UNIVERSITY COLLEGE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY BAMU BAY REVISITED (1i?i - 1iii ): THE >TRATEQ10 S1GNJF8QANQE ©F Om mUU BAY TH[ AND mm. BY CAPTAIN JUAN A. DE LEON PN (GSC) NOVEMBER 1989 A SUB-THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES II PREFACF AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT Southeast Asia is a region fast becoming the center stage of the 21st Century. One historian said that "the Mediterranean is the past, Europe is the present and the Asia-Pacific Region is the future." The future is now! This sub-thesis deals with contemporary issues now determining the future of the region going into the year 2000. Soviet attention was refocused on the Asia-Pacific region after Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev made his historic speech at Vladivostock on 28 July 1986. Since then developments have gone on at a pace faster than expected. The Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan. Then in September 1988, Gorbachev spelled out in detail his Vladivostock initiative through his Krasnoyarsk speech and called on major powers, the US, China and Japan, to respond to his peace offensives. He has offered to give up the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh if the US did likewise at Subic and Clark in the Philippines. To some it may appear attractive, while others consider that it is like trading "a pawn for a queen". This sub-thesis completes my ten-month stay in a very progressive country, Australia. I was fortunate enough having been given the chance to undertake a Master of Defence Studies Course (MDef Studies) at the University College, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy upon the invitation of the Australian Government. My deepest gratitude goes to the Government, its Defence Force and its wonderful and cordial people. This written work would not have been possible were it not for the patient and inspiring supervision of Dr. Carlyle A. Thayer. Likewise, I'd like to acknowledge the encouragement of Dr. Hugh Smith and the professional knowledge acquired under Professor John McCarthy and Dr. Roger Thompson, both of the History Department. ILL My sincerest thanks to the Staff at the ADFA Library who were most helpful, Mr. Phillip Berrie of the Computer Centre, Mrs. Lynne Smith and Elizabeth Hoole of the Defence Studies Centre, and Shirley Ramsay, Secretary of the Politics Department. The Staff at the Officers Mess, made my short stay there "home away from home" and Capt John Mould and Maj Zaharias of the ADSS who attended to all of our administrative requirements. While pursuing the MDefStudies Course, I had the occassion of meeting classmates who were genuinely interested in Asians like us, myself and my good friend from Malaysia Mr. Arujunan Naranayan, namely; Lt. Col. Chris Welburn, Lcdr. Wayne Gobert, Capt. Monique Feinberg and other Australian friends like Lcdr. Ernest James. Back in the Philippines, my sincerest appreciation and gratitude go to Gen. Renato S. De Villa, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Rear Adm. Emerson Tangan, Deputy Chief of Staff, my former boss. Brig. Gen. Arturo Castro, erstwhile DCS Plans (J5), now Defence Attache in Washington, D. C., Brig. Gen. Lisandro Abadia (J-3), Commo. Domingo Calajate, (former J-8) and Capt. Armando Q. Madamba, PN (GSC), newly designated J-5, for their unstinted support and moral encouragement for me to exert my best with this course. I also had the fortune to share my Australian experience with my family and a grandson, a full-fledged "Australian bloke" born in the midst of my research time on Cam Ranh Bay. With their presence, it made life in a foreign country a truly memorable one! CANBERRA. AUSTRALIA NOVEMBER 1989 Page PREFACE and ACKNOWLEDGMENT ii TABLE OF CONTFNTR 1 MAPS AND FIGURES I INTRODUCTION 2 II GEO-STRATEGIC ASPECT OF CAM RANH BAY 1 0 1. Historical Aspect 2. US Infrastucture until 1979 3. Soviet Activities and Infrastructure from 1979 4. Sea Lines of Communications ( SLOCs) III KEY AND PERIPHERAL 'ACTORS' 4 3 1.USSR 2. SRV 3. PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) 4. ASEAN 5. USA 6. AUSTRALIA 7. JAPAN IV "A PAWN FOR A QUEEN" 73 V CONCLUSION 82 BIBLIOGRAPHY 87 ANNEX Maps and Figurftc; 1. Map of Southeast Asia/South China Sea 2. Map of Cam Ranh Bay 3. Encirclement of China 4. Global Deployment of Soviet Forces 5. Map of the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk 6. Map of the 'Choke Points' 7. Soviet Naval Aviation Operating Areas Bear D & F 8. Range of the Badgers 9. Range of the Backfires 10. Sea Lines of Communications 11. Map of Davao Gulf and the Straits 12. Map of Australia and the South Pacific 13. Outline of Soviet Naval Activities and Military Aircraft Around Japan 14. Chinese Illustration of the Geographical Importance of Cam Ranh Bay FIGURES 1 & 2 - Aerial Photographs of Cam Ranh Bay CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION On 28 