected to help commanders communicate to the parties their intentions and might, and lead the local population to act friendly. During both the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and during NATO operations in Bosnia, major military operations were rare .6 On the other hand, IFOR 5 Department of the Army, Field Manual: FM 100-6: Information Operations, Washington, D.C., 6 During UN and NATO missions through mid-1997, major military operations were rare. One of them took place in March 1996, when IFOR seized arms and ammunitions from the Bosnian government. IFOR also seized many documents linking the Bosnian government to Iran. Anothe major operation occu red when SFOR troops redeployed in Republika Srpska to back the elected President Biljana Plavsic in her power struggle against the Bosnian-Serb military leader Radovan Karadzic. Karadzic, an indicted war criminal, gave up all official positions in 1996 under pressure 6 (and later SFOR) often used information activities to deter the Bosnian factions from violating the military annex of the Dayton agreement and from attacking NATO troops. IFOR/SFOR also used information activities to convince the local population that a brighter future would await them if the Dayton agreement was fully complied with. Before the NATO deployment began in December 1995, the stakes were particularly high for a successful information campaign.
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