The ’s System 1793-1805: A Tactical Paradox Patrick Braszak

Throughout the French Revolutionary The Royal Navy’s blockade system Admiral Howe (then the -in- and Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain relied counteracted their advantage at sea because chief of the Channel fleet) had put to sea heavily upon its maritime forces, known it discouraged French and Spanish ships from Port St. Helens with twenty-two men- collectively as the Royal Navy. The Royal from leaving port, meaning decisive open- of-war and six in search of a ’s blockade of the European continent water conflicts could not occur.7 The Royal that he had heard was coming back during this period thwarted Navy kept a constant presence outside its from and the .13 Bonaparte’s ambitions for the invasion enemy’s ports to prevent hostile expeditions Howe’s intelligence was validated when, on of Great Britain, cut off from its against Great Britain. By doing so, the British May 19, an American vessel out of Brest overseas resources and facilitated ’s contained their adversaries but allowed them reported that a French fleet composed of rapid imperial and economic growth.1 The to maintain a fleet in being: not active, but twenty-four men-of-war and ten frigates had blockade system, however, only became always ready to become so. The British left two days earlier to protect their valuable a viable strategy once Great Britain had would commit the same tactical error during homeward-bound convoy.14 Outnumbered achieved naval supremacy over France the First — despite being under by six ships, Howe nonetheless set off, following the . Prior blockade, ’s Hochseeflotte posed and on May 25, he destroyed two French to this pivotal moment, the Royal Navy’s a continuous threat to Britain’s merchant that had mistaken his ships for blockade system had put its ships at a tactical navy, until it was thoroughly diminished at their own convoy. Knowing that the French disadvantage against enemy vessels. This the Battle of Jutland.8 Regardless of the were close, Howe steered northwards until fundamental flaw, masked by the broader historic period, Britain’s naval enemies were on May 28, several of his advance frigates successes of the blockade system, was only predominantly safe under a blockade system, spotted the opposing fleet far to the south- overcome by the skill of the Royal Navy’s and furthermore posed a constant threat to east. Howe gave chase and was rewarded ablest admirals and captains. British domestic and foreign interests.9 when the Revolutionaire, a three-deck warship, There were numerous difficulties that Many of the Royal Navy’s most struck its flag by the end of this first day.15 blockading squadrons had to contend prominent figures recognized these tactical Howe spent the beginning of the with while at sea. Ports enjoy the luxury deficiencies, and thus despised the blockade following day enduring shots directed at of concentrated land and naval defences, system. This included Richard Howe, who, his van; the French fleet would pull away, making attack impractical. Blockading as Admiral of the fleet, held the Royal Navy’s then haul their wind and concentrate their squadrons had to cope with bad weather, highest rank. During his correspondence fire upon the leading British ships before which could drive them from their positions with Lord Chatham, Howe argued that the again fleeing.16 He decided at noon to give and allow enemy fleets opportunities to Royal Navy should keep its fleets anchored the signal to break through the French line, escape port — or enter port. The blockade within the relative safety of friendly ports, but after this maneuver was completed, the system was ruinous to the ships, hard on the with only frigates acting as sentinels to watch British found themselves too dispersed to morale of seamen, and incredibly expensive. the enemy’s coast for movement.10 This be able to concentrate on any portion of also robbed the Royal Navy method ultimately encouraged open-water the segmented French fleet. May 30 and 31 of public support throughout the Wars naval battles. It would be easier for enemy were spent recovering from the confusion, because they inhibited significant fleet fleets to put to sea without British men-of- which was prolonged due to particularly actions from occurring.2 war anchored off of their ports — but their foggy conditions. On the morning of June 1, The Royal Navy’s greatest strength was movements would be relayed back to the however, the French admiral decided to haul its prowess in battle. Its men were better Royal Navy, who would then move its fleets to the wind and form a line with his twenty- trained than those of their