The Foreign Service Journal, August 1964
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Presidential Recordings of Lyndon B. Johnson (November 22, 1963-January 10, 1969) Added to the National Registry: 2013 Essay by Bruce J
Presidential Recordings of Lyndon B. Johnson (November 22, 1963-January 10, 1969) Added to the National Registry: 2013 Essay by Bruce J. Schulman (guest post)* Lyndon B. Johnson built his career--and became one of the nation’s most effective Senate leaders--through his mastery of face-to-face contact. Applying his famous “Treatment,” LBJ pleased, cajoled, flattered, teased, and threatened colleagues and rivals. He would grab people by the lapels, speak right into their faces, and convince them they had always wanted to vote the way Johnson insisted. He could share whiskey and off-color stories with some colleagues, hold detailed policy discussions with others, toast their successes, and mourn their losses. Syndicated newspaper columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak vividly described the Johnson Treatment as: supplication, accusation, cajolery, exuberance, scorn, tears, complaint, the hint of threat. It was all of these together. Its velocity was breathtaking, and it was all in one direction. Interjections from the target were rare. Johnson anticipated them before they could be spoken. He moved in close, his face a scant millimeter from his target, his eyes widening and narrowing, his eyebrows rising and falling. 1 While President Johnson never abandoned in-person persuasion, the scheduling and security demands of the White House forced him to rely more heavily on indirect forms of communication. Like Muddy Waters plugging in his electric guitar or Laurel and Hardy making the transition from silent film to talkies, LBJ became maestro of the telephone. He had the Army Signal Corps install scores of special POTUS lines (an acronym for “President of the United States”) so that he could communicate instantly with officials around the government. -
France Invades the 1961 White House
France Invades the 1961 White House Christopher Early East Carolina University Visual Arts and Design Faculty Mentor Hunt McKinnon East Carolina University Throughout its history, America‟s White House has undergone many changes through its many administrations. While a select few presidents worked to improve it, most others merely neglected it. No one, however, worked harder in restoring the White House interior than Jacqueline Kennedy, wife of President John F. Kennedy, who occupied the Executive Mansion from January 1961 until November 1963. Soon after Kennedy‟s election to the presidency in November 1960, a pregnant Jacqueline Kennedy visited the White House, as per protocol, and was given a tour of her soon-to-be-home by the outgoing First Lady, Mamie Eisenhower. “Jackie‟s first visit to the White House was her coming-out party as the next first lady.” 1 After viewing the condition of the White House, Mrs. Kennedy was appalled by its drab furniture and design. She was shocked that the White House interior, that of America‟s preeminent home, had been so woefully decorated. To her, it was nothing short of a national disgrace. Soon after taking up residence in the White House, both the President and his First Lady were struck by how depressing, drab, and tasteless the home appeared. Furniture in rooms did not match with each other, nor did paintings adorning the walls. There were no unifying themes in individual rooms or the mansion as a whole. “To her dismay she found the upstairs family quarters decorated with what she called „early Statler‟; it was so cheerless and undistinguished it wasn‟t even worthy of a second-class hotel. -
War Prevention Works 50 Stories of People Resolving Conflict by Dylan Mathews War Prevention OXFORD • RESEARCH • Groupworks 50 Stories of People Resolving Conflict
