UNIVERSITY COLLEGE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY

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BY

CAPTAIN JUAN A. DE LEON PN (GSC)

NOVEMBER 1989

A SUB-THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES II PREFACF AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Southeast Asia is a region fast becoming the center stage of the 21st Century. One historian said that "the Mediterranean is the past, Europe is the present and the Asia-Pacific Region is the future." The future is now! This sub-thesis deals with contemporary issues now determining the future of the region going into the year 2000. Soviet attention was refocused on the Asia-Pacific region after Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev made his historic speech at Vladivostock on 28 July 1986. Since then developments have gone on at a pace faster than expected. The Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan. Then in September 1988, Gorbachev spelled out in detail his Vladivostock initiative through his Krasnoyarsk speech and called on major powers, the US, China and Japan, to respond to his peace offensives. He has offered to give up the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh if the US did likewise at Subic and Clark in the Philippines. To some it may appear attractive, while others consider that it is like trading "a pawn for a queen".

This sub-thesis completes my ten-month stay in a very progressive country, Australia. I was fortunate enough having been given the chance to undertake a Master of Defence Studies Course (MDef Studies) at the University College, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy upon the invitation of the Australian Government. My deepest gratitude goes to the Government, its Defence Force and its wonderful and cordial people.

This written work would not have been possible were it not for the patient and inspiring supervision of Dr. Carlyle A. Thayer. Likewise, I'd like to acknowledge the encouragement of Dr. Hugh Smith and the professional knowledge acquired under Professor John McCarthy and Dr. Roger Thompson, both of the History Department. ILL

My sincerest thanks to the Staff at the ADFA Library who were most helpful, Mr. Phillip Berrie of the Computer Centre, Mrs. Lynne Smith and Elizabeth Hoole of the Defence Studies Centre, and Shirley Ramsay, Secretary of the Politics Department. The Staff at the Officers Mess, made my short stay there "home away from home" and Capt John Mould and Maj Zaharias of the ADSS who attended to all of our administrative requirements.

While pursuing the MDefStudies Course, I had the occassion of meeting classmates who were genuinely interested in Asians like us, myself and my good friend from Malaysia Mr. Arujunan Naranayan, namely; Lt. Col. Chris Welburn, Lcdr. Wayne Gobert, Capt. Monique Feinberg and other Australian friends like Lcdr. Ernest James.

Back in the Philippines, my sincerest appreciation and gratitude go to Gen. Renato S. De Villa, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Rear Adm. Emerson Tangan, Deputy Chief of Staff, my former boss. Brig. Gen. Arturo Castro, erstwhile DCS Plans (J5), now Defence Attache in Washington, D. C., Brig. Gen. Lisandro Abadia (J-3), Commo. Domingo Calajate, (former J-8) and Capt. Armando Q. Madamba, PN (GSC), newly designated J-5, for their unstinted support and moral encouragement for me to exert my best with this course.

I also had the fortune to share my Australian experience with my family and a grandson, a full-fledged "Australian bloke" born in the midst of my research time on Cam Ranh Bay. With their presence, it made life in a foreign country a truly memorable one!

CANBERRA. AUSTRALIA NOVEMBER 1989 Page

PREFACE and ACKNOWLEDGMENT ii

TABLE OF CONTFNTR 1

MAPS AND FIGURES

I INTRODUCTION 2

II GEO-STRATEGIC ASPECT OF CAM RANH BAY 1 0

1. Historical Aspect 2. US Infrastucture until 1979 3. Soviet Activities and Infrastructure from 1979 4. Sea Lines of Communications ( SLOCs)

III KEY AND PERIPHERAL 'ACTORS' 4 3

1.USSR 2. SRV 3. PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) 4. ASEAN 5. USA 6. AUSTRALIA 7. JAPAN

IV "A PAWN FOR A QUEEN" 73

V CONCLUSION 82 BIBLIOGRAPHY 87 ANNEX Maps and Figurftc;

1. Map of Southeast Asia/South China Sea 2. Map of Cam Ranh Bay 3. Encirclement of China 4. Global Deployment of Soviet Forces 5. Map of the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk 6. Map of the 'Choke Points' 7. Soviet Naval Aviation Operating Areas Bear D & F 8. Range of the Badgers 9. Range of the Backfires 10. Sea Lines of Communications 11. Map of Davao Gulf and the Straits 12. Map of Australia and the South Pacific 13. Outline of Soviet Naval Activities and Military Aircraft Around Japan 14. Chinese Illustration of the Geographical Importance of Cam Ranh Bay

FIGURES 1 & 2 - Aerial Photographs of Cam Ranh Bay CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

On 28 July 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), delivered in the Soviet Far East city of Vladivostock a major policy speech which touched on both domestic and foreign issues. But the speech clearly "served notice that the Soviet Union would engage in international relations as an Asian-Pacific power as much as a European power".

The Soviet Union's identity as an Asian-Pacific power is critical to Gorbachev's twin concerns of the security of the USSR and the resuscitation of its economy. Vladivostock was clear evidence of Gorbachev's deft application of 'linkage diplomacy'. His own version of strategic parity with the US dealt with 'two birds with one stone' - parity with the US on his own terms (the INF Treaty) and his European "double zero option" linked with his economic restructuring goals.

Also in his Vladivostock speech, Gorbachev once again revived the idea of an Asian Collective Security System but this time almost entirely different from the Brezhnev proposal. It was more directed towards China enticing it into participating in a new Asian socialist community.

In July 1987, a three-day meeting of Asian communist parties was convened in Ulan Bator, Mongolia at which it was agreed to promote Soviet proposals for a collective security system in the Asia-Pacific region. This was the first ever meeting

^ Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (ed), The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostock Initiative, West View Press Inc., Macmillan Australia, 1987, p. 2. of this type held in Asia.^

The American withdrawal from the former Republic of (South) Vietnam (RVN) led to the subsequent fall of the Saigon government in 1975. This and the ascendancy of a unified Vietnam have rendered imperative a re-evaluation of the regional power equation and balance in Southeast Asia and even in the Pacific. Before the fall of South Vietnam, the South China Sea was virtually an "American lake" on account of the American naval and air presence in bases therein particularly in Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay and the US bases, Clark and Subic in the Philippines.

The US withdrawal from Vietnam left a power vacuum which the Soviet Union was just as eager to fill in but at the same time anxious in making sure that China should not fill in. The significance of Southeast Asia to the Soviet Union is that it is an area where access to other regions and where pressure can be applied to its adversaries, the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) and the United States (US).^ Soviet policy in this region should be taken as part of its global strategy rather than an isolated regional issue.

The Asia-Pacific region (APR) is where the interests and borders of four of the five main power centers of the world, the US, China, USSR, and Japan intersect."^ In 1916, V. I. Lenin said that Russia geographically, economically and historically belonged

^ Carlyle A. Thayer, "Kampuchea: Soviet Initiatives and Regional Responses", Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (ed), The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostock Initiative, p. 187.

^ Leszek Buszynski, "Gorbachev and Southeast Asia: Prospects for the 1990s", Ross Babbage (ed), The Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, Brasseys Australia, 1989, p. 9.

^ Henry Trofimenko, "Long Term Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region, A Soviet Evaluation", Asian Survey, Vol XXIX, No. 3, March 1989, p. 239. not only to Europe but also to Asia. It is further bolstered by the fact that one third of Asia lies within the geographical limits of the country.5

There are various interpretations of the Soviet Union's presence in Indochina especially in Cam Ranh Bay. On one hand, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) has persistently maintained that there are no Russian 'bases' in that country although port calls by Soviet ships and aircraft are made on a regular basis. There have been reports that these 'bases' are off-limits to the Vietnamese themselves. On the other, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin in a visit to Japan in 1979 confirmed that the presence of Soviet ships and aircraft is in consonance with the Russo-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in November 1978. The arguments may be purely semantics but both the SRV and the USSR acknowledge that the Soviets are accorded military 'facilities' thereat. Others call it by a host of names, i.e., facilities, pit stop, forward deployment bases, support bases and supply points.

Therefore, this thesis will look at the development of the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay, its origins, reasons/rationale for such presence, its implications and the prospects and outlook beyond the 1990s.^ It will also focus on operational as well as support aspects of the Soviet military presence as these will give indications whether the base is fully under Soviet control. Another consideration is whether the Soviet infrastructures are intended to

Mikhail Nossov, "USSR and Security of the Asia-Pacific Region, From Vladivostock to Krasnoyarsk", Asian Survey, Vol XXIX, No.3, March 1989, p. 253.

The Soviets are also in Da Nang, Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa. Please see pages 36-37.The emphasis is on Cam Ranh because in June 1979, units were moved from Da Nang into Cam Ranh. It is in Cam Ranh where tactical as well as strategic forces are deployed. Soviet presence at Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa is considered of less significance compared with Cam Ranh. be permanent or simply transient. It will thus give a clear description whether these facilities are intended to be forward bases or simply refueling stations. The latter category has lesser support capabilities and significance than the former.

In my review of background literature, I identified articles written by notable authors like Douglas Pike, William Duiker, Nayan Chanda, Alvin Bernstein, Derek Da Cunha, Leszek Buszyinski, Paul Dibb and Lt. Col. Dion Johnson. It is my hope that this thesis will be able to contribute more to public knowledge and debate on this particular subject. I was fortunate enough to come across a treasure chest-full of reference materials all painstakingly but professionally compiled. Others I had to cross check for references. By and large, inspite of the numerous articles written about Cam Ranh Bay, there are still unanswered questions and new developments that need explanation, IQ_., the possible deployment of the Backfire bombers, the unusual Soviet interest in Kampuchean ports and bases; my own theory of an evolving defence 'burden sharing' - Soviet style with Vietnam and India, for both to assume the role of SLOC interdiction in their respective areas of influence; and the Soviet afloat concept of command, control and communications (C^) which indicates non-permanency. This concept is further coupled with afloat repair capability by use of tenders and movable floating drydocks without having to depend on permanent shore-based facilities.

Chapter I is an introduction of the subject matter. The choice of the title "Cam Ranh Bay Revisited..." refers to more than a decade of Soviet presence there and a host of events that happened thereafter, Lg.., the 11-year Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and their recent withdrawal, the intrusion of the Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk into the Gulf of Thailand, the reported deployment of the Backfire bombers and the Bear long range reconnaissance aircraft, and the presence of nuclear submarines.

Significantly, the Gorbachev Vladivostock initiative brings altogether a new dimension of Soviet interest in Asia and the Pacific. The basic outline of the Soviet Union's approach to enhancing security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region has been formulated in the two well-known speeches by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostock in July 1986 and in Krasnoyarsk in September 1988. The Vladivostock program as developed in the later speech at Krasnoyarsk, outlined the developing trends in Soviet policies in the region."^ The Soviets are ready to take practical steps to implement the ideas and schemes for the tripartite economic activities in the region involving Soviet, Chinese and Japanese firms or enterprises.®

The second Chapter deals with the geo-strategic aspect of Cam Ranh Bay. It begins by taking into account a historical view when the Russian fleet dropped anchor on its way to the Tsushima Strait in 1905. While it may have been recognized that the bay offered a suitable deep water harbor and port, not much of any infrastructure was built. During the French period, only a few shore batteries and port facilities were constructed. Cam Ranh Bay gained prominence only with the arrival of the U.S. from 1965 to 1973 in the prosecution of the Second Indochina War. This chapter also details the various infrastructure built by the US until its departure in 1975.

It was reported that not much was done by the Vietnamese to improve whatever facilities were left by the US after that time. It was not until after the signing of the Treaty of

^ Nossov, dt., p. 253. ^ Trofimenko, Q^. dt., p. 249. Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and Vietnam in November 1978 that the Soviet presence began to take a firm hold in those facilities, in February 1979, at the height of the Sino- Vietnamese border war, the presence of Soviet ships, laying off the waters in Haiphong and Cam Ranh Bay, was reported. Thereafter, Soviet presence in terms of naval and air forces increased significantly. This chapter also discusses the importance of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) from the Persian Gulf to Northeast Asia where trade and transit of oil-carrying tankers occur. This gives the geographic location of Cam Ranh Bay, laying astride this SLOC, the significance that it provides.

Chapter III discusses the various interests of "power centers" in the region namely, the US, USSR, PRC, SRV, Japan, ASEAN and Australia comprising both sides of the regional power equation. The Gorbachev Vladivostock initiative brings to the fore the desire of the Soviet Union to establish its presence more in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The Krasnoyarsk speech in September 1988 further discussed in detail the Vladivostock program. The unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from the European theatre can be seen as a subtle but deliberate move by Moscow in shifting the 'center of gravity' from Europe where NATO stands in a superior position. This grand design is further coupled with the scrapping of long range ballistic missiles in that area under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This confirms implicitly that the USSR in a major confrontation with the US, would want to create and limit itself to one front rather than having to contend with Western forces simultaneously in Europe and in Asia in a two-front war.

It has been a consensus among Western military analysts that the Soviet Far Eastern Forces' main strategic mission in the event of an East-West military confrontation is to deter the 8

opening of a second front from forward deployed US, Japanese and Chinese forces. On the other, based on the 'Lehman Doctrine',^ any Soviet aggression in Europe or anywhere else would be met by the US by opening a second front in the Far East and to prevent Soviet transfer of Far Eastern forces to Europe.

Chapter IV provides a critical analysis of the role of Cam Ranh Bay in the power equation in terms of opportunities (for the Soviets), challenges (to the US) and, threat (to the SLOC), with the Soviet military presence thereat. The importance of the US bases in the Philippines as a countervailing factor to the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay and its prospects beyond 1991 are also extensively discussed. The chapter also discusses the Gorbachev proposal to trade off the Cam Ranh Bay Soviet facilities should the US do likewise with Clark and Subic in the Philippines. While it may seem attractive to scores of advocates of the neutrality concept (ZOPFAN), others claim however that it's just like trading off a 'pawn for a queen'.

In early October 1989, a Soviet political analyst with the Novosti Press Agency predicted that the USSR would end its use of the military facilities in Cam Ranh Bay."" ^

Finally, based on all of the foregoing discussion, the conclusion provides a perspective on the strategic significance of Cam Ranh Bay, then, and now. After ten years, the South China Sea is not the same again as the shadow of the Russian 'bear' looms largely over the 'radar' horizon. The South China Sea is no longer an

^ Developed during the Reagan administration and as propounded by then Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman. It is commonly called " US Maritime Strategy".

^ ° Derek Da Cunha, "The Soviet Naval Capabilities in the Pacific in the 1990s", Ross Babbage (ed), The Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, Brasseys Australia, 1989, pp. 68-69.

^ Washington Times, 3 Oct. 1989. 'American lake'. In a US-Soviet confrontation in this part of the world, the sea lines of communication (SLOC) may get to be more stretched in a circuituous route, at worst-closed.

As an epilogue, the prognosis looks to a brighter future. The proverbial "light at the end of the tunnel" for peace is becoming brighter at every twist and turn along the path. The latest withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea signals that future. Since Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 with his twin program of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness), the world has seen initiatives at seeking world peace in major conflict areas. Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan, the INF Treaty was signed and lately, Vietnam has ended its eleven-year occupation of Kampuchea. Sino-Soviet rapprochment has warmed up, capped with the Sino-Soviet Summit in Beijing in May 1989. From his Vladivostock speech in 1986 to Krasnoyarsk in 1988, Gorbachev put forward bold peace proposals for the Asia-Pacific region urging the US and other major powers (China and Japan) to respond. If the desired responses come about, the 1990s and the turn of the century will augur well for global peace. 10

I I GEO-STRATEGIC ASPECT OF CAM RANH BAY

1, Historical Aspect

Cam Ranh literally means 'Sweet Stream'. It lies north of Saigon along the Vietnam coast. One of the great natural harbors of the world, Cam Ranh Bay is wide, deep and sheltered. It was used by the French Navy since they first visited the Vietnam area in 1847. The French had built harbor defense artillery emplacements to protect its approaches, and a few small military compounds. Notwithstanding its favorable characteristics, the French preferred to build ports at the two largest cities of Saigon and Da Nang.

In 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, the Imperial Russian fleet used Cam Ranh as a stopover point. It was Vice Adm. Zinovi Rozhdestvensky's squadron of 37 ships on its way from homeports in the Baltic to Tsushima Strait. The Russians were refused permission to land at Singapore and were forced to refuel at the French Indochinese port of Cam Ranh Bay. The trip of 4,500 miles from Madagascar was to be the longest non-stop sea voyage by coal-fired ships to date. There in Tsushima, in the waterway between Japan and Korea, they met defeat and destruction at the hands of the Japanese navy commanded by Adm. Togo.''^

During World War II, it was also extensively used by Japanese warships in their southward thrust against Malaya and Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies.