adversaries; at to intercept. Howe reasoned that: six sail (some ships had joined the French the time of the Revolutionary War, British (…) the two contending fleets fleet from nearby ports while others had gun crews could fire three times faster than might then engage on something become separated).17 the French crews.3 This allowed the British like equal terms, as to their state and The action between the two fleets ensued to capture far more French and Spanish condition, each of them fresh from at nine in the morning. After a little more than ships than they lost throughout the Wars, their respective ports; whereas a one hour of furious fighting, the French admiral despite the inferior designs of the Royal blockading squadron, keeping the sea decided to flee northward where he again Navy’s vessels. The French and Spanish for months without being relieved, and formed a line with roughly a dozen of his ships. men-of-war had broader beams and deeper exposed to all kinds of weather, ought Noticing this, ten more French ships bore away droughts, which meant that they were larger, not to be considered on a par with an to join their comrades; Admiral Howe’s fleet sturdier, and capable of carrying far greater enemy of equal force fresh from a port, was too dispersed, and had sustained too much armaments.4 The Spaniards’ monstrous men-of- and still less in a condition to follow damage to their masts and rigging to prevent war that stood four decks tall, such as the Santissima them, perhaps to a foreign station (…)11 the escape. Seven French ships, however, were Trinidada and the Santa Anna, were exemplars of Howe’s confidence in the Royal Navy’s too crippled to flee, and were thus abandoned the technical advantage which Britain’s adversaries prowess was well-founded, for he himself to be seized by the British.18 The British vessels enjoyed.5 That these two vessels sunk following had been involved in a victorious action could be repaired, but the French had lost the Battle of Trafalgar shows the mastery of the against a larger fleet early in the French a significant portion of their naval force by Royal Navy at open-water engagements.6 Revolutionary War.12 On May 2, 1794, abandoning them to Howe’s fleet.

# Journal of Undergraduate Research and Scholarly Excellence – Volume VIII History

Admiral Howe’s gallant victory, dubbed While Collingwood’s experiences In all reasonable expectation, “the Glorious First of June,” exemplified blockading exemplified the dangers the French fleet ought not to have the Royal Navy’s prowess and revealed why of waiting outside an enemy’s port while escaped us; and I had always hopes many of its most prominent figures abhorred war waged on inland, his experiences off of our coming up with them, until a blockade system designed to avoid similar Cadiz illustrated the difficulties of bringing we sailed into Port Mahon, which is a battles. One such man was Vice-Admiral a blockaded enemy to battle. Collingwood’s very narrow harbour, from which you Lord Collingwood, who had been present on frustrations with Cadiz were apparent on cannot get out without great difficulty. that occasion sailing under Admiral Howe as January 26, 1798: he had been goading There we remained, until the enemy (then) Captain of the Barfleur.19 Unbeknownst the enemy’s fleet of thirty men-of-war by had got so far the start, that it was not to him at the time, Collingwood was destined cruising with just six of his own, yet was possible to come up with them. We to spend the remainder of his life fighting consistently denied release from boredom by arrived at Brest the day after them, and the French. From the beginning of the the enemy’s ardent refusal to sail from their finding them snug, came [to Torbay]; French Revolutionary War in 1793 to his port. Collingwood had received intelligence - at all which there has been great death in 1810, Collingwood spent all but one indicating that the Cadiz fleet planned to lamentation in the fleet.27 year at sea. It was a fitting culmination to join twenty-six other line-of-battle ships Despite the considerable efforts that a perilous fifty-year career — the seasoned from Carthagena and Toulon. He could do had gone into containing the enemy fleets, Vice-Admiral had served forty-four years little to prevent this dangerous possibility they had managed to escape and travel abroad in active employment by the end of because Collingwood had become convinced through the Straits of , and then a his life.20 As a dedicated servant of country that the Cadiz fleet would only move when considerable distance northwards along the and cause, Collingwood’s disapproval of the they were certain they could avoid battle coast of and France. blockade system lent significant credence at sea.23 The soldiers aboard his ships were It appears the only measure that could against its tactical efficiency. growing so restless from the lack of action have been taken within the blockade system to Collingwood’s disdain of blockading that Collingwood had to resort to creative prevent the escape of such a combined fleet grew steadily throughout the French distractions to quell their agitated states. was to have attacked them in their own ports. Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In We have lately been making Lord Horatio Nelson, who was arguably the April 1796, Collingwood joined the blockade musical instruments, and now have Royal Navy’s most influential commander off Toulon and quickly realized how a very good band. Every moonlight of the period, was the only British officer monotonous the entire affair would be. In a night the sailors dance; and there who would achieve any considerable success letter written from the Excellent on May 11, seems as much mirth and festivity at doing so in the French Revolutionary 1796 to J. E. Blackett, Collingwood described as if we were in Wapping itself. One and Napoleonic Wars. He had attacked and the situation this way: “(…) [the French] night the rats had destroyed the defeated an enemy’s port on two separate cannot move a ship without our seeing them, bagpipes we made, by eating up the occasions: the first outside Alexandria, and which must be very mortifying to them; but bellows; but they suffer for it, for in the second at Copenhagen.28 we have the mortification also to see their revenge we have made traps of all Nelson’s encounter outside Alexandria merchant-vessels going along shore, and constructions, and have declared a war in August of 1798 had been the culmination cannot molest them.”21 French land batteries of extermination against them.24 of a long and arduous pursuit. On April 30, and heavy moveable units prevented While the enemy (meaning the French and 1798, Earl St. Vincent had detached Nelson Collingwood from getting close enough to Spanish ships, not the rats), whose numbers from his duties before Cadiz so that he could the shore to disrupt French shipping in any were vastly superior to his own, would not watch French forces at Toulon.29 Earlier that meaningful way. The role of his fleet, with come out to meet him, Collingwood was also year, Nelson had mentioned in passing to his its powerful men-of-war, had been largely apprehensive of bringing the battle to their wife that “Buonaparte is gone back to , reduced to merely observing the French port for fear of their gun-boats. Mounted where 80,000 men are embarking for some lying in port. with heavy and propelled by oars Expedition.”30 He would go on to pursue this As the blockade of Toulon went on, this and sail, these tiny vessels were able to avoid expedition for four months. While sailing monotony grew to be a very real danger to most of the fire that line-of-battle ships and for Toulon, Nelson’s squadron captured the the British ships because of France’s exploits frigates could offer them. -boats French la Pierre, which divulged that on land. Collingwood wrote another letter were also far more maneuverable in light The French , Buonaparte, to Blackett on September 25 of that year winds and shallow waters, which robbed arrived at Toulon ten days ago, to explaining that the French had closed the the Royal Navy’s larger vessels of much of command the secret Expedition ports at Leghorn and to the Royal their speed and dexterity.25 A stalemate was preparing to sail from that port (…) Navy, which meant that his fleet would have thus inevitable, for neither side was willing to It was not, however, generally believed difficulty securing the supplies they needed initiate any sort of action. that Buonaparte would embark; to maintain their health. On December 5, Such stalemates often gave the tactical but no one knows to what place the Collingwood expressed his fears that his advantage to the fleet anchored in port, as Armament is destined. Nineteen sail fleet could possibly be trapped in Porto was made evident by Collingwood’s dismayed of the line are in the harbour, and Ferraio if they were not cautious, for it was letters to Blackett on December 9, 1798 and fifteen are apparently fitted for sea: yet the Royal Navy’s only friendly port left in the August 18, 1799. Dejected, Collingwood it is said, that only six are to sail with region following the evacuation of . wrote on the ninth that the French could set the transports now ready, and that Collingwood insisted that his fleet could beat sail from their ports almost at will, noting 12,000 men are now embarked.31 the enemy’s if they met at sea, but the threat that a fleet had joined the Spaniards off Nelson’s unique vigour was made of the enemy waiting instead to corner the Carthagena.26 The latter correspondence apparent by a private note that he added in British once they had to resupply was too was as follows: his letter to his patron, Lord St. Vincent, great to continue the blockade.22 which read “Be assured I will fight the French fleet the moment I can find them;

