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Israel's Critical Security Requirements

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Israel's Critical Security Requirements What Israel Has Learned about Security: Nine IDF Officers Discuss Israel's Security Challenges A Jerusalem Center Anthology Published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs at Smashwords Copyright 2012 Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Other ebook titles by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs: Israel's Critical Security Requirements for Defensible Borders Israel's Rights as a Nation-State in International Diplomacy Iran: From Regional Challenge to Global Threat The "Al-Aksa Is in Danger" Libel: The History of a Lie Jerusalem: Correcting the International Discourse – How the West Gets Jerusalem Wrong Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 13 Tel Hai Street, Jerusalem, Israel Tel. 972-2-561-9281 Fax. 972-2-561-9112 Email: [email protected] - www.jcpa.org ISBN: 978-147-605-141-3 Cover photo: IDF soldier passes through wall to avoid booby-trapped doorway during the Gaza Operation on January 15, 2009. (IDF Spokesperson) * * * * * Contents Foreword Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror Israel's Security Doctrine and the Trap of "Limited Conflict" Col. (res.) Yehuda Wegman Lessons of the Gaza Security Fence for the West Bank Maj. Gen. (res.) Doron Almog The Strategic Logic of Israel's Security Barrier Col. (res.) Danny Tirza The Influence of Christian Interests in Setting the Route of the Security Fence in Jerusalem Col. (res.) Danny Tirza Predicting the Rise of Hamas: The Democracy of the Rifles Brig. Gen. (res.) Shalom Harari Misreading the Second Lebanon War Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror Strategic Lessons of the Winograd Commission Report on the Second Lebanon War Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror Israel's Deterrence after the Second Lebanon War Maj.-Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan Defensible Borders on the Golan Heights Maj.-Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland The Future of the Two-State Solution Maj.-Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland The Geneva Accord: A Strategic Assessment Maj. Gen. (res) Yaakov Amidror The Beginning of Israeli Rule in Judea and Samaria Maj.-Gen. Rephael Vardi Ethical Dilemmas in Fighting Terrorism Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin Notes About the Author About the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs * * * * * Foreword The security of the Jewish nation is the full-time focus of the officer corps of the Israel Defense Forces. In recent years the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs has provided a unique public forum for presenting the views of some of Israel's top military leaders on a myriad of issues – in English. This volume brings together fourteen studies and essays by nine leading IDF officers who have shared from their rich experience. It serves as a companion to another recent Jerusalem Center eBook – Israel's Critical Security Requirements for Defensible Borders – which includes assessments by five leading Israeli generals. In recent decades, Israel has served as a laboratory for counterinsurgency war, one of the new faces of modern warfare. In "Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience," Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, who was appointed in 2011 as National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and previously served as head of the IDF Intelligence Research and Assessment Division, discusses in detail how, contrary to popular belief, conventional armies can indeed defeat terrorist insurgencies. He focuses particularly on Israel's success in defeating the suicide terrorist onslaught known as the Second Intifada, which began in 2000. Col. (res.) Yehuda Wegman also writes based on the IDF's experiences in the Second Intifada. In "Israel's Security Doctrine and the Trap of 'Limited Conflict'," an earlier version of which appeared in the IDF journal Marachot in Hebrew, he points out that suicide terrorists, though presented as insurmountable weapons, are really products of a system whose leaders value their lives. Accordingly, it is the heads of the terrorist organizations who should be the main targets of Israel's response. A key element in Israel's success in defeating the challenges of the Second Intifada was the construction of a security barrier to separate Israel's population centers from terrorists based in the West Bank. In "Lessons of the Gaza Security Fence for the West Bank," Maj.-Gen. (res.) Doron Almog, head of the IDF's Southern Command in 2000-2003, describes how a security fence coupled with a buffer zone prevented terrorists from leaving Gaza. Instead they changed tactics and developed rockets, and warned that they could do so as well from the West Bank. Col. (res.) Danny Tirza, the IDF's chief architect for the West Bank security fence, discusses "The Strategic Logic of Israel's Security Barrier," explaining why the fence wasn't built along the "green line" – the 1949 ceasefire line. From a security perspective, mountains dominate valleys. To provide security, Israel must control the high ground in order to dominate the area and not have others dominate it. Col. Tirza then follows with a fascinating account of "The Influence of Christian Interests in Setting the Route of the Security Fence in Jerusalem." Brig.