The geo-strategic significance of Cam Ranh Bay arises from its position astride the South China Sea. It is a region where trade and commerce pass through and more importantly where vital oil-carrying tankers pass from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean

^ Richard Natkiel, Alias of Battles, Bison Books Ltd, London, 1984, pp. 15-17. 11

thence to the South China Sea. From the east, the Indian Ocean may be entered by passing Singapore via the Malacca Strait to the Andaman Sea. The Sunda and Lombok Straits are two more main gates from the east and there are nine other passages between Java and Wetar, 800 miles to the east. These passages are inside Indonesian territorial waters and navigation through these entrances is difficult. Another entrance to the Indian Ocean is by way of the Timor Sea where the neck is 250 miles wide and easier to navigate. Failing these approaches, the Indian Ocean may be entered from the east by passing south of Australia. (Map 1 - Southeast Asia)

The distances involved are considerable; from the South Ch ina Sea to Colombo via Malacca Strait, 2,100 miles; via the Sunda Strait, 2,500 miles; via the Lombok Strait, 3,485 miles, via the Timor Sea, 5,085 miles, and around Australia, 9,750 miles.

It is said that in the 1980s, the US was importing as much as 50% of its oil from the Middle East. Europe already gets 60% of its oil from the Persian Gulf area, while Japan gets 90%. Any nation that could dominate the South China Sea could exert pressure over the world's vital shipping routes from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean.

2. US Infrastructure (Until 1975)

One of the champions of development of this huge bay was Admiral Harry D. Felt, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), the overall military commander of the Pacific area and Southeast Asia. As the building boom progressed in South Vietnam, new interest in Cam Ranh as a harbor grew in 1963. His proposal Kong lUK! y ^ V Macao (Plkmii-iiI.

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was to build at least one up-to-date pier for deep-water ships at Cam Ranh. He had his way.

The first RMK (Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen) personnel came to Cam Ranh Bay on 2 May 1963. They set up offices and quarters in the former French military barracks near the pier site. The causeway construction was started on July 12th."'3 The pier was nearly finished the first week in April, 1964, and the concrete decking was completed on April 15th. It was June before the causeway, the pierfender system, the water system, and the powerhouse, POL tanks and paving had been completed. The pier project was finished at a cost of about $ 1.6 million on 23 July 1964.

The buildup of facilities in Cam Ranh Bay was again reactivated in the early summer months of 1965.''^ Within the first 30 days, Engineers had lengthened the existing 1,100-foot landing strip to 1,400 feet and built new roads or reinforced existing ones in the southern part of the peninsula. They had also started to extend the 300-foot-long pier, built by RMK in 1963-64, to 600-foot length. This provided two berths for full-size deep- water freighters.''^ Equipment storage platforms, a Petrol-Oil- Lubricants (POL) storage area and temporary motor pools were added by the middle of August.

1966 saw the addition of the four deep-draft DeLong piers to the one shorter (300 feet) deep water pier which had been built in 1963-64 by RMK. The four DeLong piers were finished in January, October (two) and December."'® An outstanding

^ Richard Tregaskis, Southeast Asia; Building the Bases, The History of Construction in Southeast Asia, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p. 45. jm., p. 140. ^ IM., p. 142. 1 3

contribution in expediting the port construction program was made by using DeLong Floating Piers. These patented products of the DeLong Corporation are sectional and can be fabricated outside of the theatre of operations in a variety of sizes and configurations, towed to a site, and quickly emplaced. These piers made it possible to develop additional deep-draft ports and berths at Qui Nhon, Vung Tau, Cam Ranh Bay, Vung Ro and Da Nang in record time.

The first DeLong pier with all its equipment and spare parts was towed to Cam Ranh Bay from the east coast of the United States in a trip that took two months. The first pier was essentially a 90 x 300 foot barge supported by eighteen tubular steel caissons six feet in diameter and fifty feet long. The additional caisson sections were joined end-to-end to provide the required length. Collars attached to the pier caissons were driven into the harbor bottom, and pneumatic jacks, which were a part of the collars, were then used to jack the barge up on its legs to a usable height. The first DeLong pier, completed in mid-December 1965, doubled the capacity of the Cam Ranh Bay port.''^ It has demonstrated that significant savings in time and material could be had with the DeLong pier compared to an equivalent timber-pile pier.

The two existing piers for deep-draft vessels still lacked in-transit storage areas, so a sheet-pile bulkhead was constructed between the causeways to each pier. The area behind the bulkhead was filled in using a 30-inch pipeline dredge and 96,000 cubic yards of material. The surface was then stabilized to provide a large cargo-handling area.

p. 238. Lt. Gen. Carroll H. Dunn, Vietnam Studies: Base Development in South Vietnam, 1965- 1970, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. , p. 55. 1 4

Work started on the third general cargo pier at Cam Ranh Bay in May 1966. This was a two-barge DeLong pier ninety feet wide by six hundred feet long.

With the addition of the third and fourth DeLong piers, and more than 3,000 linear feet of bulkhead, the port facility formed a major part of the logistical area at Cam Ranh Bay, which became one of the largest in the Republic of Vietnam. (Map 2 - Cam Ranh Bay)

There was a considerable difference between building in Saigon and Da Nang as compared to Cam Ranh. Before the Americans arrived to build the first relatively small (300 foot) deep water pier in 1963-64, Cam Ranh was largely a vast sandy seaside waste with Sahara-like dunes which had to be moved before any sizeable installations could be successfully constructed.

The Port of Saigon and, to a lesser extent, the port of Cam Ranh Bay were the only harbors in South Vietnam capable of docking deep-draft oceangoing vessels before the force buildup in early 1965. Cam Ranh Bay had at that time only one deep-draft pier in operation which was insufficient for existing and projected cargo handling requirements."'®

It was acknowledged by the US that Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay were fine natural harbors that could be developed into ports capable of docking deep-draft oceangoing vessels with a reasonable amount of effort and cost.""^

Ibid., p. 50. 19 Ibid., p. 38. SOUTH CKHA S£A

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But the general requirements were the same as at Da Nang and Saigon; deep water port, Army and Air Force barracks, and extensive airbase building were also built at Cam Ranh Bay ^^

Both the Army and the Air Force saw the great value in having major operational and depot facilities at Cam Ranh. It also became one of the bases for the Navy's MARKET TIME coastal patrol operations. There was also a large Navy communications station, and a naval air station at the Cam Ranh airfield site.

The most-urgent-priority job of the RMK-BRJ crews was to build a temporary 10,000-foot runway which would accommodate the most advanced fighter-bombers in the US military arsenal, the F-4s. The Cam Ranh runway was finished on Oct.16,1965, 50 days after the start.^^ Cam Ranh Bay became the second largest port in Vietnam (next to Saigon) and the third- busiest airbase (behind Saigon and Da Nang).

The airfield project was the largest job undertaken at Cam Ranh. Though not as large as the airfield at Da Nang or Saigon (Tan Son Nhut-Bien Hoa), it included aircraft parking areas, storehouses, barracks complexes and a new 10,000 foot Portland cement runway and taxiway. It was formidable in size, especially considering that the "interim" airfield, taxiways and parking facilities of aluminum planking were maintained side by side with the new concrete facilities.^^

The first jet fighter aircraft were scheduled to arrive on 1 November 1965. However, the fuel supply available was inadequate, so in early October, work started on a 400-foot timber Tregaskis, o^. ck., p. 275. 21 p. 145. 22 I^., p. 277. 1 6

fuel jetty extending out to the five and a half fathom line.

Cann Ranh Bay became less important for direct support of ground operations, but it developed into a theater depot and an inter theatre air terminal. These four deep draft ports - Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon - became keystones of the base development plan and the centers of what eventually became semi- autonomous logistical enclaves. A fighter-bomber and logistics terminal was built at Cam Ranh Bay.

By late 1966, the Cam Ranh Bay complex supported the operations of 8,000 combat troops (including 2,400 Republic of Korea, ROK) and 11,100 combat support troops (including 2,000 ROK), as well as 17,000 service support troops on a direct basis. By May 1967, the Port could handle simultaneously, 8 deep-draft cargo vessels plus one tanker. The major logistical and support facilities included:^^ 1. Deepwater port with ten berths at Cam Ranh Bay 2. Depot at Cam Ranh 3. LST ports at Nha Trang, Phan Rang and Tuy Hoa 4. Jet airfields at Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Rang 5. Six other airstrips of which five were C-130 capable 6. Market Time facilities

The Cam Ranh Bay base was the American answer to a major problem in Vietnam War; finding ways and means of feeding, clothing, housing, arming, supplying and resupplying the powerful military machine the US installed in Southeast Asia 11,000 miles from its home base.^^

^ Dunn, cit., p. 68. ^ K. M. Chrysler, US News and World Report, 11 Oct. 1965. 1 7

After 1975, Vietnam had ready made military facilities for a superpower such as the Soviet Union. The airfields at Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon, plus the deep water port of Cam Ranh Bay were ready-made for long-range planes, ships and submarines.

Published reports about Soviet operations at Cam Ranh Bay have referred to them using a port and military base that the US built at a cost of $ 2.0 billion during the Vietnam War. US officials say however, that there is no $ 2.0 billion base in Cam Ranh that has been taken over by the Soviets. The US stripped the installation during its military withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972 and 1973. All the base equipment were removed, officials say. The only thing left was the 10,000-foot concrete runway, a few concrete piers and a few buildings. The bay was left so desolate that the Saigon government never did anything about long-range plans to develop an industrial center there. In 1979, the Soviets have not done any construction on the bay, reports say, and have not brought in equipment needed to operate a naval base there.^^

3. Soviet Activities and Infrastructure

In 1975, Moscow indeed had unsuccessfully pressed for military facilities - something they would not get for four more years with the deepening of Vietnam's conflict with China.^^

Around mid-1978 there were strong rumors, spread by the Chinese, that the USSR had acquired naval base facilities in Cam Ranh Bay and was assisting the Vietnamese in the construction

25 Washington Star, 19 May 1979. ^ Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy, The War after the War, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, Orlando Florida, 1986, p. 23. 1 8

of a string of missile sites along the China border and around the Port of Haiphong.

Vietnam has reportedly "allowed" the Soviet Union use of the vast naval base built by the United States at Cam Ranh Bay in South Vietnam.in 1975 after the fall of Saigon, there were no restrictions in the Cam Ranh Bay district. By 1979 entry into it was forbidden. The sea there is full of Soviet ships according to Chinese refugees from Vietnam interviewed in southern China by Mr. Howard Chao, a member of Yale's East Asia Language and Literature Research Center.

In February 1979, with a potential Chinese invasion force poised on Vietnam's northern border, the Soviet Union concentrated a war fleet off the Vietnamese coast. The build-up was said to be in two parts. One was a task force of seven ships situated between the southern Chinese island of Hainan and the northern Vietnamese coast. It had two small gunships and five intelligence-gathering vessels.^^ The other was more widely dispersed and included a heavy 15,000-ton Kresta Class cruiser, a guided missile frigate and two auxiliary ships situated further off the Vietnamese coast in the South China Sea.

Then Soviet warships, in a move that confirmed long time fears of the US naval staff, began using Vietnamese ports for the first time since before World War II. A Soviet guided-missile cruiser, a frigate and a minesweeper put into Cam Ranh Bay on 27 March 1979, where the United States^ built a huge $2.0 billion f military complex during the Vietnam War.^^ u r''

[/F/, 8 June 1978. New York Times, 8 Feb. 1979. Washington Star, 29 March 1979. 1 9

Following closely on this development, in April 1979, two big Tupolev 95D Bear electronic intelligence planes landed in Vietnam to refuel and rest their crews for the first time. Use of the Vietnamese airfields would then have the effect of more than doubling the area the planes can cover with their 7,800-mile range, military analysts said. This would give the Soviet Union far greater ability to patrol along the Chinese and Japanese coasts and track the American 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans.^o

Nevertheless, Vietnam had assured the former UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim that the facilities at Cam Ranh would not become a Soviet base and would remain a Vietnamese port.

Former Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev had also assured the United States that the Soviet Union will not establish military bases in Vietnam. President Carter said Brezhnev made that assurance personally to him when the two leaders met in Vienna for three days of talks in June 1979 at the signing of the new strategic arms limitations treaty (SALT).^^

Vietnam declared that it will not allow the Soviet Union to establish military bases but would continue to let Moscow's ships use its ports. A Foreign Ministry statement carried by the Vietnam News Agency said that the use of the ports by Soviet ships "is completely in keeping with legal practise and principle widely accepted in the international community.

Baltimore Sun, 14 April 1979. Straits Times, 28 April 1979. Washington Post. 24 June 1979. 33 International Herald Tribune, 12-13 May 1979. 20

But as early as 1979, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin told the opening session of Soviet-Japanese consultations that Russian vessels had sailed into Cam Ranh Bay under terms of a friendship treaty Hanoi and Moscow signed in November 1978 This statement finally confirmed that warships of the Soviet Union were using Vietnam's huge military base at Cam Ranh Bay. Firyubin further stated that "The Soviet Union is using military facilities in Vietnam in order to carry out its obligations set under the Russo-Vietnamese friendship and alliance treaty.

In May 1979, American spy satellites photographed at least one Soviet Foxtrot submarine sailing in and out of Cam Ranh. In the view of US Navy intelligence, not only was Vietnam shaping up as a launching site for Soviet reconnaissance missions by the TU 95 Bear bombers, and surface ships, but it was also becoming a stopover point for submarines on their way to and from the Indian Ocean.it was the widening Soviet use of Vietnam as a military base that worried US intelligence.

According to information circulating among Vietnamese troops in 1979, the Soviet ships were stationed in Cam Ranh Bay to help the weak Vietnamese navy defend itself. In addition, it was said that the Soviet ships would help Vietnam protect the Huangsha (Paracels) Islands.

In May 1979, US intelligence had discovered the Soviet Union was also installing an electronic eavesdropping station at Cam Ranh Bay, NBC reported. The Soviet listening post was a Signals Intelligence Station. NBC said "Administration sources believe the station is designed to let the Russians eavesdrop on

^ International Herald Tribune, 15 May 1979. Japan Times, 15 May 1979. Washington Post, 10 May 1979. 21

Chinese transmission".^^

A detachment of the Soviet Navy under the command of Vice Admiral N. Yasakov, first deputy commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, marked the first anniversary of the Vietnam-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with a visit to Haiphong in November 1979.^8 jhe visit of the Soviet naval force was seen in the light of a possibility of a 'second lesson' from China. Earlier, Ch ina launched an attack on February 1979 on Vietnam's northern border provinces which it said was aimed at 'teaching Hanoi a lesson'. Yasakov made another visit with a naval task force in 1981.

In Cam Ranh, fuel storage at a current capacity of four million gallons was expanded. A seventh pier was constructed which had boosted dock space by 20% and additional buildings and roads have been added.^^ Floating piers were also constructed in 1980.

In 1984, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, Richard Armitage was quoted as sayingi'^o

The Soviets have built their own installations, but they have not taken over any large compounds that we built there. They have their own little sections. They still have a sand-bag type appearance.

Soviet Objectives in Indochina

The post-Vietnam war vacuum caused by the

^ International Herald Tribune, 14 May 1979. Japan Times, 4 Nov. 1979. ^ Leszeck Buszynski, "Gorbachev and Southeast Asia: ...", o^. dt., p. 97. ^ FEEJ^, 6 Sep. 1984. 22

termination of US presence, has provided the Soviets the opportunity to expand their influence and perhaps gain the advantage over their remaining rival, the PRC. While the region's remoteness undoubtedly lends it a lower priority in Soviet planning than areas such as Europe, Northeast Asia or the Middle East, there are significant reasons for Soviet interest in expanding their influence, and, as an ultimate goal, of establishing a military presence. Soviet interests in the area can be defined in terms of:^''

(1) containing the spread of Chinese power and influence, (2) limiting the latitude of the US to act as a Pacific power (3) improving their own posture in the Pacific/Indian Ocean region.

A. Containing China

With the US presence in Southeast Asia significantly reduced, the Soviets in 1975-79 have publicly and privately stated that their primary concern is the growth of Chinese influence in the area. In their view, the PRC's main thrust was to the South (i.e.., towards Indochina) and, they feel that "their competition with Peking is virtually a zero-sum game, in which China's gain is by definition their loss". Thus, in their view, the preservation of Soviet interests in Indochina can be achieved only if Chinese influence is held in check.

Beyond maintaining the regional status quo, the Soviets viewed Indochina in the light of an encirclement policy analoguous to the US Cold War policy of geographic "containment" of China. This policy would help prevent the spread of Chinese influence. Map

Charles McGregor, The Sino-Vietnamese Relationship and the Soviet Union, Adelphi Paper 232, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1988, pp. 58-60. 23

3 shows that the inclusion of Indochina in an encirclement strategy, along with the USSR and India, would restrict China's immediate geographic access for influence to North Korea, Taiwan, Burma.and the rest of Southeast Asia.

Indochina as a Soviet military base could expose the PRC's southern flank in the event of a Sino-Soviet conflict. From airfields in Vietnam, Soviet Badgers could threaten much of southern China now out of range of aircraft (other than Backfires) based in the Soviet Far East or southern USSR. The existence of such a threat on their southern border probably would stir the Chinese to redeploy at least some forces into the area, potentially weakening them in the north where the main Soviet attacks would most likely to occur.

