EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE FIELD OF COUNTERTERRORISM CAN TRADITIONAL INTEGRATION THEORIES EXPLAIN THE MEASURES TAKEN TO COMBAT THE NEW THREATS FACING EUROPE?

EMMA JOHANNESSON

Master’s Thesis Fall 2018 Department of Government Uppsala University Supervisor: Thomas Persson Word count: 19475

Abstract

European integration has been a widely discussed topic within political science since the creation of the EU. In recent years, signs of disintegration have been observed due to widespread euroscepticism, major crises and public discontent. Simultaneously, cross-border terrorism has become an acute issue for the EU with terror attacks being executed in several member states. This study examines the development of European integration in counterterrorism from 2014 to 2017 to determine if integration in this field has continued or halted. Two traditional integration theories, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovern- mentalism, are applied to understand the driving factors for the European integration process in this field. The results show that European integration in counterterrorism has persisted, and even accelerated in the aftermath of recent terror attacks. The driving factors for this development can be explained by a combination of the applied theories, but the framework of neofunctionalism is unexpectedly strong.

Keywords: EU, European Integration, Terrorism, Counterterrorism, Neofunctionalism,

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

2 Table of Contents LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... 4 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 5 2. THEORY ...... 8 2.1 INTEGRATION THEORIES ...... 8 2.1.1 Neofunctionalism ...... 8 2.1.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism ...... 12 2.1.3 Integration Theories in Crises - the Financial Crisis and the Refugee Crisis ...... 15 2.2 EU COUNTERTERRORISM ...... 22 3. METHOD AND MATERIAL ...... 26 3.1 METHOD ...... 26 3.2 MATERIAL ...... 27 3.3 OPERATIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ...... 30 3.4 OPERATIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORIES ...... 31 3.4.1 Neofunctionalism ...... 32 3.4.1 Liberal intergovernmentalism ...... 34 4. RESULTS ...... 37 4.1 INTEGRATIVE MEASURES IN COUNTERTERRORISM 2014-2017 ...... 37 4.1.1 Strategic Agenda for the Union in Times of Change ...... 37 4.1.2 The attack on Charlie Hebdo, January 2015 ...... 38 4.1.3 The European Agenda on Security is Launched ...... 39 4.1.4 Push From the Commission President for more European integration ...... 40 4.1.5 Coordinated Terror Attacks in Paris, November 2015 ...... 40 4.1.6 Proposal for a Directive on Combating Terrorism ...... 43 4.1.7 Limited Possibilities for Stakeholder Engagement ...... 45 4.1.8 Terror Attacks in Brussels, March 2016 ...... 45 4.1.9 European Political Strategy Centre Calls for More Integration ...... 46 4.1.10 The European Commission Proposes a European Security Union ...... 47 4.1.11 The Commission Portfolio for the Security Union is Introduced ...... 49 4.1.12 JHA Council Agrees on a Roadmap for Better Information Exchange ...... 49 4.1.13 The Directive on Combating Terrorism is Adopted ...... 50 4.1.14 Differentiated European Integration ...... 52 4.1.15 The European Parliament’s Special Committee on Counter Terrorism is Approved ...... 53 4.1.16 Terror Attack in Barcelona, August 2017 ...... 53 4.2 ADDITIONAL MEASURES TAKEN BY THE MEMBER STATES ...... 54 4.3 THE COSTS OF TERRORISM ...... 55 4.4 SUMMARY OF RESULTS ...... 57 5. DISCUSSION ...... 61 5.1 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN COUNTERTERRORISM ...... 61 5.2 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORIES IN EU COUNTERTERRORISM ...... 62 6. CONCLUSION ...... 65 7. REFERENCES ...... 68

3 List of Abbreviations

AFSJ – Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

ECB – European Central Bank

EBCG – European Border and Coast Guard

EEAS – European External Action Service

EMU – European Monetary Union

EP – European Parliament

EPSC – European Political Strategy Centre

ESM – European Stability Mechanism

EU – European Union

JHA – Justice and Home Affairs

LI – Liberal Intergovernmentalism

NF – Neofunctionalism

TEU – Treaty of the European Union

4 1. Introduction In recent years, terror attacks have been executed on European soil several times in the form of bombings, shootings and by using vehicles to run over civilians. These attacks have caused fear among the public and have put counterterrorism at the top of the agenda for the EU institutions. As of November 2017, 7456 European nationals or residents were involved in jihadist networks (CAT, 2017), and according to Europol’s former director Rob Wainwright,

“another attempted attack is almost certain” (Walt, 2016). In the latest Eurobarometer on

Europeans’ attitudes towards security (2017), 95 percent of the respondents replied that terrorism is an important challenge to EU security. This is an increase of three percentage points since the previous survey that was done in March 2015.

As counterterrorism is a concern for many Europeans, it is important to understand how legislation is achieved and who is to be held accountable for decision-making in this field. In the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), where counterterrorism is included, the EU and the member states have shared competence, meaning that the member states have the possibility to exercise its competence to the extent that the Union has not, or where the Union has ceased to exercise its competence (TFEU, 2012, Article 2 and 4). Terrorism is not a new issue for European states, but it was not until the terror attack on World Trade Center in New

York on 11 September 2001 (9/11) that it became prioritized on EU level.

Since the attacks on 9/11 up until the summer of 2013, the EU proposed 238 new measures connected to counterterrorism. De Londras and Doody (2015, Ch. 1) give a comprehensive overview of these legislative counterterrorism measures and conclude that the decision- making processes of these acts were done hastily and were lacking transparency and public consultations. The developments in the EU’s counterterrorism work can clearly be connected

5 to specific terror attacks such as the attacks on World Trade Center in New York 2001, the train bombings in Madrid 2004 and the London underground bombings in 2005.

This suggests that recent attacks in Europe would further develop EU counterterrorism legislation. Several attacks have been executed in close time in Europe, for example the shooting at the Charlie Hebdo newsroom in January 2015, the coordinated Paris attacks in

November 2015, the bombings at Brussels airport and metro in March 2016, the vehicle attack in Nice in July 2016, and the attack in Barcelona in August 2017 (Stonestreet &

Lawson, 2018). The coordinated attacks in Paris and Brussels are especially important on EU level because of the cross-border nature.

Simultaneously with these events, the political environment in Europe has changed in recent years and scepticism towards more European integration have been up for discussion in connection to the financial crisis, the refugee crisis, and the Brexit referendum 2016.

Patomäki (2017) claims that the EU currently has problems of legitimacy, democracy, as well as nationalism and discontent among the public. These problems make the possibility of disintegration likely, especially as economic downturn has decreased trust for the EU.

The new political landscape in Europe, along with the relatively new issue of cross-border terrorism, makes it interesting to test the applicability of traditional integration theories. By using two different frameworks for European integration, neofunctionalism (NF) and liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), it is possible to assess the willingness of more integration in counterterrorism in this new political environment in Europe. Neofunctionalism emphasizes functional, political and cultivated spillover effects to be the causes of more European integration, whereas liberal intergovernmentalism underlines that European integration will

6 take place in instances when member states agree that their respective preferences can be reached more efficiently if some power is transferred to supranational institutions. Many scholars have used NF and LI to examine other significant events in the evolution of the EU, but the integration literature lacks studies connected to counterterrorism since this is a relatively new issue to handle on EU level.

The aim of this study is therefore to achieve a better understanding of the EU’s legislation concerning counterterrorism, by applying the theoretical frameworks of NF and LI. Previous research suggests that serious terror attacks will lead to more integrative measures on EU level, but there is reason to test these claims again due to the change of the political environment. I intend to answer if more integration in the field of counterterrorism has occurred in the aftermath of recent terror attacks, and in that case, what have been the driving factors of this change?

The study assesses if new initiatives and legislation on EU level regarding counterterrorism has been proposed and adopted over the last years. If this is the case, it is possible to determine that further integration has occurred in this field. The motivations for integration are found by studying official statements, press releases, speeches and background information for legislative initiatives. These are key to understand the driving forces for integration, and will support assumptions from the theoretical framework of NF, and/or LI, or neither of them.

The study is divided into five sections. Section two covers previous research that the study is based on. It presents the theoretical frameworks of NF and LI and how these theories have been applied on other issues. Developments of EU policy-making in the field of counter-

7 terrorism are explored to understand how European integration has evolved in security and counterterrorism. Section three presents the methodology and the expectations of the study. It includes the theoretical framework and the material used to answer the research question. The fourth section presents the results, and gives an overview of new EU legislation along with motivations for integration from relevant actors. Finally, the conclusion analyzes the results, speculates around the future possibilities for EU counterterrorism work and gives suggestions for further research.

2. Theory

2.1 Integration theories European integration occurs when member states decide to shift competence from national to

EU level. It can be political, social, and economic processes, and includes a legal dimension.

Integration theory is interested in the underlying dynamics that result in more integration

(Bulmer & Joseph, 2015). Closer cooperation and more supranational power in the field of security and counterterrorism can be viewed as an example of closer European integration.

Many theoretical models have been used to explain European integration from the end of the

Second World War up until today. Neofunctionalism (NF) and liberal intergovernmentalism

(LI) are two of the most prominent theories used in European integration literature, presenting different motives for more integration. The distinction between intergovernmental politics and supranational politics should although not be viewed as mutually exclusive but rather as a continuum of several levels of supranationalism, where policy areas can be placed on different levels (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998).

2.1.1 Neofunctionalism Ernst B. Haas presented NF in his book the Uniting of Europe in 1958, to challenge the dominating theories of international relations; realism and idealism. NF focuses on ‘spillover’

8 effects as the reasons for more integration; that cooperation in one area would spill over to other areas. Contrary to realism, Haas argued that states were not only interested in power, but interests and preferences are based on actors’ values. “Regional integration was expected to occur when societal actors, in calculating their interests, decided to rely on the supranational institutions rather than their own governments to realize their demands” (Haas & Dinan,

2004, p. *xiv). When the integration process is ongoing, interests are although likely to change to be defined in regional rather than national terms. Haas also pointed at a shift in identities and loyalty among the member states from a national center to a European center.

This new European loyalty can although exist side by side with a national loyalty (Haas &

Dinan, 2004, p. 13-14). Other neofunctionalists such as Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998), although believe that supranational governance can take place without a shift in identity. It is enough that transactions occur across borders, which creates interdependency, and that businesses and organizations push for common rules and standards, for states to agree on more supranational influence, since this would be beneficial for them.

NF is based on functional, political and cultivated ‘spillover’. Functional spillover concerns the interdependency between sectors and political issues, meaning that organized cooperation in one area requires cooperation in other areas as well to function successfully, if no other alternatives are present. If functional dissonances occur and are not resolved with further integration, it may lead to crises, which in turn put even more pressure on functional integration (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015).

Political spillover occurs when there is a realization among political élites that issues will be solved better if states cooperate. These élites are interest groups of different kinds that favor more integration (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). They are able to have a say on EU legislation

9 through public consultations and sometimes in organized working groups and roundtables.

They also lobby for their opinions in other ways, for example by hosting events and discuss issues with representatives from the European institutions (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 2013).

NGOs have refocused their lobbying efforts to the European or international level, and the presence of NGOs in Brussels has increased over the years. The research of NGO involvement in the area of freedom, security and justice is although limited. Most prominent

NGOs in this area are active within the field of migration, and it is also in this area that most research has been composed. NGO involvement in police and judicial cooperation has been limited (Uçarer, 2017).

Cultivated spillover is connected to the power of the supranational organizations. It assumes that additional integration is promoted by supranational organizations since it gains the organization and its representatives (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). The central supranational organization in the EU is the European Commission (hereafter the Commission). The relative influence of the Commission has varied historically, from a very central role achieved in the

Treaty of Rome, to a significantly weakened role in the mid-60’s. It regained influence in the mid 80’s in connection to the relaunch of the European project when power shifted from the member states back to supranational institutions. The more recent balance of power among the EU institutions is contested, but Nugent and Rhinard (2016) come to the conclusion that the Commission remains the most important agenda-setter, both directly and indirectly through other institutions. New institutions and agencies have challenged the Commission’s position, but even though some influence has been transferred to these new bodies, the

Commission still has the possibility to shape policies, ideas and priorities for the EU. In the legislative domain, the Commission has an almost exclusive right to propose legislation.

10 Nugent and Rhinard highlight that the Commission has always been initiating legislation in cooperation with other institutions and acted on feedback and suggestions to formulate proposals that will pass the co-decision procedure of the Council and the EP. Zaun (2017) also argues that several Commission initiatives have been watered down to be able to pass the legislative process and be accepted by the Council of the European Union (the Council). The

Commission may therefore not always propose legislation that is too integrative since such initiatives would be voted down due to lack of support from the Council. Regarding the

Commission’s executive tasks, more competence has been given to the Commission in the field of financial management since the financial crisis, and new institutions as the European

Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are partly controlled by the Commission. Overall, Nugent and Rhinard argue that the perceived decline of the Commission’s influence is exaggerated. In some aspects, influence has declined, but in many aspects it remains intact or has been strengthened.

The NF approach has had its critics since it cannot explain all parts of European integration.

