Depoliticizing discourses The role of editorials in the reproduction of consensus: assessing the media coverage of the Yellow Vest movement

Mathilde Colin

Human rights Bachelor thesis 15 ECTS Spring term 2019 Supervisor: Jonna Pettersson

1 Abstract The purpose of this thesis was to study how Yellow Vest protests, which started 17 November 2018, and protesters themselves, were being described in the French mainstream press. The material consisted in 19 editorials from 5 of the most-circulated newspapers in the country. They were analyzed using Norman Fairclough’s model of critical discourse analysis and within a theoretical framework drawn from Chantal Mouffe’s discussion of the notion of consensus. The findings suggest that the mainstream discourse on Yellow Vests is one which denies their legitimacy within the political realm through a process of depoliticization supported by discourses of contempt, republicanism, and unity. This study illustrates the struggle of protesters to be granted space and legitimacy within contemporary democracies to properly exercise their civil and political rights.

Keywords: consensus, democracy, , media, Yellow Vests

Word count: 14145

2 List of Abbreviations ACPM – Alliance for press and media figures (Alliance pour les chiffres de la presse et des médias) CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis EU – European Union FN – National Front (Front National, now RN, Rassemblement National) IGF – General Inspectorate of Finances (Inspection Générale des Finances) IGPN – General Inspectorate of the National Police (Inspectorat Général de la Police Nationale) LFI – Unbowed France () LR – (Les Républicains) LREM – The Republic on the Move (La République en Marche) PS – (Parti Socialiste) RIC – People's Referendum (Référendum d'Initiative Citoyenne) RWB – Reporters Without Borders TICPE – Domestic consumption tax on energy products (Taxe intérieure de consommation sur les produits énergétiques) UN – United Nations

3 Table of Contents 1. Introduction ...... 5 1.1 Introduction to the topic ...... 5 1.2 Research aim and questions ...... 6 1.3 Relevance to human rights ...... 7 1.3.1 The overall context of repression ...... 7 1.3.2 Media, protest movements and human rights: the “guard dogs” perspective ...... 9 1.4 Delimitations ...... 10 1.5 Thesis outline ...... 11

2. Context ...... 12 2.1 French politics ...... 12 2.1.1 The political system ...... 12 2.1.2 The political culture ...... 13 2.1.3 's election ...... 15 2.2 French media ...... 16 2.2.1 The media system ...... 16 2.2.2 The role and status of the editorial ...... 18 2.3 The Yellow Vest movement ...... 19

3. Literature review ...... 22 3.1 Media and protest movements ...... 22 3.2 News coverage of protest in French media ...... 23

4. Theoretical framework ...... 26 4.1 Defining consensus ...... 26 4.2 Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action ...... 26 4.3 Chantal Mouffe's model of agonistic democracy ...... 26

5. Methodology ...... 29 5.1 Critical discourse analysis ...... 29 5.1.1 Norman Fairclough's framework ...... 29 5.1.2 Norman Fairclough's perspective on media discourse ...... 30 5.2 Introduction to the media material ...... 31 5.3 Data collection ...... 34 5.4 Ethical considerations ...... 34

6. Analysis ...... 36 6.1 Discourse of contempt ...... 36 6.2 Discourse of republicanism ...... 40 6.3 Discourse of unity ...... 43

7. Conclusions ...... 46 Appendix 1: List of editorials ...... 48 Bibliography ...... 49

4 1. Introduction 1.1 Introduction to the topic On April 17, 2017, President-to-be Emmanuel Macron gave a speech in the AccorHotels Arena, east of . “You have understood it,” the En Marche ! candidate President tells the crowd. “We will have to, at the same time, live, work, and learn. Excuse me, you have probably noticed, I said: at the same time.” Immediately, the crowd laughs, applauses, and starts shouting “At the same time!” (en même temps). “Some say it’s a verbal tic,” Macron continues. “But that it’s a verbal tic that means I am not clear [...] because, you know, some people like boxes, categorized ideologies [...] well, I will keep using ‘at the same time’ because it means that we take into account imperatives [...] whose conciliation is indispensable. [...] I chose the best of the right and the best of the left.” Just under a year before that speech, Chantal Mouffe’s On The Political was translated into French under the title L’illusion du consensus (‘The Illusion of Consensus’)1. The essay tackles the post-political Zeitgest which she argues denies existing antagonisms. According to Mouffe, the nature of consensus is not to be accommodating, a one-size-fits-all, win-win solution to complex issues, but rather, “all forms of consensus are by necessity based on acts of exclusion2.” In response to antagonism, rather than referring to the inherently depoliticizing notions of consensus and of the ‘end of history,’ Mouffe argues, “a central task of democratic politics is to provide the institutions which will permit conflicts to take an ‘agonistic’ form, where the opponents are not enemies but adversaries among whom exists a conflictual consensus3.” In other words, in pluralist democracies, institutions are to accommodate antagonisms. Just over a year after that speech, the Yellow Vest movement emerged, granting the “President of consensus” with all-time low rates of approval4. Originally a tax revolt protesting raising diesel fuel prices, the Yellow Vest movement would become an all- encompassing protest which, rather than opposing a specific law or draft law, aims at identifying the structural, systemic causes to an array of issues such as poverty, unemployment, and police brutality. Soon enough, the movement would make the headlines. On December 2, 2018, the most commonly occurring words on the cover of the country’s main dailies were “chaos,” “fever,” “anger,” “burning/burns,” “black” and “escalation,”

1 Chantal Mouffe (2016). L’illusion du consensus. Paris: Albin Michel. 2 Chantal Mouffe (2009). The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso, p. 93. 3 Chantal Mouffe (2013). Agonistics: Thinking The World Politically. London: Verso, p. XII. 4 IFOP (2018). “Le tableau de bord politique–Décembre 2018.”

5 according to a study published in Le Figaro5. On television and on the radio, too, words caught the attention of observers. “The movement is on the way to cretinization,” said editorialist Dominique Seux on LCI on February 19, 2019. “Because of human rights, we are crying about people being wounded by flash-balls. But it’s murderers we have in front of us,” says F., an auditor on radio channel RMC on March 18, 2019, calling for the police to “fire real bullets” at protesters, as show co-host Olivier Truchot approves. “Let [the police] use their weapons once and for all,” suggested philosopher and former Minister for Youth, National Education and Research Luc Ferry on Radio Classique on January 7, 2019. A direct consequence of the coverage of the Yellow Vest movement, trust in the media dropped by a whopping 11 points to reach 24%–the second lowest of all countries studied by the Institute for the Study of Journalism for its 2019 media consumption report6. Critique of the media became central to the movement itself. On the back of some of the notorious yellow vests, which had become receptacles for their wearers’ thoughts, one could read things such as “Media=lies. Show our real face! Be the people7!,” “The government pisses all over us–the media says its raining8,” and “Corrupt government, muzzled media. Demos kratos–hope is yellow9.” Although criticism of protest movements is necessary in a pluralist democracy, the belief at the core of this essay is that the ubiquity and nature of the criticism formulated towards the Yellow Vest movement is not constitutive of agonism as defined by Mouffe. Rather, it is criticism aimed at defending and perpetuating the consensus surrounding existing structures of power. Applying critical discourse analysis to a corpus of nineteen editorials from five of the most-circulated French newspapers, I will be attempting to identify the specificities of the media discourse on the Yellow Vest. As such, I hope to elucidate on the notion of consensus as well as remedy a lack of research on the coverage of protest by French news outlets.

1.2 Research aim and questions The aim of this research is to identify features within editorials on the Yellow Vest movement to elucidate on the coverage of protest movements by mainstream media and, more specifically, on the specific function of editorials. To fulfill said aim, I will be applying

5 Blandine Le Cain, Julien Boudisseau and FIG Data (2018). “Comment les « gilets jaunes » se sont progressivement imposés en une de la presse.” , December 19. 6 Nic Newman et al. (2019). Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, p. 9. 7 Plein le dos (n.d.). “Acte 11.” 8 Plein le dos (n.d.). “Acte 15.” 9 Plein le dos (n.d.). “Acte 30.”

6 a critical discourse analysis (CDA) on a total of nineteen editorials published between November 22, 2018 and May 21, 2019 in five of the most-circulated newspapers in France. On a theoretical level, this research aims at unfolding the notion of consensus in Chantal Mouffe's understanding. The research questions which will be guiding my research are the following: – What discourses on the Yellow Vests can be identified in editorials from the French press? – From the study of those discourses, what can be understood about the space allocated to protest movements in the political realm?

1.3 Relevance to human rights 1.3.1 The overall context of repression Since the very beginning of the movement, a number of organisms, such as the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and Amnesty International, have drawn attention to a number of human rights abuses within the Yellow Vest movement. Three main areas of concern were at the core of their observations. The first and perhaps main preoccupation of said organisms is with the policing of the movement, deemed “excessive” by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, and “disproportionate” by the European Parliament, asking respectively for an in- depth investigation into alleged cases of police brutality10 and the prohibition of riot control weapon LBD-4011. Since January 2019, in collaboration with independent investigation newspaper Médiapart, journalist David Dufresne, who specializes in matters of policing and civil liberties, has been listing on his professional Twitter account, @davduf, every account of abuse of force and injury during a Yellow Vest protest which he has received in-depth information about. His tweets begin as such: "Hello, @Place_Beauvau12? I'd like to report..." followed by information, and often pictures or videos, about the event, in a perhaps symbolic attempt at alerting the authorities, encouraging victims to report incidents to the General Inspectorate of the National Police (IGPN). Although exact figures are impossible to obtain, the Minister of the Interior estimated that there had been a total of 2 448 protesters injured as of May 2019. As of July 20, 2019, Dufresne has received 860 individual complaints,

10 Libération (2019). “Gilets jaunes : l’ONU réclame une enquête sur « l’usage excessif de la force », le gouvernement réplique.” March 6. 11 (2019). “Le Parlement européen condamne le « recours disproportionné à la force » contre les manifestants.” February 14. 12 Place Beauvau refers to the Square Beauvau on which the Minister of the Interior, responsible for the general interior security of the country, is found, and has grown to refer to the institution itself metonymically.

7 including 315 reporting head injuries, 24 lost eyes, 5 blown-up hands and 2 deaths–that of 80 year-old Zined Redouane, and that of 24 year-old Steve Maia Caniço13 14. Of the 265 inquiries led by the IGPN about complaints from victims of police violence, not one has resulted in a court conviction and, according to the “police of the police,” “there is no such thing as police brutality15.” The second preoccupation is with the great amount of people arrested, put in custody, kept in detention awaiting trial, sent to immediate trial hearing, forbidden from joining future demonstrations, or sentenced to prison, fines, or community service. Here, too, exact, up-to- date figures are difficult to obtain. Contacted by media outlet StreetPress, the ministry of Justice gave its most recent account in early July. In nine months, about 11 000 people were kept in custody, and a little over 3 000 sentences were rendered, out of which about a third were non- suspended prison sentences, from a few months up to three years16. Preventive arrests and detentions are made possible by a law from March 2, 2010 enacted with the express purpose of tackling violence in so-called “sensitive” neighborhoods17 and reinforced with a circular promulgated on September 20, 2016, during the State of emergency, in reaction to the establishment of so-called ZADs18 19. Furthermore, on November 22, 2018, through a so-called “yellow vest” circular, Minister of Justice explicitly allowed police officers to subject to identity checks and searches anyone out of their homes on Saturdays in Paris, major towns, and the roads leading there20. After her January visit to Paris, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, denounced, among other things, the arbitrary nature of arrests during demonstrations, arguing that such practices “constitute serious interferences with the exercise of the freedom of movement and the freedoms of assembly and expression21.”

13 Steve Maia Caniço’s death was unrelated to the protests. He allegedly fell into the Loire during the Fête de la Musique, an annual celebration throughout the country, after the police came to dislodge partygoers using teargas. Not knowing how to swim, Steve was not rescued from the waters. His body was not searched for immediately, and it was found five weeks later, a time during which the question of knowing “where is Steve” (Où est Steve ?) became a major preoccupation for protesters. 14 David Dufresne (2019). “« Allô place Beauvau, c’est pour un bilan », une cartographie des violences policières.” Médiapart, January 25. 15 Le Figaro (2019). “« Gilets jaunes » : « Pas de violences policières », selon l’IGPN.” June 14. 16 StreetPress (2019). “Envoyés en prison comme 440 autres Gilets jaunes, ils racontent.” September 16. 17 Code pénal. Article 222-14-2. 18 A zone à défendre, “zone to defend,” is a French neologism which refers to the political of an area in order to oppose a development project 19 Ministère de la Justice (2016). Circulaire du 20 septembre 2016 relative à la lutte contre les infractions commises à l’occasion des manifestations et autres mouvements collectifs. 20 Ministère de la Justice (2018). Circulaire du 22 novembre 2018 relative au traitement judiciaire des infractions commises en lien avec le mouvement de contestation dit « des gilets jaunes ». 21 The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2019). “Memorandum on maintaining public order and freedom of assembly in the context of the “yellow vest” movement in France.” February 26.