July 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), delivered in the Soviet Far East city of Vladivostock a major policy speech which touched on both domestic and foreign issues. But the speech clearly "served notice that the Soviet Union would engage in international relations as an Asian-Pacific power as much as a European power". The Soviet Union's identity as an Asian-Pacific power is critical to Gorbachev's twin concerns of the security of the USSR and the resuscitation of its economy. Vladivostock was clear evidence of Gorbachev's deft application of 'linkage diplomacy'. His own version of strategic parity with the US dealt with 'two birds with one stone' - parity with the US on his own terms (the INF Treaty) and his European "double zero option" linked with his economic restructuring goals. Also in his Vladivostock speech, Gorbachev once again revived the idea of an Asian Collective Security System but this time almost entirely different from the Brezhnev proposal. It was more directed towards China enticing it into participating in a new Asian socialist community. In July 1987, a three-day meeting of Asian communist parties was convened in Ulan Bator, Mongolia at which it was agreed to promote Soviet proposals for a collective security system in the Asia-Pacific region. This was the first ever meeting ^ Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (ed), The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostock Initiative, West View Press Inc., Macmillan Australia, 1987, p. 2. of this type held in Asia.^ The American withdrawal from the former Republic of (South) Vietnam (RVN) led to the subsequent fall of the Saigon government in 1975. This and the ascendancy of a unified Vietnam have rendered imperative a re-evaluation of the regional power equation and balance in Southeast Asia and even in the Pacific. Before the fall of South Vietnam, the South China Sea was virtually an "American lake" on account of the American naval and air presence in bases therein particularly in Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay and the US bases, Clark and Subic in the Philippines. The US withdrawal from Vietnam left a power vacuum which the Soviet Union was just as eager to fill in but at the same time anxious in making sure that China should not fill in. The significance of Southeast Asia to the Soviet Union is that it is an area where access to other regions and where pressure can be applied to its adversaries, the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) and the United States (US).^ Soviet policy in this region should be taken as part of its global strategy rather than an isolated regional issue. The Asia-Pacific region (APR) is where the interests and borders of four of the five main power centers of the world, the US, China, USSR, and Japan intersect."^ In 1916, V. I. Lenin said that Russia geographically, economically and historically belonged ^ Carlyle A. Thayer, "Kampuchea: Soviet Initiatives and Regional Responses", Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (ed), The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostock Initiative, p. 187. ^ Leszek Buszynski, "Gorbachev and Southeast Asia: Prospects for the 1990s", Ross Babbage (ed), The Soviets in the Pacific in the 1990s, Brasseys Australia, 1989, p. 9. ^ Henry Trofimenko, "Long Term Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region, A Soviet Evaluation", Asian Survey, Vol XXIX, No. 3, March 1989, p. 239. not only to Europe but also to Asia. It is further bolstered by the fact that one third of Asia lies within the geographical limits of the country.5 There are various interpretations of the Soviet Union's presence in Indochina especially in Cam Ranh Bay. On one hand, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) has persistently maintained that there are no Russian 'bases' in that country although port calls by Soviet ships and aircraft are made on a regular basis. There have been reports that these 'bases' are off-limits to the Vietnamese themselves. On the other, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin in a visit to Japan in 1979 confirmed that the presence of Soviet ships and aircraft is in consonance with the Russo-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in November 1978. The arguments may be purely semantics but both the SRV and the USSR acknowledge that the Soviets are accorded military 'facilities' thereat. Others call it by a host of names, i.e., facilities, pit stop, forward deployment bases, support bases and supply points. Therefore, this thesis will look at the development of the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay, its origins, reasons/rationale for such presence, its implications and the prospects and outlook beyond the 1990s.^ It will also focus on operational as well as support aspects of the Soviet military presence as these will give indications whether the base is fully under Soviet control.