Stanley Hoffman (1966) blames NF for putting too much faith in the administration to solve discrepancies between the member states and reach consensus. NF may be used to explain the start of the European project, but fails to explain the development, since the member states have been able to stop some initiatives and opt out of some when they have not seen the benefit of further integration. The supranational administration is something that the national entities try to affect, rather than the other way around.

Schmitter (2005) argues that the involvement of more member states and the heterogeneity of the members complicate cooperation since it becomes difficult to find common solutions and make everyone feel as they are benefitting from the cooperation. With EU involvement in

11 almost all policy fields, it becomes difficult to find new areas that experiences can be transferred to. Schmitter also criticizes NF for its failure to explain the changing dynamics in

Europe, the so-called ‘turbulence’ that has been present in the European integration.

Reflecting on Schmitter’s critique today, European integration has further developed the last

15 years to include more policy fields and new member states. The cooperation has become more politicized with the additional involvement of the European Parliament (EP) and a more political European Commission. The turbulence has although persisted, and discussions about the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of European integration are widely disputed.

NF has had its ups and downs since it was first presented in 1958 and has at times been undermined due to events not following its logic. The framework has proved to be useful to explain measures of integration but been criticized for not being able to answer why integration has been limited in some instances (See Niemann & Speyer, 2018, Niemann &

Ioannou, 2015). NF may not be the perfect framework to explain all aspects of European integration, but it can still be valuable to understand why integrative measures have been taken in many policy areas and to better understand the role of supranational institutions.

2.1.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism A different theoretical approach explaining integration in the European Union is liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), presented by Andrew Moravcsik in 1993. This approach recognizes that states are the main actors in deciding the level of cooperation, and dismisses the influence of supranational organizations or interest groups emphasized by NF. Moravcsik

(1993) starts from the assumption that the EU should be viewed as an international regime for policy-coordination. States behave rationally in accordance with certain goals and national preferences that are shaped by societal groups who are pushing for their respective individual

12 preferences. Once the national preferences are formed, states bargain among themselves in a strategic manner to achieve these preferences.

LI hence seeks to combine a liberal theory of national preference formation with an intergovernmental theory of international negotiation. It rests on the assumption that the EU can be viewed as an intergovernmental regime that facilitates and makes policy coordination more efficient (Moravcsik, 1993). The pooling of sovereignty and delegation to supranational institutions increase the credibility of commitments made by the member states and decrease the temptation to cheat on agreements (Pollack, 2005). States are rational actors and their preferences are based on a consideration of costs and benefits of international interactions.

The national preferences are formed by discussions and pressure from domestic societal groups and can be considered the demand side of international negotiations. The supply side in the negotiations are the underlying political factors such as the intensity of the national preferences, existing linkages or agreement on issues as well as possible alternative outcomes

(Moravcsik, 1993).

To understand how more integration would evolve through the LI framework, it is important to understand the process of intergovernmental bargaining. The amount of bargaining power each state acquires can be viewed from different perspectives. Some of the possible discrepancies brought up are between the groups of large and small, between old and new, and between rich and poor member states. The member states with relatively low dependence on other EU economies have better bargaining power, but no evidence has been found that supports that there would be a difference between the other groupings of member states

(Vilpišauskas, 2013; Bunse & Nicolaïdis, 2013; Lequesne, 2013; Waltraud, 2013). The

Franco-German relationship has often been said to shape the EU, but Della Sala (2013) argues

13 that leadership can occur from other formations of states as well, even though support from the larger states is necessary to initiate significant changes. In conclusion, the size of the member state is important to have influence over the decisions, but smaller states have the possibility to swerve the decision in a certain direction or push forward new initiatives.

The member states are the most important actors in LI, but the balance of power between the member states and the Commission is debated. Kassim and Menon (2010) argue that the member states have taken back influence from the Commission since the Maastricht Treaty in

1991, and that they are now the central actors. The Commission has been constrained by the member states that have limited the Commission’s decision-making power and circumscribed its autonomy. The Commission is still considered a vital actor, but in relation to the other institutions, it is in relative decline. It has also been argued that the increased influence of the

EP as a co-legislator, the enlargement process and the objections of a European constitution have made the Commission more cautious in its working methods (Kurpas et al. 2008).

Moravcsik argues that the discussion concerning the democratic deficit in the EU has been exaggerated. National governments are still the major actors and hold the relatively small EU bureaucracy accountable and controlled (Kleine and Pollack, 2018).

The strength of LI is considered to be its possibility to capture intergovernmental bargaining and how it affects European integration. It is although criticized for not capturing feedback effects of integration and how different junctures of intergovernmental bargaining are connected and affected by previous negotiations (Schimmelfenning, 2018). Additional critique towards LI concerns the theoretical claims and biases associated to it. Wincott (1995) argues that it is unclear if Moravcsik has presented a deductive theory or an approach based on methodological assumptions, because the arguments end up somewhere in between. Stone

14 Sweet and Sandholtz (1998) do not criticize the intergovernmental bargaining per se, but they question intergovernmentalism as theory. It should rather be seen as a mode of decision- making within the EU. Despite this criticism, LI has continued to be a prominent theory to explain European integration, and it can give valuable insights for how and why decisions have been taken by the member states to give more influence to supranational institutions.

The theories of NF and LI were criticized, and the debate between the two was nearly overrun by other approaches discussing the EU in the 1990s. Following the debate between NF and LI was a mainstream international relations debate between rationalism and constructivism, where the main disagreement concerned the impact of the EU institutions on national preference formation and identities. Other approaches put less focus on integration and tried to understand the system of the EU, by using a comparative perspective or a governance approach (Pollack, 2005). However, despite these developments in the study of the EU, the traditional theories of NF and LI have made a comeback, and been useful also in recent times of EU integration. The financial crisis and the refugee crisis are two examples where they have been applied and explained important developments in the European integration process.

2.1.3 Integration Theories in Crises - the Financial Crisis and the Refugee Crisis

NF and LI have primarily been used to explain critical moments in the history of European integration, i.e. when the outcomes have implied either more or less integration. This section presents examples from the financial crisis and the refugee crisis, which both have been explained by NF and LI.

15 The financial crisis

The financial crisis hit the EU hard, especially some member states. Discrepancies existed between monetary and fiscal policy where the first is a EU competence and the last a national competence. Supervision of economic policy and crisis management tools were also lacking in the union, which contributed to causing the crisis. Status quo had caused the crisis, and measures were needed to safeguard the EU’s key goal of a stable common currency (Niemann

& Ioannou, 2015). A breakup of the EMU, or exit by one or several countries, was one alternative, but this would bring high costs for the member states, and for the EU as a whole, and was therefore not a desired option (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2017).

NF can be used to explain the outcomes of the financial crisis. The Eurozone was strongly interdependent but did not function properly, and the favored solution was therefore to take more integrative steps to solve the problems, what can be viewed as functional spillover

(Schimmelfenning, 2018). The discourse among national leaders and EU leaders was also centered on functional arguments for more integration, which limited the policy options

(Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). Interest groups such as businesses, trade unions and industries contributed to political spillover as they lobbied for more integration and measures to save the euro. Financial markets also put pressure on further integration since they reacted positively to integrative measures, and negatively to inactivity or hesitation. This contributed to the development of the ESM (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015).

The relevant supranational institutions in the financial crisis were the European Commission, the EP and the European Central Bank (ECB). Since many crisis management solutions were intergovernmental, the possibility for the Commission to take initiatives was rather limited.

Despite this, the member states agreed on more integration and the Commission gained new

16 competences and autonomy (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015). The Commission’s role in agenda setting decreased slightly while its executive power increased. Bauer and Becker (2014) found that the financial crisis increased the Commission’s role in inter alia financial stability support, economic policy surveillance, and in supervision of the financial sector. This changed the Commission’s role from policy entrepreneur to policy manager, but its possibility to promote political goals was maintained. The EP put significant pressure on the member states to link agreements to the treaties, to strengthen the supranational dimension in negotiations and to advance its own role of accountability in the new institutional setups. The

ECB promoted deeper integration to strengthen the EMU and save the euro during the crisis, and also pushed for a future fiscal union. Overall, the power of the supranational institutions changed with the crisis, but they all managed to either use its existing power in the most beneficial way, or come out of the crisis with increased power (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015).

The LI framework works well to explain the intergovernmental bargaining that took place in the wake of the euro crisis. The negative externalities of disintegration would be costly, both financially and politically for the member states and the EU as a whole. A lot of resources had been put into it and the EMU had been considered a success. It was hence not viewed as a possible option to go back to national currencies and abandon the EMU (Schimmelfenning,

2018). The member states thereby agreed on more integration to deal with some of the dysfunctionalities that had contributed to the crisis. National preferences differed between creditor countries and debtor countries, and both sides pushed for the solution that would benefit them the most. Regulatory measures were preferred over more solidarity by the creditor countries, but some countries did not have the ability to comply with these measures, and it was therefore not sufficient. Interdependence between the Eurozone members was strong, but asymmetrical, which put the creditor states in a better position in negotiations.

17 Germany was a particularly strong financial actor and was able to set the terms for negotiations along with likeminded northern states (Schimmelfenning, 2018). This shows that the relative bargaining among member states is important when it comes to crisis management, and that strong economic member states have an advantage in economic issues.

Both NF and LI, depending on the perspective, can hence explain the financial crisis. NF finds proof of functional spillover due to the interdependencies within the Eurozone. Political spillover occurred when financial markets, business organizations and trade unions lobbied for more integration. Cultivated spillover is supported by the push from supranational institutions to increase integration. The ECB had a significant role during the financial crisis, and will likely continue to push for a complete fiscal union. LI rests on the unwillingness to disintegrate due to the economic and political costs it would bring for the member states. This perspective emphasizes the outcome of the crisis on the intergovernmental bargaining that took place among the Eurozone member states. In economic issues, Germany has a particularly strong bargaining position and could shape the agenda.

The refugee crisis

In regard to the refugee crisis, Niemann and Speyer (2018) have presented a NF explanation to the development of the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) regulation. Since this is an area of ‘high-politics’, member states are expected to be unwilling to give sovereignty to the EU. The refugee crisis is considered to be a consequence of the dysfuctionalities between the Schengen system and weak external border management. A possible solution to the crisis was therefore an updated version of the previously suggested EBCG. An alternative solution would be to limit or abandon the Schengen agreement, but this solution was not considered to be probable due to economic and political reasons (Niemann & Speyer, 2018). Schengen is

18 “one of the greatest achievements of the EU” (European Commission, 2018) and is of high symbolic value to the EU as one of the core developments of European integration (Niemann

& Speyer, 2018). The majority of member states supported a common solution to deal with the refugee crisis and insisted on better common external border controls to safeguard the

Schengen area. This can be explained as functional spillover (Wolf & Ossewaarde, 2017).

Business organizations also endorsed the benefits of Schengen and flagged for the increased costs and lowered wealth that would face the Union if Schengen was abolished. The umbrella organizations for businesses in Brussels, Business Europe, released statements in favor of a stronger EBCG, which may have contributed to the decision-making process (Niemann &

Speyer, 2018).

Concerning cultivated spillover, the Commission has been portrayed as a supranational policy entrepreneur in the development of EBCG, an actor that is willing to invest resources in an idea in the hope of future return, or because that idea is according to the actors’ values.

Successful entrepreneurs have the claim to hearing, have political connections or negotiating skills and are persistent (Kingdon, 1984, p. 122-123). The Commission had in this case already prepared legislation on the issue, was cohesive and well-organized and acted as a broker in the trilogue between the EP and the Council (Niemann & Speyer, 2018). The Dutch

Presidency negotiated the EBCG successfully by showing strong leadership, being a credible and impartial negotiator, and by combining creativity, pressure and effective bargaining to push through solutions effectively. The Council was able to gain some power on behalf of the

Commission through the decision on intervention in the case of non-compliance, by making it a decision to be taken by qualified majority in the Council (Niemann & Speyer, 2018). The

EP was also supportive of more integrative measures and managed to successfully push

19 through its core positions, inter alia to influence the appointment of the Agency’s director.

Even though the Council was able to win over some power from the Commission, the initiatives from the Commission were important for the outcome. All three spillover effects can be found and NF is therefore useful in explaining the development of the EBCG.

From an LI perspective, the member states’ general approach to European integration may affect their stance on migration and asylum policy. Wolf and Ossewaarde (2018) used this crisis for the EU to study imaginaries of further integration among national representatives in the European Council. National heads of state or government express diverse support for further general European integration; some are very supportive whereas others reject it.

The bargaining power of each member state should although be considered, and in that case, the member states with the strongest bargaining power (Germany, France, Italy and the UK) show greater support of more integration than the member states with the weakest bargaining power (Poland, Hungary, Romania and Greece) (Wolf & Ossewaarde, 2018). In the case of the refugee crisis, bargaining power needs to be viewed in regard to the number of refugees that has entered and the popular opinion on immigration. Greece and Italy were the first points of entry for many refugees, but Germany, Sweden and Austria were popular countries for asylum applications. These states were under pressure to handle the large amount of people entering at the same time, both practically and politically. The recipient countries supported measures on EU level that allocate refugees proportionately, whereas the countries with low amounts of refugees dismissed proposals of equal burden sharing. The non-recipient states that favored status quo had a better bargaining position, and measures to introduce a permanent quota system for allocation could be dismissed (Zaun, 2018). The mandatory emergency allocation scheme of refugees, introduced in 2015, was strongly opposed by

20 Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, and these states rejected to accept the number of refugees assigned to them. These countries even challenged the scheme in court due to the mandatory aspect, but the ECJ ruled the relocation mechanism to be legal (Kroet, 2017).

