Crossovers double-crossed: NGOs, semi-clientelism and political reform Citation of the final chapter: Reid, Benjamin 2018, Crossovers double-crossed: NGOs, semi-clientelism and political reform. In Thompson, Mark R and Batalla, Eric Vincent C (ed), Routledge handbook of contemporary Phillippines, Routledge, Abingdon, Eng., pp.386-395. This is the accepted manuscript of a chapter published by Routledge in Routledge handbook of contemporary Phillippines in 2018, available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315709215 © 2018, Routledge Downloaded from DRO: http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30079192 DRO Deakin Research Online, Deakin University’s Research Repository Deakin University CRICOS Provider Code: 00113B Page 1 of 16 Page 2 of 16 From Crossover… An extensive associational/ civil society sector exists in the Philippines, alongside formal constitutional democracy; political elite-led clientelism; and high levels of poverty and economic inequality (Silliman & Noble, 1998). More recently, one facet social reform was the “crossover” of personnel from the development non-government organisations (NGO) within the associational sphere over to occupying government positions. Benigno Aquino’s government have most recently incorporated both important development NGO leaders and a non-mainstream political party – Akbayan (the Citizen’s Action Party) – into a formal coalition. The hope was that these alliances sections of the political elite and civil society leaders would result in substantive social and economic reforms. Arguably, the process of crossover was a reflection of two broad trends. On the international scale, development policy became increasingly preoccupied with problems of governance and the state Page 3 of 16 Neo-Tocquevillean and Gramscian frameworks. The first section provides a brief theoretical overview of the issues of states, civil society cooperation and development policy. It then assesses the experiences of “crossover” during the Estrada, Arroyo and Benigno Aquino governments. Civil Society, NGOs and Development The phenomena of crossover emerged in the context of global and national-based trends concerning civil society, governance and economic development. The limits of these trends in the Philippines was not difficult to anticipate. On the global scale, development thinking and policy began to promote state and civil society cooperation. One channel for increasing the capacity of the state to deliver more efficient outcomes was through cooperation with non-state agencies and actors (World Bank, 2003). The primary theoretical rationale was the Neo-Tocquevillean analysis of governance (Putnam, 2001). “Good governance” can emerge via the cooperation of state and civil society. “Democracy in America” – using de Tocqueville’s classic case – succeeded through institutions based on cooperation and reciprocity that complemented market processes Page 4 of 16 suggests that the state and dominant classes use associational groups and non-state institutions to consolidate their rule. Notionally “independent” civil society groups – such as development NGOs – may become incorporated into a hegemonic bloc of power. Moreover, the forms of the hegemonic utilisation of non-state institutions are varied. They can include the life backgrounds and linkages between personnel; funding conditions; and legislation that circumscribe the independence of non-state bodies (Howell & Pearce, 2002). One mechanism that Gramsci did not explicitly specify was clientelism and semi-clientelism. Classic accounts of political development regarded clientelism as a ubiquitous facet of governance in neo-patrimonial societies (Huntington, 1951). Overt coercion exists alongside bargaining processes between clients and patrons over resource distribution. Clientelism is a means of promoting consent alongside more overt forms of coercion. It is both a barrier to and declines with modernisation. In actuality, the forms of clientelism may only alter with the emergence of mass social movements. Elites may facilitate newer patterns of semi-clientelism that entail the manipulation of key social movement leaders (Luccisano & Macdonald, 2012). A dominant historic bloc can co-opt limited numbers of personnel from NGOs historically linked to mass social movements into the state itself. Alternatively the state machinery incorporates NGOs into policy making and service delivery. The resulting ties and flows of resources consolidate the hegemony of the state and elites. These processes are evident in Philippine politics and society. Re-democratisation has led to a general disenchantment with political processes. The disillusionment is linked to perceived widespread failures of the state to provide improvements in human development. The general opinion of Politicians is that they are primarily self-interested with little separation between private interests and public resources (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). The allocation of public resources often occurs on a clientelist basis. Electoral competition results in “vote buying” and poor design and delivery of public goods. Page 5 of 16 One response has been to reform the Philippine state on a Neo-Tocqcevillean basis. The practice of crossover emerged as a form of institutional and normative change to facilitate the better performance of political actors and state bureaucracies. The Philippines’ adoption of United State- style constitution enabled the movement of personnel from outside the state into the executive. Presidential regimes can appoint the departmental and agency leaders that comprise the cabinet. However, any analyses that is conscious of the exclusionary characteristics of power in the Philippine political economy casts doubt on the effectiveness of such measures (Kasuya, 2008; Reid, 2008). Many of the problems of Philippine politics and economic development are the product of the hegemonic bloc. The predominance capital from unproductive sectors and land ownership over the state has had negative consequences. It has acted as a break on any continued accumulation of capital in critical industrial and manufacturing sectors. The resulting lower levels of income growth and high levels of poverty tend to reproduce the social and political exclusion of large sections of the population (Reid, 2000). The representative and bureaucratic functions of the state, therefore, reflect the underlying pattern of class relationships and accumulation. Semi-dynastic families combine a basis in land ownership with control of the state for wealth accumulation. In this historical context, notions of governance reform via cooperation with civil society relationships confront intractable problems. Clientelist electoral competition becomes complemented with semi- clientelist co-option and manipulation of NGO and social movement leaders. … to Double Cross Indeed, a review of the historical experiences confirms the limited efficacy of crossover in the Philippines. Prior to Benigno Aquino, the two most notable cases were during Joseph Estrada and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s administrations. Prior to these governments, the continued existence of high levels of income poverty had already led to limited and recurring efforts at social reform involving civil society actors.1 The first Aquino administration (1986-1992) abandoned any substantive efforts at social reform in favour of its Page 6 of 16 commitment to meeting structural adjustment targets. Fidel Ramos’ government primarily focused on economic liberalisation and growth until its final years in office. A “Social Reform Agenda” was devised that institutionalised sectoral participation of development NGOs via a National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) (Reid, 2008). These institutions provided some of the frameworks for the subsequent periods of crossover. The short-lived Estrada government (1998-2001) promoted the crossover of a faction of civil society leaders. Estrada was a former movie star that established a “pro-poor” policy rhetoric. Although not directly a member of any of the main political clans, he came to power on the basis of firm alliances with business figures that had long subject to claims of corruption and “cronyism.” One way to promote the pro-poor image was to appoint leaders from the NGO and other social reform-minded sectors. Some leaders from the development NGO sector had already theorised a strategy of aligning with “elite clans” with an interest in facilitating more inclusive processes of economic growth and transformation (Reid, 2008). Prominent figures from the Movement for Popular Democracy (that had broken with the revolutionary left in late 1980s) were appointed as principal advisors and department heads. Others came from academia and different NGOs. However, the Estrada government became quickly embroiled in a myriad of internal contradictions and collapsed. Although an expansion of social spending occurred, little headway was achieved in redressing poverty. Areas such as agrarian reform experienced slowdowns in the rate of land tenure transfer (W. F. Bello, de Guzman, Malig, & Docena, 2005). There was also an acceleration of the armed conflict in Mindanao with the Moro-Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Eventually, accusations surrounding Estrada’s receipts of gambling funds from the illegal Jueteng syndicate in 2000 culminated in impeachment proceedings in the Philippine Senate. When the pro-Estrada bloc voted to prevent the consideration of critical evidence in the procedure, already existing opposition coalitions led mass demonstrations. The government