# Journal of Undergraduate Research and Scholarly Excellence – Volume VIII History

until then adieu.”32 It was this determination the morning, the French L’Orient encouraged them to take initiative if they to not only fulfill his duty, but to destroy caught fire. It fought on for thirty-seven came upon an opportunity that deviated his enemy that separated Nelson from his minutes until the flames finally ignited its from his battle orders.46 colleagues and allowed him to succeed in a magazines, causing the “L’Orient to [blow] The battle began five minutes after ten blockade system predisposed to stalemates. up with a crashing sound that deafened all in the morning. Nelson maneuvered his When Nelson finally arrived at Toulon around her. The tremulous motion, felt to own ship, the Elephant, into the centre of on June 4 after a month marked by a violent the very bottom of each ship, was like that the action, with one British ship astern and squall, there were no French ships to be seen. of an earthquake.”37 The massive explosion three ahead.47 Neither side had gained any With neither instructions nor intelligence on silenced both sides for a few minutes, until decided advantage by one in the afternoon, what to do next, Nelson decided to sail for the French began shooting again at a frenetic at which point Sir Hyde Parker, aboard Corsica, following the northwest wind that he pace, spurred on by their anger and grief.38 the London, gave the signal for the British assumed the French had also taken. After he The fighting laboured on until three ships to withdraw from the fight. Nelson again found nothing, Nelson steered towards o’clock the next morning, when both sides ignored this signal for a moment, and then Naples, and was finally rewarded on June 20 stopped, exhausted. This second break gave the order to simply acknowledge it with information that the British consul at lasted only an hour, until the Alexander and rather than repeat it, and then carried on had surrendered to the French. While Majestic resumed their attacks on the Tonnant, his bombardment of the Danish defences.48 on course to Malta, Nelson was rewarded Guillaume Tell, Genereux, and Timoleon. More After four hours of desperate fighting, in with a second instance of luck, when a British ships steadily joined the fray, and which droves of Danish reinforcements Genoese brig reported on June 22 that the the two sides continuously bombarded each strove to keep the British at bay, Nelson French had sailed four days prior from Malta other until Rear-Admiral Villeneuve cut the was finally able to subdue the defences and at the head of a northwest gale. Deducing cable of the Guillaume Tell at eleven in the secure a truce that ended ’s part in correctly that the enemy was aiming for morning and made off with the Genereux and the Second Coalition.49 Egypt, Nelson took off in that direction.33 two frigates. The British ships, too crippled Lord Nelson was a remarkably successful In an unfortunate occurrence of to follow, resolved themselves to securing the naval officer, but his prowess alone could not mistiming, Nelson arrived at Alexandria on spoils of their victory. They had captured a make up for the flaws of the Royal Navy’s June 29 only to find a governor shocked that total of eleven men-of-war and two frigates, blockade system. An entire tactical system he was chasing a French fleet. Puzzled that more than in any other naval victory of the cannot rely on the ingenuity of a single man. his enemy had not arrived, the admiral set Napoleonic Wars.39 Lord Nelson had been an unusually aggressive, off on a course that took him past several The victory at Aboukir Bay brought ambitious and insightful individual. Nelson’s islands on the way to the port at Syracuse praise to both the Royal Navy and Lord peers, although distinguished and proven in , which ironically made him miss Nelson.40 He had managed to assault and in their own rights, simply could not fight the French fleet a second time. On July 25, defeat a fleet of heavily-defended ships in in the same way he did. The frustrated Nelson would again sail for Egypt only after harbor, with just one of his own having to efforts of a Captain Peter Puget (who had