The relocation mechanism is an example of intergovernmental bargaining where several member states did not believe more integration would be beneficial, perhaps due to domestic pressures. The relocation system rather caused disintegration as member states were unwilling to cooperate and introduced internal border controls to stop migrants. A possible explanation for this is that interdependence was not as strong in this crisis as it was in the financial crisis, and the negative outcomes of disintegration were not as significant. Schimmelfenning (2018) argues that the consequences were easier to handle compared to disintegration in the

Eurozone because “[i]n contrast with financial markets, migrants are powerless transnational actors that even the weakest countries on the migrant routes could block or divert”.

In the EBCG regulation, member states could agree on more cooperation because they could all favor from more control at the external borders and were willing to pay for it, but in regard towards the hosting of refugees, the situation was different and member states calculated the costs of accepting refugees to be higher than the costs of refusing it. The relocation mechanism proves the importance of the specific issue at stake in intergovernmental bargaining, and shows that despite three out of four of the most influential member states being pro integration, smaller states can prevent integrative measures.

In regard to both the financial crisis and the refugee crisis, these studies show that support for

NF or LI as the motivation for more or less integration depends on the chosen case. It is likely that the same goes for different issues connected to counterterrorism, especially since this is a

21 field connected to many others, such as human rights, radicalization, migration, technology, finance, and integration.

2.2 EU counterterrorism ’The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime’ (TEU, article 2:2)

As article 2:2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states, the union should be an area of freedom, security and justice. This is legislated under the EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) law, a legislative area that has undergone many changes over the evolution of the EU. Before the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty 1993, this area was purely intergovernmental and informal, but over the years it has become formalized and more influence has been given to supranational institutions such as the Commission and the EP (Peers, 2017). Legislation in this area is although debated since freedom and security concerns, two of the constitutional foundations of the EU, can be conflicting (Matera, 2017).

Security, and particularly terrorism, has traditionally been a national issue. Different kinds of separatist groups have been responsible for the majority of the terror attacks, and the extent of the issue has varied largely among the member states. Counterterrorism cooperation on EU level is relatively new, and the development of cooperative measures has been characterized by different domestic experiences and views on the issue (Argomaniz, 2001, p. 3). By the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, counterterrorism was placed under the third pillar, and action in this area was to be taken by intergovernmental methods (European

22 Parliament, 2018a). National governments are said to still play a larger role in this area than in others and the European Council has secured its leading role while EU institutions have less autonomy to successfully fulfill their tasks (Matera, 2017).

Counterterrorism is predominantly included in JHA law, but also in the framework of

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) due to its international dimension (Poli, 2017).

Within the Council configurations, committees and working groups are involved in the process to prepare legislation (General Secretariat of the Council, 2018b).

The first measures taken at EU level in this area was the formation of the Terrorism,

Radicalism, Extremism, and Violence (TREVI) group in 1975, an informal group of interior and justice ministers from the member states, created to exchange information and best practices (Bures, 2011, p. 60). The Maastricht Treaty formally put counterterrorism in the EU framework under the Justice and Home Affairs pillar, but influence from the EU institutions was still limited. The development of counterterrorism policy was slow and remained a mainly national issue until 11 September 2001. The attacks on 9/11 quickly changed the EU counterterrorism efforts. The Commission, the Council and Europol all acted to introduce new legislation and initiatives to combat terrorism. This resulted in a Plan of Action on Combating

Terrorism and the adoption of Council Framework Decision (2002/475/JHA) of June 2002 on

Combating Terrorism (Bures, 2011, Ch. 3; Council of the EU, 2002). The Council Framework

Decision includes a common definition of terrorism and a requirement for member states to introduce minimum penalties for activities related to terrorism. The Framework Decision has been the cornerstone of the EU’s counterterrorism work.

23 The attacks on the metro in Madrid 2004 resulted in a declaration on combating terrorism, and the introduction of a counter-terrorism coordinator. The coordinator monitors implementation of counterterrorism measures and reports to the Council, coordinates the work within the

Council and between the EU institutions, facilitates communication with third countries etcetera (General Secretariat of the Council, 2018).

Over the last decade, characteristics of terrorism in the EU have changed significantly. Figure

1 shows that the number of attacks has decreased, but the number of casualties has increased.

The attacks have become deadlier, and the threat has changed from being mainly internal to external as foreign terrorist fighters enter Europe from abroad to execute attacks. Radicalized individuals within Europe, so called homegrown terrorists, may travel to war-torn countries for training and then return to Europe to commit terrorist attacks. This new trend calls for an updated analysis of the EU’s counterterrorism work and European integration in this area.

Terror attacks in Europe between 2006 and 2017 700 583 600 498 515 500

400 294 Attacks 300 249 Casualties 219 201 211 205 174 200 152 151 142

68 100 7 7 17 7 4 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Figure 1. Number of failed, foiled and completed attacks in the EU between 2006 and 2017 (Europol)1

1 According to data from the European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TE-SAT) gathered by Europol. Number of casualties for 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2011 were not reported.

24 Counterterrorism work on EU level has been lacking in regard to transparency. It has been difficult for the public to know what measures are being discussed and to influence the decision-making processes. Despite the commitment of the Commission to increase the number of public consultations and to better assess the impact of initiatives, only three out of

88 legally binding counterterrorism measures between September 2001 and summer 2013 were open for public consultations and 22 of the measures were examined in an impact assessment. This undermines the legitimacy and democracy of counterterrorism action in the

EU (Hayes and Jones, 2015).

Of interest for this study is to see if more European integration has been stated as a necessary solution to deal with the issue of cross-border terrorism, and if proposed measures follow the logics of neofunctionalism or liberal intergovernmentalism. The relatively new challenge of cross-border terrorism and foreign fighters coming from war-torn areas using new modus operandi implies that the EU would adopt legislative acts that better suit the new situation. It has although been suggested that further EU integration in general is unlikely due to the problems of democracy, legitimacy and public discontent. National sovereignty is said to be especially important in security issues, which implies that member states would be hesitant towards more integration in counterterrorism, since integration measures would restrict their sovereignty. If the member states would agree on more integration, this would probably occur through multilateral cooperation, rather than by supranational governance. Counterterrorism would consequently be a policy field where LI is expected to explain integration measures better than NF.

25 3. Method and Material

3.1 Method I have conducted a qualitative analysis of the development of counterterrorism in the EU and the motivations presented regarding further European integration in this area. To be able to determine if more integration has occurred in counterterrorism, I describe central events in the

EU’s counterterrorism work from 2014 to 2017. If more legislation on EU level in this area has been adopted, it would be an argument for more integration. On the contrary, if claims are found that member states’ sovereignty should be safe-guarded and that they better handle the problem of terrorism nationally or through bilateral cooperation, these would be signs of disintegration or the continuation of status quo. Proposals of more integration would in that case not have been launched on EU level, or have been turned down by the member states.

Actions taken on EU level connected to counterterrorism have previously been assessed in a study by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional

Affairs, on demand from the LIBE committee. The study is, however, focused on the relevance and effectiveness of different actions, in order to give policy recommendations for future action. It critically assesses the EU’s counterterrorism work based on the number of involved actors and the confusion connected to determining the impact of policies taken in various subfields to counterterrorism (European Parliament, 2017). My thesis complements the study by looking at the motivations behind some of the actions taken, rather than the impact and coherence between them. It also gives a better overview of the policy field and the connection between non-legislative documents such as guidelines and action plans, and the legislative proposals in the form of directives and regulations. This thesis also contributes with an examination of the driving factors of the new counterterrorism measures.

26 The driving factors of European integration are studied through the frameworks of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. By assessing the theories, I have constructed an analytical framework used to categorize the motivations and arguments for

European integration in counterterrorism. European integration is in this thesis connected to integration that occurs within the EU, and is hence equivalent to EU integration. Since the theories I have applied generally use the term European integration, I have decided to use the same wording, even though all European states are not members of the EU and some EU states have decided to opt out of cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs.

3.2 Material To answer the research question and to gain a better understanding of the motives for

European integration, various documents are studied. The main material is official documents from the EU institutions. These are used to assess what kind of integrative measures that have been taken in recent years. The European Agenda on Security and the Directive on

Combating Terrorism are central documents, but other relevant documents related to terrorism, such as Council conclusions and opinions from EU institutions are also used to understand the implementation of the Agenda and the process of agreeing on the directive.

Since terrorism is an issue connected to various policy fields, such as finance, security, foreign affairs, social policy, migration, transport and the Single Market, the available material is extensive. The study has thus been limited to focus on parts of legislative acts that directly have an impact on European integration and arguments that support or contradict the integration theories. The objective is to describe initiatives and measures taken on EU level, not to make further assessments of the acts’ impact, effectiveness, or coherence.

27 The material from the EU institutions is viewed with awareness that all discussions on sensitive topics are not included in the official documents, especially since this field traditionally has been characterized by lack of transparency. The official conclusions from meetings may not reflect the specific views of all participants, no matter if the participants are national leaders, commissioners or people involved in relevant working groups. The benefit of using the official documents is that they have not been changed since the time of publication, but reflect the discussions and opinions from that specific time. The official documents are formal and are supposed to be informative and/or have a legal aspect. They are therefore written rather clearly to not leave room for excessive interpretations.

Official documents from the various EU institutions may although include a certain bias in their own respective favor. All institutions would likely want to seem progressive compared to the other, and may therefore not show conflicts within the institution officially, but rather put the blame of slow decision-making on other institutions or limitations in the legislative framework. The officially published documents are usually a compromise of the participants’ opinions, and may reflect a minimum standard that could be agreed upon by all.

Due to the restrictions of using official EU documents, the study is complemented by other sources to find motivations and arguments for integration. These sources are official statements made by national leaders and EU leaders as well as news articles and opinions from stakeholders and think tanks. Statements and press releases made in connection to terrorist attacks are of particular relevance since previous research shows that integrative measures have been proposed or accelerated in this field following serious attacks. By searching for articles connected to terrorism, terror attacks and European integration, I have been able to find news articles and interviews with relevant policy makers to complement the

28 study. I have mostly searched for information in European wide newsrooms such as Politico and Euractiv, but also in some large national newsrooms such as The Guardian, Deutche

Welle and BBC News. The issue of using statements published directly after attacks is that they may be influenced by emotions. There could be a tendency for leaders to express exceptional solidarity and give empty promises in connection to attacks to seem trustworthy and caring, but these promises may not be followed by action.

The member states have different experiences of terrorist offences committed by foreign fighters, and have therefore also adopted legislation in the area at different pace. The most ambitious member states in counterterrorism legislation are France, the UK, Spain, Germany,

Belgium and Italy, who all have adopted national legislation before there has been EU legislation in place. These are also some of the largest states with high bargaining power, and/or member states widely affected by terror offences. The leaders of these states are therefore chosen for this study in order to determine the will to legislate more on EU level among national leaders, which would support LI. Measures taken on national level may influence European security and be a way for member states to indicate what they want to be done on EU level, but these national measures will not be examined in this study, the focus is rather on measures taken on EU level.

External actors such as international organizations, and other powerful non-European states, may also influence the EU and its member states to integrate more or less. This external perspective of European integration is although restricted in this study due to the constrained scope and the difficulties of determining the effect of external pressure.

29 Time wise, the study is limited to developments that have occurred between 2014 and 2017 in the EU’s counterterrorism work. This is the time period that follows after de Londras’ and

Doody’s (2015) extensive examination of counterterrorism measures, and includes the time period when the threat of cross-border terrorism executed by radical extremists became acute for the EU. This period has also been characterized by an increase in euroscepticism in

Europe, the migration crisis and the Brexit referendum. Some of the measures in this study were prepared well before this time period and some background information is in that case presented. Other measures were proposed during this time but the outcomes are undetermined up to this date.

The study is performed on the field of counterterrorism. Due to the methodology and specificity of the case, the external validity of the findings is relatively low, and it cannot be used for generalizations of European integration in all fields. It may however give important insights for other issues related to security or for other crises on European level were urgent action is needed. The documents used for this thesis have been written in English, and it is possible that additional information written in other languages could give further insights.

3.3 Operationalization of European Integration As previously mentioned, European integration occurs when member states decide to shift competence to EU level. This can be done by increasing the use of European cooperation mechanisms, by transferring legislative power to EU level and by agreeing on more supra- national governance by new or existing institutions. In this case, it is therefore possible to determine that European integration has occurred if member states have decided that more legislation concerning counterterrorism should be done at EU level, and if member states increase the intelligence and information sharing through Europol or other EU agencies, and

30 if they express the need for more to be done by the EU to handle the threat. Adoption of legal proposals that concerns measures that have previously been decided on national level, and acts that give supranational institutions more power are also indications of more European integration. Contrary, indications from the member states of the need for more sovereignty and measures taken on national, rather than EU level, would be signs of support for less integration. Member states may reject proposals according to the principle of subsidiarity if they believe that this issue should be handled on national level.