8 Mijatović also expressed concern about the introduction of an administrative ban on demonstrating, which is a third concern surrounding the response to the Yellow Vest movement. Although the controversial article providing for the prohibition of participation in a demonstration as a preventive measure and as the result of an administrative decision has since been censored by the Constitutional Council on the basis that it was a breach of article 11 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen22, concern remains. Indeed, article 6 of the law n°2019-290 of April 11, 2019 also contains a provision aiming at taking into custody and potentially sentencing to prison, rather than just fining as was the case before, anybody intentionally hiding all or part of one’s face in a demonstration. According to Amnesty International, such a legal arsenal impedes Yellow Vests’ right to protest as embedded in international law, because protesters are automatically, arbitrarily treated as if they were guilty23, which follows from Minister of the Interior Christophe Castaner’s conception that “those who join demonstrations where degradations are expected become accomplices to those degradations24”. In the beginning of July, Amnesty started an inquiry among protesters aimed at identifying the consequences of such a law.

1.3.2 Media, protest movements and human rights: the “guard dogs” perspective The belief which grounds this research is that where negative news coverage of protest is prominent, it denies protesters’ legitimacy as political actors and impedes their civil and political rights. The role of the media is crucial in drawing attention to protesters’ demands and in helping protesters’ achieve desired outcomes, and the notion that there might be a positive influence of coverage which amplifies protesters’ voice is supported by research25. In 1995, Donohue et al. developed a 'guard dog' perspective on the role of the media which has since became a key concept within journalism studies26 and is attached to a vast discussion on the degree of power of the media and its autonomy from other powers. It is distinct from both the watch-dog perspective of media which surveils government policies and excesses and the lapdog view of media as largely submissive to existing powers27. The conception of the press as a “forum for the people” and “freedom-seeker-and-defender,”

22 Conseil constitutionnel (2019). Décision n°2019-780 DC, Loi visant à renforcer et garantir le maintien de l'ordre public lors des manifestations. 23 Amnesty International (2019). La casse du droit de manifester. 24 Huffington Post (2019). “Pour Christophe Castaner, ceux qui manifestent là où il a de la casse annoncée savent qu’ils seront complices.” January 11. 25 William A. Gamson and Gadi Wolfsfeld (1993). “Movements and Media as Interacting Systems.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 528. 26 George A. Denohue, Philip J. Tichenor and Clarice N. Olien (1995). “A Guard Dog Perspective on the Role of Media.” Journal of Communication, Vol 45, No 2. 27 Ibid., p. 115.

9 Donohue et al. argue, springs from Edmund Burke's 'fourth estate' conception, was largely popularized by fiction, and is only supported by relatively rare acts of bravery within the profession28. Within the guard dog perspective, the role of the media is to act as a security system for the powerful, “a sentry not for the community as a whole, but for groups having sufficient power and influence29.” “In the consensus atmosphere,” Donohue et al. argue, “the media are sleeping guard dogs,” except “when external forces present a threat to the community leadership30.” Drawing from that perspective, this thesis argues that in the midst of a protest movement, if the media acts like a 'guard dog' for the oligarchy rather than as a 'watch-dog' of civil, political, and socio-economic rights, the overcoming of the inequalities addressed by protesters is jeopardized. In addition, this research draws attention to the causes of a relatively poor freedom of the press and journalistic culture in France.

1.4 Delimitations The limits reached by this thesis are many and lead way for potentially fruitful future research. Time and space restrictions, but mostly boundaries set by my own knowledge and skills, have compelled quite restrictive choices. CDA was preferred over other methods because a strictly qualitative study seemed a better fit when dealing with little data. The chosen corpus allows for an in-depth analysis within said limits, but the number and nature of the chosen texts prohibits certain assertions. There is pluralism within the French press and I am only focusing on five of the most-circulated daily newspapers. As such, this study will not be able to make claims about the impact of a media outlet's location, political affiliation, ownership and other specificities not accounted for on its coverage of social movements. Given the choice of methods, this study will not be able to make claims about the potential change in discourses over time, either. Another, prominent difficulty with the chosen methods is that it rests highly on the interpretation of whoever is conducting the study. Another author may have read the text material differently, and raised different arguments. Furthermore, due to my attempt at making French society intelligible to foreign readers, I am touching on a variety of topics which fall beyond the scope of this essay and will not be elaborated upon. A perhaps bigger difficulty lies in that the studied material is, evidently,

28 Ibid., p. 118. 29 Ibid., p. 116. 30 Idem.

10 exclusively in French. As there is no official English translation of the selected outlets, all translations of the studied texts are mine. Although I am a native French speaker, some words and expressions cannot be translated without losing some of their substance. I am producing the most literal translation possible and, as access to most articles is restricted, I will be providing the original texts in footnotes for greater transparency. Lastly, it is important to specify that as of July 2019, the movement is still going on. Conclusions must therefore be drawn with precaution and taken with a grain of salt.

1.5 Thesis outline Having given a brief introduction to my topic, I will begin my thesis per se by providing some context, touching upon the French political and media systems and cultures as well as the Yellow Vest movement. I will then review the literature on the news coverage of protest and examine cases from France. This will be giving way to my own research. I will be introducing the reader to the theoretical framework for my thesis, clarifying the notion of consensus and its relevance to the present study. After explaining my research design and laying out the material that I will be using, I will be proceeding to the analysis.

11 2. Context 2.1 French politics A political system is defined as an array of institutions and interest groups, their interactions, and the norms and rules which govern them31. It differs from political culture, which is defined as “the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system […]. [Political culture] is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of its members32”.

2.1.1 The political system The French political system is a republic. The present regime, called the Fifth Republic, is the product of a deep-rooted history of instability–since the 1789 Revolution, there had been a tight succession of republican, orleanist (monarchist), and bonapartist regimes–and was created in reaction to the failing of the parliamentary-based Fourth (1946-1958) Republic to deal with crises such as the beginning of the Cold War and processes of decolonization–most notably, the Algerian War of Independence33. Within the typology established by Maurice Duverger34, the French Fifth Republic is a semi-presidential system, characterized by two executive leaders: a President and a Prime Minister. However, the purpose of the Fifth Republic was to grant much power to the President–the French political system is often referred to as a "republican monarchy" and the French Presidency, "the most powerful office in the democratic world35.” Elected by direct suffrage for a five-year term, the role of the French President is highly symbolic–he is expected to, among other things, provide a vision, keep antagonisms under control, and incarnate national unity. Beyond those symbolic aspects, the Constitution grants him an array of powers. Articles 67 and 68 make him irresponsible, meaning that he cannot be held accountable nor removed from office before the end of his term. In addition to electing ministers, a power granted by article 8 of the Constitution, the President gets to appoint holders of an array of offices in such thing as the judiciary and the military as inscribed in articles 13, 14, and 56. Lastly, articles 13 and 49 grant him the power to bypass Parliamentary vote36. The French parliament is bi-cameral: the

31 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (2008). “Political System.” 32 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (2008). “Political Culture.” 33 Andrew Knapp and Vincent Wright (2006). The Government and . 5th edn. London: Routledge, p. 49. 34 Maurice Duverger (1978). Echec au roi. Paris: Albin Michel. 35 Robert Tombs (2017). “France’s Presidency Is Too Powerful To Work.” Foreign Policy, May 2. 36 Article 49-3 of the Constitution allows the government to make a bill a “question of confidence,” halting

12 lower house, the National Assembly, is subject to a direct election every five years while the upper house, the , is elected by local representatives37. The party system of France underwent major transformations in the past years. Although the terms 'right' and 'left' originated in the French Revolution and the division of the National Assembly between, to the left, supporters of the revolution and, to the right, supporters of the king, this dichotomy is increasingly considered outdated, which reflects in the variety of French political parties. Since 1958, France went from a strong multipartism characterized by the co- existence of up to 5 or 6 'relevant' parties38 to a system dominated by three parties39, landing into instability in 2017 due to the decline of traditional parties. The 2017 presidential election was characterized by the appearance of liberal party La République en Marche (LREM, 1st place), the rise of far-left La France Insoumise (LFI, 4th place), and the decline of centre-left Parti Socialiste (PS, 5th place) while far-right Front National (FN) and right Les Républicains (LR) came respectively 2nd and 3rd, not suffering any major change40. The 2019 European election confirmed the decline of traditional parties, with the PS and LR both obtaining under 10% of the vote41.

2.1.2 The political culture Compared to other Western and specifically West European countries, France averages lower scores in democracy and freedom of expression indexes. In The Economist’s 2018 Democracy Index, France ranks 29th–in between Botswana and Israel–and classifies as a flawed democracy42. When looking closer at the country’s scores, one notices that France ranks particularly low in what The Economist calls political culture, with a score of 5.63 out of 10. The Economist defines a democratic political culture as one in which there are elections at the result of which "the losing parties and their supporters accept the judgment of the voters, and allow for the peaceful transfer of power," as opposed to "a culture of passivity

the parliamentary discussion. Opponents must then table a “motion of censure” within twenty-four hours and vote it by an absolute majority of all members of the National Assembly, otherwise the bill is considered passed. 37 Andrew Knapp and Vincent Wright, op. cit., p. 57. 38 In the 1997 legislative election, the Parti Communiste Français, Parti Socialiste, Les Verts (Greens), Union pour la Démocratie Française, Rassemblement Pour la République and Front National all obtained over 5% of the vote. 39 In the 2015 election, the Parti Socialiste, Républicains, and Front National all obtained over 23% of votes while no other party obtained over 4%. 40 Ministère de l’Intérieur (2017). “Résultats de l’élection présidentielle 2017.” 41 Ministère de l'Intérieur (2019). “Résultats des élections européennes 2019.” 42 Economist Intelligence Unit (2018). EIU Democracy Index 2018–World Democracy Report.

13 and apathy, an obedient and docile citizenry43." Criteria to define a country's political culture include such things as the degree of societal consensus surrounding representative democracy, the perception of leadership, the likelihood of endorsement of technocratic or military leaders, and secularism44. Similarly, according to Freedom House, France, despite having an aggregate ‘freedom’ score of 90 out of 100, classifies as slightly less free than its neighbors45. Freedom House largely attributes this score to the state of emergency. Originally implemented in 2015 after the 13 November attacks, it was not repealed before October 2017, when it was made into permanent law, containing notably provisions which increased the powers of the police. Freedom House also pointed at the French government's habit of bypassing parliamentary debate using either Article 49.3 of the French constitution or the ordonnance process, lingering, large scale corruption, high concentration of media ownership, government surveillance, restrictions on freedom of assembly and an excessive use of force by the police46. Criticism of these indexes, their understanding of democracy– keen to that of Almond and Verba47–and their methodology, falls beyond the scope of this thesis. The French political culture is multifaceted. Most importantly, it is characterized by a legacy of conflict and a strong State. Debating politics is central to the French way of life and is done in all occasions, including at the Christmas dinner table–to the extent that on December 22, in the midst of the Yellow Vest movement, the government published a guide to help its supporters defend its politics during holiday family dinners48. Since 1789, a dozen regimes have ruled France and most transitional periods were characterized by insurrections and bloodbaths49. On the other hand, the history of France is also one of state-building, of the continuous struggle to unite disparate and coveted provinces into a nation50. The strong French statism is most obvious to the foreign observers in such things as France's extreme centralization and its peculiar secularism (laïcité). In face of a hectic people, the French State maintains its hegemony through a culture of hierarchism and elitism supported by Cartesianism–as the joke goes, a Frenchman is somebody who asks “The idea works just fine

43 Laza Kekic (2007). The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of democracy. Economist Intelligence Unit, p. 2. 44 Ibid., p. 10-11. 45 Michael J. Abramowitz (2018). Freedom in the World 2018–Democracy in Crisis. Freedom House. 46 Freedom House (2018). Freedom in the World 2018–France Profile. 47 Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba (1963). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 48 Gouvernement (2018). “Repas de Famille.” 49 Andrew Knapp and Vincent Wright, op. cit., p. 3. 50 Ibid., p. 14.

14 in practice, but will it work in theory?”–and a sense of destiny51. French elitism is best illustrated by the French classes préparatoires, which consist in two years of study in order to prepare high school graduates for enrollment in the grandes écoles–highly selective, prestigious institutions which fundamentally provide leaders for the country’s public and private sectors. French elitism isn’t merit-based, as was demonstrated in the works of Pierre Bourdieu and is supported by research up to this day52. French hierarchism is best illustrated by the lack of trust of the population in its elites. The very low trust in vaccines–one in three disagrees that they are safe, the highest percentage globally53–is one of many examples. The lingering skepticism of the French can be partly explained by the many lies and treasons of the elites, including former president François Mitterrand having a secret family and lying about it54 and the infamous infected blood scandal, causing hemophiliac patients to be infected with HIV55.