OXFORD • RESEARCH • GROUP war prevention works 50 stories of people resolving conflict by Dylan Mathews war prevention works OXFORD • RESEARCH • GROUP 50 stories of people resolving conflict Oxford Research Group is a small independent team of Oxford Research Group was Written and researched by researchers and support staff concentrating on nuclear established in 1982. It is a public Dylan Mathews company limited by guarantee with weapons decision-making and the prevention of war. Produced by charitable status, governed by a We aim to assist in the building of a more secure world Scilla Elworthy Board of Directors and supported with Robin McAfee without nuclear weapons and to promote non-violent by a Council of Advisers. The and Simone Schaupp solutions to conflict. Group enjoys a strong reputation Design and illustrations by for objective and effective Paul V Vernon Our work involves: We bring policy-makers – senior research, and attracts the support • Researching how policy government officials, the military, of foundations, charities and The front and back cover features the painting ‘Lightness in Dark’ scientists, weapons designers and private individuals, many of decisions are made and who from a series of nine paintings by makes them. strategists – together with Quaker origin, in Britain, Gabrielle Rifkind • Promoting accountability independent experts Europe and the and transparency. to develop ways In this United States. It • Providing information on current past the new millennium, has no political OXFORD • RESEARCH • GROUP decisions so that public debate obstacles to human beings are faced with affiliations. can take place. nuclear challenges of planetary survival 51 Plantation Road, • Fostering dialogue between disarmament. -
Foreign Service of the United States
FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR CORRECTED UAR 1 1 27 TO JAN Y , 9 " “ NOTE : To av oid delay and insure prompt atten tion Corr s on n h uld , e p de ceuponcensulat business s o be addressed To the American Consul o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o WAS HIN G TO N AD D IT ION A L CO P IES THIS P UBLICATI ON M AY BE P E ocuEED FROM TH E sUP ERINI' ENDENT OE DOCUM ENTS GO V ERN MENT P RINTING OFFICE. WASHIN GTON, D . 0 . AT 20 C E N T S P E R C O P Y CONTENTS F T H E UN D 1 . FOREIGN SERVICE O ITE STATES ania Ar entina 1 ° Austria 1 ° Bel ium 2 Bolivia 2 Brazil 2 B ritish E m ire Alb , 1 ; g , , , , g , ; , ; , ; p , 3 ° Bul aria 8 ° Chi1e 9 China 9 C olombia 1 1 C osta Rica 1 1 Cuba 1 1 C zecho , g , , , ; , ; , ; , ; , ; slovakia 1 2 D anzi F ree C it O f 1 2 Denmark 12 D ominican Re ublic 1 2 , ; g, y , , , ; p , ador 1 2 E t 1 3 Estonia 1 3 ° Finland 1 3 France and P os sess ions 1 3 E cu , ; gyp , ; , , ; , , rman 1 5 Greece 1 6 Guatemala 17 HaItI 1 7 Honduras 1 7 Hun ar 1 7 ° Ge y, ; , , ; , , ; g y, al 1 ° a an Em ir 1 Latvia 20 iberia 2 0 18 ; It y, 8 J p ese p e, 9 ; , ; L , , Lithuania 20 LuxembIIr 2 0 Mexico 20 M orocco 2 ° Netherlands and , ; g, ; , ; , 2 P 2 Ni ara ua 2 Norwa 2 ° P alestine 2 P anama 23 P ara osses sions , 2 ; c g , 3 ; y , 3 , 3; , ; a 24 P rsia 2 4 P eru 2 4 P oland 2 4 P ortu al and P osses sions 2 5 gu y , ; e , ; , ; , ; g , ; umani 2 Salvador 2 5 SOrbs C roats and SlO venes in domOf the R , 5; , ; , , g g , a . -
Cabinet Room Scope and Content Notes
WHITE HOUSE TAPES CABINET ROOM CONVERSATIONS Nixon Presidential Materials Staff National Archives and Records Administration Linda Fischer Mark Fischer Ronald Sodano February 2002 NIXON WHITE HOUSE TAPES CABINET ROOM TAPES On October 16, 1997, the Nixon Presidential Materials staff opened eighty-three Nixon White House tapes containing conversations which took place within the Cabinet Room from February 16, 1971 through July 18, 1973. This release consisted of approximately 436 conversations and totaled approximately 154 hours. The Cabinet Room was one of seven locations in which conversations were surreptitiously taped. The complete Cabinet Room conversations are available to the public on reference cassettes C1 – C251 During review of the Cabinet Room tapes, approximately 78 hours of conversations were withdrawn under the provisions of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974 (PRMPA) (44 USC 2111 note) and Executive Order (EO) 12356. These segments were re-reviewed under EO 12958 (April 17, 1995). As a result, the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff was able to open approximately 69 hours of previously restricted audio segments. The declassified segments were released on February 28, 2002, and are available as excerpted conversation segments on reference cassettes E504 – E633. These recorded White House tapes are part of the Presidential historical materials of the Nixon Administration. These materials are in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) under the provisions of the PRMPA. Access to the Nixon Presidential materials is governed by the PRMPA and its implementing public access regulations. A Brief History of the White House Taping System In February 1971, the United State Secret Service (USSS), at the request of the President, installed listening devices in the White House. -