3.4 Operationalization of European Integration Theories To get a better overview of the respective arguments used by NF and LI, the two theories are applied to the processes of integrative measures taken in counterterrorism on EU level. A deductive study is done which borrows analytical tools from scholars who have applied the frameworks on the financial crisis and the refugee crisis (Bauer & Becker, 2014; Niemann &

Ioannou, 2015; Niemann & Speyer, 2018; Schimmelfenning, 2018; Wolf & Ossewaarde,

2018). These scholars have presented arguments that are used to motivate a certain perspective, and by applying similar arguments on the issue of counterterrorism, I can determine which framework that works best in this case.

As noted in the examples from the financial and the refugee crisis, it is likely to find support for both theories if done from different angles. I thereby expect to find support for both NF and LI, especially due to the mix between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism that has shaped the EU. It will be more surprising if arguments are not found that support respective theory, or if new legislation is adopted despite the arguments being in line with disintegration or status quo. The aim of the study is not to accept one theory and reject the other, since these theories are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. I will instead test the explanatory value of the theories in the field of counterterrorism. From the findings I

31 will be able to determine which theory that best explains the evolution according to the types of measures introduced and the arguments in favor of these measures.

3.4.1 Neofunctionalism From a NF perspective, I would expect to find functional arguments for more integration.

Functional arguments include statements and arguments stating that terror attacks were possible due to dysfunctionalities in previous integration processes. Further integration in new areas would be suggested as the solution to make existing integrative measures function well.

This could for example be a discrepancy between the free movement of people within the

Schengen area, which is a EU competence, and the security and counterterrorism work which has traditionally been a national competence, but more recently a shared competence. Due to this imbalance, the policy areas were not coordinated, and attacks could occur. This would put pressure on more integration in the field of security to be able to preserve the Schengen agreement and make it function successfully.

To verify the presence of political spillover, statements and opinions from stakeholders such as businesses and interest organizations calling for more integration are studied. If interest organizations pushed for more integration in the decision-making process, and especially if amendments were made in line with these opinions, it can be assumed that political spillover occurred. Businesses may be involved in the discussion since they rely on well-functioning and secure infrastructure, on open borders for better exchange of goods and/or services as well as on consumers that feel safe in their surroundings and at public places. Statements from various kinds of national leaders are also important. The civil society is strong in many member states and may have the possibility to influence the political direction. If they suggest solutions on EU level to deal with the issue, and have the EU’s best in consideration, this shows a European identity among the leaders, which in turn could affect the legislation.

32

Cultivated spillover occurred if supranational institutions, especially the Commission, played a significant role in counterterrorism initiatives, emphasized more supranational power in connection to the attacks, and was able to achieve more power. To understand the importance of supranational institutions in counterterrorism, it is interesting to compare the Commission’s proposals with the final versions adopted by the Council and the EP, especially in regard to the Council’s remarks and proposed amendments to the proposal. According to the NF framework, the Commission as a supranational actor would drive integrative measures that result in more supranational power, since it would be favorable for them. Europol is a EU agency of importance here as well. According to its mandate, ‘Europol supports law enforcement authorities throughout the EU on crime fighting activities in all its mandated areas’. It is governed and held accountable by the Council of ministers for JHA, the EP, its management board and its directorate (Europol, 2018). If the Commission or Europol itself suggests changing its mandate to become a driving rather than supporting actor, and this is agreed upon, this would be an indication of cultivated spillover. The EP is also considered a supranational actor and is thus important when determining the occurrence of cultivated spillover.

Table 1 summarizes the main theoretical arguments of NF, as well as my operationalization of what I would expect to find for NF to be applicable on the development of EU counter- terrorism in the chosen time period.

33 Table 1. Neofunctionalism

Main arguments What is expected for integration to occur? Functional • Integration in one area • Primary goals are stated to be security and to spillover requires integration in maintain the functioning of the Single Market, other areas to function which is not achieved in status quo. well. • Previous integrative measures have resulted in • No other possible the need for more cooperation in alternatives are counterterrorism. present. • Schengen does not work as intended if terrorists use it for attacks. New integrative measures are needed to preserve Schengen. Political • National elites are • National civil society leaders call for more spillover pushing for more EU cooperation. integration. • Interest organizations have expressed the need • European interest for more counterterrorism measures on EU organizations are level or for the safeguarding of the Single positive towards more Market and security through statements, integration. policy papers, and opinions. • Governmental leaders call for more integration to be best for Europe. Cultivated • Supranational • The proposals from the commission came spillover institutions are driving before pressure from the member states. integration • Statements from the Commission and other supranational institutions call for more integration and more supranational power. • New supranational agencies and/or bodies are suggested.

3.4.2 Liberal intergovernmentalism Using the framework of LI, the bargaining power of the member states is central. To understand if member states would push for more integration in counterterrorism, their respective experience of the issue may be of importance. On the one hand, those states most affected by terrorism would have more bargaining power since these member states are also the largest and most powerful member states. They can also push the other states to cooperate more in terms of solidarity. On the other hand, the states mostly affected by terror attacks are the ones with most resources to cope with the issue while smaller states gain more from

34 cooperation. It can also be argued that the states least affected by terror attacks would be expected to have more bargaining power since they do not want to spend more money on an issue not relevant for them, and would therefore be able to stop initiatives by the states mostly affected by terrorism who would push for more measures. Domestic support for more or less integration and pressure from the citizens to act on EU level could also shape the member states’ stance on the issue and their willingness to integrate further.

Terror attacks by radical Islamists are also expected to be connected to member states’ involvement in the ‘war on terrorism’ and the fight against IS in Iraq and Syria since more involvement to stop IS in the Middle East could be a reason for terror attacks as ‘revenge’ by radicals in Europe. France, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK have all been involved in using air strikes against terrorist groups in the Middle East. Additionally,

Germany, Spain, and Italy have provided weapons and training to groups fighting terrorists abroad (Dworkin, 2017). These states face a higher threat of terrorist attacks and may therefore prioritize more cooperation on the issue. Among these are the largest member states, with higher general bargaining power. What may limit their willingness to cooperate is if they find their sovereignty to be challenged by doing so, or if they face domestic opposition.

The question of more integration depends on possible alternative solutions to the issue. Would it be achievable to combat terrorism, prevent attacks and prosecute terrorists without more integration? One alternative would be for each member state to devote more resources to counterterrorism measures, especially those most affected. The risk would be that terror cells move to member states where surveillance and counterterrorism legislation is weak to organize and plan attacks, but they could still execute attacks in other states due to the free movement. To avoid this situation, the Schengen system would need to be restricted or

35 abolished. Regarding the refugee crisis, the Schengen system is of high economic and political value for the member states and for the EU, and to maintain the open borders between the member states would therefore be prioritized. To be able to keep the Schengen agreement of open borders between the member states, more integration would be necessary to uphold surveillance of suspects, exchange information and avoid cross-border terrorism.

LI suggests that member states can be willing to agree on more integration if they can see the benefit of it, and if the benefits are larger than the costs. Giving more competence to the EU institutions may although intrigue on the member states’ sovereignty. It is therefore likely that suggestions for integration are in terms of more cooperation among the member states rather than more influence for new or existing supranational EU institutions.

Table 2 summarizes the main theoretical arguments of LI, as well as my operationalization of the arguments and statements I expect to find in the studied material for the framework of LI to be applicable on the development of EU counterterrorism.

Table 2. Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Main arguments What is expected for integration to occur? • Intergovernmental bargaining • Governmental leaders express integration as the drives integration. solution. • Relative strength of member • Member states (through the Council/European states will decide direction, Council) push the Commission to propose measures. bargaining power can differ • Stronger member states get their will. depending on the issue. • Leaders refer to domestic support for positions. • States are rational and • More integration is expressed to be the favored calculate costs and benefits. solution. • Domestic pressure shape • Multilateral cooperation is preferred over national preferences. supranational governance. • No other options are plausible. • Actors point at the balance of costs and benefits, benefits are larger than the costs of more integration.

36 4. Results

4.1 Integrative measures in counterterrorism 2014-2017 This section chronologically presents central events in the development of the EU’s counterterrorism work from 2014 to 2017 to determine if more European integration has occurred. Several actions have been taken with the objective to prevent terrorist offences and combat the underlying reasons for participating in activities related to terrorism. In this section, the main initiatives on EU level connected to combating terrorism are presented, along with the motivations for them. The motivations are examined to assess if NF or LI has been the driving factor for integration. Several initiatives involve sections of a more technical nature, which are excluded from the results since these details are not necessary to answer my research question.

4.1.1 Strategic Agenda for the Union in Times of Change At the European Council meeting 26-27 June 2014, the members agreed on five strategic priorities for the EU for the upcoming years. One of the priorities was a union of freedom, security and justice, where joint European action with respect to fundamental rights was highlighted. The need to build bridges between the different justice systems and strengthening of common tools were also emphasized to bring justice and security to the citizens. The conclusion from the meeting stated that “Our diversity is an asset, our unity brings strength”

(European Council, 2014b). This is clearly in line with the framework of LI since it shows that the sovereignty and specific traditions of each member state are important, but the member states can also be stronger together in some cases.

The European Council meeting also brought up interdependency between policy areas and emphasized the need for coherent policy making in connecting areas. It was argued that

37 “Success or failure in one field depends on performance in other fields as well as on synergies with related policy areas” (European Council 2014a). This is a functional argument for more integration, since it implies that if one area does not function well, it has implications for other areas due to the strong linkages between them.

4.1.2 The attack on Charlie Hebdo, January 2015 The shooting at the Charlie Hebdo newsroom in January 2015 made France raise its security level to the highest possible, and new measures to combat terrorism and radicalization were presented. The French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, acknowledged that the higher security level would be a challenge, and emphasized more cooperation among European states to be vital to track the movements of suspected terrorists (Willsher, 2015). The statement is hence positive towards more integration, but does not explicitly say if cooperation should be intergovernmental or supranational.

According to the Press Release from the informal meeting of the heads of state or government on 12 February 2015 (56/15), after the Charlie Hebdo attack, the members of the European

Council asked for several measures to be taken to face the terrorist threat. Among these measures were urgent adoption of a European Passenger Name Record (PNR), operational guidelines from the Commission for border checks at the external borders, more cooperation in judicial and law enforcement as well as among the member states’ security services. This statement from the heads of state or government demonstrates an intergovernmental push for more European integration and that the member states believe that more cooperation in this policy field would be beneficial.

38 4.1.3 The European Agenda on Security is Launched Security issues had moved up on the EU’s agenda in 2014, and a European Agenda for

Security was part of the Commission’s work programme for 2015 (European Commission,

2014). With the Charlie Hebdo attack, it became even more acute, and the Commission launched the European Agenda on Security on April 28th 2015. This is a highly significant initiative on EU level since it is used as the strategic guidelines for the EU in the coming years and presents the priorities of the Commission. It was launched in order to protect the security of EU citizens and to face new threats with a coordinated European response. The communication states that “in recent years new and complex threats have emerged highlighting the need for further synergies and closer cooperation at all levels”. To do so,

“this Agenda will drive better information exchange, increased operational cooperation and mutual trust, drawing on the full range of EU policies and tools”. It is underlined that security will remain an important national responsibility, but that measures on EU level can bring added value to the member states’ security work (European Commission, 2015a).

The three main priorities of the agenda are terrorism, organized crime and cybercrime. These issues are cross-border threats and are interlinked to each other, and EU action is therefore considered to make a vital impact (European Commission, 2015a). The Agenda is used as guidelines for the Commission’s work and highlights the need for EU institutions and agencies, member states and national authorities to work together, but it is a non-legislative document.

In the area of tackling terrorism and preventing radicalization, the European Agenda on

Security suggests the following actions; to broaden Europol’s capabilities and launch a

European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) within Europol; Launching an EU-forum with

IT companies; measures to fight financing of terrorism; address hatred online; a review of the

39 Framework Decision on Terrorism; prevention of radicalization through EU-programmes for education, youth-participation and inter-cultural dialogues; prevention of radicalization in prisons and development of de-radicalization programmes and the setup of the knowledge hub

‘RAN centre of excellence’ with neighboring countries. The proposal is suggesting more influence for the European agency Europol, as well as initiatives that have previously been handled on national level, and new modes of cooperation. The agenda is motivated by the changing threat of terrorism for the union and the need for an updated approach. It is a measure taken by the Commission, and it suggests further European integration. Many of the proposed actions involve more responsibility for existing or new supranational institutions; hence it is a sign of cultivated spillover and support for NF.

4.1.4 Push From the Commission President for more European integration In Commission President Juncker’s State of the European Union speech in 2015, he stated that “there is not enough Europe in this union, and there is not enough Union in this Union.”

This remark demonstrates that he wishes European integration to increase, and for a European identity to develop further, hence it is a sign of cultivated spillover since more integration and supranational governance would be needed for the EU to be a closer union. Following the speech, the Commission released the Work Programme for the coming year, which underlined that terrorism and radicalization require a EU response. It announced an upcoming proposal for the revision of the current Framework Decision on Terrorism to address the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters (European Commission, 2015b).