2.1.3 Emmanuel Macron's election The 2019 presidential election had a voter turnout of 74.5%, among which 8.5% were blank, and Emmanuel Macron was elected with 66% of expressed votes56. Before turning to politics, Macron worked in finance, first in the General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF), then as an investment banker at Rothschild & Co57. During both employment periods, Macron also worked for Jacques Attali’s “Commission to Unleash French Growth58.” In 2014, he was appointed Minister of the Economy before resigning in 2016, invoking “our political system's […] failure to generate an in-depth, ideological consensus.” Simultaneously, he created En Marche ! ('Forward!', now LREM), in the hopes of “gathering everybody who shares” his “project to serve the general interest” and “indifferent of their political allegiance.” Some commented-upon reforms include the wealth tax repeal (replaced with a real estate tax), the decrease in housing tax, the turning of the state railway service into a joint-stock company and the plan to privatize Paris airports59.

51 John Lichfield (2015). “How the French Think by Sudhir Hazareesingh, book review: The theoretical construct is all.” The Independent, June 25. 52 Pascal-Emmanuel Gaubry (2018). “France’s Gifted Youth Are Set Up to Fail.” Bloomberg, April 24. 53 Angelique Chrisafis (2019). “French scepticism over vaccines reflects distrust of government.” , June 19. 54 Christophe Barbier (2005). “La seconde famille de Mitterrand–derniers secrets.” L’Express, May 29. 55 Sophie Chauveau (2011). L'Affaire du sang contaminé (1983-2003). Paris: Les Belles Lettres. 56 Ministère de l’Intérieur (2017). “Résultats de l’élection présidentielle 2017.” 57 Le Monde (2012). “Emmanuel Macron, un banquier d’affaires nommé secrétaire général adjoint de l’Elysée.” May 16. 58 (2014). “Emmanuel Macron, un ex-banquier touche-à-tout à Bercy.” August 27. 59 Le Macronomètre (n.d.). “Le suivi du quinquennat 2017-2022.”

15

2.2 French media 2.2.1 The media system According to a 2018 survey, 60% of the French population reads at least parts of one physical newspaper daily60. However, as mentioned earlier, trust in the media has fallen to 24%–well under the worldly average of 49%–as a direct consequence of the Yellow Vest movement61. The 2019 findings of the annual face-to-face survey led by newspaper La Croix62 confirms these results. Of the 1050 people surveyed, 51% considered that the media coverage of the Yellow Vest movement was poor. Around two thirds believe that the media is influenced by financial and political powers. Overall, the written press is the second most trusted form of media, right behind the radio, with about 44% of people granting some degree of trust to newspapers. Television, specifically state-owned channels and private news channels, suffered the most from the whopping drop in media trust63. The report also posits that have risen in France in the past years, but show lower usage and awareness rates than in neighboring countries64. Although the report disqualifies them on the basis of their populism, it imputes their relative renown to their extensive coverage of social movements. The situation of French media is a much studied issue. France ranks relatively low on the Reporters Without Borders' 2019 World Press Freedom Index. Laying in 32nd place with a score of 22.21, RWB blames attacks on freedom of expression such as the 2018 law on business secrets, as well as the concentrated ownership of media outlets and ensuing censorship65. In 1997, Serge Hamili published an essay entitled Les nouveaux chiens de garde, tackling the reputation of French media as a "counter-power” and detailing the causes to poor journalism in the country66. The title is a reference to Paul Nizan’s 1932 Les Chiens de garde, a pamphlet targeting some of France's prominent philosophers, arguing that their role is to protect the moral values and socioeconomic interests of the bourgeoisie, while being granted respect and trust due to their status as the intellectual elite of the country67. Himself a

60 ACPM (2018). “Classement Audience One Global 2018 V3.” 61 Nic Newman et al., op. cit., p. 9. 62 Aude Carasco (2019). “Baromètre médias, les journalistes sommés de se remettre en question.” La Croix, January 24. 63 Nic Newman et al., op.cit., p. 20. 64 Ibid., p. 23. 65 Reporters Without Borders (2019). France. 66 Serge Halimi (1997). Les nouveaux chiens de garde. Paris: Raisons d’. 67 Paul Nizan (1932). Les Chiens de garde. Paris: Rieder.

16 journalist at Le Monde diplomatique, Halimi aimed to write a book in support of his profession, arguing that the impact of journalism on the social world calls for responsibility68. He identified three root issues within journalism: reverence before political power; concentrated ownership; and market journalism. The first kind is best understood as the overlapping of the media and political systems in France. As the political system is extremely opaque, journalists who get close to politicians in an effort to get information end up forming friendships and getting granted advantages which they find difficult to renounce, or which they imagine to be inconsequential69. Furthermore, Halimi explains, success for the mainstream media is still defined as having “whatever politician” discuss “whatever he wants” and “whenever he wants” in one’s media outlet70. “In France”, Halimi adds, reporting from a third source, “it is absolutely normal to discuss with the Elysée which journalists are to interview [members of the government71].” The second kind is best illustrated by the fact that most of the country’s wealthiest people have invested in the sector of communication, Halimi explains. Bernard Arnault and his family, #4 on Forbes’ 2019 Billionaire list; François Pinault and his family, #30; Patrick Drahi, #192; the Dassault family, #272; Vincent Bolloré and his family, #343; and Xavier Niel, #478, all own parts in one or several media outlets72. The third kind is characterized by a broad array of problems including “plagiarism, lack of skills and culture, laziness, lack of time given to doing proper work73” as well as the need for media outlets to do what is most lucrative, hence making headlines with dead donkeys, ready- made thinking, solar eclipses, gossip, and so on74. Scholars Hallin and Mancini have developed a typology of media systems. Their typology is based on four clusters of variables: the development of media markets; the degree and forms of political parallelism; journalistic professionalism; and the role of the state75. They have identified three models: Liberal, Democratic Corporatist, and Polarized Pluralist, and consider France to be, alongside Britain, a "mixed case76." According to them, France shares characteristics of both the Polarized Pluralist and Democratic Corporatist models. Compared with the Liberal model, the other two models are characterized by lower levels of journalistic

68 Serge Halimi, op. cit., p. 9. 69 Ibid., p. 35. 70 Ibid., p. 22. 71 Ibid., p. 22-23. 72 Forbes (2019). “Billionaires: The Richest People in the World.” March 5. 73 Serge Halimi, op. cit., p. 73. 74 Ibid., p. 76. 75 Daniel C. Hallin (2016). “Typology of Media Systems.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, p. 4. 76 Ibid., p. 5.

17 professionalism, tighter links between the media and the political world, and a rather interventionist role of the state77, which seems to confirm Halimi’s arguments.

2.2.2 The role and status of the editorial The term 'editorial' was first used as a noun in the nineteenth century to mean “a newspaper article written by or under the direct responsibility of the editor78.” Scholars Dubied and Lits summarize the characteristics of the editorial as: “[...] an article at the head of the newspaper, published at important moments only, engaging the editor […] and taking position, blending passionate engagement and classical argumentation, on a subject of some importance, in a sought-after style79.” Colored backgrounds, illustrations, bold letters and other gimmicks may be used to distinguish the editorial from the rest of the opinion articles. Editorials have generated considerable academic interest within the field of linguistics as “good editorials are considered some of the best examples of persuasive writing in all countries80.” According to Van Dijk, editorials are “probably the widest circulated opinion discourses of society” and, as they are read by people in positions of power, they can be considered to have a concrete influence on policy making, public opinion–even when through critical opposition to them– and all kinds of social and political action81. Due to their omnipresence, editorialists in France are sometimes nicknamed 'editocrats,' a term popularized by the 2009 eponymous essay. “Anybody who has made the wild bet to go through a whole week without bumping into Jacques Attali or Bernard-Henri Lévy […] knows […] that such a challenge is impossible to complete82. ” According to Le Parisien, since September 2018, a number of television channels have been paying editorialists an average of 250 euros per appearance83. Since the decline of traditional political parties linked to Macron's election, editorialists have replaced them as the incarnation of strong political views in the media. However, despite their ubiquity, few editorialists clearly state where they stand politically. On September 27, 2017, left-wing Thomas Guénolé, who then worked as an

77 Ibid., p. 4. 78 Anne Magnet and Didier Carnet (2007). “Les éditorialistes : auteurs scientifiques ou acteurs sociaux ?” Asp, Vol 51-52, p. 97. 79 Annik Dubied and Marc Lits (1997). "L'éditorial, genre journalistique ou position discursive ?" Pratiques, Vol 94, p. 52. 80 Ulla M. Connor (1996). Contrastive Rhetoric: Cross-Cultural Aspects of Second Language Writing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 144. 81 Teun A. Van Dijk (1996). "Opinions and ideologies in editorials." Discourse Analysis, Language, Social Life and Critical Thought, p. 2. 82 Olivier Cyran et al. (2009). Les éditocrates. Paris: La Découverte, introduction. 83 Le Parisien (2018). “Barbier, Joffrin, Bastié... ces éditorialistes qui font l'opinion.” November 20.

18 editorialist on radio channel Europe 1, asked fellow editorialists on Twitter to undertake their “political coming-out84.” Few answered and those who did were vague, such as Jean-Michel Apathie telling Guénolé “[...] I've been casting blank ballots since 1988 […].” The aim of discourse studies of editorials is to elucidate where editorialists stand politically–which, given their importance as both opinion prescribers and expressions of a newspaper's editorial board, is essential to understanding the political health of a society. For instance, a study of editorials about the 2005 European Constitution Treaty referendum showed that editorialists widely stigmatized 'No' voters85. By casting opposite views as ineligible using fatalist rhetorics of 'fear' and 'populism,' editorialists preserved the prevailing ideology, applying what Pierre Bourdieu would call 'politics of depoliticization86.' The debate surrounding the 2005 referendum, the author argues, was the foremost example in France of the existence of a neoliberal consensus which cannot be refuted. The homogeneity of opinion among editorialists can be explained primarily by two observations: on the one hand, they overwhelmingly come from the same milieus and have studied in the same, prestigious schools, and on the other hand, they are, contrary to journalists, not expected to leave their office. “Fieldwork pollutes the mind of the editorialist” said Christophe Barbier in an interview to JDD, adding that “the editorialist is a stake on which the people, like crawling ivy, can raise87.”

2.3 The Yellow Vest movement On May 29, 2018, Priscillia Ludosky, an entrepreneur from Seine-et-Marne, started an online petition protesting fuel prices, attracting over a million signatures88. Since 2014, the domestic consumption tax on energy products (TICPE) includes a carbon component in an effort to reduce fossil fuel consumption89. In 2017 and 2018, the TICPE for diesel fuel was raised sharply to amount to the level of the tax on petrol, and a further increase was planned for 2019–which the so-called “MacronLeaks” revealed was planned to compensate for the tax

84 Thomas Guénolé (2017). “Les éditorialistes des grands médias sont-ils massivement pro-Macron ?” Marianne, October 2. 85 Antoine Schwartz (2008). "Bonne Europe et mauvaise France. Les éditorialistes français interprètent la victoire du « non » au traité constitutionnel européen." Politique et Sociétés, Vol 27 No 2, p. 158-159. 86 Pierre Bourdieu (2000). Contre la politique de la dépolitisation. 87 Le Journal du Dimanche (2017). “Christophe Barbier : « Se confronter au terrain pollue l'esprit de l'éditorialiste. »” April 14. 88 Alexandre-Reza Kokabi (2019). “Priscillia Ludosky : Avec les Gilets jaunes, « la fraternité s’est réveillée ».” Reporterre, March 2. 89 Ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire (2018). “Fiscalité des énergies.” January 24.

19 cuts for employers90. In 2017, the tax burden on the French population was highest of all 34 OECD nations, stealing the lead from Denmark91. In a context of increasing privatization, dematerialization, and complexification of public services–to the extent that French ombudsman Jacques Toubon made it his first area of concern in his 2018 report92 and with, in particular, the closing of small train lines preconized by the so-called “Spinetta” report93–and spiraling rents and property prices driving working classes away from city centers, another raise on fuel prices was perceived as unfair by many. Additionally, it is likely that the respective Benalla94 and Carlos Ghosn95 affairs, adding to a lingering feeling of impunity amongst so- called elites, as well as Macron’s decried arrogance96, triggered the first protests. In the months following the petition, Facebook groups were created and the movement’s first figures started to appear. By the end of October 2018, the date was set: those who opposed the diesel tax were to meet on November 17. G. Coutard, a service technician from Narbonne, published a video on Facebook introducing the yellow vest as a symbol. “We all have one in the car. Put in under the windshield [...] until the 17 [November]. A simple color code to show that you agree with us, with the movement. [...] People will see yellow vests everywhere [...]

