Crossovers Double-Crossed: Ngos, Semi-Clientelism and Political Reform

Crossovers double-crossed: NGOs, semi-clientelism and political reform

Citation of the final chapter: Reid, Benjamin 2018, Crossovers double-crossed: NGOs, semi-clientelism and political reform. In Thompson, Mark R and Batalla, Eric Vincent C (ed), Routledge handbook of contemporary Phillippines, Routledge, Abingdon, Eng., pp.386-395.

This is the accepted manuscript of a chapter published by Routledge in Routledge handbook of contemporary Phillippines in 2018, available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315709215

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From Crossover to Coalition (Still Double-Crossed): Semi-Clientelism, Development NGOs and Political Reform in the Philippines

Dr Ben Reid

Deakin University, Australia

Abstract One facet of politics in the Philippines has been the crossover personnel from development non- government organisations (NGOs) into executive appointments. The hope has been that these alliances would lead to better outcomes in social reform and poverty reduction. The experiences of these reform attempts are discussed and analysed according to contrasting theoretical approaches to civil society and the state. It concludes that a Gramscian approach provides a better explanation of the semi-clientelist process of alliance formation in the Philippines. Historic blocs have utilised development NGOs within hegemonic processes to legitimise the operation of exploitative social class relationships.

Chapter submitted for consideration for publication in the Routledge Handbook of the Contemporary Philippines.

Page 2 of 16

From Crossover… An extensive associational/ civil society sector exists in the Philippines, alongside formal constitutional democracy; political elite-led clientelism; and high levels of poverty and economic inequality (Silliman

& Noble, 1998). More recently, one facet social reform was the “crossover” of personnel from the development non-government organisations (NGO) within the associational sphere over to occupying government positions. Benigno Aquino’s government have most recently incorporated both important development NGO leaders and a non-mainstream political party – Akbayan (the Citizen’s

Action Party) – into a formal coalition. The hope was that these alliances sections of the political elite and civil society leaders would result in substantive social and economic reforms.

Arguably, the process of crossover was a reflection of two broad trends. On the international scale, development policy became increasingly preoccupied with problems of governance and the state since the late 1990s. One solution was the promotion of greater collaboration between state actors and civil society. A Neo-Tocquevillean conception of governance emphasised complementarities between state and civil society institutions (Putnam, 2001; World Bank, 2003). Within the Philippines, the restoration of constitutional democracy after 1986 imposed significant challenges, such as reducing poverty and social exclusion. The executive form of government provided avenues for presidential appointments as heads of state departments and agencies. Such actions started with the

Corazon Aquino government and further accelerated during the Estrada, Arroyo and second Benigno

Aquino governments (Reid, 2008). These political regimes, however, primarily comprised alliances between semi-dynastic political clans (Sidel, 1999).

These crossover appointment’s achievements were modest at best. At worst, they tended to confirm the consent-generating role of the state and civil society that Gramscian analyses suggest. For Gramsci

(2000), civil society is an “outer rampart” of the state that helps to maintain the hegemony of ruling historical blocs of power. An important mechanism of hegemony in the Philippines was semi-clientelist alliances between sections of the elite and different “camps” of NGOs. This chapter provides a historical overview of the crossover process in the Philippines and assesses the applicability of the Page 3 of 16

Neo-Tocquevillean and Gramscian frameworks. The first section provides a brief theoretical overview of the issues of states, civil society cooperation and development policy. It then assesses the experiences of “crossover” during the Estrada, Arroyo and Benigno Aquino governments.

Civil Society, NGOs and Development The phenomena of crossover emerged in the context of global and national-based trends concerning civil society, governance and economic development. The limits of these trends in the Philippines was not difficult to anticipate.

On the global scale, development thinking and policy began to promote state and civil society cooperation. One channel for increasing the capacity of the state to deliver more efficient outcomes was through cooperation with non-state agencies and actors (World Bank, 2003). The primary theoretical rationale was the Neo-Tocquevillean analysis of governance (Putnam, 2001). “Good governance” can emerge via the cooperation of state and civil society. “Democracy in America” – using de Tocqueville’s classic case – succeeded through institutions based on cooperation and reciprocity that complemented market processes (De Tocqueville, 1863). In neo-classical economic terms, the principal-agent problem was best overcome via developing relationships of trust (social capital).

Building the confidence of citizens, can increase the effectiveness of the state and facilitate better development outcomes. One way is through fostering cooperation with civil society groups that are

“closer” to communities (Harriss, 2002). The Tocquevillean conception of civil society, therefore, underpinned a considerable portion of policy initiatives after the late 1990s.