4.1.5 Coordinated Terror Attacks in Paris, November 2015 On 13 November 2015, coordinated terror attacks occurred in Paris, killing 130 people and injuring over 350 people at various locations around the city (The Guardian, 2015). In connection to the terror attacks in Paris, President Hollande declared a State of Emergency in

40 France, including temporary internal border checks. The State of Emergency was prolonged for almost two years, until 1 November 2017 (Gouvernement.fr). This situation was a setback for European integration due to the restriction of the free movement of people within

Schengen. It was not a preferred solution to the problem due to the political and economic costs the restriction to open borders brought with it. The responses to the attacks have suggested more integration in many instances, but the motivations vary.

World leaders responded by offering help and solidarity to France, and many expressed the need for common European solutions. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel claimed that no European country can deal with terrorism alone, and also said that; "In the 21st century, closing borders is not a sensible option" (Merkel, 2015). British Prime Minister David

Cameron agreed that a common solution was needed with the words; “now more than ever we must come together and stand united” (Cameron, 2015). The Visegrad Group (Czech

Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland) also published an official statement emphasizing the need for better information and intelligence sharing. They also stated their support for effective coordination of efforts and said that “All relevant means of countering terrorism must be mobilized” (The Visegrad Group, 2015). The response by the Visegrad group is particularly notable since these countries usually have a more hesitant view towards further EU integration. These countries although benefit from the free movement within

Schengen and are likely to be willing to do what is needed to preserve the agreement. The statements prove the importance of open borders, and that it is a shared priority among the EU member states to revoke the situation of temporary border checks.

In the aftermath of the Paris attacks, the JHA Council of 20 November 2015 welcomed the intention of the Commission to present a proposal for a directive updating the Framework

41 Decision on combating terrorism before the end of 2015. The ministers stressed quick implementation, and put additional emphasis on the Passenger Name Record (PNR) directive, terrorism financing, external border controls, access to firearms, information sharing and criminal justice responses to radicalization (Council of the EU, 2015). EU justice and home affairs ministers called on the Commission to launch a proposal for closer cooperation and exchange of intelligence between financial units. The EU finance ministers also agreed to cooperate closer on the financing aspect of terrorism, after demands from France. (Von Der

Burchard, 2015). This suggests that member states are able to push for certain measures to get on the agenda and be agreed upon quickly; at least did France have this ability as a powerful member state recently hit by terror attacks. This is in line with the arguments for LI.

A French parliamentary committee investigating the attacks in Paris in January and November came to the conclusion that many gaps are present in the intelligence systems in France and in

Europe. These gaps made the attacks possible and hampered the capture of Salah Abdeslam, the sole survivor in the November attacks. A member of the committee said that “…Europe is not up to the task in the fight against terrorism, even if progress has been made in the past months”. It recommended that Europol should be given more competence and work with analyses and research and not only information sharing. Migration flows from third countries and within Schengen need to be better controlled and the Schengen Information System

(SIS2) of wanted or missing persons should be improved to fill some of the gaps in the national intelligence systems and the problems of coordination among them (Assemblée

Nationale, 2016, No. 3922, p. 291). The report mentions functional arguments for more integration since it is stated that the open borders require more efficient intelligence sharing among the member states.

42 The organization Friends of Europe also reacted to the Paris attacks by calling on the EU to provide a more coherent approach to counterterrorism. Giles Merritt (2015) argued that it is important for the EU to communicate the need for more European integration in security for the citizens, and to use the available instruments in the most efficient way to stop terror attacks. The statement shows engagement by interest organizations for more EU integration, but it is unclear if it affected policy making since it follows the same arguments presented by national leaders and EU institutions. Interest organizations have a more restricted possibility to influence policy making in this case than during the financial crisis when actions by financial markets and business organizations were more directly linked to the crisis.

4.1.6 Proposal for a Directive on Combating Terrorism A Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism

(the directive on combating terrorism) was launched by the Commission on 2 December

2015, as part of the European Agenda on Security. The proposed directive was intended to overhaul existing legislation on activities related to terrorism, and to fill criminal enforcement gaps in the EU legal framework. The increasing threat of foreign fighters in Europe has created the need for updated criminal law legislation and an adjusted EU response, which the proposed directive was intended to deal with (European Commission, 2015c). The directive on combating terrorism is the main legislative proposal in the field of counterterrorism during this time period.

In the proposal, the negative consequences of open borders and uncoordinated surveillance are brought up. It is stated that “Terrorists consider evasive techniques to avoid raising suspicion: they circulate within the EU and may transit through countries other than their

43 country of residence/nationality with a view to circumvent controls and surveillance. In addition, recent attacks perpetrated in the EU demonstrate that terrorists travel to other

Member States to carry out attacks or for logistical reasons (e.g. funding, procurement of weapons)” (European Commission, 2015c) This statement implies that the free movement of people within Schengen is exploited by terrorists, and may be a contributing cause to cross- border terrorism in Europe. It is thereby a functional argument for more integration since the

Schengen system does not function properly without more integration in surveillance and intelligence sharing.

The Commission proposal for the directive on combating terrorism (2015/0281) also states that “More coherent, comprehensive and aligned national criminal law provisions are necessary across the EU to be able to effectively prevent and prosecute foreign terrorist fighters-related offences and to respond in an appropriate manner to the increased cross- border practical and legal challenges”. Harmonized rules on EU level are necessary since the objectives cannot be achieved by the member states unilaterally. This is an argument for further European integration, and possibly also a push for more supranational influence by the

Commission, since the member states are urged to harmonize legislation under the monitoring and evaluation from the Commission. It is therefore an indication of cultivated spillover.

The directive was decided upon through the ordinary legislative procedure with negotiations between the Council and the EP. The results from the legislative process are further discussed below in section 4.1.13.

44 4.1.7 Limited Possibilities for Stakeholder Engagement The proposal for a directive on combating terrorism had not gone through any public consultation or any impact assessments, due to the urgency of the issue. Previously stated concerns from stakeholders regarding fundamental rights were though incorporated according to the proposal (European Commission, 2015c). However, several stakeholders were not satisfied with the proposal and stated their concerns through other channels. Rights groups, such as Amnesty EU, the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), Human Rights Watch, and European Digital Rights (EDRi), expressed criticism of the directive due to the lack of consultations and the risk that it may undermine fundamental rights. Joe McNamee, Director of EDRi claimed the directive to be “… too unclear to be implemented in a harmonised way across the EU, too shrouded in secrecy to have public legitimacy and too open to interpretation to prevent wilful abuse by governments seeking to exploit its weaknesses”

(Gotev, 2016). The process leading up to the proposal was also strongly criticized in a joint statement by Amnesty International, International Commission of Jurists, Open Society

European Policy Institute and Open Society Justice Initiative. According to these organizations, the drafting process neglected crucial democratic steps and lacked transparency

(Amnesty International et al., 2016). The Meijers Committee expressed similar concerns about the proposal and claimed that “the proposal is insufficiently substantiated, that it extends the scope of criminal law too far and compromises fundamental rights” (Meijers

Committee, CM1603, 2016). These remarks challenge the argument of political spillover since stakeholders tried to express their opinions, but no official channel was available to take their considerations into account ahead of the launch of the proposal.

4.1.8 Terror Attacks in Brussels, March 2016 Despite the actions taken by the EU institutions and the member states after the Paris attacks, another devastating attack occurred a few months later in Brussels. The attacks at Brussels

45 airport and metro on 22nd March 2016 once again showed the vulnerability of European security as 32 people were killed, hundreds were injured and critical infrastructure severely damaged. The attackers had connections to the cell that was responsible for the Paris attacks in November 2015, and the plans are thought to have been fast tracked due to the capture of

Salah Abdeslam, the surviving suspect from the Paris attacks (Dallison & Day, 2016). The attack had consequences for people’s freedom, both because the airport and the metro were shut down, but also because surveillance and additional checks of people and luggage were introduced at the airport and at train stations (Buyck, Cerulus & Kroet, 2017). Many world leaders expressed their solidarity with Belgium after this attack against the European capital, and arguments for more integration were stated. Amongst these were statements from the

Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, and the British Prime Minister David Cameron.

Rajoy offered help and highlighted that Jihadi terrorism must be fought with a united front

(Rajoy, 2016). Cameron said that "They could just as well be attacks in Britain or in France or

Germany, or elsewhere in Europe and we need to stand together against these appalling terrorists and make sure they can never win" (BBC News, 2016). The statements are positive towards more integration, but cannot be clearly categorized to be in line with NF or LI.

4.1.9 European Political Strategy Centre Calls for More Integration As of April 2016, shortly after the Brussels attacks, a report from the European Political

Strategy Centre called for more integration and for the fulfillment of a European Security

Union. The report called for more resources and better operational capacity for the ECTC, the establishment of a multi-level counterterrorism network and for a EU Public Prosecutors

Office on Terrorism. The report repeatedly claims that action on member state level is not sufficient to deal with the threat of cross-border terrorism, but measures on EU level is necessary. Learning from the Department of Homeland Security in the US, “the larger lesson

46 of better integrating and coordinating across various policy fields that pertain to security does appear to be necessary in order to prevent future attacks” (European Political Strategy Centre,

2016). Thus, not only is more cooperation needed between the member states within the field of terrorism, it is also important to comprehend the interdependency between different areas to be able to combat terrorism. This is the central argument for functional spillover within NF.

The European Political Strategy Centre is the Commission’s in house think tank and the report was written in collaboration with the Special Advisor to the European Commission

President on security and defense. It is thus possible that it is written to support the

Commission’s strategic motivations. It cannot be considered to reflect neither the views of the

Commission nor those of an independent interest organization, and hence ends up somewhere in between political and cultivated spillover. It is yet possible to conclude that it is a clear push for more integration and supranational influence, and hence supports the NF framework.

4.1.10 The European Commission Proposes a European Security Union The European Commission (2016a) presented the communication ‘delivering on the European

Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine Security Union’ in April 2016. It presented the implementation process of the

European Agenda on Security and highlighted what remained to be done to deal with the current issues for the union. More efforts and deeper integration by EU institutions and the member states were argued for in order to keep the internal open borders while protecting the citizens. Inter alia, it stated that “the EU and its Member States need to move beyond the concept of cooperating to protect national internal security to the idea of protecting the collective security of the Union as a whole” and that “The internal security of one Member

State is the internal security of all”. The communication hence shows functional arguments

47 for more integration, since it describes loopholes in the union’s security due to open borders created by the Schengen agreement, and discrepancies between freedom and security. It can also be a case of cultivated spillover since the Commission, whom would benefit from more integration and a stronger European identity, pushes for a complete Security Union that would transfer competence to EU level.

The communication is a rather big step since it clearly expresses security as a high priority.

To create a ‘Security Union’ implies that the member states ought to be closely connected in this matter, just as they are within the European Monetary Union and the Energy Union. It included a push for quick legislative processes of proposals, and quick adoption of signed agreements. One of these was the Passenger Name Record directive, which was eventually signed in April 2016. This directive had previously been contested and the EP had rejected it in 2013 and called on the Commission to withdraw the proposal (European Parliament, 2013).

The number of attacks involving foreign fighters put the proposal on the agenda again and the

Commission called for urgent adoption by the member states (European Commission, 2016a).

This is in line with the findings by de Londras and Doody (2015, p. 44) that previously halted proposals are fast-tracked and accepted in the aftermath of serious attacks.

Another part of the communication addressed an upcoming proposal from the Commission of a revision of the Schengen Information System, to handle the problem of foreign terrorist fighters. The proposal was launched on 21 December and focused on improvements in police and judiciary cooperation, in border checks and in the process of returning illegally staying third country nationals (European Commission, 2016c).

48 Vice President for the Commission, Frans Timmermans, said in connection to the discussion on better information sharing in Europe that “Better information sharing is a priority of the

European Agenda on Security and the recent attacks confirm our resolve” (European

Commission, 2016b). This confirms that the Commission wants to improve security through more cooperation, and that the terror attacks has contributed to making others realize the same thing. The Commission made clear that security was a critical threat to the Union, and followed the initiative by the appointment of a Commissioner for the Security Union.

4.1.11 The Commission Portfolio for the Security Union is Introduced Due to the Brexit vote in June 2016, the UK commissioner Jonathan Hill decided to resign.

Along with the appointment of the new commissioner, Julian King, a new portfolio was introduced and King was appointed as Commissioner for the Security Union. In the Mission

Letter from Commission President (2016), Juncker wrote that the Security Union had become an urgent matter after repeated subsequent terrorist attacks and that swift progress was needed. The new portfolio is a way for the Commission to put security matters higher on the agenda, and to show that they believe security should be further dealt with on European level.

4.1.12 JHA Council Agrees on a Roadmap for Better Information Exchange

The Dutch Council Presidency suggested a roadmap to enhance information exchange and interoperability among the member states. The document refers to the terror attacks in Paris and Brussels, and highlights the interconnection between migration, terrorism and crime- related challenges. The JHA Council endorsed the roadmap on 10 June 2016. The roadmap presents an analysis of current challenges and the strategic considerations for further action, and necessary measures to facilitate information sharing and interoperability between national systems quickly. The document states that “These conditions shall be taken into account by

49 the Commission when developing the new legal proposals for SIS [Schengen Information

System], VIS [Visa Information System] and Eurodac [a central database for fingerprint data]…” (Council of the EU, 2016).