B. Limiting the US

While the usefulness of Indochina against the PRC probably would be paramount in Soviet planning, the Soviets would also recognize that bases there could potentially allow them to countervail US power in the Pacific region. From Indochina, the Soviets could threaten both Pacific and Indian Ocean Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and that such threat would force the US to increase its force levels in the area. This would have the effect of US forces spread thinly thereby reducing their capability to attack the USSR mainland in Northeast Asia. The Soviets probably would view such refocusing of US effort as a major step toward avoiding a 'two-front' war on their own soil. More important, however, would be the Soviet capability to threaten US presence in the Philippines. At present, the Philippines contain the only US bases near mainland Asia which are not vulnerable to combined Soviet air and naval attack from existing bases in the Soviet Far East. Because of MAP 3 - SOVIET ENCIRCLEMENT STRATEGY OF CHINA 24

this strategic location, the bases play an important role in the US Pacific command, control and communications structure and in time of conflict would serve as the hub of US Indian Ocean/Pacific convoy system. That has changed. Soviet bases in Indochina could now threaten this sanctuary!

C. Expanding Soviet Power

interactions with the US and the PRC notwithstanding, a Soviet presence in Indochina, even short of full base status, enhances Soviet prestige as a Pacific power. At a minimum, it provides a forward base for the further spread of Russian influence in Southeast Asia.

Moreover, a strong Russian presence in Indochina demonstrates to the other countries of the region that Russia is a power to be reckoned with. Those countries probably would become increasingly prone to seek an accommodation with the Soviets; at the least, they might find some form of "neutrality" more attractive than developing close ties with the US. Beyond this, the Soviets now have a physical base from which to export their influence into the region through diplomatic, cultural, propaganda or revolutionary channels.

Even more direct benefits are derived in terms of support for the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. Naval support facilities in Indochina, greatly facilitate communication between the Pacific Fleet and units deployed in the Indian Ocean.

Such facilities support operations in either area, and make the transit between them easier. Finally, in the event of conflict with the US, bases in Indochina would serve as alternatives to those in the Soviet Far East, thereby providing a 25

measure of protection against getting the fleet 'bottled up' in Petropavlovsk or Vladivostock.

The Soviet Threat

A Soviet threat emanating from Vietnam probably would consist of air and naval elements, and would be limited in size. A major ground presence would be of little value to the Soviets unlike in Mongolia, Northeast Asia or Eastern Europe.

Logistics constraints however would limit the size of the air and naval force that could be deployed to Vietnam because resupply would require overflight of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Burma, and Laos, or sea transit from the Middle East or the Soviet Far East. During a conflict, these routes would be long, difficult, and vulnerable, and if interdicted, the Soviets would be forced to rely on stockpiles built up in Vietnam.

Remoteness from USSR also places Indochina low in strategic priority, and this would further reinforce any decision to keep the Vietnam force small. Moreover, assets deployed to the area probably would be drawn from Soviet Far East holdings, leading to a degradation of their position in Northeast Asia.

It is therefore but proper at this juncture to assess the potential Soviet threat emanating from Vietnam.

The Soviet Navy today is the world's largest navy.'^^

^ Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, Washington, D. C., Fifth Edition, April 1985, US Government Printing 26

For operational and administrative efficiency, the Soviet Navy is divided in four geographically grouped Fleets: the Black Sea Fleet based at Sevastopol; the Baltic Fleet divided into the Northern Group based in Tallin and a Southern Group based at Baltiisk; the Northern Fleet based at Murmansk and the Pacific Fleet divided into a Northern Group based at Petropavlovsk and a Southern Group based at Vladivostock. To date there is nothing definite about a fleet of the Soviet Navy designated for the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union draws its naval deployment for the area partly from the Black Sea Fleet and largely from its Pacific Fleet in Vladivostock. (Map 4 - Global Deployment of Soviet Forces)

The Soviet Pacific Fleet has expanded in recent years and is now second to the Northern Fleet in capabilities. It operates from three bases in the Soviet Union itself; Vladivostock, Petropavlovsk and Sovetskaya Gavan.^3 when its ships need to reach open sea from either Vladivostock or Sovetskaya Gavan, they must cross the Sea of Japan and then pass through one of the three relatively narrow straits- Tsushima, Tsugaru, or Soya (La Perouse as it is sometimes called). (Map 5 - Seas of Japan and Okhotsk)

Tsushima- between Japan and South Korea, and within range of US bases on Okinawa - is inhospitable to the Soviets. Soya freezes over during the winter. The Soviet Union therefore must rely heavily on the Tsug aru Strait. The other, Petropavlovsk, is located well north and east of Soya Strait, developed since the war on isolated Kamchatka peninsula, chiefly for submarines, and is the only major Soviet base with unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean, though it too is icebound several months every year. Key supplies must be shipped by sea before the onset of the long northern winter. Yet the Soviets are secure in these bases. Of the

Office, p. 26. ^ AJvin Bernstein, "The Soviets in Cam Ranh Bay", Quadrant, (Sydney), July-August 1986. MAP ^ - GLOBAL DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET FORCES

Global Deployment of Soviet Forces

Sea areas where the Soviet liMii? forces are concentrated navy is deployed I j Sea areas where the Soviet Sea areas where Soviet ' ' navy is active SSB/SSBN are active

--Snvipt V'ilir.^ry PpA-or" ^nd nth>vO Principal Soviet naval bases in the Far East

MAP 5 - MAP OF THE SEAS OF JAPAN AND OKHOTSK 27

minor bases in the Soviet Union, only Korsakov on the southern tip of Sakhalin astride the Soya Strait, warrants mention because it is supposedly being transformed into a major facility.

The Russians have been seeking warm water ports since the Tsars first flexed their imperialist muscles.Cam Ranh Bay gives them their first warm water port.

Several factors have contributed to the growth in the strength and importance of Moscow's Far Eastern naval arm;'^^ 1. A Soviet desire to ensure the security of the Pacific component of its sea-based strategic nuclear arsenal. 2. Soviet perceptions of geopolitical disadvantage in Northeast Asia and the need for a military response. 3. Soviet opportunism in Southeast Asia (L^., Vietnam) and its corollary- the establishment of a regional naval presence and 4. Soviet attempts to develop appropriate force structures and strategies for the conduct of warfare in geographically compartmentalized regions, conceptually known as theatres of military action.

Derek Da Cunha posits that with a few minor refinements, the hierarchy of wartime missions of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the 1990s is likely to remain similar to that which has been established since the early 1980s. He based this observation from two principal sources namely: the characteristics of its force structure and its program of exercises. He concludes that the Fleet's current mission structure in their order of importance are as follows;^®

^ Asiaweek, 24 Feb. 1984. ^ Derek da Cunha," Soviet Naval Capabilities dt., p. 47. Ibid., p. 49. 28

1. Strategic nuclear strike 2. Theatre nuclear strike 3. Tactical anti-submarine warfare in support of the ballistic missile submarine force 4. Anti-carrier operation in defense of the homeland 5. Strategic anti-submarine warfare (against the US ballistic missile submarine force) 6. Anti-sea line of communication operations

This analysis is pertinent when one looks into the mission and roles of the Soviet South China Sea and the Indian Ocean squadrons. These two subordinate force groupings draw their units from their mother Fleet which is the Soviet Pacific Fleet. At least 16 naval vessels are considered semi-permanent, which probably comprise the Soviet South China Sea squadron. Furthermore in the analysis is the intended theater of operations of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the event of a major conflict which is confined mainly in Northeast Asia specifically in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk.

The theory of a 'break-out' from these seas by the Soviet Pacific Fleet to engage the US carrier battle groups of the 7th Fleet in Northern Pacific has been rejected by Derek Da Cunha in which he stands firmly in the school of thought that the Soviet Fleet, primarily the SSBNs in their well entrenched bases, will undertake their first and primary mission of strategic nuclear retaliatory strike at targets in an arc in the US West Coast up to the Great Lakes.

On the other hand, US and allied (Japan, S. Korea) maritime strategy in Northeast Asia is to 'bottle up' the Soviet Fleet in those two primary seas and prevent a 'break out' - a 29

strategy which in the first place will never occur, theorizes Da Cu nha. This observation is well founded in all the previous exercises that the Soviet Pacific Fleet undertook. The Soviets feel that their nuclear submarines, well entrenched and protected in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk theater, will have an edge over the US 3rd and 7th Fleet.

The pattern of deployment in many respects is similar to that in the Atlantic - most SSBNs patrol waters close to the Soviet homeland with a few older YANKEES and DELTAs deployed near the US Pacific coast. New TYPHOONs augment the DELTA and the YANKEE class SSBNs comprising the Soviet naval front-line strategic strike force. Diesel powered submarines also continue to occupy an important place in Soviet submarine force. Difficult to detect when operating on their batteries, these submarines can be particularly effective in choke points, confined waters and in coastal defense missions.Deployment of these types may be expected more in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.

It is from this perspective that we look at the Soviet forces deployed on a rotation basis at Cam Ranh, can we conclude that in a major conflict, Cam Ranh Bay would serve both as a transit station and a staging area for a tactical feint. As transit station, it fulfills its role in the 'swing strategy' of shifting forces to and from the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean and vice- versa. 'On-station times' can further be extended without having to return to Vladivostock or Petropavlovsk. During peacetime, it just simply serves as a "pit stop" for units on their way to and from the Indian Ocean.

As a staging area for a tactical feint, Soviet air and naval forces in Cam Ranh Bay can undertake a surprise attack on Understanding Soviet Naval Deployments, op. cit., p. 29. 30

Subic and Clark. This in effect will divert US assets to deal with a Soviet "fleet in being". This can also minimize the likelihood of damage to the 'homeland'. Additionally, mining of Subic and the 'choke points' will entail substantial US/Allied forces to negate this secondary goal.

The majority of Soviet ships which deploy to the Indian Ocean make the long trip from the Pacific Ocean Fleet. On such long transits, the Soviets often tow submarines and smaller combatants as one way of reducing "wear and tear", extending the time between engine overhauls and conserving fuel.

The Soviets' need for port access and base facilities in the Indian Ocean is even greater than that in the Mediterranean Sea. Concerted Soviet efforts in this respect have resulted in access to facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen to support their Indian Ocean Squadron. Ethiopia's Dhalak Island in the Red Sea has become an especially important maintenance and resupply facility for Soviet navy ships and submarines.^® The facilities at Cam Ranh support the needs of the Indian Ocean Squadron.

Cam Ranh Bay gains prominence due to its geo-strategic location in that it lies at the front doorstep of the South China Sea, a busy and frequently used sea line of communication from Northeast Asia and the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. However taking the worst case scenario where the South China Sea is 'lost' to the Soviets, an alternative route can be had bypassing the Malacca Strait and instead pass through south of Sumatra thence to the 'choke points' namely Sunda or Lombok passing Makassar Strait going north towards Davao Gulf in the Philippines thence pass the eastern seaboard of the Philippines into the Pacific Ocean, keeping IMd., p. 24. 31

out of range of Soviet bombers and its submarines. (Map 6 - Choke Points)

The role of Indonesia, the Philippines and Australia in this alternative route can not be overemphasized. Indonesia's role will be to keep the 'choke points' open. The Philippines will increasingly have to guard entry points in the Balabac Strait and Bashi Channel to protect its eastern seaboard. Australia with its outposts in the Cocos and Christmas Islands'^^ will have the primary role of guarding the approaches from the Indian Ocean and Andaman Sea, the waters south of Sumatra all the way up to the 'choke points'. The other FPDA countries^o with their integrated air defence system can provide an early warning screen and tactical air units.

As stated earlier, in the hierarchy of mission priorities - the interdiction of military and civilian sea lines of communication - ranks lowest. Though low in priority, the Soviets realize its usefulness in terms of tying down a substantial number of enemy naval forces with only a few deployed units.

The Soviet Union has stationed nuclear powered attack , submarines in the South China Sea for the first time in an apparent demonstration of its power to disrupt some of the world's busiest e vx^' ' shipping lanes. The submarines, carrying sea-to-sea cruise missiles have for several months patrolled an area crisscrossed by shipping lanes linking the Middle East, Asia, Australia, North and South America.

Ross Babbage, Should Australia Plan to Defend Christmas and Cocos Islands?, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 45, ANU Canberra, 1988. ^ Five Power Defence Arrangement comprises UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. Derek Da Cunha , "Soviet Naval Capabilities...", ck., p. 51. MAP 6 - CHOKE POINTS 32

The submarines' activity increased when a Soviet navy submarine tender moved as depot ship to the former US naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in 1980. The submarines, from the Soviet classes designated Charlie and Echo by the West- were patrolling within reach of the Strait of Malacca, one of the commercial shipping's busiest channels which lies between Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula.

Prior to 1979, the Soviet Navy never kept submarines on a permanent basis in the South China Sea. They only passed through from their base at Vladivostock to the Indian Ocean. Since 1983, there had been a continuous Soviet Navy submarine presence there. The Echo-class submarine is equipped with cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warhead over 100 miles. The Charlie class carries cruise missiles that are believed to have a range of about 30 miles.

The use of Cam Ranh port facilities by general purpose submarine forces started as a replenishment stop for units enroute to or returning from Indian Ocean deployments. Facilities at Cam Ranh were used primarily for fresh water resupply and crew rest as well as minor repairs from on station submarine support ships. The recent history of submarine deployments to the South China Sea began with the Soviet reaction to the Chinese invasion of Vietnam.

The Minsk assigned to the Soviet Pacific Fleet in 1979 has made cruises to the South China Sea and an extended cruise to the Indian Ocean from Vladivostock, stopping each time in Cam Ranh Bay. The Novorossiysk the second aircraft carrier has been deployed in the Soviet Far East since February 1984.^^

International Herald Tribune, 2 May 1980. The Age, 18 April 1984. 33

In late March and early April 1980, the Ivan Rogov, one of the Soviet navy's newest amphibious assault transport docks, spent about two and a half weeks at Cam Ranh while deploying from Vladivostock to the Indian Ocean. The Rogov can carry an entire naval infantry battalion team, up to 500 men in assault and support roles, and is armed with both gun and missile armament and is equipped with six HORMONE-type light helicopters. The KOTLIN class guided missile destroyer, accompanied the Rogov to Cam Ranh and onward to the Indian Ocean. The LAMA class missile supply tender probably deployed to Cam Ranh primarily to provide contingency support for the Soviet Indian Ocean units, as there was no other Soviet naval activity at the time to warrant such deployment. By stopping at Cam Ranh, the LAMA was able to reduce by half the trip that would have been necessary if Cam Ranh had not been available.

In April 1984, some 400-500 Soviet troops staged their first amphibious landing manuevers along the coast of central Vietnam, about 100 miles south of Haiphong. Nine Soviet warships were employed in the exercise including the Ivan Rogov assault ship, Nikolayev landing ship and a Kiev-class aircraft carrier.

The sightings of OKEAN class intelligence collector, or AG! have also been reported. These vessels normally conduct patrols in the Philippine Sea, monitoring US activities, but now they are increasingly able to collect intelligence on Chinese activities as well as merchant shipping in the area. The AGIs in the past had to return to Vladivostock after completing their patrols. However, the availability of Cam Ranh allows these units to put into port for crew rest and replenishment after their cycle is complete. They are thus able to extend their deployment time while avoiding costly, time consuming returns to home port in the Soviet Union. 34

At the end of 1979, seven Soviet ships were observed in port. Their number has grown steadily to 10 in 1981, 12-15 in 1982, and 24 in 1983, and an average of 20-25 ships in 1984. About 6 to 10 were surface combatants, 5 to 6 were submarines (both nuclear and conventional) and 10 to 12 were support ships.Since mid-1982, several Charlie I nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines and Victor III nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) took turns to anchor at Cam Ranh as well as a significant number of Whiskey class conventional attack submarines.

In May 1983, the Soviets appeared to have established an afloat command authority in the Cam Ranh Bay area. The command group was first identified aboard the AMUR Class repair ship, and later moved to the DON Class submarine repair ship.

With the apparent centralization of naval forces surface, air and submarine at Cam Ranh and the identification of a command authority aboard the DON Class submarine repair ship, the Soviets appear to have established a base of operations in Vietnam to support a continued Soviet presence in the South China Sea. The continous deployment of some level of naval forces to this area has provided the Soviets with certain strategic advantages:

- Vietnamese facility use allows the Soviets to provide forward-deployed maintenance and replenishment support to Soviet units transiting to and from the Indian Ocean as well as quick reaction force to supplement the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron during a crisis situation.

^ Dion Johnson, Lt. Col., (USAF), Bear Tracks in Indochina, An Analysis of Soviet Presence in Vietnam, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1987, p. 57. 35

-South China Sea deployments, as well as the establishment of the FIX 24 intelligence collection site greatly improve the Soviet's ability to observe US and allied military and commercial traffic through the area-either transiting to or from the Indian Ocean, or in support of ASEAN allies.