-Gen. (res.) Shalom Harari served in the territories for twenty years as a senior advisor on Palestinian affairs for Israel's Defense Ministry. Speaking at the Jerusalem Center in October 2005, he predicted the rise of Hamas in Gaza. In "Predicting the Rise of Hamas: The Democracy of the Rifles," he pointed out that while Fatah forces in Gaza at the time outnumbered Hamas by four to one, every Hamas and Islamic Jihad member was worth five or six Fatah members because they were much more committed and fanatical and had more self-discipline. Hamas won the Palestinian elections three months later, and took over all of Gaza from Fatah in June 2007 after a brief fight. The Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006 saw over a million residents of northern Israel subject to Hizbullah rocket bombardments that continued up until the end of the 34-day conflict. Critical voices immediately began to ask why Israel had not vanquished a numerically inferior enemy. Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror warns against "Misreading the Second Lebanon War," noting that Hizbullah's casualties in the war were greater than all the casualties Hizballah had suffered during the previous twenty years. He also noted that the determination of Israel's government to respond and to retaliate was a very important factor in restoring deterrence. Finally, Gen. Amidror looks at some of the "Strategic Lessons of the Winograd Commission Report on the Lebanon War" – the commission that investigated Israel's conduct during the war. Reviewing "Israel's Deterrence after the Second Lebanon War," Maj.-Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan, former chairman of Israel's National Security Council and National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister, warns that hardly anybody in Israel thinks that if we give territories now, we will get peace in return – after Israel experienced massive rocket fire following its withdrawal from Gaza and southern Lebanon. He notes that Israel is not suicidal and is unlikely to try this strategy again in another place. In 1999-2000, Israeli-Syrian negotiations discussed security arrangements intended to compensate Israel for the loss of the Golan Heights. When indirect Israeli-Syrian negotiations were renewed in 2008 under Turkish auspices, they were conducted under the assumption that there was a military solution that would compensate Israel for the loss of the Golan. As Maj.-Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland, former chairman of Israel's National Security Council, demonstrates in his analysis, "Defensible Borders on the Golan Heights," Israel does not possess a plausible solution to its security needs without the Golan Heights. Not only was the "solution" proposed in 2000 implausible at the time, but changing circumstances have rendered Israel’s forfeiture of the Golan today an even more reckless act. Gen. Eiland then views "The Future of the Two-State Solution," noting that the maximum that any government of Israel will be ready to offer the Palestinians and still survive politically is much less than the minimum that any Palestinian leader can accept. Eiland proposes a series of multilateral land swaps involving Egypt which would double or triple the current size of Gaza in order to make it economically viable, while retaining 600 sq. km. in the West Bank to solve Israeli security needs. Maj.-Gen. (res) Yaakov Amidror looks at the proposed "Geneva Accord," a draft peace agreement negotiated by a self-appointed group of Israelis and Palestinians in 2003. In "The Geneva Accord: A Strategic Assessment, Gen. Amidror notes that the document concedes almost all the security arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza sought by past Israeli governments and leaves Israel with no safety net in the event that the agreement is violated by the Palestinian side. Offering a rare first-hand perspective on events immediately following the Six- Day War, former West Bank military governor Maj.-Gen. Rephael Vardi describes "The Beginning of Israeli Rule in Judea and Samaria." Vardi notes that the IDF did not believe Israeli rule in the territories would last more than a few months following the experience after the Sinai Campaign in 1956 when Israel was compelled to withdraw from the whole of Sinai. He describes how during the first two years following the war the local leadership of the Arab population was ready to take its fate in its own hands and try to negotiate a settlement with Israel. Israel's government at the time was ready to negotiate with the local leadership, but in the end it was the West Bank leaders who hesitated and withdrew even when there were good prospects to succeed. To conclude, Maj.-Gen. Amos Yadlin, who headed the IDF team that outlined the principles of the war against terror, presents "Ethical Dilemmas in Fighting Terrorism." He describes how in August 2002, Israel knew when all the leaders of Hamas were in one room.
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