97 they’ll think: “[...] maybe something is actually about to happen [...].” Rapidly enough, the movement stopped being about the diesel tax only. On November 29, 2018, a group of Yellow Vests sent a list of 42 demands98 to media outlets and Parliament members asking for, among other things, better treatment for asylum seekers; no homelessness; the prohibition of offshoring; the end of detached work; the end of privatizations; and, what would come to be one of the movement’s major demands, the People’s Referendum (RIC). Due to the absence of leaders, trade unions and official spokespeople, the question of knowing exactly who Yellow Vests are has been a main preoccupation of observers since the beginning of the movement. A number of organisms have led inquiries to elucidate the

90 Manuel Vicuña (2018). “Taxes carburants et cadeau aux patrons : l’éternel retour d’un « Macron Leak ».” Arrêt sur images, December 25. 91 OECD (2018). Revenue statistics 2018. Tax revenue trends in the OECD. 92 Défenseur des droits (2018). Rapport annuel d’activité. p. 15. 93 Jean-Cyril Spinetta (2018). L’avenir du Transport ferroviaire. February 15. 94 Médiapart (2018). “L’affaire Benalla sème la panique à l’Elysée.” Médiapart, July 19. 95 Le Monde (2018). “Tout comprendre à l’affaire Carlos Ghosn, qui ébranle l’Alliance Renault-Nissan- Mitsubishi.” November 26. 96 Pauline Bock (2017). “Emmanuel Macron’s most offensive, self-centered, and disconcerting comments of 2017.” New Statesman, December 21. 97 Christophe-Cécil Garnier (2018). “Le gilet jaune, d’un siège passager aux rues européennes.” Slate, December 10. 98 OpenDemocracy (2018). “Demands of France’s yellow vests as uploaded by France Bleu, November 29.” December 7.

20 sociology of Yellow Vests. ELABE and Institut Montaigne have undergone a large-scale survey from December 14, 2018 to January 8, 2019 on a sample of 10 010 people from 12 regions France99. Out of the 10 010 survey participants, 21% self-describe as Yellow Vests, while 47% support the movement but do not identify as protesters. 53% of those who self-describe as Yellow Vests are women, an unusually high number for a social movement. 12% are single mothers, as opposed to 6% in the rest of the French population. A short majority of Yellow Vests are aged 50 to 64, closely followed by 35 to 49 year-olds, making up respectively 30% (+5 compared to the general population) and 28% (+3) of protesters. 11% (+5) are unemployed while, out of those who work, 26% (+9) are factory workers and 21% (+4) are employees. 49% (+8) of Yellow Vests live in the countryside and towns of less than 20 000 inhabitants and 22% (-8) have completed graduate studies. Their average monthly income is lower than that of the general population by about 300 euros. Yellow Vests also describe themselves as less happy and lonelier than the rest of the population, reporting lacking somebody to count on and growing difficulties in feeding themselves and seeking medical treatment when necessary. An overwhelming majority of Yellow Vests reported distrust in the President (80%), political parties (75%) and the European Union (EU) (61%). 33% are not affiliated to a political party, while 19% feel closest to the Front National (FN, now RN) (far-right) and 10% to La France insoumise (LFI) (left/far-left). According to governmental figures, a little under 300 000 people joined 2 034 gathering spots on November 17 to undertake actions such as blocking roads, fuel depots and supermarkets, constructing barricades, occupying toll booths to let motorist through for free and occupying roundabouts to discuss politics and future protest100. France has the world’s highest number of roundabouts, meaning that they are, like yellow vests, easily accessible and, as such, federative. Day after day, however, shacks that were being set up by roundabouts were being dismantled by police, forcing protesters to gather elsewhere101. From the first protests which were strike-like, daily, and rather peaceful, the movement went on to focus on Saturday’s protests and concentrate in major cities. Saturday actions are called “acts,” with Act 1 being on November 17 up until Act 36 on July 20 and ongoing.

99 Bernad Sananes et al. (2019). “Les « Gilets jaunes » : la partie émergée de la crise sociale française ?” Elabe and Institut Montaigne, March 21. 100 Huffington Post (2018). “Le bilan du 17 novembre des gilets jaunes, en cinq chiffres.” November 17. 101 Luc Gwiazdzinski and Olivier Frérot (2019). “Cabanes et ronds-points, un patrimoine populaire en feu.” Libération, April 23.

21 3. Literature review The past decade has seen a vast body of literature on news coverage of protest emerge. In my first review of the literature, about two thirds of the articles had been published in the 2010s, seven of which had been published during the years 2017 and 2018.

3.1 Media and protest movements In the literature, there is an agreement around the idea that protest movements rely on mainstream mass media to alert and gain support from the population, to obtain political legitimacy, and possibly influence the political agenda102. As such, getting positive coverage is key to a movement’s continuation and success. Despite this point of harmony, the relation between the media and protest remains rather ambiguous. There is a profusion of controversial and unexplored areas. They include the identification and understanding of journalistic biases as well as of the exact influence of media coverage on policy-making and repression. Scholars have identified two major biases which media may be subject to: ‘selection biases’ and ‘description biases,’ applying respectively to the type of protest movements which news outlets choose to cover and the faithfulness with which they cover them. By comparing official records to the news coverage of specific events, scholars have found that media outlets focus on protest which is large, violent, and close to the newspaper’s headquarters, and are more likely to report on violence from protesters and arrests than to discuss the issues addressed by the movement103. In her study of the 2013 Brazilian protests, Mourão however found that, as the movement’s demands started meeting those of the main established opposition parties, the coverage became more sympathetic, suggesting that protest is not necessarily disqualified by media outlets104. In turn, the consequences of variations in media coverage on protest have been researched in a number of studies. Firstly, Hess and Martin have found that the coverage of repression directly contributes to public-opinion management, potentially generating massive outrage in the population, leading to backlash or backfire105. Looking into McAdam’s 'threat' model, which establishes that movements resorting to confrontational, non-institutional tactics as

102 Edwin Amenta et al. (2017). “From bias to coverage: What explains how news organizations treat social movements.” Sociology Compass, Vol 11, No 3, p. 1. 103 Jennifer Earl et al. (2004). “The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action.” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol 30. 104 Rachel R. Mourão (2018). “From Mass to Elite Protests: News Coverage and the Evolution of Antigovernment Demonstrations in Brazil.” Mass Communication and Society, Vol 22, No 1. 105 David Hess and Brian Martin (2006). “Repression, Backfire, and The Theory of Transformative Events.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly, Vol 11, No 2.

22 well as those pursuing revolutionary goals face greater repression than other kinds of protest movements, Wisler and Guigni have found in turn that negative portrayal of such movements by the media propels observers to resent protesters, virtually annihilating the risk of backfire106. Wisler and Giugni have also found that the presence of media outlets in the midst of demonstrations may hinder violent, overt repression107. Instead of risking public discredit and humiliation, authorities instead engage in more covert acts of repression as well as public attempts at discrediting the movement. Hess and Martin’s findings are more contrasted, suggesting that news coverage may either protect protesters from harsh repression or help justify the repression, depending on the grasp that a country’s elites have on the media108. Sullivan, in his study of the Guatemalan civil war, argues in turn that biases in newspapers predispose observers to the conclusion that governments only employ repression in self- defense and in response to overt, collective actions109, demanding that future researchers complete studies of repression in more democratic and less violent contexts.

3.2 News coverage of protest in French media Research on the news coverage of protest movements by French media is lacking. Of the few articles that I was able to find and access which were content, framing, or discourse analyses of news coverage of protest, one was about the 1998 farmers' protest in Brittany while all the others were about the 2005 riots. Neveu’s study of the coverage of the farmers’ protest attempts to elucidate the influence of localism and centralization respectively on news coverage of protest. Comparing regional and national news sections, he finds that local coverage of protest is more comprehensive and gives movement actors opportunities to express their views–so long as there is no local opposition– and that violence only triggers coverage–and sometimes harsh criticism–in the national press110. Neveu also notices the use of the pronoun tu (informal ‘you’) in an article published in Ouest-France and addressed to protesters, which usually denotes closeness and a friendly relationship. Costelloe’s and Harsin’s respective studies of the coverage of 2005 riots focus on different

106 Dominique Wisler and Marco Giugni (1999). “Under The Spotlight: The Impact of Media Attention on Protest Policing.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly, Vol 4, No 2. 107 Ibid. 108 David Hess and Brian Martin, op. cit. 109 Christopher M. Sullivan (2016). “Undermining Resistance: Mobilization, Repression, and the Enforcement of Political Order.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol, 60, No 7. 110 Erik Neveu (2002). “The Local Press and Farmers' Protests in Brittany: proximity and distance in the local newspaper coverage of a social movement.” Journalism Studies, Vol 3, No 1.

23 types of discourses within different news outlets, but get to rather similar findings. Costelloe, who compares articles about the riots from four French newspapers, identifies discourses of nationalism through the use of pronouns and grandiloquent references to French history and political tradition111. She argues that the French press practices othering towards immigrant- descent inhabitants of the suburbs, using the riots to reinforce the conception of France as a homogeneous country. These findings are similar to those of Darling-Wolf who, in a comparison of and Le Monde, found that the latter avoids addressing the historical roots of the riots and overall racial tensions in French society112. David Snow et al.’s comparative study of major global–including French–newspapers confirms such observations in the identification of causal frames systematically blaming youth and ‘criminals’ while dismissing social issues and racial tensions having led to the uproar113. Lastly, in his study of the coverage of the riots by French private television channel TF1, Harsin identifies cultural racist frames as dominant114. Such frames include the blaming of urban violence on polygamy or on rioters’ culture and religion, and the putting forward of solutions such as deportation and parenting classes for rioters’ parents. In contrast, two comparative studies of Le Figaro, Le Monde, and Libération both found differences in the framing of the riots between the former and the two latter newspapers. Indeed, Peeters found that rioters were portrayed as victims in articles from Libération, while Garciá and Retis observed that the outlet often allowed locals and rioters to articulate their views115 116. The great majority of these studies seem to confirm the hypothesis that media outlets tend to portray protest negatively, which sheds light on the deeply-rooted social and racial tensions in the country. However, some authors identified the location and political affiliation of the outlets as variables, with local and left-leaning media being more prone to accommodate the perspective of protesters. Although the Yellow Vest movement, the 2005 riots and the 1998 farmers' protests display similarities–a situation of exclusion from the so-called public sphere, growing material difficulties–processes within the media coverage of Yellow Vests

111 Laura Costelleo (2014). “Discourse of sameness: Expressions of nationalism in newspaper discourse on French urban violence in 2005.” Discourse & Society, Vol 25, No 3. 112 Fabienne Darling-Wolf (2008). “HOLIER THAN THOU.” Journalism Studies, Vol 9, No 3. 113 David Snow et al. (2007). “Framing the French Riots: A Comparative Study of Frame Variation.” Social Forces, Vol 86, No 2. 114 Jayson Harsin (2015). “Cultural Racist Frames in TF1’s French Banlieue Riots Coverage.” French Politics, Culture & Society, Vol 33, No 3. 115 Stéfanie Peeters (2012). “La couverture médiatique de la « crise des banlieues » : métaphores, représentations et l’apport indispensable du contexte.” Corela, No 11. 116 Paola Garcia and Jéssica Retis (2011). “Jeunes et minorités ethniques dans la presse européenne : Les médias et les émeutes parisiennes de 2005.” Global Media Journal: Canadian Edition, Vol 4, No 1.

24 are expected to be different due to its peculiar sociology, longevity, and means of action. This research will add to the growing body of literature on the ideology (re)produced by the media. More specifically, it will remedy a lack of research using editorials as data, and focusing on social movements which support radical ideals and threaten existing structures of power.

25 4. Theoretical framework 4.1 Defining consensus Merriam-Webster's online dictionary defines consensus as "a general agreement," "the judgement arrived at by most of those concerned" or "group solidarity in sentiment and belief117." In much of Western philosophy, consensus is viewed as something which is not only desirable but also whose ultimate realization is certain–whether assured by God, reason, the march of history, or effective communication amongst humans118. In Beyond Left and Right (1994), British Third Way theorist Anthony Giddens argued that, in an ever more interconnected world characterized by processes of homogenization of systems, cultures, and people, politics ought to be calm, undramatic, a public arena in which controversial issues [...] can be resolved, or at least handled, through dialogue119."

4.2 Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action Consensus as the end goal of deliberation within the public sphere was primarily, although far from single-handedly, emphasized by German political philosopher Jürgen Habermas. Habermas sees the need for consensus as inherent to human rationality. Proceeding in a manner reminiscent of Kant's 'categorical imperative,' Habermas makes consensus the ultimate desideratum of rational inquiry. Consensus rests on "an intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims," meaning that consensus is evolving and constantly renewed: the refutability of consensus only further reinforces its legitimacy120. This process of consensus- seeking through reasoned argument and cooperation is called 'communicative action121.' The aim of communicative action is to avoid the danger and perils of relativism.