However, a rival theoretical approach to civil society takes a contrary view. The Gramscian method focuses on how non-state institutions can reinforce the hegemony of the state and exploitative social class relationships (Gramsci, 2000). In the Italian case, the risorgimento (national unification) and passive revolution of the late nineteenth left in place institutions such as the church and other associative groups. These became institutions that helped maintain the power of the new ruling historical bloc over subaltern social classes. The application of such an analysis for developing societies Page 4 of 16

suggests that the state and dominant classes use associational groups and non-state institutions to consolidate their rule. Notionally “independent” civil society groups – such as development NGOs – may become incorporated into a hegemonic bloc of power.

Moreover, the forms of the hegemonic utilisation of non-state institutions are varied. They can include the life backgrounds and linkages between personnel; funding conditions; and legislation that circumscribe the independence of non-state bodies (Howell & Pearce, 2002). One mechanism that

Gramsci did not explicitly specify was clientelism and semi-clientelism. Classic accounts of political development regarded clientelism as a ubiquitous facet of governance in neo-patrimonial societies

(Huntington, 1951). Overt coercion exists alongside bargaining processes between clients and patrons over resource distribution. Clientelism is a means of promoting consent alongside more overt forms of coercion. It is both a barrier to and declines with modernisation.

In actuality, the forms of clientelism may only alter with the emergence of mass social movements.

Elites may facilitate newer patterns of semi-clientelism that entail the manipulation of key social movement leaders (Luccisano & Macdonald, 2012). A dominant historic bloc can co-opt limited numbers of personnel from NGOs historically linked to mass social movements into the state itself.

Alternatively the state machinery incorporates NGOs into policy making and service delivery. The resulting ties and flows of resources consolidate the hegemony of the state and elites.

These processes are evident in Philippine politics and society. Re-democratisation has led to a general disenchantment with political processes. The disillusionment is linked to perceived widespread failures of the state to provide improvements in human development. The general opinion of

Politicians is that they are primarily self-interested with little separation between private interests and public resources (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). The allocation of public resources often occurs on a clientelist basis. Electoral competition results in “vote buying” and poor design and delivery of public goods. Page 5 of 16

One response has been to reform the Philippine state on a Neo-Tocqcevillean basis. The practice of crossover emerged as a form of institutional and normative change to facilitate the better performance of political actors and state bureaucracies. The Philippines’ adoption of United State- style constitution enabled the movement of personnel from outside the state into the executive.

Presidential regimes can appoint the departmental and agency leaders that comprise the cabinet.

However, any analyses that is conscious of the exclusionary characteristics of power in the Philippine political economy casts doubt on the effectiveness of such measures (Kasuya, 2008; Reid, 2008). Many of the problems of Philippine politics and economic development are the product of the hegemonic bloc. The predominance capital from unproductive sectors and land ownership over the state has had negative consequences. It has acted as a break on any continued accumulation of capital in critical industrial and manufacturing sectors. The resulting lower levels of income growth and high levels of poverty tend to reproduce the social and political exclusion of large sections of the population (Reid,

2000). The representative and bureaucratic functions of the state, therefore, reflect the underlying pattern of class relationships and accumulation. Semi-dynastic families combine a basis in land ownership with control of the state for wealth accumulation.

In this historical context, notions of governance reform via cooperation with civil society relationships confront intractable problems. Clientelist electoral competition becomes complemented with semi- clientelist co-option and manipulation of NGO and social movement leaders.

… to Double Cross Indeed, a review of the historical experiences confirms the limited efficacy of crossover in the

Philippines. Prior to Benigno Aquino, the two most notable cases were during Joseph Estrada and

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s administrations.

Prior to these governments, the continued existence of high levels of income poverty had already led to limited and recurring efforts at social reform involving civil society actors.1 The first Aquino administration (1986-1992) abandoned any substantive efforts at social reform in favour of its Page 6 of 16

commitment to meeting structural adjustment targets. Fidel Ramos’ government primarily focused on economic liberalisation and growth until its final years in office. A “Social Reform Agenda” was devised that institutionalised sectoral participation of development NGOs via a National Anti-Poverty

Commission (NAPC) (Reid, 2008). These institutions provided some of the frameworks for the subsequent periods of crossover.