receiving assurances that the French fleet had strike its flag after running into the rocky been employed in the blockade of Brest) to gone to neither the Archipelago, the Adriatic, bottom of a particularly shallow portion of organize an attack on the moored French nor the Mediterranean. Nelson finally got his the bay.41 Nelson would prove his merit again ships characterized the difficulties that men ultimate reward when on August 1, he again almost three years later when on April 2, 1801, without Nelson’s abilities faced when trying came within sight of Alexandria, and at four he led an attack on Copenhagen harbour, to work within the blockade system. in the afternoon received a signal that the whose defences were even greater than Puget had first proposed his idea of approach to the city was full of French ships.34 those he had encountered off Alexandria.42 using fire ships — vessels deliberately set Nelson’s fleet had found sixteen ships Copenhagen had been defended by afire and steered into enemy formations — anchored in Aboukir Bay. Their defensive (…) six sail of the line, eleven to destroy the French fleet at Brest on June position gave them the decided advantage floating batteries, mounting from 23, 1804, in a letter to Admiral Cornwallis. against any attack, with only their artillery 26 twenty-four pounders to 18 Enclosed in his letter had been an incredibly to focus their attention on whilst the British eighteen pounders, one bomb ship detailed report which outlined the specific would have to navigate the narrow harbour and schooner gun vessel. These were number and class of ships that would be under heavy fire. Nevertheless, at a quarter supported by the Crown islands, needed for the operation, along with the past six in the morning on August 2, the mounting 88 pieces of , four requisite number of men, equipment and first British ships approached their enemy, sail of the line moored across the sailing conditions. Puget asked for: receiving fire from the van ships, coastal mouth of the harbour, and batteries (…) ten brigs from 100 to 130 tons batteries and gun boats. Nelson ordered his on the island of Amok.43 each, and three sloops from 50 to 60 fleet to double the French line, and within With just twelve ships, Nelson plunged tons each (…) They should be supplied twelve minutes, the French Guerrier had lost headlong into a hail of Danish fire. Three of with grapnels and chains, as also with its masts. The Conquerant was dismasted just his ships, the Bellona, Russel, and Polyphemus, two fast-rowing six-oared Deal boats ten minutes later.35 were immediately taken out of the action, (…) Two captains, ten lieutenants, ten Losses were severe for both the British running aground in the shallow and narrow master’s mates, ten midshipmen, with and the French. Nelson anchored his water.44 The Bellona and Russel did not quit a hundred seamen, would be sufficient Vanguard on the other side of the enemy’s however. They were “within range of shot, to conduct the brigs; three lieutenants, line, and within just a few minutes, “every and continued to fire with much spirit upon three midshipmen, and eighteen man stationed at the first six guns in the such of the Enemy’s ships as they could seamen, the sloops; in all 156 persons, forepart of the Vanguard’s deck, were all reach.”45 The perseverance of the Bellona and the whole to be volunteers.50 either killed or wounded, and one gun in Russel could have been attributed to Nelson’s With this force, Puget argued that: particular was repeatedly cleared.”36 So leadership; he trusted the capabilities of ferocious was the action that at nine in all the men sailing under him, and always The best time for making the

Journal of Undergraduate Research and Scholarly Excellence – Volume VIII # History

attempt to destroy the enemy’s fleet in unavoidably been delayed considerably gun-vessels, and required a smaller amount Brest appears to be in the last quarter beyond the time, and Captain Puget had of men to oppose Napoleon’s massive of the flood tide, on a starlight night, observed that the enemy had changed invasion flotilla.60 Napoleon had amassed with the wind blowing a commanding their position as well as some gun- 130,000 men, over one thousand boats, and breeze from the N.W., or, indeed, vessels. The unfavourable opinion of 8,500 horses, all spread over seven ports: further to the westward, for the boats the sea officers of the [Naval] Board the major one being Boulogne, with smaller could always secure their retreat with did also dampen the ardour of some.56 harbours at Vimereaux, Ambleteuse, and the assistance of the ebb tide.51 Captain Puget, unlike Nelson, had not Étaples as well as ports at