Henry Kissinger: the Emotional Statesman*
barbara keys Bernath Lecture Henry Kissinger: The Emotional Statesman* “That poor fellow is an emotional fellow,” a fretful Richard Nixon observed about Henry Kissinger on Christmas Eve 1971. The national security adviser had fallen into one of his typical postcrisis depressions, anguished over public criticism of his handling of the Indo-Pakistani War. In a long, meandering conversation with aide John Ehrlichman, Nixon covered many topics, but kept circling back to his “emotional” foreign policy adviser. “He’s the kind of fellow that could have an emotional collapse,” he remarked. Ehrlichman agreed. “We just have to get him some psychotherapy,” he told the president. Referring to Kissinger as “our major problem,” the two men recalled earlier episodes of Kissinger’s “impossible” behavior. They lamented his inability to shrug off criticism, his frequent mood swings, and his “emotional reactions.” Ehrlichman speculated that Nelson Rockefeller’s team had “had all kind of problems with him,” too. Nixon marveled at how “ludicrous” it was that he, the president— beset with enormous problems on a global scale—had to spend so much time “propping up this guy.” No one else, Nixon said, would have put up with “his little tantrums.”1 Kissinger’s temper tantrums, jealous rages, and depressions frequently frus- trated and bewildered the president and his staff. Kissinger habitually fell into a state of self-doubt when his actions produced public criticism. When his support for the Cambodian invasion elicited a media frenzy, for example, Kissinger’s second-in-command, Al Haig, went to Nixon with concerns about his boss’s “very emotional and very distraught” state.2 Journalists often found what William Safire called “Kissinger’s anguish—an emotion dramatized by the man’s ability to let suffering show in facial expressions and body *I am grateful to Frank Costigliola and TomSchwartz for comments on a draft of this essay, and to Frank for producing the scholarship that helped inspire this project. -
William Watts
The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project WILLIAM WATTS Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy Initial interview date: August 7, 1995 Copyright 1998 A ST TABLE OF CONTENTS Background Born and raised in Ne York City Yale University% University of Syracuse% Harvard University (MA) U.S. Air Force - Russian language training ,ntered Foreign Service, .901 Foreign Service ,2am State Department - INR, Soviet Internal Affairs .901-.908 5amma 5uppie Operation Soviet press Relations ith Soviet Desk Seoul, 6orea - visa7political .908-.910 Ambassador :illiam Do ling Local environment Syngman Rhee Visa issuance Intervie ing North 6oreans Ambassador :alter McConaughy 6orea's .910 elections Rhee resignation ,isenho er letter to Rhee ,isenho er visit to 6orea Russian language training .910-.91. Mosco , USSR - Cultural affairs .91.-.913 Ambassador Tommy Thompson Ambassador Foy 6ohler Stalin "dethroned" Cultural e2hibits and events Local environment 1 Tricks for entrapment Lumumba students' oes Berlin :all falls Penkovsky files Cuban Missile Crisis 6hrushchev second letter to 6ennedy :ar averted 6hrushchev the man Anti-Russian feeling in USSR ,mbassy reporting Chinese language training .913 State Department - Office of Asian Communist Affairs .914-.910 Resignation, .910 Ford Foundation - Office of Policy Planning .910-.918 Rockefeller political campaign .918 The Ni2on :hite House - Staff Secretary, NSC .919-.9A0 6issinger and Ni2on relationship Internal back-biting State Department briefing books Internal NSC secrecy State Department versus :hite House By-passing bureaucracies Al Haig Tony Lake Vietnam USSR SALT talks Vietnam China NSC recommendations (NSIMs) Cambodia Resignation over Cambodia attack Aftermath Potomac Associates .9A0 Publications INTERVIEW 2 ": Today is August 7, 1995 and this is an interview with William Watts on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. -