The short-lived Estrada government (1998-2001) promoted the crossover of a faction of civil society leaders. Estrada was a former movie star that established a “pro-poor” policy rhetoric. Although not directly a member of any of the main political clans, he came to power on the basis of firm alliances with business figures that had long subject to claims of corruption and “cronyism.” One way to promote the pro-poor image was to appoint leaders from the NGO and other social reform-minded sectors. Some leaders from the development NGO sector had already theorised a strategy of aligning with “elite clans” with an interest in facilitating more inclusive processes of economic growth and transformation (Reid, 2008). Prominent figures from the Movement for Popular Democracy (that had broken with the revolutionary left in late 1980s) were appointed as principal advisors and department heads. Others came from academia and different NGOs.

However, the Estrada government became quickly embroiled in a myriad of internal contradictions and collapsed. Although an expansion of social spending occurred, little headway was achieved in redressing poverty. Areas such as agrarian reform experienced slowdowns in the rate of land tenure transfer (W. F. Bello, de Guzman, Malig, & Docena, 2005). There was also an acceleration of the armed conflict in Mindanao with the Moro-Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Eventually, accusations surrounding Estrada’s receipts of gambling funds from the illegal Jueteng syndicate in 2000 culminated in impeachment proceedings in the Philippine Senate. When the pro-Estrada bloc voted to prevent the consideration of critical evidence in the procedure, already existing opposition coalitions led mass demonstrations. The government quickly collapsed with much of the cabinet resigning and the military Page 7 of 16

and police withdrawing support for Estrada. The first round of crossover, therefore, came to an end with little results.

In practice, semi-clientelist processes were occurring that led to little effect on policy implementation.

While Estrada was beholden to elite clan-based political interests, his ability to retain power depended on his popularity with poorer voters (Reid, 2001). One way of appealing to them was through the mechanism of clientelist programs, combined with the semi-clientelist appointment of personnel from the development NGO sector. The outcomes of agrarian reform and the Bangsamoro conflict were negative and would no doubt be replicated in other areas. Some leaders, however, remained loyal even continuing to claim that elites hostile to Estrada’s “pro-poor” ambitions ended the government.

Nevertheless, the subsequent Arroyo government (2001-2008) engaged in a similar process of crossover (Reid, 2008). Arroyo – a daughter of a former president - was a more obvious a member of the traditional political clans with a base of political support amongst middle and upper-class voters.

Any appeal to lower wage and poorer constituents, however, required developing an anti-poverty agenda. Arroyo also had to forestall any backlash from Estrada’s base of support, especially after they staged mass protests in May 2001. Arroyo revived the consultative mechanisms such as the NAPC. She placed people aligned with a different section of development NGOs in the cabinet. The Kongreso ng

Mamamayang Pilipino II (Kompil II) was established to act as a secretariat of the anti-Estrada movement. Centred on the Congress of Development NGOs (CODE-NGO) – one of the main NGO federations - it became a mainstay of the new government.

Indeed, Corazon Soliman was one of Arroyo’s foremost appointments as the head of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Soliman helped lead the Kompil II and had a long history as an advocate in the development NGO sector (Reid, 2008). The previously marginal DSWD had its capacity strengthened with it beginning (or at least being seen) to develop a social protection strategy.

The largest single component of this was the Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan–Comprehensive and

Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS) project that was primarily funded by the World Page 8 of 16

Bank. On the surface, KALAHI aimed to combine the objectives of governance reform with poverty alleviation via “community-driven development”. It supported local government units to enact existing provisions in the Local Government Code to convene village assemblies to deliberate and decide on poverty alleviation expenditures. The aim was to prevent the clientelist capture of funds aimed at community-based infrastructure by local mayors and political clans.

The sophisticated design notwithstanding, KALAHI had limited impacts. With an initial budget of $200 million over three years, the scale of the program had very limited coverage and was narrowly targeted on some heavily impoverished communities. At best it was a very residual approach to poverty alleviation, limited to less than 5 percent of municipalities. The overall proportion of expenditure devoted to social services either remained stagnant or fell in the first years of Arroyo’s government. The use of local assemblies and similar participatory methods did not bypass the ability of local authorities to engage in clientelist activities (Reid, 2011). Although KALAHI provided funds for much-needed community assets such as schools and child care centres, local landowning and political families provided access to land and other vital resources.

More broadly, there was a sense that appointments, such as Soliman, were mostly cosmetic measures.