4.3 Chantal Mouffe's model of agonistic democracy This last decade has, however, unarguably been one of increasing polarization: bioconservatives oppose transhumanists, universalists oppose proponents of identity politics, populists oppose elites and traditionalists oppose modernists in seemingly irreconcilable conflicts. According to Belgian philosopher Chantal Mouffe, this is a direct consequence of post-war politics of consensus such as the Third Way which, "far from creating the conditions

117 Merriam-Webster (n.d.). “Consensus.” 118 Nicolas Rescher (1993). Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 1. 119 Anthony Giddens (1994). Beyond Left and Right. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 15. 120 Jürgen Habermas (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the rationalization of society. Boston: Beacon Press, p. 119. 121 Ibid., p. 86.

26 for a more mature and consensual form of democracy," she argues, "produce [...] exactly the opposite effect122." Consensus, Mouffe argues, in relegating dissent voices, passions and beliefs to the private sphere, produces "extreme forces of individualism" which "threaten the social fabric123" and puts democracy in peril in that it generates political apathy and factions within society124. In the formation of consensus, the proclaimed end goal is for dissent voices to cease feeling strong enough opposition to the reached consensus that they feel unaccounted for and wish to express discontent which might impede governing or lead to chaos. On the contrary, Mouffe emphasizes that pluralism cannot be tempered for "pluralism is not merely a fact, something that we must bear grudgingly or try to reduce, but an axiological principle [...] constitutive at the conceptual level of the very nature of modern democracy125. " She argues that "consensus in a liberal-democratic society is-and always will be-the expression of a hegemony and the crystallization of power relations126" as it consists in denying antagonisms which are inherent to democratic societies. Drawing from Carl Schmitt's 'friend/enemy' dichotomy127, Mouffe develops a theory of agonist pluralism. Agonism consists in antagonism in that it has been relieved of its violence by democratic institutions which allow for genuine opposition. "Democratic politics," she argues, "must have a partisan character128," and "opposed camps with which people can identify129." Indeed, opinion is based not on rationality, but also on emotions, identity, morals, ethics, aesthetics, which necessary generates pluralism. It follows that democratic institutions must be designed to accommodate such differences and allow for pluralism to be expressed. Mouffe's model of agonistic democracy is no cure for all ills, but rather, aims at generating more assent than models such as Habermas' model of communicative action based on liberal rationalism. Given the prominence of the media as a social institution, its role in accommodating and fostering pluralism is crucial. What the media can do to act as watch dogs of democracy, a genuine counter-power, rather than as guards dogs of the existing

122 Chantal Mouffe (2005). On the Political. London: Routledge, p. 76. 123 Chantal Mouffe (2009), op. cit., p. 96. 124 Chantal Mouffe (1993). The Return of the Political. London: Verso, p. 6. 125 Ibid., p. 19. 126 Chantal Mouffe (2009), op. cit., p. 49. 127 For Schmitt, the task of politics is to identify 'the enemy,' which is “the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specifically intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case, conflicts with him are possible.” Carl Schmitt (1976). The Concept of the Political. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, p. 70. 128 Chantal Mouffe (2005), op. cit., p. 6. 129 Ibid., p. 25.

27 consensus, is to help people think by themselves, rather than providing ready-made understandings of facts. Mouffe distinguishes between la vérité de raison (truth of reason) and la vérité de faits (factual truth), arguing that while there are factual truths, there is no objective truth of reason130. As such, the media must not only present facts, but also show awareness in respect to the different interpretations one can have of such facts. This distinction between factual truth and truth of reason must be kept in mind in a so-called post- truth area in which 'fake news' are considered the single greatest threat to democracy. In a 2016 blog post, economist and philosopher Frédéric Lordon argues that the focus on fake news is directly responsible for most journalists' inability to understand, let alone understand their own contribution to, events such as the 2005 European Constitution Treaty referendum, Brexit, and Trump's election131. The media, Lordon argues, refuses to take responsibility for such events, blaming it on the inability of the people to care for facts. "The press doesn't take any responsibility for the ideological consolidation of neoliberal structures (...) for allocating speaking time to those praising its merits (...) for never questioning generalized free trade (...) for never criticizing the euro (...) for, in other words, in the name of 'modernity,' 'realism' and 'pragmatism,' prohibiting the expression of any real alternative." A journalism which limits itself to fact-checking and the delimitation of what is acceptable to say is fundamentally one which maintains hegemonic ideologies: a consensual and, as Lordon calls it to mirror the qualifier 'post-trust,' 'post-political’ journalism, depoliticizing in that it excludes dissent voices from the political realm. The theoretical focus on consensus was found to be the best fit for my thesis for two reasons. Firstly, discussions of consensus, as opposed to, for instance, discussions of hegemony, pinpoint that a direct consequence of politics of consensus is the emergence of deep-rooted conflicts, as exemplified by the Yellow Vests. Secondly, specifically Chantal Mouffe's discussion of consensus provides a political solution to the present situation, namely, agonistic democracy. Concepts of consensus and agonism resonate well with the Donohue et al.'s conceptual distinction between the media as guard dogs of elite interests and the media as watch dogs of democracy and human rights.

130 Nico Carpentier and Bart Cammaerts (2006). “Hegemony, Democracy, Agonism and Journalism: An interview with Chantal Mouffe.” Journalism Studies, Vol 7, No 6, p. 974. 131 Frédéric Lordon (2016). “Politique post-vérité ou journalisme post-politique ?” La pompe à phynance, November 22.

28 5. Methodology 5.1 Critical discourse analysis Discourse analysis is a qualitative method best understood as a tool to study language variation as a part of social practice132. Indeed, to speak is undeniably to give information on a topic of one’s choice, but it is also a means of acting upon one’s audience as well as on the world around us133. Any variation in language is the result of a selection process which includes and excludes information. In other words, language is a social act which is ideologically driven and bears upon the social world. CDA is a branch of discourse analysis which specifically aims at studying relations of power and inequality. It is rooted in critical linguistics, a field of study developed in the late 1970s by researchers at the University of East Anglia134. Within CDA, “language is treated as a system of lexico-grammatical options from which authors make their choices about what to include or exclude and how to arrange them135.” An array of researchers within the social sciences have since engaged with it and CDA is, rather than a straightforward method or school of thought, “best viewed as a shared perspective encompassing a range of approaches136.” CDA was chosen because it allows for an in-depth analysis of a small sample. Furthermore, qualitative research enables the identification of patterns which can serve as groundwork for later quantitative studies.

5.1.1 Norman Fairclough's framework Fairclough defines CDA as a “discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony137.” According to Andersen, one of Fairclough’s achievements is “his tight empirical analysis [with which] he has lifted discourse analysis out of postmodern theoretical

132 Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell (1987). Discourse and Social Psychology. Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour. London: Sage, p. 32. 133 Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni (2001). Les actes de langage dans le discours. Théorie et fonctionnement. Paris: Nathan, p. 1. 134 Roger Fowler et al. (1979). Language and Control. London: Routledge. 135 Bethan Benwell and Elizabeth Stokoe (2006). Discourse and Identity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 108. 136 Allan Bell and Peter Garret (1998). Approaches to Media Discourse. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 7. 137 Norman Fairclough (1993). “Critical Discourse Analysis and the Marketization of Public Discourse: The Universities.” Discourse and Society, Vol 4, p. 135.

29 fetishism138.” Fairclough's original aim was to contribute to "the general raising of consciousness of exploitative social relations, through focusing upon language139". Together with Chuliaraki, Fairclough argues that "the past two decades or so have been a period of profound economic social transformation on a global scale140" which has been perceived as "part of nature141." The vital contribution of CDA, they posit, is that it can raise awareness on the tremendous linguistic and discursive components to those changes. However, CDA rarely expends beyond the boundaries of the scholarly world. In France, activist Frank Lepage is a foremost contributor to the democratization of discourse analysis. A creator of "language detoxification workshops,” Lepage is most famous for a skit in which he randomly picks up cards from a desk of paper slips on which words are written142. "These are words which do not mean anything at all but seem to mean something. Rather, they do not mean what they seem to mean, and what they do mean, they do not say." Picking card after card, Lepage builds up what sounds like a proper political discourse, using words such as "actors," "partnership," "contract," "citizenship," "intercultural," and "democracy." Other, less humorous examples from political discourses may include "negative growth" and "collateral damage." In so doing, Lepage has brought attention onto an otherwise opaque field of study. Fairclough's framework for analyzing communicative events is tripartite143. At the core lays the text (e.g. an editorial), which is submitted to a text analysis. The text is surrounded by discourse practice (how the text is produced and consumed), submitted to a processing analysis. Finally, the third "layer" or dimension is sociocultural practice (the origin and impact of the text on the social world), submitted to a social analysis.

5.1.2 Norman Fairclough's perspective on media discourse Fairclough argues that the ideology of mainstream media is one which parallels the ideology of the powerful, resorting to Gramsci's concept of hegemony, intertwined with Chomsky's designation of the media's power to manufacture consent in the population.

138 Niels Åkestrøm Andersen (2003). Discursive analytical strategies: Understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann. Bristol: Policy Press, p. XIX. 139 Norman Fairclough (1989). Language and Power. London: Longman, p. 4. 140 Norman Fairclough and Lilie Chouliaraki (1999). Discourse in Late Modernity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 30. 141 Ibid., p. 4. 142 Kevin Amara (2018). “Frank Lepage : « Le gilet jaune est le symbole d’une conscience de classe qui est en train de renaître. »” Le Comptoir, December 26. 143 Norman Fairclough (1995). Media Discourse. London: Edward Arnold, p. 57.

30 Fairclough defines hegemony as "relations of domination based upon content rather than coercion [...] hegemony emphasizes the importance of ideology in achieving and maintaining relations of domination144.” The notion of consent is important in that it overlaps with that of consensus. As such, "an account of communication in the mass media must consider the economics and politics of the mass media: the nature of the market which the mass media are operating within, and their relationship to the state145." Concentrated ownership of the media, he argues, "manifests itself in various ways, including the manner in which media organizations are structured to ensure that the dominant voices are those of the political and social establishment, and in the constraints on access to the media146” . This follows from his argument that text analysis is central to media analysis, but must be coupled with an analysis of the specific pieces' production and consumption147. Consumption is divided between interpretation, that is, the analyst's understanding of a text, and its impact on readers, and reception, that is, readers' thoughts about their own interpretation of the text148.

5.2 Introduction to the media material This study focuses on editorials from five of the most-circulated newspapers in France: Ouest-France, Le Parisien, Le Figaro, Le Monde, and Libération. I chose similar media regarding circulation and audience as my goal is to identify a mainstream, consensual discourse on the Yellow Vest movement. In an effort to help distinguish between them, I will briefly introduce each outlet. Following Fairclough’s advice, I will provide details about their ownership and clarify their ideological stances. Ouest-France is a regional daily published in the western regions of Brittany, Normandy and Pays de la Loire. Averaging 648 485 sales and 2 296 000 readers daily, it is the first daily in France as well as the first French language daily worldly149. Founded in 1944, it aspired to pursue a Christian-democratic orientation, best illustrated by its slogan, “Justice et Liberté150.” It reached hegemony through a strategy of aggressive competition and acquisition of competitors and became increasingly liberal over the years, taking a strong stance in favor

144 Ibid., p. 24. 145 Ibid., p. 36. 146 Ibid., p. 43. 147 Ibid., p. 16. 148 Ibid., p. 16. 149 Figures for sales, readership and Internet visits are those for year 2018–except for Internet visits which are June 2019 figures–and retrieved from http://www.acpm.fr (accessed 3 August 2019). 150 David Bensoussan (2014). "La naissance d'Ouest-France." Parlement[s], Revue d'histoire politique, Vol 2, No 10.