The fact that the Soviets have been allowed almost 'unhampered' access to Cam Ranh, projects Soviet power deeply into the Southeast Asian region. This projection supports the Chinese contention that the Soviets continue to attempt to encircle them. To the other regional nations, such as the member states of ASEAN, the Soviet military presence in Vietnam have allowed the Soviets to exert greater political pressure in support of their regional objective.

Ground Forces

As stated earlier, the Soviet threat emanating from Vietnam probably would consist of air and naval elements. A ground presence would be of little value to them. However for base security purposes, Soviet troops have occupied four former US military bases in Vietnam with more than 3,000 officers and soldiers to operate them, the Daily Telegraph reported.^^ The London newspaper said the most important base taken over by the Soviets was Cam Ranh Bay. By 1980, other bases taken over by the Russians were Da Nang and two near Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) - Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut, the former US air force base.

The Chinese claimed that the Vietnamese themselves have actually been excluded from the base and the facilities are now run exclusively by the Soviets. Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, Richard Armitage, reported in

Quoted by UPI in Straits Times, 8 April 1980. 36

1984 that guard duty in the outer compound of Cam Ranh Bay was undertaken by the Vietnamese but that the Soviets look after the security of the inner compound.^®

After the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty in 1978, preparations were made to accommodate the Soviets at Cam Ranh Bay. Residents of My Ca were driven from the Cam Ranh peninsula. Likewise, residents of Ba Nguy, a small town on the west coast of the peninsula, were also driven away. They were replaced by public security men, government officials or dependents of army officers. In March 1979, construction begun on a new "Soviet village" in Cam Ranh. in early 1980, Vietnamese troops were ordered off the base and the Soviets began to take over the position, including its air and sea defence.^^

All told, between 3,000 and 4,000 Soviet officers and troops man the four bases. The presence of Soviet ground troops is basically for base security aside from operations and maintenance purposes only. It was reported that there are 2,000 Soviet military advisers and another 3,000 assigned to diplomatic, technical and support functions.

Air

In late March 1979, Soviet BEAR aircraft deployed at Da Nang began flying to Cam Ranh and in June moved their base of operations to Cam Ranh airfield. Improvements at Cam Ranh Bay airfield have been noted. The presence of radars indicated an all- weather, day/night capability for handling aircraft.

^ Alvin Bernstein, Cam Ranh Base Issue: The Multidimensional Impact of the Soviet Military Build-Up in Indochina, Conference paper presented in Singapore, 5-6 Oct. 1987. ^ Le Anh Tuan, "Who Actually Owns Cam Ranh Bay?" Beijing Review, No. 17, 23 April 1984, p.l3. 37

These developments suggested that the Soviets have centralized their Vietnam based military operations at Cam Ranh which is less congested and more secure than Da Nang.

Soviet naval aviation Tu 95/BEAR D operations in the South China Sea began with a series of maritime surveillance operations from their home base at Khoral East, in response to the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February-March 1979. TU 95/BEAR D aircraft began deploying to Da Nang in pairs for short periods. Then two TU 142/BEAR F aircraft arrived on 16 May 1979. Since then the Soviets have maintained four BEARs - two of each type at Da Nang and later at Cam Ranh airfield. The BEAR Ds conduct reconnaissance and intelligence collection patrols against US naval vessels and Ch inese targets. The BEAR Fs, which are anti-submarine warfare aircraft, also conduct long-range patrols from Da Nang to as far south as Natuna Island between east and west Malaysia and ranging north into the Bashi Channel separating Taiwan and the Philippines.^^ (Map 7 - Soviet Naval Aviation Operating Areas of Bear D & F)

In November 1983, deployment in Cam Ranh Bay of at least 10 Soviet Tu-16 Badger medium range bombers was reported. The Badgers have an unrefueled radius of 1,500 miles that could reach any number of US allies and installations in the region including the Philippines.^^ The Badgers extend Soviet strike capability to all ASEAN nations, the US Trust Territory of Guam and the western portion of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Map 8 - Range of Badgers).

^ Kensube Ebata, "Cam Ranh Bay: Forward Base of the Soviet Pacific Fleet", Jane's Defence Weekly, No. 2, 20 July 1984, p. 66. ^ The Star, 22 Dec. 1983. CHINA TAIWAN

.y Subic Bay ,

P hfl LI P P } N ES ' ^ J • - ' ." ;v

• -t

SPRATLY , ISLANDS f-

''MALAYSIA CELEBES SEA

BORNEO

q^ yS" Singapore CELEBES BEAR F . BEARD

FIAP 7 ~ Soviet Naval Aviation operating Aroos BEAR D & F MAP 8 - RANGE OF THE BADGERS Soviet Tu-16/BADGER Comh.it Radius Soviet BEAR Operating Area From Cam Ranh Airfield 38

The reported arrival of five additional Badgers in 1984 was probably aimed at further strengthening Soviet air power in Vietnam or at replacing some of the Badgers already deployed there. It brought to 14 the number of Soviet bombers stationed at Cam Ranh Bay. The Badger with a maximum speed of 990 kph can carry 5,900 kg of bombs.^^

The usual route of the Bears and the Badgers aircraft coming from bases in Vladivostock is to fly over North Korea, down the Yellow Sea then down to the South China Sea to and from Cam Ranh Bay. It saves roughly eight hundred miles where before they had to go around Japan down to the South China Sea.

Thailand's National Security Council chief has claimed that the Soviet Union has stationed 14 MiG-23 FLOGGER fighter- interceptors at Cam Ranh Bay in December 1984, the first such advanced planes to be based in the region. It was said that the contingent was part of the Soviet air force and does not represent aircraft being turned over to the Vietnamese forces. The MiG-23 has a combat radius of 520 nautical miles.®"' The Flogger can be used both for air defence and for escorting the Badgers.

Ten Soviet Tupolev Tu-26 Backfire-B long range naval reconnaissance/bombers are reportedly deployed at Cam Ranh.^2 They can carry two AS-4 Kitchen air-to-air surface missile or a mix of other Soviet anti-shipping missiles such as the AS-6 Kingfish. The Backfire can strike naval targets from a range of nearly 300 miles. The aircraft is capable of Mach 1.7-1.8 sustained cruise speeds and in-flight refueling. (Map 9 - Range of Backfires) However, there seems to be some contradiction in this report when ® Straits Times, 14 Nov. 1984. The Age, 3 Jan. 1985. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6 Jan 1986. MAP 9 - RANGE OF THE BACKFIRES Unrefueled Ooerating Radii fron Vielnamcst Ai rf i(?lds 39

Adm. Ronald J. Hays, CINCPAC, was interviewed in Bangkok in August 1987 about the reported presence of the Backfire Bombers. He said that according to his knowledge, there were no Backfires in Cam Ranh, but he did not discount the possibility of their future deployment.

The Backfire/AS 4 combination remains the primary threat - conventional or nuclear - in the North Pacific region. Should this combination be introduced into Cam Ranh Bay, it would complicate US, Chinese, and ASEAN states' defence problems in the South China Sea region, even in a limited war situation.

With modern weaponeering, with fifteen hundred mile cruise missiles, almost all of Australia can be covered by the Backfire bombers coming out of Cam Ranh Bay. In fact they can cover all the important sea lines of communication in the eastern Indian Ocean straight to Malacca and with in-flight refueling actually can launch a strike at New Zealand.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE fSIGINT)

There are other significant Soviet activities at Cam Ranh aside from naval and air deployments. For intelligence collection, a FIX-24 site was built on the Cam Ranh peninsula. Next to the KRUG, the second most capable Soviet HFDF system is the FIX 24. The system consists of a circular array of 24 vertical monopoles placed at 15-degree intervals in a ring of about 150 meters in diameter, but does not use a reflecting screen, to provide

® Aviation Week and Space Technology, which reported the deployment of the Backfire, might have mistaken it for the ten Tu-16 Badgers that arrived in Cam Ranh in Nov. 1983. 40

coverage of the whole HF band.^'^ Omni directional, the electronic station is the eyes and ears of Soviet naval ships operating from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, across the South China Sea to Guam in the Pacific Ocean and from Southeast China through ASEAN countries to Australia. It is capable of tracking ships, aircraft and of intercepting radio voice communications. This facility greatly enhances their maritime surveillance capabilities against US, Chinese and allied operations.

The Soviet SIGINT complex at Cam Ranh Bay has been described by the CINCPAC as the largest in the world outside of the Soviet Union with the exception of Cuba and one spot in the Middle East (Aden). Construction began in March 1979 and was reportedly completed in 1981.

In sum, the Soviets to date have the following facilities in Cam Ranh Bay; - satellite communications downlink facility - naval command authority communications center - High Frequency , direction-finding radio intercept site (FIX-24) - large floating drydock (170 meters, 4,500 tons) -2,000 Soviet military advisers, another 3,000 assigned to diplomatic, management support and advisory function - new ground control and precision approach radars at the airfield - use of airfield by Tu 95s, Tu 142s, Tu 16s and MiG 23s - MINSK carrier task group staging area

^ Dr. Desmond Ball, "All the better to hear you with, my dear", Pacific Defence Reporter, May 1987. The KRUG is the largest and most sophisticated ground-based Soviet Sigint system. It is used for high frequency (HF) interception and direction finding out of ranges of about 10,000 kilometers. 41

The latest addition to the facilities at Cam Ranh - and more evidence that the Soviets have a base - is a major "fuel farm" capable of storing four million gallons of fuel for aircraft and ships, including a bunkering pier with considerable capacity. This pier is in addition to the seven piers that the Soviets already have, compared to the two the US left behind in 1975.^^

4. Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC)

Geographically, Vietnam offers tactical and strategic advantages to a naval power seeking to influence events in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Both Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang provide excellent natural harbors with sufficient anchorage to shelter large fleets. The harbors afford ready access to the South China Sea, through which run important sea lines of communication (SLOC) between the Middle East oil fields and Northeast Asia.

The presence of its warships and naval aircraft in Vietnam demonstrates a Soviet intention to expand its presence in Southeast Asia. With the Soviets given base rights in Vietnam, the buildup followed patterns established in other parts of the world, such as the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean. Soviet experience in those areas revealed a tendency to expand slowly and deliberately with a gradual and seemingly calculated increase in both force levels and support capabilities until an intended level of activity was reached.

Although in line with their recent practice the Soviets did not undertake any major onshore construction that was not

^ Hamish McDonald, "The Cam Ranh Bugbear", Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 June 1987, p. 34. 42

expendable (with the exception of an intelligence gathering station), in slow but steady steps they increased the number of ships and aircraft operating from Cam Ranh Bay. From the daily average of five to ten ships operating in 1979, the number steadily rose from twenty-five to thirty-five by 1985.^®

Initially, periodic port calls were made by a few combatants or auxiliaries, during transits to and from the Indian Ocean. Following the combatants and the auxiliaries, a repair ship or submarine tender was stationed in Cam Ranh Bay. This have given the Soviets the capability to conduct extended naval operations in Southeast Asia area. Apart from presence in the South China Sea, the repair capability also benefitted ships deployed in the Indian Ocean.

In a war with the United States, the Soviet Navy could be expected to use Vietnamese bases to support combat operations against the 7th Fleet and the SLOC against allied tankers carrying oil from the Persian gulf to Northeast Asia. Soviet heavy bombers are within two hours of the Malacca Straits, a critical chokepoint for Asian oil routes. (Map 10 - Sea Lines of Communication)

^ Nayan Chanda, op. dt., p. 398. NAP 10 - SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS 43

111 KEY AND PERIPHERAL ACTORS

1. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

Soviet strategic interests in Indochina were discussed by Richard Armitage, then US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, in a paper presented at Denpasar, Indonesia in November 1981. He said that Moscow has been willing to pay heavy political and economic costs for a foothold in Indochina because Soviet leaders see the peninsula as a unique base from which to influence regional developments and gain increased acceptance as a dominant Asian power.

Net Impact of Soviet Bases

A. In a Conflict

In general, the Soviets probably would not gain a long- term advantage from bases in Indochina during a conflict. This results both from logistic constraints and from an inability to achieve a decisive force superiority.

Logistic problems, as noted earlier, are caused by the remoteness of Indochina from secure lines of communications. Aerial resupply would require the establishment of an extended 'pipeline' and the acquiesence of at least five South and Southeast Asian countries. Even if the route were not subject to interdiction, maintaining it would be a major undertaking.

A second logistic constraint would be the ease with which the US and allied countries could deny the Soviets freedom of access to and from the South China Sea. In addition to frustrating 44

submarine operations, anti-sub marine warfare (ASW) barrier patrols and mining could interdict or impede Soviet SLOCs to and from Indochina and out-of-area resupply. An attempt to clear the barriers with the minimal surface forces estimated for Indochina would be suicidal, and the Soviets would be unlikely to deploy significant additional Far East forces to accomplish that mission.

Target range and priorities are the key factors in preventing the Soviets from gathering a superior force. Badgers, for instance, would be at or near their maximum radius during attacks on the Philippines. Such attacks also generally would be unescorted, since the Philippines are beyond the range of most Soviet fighters.^^ In addition, Indian Ocean convoys would be substantially free from air attack if they used the Lombok Strait - Flores/Banda/Ceram/Molucca seas route. Finally, Soviet priorities in the Far East dictate an overriding concern for defense in Northeast Asia, and thus, provide a limited deployment to Indochina.

On balance, it is believed that US and allied forces deployed in Southeast Asia could cope with the projected Soviet threat. In sum, the security of US bases in Southeast Asia and SLOCs in the Far East probably could be maintained during and extended conflict.

The short term situation, however, is much less clear. During the initial conflict, there would be no logistics constraints on Soviet operations as they could draw on stocks already in Indochina. Moreover, allied anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti- air warfare (AAW) barriers might not be immediately and ^ With external fuel, Floggers will have an extended combat radius which could reach Clark and Subic, as well as northern Borneo and Sumatra and be able to return. Such flights could carry only minimal armaments however, and could not reach the Gulf of Davao. 45

adequately formed. Under these circumstances, and given the probable Soviet strategy of attriting US nuclear capacity early in a conflict, the Soviets might risk a heavy, quick raid on US naval forces in the Philippine waters by combined submarine and bomber force. Mining of Subic and the 'choke points' is also another course of action that the Soviets may undertake.

During Peacetime

In contrast to the conflict situation outlined previously, the Soviets stand to gain a great deal in Indochina in peacetime. The most significant impact probably would be on their Indian Ocean operations should there be any need for them in the future.The use of Vietnamese ports to supplement African bases have expanded the Soviet capability to operate in the Indian Ocean, and facilitated communication between forces there and in the Pacific.

Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean is "winding down substantially." This is supported by the US Department of Defence latest issue of "Soviet Military Power" which said that after reaching a peak in 1980 with the Afghanistan and Iran crises; Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean had declined steadily to its mid-1970 levels.

In addition, Indochinese bases increased the Soviet capability to conduct surveillance of US operations. From Indochina, Bear Fs cover most of the Indian Ocean east of India and the Pacific Ocean as far north as Japan. These bases also improved Soviet surveillance of the Chinese, and, more important to the

® With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, naval deployment have correspondingly been reduced in the Indian Ocean. The growing presence of the Indian Navy in that area is indicative of this development. 46

Soviets, arrest the spread of Chinese influence.

In early June 1979, the USSR has shown interest in establishing naval base facilities, including land-based repair and naval personnel at the Kampuchean port of Kompong Som and nearby Ream. The Soviets regard Kompong Som as preferable to either Da Nang or Cam Ranh Bay inspite of the better developed port facilities at the latter locations because of its geographic proximity to Indian Ocean sea lanes.^^ Vietnamese engineers have started reconstructing the road network linking with Kampong Som deep-sea port in southern Cambodia and expanding airstrip facilities in the vicinity in what was suspected by Thai military sources to be an attempt by Hanoi to transform the port as a re- supply base for the Soviet Pacific Fleet^o

It is said that Kompong Som is better for accommodating Soviet naval ships than Cam Ranh Bay in southern Vietnam."^'' However some "Washington sources" do not see Kompong Som as strategically significant although they appear to accept that it is a naval base.^^ During the period of November 1986, it was reported that a total of 28 Soviet merchant ships have already docked at Kampong Som formerly known as Sihanoukville, to unload strategic supplies for Vietnamese occupation forces in Cambodia/^

The value of the Kampuchean ports to the Soviets may have been solely for unloading military supplies direct to the Phnom Penh regime. Nayan Chanda writes in his book "Brother

® Untitled US government intelligence report, June 1979, Thayer Files, Vol. I. IM. Bangkok Post, 8 July 1979. Business Week, 15 Sept. 1980. ^ Straits Times, 22 May 1987. 47

Enemy..." that Phnom Penh preferred direct shipments of Soviet military aid to Kampuchea rather than Moscow passing it through Hanoi. It was reported that Phnom Penh does not get the whole shipment because Hanoi gets a "cut". Moreover, there were reported visits of Soviet naval ships in Kompong Som and Ream but they did not stay there regularly as in the case of Cam Ranh Bay.