The elements of the political Left, for instance, that had backed deposing Estrada recognised that elite- linked actors controlled the central areas of the new government. Joel Rocamora (2003), an influential figure amongst left-leaning development NGOs surmised:

You (the crossover appointments) are not even going to be in the second stream. You’re going to be the water boy. You won’t have any overall impact on the thrust of the administration. What’s going to happen is that you’ll just get used. You’ll get used to drum up some kind of organized manifestation of mass support... You’ll be given small chunks of the bureaucracy.

Rocamora was recommending that Soliman and others “bailout” from the government by the end of

2002. Arroyo subsequently claimed that she was not going to seek a second term to accomplish significant reforms and won some crossover supporters back. Page 9 of 16

In any event, Arroyo did run for and won the Presidential position in 2004. There were important consequences when, it became apparent that she achieved this through massive electoral fraud. An political crisis ensued when a recording emerged Arroyo colluding with the head of the Commission on Elections in June 2005. Many supporters from amongst the development NGOs—such as CODE-

NGO— distanced themselves from the government. Any explicit commitment by the government to social reform largely disappeared. What emerged in its place was an explicitly “national security”- based agenda, which effectively entailed the government’s survival.

By July seven cabinet members and three agency heads, including almost all of the civil-society sector reformers, had resigned from the government. Soliman (2003) recounted:

What broke the camel’s back—so to speak—was on July 5th [2005]. We were having a cabinet meeting and she said, “Okay, the framework for governance now is national security. We will bring in the muscle and we will bring in the fear factor and we will increase the funds of DSWD so that the poor will be always loyal to us,” and one of the cabinet members said: Yes, yes, yes. If they’re paying the poor PHP200,000.00 to come up into the valleys, we will give them mobile phone cards and sacks of rice to buy their loyalty, and I said—I couldn’t help myself—“Hey, wait a minute. Isn’t that the right of the people to be served and it’s our responsibility to serve, especially the poor?” And someone said, “Dinky,stop that. This is already political survival. We have to think in a different way.” And in my mind I said, “Okay, good-bye. I’m not going to join you in thinking in a different way.” I’d compromised too much. In fact, I think this is a little too late, and when I left they really gave it to me and have, up to now, made it a point to diminish my integrity, and it’s the cultural value of loyalty that they keep chipping—that I have been disloyal to my best friend.

Eventually, a limit to the semi-clientelist co-option of the development NGO representatives was reached. It became apparent that the aim of any anti-poverty measures was obtaining support from poor constituencies. The consultative bodies, such as the NAPC, largely ceased to function.

Hence, another cycle of reform came to a close with little results. As with Estrada, select groups of development NGOs and leading personnel were given favourable access to resources and received appointments in the Arroyo government. Both regimes had an at best, residual commitment to anti- poverty measures. The character of these alliances was semi-clientelist. Highly selective arrangements Page 10 of 16

with little basis in agreed policy goals were made to maintain a “pro-poor” face to elite clan-led governments.

From Crossover to “Non-Conventional” Coalition… Arroyo’s government survived until the end of its term, with continual political crises and record levels of unpopularity. As Arroyo’s government was concluding, figures within “civil society” again began to consider forming new alliances. These would have significant implications for the next presidential regime under Benigno Aquino II (2009-). What emerged was a more formal coalition with the political party Akbayan and a collection of development NGO leaders.

The inclusion of these social reformers within the Aquino government originated with the disintegration of Arroyo’s cabinet in 2006. Many of these figures became the basis of a campaign to support a presidential bid by Manuel Roxas: a member of the “reform bloc” within the traditional clan- based Liberal Party. Roxas, however, eventually abandoned his attempt and ran as the Vice-

Presidential candidate on Aquino’s ticket. The campaign consisted of conventional (comprising the party apparatus) and “non-conventional” wings. The “non-conventionals” came from various non- party campaign organisations and Akbayan (Villacorta, 2011). Some Akbayan and civil society leaders subsequently became members of Aquino’s cabinet.