31 of the European Union and against a variety of social movements151. Ouest-France is owned by SIPA, itself owned by the Association for the support of democratic and humanist principles152. As of June 2019, ouest-france.fr was the 9th most visited news website in the country. Le Parisien also is a regional daily, published in Île-de-France, which takes in Paris and its surrounding departments. Combined with its national edition Aujourd’hui en France, it totals an average of 301 453 sales and 2 652 000 readers per day. Founded in 1944, it went from being openly Gaullist, popular, and right-wing to claiming factuality, publishing concise, accessible articles focusing on faits divers153 (sometimes called chiens écrasés, literally “run over dogs”, in an attempt to illustrate their futility, they are the French equivalent to dead donkeys). As a symbol of its metamorphosis from a journal d’opinion (political newspaper) to a journal d’information (general newspaper), Le Parisien removed its editorial from its daily edition. There is now a weekly editorial published in the weekend edition, a supplement attached to the newspaper on Fridays. Le Parisien is owned by luxury goods conglomerate LVMH, whose CEO is France’s richest and the world’s 4th richest man, Bernard Arnault. His influence was commented upon in 2016, when journalists from Le Parisien were instructed not to talk about Merci Patron!, a successful documentary, critical of offshoring and, in particular, of Bernard Arnault154. leparisien.fr was, as of June 2019, the 5th most visited news website in France. Le Figaro, Le Monde and Libération are national opinion dailies. With respectively 309 492, 288 435 and 67 238 sales and 126 230 282, 101 072 507 and 19 978 677 readers per day, they are the 1st, 2nd, and 7th national dailies in the country in terms of audience. Le Figaro and Le Monde are sometimes referred to as the two French so-called newspapers of record, meaning that they are considered, and expected, to meet higher standards of journalism. Founded in 1826, Le Figaro is France’s oldest daily. Originally a satirical and witty gossip sheet, it rapidly grew to embrace a strong right-wing stance characterized by social conservatism and economic , becoming France’s leading opinion newspaper155. Its

151 Cégolène Frisque (2010). "Des espaces médiatiques et politiques locaux ?" Revue française de science politique, Vol 60, No 5. 152 All information on the ownership of news outlets is retrieved from the following Acrimed and Le Monde diplomatique report. Acrimed and Le Monde diplomatique (2018). ”Médias français : qui possède quoi ?” 14th edition. 153 Médiapart (2010). “« Le Parisien » : le nouveau mirage de Serge Dassault.” September 20. 154 L’Obs (2016). “Les syndicats du « Parisien » regrettent l’absence de « Merci Patron » dans ses pages.” March 10. 155 Encyclopedia Britannica (2017). “Le Figaro.” August 17.

32 name and slogan, “Without the freedom to criticize, there is no true praise,” are inherited from Beaumarchais’ Figaro plays. Le Figaro is renowned for the great amount of “immortals” to have written in its columns, such as Charles Baudelaire, Colette, Emile Zola and Marcel Proust. Often suspected of lacking editorial independence156, the newspaper belongs to the Dassaults, France’s 4th richest family and owner of, among other companies, Dassault Aviation, producer of the Rafale, a fighter aircraft used in the French army and sold to countries such as India, Egypt and Qatar157. In 1997, Serge Dassault allegedly expressed the need for his group to “own a newspaper to express his ideas158.” Following the 2017 presidential election, Le Figaro was the first news outlet to interview Macron159. As of June 2019, lefigaro.fr was France's most visited news website. Le Monde is regarded as a high quality newspaper, claiming neutrality and a commitment to in-depth treatment of all topics. It has however been at the heart of numerous controversies concerning its pursuit of profit and the resulting breaches in deontology160. Le Monde has created Les décodeurs and later Decodex, fact-checking engines, criticized for attempting to define journalism as the strict enunciation of facts, while designating themselves as the referees for other news outlets161. Le Monde is owned by Xavier Niel who was reported saying that “when journalists piss [him] off, [he] take[s] parts in their journal and they leave [him] in peace162.” In June 2019, lemonde.fr was the 6th most visited news website in the country. Finally, Libération, last in the list in terms of audience, is considered most left-wing of all five newspapers. In 2005, in the occasion of the French referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, editor Serge July took a strong stance in favor of the ‘yes,’ arguing that those voting against the treaty did it purely out of “fear” and “anger163.” In between the two turns of the 2017 presidential election, for its 6-7 May edition, Libération titled “Do whatever you want, but vote for Macron.” Its main shareholders are businessmen Bruno Ledoux and Patrick Drahi. liberation.fr was France's 31st most visited news website in June 2019. Selected for their high circulation and vast audiences, the five newspapers are nevertheless

156 Médiapart (2016). “Les absences du « Figaro ».” May 21. 157 Dassault Aviation (n.d.). www.dassault-aviation.com 158 Marie Bénille (2003). “Médias français, une affaire de famille.” Le Monde diplomatique, November. 159 Hadrien Mathoux (2017). “« Le Figaro » se macronise… et la droite crise.” Marianne, June 30. 160 Pierre Péan and Philippe Cohen (2003). La Face cachée du Monde. Paris: Mille et une nuits. 161 Vincent Glad (2017). “Qui décodexera le Décodex ? De la difficulté de labelliser l’information de qualité.” Libération, February 3. 162 Le Monde diplomatique (2011). “Comment « Le Monde » fut vendu.” June. 163 Les mots sont importants (2005). “Un « cri de douleur » de Serge July.” June 1.

33 reflective of some variety of political and ideological perspectives. Le Figaro, Le Monde, Libération, Ouest-France and Le Parisien exemplify, respectively, right, centre, centre-left, and regional standpoints.

5.3 Data collection To select the articles (Appendix 1) for this study, I sampled at two stages. After identifying the five newspapers that I would focus on, I searched their websites for all articles containing the group of words gilets jaunes ('yellow vests'). When faced with the vast amount of results– which went up to over 20,000 for Ouest France–I decided to instead focus on editorials which are, evidently, much fewer. In her study of the media coverage of the 2005 Brazilian crisis, Raice Cabral, focusing on editorials, justifies her choice of material by the necessity to "go to the heart of journalistic narratives to check on meta-journalism164." Editorials are expected to best fulfill my aim of identifying a mainstream discourse on the Yellow Vest in that they are opinion, rather than information, articles. Furthermore, the very existence of authoritative pieces within newspapers suggests the importance of the press as a social institution165. Providing an accurate, concise view of a newspaper's stance on current issues, editorials are appropriate data for qualitative studies on small samples. The first stage of my sampling was purposive. It consisted in gathering all editorials containing the words gilets jaunes, and weeding out those which only mentioned the movement in passing. The second stage of my sampling was stratified. Given the difference in amounts of editorials between the selected outlets, I decided to proceed to a proportional selection within each of them. Le Parisien was the newspaper with the least relevant editorials, given that it only publishes an editorial in its weekend edition, while Le Monde and Le Figaro were having the most relevant editorials. I ended up with a total of 19 editorials published between November 22, 2018 and May 31, 2019, out of which 7 were from Le Figaro, 5 from Le Monde, 3 from Ouest-France and Libération respectively, and 1 from Le Parisien.

5.4 Ethical considerations The biggest weakness of CDA is its inherent subjectivity. Discourse analysis is necessarily limited by the skills and knowledge of the researcher. In the words of Potter and Wetherell,

164 Raice Cabral (2009). Presse sur le divan. La crise politique de 2005 révèle-t-elle un changement inconscient de la presse brésilienne ? Saint-Denis: Publibook, p. 84. 165 Seija Ridell (2008). "Top University–downhill for humanities? Policing the Future of Higher Education in the Finnish Mainstream Media." European Educational Research Journal, Vol 7, No 3, p. 293.

34 conducting a discourse analysis is “like riding a bicycle” in that it cannot be explained easily166. Within a constructivist approach, the researcher’s subjectivity needs to be acknowledged. Lincoln and Guba put forward two sets of criteria by which constructivist inquiry should be judged: trustworthiness criteria, which parallel conventional criteria of rigor, and authenticity, which includes such criteria as fairness in understanding and exposing others’ constructions and their underlying values, reflexive consciousness, and appreciation for different perspectives167. As such, I ought to clarify my stance on the issues at stake. As a Yellow Vest supporter, but mostly as the result of my own political and philosophical standpoints, I am always skeptical towards, and often critical of, my country's political and media systems. I deem necessary to reiterate that I support pluralism and freedom of speech in the press. My aim is not to express judgment towards any particular newspaper’s portrayal of Yellow Vests, but to identify a mainstream discourse on the movement and to explore its consequences on the social world, partaking in a vast conversation on media narratives. I was blessed with loved ones from various backgrounds. Some of them were enough to proofread parts of this essay, or discuss the issues at stake, helping me gain consciousness of my own biases.

166 Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell, op. cit., p. 168. 167 Lincoln, Yvonna S. and Egon G. Guba (1986). “But is it rigorous? Trustworthiness and authenticity in naturalistic evaluation.” New Directions for Program Evaluation, 80-81.

35 6. Analysis The analysis was initiated with an inductive coding process. A first reading of the corpus provided some understanding of the nature of the material. A variety of themes were identified. The texts were then divided into the identified themes and their overlapping allowed for the distinction of discourses of contempt, republicanism, and unity.

6.1 Discourse of contempt Analysis suggests that the news coverage of Yellow Vests operates a judgmental distinction between what is seen as two separate Frances. This discursive pattern is expressed primarily through the use of lexis and modality. Considered a “major dimension of discourse,168” modality refers to “a speaker's attitudes, or opinions about, the truth of a proposition expressed by a sentence169” and reveals the position of authority which the writer has over its audience, its legitimacy in prescribing opinions. This judgmental distinction is foregrounded in Extracts 1, 2, 3 and 4:

Extract 1 The consequence is simple–and worrying. Just over half of the French consider paying taxes to be an “act of citizenship.” And behind this figure, two fiscal Frances are emerging: on the one hand, that of working classes and inhabitants of rural and peripheral areas, for whom consent to taxation is less and less an evident civic duty; on the other hand, that of well-off French people, urban and educated, who, willy-nilly, keep bearing it170.

Within this pattern, working classes and inhabitants of rural and peripheral areas are assumed to consent less willingly to taxation, citing a poll without exploring its results in detail and not accounting for phenomena such as tax evasion. As such, those people are designated as lesser citizens than the well-off who are assumed to bear the tax burden. Furthermore, this description of the tax burden as born single-handedly by the well-off obscures the existence of taxes to which all participate to the same extent, such as VAT. The use of lexis is also interesting. While there is a designated ‘working class,’ there is no designated class for the ‘other France’ which is simply described as ‘well-off,’ ‘urban’ and

168 Norman Fairclough (1992). Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity, p. 160. 169 Paul Simpson (1993). Language, Ideology and Point of View. London: Routledge, p. 47 170 La conséquence est simple – et inquiétante. A peine plus de la moitié des Français considèrent que payer ses impôts reste un « acte citoyen. » Et derrière ce chiffre se dessinent nettement deux France fiscales : d'un côté celle des classes populaires et des habitants des zones rurales ou périphériques, pour qui le consentement à l'impôt est de moins en moins un évident devoir civique ; de l'autre celle des Français aisés, urbains et diplômés qui continuent, bon gré malgré, à l'assumer.

36 ‘educated.’

Extract 2 From now on, no government will be able to neglect them. The invisibles are now very “visible.” This slightly late realization should not make us look with disgust upon the other France, more joyful, with more of a winning spirit, on the grounds that it would have up until today benefited from excessive respects. I think of those who live in big cities–it is not a flaw–and manage rather well–it is not a crime–despite the difficulties of our time. [I think of] the students, mobile in spirit, who speak current English, believe in the future and prepare for it. [I think of] entrepreneurs, hungry for success, not only money. I also think of all of those who, in the country, love their job and can live a decent life, of the 'included' who are not to be confused with privileged [people], and even of those much decried elites, big bosses, high-ranking officials, researchers and artists, which the country needs so much171.

The structure of Extract 2 is similar to that of Extract 1. Using an anaphora through the syntagm “I think of,” the writer lists a France which he considers to be the exact opposite to Yellow Vests. Without directly mentioning the qualities he attributes to protesters, they are made obvious by the construction “the other France” which distinguishes between “those who are joyful” and those who aren’t, “those who manage” and those who don’t. Furthermore, in using modality (“should not”), the writer expresses a fear that the disgust which was until then granted to the France of Yellow Vests is reversed and falls back onto “the other France.” This discursive pattern is also evident in Extract 3:

Extract 3 The well-mannered France which asks questions to the head of State contrasts with the enraged without a compass and without a goal who, every Saturday, amid the noise and confusion, insult, threaten, destruct. The yellow in jacket is going out of fashion, the white

171 Désormais, aucun gouvernement ne pourra plus jamais les négliger. Les invisibles sont désormais très « voyants ». Mais il ne faudrait pas que cette prise de conscience, un peu tardive, nous pousse à considérer avec dégoût l'autre France, plus joyeuse, voire conquérante, au motif qu'elle aurait bénéficié jusqu'ici d'égards excessifs. Je pense à ceux qui vivent dans les grandes villes – ce n'est pas une tare – et se débrouillent plutôt bien – ce n'est pas un crime –, malgré les difficultés du temps. Aux étudiants, mobiles dans leur tête et dans leur mode de vie, qui parlent couramment l'anglais, croient en l'avenir et s'y préparent. Aux jeunes entrepreneurs, affamés de succès, pas seulement d'argent. Je pense aussi à tous ceux qui, dans le pays, aiment leur travail et en vivent dignement, aux « inclus », qu'il ne faut pas confondre avec des privilégiés, et même à ces élites souvent décriées, grands patrons, hauts fonctionnaires, chercheurs ou artistes, dont le pays a tant besoin.

