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USAMHI France Napoleon U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center France-Napoleonic Wars 950 Soldiers Drive Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5021 21 Sep 2012 NAPOLEONIC WARS/WARFARE A Working Bibliography of MHI Sources CONTENTS General Sources…..p.1 -Reference Works…..p.1 Special Aspects…..p. Grand Armeé.....p.3 Command/Tactics.....p.4 Soldier Perspective.....p.5 Medical…..p. Naval Aspects…..p. GENERAL SOURCES Aaslestad, Katherine B. “Lost Neutrality and Economic Warfare: Napoleonic Warfare in Northern Europe, 1795-1815.” In War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815. NY: Cambridge, 2010. pp. 373-95. U39.W36. Ashby, Ralph. Napoleon against Great Odds: The Emperor and the Defenders of France, 1814. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010. 230 p. DC236.75.A84. Bingham, George R. Wellington’s Lieutenant, Napoleon’s Gaoler: The Peninsula and St. Helena Diaries and Letters of Sir George Ridout Bingham, 1809-21. [Edited by Gareth Glover] South Yorkshire, England: Pen & Sword Military, 2005. 310 p. DC232.B56. Blaufarb, Rafe, & Liebeskind, Claudia. Napoleonic Foot Soldiers and Civilians: A Brief History with Documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2011. 164 p. DC226.5.B532. Britt, Albert S., III. The Wars of Napoleon. Wayne, NJ: Avery, 1985. 185 p. DC203B847. Broers, Michael. “The Concept of ‘Total War’ in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Period.” War in History Vol. 15, No. 3 (2008): pp. 246-68. Per. Napoleonic Wars-Overview p.2 Citino, Robert M. The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich. Manhattan, KS: U KS, 2005. 428 p. DD101C58. See Chap. 4. Connelly, Owen. Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1987. 250 p. DC203.9C66. Dwyer, Philip G. Napoleon: The Path to Power. New Haven, CT: Yale, 2008. 651 p. DC205D99. Emlsey, Clive. Napoleon: Conquest, Reform and Reorganisation. NY: Pearson/Longman, 2003. 142 p. DC201E47. Franceschi, Michel, & Weider, Ben. The Wars against Napoleon: Debunking the Myth of the Napoleonic Wars. [Translation of Napoléon Défenseur Immolé de la Paix by Jonathan M. House] NY: Savas Beatie, 2008. 227 p. DC203.95.F7313. Gallaher, John G. Napoleon’s Enfant Terrible: General Dominique Vandamme. Norman, OK: U OK, 2008. 362 p. DC146.V36.G35. Gates, David. The Napoleonic Wars, 1803-1815. NY: Arnold, 1997. 304 p. DC226.3.G38. Hall, Christopher D. British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15. NY: Manchester, 1992. 237 p. DC226.6.P362. Haythornthwaite, Philip J. Die Hard!: Dramatic Actions from the Napoleonic Wars. London: Arms & Armour, 1996. 256 p. DC226.3.H39. Hill, Peter P. Napoleon’s Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815. Wash, DC: Potomac, 2005. 289 p. E183.8F8H55. Horne, Alistair. How Far From Austerlitz?: Napoleon, 1805-1815. NY: St. Martin’s, 1998. 429 p. DC227H672. Hueckel, Glenn R. “The Napoleonic Wars and their Impact on Factor Returns and Output Growth in England, 1793-1815.” PhD dss, U WI, 1972. 217 p. HC255.H84.Microfilm. Hyatt, A.M.J. "The Origins of Napoleonic Warfare: A Survey of Interpretations." Military Affairs (Winter 1966-67): pp. 117-85. Per. Kagan, Frederick W. The End of the Old Order: Napoleon and Europe, 1801-1805. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2006. 