Here, the issue of civil society crossover becomes more complex as political parties like Akbayan occupy an ambiguous position. Political parties have a contradictory character of being both voluntary associations and (usually) concerned with obtaining control over the state’s representative and executive functions. There is also wide variation in the forms of political parties. Some are primarily electoral organisations that comprise staff and nominal memberships for the purpose of contesting elections. Others have a deeper base amongst associations such as trade unions, other social movements and NGOs (Morales, 2009). Akbayan, while a small party, was more like the latter. As such it can perhaps be regarded as a political party based amongst and to some degree representative of a section of development NGOs and membership-based organisations (broadly defined). Page 11 of 16

Notionally committed to “participatory democracy, participatory socialism”, Akbayan managed to find enough points of agreement with the Aquino campaign to support it (Akbayan, 2015). Akbayan, therefore, allied itself with a “traditional politician” who was a member of one of the principal political and landowning clans. The “platform” of the Aquino campaign was the “Social Contract with the

Filipino People” (Villacorta, 2011). It was a mostly rhetorical rather than ideological or policy document, primarily limited to promoting a “good governance” agenda. “Transformational leadership” and anti-corruption measures were needed in the aftermath of Estrada and Arroyo’s numerous scandals. It entailed “a re-awakened sense of right and wrong, through the living examples of our highest leaders”. The text also invoked nostalgia for Aquino senior, claiming she “represents the reverent memory of a good leader in the past and the firm hope of having a similarly good leader in the future”. While the moral and anti-corruption themes predominated, there was little reference to poverty. The one exception was a call for moving away from “anti-poverty programs that instil a dole-out mentality to well-considered programs that build capacity and create opportunity among the poor and the marginalized in the country”. There was also a minor reference to gender equality.

Once in office, the “non-conventional” supporters of Aquino continued their support in three main ways. First, there was a considerable number of appointments to executive posts. From Akbayan, this included Etta Rosales (Commission on Human Rights.); Joel Rocamora (NAPC); and Ronald Llamas

(Special Advisor to Aquino). Corazon Soliman was again appointed as Secretary of the DSWD. Second,

Akbayan’s Congress members (elected under the party-list system) provided critical support and legislative initiatives. Third, there were various (usually modest in scale) extra-parliamentary protests aimed at providing support for select policies.

Over the next four years, the Aquino regime’s “reform” initiatives were primarily limited to areas of corruption and governance (Akbayan, 2013). The administration referred to its priorities as the Daang

Matuwid (straight road) approach. It meant dismantling much the Arroyo government’s network of appointments and subsequent barriers to legal reform. Examples included the impeachment of Page 12 of 16

Arroyo’s last minute appointment to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Vincent Corona and the filing of plunder charges against Arroyo. The legislative agenda focused on these and other minor reforms such as the Government Owned Corporations Act in 2011. The emergence of episodic political scandals led to some other changes. The most notable was the “abolition” of the Presidential

Accelerated Development Funds (discretionary funds granted to members of Congress), widely regarded as the primary “pork barrel”. Other crucial measures - such as the Freedom of Information

Bill - were much slower to implement.

However, these initiatives were not matched by fundamental social reforms. By 2013, Akbayan conceded that there were limits to a “good governance paradigm if unaccompanied by structural reforms addressing critical issues of poverty and inequality ” (Akbayan, 2013). On the one hand, the biggest initiative was undoubtedly the passing of the Reproductive Health Act, despite opposition from the Catholic Bishops Conference and the Supreme Court striking out several provisions in 2015.

Aquino’s primary anti-poverty policy - the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) project - was expanded.

The Arroyo government had already adopted the CCT scheme that was funded by various donors. A crucial non-conventional appointment - Corazon Soliman of the DSWD - implemented the project. Not surprisingly, however, the model the World Bank chose to apply was the highly intrusive approach adopted in Colombia. The Colombian program entailed a high level of surveillance of recipients and was unaccompanied by measures such as increases in minimum wages and pensions (Reid, 2013).

These had been crucial to reductions in poverty in other CCT implementing countries such as Brazil.

Indeed, the small amount of attention granted to social reform reflected more fundamental problems within the government’s economic and development strategy. These led to considerable tension with at least some elements of Akbayan and other non-conventionals. Akbayan Congress member Walden

Bello (2014) argued:

Continuous adherence to the old neoliberal model can erode the gains that the administration has made in the last four years, probably much faster than the schemes mounted by the detained plunderers to undermine President Aquino. The President still Page 13 of 16

enjoys a popular mandate, and that political capital must be used to mobilize institutions to the path of a new and progressive macroeconomic model

The lack of substantive movement away from “the old neoliberal model” meant the social reforms that did take place had little relationship with overall strategies of economic growth and development.

The early alienation of the trade union sector reflected the government’s stance of continued support for outsourcing with their associated barriers to unionisation. Much of the rest of the political Left continued to characterise the Aquino’s administration as a “neoliberal government”.