With the Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea in September 1989, it is highly likely that the Soviet presence in Kompong Som and nearby Ream would greatly diminish.

2. Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)

The USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in Moscow on 3 November 1978, was an important formal link in the long-standing cooperation between the USSR and Vietnam. (For text, see Annex A.) Following as it does, the admission in June 1978 of Vietnam as a full member of COMECON, this event underlined the USSR's interest in extending its influence in Vietnam and the remainder of the Indochina region at China's expense. The Treaty also illustrates the need Vietnam feels to have more explicit links with the USSR, its sole major friend and supporter, to offset its perception of increasing pressure from its large neighbor, China. Among the ASEAN countries and elsewhere in Asia, there was some concern that Vietnam has unnecessarily introduced into Southeast Asia a higher level of Soviet involvement that could be to the detriment of regional stability.

The most significant article of the Treaty (Article VI) provides that "In case either party is attacked or threatened with 48

attack", the two parties "shall immediately consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat" and "take appropriate and effective measures to safeguard peace and the security of the two countries". These formulations distinguish it sharply from treaties between the USSR and communist countries adjacent to the USSR's borders - that is, the Warsaw Pact members, Mongolia, and North Korea. In those cases, the USSR is committed to provide "immediate aid", Including "military aid", in the event of an attack on the other party. Although the security provisions of the Treaty are not explicit, the ambiguity about them caused potential adversaries of Vietnam including China, to consider carefully the risks in a possible conflict.

There has been some speculation that there may be a secret protocol to the Treaty that commits the USSR to assist Vietnam militarily if Vietnam is attacked. Kyodo, quoting a Soviet source in Bangkok said, "When the Soviet-Vietnam friendship and cooperation treaty was signed in November 1978, instruments confirming military cooperation were exchanged in an annex". Thus the source confirmed that the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty took on the character of a military agreement.

The USSR-Vietnam Treaty does not commit the parties to contribute to "the strengthening of the defense capacity of the other". This was in contrast to Soviet treaties with Angola, Iraq, and Mozambique, where the USSR has gained, or has sought to gain, access to military facilities. In effect this probably limited the use the USSR can make of the Treaty as a means for obtaining access to military facilities in Vietnam, such as the port of Cam Ranh Bay. The USSR has in the past sought access to such facilities, and has been denied it by Vietnam. At the time of signing of the Straits Times, 17 May 1979. 49

Treaty, no Soviet naval combatants had visited Vietnamese ports, and there was no evidence that the USSR has constructed dedicated naval or air facilities/^

Other Soviet treaties contained references to threats against peace generally, in addition to threats against the contracting parties. Those with Vietnam and India were the only two Soviet treaties that specifically limited themselves to threats against either of the parties. The effect of this limitation seemed to be to reduce the range of situations in which the USSR could use Vietnam as a base from which to project its power in Southeast Asia.

The Soviet Treaty with Vietnam, unlike those with Angola, India, Iraq, Mozambique, and Somalia, did not prohibit either of the parties from signing other agreements or from joining alliances that either party might consider incompatible with the terms of the Treaty. The primary purpose of the Treaty, it was believed, was to act as deterrent to China.

It seems likely that Vietnam's deteriorating relations with China together with its severe economic difficulties has brought about Vietnamese agreement to a Treaty. Since the termination of Chinese aid in July 1978, Vietnam has drawn economically much closer to the USSR. The USSR and East European countries are now committed to provide almost 60 percent of Vietnam's aid receipts ($US 3,200 million in 1976-80)."^® The Treaty could be part of the price that Vietnam had to pay for such large-scale Soviet economic assistance.

" Strategic Implications of the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation", US Defense Intelligence Agency Study, 21 Nov. 1978, Thayer Files, Vol I. Ibid. 50

Prior to the February-March 1979 Chinese invasion of SRV, the Politburo inner circle resisted Soviet pressure for rights to air and naval bases in the SRV such as Cam Ranh Bay7^ The Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) Politburo inner circle at that time consisted of VCP Sec. General Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Premier Pham Van Dong, Le Due Tho and Interior Minister Pham Hung.

Having seriously miscalculated China's intentions, the inner circle reversed itself and decided that it was now in the SRV national interest to accede to Soviet demands by granting the Soviets the "use" of air and naval bases in the SRV.

It was viewed that the Politburo inner circle could be expected to resist Soviet pressures to put Soviet ground troops on SRV soil which would place the SRV in permanent indebtedness to the USSR for its national security and which would result in a permanent loss of SRV national sovereignty and complete independence to the USSR. The Politburo inner circle did not want to be placed in a locked-in position which mean that the SRV would be totally incorporated into the bloc led by the USSR, such as the Eastern European satellite countries. The Politburo inner circle hoped that whenever relations with China improved, the dependency on the USSR would decrease.

When Hanoi and Moscow concluded the Friendship Treaty in November 1978, the Vietnamese leadership finally acceded to Soviet demands, by granting the Soviet's the "use" of air and naval base in Vietnam. In exchange they hoped that they could continue to forestall Soviet demands for permanent air and naval bases and that if Vietnam was attacked by China, Soviet air and naval support

^ "Soviet Military Assistance and the Use' of Air and Naval Bases in Vietnam", Feb. 1980, US government intelligence report, Thayer Files, Vol. I. Discussion in the following paragraphs relies on this source. 51

could be deployed from Vietnamese bases. The immediate result of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978 and China's subsequent attack on Vietnam in February 1979 was the unprecedented breakthrough of Soviet military presence in Indochina.

By late 1979, in the view of some^^ with access to information concerning the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee (VCP,CC) the Politburo decision-making inner circle regarded Socialist Republic of Vietnam dependency on Soviet military assistance as being of absolute necessity in preserving SRV national security and independence against China.

The Soviets also have substantially improved Vietnam's naval capabilities. PETYA I Class frigates, POLNOCNY landing ships, SHERSHEN torpedo boats and OSA II missile patrol boats based near Haiphong have improved Vietnam's coastal defense capabilities. Vietnam received its first floating drydock from the USSR. It is a 4,500 ton dock although the transporter dock repair and servicing capability is more limited than that of a floating drydock. It can provide limited short term repair of submarines and small surface warships up to PETYA class frigate.

The Soviets also have delivered a minesweeper and several other patrol craft to Vietnam and have provided a limited anti-submarine warfare capability, through the delivery of Ka 25/HORMONE helicopters.^o

"More Soviet Naval Craft Deliveries", August 1979, US government intelligence report, Thayer Files, Vol. I. ^ Ibid. 52

Vietnam was reported to have received the advanced Su-22/FITTER aircraft. The FITTER is one of the most sophisticated aircraft built by the Soviets. These fighter-bombers can carry up to 4,000 kilograms of bombs and operate up to 950 nautical miles. They are assigned as ground attack and close air support mission.The Soviets also began delivering the heavily armed MI-24 HIND helicopter to Vietnam. The HIND is an extremely effective ground support helicopter that the Soviets have employed in Afghanistan. At the Noi Bai airfield northwest of Hanoi, MiG-21s of the later models "L" and "N" have also been deployed.

The Soviet Union also provides Vietnam with military assistance now believed to be running at a rate of $ 1.3 billion annually. It is said that since 1976 about five billion US dollars (US $ 5 billion) in economic aid and 3,750 technical advisers have been sent by Moscow to Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. Military assistance since 1979 has been worth over two billion US dollars in addition to support by 2,500 military advisers.a CINCPAC intelligence summary said that in 1981, about 3.3 million tons of Soviet goods were sent to Vietnam, making up 90% of the latter's food imports, 100% of its oil imports, nearly 70% of its fertilizer imports, almost 90% of its cotton imports and 80% of its metal imports.

In 1982, the volume of goods between the Soviet Union and Vietnam increased by 13.3% and, as specified in the Protocol on Goods Exchange for 1983, the Soviet Union has increased its supply of goods to Vietnam by another 30% over 1982, including trucks, tractors, electrical and transport equiment, petroleum products and cotton.

81 m. ^ The Age, quoting a summary from Hqs CINCPAC. 53

Suwit Suthanakun, the Secretary General of Thailand's National Security Council, told a Japanese news agency that Hanoi received US$ 1,500 million, Kampuchea received US$ 200 million and Laos US$ 50 million. This military assistance represented a slight decrease from US$ 2,050 million in 1985.^3 (See Table 1 below) Soviet Military Assistance to the three Indochinese Countries (Amount in million US dollars )

•82 '83 •84 '85 •86 Vietnam 1400 1450 1400 1650 1500 Laos 100 150 100 50 50 Kampuchea 50 150 200 350 200 Total 1550 1750 1700 2050 1750

3. PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

To counter what has become a formidable Soviet military presence in the South China Sea, Beijing has advised friendly western governments it was fortifying Hainan island near Vietnam. From Hainan, the Chinese can watch what the Soviet navy is up to in the region. The buildup of Chinese power in Hainan, in the view of western military and diplomatic specialists, also has special significance in the context of past, present and probably future hostility between Beijing and Hanoi.

Vietnam's earlier occupation of Kampuchea has given China certain distinct benefits. China has been able to consolidate a new relationship with the ASEAN states and a defense relationship with Thailand. Vietnam has been effectively isolated from the

® The Nation (Bangkok), 15 May 1987 in BBC, SWB F£/8570/A2/2, 18 May 1987. ^ Straits Times, 18 Oct. 1980. 54

economic and political mainstream of the Asian-Pacific region. China does not consider Cam Ranh Bay as a vital security issue. It is now seen in Beijing as a symbol of Soviet rivalry with the US in the Pacific and Indian Ocean rather than as part of a Soviet attempt at encirclement of China.^^

Any pressure on Vietnam as a consequence of improving Sino-Soviet relations seems to be an effect of, rather than a cause, behind the improvement.®^ The implications of the Sino-Soviet rapprochement process had profound consequences for Vietnam's occupation and final withdrawal of Kampuchea. Vietnam's economy is debilitated and is dependent on the USSR. Diplomatically, it is quite isolated. China, for a small outlay on the Sino-Vietnamese border, is reaping all the benefits from being in the mainstream of developments in the Asian-Pacific region. The Soviet economy moreover is such that it can ill-afford the cost of supporting Third World countries for uncertain gains. Vietnam provides useful naval and air base facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang, so that although the USSR may have been dissatisfied with the cost of the Kampuchean war, it has considered the strategic returns well worthwhile. Deng Xiaoping, however, has suggested that China could live with the Soviet facilities in Vietnam.®^ Deng's 17 April 1985 statement indicated that the Chinese "do not really seem to mind the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay."

In his Vladivostock speech of 28 July 1986, Gorbachev made concessions in the Soviet negotiating position on the Sino- Soviet border dispute. Aside from troop withdrawal from ^ Gary Klintwoith, "Gorbachev's China Diplomacy", in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer (eds), The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostock Initiative, p. 46. ^ IMd., p. 49. ^ IM., p. 52. 55

Afgh anistan, he also mentioned about the possibility of troop reductions in Mongolia (which took place) - concessions on two of the three obstacles China maintains prevent further improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.®®

Before the Sino-Soviet summit in May 1989, there seemed to be no lack of signals from both Moscow and Beijing that the two governments wished to improve relations. The Sino-Soviet rapprochement have side stepped some of the major obstacles - Kampuchea and Afghanistan - while concentrating on more promising areas like trade and scientific exchanges.

The Chinese appeared to be amenable to this approach. They spoke of major obstacles in the way of improving relations, but added that "these did not have to be removed all at once for relations to start improving", according to Deng Xiaoping.®^

Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping earlier marked a cool note into the warming Sino-Soviet relations when he said that the Kremlin has not made any substantial change in the Soviet policy towards China. There were still obstacles in the normalization process; namely Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, its troops on China's northern border and its continued aid to Vietnamese forces in Cambodia.^^ China includes the Kampuchean conflict among its "three obstacles" which must be settled before relations with the USSR can be normalized.

On 15 May 1989, Gorbachev arrived in Beijing on an official four-day visit for summit-level talks with senior Chinese leaders. His visit marked the formal normalization of state and

^ McGregor, " The Sino-Vietnamese ..." op. ck., p. 62. ® Christian Science Monitor, 14 May 1985. Asiaweek, 12 April 1985. 56

party relations between China and Soviet Union, after almost 30 years of enmity. Gorbachev, elected CPSU general secretary in March 1985, announced that the Soviet Union would seek "a serious improvement in relations" with China. In Vladivstock in July 1986, he offered China a number of crucial concessions towards a resolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Following the period after his statement, the Soviet Union partially conceded the validity of China's border claim, withdrew all its forces from Afghanistan and pressured Vietnam into announcing a September 1989 deadline for the removal of its troops from Kampuchea, which it subsequently carried out.

4. Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The first issue that concerns the ASEAN countries is the Philippine attitude towards the American bases as it has unfolded under the Aquino government.^"" As President Aquino stressed during the Third ASEAN summit in December 1987, the Philippines really faces no external threat and does not express concern over the Soviet position in Cam Ranh Bay. There is a growing nationalist sentiment that favors the termination of the bases in 1991 or a gradual phase out of US military forces in 5-10 years time.^^ President Aquino has not indicated her inclination but announced that she will keep her "options open".

One factor in the reassessment of the US bases was the

Leszek Buszynski, ASEAN: Security Issues of the 1990s, Working Paper No. 165, Strategic and Defence Studies Center, ANU Canberra, 1988, p. 9 . The other issues are Kampuchea and the Spratly Islands. ^ Interview with Senator Leticia Ramos Shahani, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Philippine Senate, Pacific Defence Reporter, Sept 1989. 57

changing international situation and the appearance of a supposedly less threatening Soviet Union under Gorbachev, as well as the importance attached to arms control agreements by the Soviet leadership.

Igor Rogachev, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, visited Manila on March 29, 1988. He denied that the Philippines was under threat from Soviet military expansion, and concluded a protocol agreement providing for regular consultations between the two governments on regional issues. On September 16, in his Krasnoyarsk speech, Gorbachev confirmed earlier reports that the Soviet navy was prepared to withdraw from its base at Cam Ranh Bay in return for a US withdrawal from the Philippine bases.

Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in May 1979 has offered to enter into a bilateral or multilateral treaty or non- aggression pact with countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to dispel their apprehensions about Vietnam's intentions. The offer was made during a talk with Mr. Triloki Nath Kaul, former foreign secretary of India and ambassador to the US from 1973 to 1976. Mr. Dong also gave categorical assurances to Mr. Kaul that Thailand or any other ASEAN country had nothing to fear from Vietnam. The Vietnamese leader was equally emphatic that the Soviet Union has not been, and would not be given, military bases in Vietnam. However, he said that "the Soviet Union was given normal facilities offered to friendly countries".^^

Due to intrusions in its air space in 1979, Thailand made a diplomatic representation to the Soviet Union, calling on that country to stop varying from the designated routes when flying

^ Hongkong AFP in English 0157 GMT 27 March 1979. 58 through Thai airspace. The diplomatic note was submitted by Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Dr. Owart Suthiwartnaruepruk to Soviet Ambassador Pouri Ivanovitch Kournetsov at the Foreign Affairs Ministry. It also informed the Soviets that as Thailand wished to be strictly neutral over the conflict in Indochina, it could not allow any country to transport armaments through Thai air space to either side in Kampuchea. The transport planes used the regular route of the Russian national airline, Aeroflot, which is authorized to make three flights a week over the country. The Soviet planes were identified as Antonov- 12, the Antonov-22 and llyushin-76. The An-22 is equivalent to the American C-123 and the An-22 to the C-130. There is no American equivalent to the 11-76.^^

In the period before the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. Soviet cargo planes flew from Tashkent to New Delhi, then skirted northern Thailand in a corridor across northern Burma and Laos to Hanoi. But in early March 1979, two weeks after China launched its invasion, the Soviets switched their refuelling stop to Bombay and made their first special overflight request to Bangkok. However there could be practical reasons for the route change. Observers pointed out that Soviet planes involved in the airlift used the same air corridor between Bombay and Hanoi as three of the five weekly Aeroflot flights which use Thai airspace under an inter- governmental agreement.^^

Developments in Cambodia and the appearance of a four ship flotilla headed by the Minsk in the Gulf of Thailand in late 1980 aroused fears in Bangkok that the Gulf of Thailand could become a focus of Soviet attention. It was reported sometime in

^ Bangkok Post, 2 Oct. 1979. ^ Bangkok Post, 24 May 1979. ^ John McBeth, "Skywatchers are seeing red", PEER, 5 Oct. 1979, p. 16. 59

November 1980 that the Soviet carrier Minsk and three support ships steamed into the Gulf of Thailand to within 150 km of Thai territory before turning back.