The White House and War
Classroom Resource Packet The White House and War INTRODUCTION The American colonies gained their independence by fighting a war against England. After the American Revolution, the newly formed United States began to establish itself as a nation by ratifying the Constitution, creating a capital in Washington, D.C., and building the President’s House. As the home of the president, the White House has confronted war on various occasions in more than two hundred years of its existence. Learn about the physical scars created during the War of 1812, the victory gardens planted on the grounds during World Wars I and II, and other topics highlighting the history of the White House and war. CONTEXTUAL ESSAY The White House experienced various aspects of war throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries, but war’s most significant impact on the Executive Mansion occurred during the War of 1812. In August 1814, after the American defeat at the Battle of Bladensburg outside Washington, D.C., President James Madison and First Lady Dolley Madison made quick arrangements to leave the White House ahead of advancing British troops. With the assistance of her enslaved servants and hired help, Mrs. Madison saved the famous Gilbert Stuart portrait of George Washington before leaving. The British entered the White House that evening and set fire to the building (Image 1). Only the outer stone walls remained (Image 2). Despite considerations about moving the capital away to a more remote location inland, President Madison quickly assessed the damage and ensured that the White House was rebuilt on the same grounds. -
The Worldview of Franklin D. Roosevelt: France, Germany, and United States Involvement in World War Ii in Europe
ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: THE WORLDVIEW OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: FRANCE, GERMANY, AND UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN WORLD WAR II IN EUROPE Michael S. Bell, Doctor of Philosophy, 2004 Dissertation directed by: Professor Keith W. Olson Dep artment of History President Franklin D. Roosevelt operated from a remarkably consistent view of the world that grew naturally from his experiences. Before he entered the White House, Roosevelt already possessed a coherent worldview that influenced his thinking and informed his decisions as president. The product of his background and education, his experiences, and his exposure to contemporary ideas, Roosevelt’s worldview fully coalesced by the mid 1920s and provided a durable and coherent foundation for Roosevelt’s thinking as president and his strategic direction in response to the deteriorating situation in Europe in the late 1930s and toward the Second World War. Roosevelt’s “worldview” was his broad perspective and sweeping understanding of the impact and interplay of states, parties, groups, and individual people on the progressive advance of world civilization. His background and personal experiences, understanding of historical events, and ideology shaped Roosevelt’s perspective and enabled him to formulate and deliberately pursue long-range strategic goals as part of his foreign policy. The foundation of Roosevelt’s worldview was a progressive, liberal outlook that provided a durable basis for how he interpreted and responded to events at home and abroad. An essential aspect of that outlook was Roosevelt’s deep conviction that he had a personal responsibility to advance civilization and safeguard the cause of liberal reform and democracy. He believed that he was an agent of progress. -
90 Pacific Northwest Quarterly Cuthbert, Herbert