Eventually, the central issue that led to a collapse of at least some of the non-conventional support

Aquino was the Bangsamoro peace process. Aquino adopted a dual approach to the conflict in the south. There were, on the one hand, formal negotiations with the main insurgency group the MILF on demilitarisation and a basis for autonomous self-government. Quite clearly, however, there remained an actively military-based strategy notionally aimed at foreign supported groups and rival insurgent groups. One eventual consequence was the entry of Special Action Force into restricted MILF territory and a resulting ambush that claimed the lives of 44 of these troops. Aquino effectively denied responsibility, despite being the head of the Philippine National Police and clearly aware of the operation. Walden Bello resigned as an Akbayan Congress member in response to Aquino’s shirking of responsibility for a disastrous military action in Mamasapano in Mindanao. The contradictions between an avowed commitment to peace and responsible governance and the actuality of clumsy militarism were eventually too much for Bello and other Akbayan figures such as Ricardo Reyes. The government faced its first serious crisis and fall in popularity, although it was not of the scale that

Arroyo confronted. The non-conventional constituency remained largely supportive of Aquino. The majority of the Akbayan party also continued its coalition with Aquino.

Therefore, both similarities and contrasts existed between the semi-clientelist crossover process with

Estrada and Arroyo and the coalition with Aquino. It's hard to interpret policy documents, such as the

“Contract”, as discerning substantive proposals let alone transformative approaches to development Page 14 of 16

and poverty. The non-conventional alliance with Aquino followed a semi-clientelist pattern of policy vagueness and the inclusion of prominent personalities from development NGOs and Akbayan. Aquino was an establishment (or ‘trapo’) politician that (like Estrada and Arroyo) cultivated a rhetoric and façade of political and social reform. There was a formal process of coalition formation with the “non- conventionals” being included in the Presidential campaign. The boundary between civil society crossover/coalition also altered with a critical role being played by a marginal political party (Akbayan).

These differences notwithstanding, the experiences of Aquino government was disappointing in terms of substantive results. As Akbayan acknowledges, there were no substantial alterations in fundamental areas of development and economic policy.

… Still Double-Crossed? Therefore, the primary trend has clearly been processes of generating consent to elite-based rule via semi-clientelist processes. There has been the integration of competing sections of civil society – especially development NGOs – into different political regimes.

The outcomes of policy measures were limited. The Estrada government’s initiatives in services provision did increase expenditures but had no tangible impacts. The rate of agrarian reform slowed, and militarisation of conflict increased. In any event, the regime quickly collapsed under the weight of corruption allegations and inertia. Arroyo’s government, likewise, commenced with a rhetoric of social and political reform. NGO leaders crossed over to implement significant changes, such as the KALAHI community-driven development project. These and other measures had limited effect on poverty levels. The political situation deteriorated even further, and most of the “crossovers” left the government in 2006. While the Aquino government is still in play, serious contradictions have also emerged leading to the departures of some of the “non-conventional” coalition members.

The evidence overwhelmingly supports a Gramscian perspective on development NGO and non- conventional crossover/ coalitions. Gramsci regarded civil society institutions – such as NGOs - as critical to maintaining the hegemony of elite over society and ensuring consent. The Neo- Page 15 of 16

Tocquevillean approach to civil society has limited utility in the context of exclusionary politics based on elite political clan alliances. In practice, the Estrada, Arroyo and Aquino governments implemented little substantial political or social reform. The crossover and coalition components of these administrations remained either marginal or responsible for implementing residual poverty alleviation projects.

The generation of consent through crossover/coalition was based on semi-clientelist processes that were the historical product of Philippine political and social development. The presidential system rewards power to the fractions of the historic bloc that can mobilise sufficient support from sections of the elite and via clientelist voting processes amongst the population. What emerged was an additional layer of alliance formation with camps within the development NGO sector and key personalities. The political basis was usually unclear beyond very general gestures in favour of social reform. Resources and status were the rewards for organisations and personalities. The legitimisation of ruling fractions of the historic bloc occured through the appearance of them undertaking some measures of social reform and poverty reduction.

Finally, what the experience of coalition and crossover suggests is that the process of alliance formation perhaps needs to be re-thought. A political position of unifying development and poverty- reduction oriented action around an alternative framework of governance would probably generate higher rates of success. Both the longer term transformation of Philippine politics and economics and the obtaining shorter-run measures of poverty alleviation would be better conducted through a framework of independent popular mobilisation and protest.

1 The National Statistics Office estimates suggest levels of income poverty have remained unchanged since the early 2000s (National Statistics Office, 2013).

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