In June 1988, Philippine defence officials reported Soviet reconnaissance flights everyday in the northern provinces by planes from Cam Ranh.^^ These may be the Soviet Bears conducting reconnaissance missions in the Bashi Channel. (See Map 7)

Since China decided to cut off aid to communist insurgencies in the region, Hanoi was seen as the new connection for pro-Soviet communist elements. Moscow has entrusted their Vietnamese ally with the task of training at the Central School of Nationalities in Hoa Binh not only communists from Laos and Cambodia, but also from other countries of Southeast Asia.^® Nguyen Co Thach in his ASEAN tour in July 1982, extended a veiled threat to support insurgent groups in Southeast Asia. Of the ASEAN countries, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines still have active communist insurgency problems.

5. United States of America (USA)

US Interests in Southeast Asia

Former US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger defined the "Six Pillars" of US policy in Southeast Asia as: ^^ - US determination to remain a Pacific power Radyo ng Bayan report from Quezon City, 2 Jan. 1988 cited in BBC, SWB FE 0039/i, 4 Jan. 1988. ^ Bao Quoc, "The Cam Ranh Syndrome", ASEAN Forecast, Vol. 4, No. 6, June 1984. ^ FEER, 29 June 1985. 60

- The US security relationship with Japan - The US commitment to the stability of the Korean peninsula - US efforts to build an enduring relationship with China - US support for the political and economic vitality of ASEAN and the self-defense efforts of its members - The ANZUS alliance with Australia and New Zealand

US interests in preserving its ability to transit between the Pacific and Indian Ocean manifests itself in two ways. First, the US desires to preserve its ability to use the Philippines as a base for Asian operations. With the Soviets in Indochina, the Philippines would be the only base which could effectively support both Pacific and Indian Ocean operations."" ^^ Moreover, the Philippines has an advantage of about 1500 miles over Guam in terms of proximity to the Asian mainland. These physical advantages aside, US command and support structure in the Philippines would be difficult to reestablish quickly elsewhere.

The US' second major goal is to maintain security for allied convoys moving along Indian Ocean routes to the Philippines and thence to Japan. Studies show that austere economic support of Japan during a conflict could be accomplished with an average of one convoy per month from the Persian Gulf to the Philippines, and six convoys per month (composed of vessels from the Persian Gulf, Australia, Indonesia and the US) between the Philippines and Japan. The hub of this convoy system would be the Gulf of Davao, on the east coast of Mindanao (Map 11 - Gulf of Davao) where the Philippine-Japan convoys would be formed. Also shown on the map are the straits which convoys from the Persian Gulf could use to

From bases in South Vietnam, the Soviets could deny the use of Malaysia and Singapore, either through direct attack, or indirectly through interdiction of the Malacca Strait. MAP 11 - MAP OF DAVAO GULF AND THE STRAITS

Austtalli 61 move through the Indonesian archipelago. Two of the four major straits, including the Malacca Strait, which constitutes the shortest route, are within Badger range from Vietnamese airfields.

Security Role of the Philippine Bases

Since World War II, Soviet military power has undergone a continuous build-up, with emphasis on offensive capabilities. This build-up has proceeded at levels of effort unmatched by any other country, including the United States, and has been particularly pronounced in the Pacific region.The Soviet Union has also demonstrated its willingness, when presented with favorable risks, to use military power to advance its foreign policy goals.

Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke in his testimony before the Senate East Asia and Pacific Affairs Sub- Committee said:''^^

... through their increased access to these facilities (in Vietnam and Kampuchea), the Soviets have significantly enhanced their military capabilities, not only in Southeast Asia and the South- west Pacific but also in the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union has now gained a "strategic foothold" in Vietnam, astride major Pacific-Indian Ocean trade routes. Operations from Cam Ranh Bay on the South China Sea routes can greatly increase the flexibility of the Soviet Far Eastern Fleet, which is based at Vladivostock in the restricted waters of the Sea

" Background On the Bases, American Military Facilities in the Philippines", Second Edition, USIS, 1987. 102 isjew Nation, 24 March 1980. 62 of Japan. The Soviet Union is reported to have 25 ships of all types in the South China Sea and the other areas where the US 7th Fleet operates in the Far East. Reconnaissance and anti-submarine planes fly from Da Nang.

Since 1979, Soviet Navy ships are now routinely deployed in the South China Sea. By 1985, the average number of Soviet ships in Cam Ranh Bay (25-30 per month) was double the average number of American ships at Subic (12-14 per month). Soviet reconnaisance, interceptor, ground-attack, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft are now permanently based at Cam Ranh. Bear aircraft regularly conduct intelligence-gathering and anti- submarine missions in the region. Badger aircraft have the capability to strike targets throughout Southeast Asia and Soviet forces now conduct coordinated warfare exercises in the South China Sea.

The Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia constitutes a threat to the Philippines and its neighbors as demonstrated by documented intrusions of Soviet military aircraft into the airspace of ASEAN countries. In 1980, Philippine Foreign Ministry lodged diplomatic protests to the Soviet Union for violation of its airspace.''®^

In the South China Sea to the Southwest of the Philippines, are three strategic "choke points," the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits. Approximately 50 percent of Asia's oil supplies and 80 percent of its strategic material transit these passages. In the case of Japan, nearly 90 percent of its oil crosses the South China Sea. The Soviet navy is now astride these sea lanes with sufficient military force to threaten Asia's economic lifeline. Leszeck Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia, Croom Helm, London and Sydney, 1986, p. 204. 63

The Philippines is located at a strategic "crossroad" between the Pacific Ocean on one side and the South China Sea on the other, adjacent to the Asian mainland and near the critical straits that lead to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East.

Because of its advantageous location, US naval and air forces stationed in the Philippines can effectively protect regional air and sea lanes, maintain a balance to Soviet forces based in Vietnam, and provide a security shield behind which the countries of Southeast Asia can pursue peaceful economic development. The non-communist countries of the region and even the People's Republic of China view the bases as an important balance to the increasing Soviet presence.

The American military presence also contributes directly to the defence of the Philippines by providing a formidable deterrent against any external threat to Philippine security.

The US facility at Subic Bay is the primary port, training area, and logistics support base for the US Seventh Fleet, which operates in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. It contains the major supply depot for the fleet, serves as a crucial communication link for US naval forces in the region; offers ship repair capabilities second to none in the Pacific; operates an airfield for the Seventh Fleet's carrier striking force; and provides training in all phases of naval warfare for American and Philippine forces.

Clark Air Base hosts the headquarters of the US Thirteenth Air Force. The Clark facility serves as a staging point for strategic airlifts into the Indian Ocean, including the island of Diego Garcia; permits constant surveillance of the "choke points" 64

(the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits); can handle large-scale aircraft deployments from the US in case of emergency; maintains a program of air combat readiness; provides training and upgrading of aircrews from the United States, the Philippines, and other friendly countries and contributes to Philippine air defences under the Mutual Defence Treaty.

In sum, US facilities in the Philippines provide a ready deterrent against potential threats to peace in the region. This security shield permits the Philippines and its neighbors - ASEAN, North Asia and the South Pacific, to avoid excessive military expenses and to concentrate scarce resources on the economic development that is crucial to long-term growth and stability.

The Bases in the Philippines after 1991

In 1991, unless a new base agreement is concluded, the current 25-year base agreement changes to an indefinite term, an agreement that can be terminated by either party upon one year's notice. This provision is similar to that in American military base agreements with NATO nations, Japan, and Korea.

Over the years seven Philippine administrations and eight American presidents have supported close defense ties between the Philippines and the United States and have found the bases to serve the mutual interest of both nations. Reputable public opinion surveys have consistently shown a majority of Filipinos favoring continued close ties with the United States and acceptance of the bases as part of that relationship."^®"^ The substantial mutual benefits that the bases provide seem likely to encourage continued Filipino and American support for the presence

" Background on the Bases...", fig. £it. 65

of US facilities in the Philippines.

The US never understated the importance of the bases to the stability and security of the region. For the US, low labor cost, natural surroundings and access to the vital air and sea lanes through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean make the bases impossible to duplicate anywhere in the region. The Pentagon estimates it would cost at least US $8 billion if political or other circumstances forced their relocation. Contingency plans have been drawn up. The most favored relocation sites are Guam, Okinawa in Japan, and South Korea. Marianas is also being considered. Defence analysts agree the loss of the US bases in the Philippines would be disastrous to the US defence plans for the region and have serious implications for the US global defence strategy.

Admiral Huntington Hardisty, CINCPAC, after his assumption of command in October 1988 had this to say as far as US interests in the Pacific is concerned:

In the near term, I don't see any great change in our strategy out here. I don't see any change in our strategy out here, or our interest in the Pacific. ^^^

On the Gorbachev initiative, Admiral Hardisty, does not see any diminishment in the Soviet capability in the Pacific. In fact, he said, that the Soviets have increased their ships by some 40 new, modernized ships, qualitatively and quantitatively since 1986 with the deployment of fourth generation aircraft in the Kuriles and Sakhalin. On the reactions in Korea, Philippines and Japan, he said;

I've just visited those countries (Japan, Korea and the Philippines) .... I found both Japan and Korea to be wary, in a wait and see mode on the Gorbachev initiatives. ^^^

Interview with Admiral Huntington Hardisty, CINCPAC, Pacific Defence Reporter, Feb. 1989. 106 66

During the three day Soviet exercise in August 1989 which Western correspondents were invited to witness, the first time ever, Admiral Gennady A. Kavatov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Pacific Fleet briefed about the developments in the Far Eastern Fleet. He said that 57 combat vessels have already been retired from the Fleet while additional 16 are scheduled to be withdrawn from active service in the years 1989-1990. The latter figure had been announced by Gorbachev during his Beijing visit.""®^

However other reports say that unlike the reduction taking place in Eastern Europe, where the emphasis is on the withdrawal of major quantities of weapons systems, including 10,000 tanks and the removal of offensively dedicated units, such a pruning of similar resources has yet to take place in the Far East.^08

6. AUSTRALIA

In Australia, the 1979 movement through the region of the 45,000-tonne aircraft carrier Minsk and several support craft was cited as a worrying development. Defence analysts said if those vessels which moved from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean at that time had called at Cam Ranh Bay, it would have created " a hell of a stir",'''^^ particularly if it was accompanied by hard evidence of Russian moves to upgrade facilities at the base. As it turned out, the Minsk, the guided missile cruiser Petpropavlovsk and the amphibious assault ship, the Ivan Rogov steamed on to Vladivostock. But later developments at Cam Ranh

Robert Y. Horiguchi, "Eyewitness with the Pacific Fleet", Pacific Defence Reporter, Aug. 1989. 108 PEER, 31 Aug. 1989. 109 The Age, 31 July 1979. 67

Bay thereafter proved Soviet intentions.

In mid-1979, the Australian government was studying the implications of a new intelligence assessment"" ° which warned that the Soviet access to bases in Vietnam needed closer monitoring. The assessment was ordered by the then Prime Minister Mr. Fraser to be considered by the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of Cabinet. Australian analysts tended to take a sceptical view of Soviet undertakings, made in talks between Mr. Brezhnev and President Carter at the June Vienna summit, that Russia did not intend to make use of the bases.

Notwithstanding the calm assurance of then Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot, there was an intense debate within the Australian intelligence community about Soviet power play in Southeast Asia. On one side, the hawks claimed the Soviets were intent on establishing permanent facilities at abandoned American bases in Vietnam. On the other side were those who insisted that Vietnam, jealous of infringements to its sovereignty, would prevent the Soviets gaining much more than limited access for their ships and planes to bases at Cam Ranh and Da Nang. Another view similar to the one held by the Japanese Defense Agency, was that even without access to bases, the build- up of Soviet military strength in the region was challenging American superiority.

The growth of a Soviet military power in Southeast Asia and the more or less static Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean were dealt with at length in the assessment of Australia's strategic environment circulated among ministers and government agencies ordered by then Prime Minister (Fraser) after he returned from the US-''^^ 110 The Age, 24 July 1979. 68

The Soviet naval base at Cam Ranh Bay was cited by some Liberal politicians as a direct military threat to Australia. Inspite of this fear, no Russian surface warships has been sighted in the Southwest Pacific for more than a century.2

Although the South and Southwest Pacific do not lie in a direct path in the Soviet axis of advance towards the Indian Ocean nevertheless, activities in Cam Ranh have 'spill-over' effects into the island states in this area. The Kremlin has undertaken a more sophisticated approach of penetration through fishing agreements and also by 'proxy'.

The USSR has launched an offensive aimed at developing diplomatic and political links in the South Pacific starting with port facilities and tuna fishing deals with Pacific Island states. The Soviet Union approached the President of Kiribati to obtain port facilities for Soviet fishing vessels. The Soviet Union has made similar approaches to the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Tuvalu and possibly Papua New Guinea."^''^

The tiny South Pacific nation of Tuvalu has banned Soviet fishing fleets from its waters because it fears infiltration by Soviet agents. The Prime Minister of Tuvalu, Dr. Tomasi Puapua has rejected a Soviet offer worth $ 1 million. The South Pacific countries are expected to ratify a five year regional fisheries agreement with the US worth $ 12 million a year.""""^

In Australia, the Soviets are practising "glasnost" more aggressively since Gorbachev's ascension to power in 1985. The

111 The Age, 2>\ My 1919. 1Sydney Morning Herald, 30 Oct. 1986. f^ews Weekly, 17 April 1985. 114 The Australian, 26 Feb. 1987. 69

Soviets have been encouraged by the breakdown in the ANZUS Treaty. Though Moscow has found it difficult to establish even a toehold in the South Pacific. There are no communist parties or one-party states. But the Soviets have recently signed a fishing deal with Vanuatu in 1987. This agreement gives the Kremlin its first shore facilities in the South Pacific. The fishing agreement with Kiribati in August 1985 collapsed after some price disagreement. The Russians terminated their fisheries agreement in October 1986. Its a more sophisticated form of penetration into the region. Soviet fishing fleets have been known as intelligence collectors and oceanographic ships. On the other hand Australia and New Zealand have been developing close ties with Forum countries. (Map 12 - Australia and the South Pacific)

As early as 1983, the Government top secret Strategic Basis paper- the key document which shapes Australia's defence policy, warned of the strategic value to the Soviets of Cam Ranh

Certainly the Australian government believes that Cam Ranh Bay is a Soviet naval base. A spokesman for the former Foreign Minister Bill Hayden confirmed that Australia has long accepted that the Soviets maintain a permanent military facility there.

However, the Defence Minister, Mr Kim Beazley has claimed that the significance of increased Soviet military activity in the Asia-Pacific region was being exaggerated. He said that the Soviets were outclassed by US military power in the region and that the controversial naval base at Cam Ranh bay in Vietnam was only of limited value to the Soviets. He also reiterated an earlier announcement that the emphasis of Australia's defence cooperation

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program would be shifted from Asia to the South Pacific."'''®

This represents a difference of view about the Soviet threat between the US and Australia. On one hand, Australian Defence Minister Beazley said that the true significance of the Soviet position in Cam Ranh Bay lies in the political influence that it gives from which Moscow can influence and intimidate countries in the Pacific region."'"'^

This was further confirmed when Mr. Beazley in a question in the House declared that the true significance of the Soviet position in Cam Ranh Bay lies in the political influence it gives. He further added that "activities of Australian P3 aircraft and Mirage aircraft in Malaysia - and soon the F18s and the visits of the surface fleet to that area are all part of a political counter to what is going on there and are all thoroughly in keeping with the Government's policies as previously announced"."'"'®

In 1987, the Government announced formally the relocation of half of the Royal Australian fleet to Cockburn Sound in Western Australia over the next decade. This is in commitment to the concept of a two ocean navy. This means that the fleet operating there would gain a 13 to 31% increase in operating time."'"'^ By shifting its attention to the direction of western Australia, the Navy and Air Force will be in a better position to watch that portion of the Indian Ocean and approaches towards Australia - this includes the Strait of Malacca.

The Age, 26 Feb. 1987. McDonald, "Cam Ranh bugbear", Qg. 1Daily Hansard, 25 Feb. 1987. 119 The Age, 26 Feb. 1987. 71

7. JAPAN

There is no question that increasingly the Japanese have regarded the Soviet Union as a hostile country and a threat in general terms. Experts assert that with its current capabilities, Japan could not defend itself against invasion for more than a few days.

However one should not overlook the steps that have been taken by Japan to improve its military capabilities. Japan now has the eighth largest military establishment in the world. There can be little question that while the Japanese forces are limited and geared solely for defense, they are highly modern in conventional terms.