37 shirt with rolled-up sleeves is regaining its radiance172.

Lastly, in Extract 4, the editorialist doesn’t oppose two Frances but rather, protesters and governors. The structure is however strikingly similar:

Extract 4 Is it a people or an aggregate of individuals who, in a mix up of nihilism (gratuitous violence) and utopia (everything and right now), turns into a pack? Is it an elite which governs or a concentrate of brilliant minds which confuse the administration of things and the life of men, the mechanics of governing and passions of flesh and blood173?

In the extract above, governors are criticized for caring about the Yellow Vest movement which is associated with “passions of flesh and blood” while the act of governing is reduced to “mechanics” and “administration.” In the context of a consensus surrounding existing economic and political systems, governing has increasingly become a matter of administrative functionalism, rejecting any profound critique of systems of power174. As this is done in the name of pragmatism and reason, opponents are automatically deemed idealistic and unreasonable. Indeed, the use of lexis dehumanizes and animalizes protesters, which are reduced to “an aggregate,” “a pack,” in opposition to governors which are deemed “brilliant minds.” Furthermore, in asking rhetorical questions, the editorialist posits that his own interpretation of things is right. In another handful of texts, Yellow Vests are discredited without being opposed to another group of people. This vision is expressed through the use of rhetorical questions, lexis, as well as a variety of fallacious arguments, such as straw man arguments, arguments from authority, appeals to fear, and association fallacies. See first Extract 5:

Extract 5 How much more time will France be able to handle the psychodrama of the “yellow vests?” [...]

172 La France bien élevée qui pose des questions au chef de l'État contraste avec les enragés sans boussole et sans but qui chaque samedi, dans le bruit et la confusion, insultent, menacent, détruisent. Le jaune en gilet se démode, la chemise blanche aux manches retroussées retrouve un peu d'éclat. 173 Est-ce un peuple qui se dresse ou un agrégat d'individus qui, en un mélange de nihilisme (violence gratuite) et d'utopie (tout et tout de suite), se change en meute ? Est-ce une élite qui gouverne ou un concentré d'esprits brillants qui confondent l'administration des choses et la vie des hommes, la mécanique de l'exercice de l'Etat et les passions de chair et de sang ? 174 Chantal Mouffe (1993), op. cit., p. 48.

38 However understanding we are of what they embody, the “yellow vests” are engaged in an overbid which leads straight into a deadlock. Inexcusable exactions, preposterous demands, despise for institutions… all of this discredits their fight. [...] It is high time to put an end to this big waste175.

Using modality (“it is high time”), lexis and a rhetorical question, the writer wishes for the reader to hope for the end of what he calls a “waste” and a “psychodrama.” Using a straw man argument, which consists in deforming one’s opponent’s argument to make it sound absurd and easily refutable, the writer draws the conclusion that the movement has lost its legitimacy. Similarly, in Extract 6, the Yellow Vest movement is compared to UFOs, implying that they aren't a readily understandable movement. In using the expression “manufacturing,” the editorialist further posits that the movement does not accidentally produces paradoxes but rather, specializes in doing so.

Extract 6 The «USO» yellow vests–Unidentified Social Object–keeps manufacturing paradoxes176.

Extract 7 is an example of an appeal to fear:

Extract 7 This detonating precipitate blends revolutionary intoxication, nihilist fever, and delinquency in a pack. Those who want to set the Standing night on France are in contact with the putschist’s apprentices and thugs from our lost territories177.

The editorialist refers to history and a national imaginary to scare the reader. In mentioning simultaneously the 2016 movement Nuit debout, putschism, and the “lost territories” which refer to French suburban areas, the writer posits that Yellow Vests bring back painful memories from the past and may lead to chaos. The appeal to fear is strengthened by the use of possessive adjective “our.”

175 Combien de temps encore la France pourra-t-elle supporter le psychodrame des « gilets jaunes » ? […] Aussi compréhensif soit-on pour ce qu'ils incarnent, les « gilets jaunes » sont engagés dans une surenchère qui conduit tout droit dans une impasse. Exactions inexcusables, revendications abracadabrantesques, mépris des institutions... tout cela déconsidère leur combat. […] Il est plus que temps d'en finir avec ce grand gâchis. 176 L’«osni» gilets jaunes – objet social non identifié – continue à produire des paradoxes à la chaîne. 177 Ce précipité détonant mêle ivresse révolutionnaire, fièvre nihiliste et délinquance en meute. Ceux qui veulent faire tomber la Nuit debout sur la France côtoient les apprentis putschistes et les voyous de nos territoires perdus.

39 Another appeal to fear is particularly evident in Extract 8:

Extract 8 We will not exit our deficit of social link by adding sound to the noise, fury to the confusion178.

The expression, initially referring to nonsense and irrationality, the expression “the sound and fury” has grown to allude to the horrors of war.

6.2 Discourse of republicanism In a second pattern within the corpus, Yellow Vests are described as a threat to the Republic, which is associated to a variety of notions which belong to the collective imaginary of the nation, such as the rule of law, order, authority, representative democracy, the figure of the President, and French symbols. Additionally, Yellow Vests are described as having no viable political project. This is done primarily through the use of fallacious arguments, metaphors, and personification.

Extract 9 If anyone can declare themselves “I am the people,” elected representatives see their legitimacy falter. They have however gotten it from the polls. […] In a democracy concerned with respecting itself, it is urgent for the debate on buying power, fiscality and energy transition to be able to find a properly political frame179.

In Extract 9, the use of lexis shows that democracy, legitimacy and politics are reduced to representation, election, and institutions. This reminds us of Jacques Rancière's conceptual distinction between politics and the political. “Politics is the art of suppression the political,” posits Rancière180. In French, this distinction is expressed through the use of gender: while la politique, politics, refers to the institutional arrangements surrounding the governing of a community, le politique, the political, consists in “disturbing this arrangement […] an intervention in the visible and the sayable181.” In a situation such as this one, the media plays

178 On ne sortira pas de notre déficit de lien social en ajoutant du bruit au bruit, de la fureur à la confusion. 179 Si chacun peut s'autoproclamer « Je suis le peuple », les élus voient leur légitimité vaciller. Ces derniers la tiennent pourtant des urnes. […] Dans une démocratie soucieuse de se respecter, il est urgent que le débat sur le pouvoir d’achat, la fiscalité et la transition énergétique puisse trouver un cadre proprement politique. 180 Jacques Rancière (1995). On the Shores of Politics. London: Verso, p. 11. 181 Ibid., p. 36.

40 the role of police in Rancière's understanding: that of protecting politics of consensus, of saying “Move along! There's nothing to see here182.” Similar patterns are observable in Extract 10:

Extract 10 The extreme minority who wishes to fight [the police] is not made up of protesters but of an aggregate of individuals with distinct objectives. In disorder: overthrow the Republic, remove the Senate, take Bercy183, degrade national symbols, break for pleasure, burn for the selfie or simply take advantage of the riot to get groceries. […] If some “yellow vests” want to change everything, it is in their good right. The European elections are in six months: let them prepare their list. In the waiting, Paris is in a state of siege and France holds its breath184.

Here, too, democracy is reduced to elections and the “right” to change things, reduced to the “right” to present a list for the upcoming elections. Through the use of metaphors (“overthrow the Republic”, “take Bercy”), personification (“France holds its breath”) and exaggerations (“Paris is in a state of siege”), the Yellow Vests are presented as a threat to the good functioning of the Republic and of democracy rather than as a legitimate element within the political realm. Furthermore, protests are, due to their violence, delegitimized as protests themselves and the writer implies that their goal is to simultaneously disturb the Republic and take pleasure in the riots. Direct references to the Republic are also present in Extract 11:

Extract 11 Anti-republican violence then. As much as protesting–a fundamental right within a democracy– is legitimate, non negotiated, savage, aggressive crowds are contrary to democratic logic, perpetrated by activist minorities which pursue goals foreign to the movement, animated by the perverse dream of purportedly history-making disorder. […]

182 Jacques Rancière (1999). Dissensus, On Politics and Aesthetics. London: Continuum, p. 37. 183 Bercy refers to the Ministry of the Economy and Finance metonymically in reference to its location in the Bercy neighborhood of Paris. 184 L'infime minorité qui veut les affronter n'est plus composée de manifestants mais d'un agrégat d'individus aux objectifs distincts. Dans le désordre: renverser la République, supprimer le Sénat, prendre Bercy, dégrader les symboles nationaux, casser pour le plaisir, brûler pour le selfie ou tout simplement profiter de l'émeute pour faire ses courses. […] Si certains « gilets jaunes » veulent tout changer, c'est leur droit. Les élections européennes sont dans six mois: qu'ils préparent donc leur liste. En attendant, Paris est en état de siège et la France retient son souffle.

41 Democratism ends up becoming anti-democratic185.

In the extract above, the writer assumes the intentions of protesters (“savage,” “aggressive”, “activist minorities which pursue goals foreign to the movement”) and denies the historical importance of protests (“the perverse dream of purportedly history-making disorder”) to delegitimize them and posit that where they cease to be peaceful, protests cease to be republican and a fundamental right. This construction furthermore denies the responsibility of the republican police and riot control doctrines in creating a climate of violence within demonstrations. Lastly, in opposing “democracy” and “democratism,” the writer illustrates two contrasting conceptions of democracy: democracy as the consensus surrounding existing institutional arrangements, an democracy as the irruption of dissent within said arrangement. In Extract 12, the editorialist uses a straw man fallacy to ridicule the arguments of Yellow Vests.

Extract 12 As if the representatives of the nation, regularly insulted, had suddenly turned into blood suckers, an arrogant aristocracy, a parasite cast186.

Lastly, Extract 13 discusses the “Great National Debate” instigated by Macron in response to the movement:

Extract 13 In these conditions, unless one is of bad faith or mediocrely dissenting, how not to understand that [Macron] will not be able to bias, trick, or mess with the debate he is engaging. It is his last chance not to see the rest of his mandate crippled. It is his high risk bet: if he does not want to be, in his words, “dispowered,” he is obliged to succeed. This means restoring the broken dialogue with the French, finding a political solution to the crisis, “transforming anger into solutions,” and, for this, leading a true debate, open, transparent, contradictory and sincere. Democratic in one word187.

185 Violence antirépublicaine ensuite. Autant la manifestation – droit fondamental en démocratie – est légitime, autant les attroupements non négociés, sauvages, agressifs, sont contraires à toute logique démocratique, perpétrés par des minorités activistes qui poursuivent des buts étrangers au mouvement, animées par le rêve pervers du désordre soi-disant accoucheur d’histoire. [...] Le démocratisme finit par devenir antidémocratique. 186 Comme si les représentants de la nation, régulièrement insultés, s’étaient soudain changés en suceurs de sang, en aristocratie méprisante, en caste parasite. 187 Dans ces conditions, sauf à être de mauvaise foi ou médiocrement contestataire, comment ne pas comprendre qu’il ne pourra pas biaiser, ruser ou finasser avec le débat qu’il engage. C’est sa dernière chance

42 The use of modality (“how not to understand”) posits that the argument presented by the writer is evidently right. The writer’s argument is essentially that within a democracy, governors have no choice but to govern correctly if they wish to be re-elected eventually. Finally, in insisting upon calling the Great Debate “democratic,” an argument found in all editorials about the Great Debate, the writer implies that Yellow Vest protesters are not properly democratic.

6.3 Discourse of unity Within the analytical sample, some texts posit a sense of unity between the writer, the reader, and a “silent majority” of the French population, in the aim of bringing protesters back to reason and gathering the county surrounding the initial question of fiscality. This discursive pattern is expressed primarily through lexis, personification, modality, and the use of pronouns “we” and “us” as well as possessive adjective “our[s].” This use of pronouns constitutes the so-called “editorial we”. According to Fairclough, the ‘editorial we’ is often an exclusive one, implying that the reader or audience must share the editorialist’s views as being the proper ones188. Furthermore, in national newspapers, such an use of pronouns “can be understood as referring to the nation189,” that is, to an assumed homogeneity of the nation, from which protesters are excluded. See first Extract 14:

Extract 14 We are relieved to have avoided the worst, but how not to remain preoccupied by these weekly movements of protesters and rioters who break, burn, assault and steal? We have integrated these “low-intensity” violences to such an extent that a peaceful parade on a 1st of May seems unthinkable today190.