The roadmap focuses on the interconnection between policy areas, which can be linked to functional spillover. It is also an example of an initiative from the Council with the aim to influence future legislation as well as improve cooperation among the member states. It is hence an argument along the lines of LI since the push from the member states occurred before the proposals from the Commission. The upcoming legal proposals would give credibility to commitments agreed upon by the member states and improve interoperability between national systems without replacing them with a new European system.

4.1.13 The Directive on Combating Terrorism is Adopted After negotiations and some amendments, the Directive of the European Parliament and of the

Council of March 2017 on combating terrorism (2017/541) was adopted. It was done through the ordinary legislative procedure, which gives the EP and the Council equal decisive power.

The directive on combating terrorism emphasizes the need for coordination and cooperation between and among the member states in order to deal with cross-border terrorism, as well as cooperation between and among the EU agencies and bodies involved in counterterrorism. It defines what should be considered a terrorist offence and criminalizes activities related to terrorism such as financing, providing and receiving training, providing assistance etc. The directive is an important decision for EU counterterrorism work since it coordinates legislation and constitutes a minimum standard for the member states. Due to its importance as a legislative document on EU level, it is also highly significant for this thesis.

50 The final text did not change substantively compared to the proposal, but some additional statements are included pointing at the importance to safeguard human rights and people’s integrity. The deadlines for transposition of the directive and the member states’ reporting to the Commission were delayed, while the Commission’s reporting to the EP and the Council of the impact of the directive was changed to an earlier date. Member states were hence given additional time for implementation, but the Commission’s assessment report was hurried.

Wishes to change the deadline of transposition were brought up during negotiations with the

Council, and this change in the final version is therefore a sign of influence by the member states. The relatively quick adoption of the directive and the few changes imposed during the trilogue process implies a coherent view of the need for counterterrorism measures and harmonized EU legislation among the EU’s legislative institutions.

The Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism is referred to in the directive, as well as the Resolution 2174 (2014) from the UN Security

Council. International organizations that the member states are part of have thus had some influence over the choice to put forward an updated directive, and the legislation has been written in order to comply with these documents.

Many of the provisions to the proposal that were provided by other stakeholders were neglected, and the directive remains unclear in some aspects. EDRi says that some important changes have been made to the directive, but yet argues that the “Weak, unclear, ambiguous wording in the Directive presents dangers for the rule of law, the right to privacy and freedom of opinion and expression of people in the European Union” (EDRi, 2017). This contradicts the neofunctional argument of political spillover since the organizations were not able to convince neither the Council nor the EP to stop the adoption of the directive, nor make the

51 necessary changes to it. This implies that the pressure from external actors was not enough to make significant changes. For this study, it is important to note that the main concerns brought up by interest organizations were related to the formulations within the proposal and measures that may impose on human rights. No evidence has been found of European organizations that disagree on the effort to deal with terrorism on European level.

4.1.14 Differentiated European Integration According to LI, member states base their willingness of more integration on the costs and benefits of it. In cases of stalemate on legislative matters, differentiated integration has taken place, such as the possibility to opt out of certain acts or entire policy areas. Member states can then preserve autonomy, but also lose influence over decision-making in the area. In the directive on combating terrorism, the UK and Ireland has the possibility to opt in, but are not bound by the directive, and Denmark has an opt out on the directive. Denmark has an opt out in the whole area of JHA and are therefore not obliged to adopt legislation, but can neither formally influence matters in this field (Adler-Nissen, 2009). In 2015, a referendum was held to change the opt out to an opt in, meaning that Denmark would be able to choose to join some parts of JHA legislation. The Danish population although voted no, and the opt out therefore remains (Folketinget). The possibility to join only the the parts of EU legislation that seem beneficiary, what has been called ‘Europe à la Carte’, gives the member states power over the EU legislation and the possibility to choose the extent of integration. This is in line with the framework of LI since the member states can decide to join only what they have domestic support for and where the benefits are larger than the costs. The Parliament’s

Special committee on Counter Terrorism strongly opposes opt outs from police and judicial cooperation because it ‘could endanger the speed and efficiency of terrorism investigations and may have detrimental effects’ (European Parliament, 2018/2044(INI)).

52

4.1.15 The European Parliament’s Special Committee on Counter Terrorism is Approved The Parliament’s involvement in counterterrorism increased with the Lisbon Treaty as it was given equal decisive power as the Council. The European Parliament Special Committee on

Counter Terrorism was approved in the plenary session 6 July 2017. The committee assesses the impact of existing modes of cooperation between the member states, the interoperability between databases, and of existing legislation and programmes on EU level. This is done to find deficiencies that need to be dealt with to improve security while protecting fundamental rights. The committee is set up for one year, with the possibility to be prolonged. In its draft report, the committee calls on the member states to make better use of existing bodies and agencies for cooperation and information sharing to make it the default mode of operations in counterterrorism (European Parliament 2018/2044(INI)). The parliamentary committee may give the EP higher stakes in the negotiations on terrorism, and the issues of democracy and human rights brought up by interest groups could be better accounted for onwards. The committee proposes more European integration to face the threat of terrorism, which would thus be a case of cultivated spillover where supranational institutions promote additional supranational governance since they benefit from it.

4.1.16 Terror Attack in Barcelona, August 2017 Barcelona was hit by a terror attack on 17th August 2017 as a van crashed into the crowd at

Las Ramblas Boulevard, one of the main tourist attractions in the city. 13 people of various nationalities were killed in the attack, and many more wounded. The suspects of the attack had travelled to other European countries, such as Belgium, France and Switzerland ahead of the attack (EURACTIV, 2017). This attack has not been paid as much attention on European level as the Paris and Brussels attacks even though the victims were from several countries.

This may be due to the domestic political conflicts between Catalonia and Spain. In the

53 aftermath of the attacks, the focus has rather been on the tensions between Catalonia and

Madrid than on the European response (Minder, 2017; Jackson, 2017). In cases of conflicting national views, it may be difficult to agree on common interests to promote on EU level.

Another possible explanation would be that the attack was not connected to a large cross- border terror cell, as was the case in Paris and Brussels, and is therefore viewed as a Spanish problem rather than a European problem.

The Italian Justice Minister Andrea Orlando is although one of the European leaders that have discussed the European dimension of the attacks in Barcelona. He called for deeper judicial cooperation and more power for the European prosecutor to combat terrorism (Finanza,

2017). This is another example of a government leader calling for more European integration to combat terrorism. This can be viewed as a push from Italy towards the Commission to propose measures and facilitate cooperation, and would thereby support the LI framework.

The major initiatives and legislative proposals taken by the EU institutions, as well as the most noteworthy acts of terrorism in the EU have been presented above in chronological order. There are although some additional factors that impact EU counterterrorism, which cannot be considered to have occurred at a specific time. Among these are the unilateral and bilateral measures taken by the member states, and the calculation of the costs of terrorism.

4.2 Additional Measures Taken by the Member States The initiatives presented above show that counterterrorism measures on EU level have been prioritized by the member states in recent years. Intelligence sharing has also increased significantly. Europol supported 127 counterterrorism operations in 2016, compared to 86 in

2015 (Europol, 2017). This could be seen as willpower of the member states to cooperate

54 more and use the EU’s official channels of intelligence sharing, hence a step towards more integration. Since this is a voluntarily effort by the member states to cooperate more and drive more integration in intelligence sharing, it follows the logics of LI.

It is although important to note that measures on EU level do not replace measures taken on national level, but is rather a minimum standard to be followed by the member states.

Additional legislation is done on national level where some states have been in the forefront.

Bilateral cooperation is also used as an additional way to deal with common threats. Belgium and France have set up a common task force to deal with various aspects of terrorism, exchange information and agree on common positions on EU level (premier.be, 2017). France and Germany, known as “the motor of integration” in Europe, also work bilaterally to come up with unified positions on security issues (Deutche Welle, 2016). These bilateral initiatives show that some member states believe bilateral cooperation is needed, possibly because it is more efficient or because they want more ambitious policies in place and face similar issues.

The member states more severely threatened by terrorism take their own initiatives that may later be transferred to the EU level. These include the states with the highest bargaining power, and they are thereby likely to shape the direction of counterterrorism work on EU level. This can be considered intergovernmental bargaining, an important aspect in the framework of LI.

4.3 The Costs of Terrorism A study presented by the Parliament’s European Added Value Unit presents the economic and humanitarian costs linked to terrorism. Between 2004 and 2016, terrorism has cost the EU about €185 billion in lost GDP and about €5.6 billion in lost lives, injuries and damaged infrastructure. The costs include medical bills, lost income earnings, lower productivity, and

55 reconstruction of buildings and infrastructure. Additional costs that are difficult to measure quantitatively are feelings that affect the citizens’ wellbeing, such as fear, uncertainty and distrust towards other individuals or the political system. These may affect the behavior of people and have economic consequences. The study shows that some sectors may face a decline in the short term due to terror attacks, especially the tourist sector, but in the long run, no such evidence is present. Another finding is that consumption slightly increases in connection to terror attacks. The reason for this is unclear, but a speculation by the authors is that higher mortality awareness in turn increases the likeliness to spend more and save less.

The European Added Value Unit has the mission to prove why issues are better handled on

European level, and one should therefore expect the report to suggest more integration and more measures to be taken at EU level. The cost assessment was although commissioned by the EP to the non-profit research organization RAND Europe. This decreases the bias in the results since this organization would not have the same tendency as the Added Value Unit to cherry pick results that would be in their favor.

The cost assessment shows how much money and resources that has been lost in the terror attacks around Europe and what implications these attacks have for individuals’ feelings.

According to these findings, member states would likely be ready to spend quite a lot of money on counterterrorism measures and even give up some sovereignty to avoid these economic, physical and humanitarian losses. This result would be a strong argument for the LI framework; that member states would push for more integration because the benefits of cooperation are higher than the costs.

56 4.4 Summary of Results The new political environment and the signs of disintegration we can see around Europe today do not seem to have had a negative impact on integration in the field of counter- terrorism. Counterterrorism has been highly prioritized by the EU institutions, which all have had a coherent approach regarding the need for action to deal with the threat. Many new initiatives have been taken, roadmaps and guidelines have been presented, and new legislative acts have been introduced that transfer competence from national level to EU level, most notably the directive on counterterrorism. New EU agencies and networks have also been initiated, Europol has for example been given more influence, and the member states have increased cooperation in information and intelligence sharing through Europol. Both EU institutions and national government leaders have pointed at the importance of more European cooperation on security matters due to terrorism being a cross-border threat. The answer to the first part of the research question is therefore that more European integration has occurred in counterterrorism in recent years in a number of different ways.

The various initiatives presented in this study cannot be valued equally since some initiatives are more important than others. The European Agenda for Security and the Strategic Agenda for the Union in Times of Change presents the strategic positions of the Commission and the

European Council, the two institutions in charge of setting the direction and priorities for the

EU. It was followed by the initiative by the Commission to create a full EU Security Union.

These documents therefore play a significant role despite not being legislative. The directive on combating terrorism is the main legislative act and is hence particularly important. The directive is the basis of the harmonized legislation on terrorism among the member states and can therefore be considered the basis of EU counterterrorism legislation. It is complemented by legislation in overlapping policy fields, for example in border controls, aviation security, organized crime, and radicalization.

57

The influence by different actors also varies, and all statements presented in this study can therefore not be valued equally either since some bear more weight than others. Arguments presented by the European institutions are especially important since these have a strong impact on legislation. The Commission is the central supranational institution and its opinions are therefore significant for determining cultivated spillover. In regard to LI, the European

Council and the Council represent a common view from all member states, and the Council also has legislative power. The member states’ common views are considered to make a larger impact on EU level than the national leaders’ individual opinions, even though these statements can support views expressed by the institutions, or show potential conflicting views that are not expressed in conclusions or statements from the European Council or the

Council. Opinions from interest organizations or think tanks have lesser value since no institution is obliged to take their opinions into account.

The initiatives taken, and the arguments presented in connection to these, give important insights into why further integration has been proposed. Statements and press releases after attacks have involved arguments for how the problem should be dealt with, and several actors have proposed further EU action as a solution. The motivations for further European integration are categorized according to the frameworks of NF or LI. Table 3 and 4 first repeat the main theoretical arguments of the theories, and summarize the arguments connected to the initiatives, accordingly to the respective theory where it is best suited. As shown, arguments have been found that support the three spillover effects in NF, as well as arguments that support the LI framework.

58 Table 3. Neofunctionalism

Main arguments What is found? Functional • Integration in • “Success or failure in one field depends on performance in spillover one area other fields as well as on synergies with related policy areas” - requires European Council. integration in • “The internal security of one Member State is the internal other areas to security of all” - European Commission. function well. • “Terrorists consider evasive techniques to avoid raising • No other suspicion: they circulate within the EU and may transit possible through countries other than their country of alternatives are residence/nationality with a view to circumvent controls and present surveillance. In addition, recent attacks perpetrated in the EU demonstrate that terrorists travel to other Member States to carry out attacks or for logistical reasons…”- European Commission. Political • National elites • Friends of Europe called for a more coherent European spillover are pushing for approach to counterterrorism. more • EPSC calls for more integration and supranational influence. integration • European - Interest organizations had no official channels for influence, interest and have not been able to evidently impact legislation. organizations are positive towards more integration Cultivated • Supranational • The European Agenda for Security calls for more influence spillover institutions are for existing and new supranational agencies. driving • “There is not enough Europe in this union, and there is not integration enough Union in this Union.” – European Commission President Juncker. • The objectives in the fight against terrorism cannot be achieved by the member states unilaterally - European Commission. • EPSC calls for more integration and supranational influence. • “the EU and its Member States need to move beyond the concept of cooperating to protect national internal security to the idea of protecting the collective security of the Union as a whole” - European Commission. • The ambition to fulfill a Security Union is launched by the Commission. • The EP’s Special Committee on Counter Terrorism proposes more European integration to face the threat of terrorism.