In principle, Japan is committed to conducting air surveillance in the region up to 200 miles and sea surveillance up to 1,000 miles to the east and south. Beyond this, agreements exist between the United States and Japan with respect to the defense of South Korea should it be attacked, and the presence of US F-16s on Hokkaido are concrete evidence of Japan's role in the containment of the USSR. (Map 13 - Soviet Military Activities around Japan)

Japan-US political relations are strong at present. Japanese political relations with the USSR are at a low ebb. The principle obstacle on the Japanese side is the issue of the four northern islands. Japan insists that these islands are an integral part of Japan, not an extension of the Kuriles, and are illegally occupied by the Soviet Union. These islands have assumed a strategic as well as political significance. Viewing the basic Japan-US objective as that of 'bottling' the Soviet Fleet inside the Sea of Okhotsk, Soviet officials want the maximum control of the MAP 13 - outline of Soviet Naval Activities and Military Aircraft Movements Around Japan 'MJntary Aircraft: (A) Flights southward over the Japan Sea {B) Plights over the Tsushima Straits (C) Flights east off coast of Okinawa, etc. (D) Flights southward over the Pacific Ocean (E) "Tokyo Express" flights, etc. (F) Flights off eastern Hokkaido (G) Flights over North Korea (note) (Flights per year 320)

Vessels: (a) Passage through Tsushima Straits 140 (b) Passage through Tsugaru Straits 55 (c) Passage through Soya Straits 430 (625 passages a yoar)

Notes; 1- Numl>M (if ships and instances mdiCiitt! ayeiage fu|UM'i ov.ii past tivi< y'M's

2 (G) Fli.JHU NV.M Ni)ITT^ KVOI.-.H DAVF IIVOIACJ.MI I-I.IH! TMU-. .. V.,: sine.' V-..MC COMIIMU l,,i "i.si nmi- .r. 1 9Bf) 72

off-shore islands.""^o

Four of the Kurile islands off the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido are now said to be garrisoned by Soviet mechanized infantry division of 14,000 men.

Japan has asserted that until this issue is fairly resolved, there can be no peace treaty formally putting an end to the hostility between the two countries since the declaration of war by the Soviet Union on Japan in the closing days of World War 2.

Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, visited Japan on December 18-21, 1988, for talks with Suzuki Uno, his Japanese counterpart, and he also met Takeshita on Dec. 19. Although the talks were regarded as positive in tone, no substantive progress had been made on the Kuriles issue.

Robert A. Scalapino, Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia, University Press of America, Boston, 1987, p. 27. 73

IV "A PAWN FOR A QUEEN"

The Soviets have been very effective in establishing a ring of bases that stretches from the Dahlak Island in the Red Sea which is owned by Ethiopia,to the use of the former UK base at Aden and the use of Socotra for their permanent Indian Ocean Task Group. Cam Ranh Bay is the eastern anchor of that ring from Afghanistan to Socotra.

Gorbachev in his monumental speech at Vladivostock said "If the US were to give up its military presence, say, in the Philippines, we wouldn't leave that step unanswered." In a seemingly amplification of the speech, Anatoly Zaitsev (Chief of Moscow's Southeast Asia Department) spoke to a forum in Manila titled "The Philippine response to the Gorbachev Initiative". In a later talk with correspondents, Zaitsev hinted that Moscow had decided to link any discussion on nuclear forces in the Soviet Far East with the Philippine bases.This move may be one of Gorbachev's confidence building measures in the region, - reduction of the activity of naval forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans particularly nuclear-armed ships.

On 16 September 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in his speech in Krasnoyarsk, Eastern Siberia proposed seven new Soviet peace proposals which were aimed at strengthening security in the Asia- Pacific Region. These were:""^^

^^^ The Ethiopians are not allowed inside the base. Asiaweek, 14 Sep. 1986. ^^ Soviet News Bulletin, published by the Press Office of the USSR Embassy in Australia, 17 Sep.88. 74

1. USSR will not increase the amount of any nuclear weapon in the region and called on the US and other nuclear powers (with reference to China) to do the same. 2. called on main powers in the region to hold consultations on non-increase in naval forces in the region 3. on the question of lowering military confrontation in the areas where the coasts of USSR, PRC, Japan, the DPRK and South Korea converge, that the matter be discussed on a multilateral basis with a view to freezing and commensurately lowering the levels of naval and air forces and limiting their activity. 4. If the US agreed to the elimination of military bases in the Philippines, the Soviet Union will be ready, by agreement with the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, to give up the Fleet's material and technical supply station in Cam Ranh Bay. 5. The USSR suggested that measures be jointly elaborated to prevent incidents in the open sea and air space over it. 6. The Soviet Union proposed that an international conference on making the Indian Ocean a 'zone of peace' be held not later than 1990. 7. The USSR suggested discussing at any level and in any composition, the question of creating a negotiating mechanism to consider Soviet and any other proposals pertaining to the security of the Asia-Pacific region. The discussion could be started between the USSR, the PRC, and the United States as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

The Krasnoyarsk speech was the first ever official acknowledgment by no less than the highest Soviet official of the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay calling it "fleet material and technical supply station". Soviet denials of the existence of a military base at Cam Ranh Bay completely collapsed when the erstwhile CINCPACFLT, Adm. James Lyons showed photographs of 75

Soviet ships and aircraft at the base in a press conference at Sydney in February 1987. It came at the heels of denials by Soviet Minister Counsellor, Mr. Valery Zemskov of the Soviet Embassy in Canberra (Figs 1 & 2 - Photographs).

Before this, another Soviet official, the Ambassador to Singapore, Vladimir M. Semenov denied the existence of bases in Cam Ranh. Instead he said that Soviet forces use the 'facilities' in Vietnam - being bases requiring extra-territoriality while facilities do not.

The trade-off proposed by Gorbachev brings into sharp focus the tremenduous importance the role that the US facilities in the Philippines play with regard to regional stability. Adm Lyons in his press conference in Sydney in February 1987 said:

if the US withdraws from those facilities, to me that would be totally destabilizing to the region. In fact no matter where I've travelled, I know of no one that wants us to withdraw from the facilities. Anywhere I went in the region, they recognized the tremenduous stabilizing influence that those facilities bring to the region.

It was also mentioned in that interview that should access to the facilities in the Philippines be denied to US forces, it would require 2-3 times the amount of resources to maintain that presence. American officials say there are no plans to move the bases. But they have also been talking publicly about contingency plans for a move, which they say are a normal part of analysis.

Estimates of the cost of moving them, if the need arises have ranged from $2 billion to $8 billion. Analysts say it is probable that no one site could duplicate the complex of services the two bases provide and therefore it is likely that some FIG. 1

(,nm Ranh Bay is now the major staging complex forSoviet Pacific Fleet ships, submarines, and aircraft outside Soviet tfj-ritor>'. The base, still being developed, includes support fd(,ilitics for submarines, surface ships and aircraft, and now supports the largest ( oiHcnlration of Soviet navjl forces routinely doijloyed outside the Soviet Union. Forces currunliy stationed at Cam Panh Bay include: Tl'-IG BADGER bombers; BEAR recon'ASW din r,ill; .MIG-23 FLOGCiEK Tighter aircraft; 6-8 surface combatants, 6-8 auxiliar>' ships; 5-6 attack and cruise-missile submarines. Before 1979 the Soviet Navy occasionally operated in llie South China Sea; since 1983, up to 30 subs and ships have operated routinely.

FIG. 2 76

operations would be scattered among more than one location. The alternative sites usually mentioned are the Pacific islands of Guam and Tinian. No other alternative site offers either strategic location or natural features that would come near to duplicating the advantages of the two bases. Relocation to Guam or Tinian which lie more than 1,500 miles east of the Philippines would move the key American centers three to four hours flying time or several days sailing time farther from the areas they defend.

In August 1989, Singapore announced that it was willing to host the US air and naval facilities should the agreement between the US and the Philippines not be renewed. It comes at a time when speculation is rife about the uncertain future of Clark and Subic US facilities in the Philippines. The Bases Agreement is due to terminate in 1991. Reactions from within ASEAN are mixed. Malaysia registered its objection to the presence of foreign troops and considers it an affront to the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) concept.''^^

Lee Kuan Yew however clarified his recent offer of Singapore to host the US military forces. "Misgivings over the proposal were baseless", he insisted. The offer extended to no more than facilities for berthing, ship repair and aircraft rotation.''^^

Whatever the actual conditions of Soviet access, Moscow's use of Vietnamese facilities remains tenuous and would be restricted or even terminated if Hanoi eventually finds a way to dispense with exclusive dependence on Soviet economic and military support. But the eventuality is farfetched. The Soviets - perhaps recognizing this have not made any capital improvements

124 New York Times, 28 Oct. 1985. Canberrra Times, 23 Aug. 1989 and FEER 31 Aug. 1989. 126 Asia Week, 20 Oct. 1989. 77

(except for fuel storage and the Sigint station) of the kind associated with a permanent naval or air station which would be left behind if they are forced to or unilaterally depart. Hanoi does not deny the Soviet presence but has repeatedly said that Cam Ranh Bay is a Vietnamese base only offering "facilities" to its Soviet ally.

Soviet facilities at Cam Ranh Bay are only transitory and Moscow has not made any significant capital investment notwithstanding some shore-related facilites. It may have something to do with their experience in Somalia when the Soviet Union was forced to leave in the mid-1970s. This has become a sort of Soviet Doctrine in terms of their "foreign bases" poiicy. Hanoi inherited a well established base which was 70% usable. The US Navy towed away the four movable long piers it had hitched to the end of the port's permanent earthen piers but existing berthage can still accommodate at least six large warships without doubling up. When the US left in 1975 there were two piers. In 1987, there were seven piers. In effect, the facilities at Cam Ranh have quadrupled since 1975.

Whether permanent or temporary, the use of Cam Ranh Bay (and other Vietnamese bases) by Soviet military forces is clearly linked to the Soviet Union's grand strategy to have its presence felt in the Pacific and Southeast Asia in order to expand its military and political influence in these strategic areas. It is important to note that Cam Ranh Bay is the first warm water foreign base in the Pacific to which the Soviet navy is permitted to have access.'' This is confirmed by the use of afloat facilities concept, Le., floating piers, floating drydocks, submarine tenders, and the afloat command headquarters. The only fixed, shore-related infrastructure are the two runways which were already there, fuel farm, and the SIGINT facility. Tai Sung An ," Soviet Access to Cam Ranh Bay: Political and Military Implications", US Naval 78

The expansion of Soviet power in Vietnam balances to a certain extent the US presence at the Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base in the Philippines. Dion Johnson in his book "Bear Tracks..." says that the US bases in the Philippines are already highly vulnerable to surprise attack from Soviet forces and do not have the capability for effective attack on Cam Ranh Bay. He recommends major developments of over-the-horizon radar in the Philippines and point defense missiles to defend the naval base at Subic and Clark Air Base. He points out that the current generation of F4 fighters at Clark are inadequately ranged to attack the Soviet base of Cam Ranh without major aerial refueling that is not normally available in the Philippines.

From the standpoint of the balance of military power in the region, the Russians have met two objectives:''^^ 1. primarily, they have closed the ring around China with air and naval bases north and south of that country 2. the Soviet Union forces are now in position to strike westward toward the Strait of Malacca and the tankers that pass through it with oil for Japan.

Soviet naval exercises, the largest OKEAN (Russian for Ocean) in 1970 and 1975 have been on coordinated operations simultaneously in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Indian and Pacific Ocean areas. Since 1975, this exercise pattern was revised and Soviet exercises have been oriented toward the missions of the separate fleets. Then in 1983, another worldwide exercise was conducted. The Soviet Pacific Fleet emphasized strategies cutting off communications and convoy operations in the South China Sea. Such a potential move for cutting off the sea lanes of communications (SLOC) could provoke dramatic changes in the

Institute Proceedings, Vol 105/9/919, Sept. 1979. New York Times Service, 31 Jan. 1984. 79

balance of power in Southeast Asia. This exercise was followed in the Spring of 1984. A 10-vessel Soviet task force, led by the Kiev class carrier Novorossiysk, conducted large scale manuevers in the Pacific, approximately 900 miles northwest of Midway.

Inspite of its modernization program, the Soviet navy still has some weaknesses which include a limited capability in open ocean ASW search and underway replenishment; inadequate sea-based tactical air forces; geographical constraints which inhibit access to the open ocean and a narrowly trained conscripted enlisted corps.

The strategic location of bases in Vietnam, midway between the two oceans help the Soviet navy to avoid costly and time-consuming returns to Vladivostock and Petropavlovsk. Cam Ranh thus provides a replenishing stop, crew rest relay and repair station for the Soviet Pacific Fleet surface ships and submarines enroute to or returning from Indian Ocean deployments.

Finally, in a wartime perspective, the prepositioning of logistics capabilities and the storage of a wide-range of lethal weapons, including most probably nuclear, decisively improve the versatility and the might of Soviet forces in the Asia-Pacific region. In a short notice, Soviet naval aviation aircraft, surface warships and submarines operating from Cam Ranh could strike US bases in the Philippines, military installations in China and ASEAN countries, cut the sea lanes, without having to refuel or come all the way from the Sea of Japan. Mining of Subic Bay and the Indonesian Straits could be launched more easily within hours by Soviet mining vessels or aircraft operating from Vietnam, armed with mines already stored there. To further enhance Soviet naval

" Understanding Soviet Naval Developments...", op. cjl., p. 31. 80

presence, the second and third Kiev'^^^ class ships, the Minsk and Novorossiysk are assigned to the Pacific Ocean Fleet.

Moreover, Moscow's willingness to sign the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, rejected by the US, fits in with a long term goal of gaining regional position at Washington's expense. It was self-serving for the Soviets with their reservations that the Soviets put on in their signature that should any of the signatory nations permit a transit through the archipelago or permit port visits, the Soviets would feel free to withdraw or not abide by the protocols of the Treaty.

The September 1988 Krasnoyarsk offer made by Gorbachev of "giving up the fleet material and technical supply station in Cam Ranh" in exchange for US withdrawal from Subic and Clark in the Philippines is an opening "gambit". While others consider it an attractive offer, others claim that it is like trading "a pawn for queen"."*^^

In October 1989, a senior political analyst with the Soviet Novosti Press Agency in Moscow said that the Soviet Union will probably give up its facilities at the Cam Ranh naval base in Vietnam. Mr. Eduard Ryabtsev, did not give any specific timetable for the unilateral withdrawal but he said that the Soviet presence in the base cast a shadow over his country's foreign policy in Asia. He further said that this unilateral withdrawal did not look for any

The Soviets originally classified the KIEV as a "large anti-submarine warfare cruiser" but subsequently redesignated it a "tactical aircraft caixying cruiser". Radio Interview with Dr. Carl Thayer by Tony Hastings from International Report. ABC Radio National, 7 Oct. 1989. Excerpts from the interview, "For a long time now, at least since the July 1986 Vladivostock speech or the subsequent September 1988 speech at Krasnoyarsk, where the Soviets offered to trade one for the other, the Soviets have been involved, to borrow a metaphor from chess, in the gambit of offering the pawn of Cam Ranh Bay for the Queen of Clark and Subic". 81

concession from any other nation (referring most likely to the US)JIt can be recalled that the Krasnoyarsk speech in September 1988, the Cam Ranh Bay withdrawal was predicated on a US reciprocal action of leaving Subic and Clark bases in the Philippines.

This latest development puts the US on notice most especially at a time when the US Vice President has just recently visited Manila urging the Aquino government that talks on the bases be started as early as September-October 1989.

Washington Times, 3 Oct. 1989 and BBC World Roundup carried by ABC Radio National, 3 Oct. 1989. 82

V CONCLUSION

The following major conclusions can be drawn. The Soviet Union has transformed Cam Ranh Bay and its adjoining airfield into a mBjor forwQrd deployment bQse thereby enhancing Soviet military capabilities in the Southeast Asian, Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Notwithstanding the Soviet designation of "material and technical support station" in Cam Ranh Bay, no less than the CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has made an official acknowledgement and reference to the Soviet presence thereat.

Although Indochina offers attractive opportunities to the Soviets to support peacetime operations in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean or wartime requirements against the PRC, the threat to the Free World interests in the area would be limited. There will be constraints in logistics due to its distance from the Soviet Union either by way of Vladivostock or through the Afghanistan-India-Burma air route. Besides interdiction by US or its allies of these resupply lines would render them vulnerable and unreliable.

The major insular countries of Southeast Asia - Indonesia and the Philippines - and Australia would be the keys to maintaining the security of allied bases and SLOCs. Indonesia, because of the strategic choke points, the Philippines because of the US bases and the alternative SLOC on her eastern seaboard and Australia because of ANZUS, the choke points and her contribution to the protection of the alternative SLOC. The other FPDA countries can provide the air defence early warning system. 83

The unusual interest that the Soviet Union has shown in 'acquiring' and further upgrading the port facilities of Kompong Som and nearby Ream in Kampuchea on the Gulf of Thailand bears close watch. The Soviets have used these ports to transfer war materiel to support the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The ports also lie at the mouth of the Gulf of Thailand bringing the Soviets closer to the Straits of Malacca and the other 'choke points'. It can be recalled that in World War II, land-based aircraft launched from bases in Indochina spelled the doom of the much-vaunted Allied Singapore strategy. But with the recent Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea in September 1989, the value of the bases may diminish over time.