774 p. DC226.4.N36v1. Kiley, Kevin F. Once There Were Titans: Napoleon’s Generals and Their Battles, 1800-1815. London: Greenhill, 2007. 320 p. DC198.A1.K55. Lavery, Brian. We Shall Fight on the Beaches: Defying Napoleon & Hitler, 1805 and 1940. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Pr, 2009. 448 p. UA647.L38. Leggiere, Michael V. Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in North Germany, 1813. Norman, OK U OK, 2002. 384 p. DC236L44. Leggiere, Michael V. The Fall of Napoleon: The Allied Invasion of France, 1813-1814. NY: Cambridge, 2007. 686 p. DC238L44. Liaropoulos, Andrew N. “Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence— The Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs.” Journal of Military History (Apr 2006): pp. 363-84. Per. Linn, John A. Battle: A History of Combat and Culture. Cambridge, MA: Westview, 2003. 399 p. U21.2L96. See Chap. 6, “The Sun of Austerlitz: Romantic Visions of Decisive Battle in Nineteenth Century Europe.” Murat, Inès. Napoleon and the American Dream. [Translation Napoléon et le rêve américain by Frances Frenaye] Baton Rouge: LSU, 1981. 243 p. DC203.9M8713. Rothenberg, Gunther E. The Napoleonic Wars. London: Cassell, 2000. 224 p. DC151.R68. Schneid, Frederick C. Napoleon’s Conquest of Europe: The War of the Third Coalition. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005. 192 p. DC227.S36. Semmel, Stuart. Napoleon and the British. New Haven, CT: Yale, 2004. 354 p. DA533.S45. Shosenberg, James W. “Napoleon’s First Victory.” Military History (Aug 2003): pp. 6-33. Per. Toulon, Dec 1793 Silberman, Neil A. "'That Miserable Fort.'" MHQ (Winter 1991): pp. 62-73. Per. Acre besieged by Napoleon, Mar-May 1799. Smith, Digby G. Armies of the Napoleonic Era. Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 2004. 272 p. UA646.S65. U.S. Military Academy. Dept of History. Summaries of Selected Military Campaigns. West Point, NY: USMA, 1971 reprint of 1956 edition. 175 p. D25.U63. Concise descriptions, maps, & chronology on pp. 11-34. REFERENCE WORKS Chandler, David G. Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars. NY: Macmillan, 1979. 570 p. DC147.C47. Includes maps and chronologies. Connelly, Owen, et al, editors. Historical Dictionary of Napoleonic France, 1799-1815. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1985. 586 p. DC201.H673. Dupuy, Trevor N., ed-in-chief. International Military and Defense Encyclopedia. 6 vols. Wash, DC: Brassey’s, 1993. pp. 1025-28. U24.I58. Esposito, Vincent J. A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars. NY: Praeger, 1964. 289 p. G1796.S62.E8. Haythornthwaite, Philip J. The Napoleonic Source Book. NY: Facts on File, 1990. 414 p. DC151.H332. _____. Who Was Who in the Napoleonic Wars. London: Arms & Armour, 1998. 351 p. DC226.4.H39. Horward, Donald D., editor. Napoleonic Military History: A Bibliography. NY: Garland, 1986. 685 p. Z2181.M5.H67. Imperial Glory: The Bulletins of Napoleon’s Grand Armée, 1805-1814: With Additional Supporting Documents. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2003. 442 p. DC226.2.N3713. de Jomini, Antoine H. Atlas Portatif pour l’Intelligence des Relations des Dernières Guerres, Publiées sans Plans, Notamment Pour la vie de Napoléon. Paris: Anselin, 1840? 29 plates. DC226.4.J66Rarebook. Luvaas, Jay, editor. Napoleon on the Art of War. NY: Free Press, 1999. 196 p. DC214.L88. McNab, Chris, editor. Armies of the Napoleonic Wars: An Illustrated History. NY: Osprey, 2009. 