Similarly, in Extract 15, the editorialist speaks for the majority of the French population:

de ne pas voir le reste de son mandat paralysé. C’est son pari, à très haut risque : s’il ne veut pas être, selon son expression, « impuissanté », il a l’obligation de réussir. C’est-à-dire de restaurer le dialogue rompu avec les Français, de trouver une issue politique à la crise, de « transformer les colères en solutions » et, pour cela, de mener un vrai débat, ouvert, transparent, contradictoire et sincère. Démocratique en un mot. 188 Norman Fairclough (1989), op. cit., p. 127. 189 Rod Brookes (1999). "Newspapers and national identity: the BSE/CJD crisis and the British press." Media, Culture and Society, Vol 21, No 2, p. 255. 190 Nous sommes soulagés d’avoir évité le pire, mais comment ne pas rester préoccupés devant ces mouvements hebdomadaires de manifestants et de casseurs qui détruisent, brûlent, agressent et pillent? Nous avons tellement intégré ces violences de « basse intensité » qu’un défilé paisible un jour de 1er Mai semble aujourd’hui impensable.

43 Extract 15 If the turn that this movement will take is unpredictable, the message it addresses to the government is, indeed, of the clearest: a good number of French people are in a state of fiscal overdose. This feeling is not new, and revolts against the burden of taxes have punctuated the history of the country. But it has become, in recent years, more and more acute. The inquiry that we publish today confirms this in an eloquent manner191.

In referring to the history of France in a positive manner, the editorialist legitimizes the feeling of “fiscal overdose,” which he probably identifies with. In a number of texts within the corpus, discontent as to the “tax burden” is legitimized and this is often used as a way to simultaneously enhance editorialists’ ability to understand the troubles of the country and discredit the protests which have gone “too far” and shifted demands. This construction is also evident in Extract 16:

Extract 16 A simple tax and the obstination of Emmanuel Macron has awakened all the pains of our social body. The invisibility of the humble, the mortuary of small marquises, the profound distress of the average French person, the impunity of thugs, the disappearing of the principle of authority, the weakness of the State192.

In the text above, published at the beginning of the movement, the editorialist interprets “a simple tax” as having elucidated what he had previously identified as the lingering problems of the country. Using possessive adjective “our,” the editorialist attempts to create a sense of unity and solidarity between himself and “the average French person.” Published later, Extract 17 elucidates the feelings of editorialists as to the state of the “average French person” before the development of the movement. Earlier in the text, it refers to the 2015 and 2016 terrorist attacks and an assumed unanimous support to the police which was then expressed publicly to contrast with the treatment of the police by protesters, presenting the police in a manichean way, as a monotonous block which is either inherently

191 Si la suite que prendra ce mouvement est imprévisible, le message qu'il adresse au gouvernement est, en effet, des plus clairs : bon nombre de Français sont en état d'overdose fiscale. Ce sentiment n'est pas nouveau, et les révoltes contre le poids de l'impôt et des taxes ont jalonné l'histoire du pays. Mais il est devenu, ces dernières années, de plus en plus aigu. L'enquête que nous publions aujourd'hui le confirme de manière éloquente. 192 Une simple taxe et l'obstination d'Emmanuel Macron ont réveillé toutes les douleurs de notre corps social. L'invisibilité des plus humbles, la morgue des petits marquis, la détresse profonde du Français moyen, l'impunité des vandales, la disparition du principe d'autorité, la faiblesse de l'Etat.

44 good or inherently bad, wholeheartedly supported or wholeheartedly decried, irrelevant of the social and political context.

Extract 17 Today, the silent majority counts on our forces of order to protect the common house193.

In Extract 18, several constructions discussed above appear:

Extract 18 In the waiting, another question should bug us. We, French, what have we learned about ourselves in the last four months which separate us from 17 November and the 280 000 people who then put on a yellow vest against the raise in fuel taxes? What should we retain? First of all, the importance of our dead angles. Nobody had seen this movement coming194.

In using modality and pronouns “we”/”us”, reinforced by the adjective “French,” and possessive adjective “our,” the editorialist posits that his cecity is shared among the greater population, which is both a way of denying that “the coming insurrection” was a much discussed topic for the last decade and a half, and a way of minimizing his own responsibility in having failed to predict it. Furthermore, rather than granting space to protesters' demands, the writer uses the movement to discuss his very own understanding of things. It is perhaps in this discursive pattern that the role of editorials as prescribers of opinion and reproducers of consensus is most obvious. Rather than accepting the way protests have turned, the writers consistently attempt to focus readers onto the tax revolt, denying protesters' in-depth questioning of economic and political structures of power as exemplified by the demand for a People's Referendum.

193 Aujourd'hui, la majorité silencieuse compte sur nos forces de l'ordre pour protéger la maison commune. 194 En attendant, une autre question devrait nous tarauder. Nous, Français, qu’avons-nous appris sur nous- mêmes au cours des quatre mois qui nous séparent du 17 novembre et des 280 000 personnes qui endossèrent alors un gilet jaune contre la hausse des taxes sur les carburants ? Que faut-il retenir ? Primo, l’importance de nos angles morts. Personne n’avait vu venir ce mouvement.

45 7. Conclusions This thesis intended to explore the following research questions: – What discourses on the Yellow Vests can be identified in editorials from the French press? – From the study of those discourses, what can be understood about the space allocated to protest movements in the political realm? Despite the richness of the corpus, three main discourses were identified: (1) a discourse of contempt, characterized by the dividing of the French population into two distinct categories, one of which is educated, successful, modern, and proper, and the other one of which, associated with the Yellow Vests, isn't; (2) a discourse of republicanism, within which Yellow Vests are described as a threat to the Republic which is associated with representative democracy, French institutions and symbols, order and authority, the rule of law, and the figure of the President himself; and (3) a discourse of unity, within which authors posit their support of the original tax protests and resort to the idea of a 'silent majority' which has grown to disagree with the movement to disqualify its new demands and means of action. In that they never discussed the repression nor the demands of protesters, and in that the patterns discussed above are reproduced with consistency throughout the corpus, the studied editorials lead to a rather monolithic reading of the press discourse on Yellow Vests. These discourses seem to both spring from an atmosphere of hegemonic consensus surrounding defining economic and political structures of powers, and aim at maintaining said consensus. On the one hand, individuals and ideas which are perceived as a threat are disqualified using such techniques as mockery, fallacious arguments and appeals to fear. On the other hand, calls to unity are formulated so as to try and aggregate France around the only question put forward by Yellow Vests which is deemed worthy of attention, namely, that of taxes and fiscality. The Yellow Vest movement and its coverage by the press confirm Mouffe's prediction that politics of consensus would either lead to a depoliticization of the public debate or conflicts between elites and non-elites. These results are consistent with the little previous literature on editorials within the French press as well as with the the 'guard dog' perspective on the media. This research however failed to explore a wide variety of news outlets. Future research could diversify or enlarge the corpus of texts so as to study the extent of pluralism within the press. Alternatively, it could put forward solutions so as to create a press which, in allowing for dissent to be expressed, would act as a genuine counter-power, a 'watch dog' for the rights

46 and interests of the people, favoring a democratic climate within which the building of a real alternative is thinkable.

47 Appendix 1: List of editorials 1. L'inquiétante fracture fiscale, Le Monde, November 22, 2018. 2. Gilets jaunes : au-delà de l’humeur, Ouest-France, November 2018. 3. Le grand gâchis, Le Figaro, November 30, 2018. 4. Crise démocratique, Le Figaro, December 3, 2018. 5. Boomerang, Libération, December 7, 2018. 6. Désordre public, Le Figaro, December 7, 2018. 7. Flottement, Libération, December 13, 2018. 8. Gilets jaunes : « On lâche rien », vraiment ? Ouest-France, December 15, 2018. 9. Fracture citoyenne, Le Figaro, December 16, 2018. 10. Gilets jaunes et masques jaunes, Libération, December 16, 2018. 11. « Gilets jaunes » : la violence ou le débat, Le Monde, January 7, 2019. 12. Crise sociale : halte au lynchage, Le Monde, January 10, 2019. 13. Grand débat national : le pari à haut risque de Macron, Le Monde, January 14, 2019. 14. Derrière le grand débat, Le Figaro, February 10, 2019. 15. Grand débat, le purgatoire de Macron, Le Monde, March 15, 2019. 16. Il ne faudrait pas que les invisibles finissent par nous aveugler, Le Parisien, March 22, 2019. 17. Gilets jaunes et Grand débat national : l’heure de l'inventaire, Ouest-France, Avril 6, 2019. 18. Soulagement et inquiétude, Le Figaro, May 2, 2019. 19. Odieux harcèlement, Le Figaro, May 31, 2019.

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52 French Politics, Culture & Society, Vol 33, No 3: 47-69. Hess, David and Brian Martin (2006). “Repression, Backfire, and The Theory of Transformative Events.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly, Vol 11, No 2: 249-267. Lincoln, Yvonna S. and Egon G. Guba (1986). "But is it rigorous? Trustworthiness and authenticity in naturalistic evaluation." New Directions for Program Evaluation, 73-84. Magnet, Anne and Didier Carnet (2007). "Les éditorialistes : auteurs scientifiques ou acteurs sociaux ?" ASp, Vol 51-52: 95-113. Mouffe, Chantal (2009). “Democracy in a Multipolar World.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol 37, No 3: 549-561. Mourão, Rachel R. (2018). “From Mass to Elite Protests: News Coverage and the Evolution of Antigovernment Demonstrations in Brazil.” Mass Communication and Society, Vol 22, No 1: 49-71. Neveu, Erik (2002). “The Local Press and Farmers' Protests in Brittany: proximity and distance in the local newspaper coverage of a social movement.” Journalism Studies, Vol 3, No 1: 53-67. Peeters, Stéfanie (2012). “La couverture médiatique de la « crise des banlieues » : métaphores, représentations et l’apport indispensable du contexte.” Corela, No 11. Ridell, Seija (2008). "Top University–downhill for humanities? Policing the Future of Higher Education in the Finnish Mainstream Media." European Educational Research Journal, Vol 7, No 3: 289-307. Schwartz, Antoine (2008). "Bonne Europe et mauvaise France. Les éditorialistes français interprètent la victoire du « non » au traité constitutionnel européen." Politique et Sociétés, Vol 27, No 2: 137–159 Snow, David A., Rens Vliegenthart and Catherine Corrigall-Brown (2007). “Framing the French Riots: A Comparative Study of Frame Variation.” Social Forces, Vol 86, No 2: 385- 415. Sullivan, Christopher M. (2016). “Undermining Resistance: Mobilization, Repression, and the Enforcement of Political Order.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol, 60, No 7: 1163– 1190. Van Dijk, Teun A. (1996). "Opinions and ideologies in editorials." Discourse Analysis, Language, Social Life and Critical Thought: 1-30. Wisler, Dominique and Marco Giugni (1999). “Under The Spotlight: The Impact of Media Attention on Protest Policing.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly, Vol 4, No 2: 171- 187.

53

Newspaper articles Amara, Kevin (2018). “Frank Lepage : « Le gilet jaune est le symbole d’une conscience de classe qui est en train de renaître. »” Le Comptoir, December 26. Benilde, Marie (2013). “Médias français, une affaire de famille.” Le Monde diplomatique, November. Bock, Pauline (2017). “Emmanuel Macron’s most offensive, self-centered, and disconcerting comments of 2017.” New Statesman, December 21. Carasco, Aude (2019). “Baromètre médias, les journalistes sommés de se remettre en question.” La Croix, January 24. Chrisafis, Angelique (2019). “French scepticism over vaccines reflects distrust of government.” The Guardian, June 19. Dufresne, David (2019). “« Allô place Beauvau, c’est pour un bilan », une cartographie des violences policières.” Médiapart, January 25 (regularly updated, accessed August 9, 2019). L’Express (2005). “La seconde famille de Mitterrand–derniers secrets.” May 29. Le Figaro (2019). “« Gilets jaunes » : « Pas de violences policières », selon l’IGPN.” June 14. Forbes (2019). “Billionaires: The Richest People in the World.” March 5. France 24 (2014). “Emmanuel Macron, un ex-banquier touche-à-tout à Bercy.” August 27. Garnier, Christophe-Cécil (2018). “Le gilet jaune, d’un siège passager aux rues européennes.” Slate, December 10. Gaubry, Pascal-Emmanuel (2018). “France’s Gifted Youth Are Set Up to Fail.” Bloomberg, April 24. Glad, Vincent (2017). “Qui décodexera le Décodex ? De la difficulté de labelliser l’information de qualité.” Libération, February 3. Guénolé, Thomas (2017). “Les éditorialistes des grands médias sont-ils massivement pro- Macron ?” Marianne, October 2. Gwiazdzinski, Luc and Olivier Frérot (2019). “Cabanes et ronds-points, un patrimoine populaire en feu.” Libération, April 23. Le Journal du Dimanche (2017). “Christophe Barbier : « Se confronter au terrain pollue l'esprit de l'éditorialiste. »” April 14. Huffington Post (2018). “Le bilan du 17 novembre des gilets jaunes, en cinq chiffres.” November 17.

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55 May 2. Vicuña, Manuel (2018). “Taxes carburants et cadeau aux patrons : l’éternel retour d’un « Macron Leak ».” Arrêt sur images, December 25.

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