59 Functional arguments have been identified in documents and statements released by the

Commission, and by the European Council. It has been apparent in the European Council’s

Strategic Agenda, in the European Agenda on Security, in the proposal for a directive on

combating terrorism and in the initiative for a Security Union. These are some of the most

important steps taken in this time period, and functional spillover is thereby strong.

Stakeholders have supported further European integration, but have not had official channels

to impact legislation, which restricts political spillover. Supranational institutions, foremost

the Commission, have promoted more supranational governance through new and existing

agencies and bodies. Examples of this are found in the European Agenda on Security, in the

initiative for a Security Union and the introduction of a commissioner for the Security Union,

all of which are important integrative measures.

Table 4. Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Main arguments What is found?

• Intergovernmental bargaining • “Our diversity is an asset, our unity brings strength” drives integration - European Council. • Relative strength of the • Member states have the possibility to put certain issues on member states will decide the agenda. direction, bargaining power • Several national leaders have called for more cooperation can differ depending on the and European solutions. Among these are Angela Merkel, issue David Cameron, and Mariano Rajoy. • States are rational, calculate • Even the most eurosceptic countries in the Visegrad Group costs and benefits push for more cooperation to combat terrorism. • Domestic pressures shape • Terrorism involves high economic, physical and national preferences humanitarian costs for the member states. • No other options are plausible • The relatively strongest EU member states take additional action on counterterrorism, both nationally and bilaterally, which is likely to shape European integration. • Member states have voluntarily shared intelligence through Europol to a larger extent. • The JHA Council roadmap for better information exchange pushes further integration by the member states.

60 Arguments connected to LI have also been found several times. The European Council’s

Strategic Agenda, as well as the JHA Council roadmap for better information exchange, are both important documents from the member states highlighting the need for more integration.

Enhanced information sharing and interoperability between national systems have been highlighted to deal with cross-border terrorism. The calculation of the costs of terrorism may also convince the member states to shift some competence from national to EU level.

National leaders from various countries have pushed for more cooperation, even leaders from the Visegrad group that often are hesitant to more European integration.

5. Discussion

5.1 European Integration in Counterterrorism The EU has basically been in a constant state of crisis during the last decade, and policy making has in many areas been focused on reducing the damage from the succeeding crises.

Euroscepticism and domestic opposition to European solutions have affected the EU, and the future of the union has been questioned. Counterterrorism is although a field where European integration has continued, even with accelerated speed the last few years. This study shows that there is a coherent view among various actors on EU, as well as on national level, that counterterrorism is a cross-border issue where EU integration has added value.

The involvement of many EU institutions, agencies and bodies, and the various strategies, agendas and roadmaps presented by each of them, although makes it quite difficult to comprehend the EU’s counterterrorism work. It is not obvious where one should look to find what the EU does to deal with the threat due to the many subfields connected to counterterrorism. Within the EU, there is also some confusion to the different actors’ responsibilities in regard to coordination, policy-making and evaluation of legislation. This

61 study gives an overview of the recent development of EU counterterrorism policy and explains the central steps taken. It shows that the cobweb of both actions and actors in this area has grown in the last few years, and that many new measures have been introduced in the aftermath of terror attacks in Europe.

5.2 European Integration Theories in EU Counterterrorism Regarding the integration theories tested in this study, signs of both neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism have been found. This is in line with my expectations since EU governance is based on a mix of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. Considering neofunctionalism; functional spillover and cultivated spillover have been strong, whereas political spillover has not been proven to be considerably influential.

Functional spillover has been motivated multiple times by the Commission, and by the

European Council. Problems within the existing legislation and lack of coordination among the Schengen states enable cross-border terrorism since suspects can cover their tracks by travelling between the Schengen states. More integration has been presented as the solution to this problem since the Schengen agreement requires better cooperation in counterterrorism to function well. Since functional arguments have been used by both supranational and intergovernmental actors, and in the most significant new initiatives such as the European

Council Strategic Agenda and in the directive on combating terrorism, it can be argued to be a strong driving factor for more integration.

Evidence of cultivated spillover has also been found, and it may be argued that the terror attacks have been a window of opportunity for the Commission to introduce measures that the

Council and the EP would otherwise have been hesitant to adopt. It is quite surprising that the

62 cultivated spillover effect has been found at several occasions since the Area of Freedom,

Security and Justice previously has been characterized by strong influence from the member states. This study shows that the member states have agreed on the Commission’s proposals of more integration and accepted to give up an additional amount of sovereignty in order to deal with the issue of cross-border terrorism. The Commission has been proactive in proposing new initiatives and promoting more European integration in security issues, and by the introduction of the EU Security Union, this traditionally intergovernmental area has become more supranational. Europol has been given new competences and the ECTC was introduced to facilitate more information and intelligence exchange in counterterrorism.

Additionally, the RAN centre of excellence has been launched to better exchange best practices related to radicalization, and the Parliament has increased its involvement in counterterrorism through the European Parliament Special Committee on Counter Terrorism.

Political spillover has not been very salient in this study. Possibilities for stakeholder influence have been limited along the decision-making process. Despite the lack of official channels of influence, interest organizations have tried to shape the views of policy makers, but it is difficult to determine if it had any impact. From available information, the political spillover seems to have been small. Instead, national leaders are likely to have acted upon public pressure to enhance security and avoid terror attacks that impact the society negatively.

Leaders that cannot sufficiently protect their citizens may face political backlash and risk to be replaced in the next election.

Evidence of liberal intergovernmentalism has also been found since the Council and the

European Council have expressed cooperation and sharing of information to be necessary to combat terrorism. National leaders have also expressed the need for a united response to

63 attacks and their improved willingness to cooperate can be seen in the significant increase of information shared through Europol. Even the Visegrad Group countries, normally the member states most hesitant to more influence by the EU, pushed for better information and intelligence sharing among the EU states, and emphasized the importance of preserving

Schengen. It is hence clear that the member states have acted coherently and that there have not been any major conflicts connected to integration in this field. One can although see that the driving countries have been large member states and/or the states mostly affected by terror attacks, which implies that the intergovernmental bargaining has been present.

In sum, evidence of both theories has been found, but from my view, NF has better explanatory value in this case since it has been unexpectedly apparent in the most important integration measures. Counterterrorism is an area where national governments are likely to defend their sovereignty and where LI ought to be prominent, but supranational actors have still been able to push for, and achieve, more supranational governance. Functional arguments have been used as motivations for the main developments taken in the EU’s counterterrorism work, which shows that these are important for the increased integration. The arguments connected to LI have not been as prominent in the central steps of the development, and are often connected to statements by individual national leaders. It is notable that both the

European Commission and the European Council have used functional arguments; this validates that functional spillover is strong. The unexpectedly strong cultivated spillover effects also contribute to strengthening NF. The Commission has taken new initiatives and suggested further supranational competence, and the member states have agreed on this through the Council. NF does not require all spillover effects to be present, so even though political spillover is not very evident in this study, the other NF arguments are strong enough to prove the theory’s importance in the process.

64

In the initiatives studied, a shortage of arguments and motivations were eminent. It was difficult to find motivations that could be connected to the two theories of European integration in the official documents. Terrorism is brought up as a big concern for the EU, but it is not always possible to find clear evidence for the driving factors in order to connect initiatives to either of the theories. The results are based on the motivations that have been found in the material, but it should be noted that the motivations were not as clearly defined as expected, and it was therefore difficult at times to determine which of the proposed theories that was applicable.

6. Conclusion European integration in counterterrorism has developed quickly in the aftermath of recent terror attacks on European soil despite the change of the political environment in Europe.

There has been a coherent view from European institutions and member states for actions on

EU level to deal with cross-border terrorism. The measures have improved possibilities for cooperation and introduced new harmonized legislation concerning terrorist offences. The involvement of supranational actors has been significant compared to previous developments in this area, and the measures also give additional competence to supranational actors further on. This thesis contributes to the field of security and EU counterterrorism since it fills a gap in the existing literature by giving a descriptive overview of important events in the EU’s counterterrorism work between 2014 and 2017.

The study also contributes to the literature on European integration by applying the two traditional integration theories on a new field, and proving their continued relevance for explaining the development of European integration. Neofunctionalism (NF) and liberal

65 intergovernmentalism (LI) were widely criticized and almost outdated for a while to give room for other theories. However, the studies on the financial crisis and the refugee crisis presented above, along with this thesis, show that NF and LI still have explanatory value in the discussion on European integration.

Further research of additional material is needed to establish the motivations in the uncertain cases and to strengthen the results. Interviews with policy makers could give deeper insights into the motivations for each action and highlight any conflicting opinions and negotiations within the institutions. It would also be interesting to analyze the influence of external actors, to understand if these have put pressure on the EU, and to study the relations between the EU and third countries to prevent radicalization and to stop foreign fighters from travelling across borders. I have chosen to look at counterterrorism measures rather broadly, but specific studies of different aspects or legislative acts related to terrorism would be necessary to better understand the impact of the EU’s counterterrorism measures.

The future of European integration is currently discussed at many levels. In the European

Commission White Paper of the Future of Europe (2017), five possible scenarios for future integration are brought up. These scenarios discuss the possibility to do less together, to focus on certain areas or to do more on EU level. The White Paper also highlights the possibility for those member states that are willing to do more to go ahead in smaller groups of cooperation.

It will be interesting to follow the steps ahead since the chosen direction may have implications for further integration in counterterrorism. The Belgian Prime Minister, Charles

Michel, has made clear that he wants a future Europe of 27 strong states, where Europe acts where its value is real. One of the areas where action on EU level is needed is according to

Michel in security issues, since more cooperation is needed to fight terrorism and preserve

66 freedom (European Parliament, 2018a). Looking at previous experiences, it is likely that the development of counterterrorism policy will slow down after a few years of full speed action, possibly until another devastating attack occurs.

As for now, it seems like other national leaders, as well as the EU institutions, agree with

Charles Michel on the added value of EU action in counterterrorism. The design of the EU’s current counterterrorism work has although been criticized, and the study done by the EP’s

Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs suggests a redesign of the whole policy field to deal with existing gaps and overlaps and to clarify the involved actors’ mandates and responsibilities (European Parliament, 2017). The future will tell what

European counterterrorism policy will look like, but starting from scratch would be a remarkable development that I consider unlikely due to the needed resources and time it would take. A complete replacement of existing legislation may not result in fully coherent legislation across all connecting policy fields anyways due to the political negotiations and intergovernmental bargaining that would shape it.

The terrorist threat remains a concern for the EU’s security. It will not be possible to prevent every attack even if the member states have fully harmonized police and judicial systems, but improved integration may at least be sufficient to prevent or limit the scope of some attacks on European soil. Despite the unions’ recent crises and uncertainty connected to Brexit, euro- scepticism, and public discontent, counterterrorism is an area where the added value of EU integration is clear. The member states and the EU institutions have found common ground for further cooperation and agreements to deal with the issue of terrorism together.

67 7. References

Adler-Nissen, R., 2009. Behind the scenes of differentiated integration: circumventing national opt-outs in Justice and Home Affairs, Journal of European Public Policy, 16:1, 62-80 Argomaniz, J., 2011. The EU and counter-terrorism: politics, polity and policies after 9/11, Routledge, London. Assemblée Nationale, 2016. Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l’État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015, Assemblé Nationale, No 3922. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap- enq/r3922-t1.pdf Bauer, M. W. & Becker, S. 2014. The Unexpected Winner of the Crisis: The European Commission’s Strengthened Role in Economic Governance. Journal of European Integration, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 213-229 BBC News, 2016. Brussels explosions: UK Foreign Office urges Britons to be vigilant, BBC News, 23 March. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-35870700 [Accessed: 2018-11-26] Bulmer, S. and Joseph, J., 2015. European integration in crisis? Of supranational integration, hegemonic projects and domestic politics, European Journal of International Relations. Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 725 – 748 Bunse, S. and Nicolaïdis, K., 2013. Large Versus Small States: Anti-Hegemony and The Politics of Shared Leadership, in The Oxford Handbook of the European Union. Ed. by Jones, E, Menon, A., and Weatherill, S. Oxford University Press. E-book Bures, O., 2011. EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger? Ashgate, Farnham Buyck, C., Cerulus, L., & Kroet, C., 2017. A year after Brussels attacks, what’s fixed and still broken, Politico. 21 March, updated 1 January 2018. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/a-year-after-brussels-attacks-whats-fixed-and-still- broken/ [Accessed 2018-11-22] Cameron, D., 2015, Prime Minister's statement on Paris attacks and G20 Summit, Gov.uk, 17 November. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers- statement-on-paris-attacks-and-g20-summit [Accessed: 2018-11-26] Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, 2017. European Jihad Watch, No. 4, November 2017. Available at: http://cat-int.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/EJW-Novembre2017- english.pdf [Accessed: 2018-10-26] Council of the European Union, 2002. Council Framework Decision (2002/475/JHA) of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism. Council of the European Union, OJ L 164, p. 3- 7 Council of the European Union, 2015. Conclusions of the Council of the EU and of the Member States meeting within the Council on Counter-Terrorism. Council of the European Union, Press release 848/15, 20 November. Availabe at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/20/jha- conclusions-counter-terrorism/pdf [Accessed: 2018-10-18] Council of the European Union, 2016. Roadmap to enhance information exchange and information management including interoperability solutions in the Justice and Home Affairs area, 9368/1/16 REV 1, Council of the European Union, 6 June. Dallison, P. & Day, K., 2016. Brussels attacks: Everything we know so far, Politico. 22 March, updated 26 March. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/brussels- attacks-everything-we-know-so-far/ [Accessed: 2018-11-22] De Londras, F. & Doody, J. 2015. The impact, legitimacy and effectiveness of EU counter- terrorism, Routledge, New York, NY.