China no longer considers the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay a threat. To the other nations in the region, especially ASEAN, the Soviet military presence in Vietnam provides the USSR with the political leverage to exert pressure in the attainment of its regional and global objectives.

it has been observed that the Soviet facilities at Cam Ranh Bay are temporary in physical structure. The Soviets have not committed themselves to building fully permanent facilities in Vietnam. Despite generous Soviet support, however, Vietnamese/Soviet cooperation remains tenuous. Douglas Pike, International Affairs Specialist at the University of California, stated that the Soviet/Vietnamese relationship "carries the seeds of its own destruction".''^^ Partly by history, there was no one who ever had a successful relationship with the Vietnamese, not the French or the Chinese, or the Japanese or the Americans, he added. Much of the Soviet aid is going down the drain where millions of dollars worth of Soviet equipment, machinery and heavy construction vehicles have been misused by the Vietnamese. A

"Backgrounder", USIS, September 1984. 84

senior Soviet port official visiting Haiphong harbor in March 1981 found abandoned Soviet equipment rusting there since 1968. In addition the Vietnamese reportedly started a fire at Haiphong in April 1981 burning 28 million dollars worth of Soviet goods to hide evidence of widespread Vietnamese pilfering.

In a bid to improve the Vietnamese economy, the coming to power in Hanoi of Nguyen Van Linh signals that desire. It has something to do with the Gorbachev effect. Nguyen Van Linh has come to replace the old guards - Le Duan, Truong Chinh- Pham Van Dong triumvirate. His rapid ascension to the top appears as an outcome of the Gorbachev effect upon Vietnamese politics. Linh is credited for having liberalized the economy of Ho Chi Minh City, his party constituency. During the Fifth Congress of the VCP, Gorbachev gave a veiled warning to Hanoi to follow the Soviet example to "make the economy, economical."''^^

It is therefore likely that the Soviets, preoccupied with economic reforms, will undertake a Soviet-style defence 'burden sharing' scheme, in the official Soviet language - "strategic division of labor" - with Vietnam and India in the 1990s, for these nations to take more active role in their spheres of influence, particularly in the South China Sea and in the Indian Ocean, respectively. The continuing Indian military build-up, particularly their naval build-up will soon have three task forces, carrier task forces. A growing Indian navy - the largest, most modern, and best equipped in the area, and very much oriented toward sea control - already occupies a strategic position in relation to the Malacca Strait with its new naval base in the Andaman islands.Vietnam, on the other hand, has been increasingly the recipient of

Thai Quang Tning, "The Strategic Nexus: The Soviet-Vietnamese Alliance", Conference paper presented in Singapore, 5-6 Oct. 1987. 136 Alvin Bernstein," The Soviets in Cam Ranh Bay", Quadrant,{ Sydney), July-August 1986. 85

obsolescent but tactically - usable naval vessels and aircraft with missile capability and may be expected to assume the role of SLOG interdiction in the South China Sea. This scheme will free Soviet naval and air assets for offensive deployment somewhere else.

On balance, the establishment of a major forward base by the Soviets in Cam Ranh Bay, can be contained by the US with Subic and Clark facilities in the Philippines without having to commit US aircraft carrier battle group/s for SLOC protection in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. They can be deployed elsewhere for offensive operations. However, should access to Subic and Clark be denied to the US, a great imbalance in relative combat power will tilt in favor of the Soviets and therefore the presence of the US carrier battle groups would be very much needed to make up for the loss.

Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay may be purely semantics - bases requiring extraterritoriality while facilities are afforded by a host country to an ally or a visitor. Finally, William Branigan aptly describes in summary: A huge naval and air base on Vietnam's coast that for many years was the key supply hub to the US war effort in that country has been gradually transformed into what the US Pacific Command now calls the 'largest Soviet naval base' for forward deployment of warships outside the Soviet Union aside from the Warsaw Pact^^'^ Such is the strategic significance of Cam Ranh Bay, then and now !

Washington Post, 1 Aug. 1986. 86

EPILOGUE

The Gorbachev factor coupled with the Reagan response have brought about quantum leap in the search for global peace. The INF Treaty has greatly reduced tensions in Europe. Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan put a close to a chapter in a major conflict area resulting correspondingly in the reduction of Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean.

The 1986 Vladivostock Initiative has shifted Moscow's attention from Europe to the Asia-Pacific Region. Followed by the Krasnoyarsk speech in 1988, Gorbachev put forward seven 'confidence building' measures. The responses of the US, PRC and Japan will spell out events in the 1990s which would have far ranging implications into the turn of the century. The Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea in September 1989 signals that first step in attaining peace in the Asia-Pacific region.

Events in the region are happening so rapidly. The latest prediction of a Novosti Press Agency political analyst in October 1989 that the USSR will unilaterally withdraw from Cam Ranh Bay augurs well for peace. Though it may not be an official Kremlin statement, statements such as this from the official Soviet Press Agency can reflect the Soviet leadership's line of thought. 87

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

THAYER FILES

USSR-Vietnam Military Bases, 3 Vols, held at the Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.

This is a collection of primary and secondary source material relating to the Soviet military presence in Vietnam in general, and Cam Ranh Bay in particular, covering the period 1975 to the present. Among the materials included are: declassified US Defense Intelligence Agency reports and studies; other US government material; transcripts from the US FBIS Daily Reports and the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: American, Australian, Southeast Asian and other newspaper clippings; published journal articles; unpublished conference papers; and other miscellaneous documents.

Daily Hansard (Parliament of Australia)

Articles

Ross Babbage, (ed), The Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990's, Brassey's Australia, 1989.

Should Australia Plan to Defend Christmas and Cocos Islands? Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 45, ANU Canberra, 1988.

, The Future of US Maritime Strategy, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 158, ANU Canberra, 1988.

A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1977. 88

Coral Bell, (ed), The Changing Pacific: Four Case Studies, Canberra Studies in World Affairs No. 22, ANU Central Printery, Canberra, 1987.

Walden Bello, Peter Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky, American Lake, Nuclear Peril in the Pacific, Penguin Books Australia Ltd., 1986.

Alvin Bernstein, "The Soviets in Cam Ranh Bay", Quadrant (Sydney), July - August 1986.

Cam Ranh Base Issue: The Multidimensional Impact of the Soviet Military Build-Up in Indochina, Conference Paper presented in Singapore, 5-6 Oct. 1987.

S. Bilveer, The Development of Moscow- Hanoi Relations Since the Vietnam War: The View From Singapore, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 54, ANU Canberra, 1982.

Alison Broinowski, (ed), Understanding ASEAN, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London,1980.

Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy, The War after the War, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, Orlando Florida, 1986.

Defence of Japan, 1988, Defence Agency, Japan, 1988.

Juan A. De Leon, Sino-Soviet Role in the Military Developments in the Indian Ocean, Unpublished Thesis, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 1975

Paul Dibb, Soviet Strategy Towards Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, Strategic and Defence Studies Center Working Paper No. 90, ANU Canberra, November 1984.

Soviet Union as a Pacific Military Power, Strategic and Defence Studies Center Working Paper No. 81, August 1984.

Soviet Capabilities, Interests and Strategies in East Asia in the 1980s, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 45, ANU Canberra, 1982. 89

William J. Duiker, China and Vietnam: Roots of Conflict, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1966.

Trevor Findlay, The Gorbachev Initiative, Reykjavick and Beyond, Peace Research Center Working Paper No. 19, ANU Canberra, 1987.

James Fitzgerald, Soviet American Relations in the Nuclear Age, Thomas Nelson Australia, Melbourne, 1988.

Bernard K. Gordon, Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia, Prentice Hall Inc. New Jersey, 1966.

Melvin Gurtov, Southeast Asia Tomorrow, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore and London, 1970.

Larry Hartley, Superpower Relations Since 1945, Bell and Hyman, London, 1988.

David Hegarty, South Pacific Security Issues: An Australian Perspective, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 147, ANU Canberra, December 1987.

Libya and the South Pacific, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 127, ANU Canberra, October 1987.

Tim Huxley, The ASEAN States' Internal Security Expenditure, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 122, ANU Canberra, 1987.

Indochina and Insurgency in the ASEAN States, 1975-1981, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper Nr. 67, ANU Canberra, January 1983.

Lim Joo Jock, Geo-strategy and the South China Sea Basin, Singapore University Press, 1979.

Dion W. Johnson, Lt. Col. USAF, Bear Tracks in Indochina, An Analysis of Soviet Presence in Vietnam, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, January 1987. 90

Paul Keal, Japan's Role in the United States Strategy in the Pacific, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 106, ANU Canberra, October 1986.

K. V. Kesavan, Japanese Defence Policy Since 1976: Latest Trends, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 31, ANU Canberra, 1984

Gary Klintworth, Mr. Gorbachev's China Diplomacy, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. Ill, ANU Canberra, 1986.

Vietnam's Withdrawal from Cambodia, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 117, ANU Canberra, 1987.

Derek J. McDougall, Rodney A. Martin, Gary K. Smith, Bernard C. Tranter, Foreign Policies in the Asian-Pacific Region, Prentice Hall of Australia Pty Ltd, 1982.

Charles McGregor, The Sino-Vietnamese Relationship and the Soviet Union, Adelphi Paper 232, International Institute for Strategic Studies , London, 1988.

Donald Hugh McMillen, China in Asian International Relations, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 72, ANU Canberra, June 1983.

Richard Natkiel, Atlas of Battles, Bison Books Ltd, London, 1984.

Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia, An Illustrated Introductory History, Allen and Unwin Australia Pty Ltd, Sydney, 1988.

, Aggression and Annexation, Kampuchea's Condemnation of Vietnam, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 15, ANU Canberra, 1979.

Patricia Ann Paez, The Bases Factor, Realpolitik of RP-US Relation, Center for Strategic and International Studies of the Philippines (CSIS), Dispatch Press, Manila, 1985. 91

Jeffrey Record, Revising US Military Strategy, Pergammon Brasseys, Virginia, 1984.

Amin Saikal. The Afghanistan Conflict: Gorbachev's Options, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 42, September 1987.

Robert A. Scalapino, Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia, University Press of America, Boston, 1987.

John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, Praeger Publishers, 3rd Revised Edition, New York, 1970.

Russel Solomon, The Role of Japan in the United States Strategic Policy for Northeast Asia, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 39, ANU Canberra, 1986.

David Joel Steinberg (ed), In Search of Southeast Asia, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1987.

Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, (eds). The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostock Initiative, Westview Press Inc, Macmillan Australia, 1987.

Periodicals

Asia Week Asian Survey Aviation Week and Space Technology Baltimore Sun Bangkok Post Beijing Review Business Week Canberra Times Christian Science Monitor Far Eastern Economic Review International Herald Tribune Jane's Weekly Japan Times 92

New Nation New York Times News Weekly Pacific Defence Reporter South China Morning Post Soviet News Bulletin Straits Times Sydney Morning Herald The Age The Australian The Star UP! US Naval Institute Proceedings US News and World Report Washington Post Washington Star MAP 14 A Chinese Illustration of the Geographical Importance of Cam Ranh Bay

LEGEND Soviet Naval Bzise JJ 4 TU-95 long range reconnaissance planes O 4 TU-142 anti submarine aircraft Soviet Air Base 16 TU-16 mediunn range bombers o I 14 MIG-23 fighter bombers Soviet Command reconnaissance & I) Soviet Naval Special Task Force. k intelligence facilities Regular Presence 30 warships (including . .Ak, submarines), one naval infantry battalion Areas of Soviet Naval Activities Flight range of TU-16 medium range bombers (2,900 km) U.S. Naval Base i) Right range of MIG-23 fighters (1,200 km) o I) Straits of Malacca: 1,080 km © Width: 37 km - 370 km U.S. Air Base Depth: 25 m - 113 meters Wry large carrier of over 200,000 dwt passable Route of major sea links 50,000 ships passing through each year; most of Japani'-se in-.portcd oi! and material. 80% of America's and Wes;.;rn E;;;.sir.iteQic inipoit.s .ire imported thr<')!H;!5 thi-j ANNEX A

Vietnamese - Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

Hanoi, November 3: A treaty of fricndsliip and coopera- tion between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Soviet Union was signed in Moscow today. The treaty signed by Le Duan and Pham Van Dong for Vietnam and L.I. Brezhnev and A.N. Kosygin for the Soviet Union, reads in full: Treaty Of Friendship And Cooperation Between The Socialist Republic of Vietnam And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, proceeding from the close cooperation in all fields in a fra- ternal spirit, from the unshakable friendship and solidarity between the two countries on the basis of the principles of Marxism — Leninism and socialist internationalism, firmly convinced that the endeavour to consolidate the solidarity and friendship between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is in conformity with the basic interests of the two peoples and in the interests of the consolidation of the fraternal friendship and one-mindedness among the countries in the socialist community, in keeping with the principles and objectives of the socialist foreign policy and the desire to ensure the most favourable international conditions for the building of socialism and communism, confirming that the signatories to the treaty acknowledge their international obllgalion to assist each other in the consoh'dation and preservniion of the socialist achievements recorded by the two peoples through their heroic efforts and selfless labour, determined to work fo|- the unity of all forces struggling for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress, expressing their iron like determination to contribute to the consolidation of i)eace In Asia and throughout the world, and (o the devclopmcnl of good relations and mutually bene- ficial cooperation among countries with different social systems, hoping to further develop and perfect the all-round coop- eration between the two countries, attaching importance to the continued development and consolidation of the juridlcial basis of the bilateral relations, in keeping with Ihe objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter, have resolved to sign this treaty of friendship and coopera- tion and have agreed as follows:

Article 1 in keeping with the principles of socialist internationalism, the two parties signatory to the present treaty shall continue to consolidate the unshakable friendship and solidarity and assist each other in a fraternal spirit. The two parties shall unceasingly develop political relations and cooperation in all fields and endeavour to assist each other on the basis of respect for each other's national independence and sover- eignty, equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Article 2 The two parties signatory to the present treaty shall join efforts to consolidate and broaden the mutually beneficial cooperation in the economic and scientific-technological fields in order to push forward the building of socialism and communism and to constantly raise the material and cultural standards of the two peoples. The two parties shall continue to coordinate their long-term national economic plans, agree upon long-term measures aimed at developing the most important sectors of the economy, science and technology, and exchange knowledge and experience accumulated in the building of socialism and communism.

Article 3 The two parties signatory to the treaty shall promote coop- eration between their state bodies and mass organisations, and develop broad relations in the fields of science and culture, education, literature and art, press, broadcasting and television, health service, environmental protection, tourism, sports and physical training, and others. The two parties shall encourage the development of contacts between the working peoples of the two countries.

Article 4 The two parties signatory to the treaty shall consistently strive to further consolidate their fraternal relations, and to strengthen the solidarity and one-mindedness among the socialist countries on the basis of Marxism - Leninism and socialist internationalism. The two parties shall do their utmost to consolidate the world socialist system and actively contribute to the develop- ment and defence of the socialist gains.

Article 5 The two parties signatory to the treaty shall continue doing their utmost to contribute to defending world peace and the security of all nations; they shall actively oppose all schemes and manoeuvres of imperialism and reactionary forces, sup- port the just struggle for the complete eradication of all forms and colours of colonialism and racism, support the struggle waged by non-aligned countries and the peoples of Asian, African and Latin-American countries against imperi- alism, colonialism and nco-colonialism, for the consolidation of independence and the defence of sovereignty, for mastery over their natural resources, and for the establishment of a new world economic rclalionsliip with no inequity, oppres- sion and exploitation, and support the aspirations of the Southeast Asian peoples for peace, independence and coop- eration among countries In (his region. The two parties shall stilve to develop the relations be- tween countries with different social systems on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence, for the purpose of broadening and consolidating the process of easing tension in international relations and radically eliminating aggressions and wars of aggression frotn the life of all nations, for the sake of peace, national independence, democracy and socialism. Article 6 The two parties signatory to the treaty shall exchange views on all important international questions relating to the interests of the two countries, hi case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the two parties signatory to the treaty shall immediatel)^ consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat, and shall take appropriate and effective measures to safeguard peace and the security of the two countries. Article 7 The present treaty does not concern the two parties' rights and obligations stemming from the bilateral or multilateral agreements to which they are signatories and is not intended to oppose any third counlry. Article S The present treaty shall be ratiliccl and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratifica- tion, which shall take placc in Hanoi as early as possible.

Article 9 The present treaty shall remain in lorce for 25 years and thereafter shall be automatically exicnded for periods of ten years if neither signatory party declares its desire to lerniinate the present treaty by informing the olher fiarly (wclvc monlhs before the treaty expires.

Done in duplicate in the Vietnamese and Russian lan- guages, both texts being equally authentic, in Moscow, this third day of November 1978.

For For The Socialist Republic The Union of Soviet of Vietnam: Socialist Republics: Le Duan L.I. Brezhnev Pham Van Dong A.N. Kosygin (signed) (signed) Academy Library Cam Ranh Bay revisited (1979-1989): the thesis 1989 De Leon BARCODE: 428333