432 p. DC226.4.A76. Markham, J. David. Imperial Glory: The Bulletins of Napoleon’s Grande Armee, 1805-1814. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2003. 442 p. DC226.2N3713. Mathews, Joseph J. Napoleon’s Military Bulletins. N.p., 1950. 7 p. DC226.6.P6.M37. Oliver, Michael, & Partridge, Richard. Napoleonic Army Handbook: The French Army and Her Allies. London: Constable, 2002. 354 p. UA646.O542. Pope, Stephen. Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars. NY: Facts on File, 1999. 572 p. DC151.P67. Smith, Digby G. The Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Book. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1998. 582 p. DC220.S62. Whaley, Leigh Ann. The Impact of Napoleon, 1800-1815: An Annotated Bibliography. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 1997. 209 p. Z8612W52. See also: -Bibliographies on specific engagements in France-Napoleonic; and Staff Rides in Training. SPECIAL ASPECTS Bruce, Robert B. Fighting Techniques of the Napoleonic Age, 1792-1815: Equipment, Combat Skills, and Tactics. NY: Thomas Dunne, 2008. 256 p. DC151.F54. Bryant, Mark. The Napoleonic Wars in Cartoons. London: Grub Street, 2009. 160 p. DC226.4.B79. Bukhari, Emir. French Napoleonic Line Infantry, 1796-1815. London: Almark, 1973. 104 p. UC485.F8.B844. Buttery, David. “Napoleon’s Brilliant Stepson.” Military Illustrated (Dec 2006): pp. 16-23. Per. Eugène de Beauharnais. Cassin-Scott, Jack. Uniforms of the Napoleonic Wars in Colour, 1796-1814. Poole, England: Blanford, 1973. 195 p. UC480.C29. De Grimoard, Philippe H. “The French Napoleonic Staff View of HUMINT.” [Translation by Rick Sanders of one chapter of Traité sur le service de l’état major general…] Studies in Intelligence (Jun 2010): pp. 37-40. Per. Egan, Clifford L. Neither Peace nor War: Franco-American Relations, 1803-12. Baton Rouge: LSU, 1983. 225 p. E183.8.F8.E43. Funcken, Liliane & Fred. The Napoleonic Wars. 2 vols. [Translation of L'Uniforme et les Armes des soldats du Premier Empire] London: Ward Lock, 1973. UC480.F83813. Hourtoulle, François G. Soldiers and Uniforms of Napoleonic Wars. [Translation of Soldats et Uniformes du Premier Empire by Alan McKay] Paris: Histoire & Collections, 2004. 208 p. DC226.4.H6813. Muir, Rory. Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815. New Haven, CT: Yale, 1996. 466 p. DC232.M85. Nester, William R. Napoleon and the Art of Diplomacy: How War and Hubris Determined the Rise and Fall of the French Empire. NY: Savas Beatie, 2012. 418 p. DC203.N46. Over, Keith. Flags and Standards of the Napoleonic Wars. NY: Sky Books, 1976. 112 p. UC590.O92. Stoker, Donald, et. al. Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs? NY: Routledge, 2009. 223 p. UB345.E85.C66. Wise, Terence. Flags of the Napoleonic Wars. 3 vols. London: Osprey, 1978-81. UC590.W56. GRAND ARMEE Bowden, Scott. Napoleon's Grande Armee of 1813. Chicago: Emperor, 1990. 380 p. DC236.B66. Includes detailed orders of battle, pp. 211-342. Chartrand, René. Napoleonic Wars, Napoleon’s Army. London: Brassey’s, 2000. 144 p. UC485.F8.C43. Cobb, Richard. The People's Armies; the Armee's Revolutionnaires: Instrument of the Terror in the Departments, April 1793 to Floreal Year II. New Haven, CT: Yale, 1987. 776 p. DC184.C6213. Dempsey, Guy C., Jr. Napoleon’s Soldiers: The Grande Armėe of 1807 as Depicted in the Paintings of the Otto Manuscript. London: Arms and Armour, 1994. 256 p.
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