68 Della Sala, V., 2013. Leaders and Followers: Leadership Amongst Member States in a Differentiated Europe, in The Oxford Handbook of the European Union. Ed. by Jones, E, Menon, A., and Weatherill, S. Oxford University Press. E-book Deutche Welle, 2016. Before Bratislava, Merkel, Hollande talk EU security, Deutche Welle, 15 September, Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/before-bratislava-merkel- hollande-talk-eu-security/a-19554624 [Accessed: 2018-11-01] Dworkin, A., 2017. Europe’s war on terror, European Council on Foreign Relations, Available at: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/essay_europes_war_on_terror [Accessed: 2018-10-12] EDRi, 2017. Recklessly unclear Terrorism Directive creates significant risks for citizens’ security, EDRi, 16 February. Available at: https://edri.org/recklessly-unclear- terrorism-directive-creates-significant-risks-citizens-security/ [Accessed: 2018-11- 21] EURACTIV, 2017. Police reveal international dimensions of Barcelona attack, EURACTIV, 21 August. Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home- affairs/news/police-reveal-international-dimensions-of-barcelona-attack/ [Accessed: 2018-11-26] European Commission, 2014. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Commission Work Programme 2015 – A new start, COM(2014) 910 final. European Commission. 16 December European Commission, 2015a. European Agenda on Security: Commission takes action to combat terrorism and illegal trafficking of firearms and explosives. European Commission. Press release, 2 December. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press- release_IP-15-6218_en.htm [Accessed: 2018-1017] European Commission, 2015b. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Commission Work Programme 2016, No time for business as usual, COM(2015) 610 final. European Commission. 27 October. European Commission, 2015c. Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism and replacing Council framework decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism. European Commission. 2 December. European Commission, 2016a. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine Security Union, COM(2016) 230 final. European Commission, 20 April. European Commission, 2016b. Commission launches discussion on future framework for stronger and smarter information systems for border management and internal security. European Commission, Press Release, 6 April, Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1248_en.htm [Accessed: 2018-11-13] European Commission, 2016c. Security Union: Commission proposes to reinforce the Schengen Information System to better fight terrorism and cross-border crime. European Commission, Press Release, 21 December. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4402_en.htm [Accessed: 2018-11-12] European Commission, 2017. Special Eurobarometer 464b. Eurobarometer Surveys. [online] European Commission. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDeta il/instruments/SPECIAL/surveyKy/1569 [Accessed 2018-09-10].

69 European Commission, 2018. Schengen, Borders & Visas, European Commission. Last updated 2018-11-20. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we- do/policies/borders-and-visas_en [Accessed: 2018-11-20] European Council, 2001. Special Council meeting C/01/318, General Affairs, 12 September. Last updated 19-02-2018. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES- 01-318_en.htm, [Accessed: 2018-09-19] European Council, 2014a. EUCO 79/14, European Council Meeting 26-27 June 2014, Conclusions. European Council European Council, 2014b. Strategic agenda for the union in times of change, Conclusions from European Council meeting 26-27 June. European Council European Council, 2015. Press Release from the informal meeting of the heads of state or government on 12 February 2015 (56/15), European Council. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/12/european- council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/# [Accessed 2018-11-20] European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2017. Directive (EU) 2017/541 Of The European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, Official Journal of the European Union, OJ L 88, 31.3.2017, p. 6–21 European Parliament, 2013. Civil Liberties Committee rejects EU Passenger Name Record proposal, Press Release, 24 April. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20130422IPR07523/civil- liberties-committee-rejects-eu-passenger-name-record-proposal [Accessed: 2018-11- 20] European Parliament, 2017. The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism: Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness, Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/583124/IPOL_STU(201 7)583124_EN.pdf [Accessed: 2018-12-19] European Parliament, 2018a. Debate on the Future of Europe: extracts from the statement by Charles MICHEL, Belgian Prime Minister. European Parliament, 3 May. Available at: https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/debate-on-the-future-of-europe-extracts- from-the-statement-by-charles-michel-belgian-prime-minister_I154733-V_v [Accessed 2018-11-14] European Parliament, 2018b. The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, Fact sheet on the European Union. European Parliament. Europol, 2017. Information sharing on counter terrorism in the EU has reached an all-time high, Press release 30 January, Europol. Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/information-sharing-counter- terrorism-in-eu-has-reached-all-time-high [Accessed: 2018-10-31] Europol, 2018. About Europol. Europol. Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/about- europol [Accessed: 2018-10-31] Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports 2007-2018. Europol. Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu- terrorism-situation-and-trend-report#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-2 [Accessed: 2018-09-14] Finanza, M. 2017. Italy pushes for deeper European cooperation on terrorism, EURACTIV, 23 August. Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/italy-pushes- for-deeper-european-cooperation-on-terrorism/ [Accessed: 2018-11-09]

70 Folketinget, The Danish opt-outs from EU cooperation, Folketinget EU information Centre. Available at: https://english.eu.dk/en/denmark_eu/danishoptouts [Accessed: 2018- 11-01] General Secretariat of the Council, Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, General Secretariat of the Council, Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against- terrorism/counter-terrorism-coordinator/ Last reviewed 2018-10-25, [Accessed: 2018-12-19] General Secretariat of the Council, Council preparatory bodies, General Secretariat of the Council, Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory- bodies/?filters=2023 Last reviewed: 2018-12-13, [Accessed: 2018-12-19] Genschel, P. & Jachtenfuchs, M. 2018. From Market Integration to Core State Powers: The Eurozone Crisis, the Refugee Crisis and Integration Theory, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 178-196 Gotev, Georgi, 2016. Rights groups expose flaws in EU counterterrorism directive, Euractiv, 1 December. Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home- affairs/news/rights-groups-expose-flaws-in-counterterrorism-directive/ [Accessed: 2018-10-23] Haas, E., & Dinan, D. 2004. The uniting of Europe: political, social, and economic forces 1950-1957, New edition, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind. Hayes, B., Jones, C., 2015. Taking stock: the evolution, adoption, implementation and evaluation of EU counter-terrorism policy. In De Londras, F. & Doody, J. (ed.) 2015, The impact, legitimacy and effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism, Routledge, New York, NY, 13-39 Hoffmann, S. 1966. Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe, Daedalus, vol. 95, no. 3, pp. 862-915 Jackson, 2017. Barcelona attacks: What could they mean for Catalan independence? BBC News, 20 August. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40990947 [Accessed: 2018-12-04] Juncker, J-C., 2015. State of the European Union, European Commission, 2015-09-09 Kingdon, J.W. 2003. Agendas, alternatives and public policies, 2 ed. Longman, New York. Kroet, Cynthia, 2017. ECJ rejects Slovakia, Hungary refugee challenge, Politico, 2017-06-09. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/ecj-rejects-slovakia-hungary-refugee- challenge/ [Accessed: 2018-10-09] Kurpas, S., C. Grøn, and P. M. Kaczynski, 2008. The European Commission after Enlargement: Does More add up to Less? Centre for European Policy Studies Lequesne, C. 2013. Old Versus New, in The Oxford Handbook of the European Union, Ed. by Jones, E, Menon, A., and Weatherill, S. Oxford University Press. E-book Meijers Committee, 2016. CM1603 Note on a Proposal for a Directive on combating terrorism. Meijers Committee, 16 March. Available at: http://statewatch.org/news/2016/mar/eu-meijers-cttee-dir-terrorism.pdf [Accessed: 2018-11-21] Merkel, A., 2015. Government statement delivered by the Chancellor - Closing borders is not an option, The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 15 December. Available at: https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-en/news/closing- borders-is-not-an-option-404258 [Accessed: 2018-11-23] Merritt, G., 2015. Brussels must break its silence on tackling terrorist threats, Friends of Europe. 17 November. Available at: https://www.friendsofeurope.org/node/53523 [Accessed: 2018-11-20]

71 Minder, R., 2017. Barcelona Attacks Add to Tension Between Catalonia and Spain, The New York Times, 24 August. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/world/europe/barcelona-attacks-tension- catalonia-spain.html [Accessed: 2018-12-04] Moravcsik, A., 1993. Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 473-524. Niemann, A. & Ioannou D., 2015. European economic integration in times of crisis: a case of neofunctionalism? Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 196-218 Niemann, A. & Speyer, J. 2018. A neofunctionalist Perspective on the ‘European Refugee Crisis’: The Case of the European Border and Coast Guard, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 23-43 Nugent, N., Rhinard, M., 2016. Is the European Commission Really in Decline? JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 54, no. 5, pp. 1199-1215 Patomäki, H. 2017. Will the EU Disintegrate? What Does the Likely Possibility of Disintegration Tell About the Future of the World? Globalizations, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 168-177. Paun, C., 2016. Brussels metro stations to reopen Wednesday, Politico. 12 April. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/brussels-metro-stations-to-reopen-wednesday-terror- attacks-maalbeek/ [Accessed: 2018-11-22] Pollack, Mark, A., 2005. Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity, or Experiment in New Governance? Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 357-398 Premier.be, 2017. Meeting between Édouard PHILIPPE and Charles MICHEL, Press Release 16 October, available at: https://www.premier.be/en/meeting-between-édouard- philippe-and-charles-michel [Accessed: 2018-11-14] Rajoy, M., 2016. Statement by President of the Government following attacks in Brussels, La Moncloa, 22 March. Available at: http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/intervenciones/Paginas/2016/20160 322-attacks-in-bruss.aspx [Accessed: 2018-11-23] Sandholtz, W. & Stone Sweet, A., 2013. Neo-Functionalism and Supranational Governance, in The Oxford Handbook of the European Union, Ed. by Jones, E, Menon, A., and Weatherill, S. Oxford University Press. E-book Schimmelfenning, F. 2018. Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Crises of the European Union, Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 1-17 Schmitter P. C., 2005. Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism, Journal of European Public Policy, 12:2, 255-272 Special Committee on Terrorism, 2018. DRAFT REPORT on findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on Terrorism (2018/2044(INI)) European Parliament. 21 June Stonestreet, J. & Lawson, H., 2018. Factbox: Deadly attacks in Western Europe, Reuters, 7 April. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-crash-timeline- factbox/factbox-deadly-attacks-in-western-europe-idUSKBN1HE0ND [Accessed: 2018-09-20] The Guardian, 2015. How the Paris Attacks Unfolded, The Guardian. 14 November. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/nov/14/paris- attacks-what-we-know-so-far [Accessed: 2018-11-05] The Visegrad Group, Joint Statement from the Visegrad Group Countries, The Visegrad Group, 3 December. Available at: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/joint- statement-of-the-151204 [Accessed: 2018-11-28]

72 Treaty of the European Union, 2012. Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012/C 326/01), Official Journal of the European Union. OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 47–390 Uçarer, Emek M., 2018. NGOs go to Brussels, in The Routledge Handbook of Justice and Home Affairs Research ed. Ariadna Ripoll Servent and Florian Trauner, Abingdon: Routledge, Routledge Handbooks Online. E-book Von Der Burchard, Hans, 2015. France pushes tough anti-terror funding rules, Politico. 8 December. https://www.politico.eu/article/france-pushes-tough-anti-terror-funding- rules-isil-paris-attacks/ [Accessed: 2018-11-05] Walt, V., 2016. Stubborn Frictions Could Undermine Europe's Fight Against Terror, Time, Inc, New York. Waltraud, S., 2013. Rich Versus Poor, in The Oxford Handbook of the European Union. Ed. by Jones, E, Menon, A., and Weatherill, S. Oxford University Press. E-book Willsher, K. 2015. France boosts anti-terror measures in wake of Paris attacks, The Guardian, 21 January. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/21/france- anti-terror-measures-paris-attacks-manuel-valls [Accessed: 2018-11-07] Wincott, D., 1995. Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 33, No: 4, pp: 597-609 Wolf, M. & Ossewaarde, M., 2018. The political vision of Europe during the ‘refugee crisis’: missing common ground for integration, Journal of European Integration, vol. 40, No.1, pp. 33-50 Zaun, Natascha, 2018. The European Commission in justice and home affairs, in The Routledge Handbook of Justice and Home Affairs Research ed. Ariadna Ripoll Servent and Florian Trauner. Abingdon: Routledge, Routledge Handbooks Online. E-book

73