Cuthbert, Herbert (Portland Chamber of in Washington,” 61(2):65-71; rev. of Dale, J. B., 18(1):62-65 Commerce), 64(1):25-26 Norwegian-American Studies, Vol. 26, Daley, Elisha B., 28(2):150 Cuthbert, Herbert (Victoria, B.C., alderman), 67(1):41-42 Daley, Heber C., 28(2):150 103(2):71 Dahlin, Ebba, French and German Public Daley, James, 28(2):150 Cuthbertson, Stuart, comp., A Preliminary Opinion on Declared War Aims, 1914- Daley, Shawn, rev. of Atkinson: Pioneer Bibliography of the American Fur Trade, 1918, 24(4):304-305; rev. of Canada’s Oregon Educator, 103(4):200-201 review, 31(4):463-64 Great Highway, 16(3):228-29; rev. Daley, Thomas J., 28(2):150 Cuthill, Mary-Catherine, ed., Overland of The Emigrants’ Guide to Oregon Dalkena, Wash., 9(2):107 Passages: A Guide to Overland and California, 24(3):232-33; rev. of Dall, William Healey, 77(3):82-83, 90, Documents in the Oregon Historical Granville Stuart: Forty Years on the 86(2):73, 79-80 Society, review, 85(2):77 Frontier, Vols. 1 and 2, 17(3):230; rev. works of: Spencer Fullerton Baird: A Cutler, Lyman A., 2(4):293, 23(2):136-37, of The Growth of the United States, Biography, review, 7(2):171 23(3):196, 62(2):62 17(1):68-69; rev. of Hall J. Kelley D’Allair (North West Company employee), Cutler, Thomas R., 57(3):101, 103 on Oregon, 24(3):232-33; rev. of 19(4):250-70 Cutright, Paul Russell, Elliott Coues: History of America, 17(1):68-69; rev. -
The Pure-Hearted Abrams Case
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Volume 29 (2020-2021) Issue 2 Article 6 December 2020 The Pure-Hearted Abrams Case Andres Yoder Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Judges Commons, and the Legal History Commons Repository Citation Andres Yoder, The Pure-Hearted Abrams Case, 29 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 455 (2020), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol29/iss2/6 Copyright c 2021 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj THE PURE-HEARTED ABRAMS CASE Andres Yoder* One hundred years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes changed his mind about the right to free speech and wound up splitting the history of free speech law into two. In his dissent in Abrams v. United States, he called for the end of the old order—in which courts often ignored or rejected free speech claims—and set the stage for the current order—in which the right to free speech is of central constitutional impor- tance. However, a century on, scholars have been unable to identify a specific reason for Holmes’s Abrams transformation, and have instead pointed to more diffuse influences. By drawing on heretofore overlooked material, and by investigating the evolution of Holmes’s political thought, this Article identifies a specific reason for Holmes’s reversal that is both compelling and new. Along the way, this Article makes the surprising revelation that Holmes never believed his influential marketplace-of-ideas concept—that is, his argument in Abrams that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com- petition of the market.” Instead, he only cared about what the intellectual elite thought. -
An Investigation of the United States' Decision To
1 Tip-Toeing through the Tulips: An Investigation of The United States’ Decision to Enter the Angolan Civil War in June of 1975 A Senior Honors Thesis in History by: Nicholas LoCastro 2 Introduction On the morning of June 25, 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had a decision to make. For the past ten months he had been thinking about bringing the United States right into the midst of the rapidly developing Angolan Civil War. Kissinger knew that an explicit commitment of American support to an Angolan faction could significantly advance U.S. interests in Southern Africa, but he recognized that there were serious risks as well. In order to make a more informed choice, Kissinger asked the head of the State Department’s African Bureau, Nathaniel Davis, to recommend a plan of action. On the morning of the 25th, Kissinger had an answer. Davis advised that the United States should stay far, far away from Angola. He argued that the risks associated with direct American involvement in an African civil war greatly outweighed any potential gain, yet it was Kissinger who held the authority to make the final decision. Two days later, he had made up his mind. Paying little heed to Davis’ reservations, the Secretary decided that the United States would directly support two of the three groups fighting for control of Angola. Kissinger called his decision the start of a “heroic phase in U.S. foreign policy.”1 Within three weeks, Kissinger had convinced President Gerald Ford to green light a program codenamed IAFEATURE. It was highly classified—no one but the highest-ranking American officials and Kissinger’s African allies knew of its existence.