Calais, Puget also explained the path that the been free to attack off his own initiative Dunkirk, and Ostend.61 England simply did attacking squadron should take to reach the when the opportunity had been available. not have enough men to arm a fleet of gun- enemy, the order by which the fire ships His proposition had been vulnerable to vessels large enough to counter Napoleon’s; should attach themselves to the enemy, and unforeseen delays, unfavourable weather according to the official answer to Pitt’s the exact steps that should be followed in conditions, and a non-compliant enemy. motion, half of the Royal Navy’s seamen securing a retreat. The Royal Navy’s blockade system and marines at the time would have been In going in, the fire-brigs should certainly did not facilitate engagements with needed to cover Boulogne alone.62 keep close under the north shore, on the enemy. Admiral Howe had noticed the Pitt also argued that gun-vessels were the principle that the nearer the vessels negative effects that this inactivity could more effective in shallow waters, but the are carried to the enemy’s batteries, have on public opinion early in the French naval officers retorted that there was a far the effect of red-hot shot would be Revolutionary War. British newspapers had greater proportion of deep water between lessened, for they would pass through repeatedly slandered Howe in 1793 because Great Britain and the European continent both sides, instead of lodging (…) of his failure to bring the enemy to battle. that needed to be defended. The capability (…) form the brigs in a loose, Poor weather had forced the admiral to of gun-vessels to operate near coasts was compact line. When the leading vessels return to port with the Channel fleet on four also of little benefit offensively, for land had arrived off the battery of Portzic, separate occasions since he had received batteries and heavy moveable artillery units they should, with the first , his secret instructions on July 1, 1793; the commonly defended enemy ports.63 haul up for the Southern part of the last occasion had forced Howe to retire to Had the Royal Navy been engaging the French fleet; the second division for Torbay for nearly four months until the French fleets in open waters, rather than the northern part (…) The fire-brigs necessary repairs were made. Blockades were allowing them to wait in port, public opinion should be on board the enemy, if effective at protecting trade and damaging would likely have been very different. possible, a quarter of an hour before the enemy’s commercial interests, but the Lord Nelson’s most famous victory, the high water, for it would be of essential public wanted to see their war taxes spent on Battle of Trafalgar, by no means ended the benefit in assisting them to maintain “the destruction of the enemy.”57 threat posed by enemy fleets or Napoleon’s their station (…) It would also be the The blockade system’s negative impacts invasion ambitions, but it nevertheless means of more effectively spreading on public opinion were exemplified by the convinced the British public that they had the flames, as with the flood tide Prime Minister William Pitt’s motion on been saved from danger.64 The Brest fleet and wind (…)52 March 15, 1804, for an inquiry into the remained following the battle, and a new one His meticulous efforts were rewarded country’s naval administration. This inquiry would be raised at Toulon.65 Furthermore, when, on August 17, Cornwallis gave his was meant to prove that Lord St. Vincent, after subjugating , and consent for the plan to proceed.53 who was First Lord of the Admiralty at the in 1807, Napoleon would once more turn his Per Cornwallis’ letter, the eight fire time, had insufficiently prepared the Royal attention to Great Britain. Russia, Denmark, ships that were to attack Brest should have Navy for the defence of Great Britain from and all threatened to oppose prepared to rendezvous with their squadron invasion.58 In particular, Pitt had accused the Royal Navy in 1809, yet the magnitude by August 29. Just three days before this date the Royal Navy of failing to construct the of the Royal Navy’s victory at Trafalgar however, Lord Melville of the Admiralty types of ships that it needed to defend Great gave the British confidence that they were wrote to Cornwallis to inform him of the Britain, of exerting less effort in fighting invulnerable to any further threats that could plan’s first delay. Inspectors had examined the enemy and preparing itself than it had come over the sea.66 the fire vessels and had proposed that some of previously in the French Revolutionary War, The Battle of Trafalgar was fought on the ships should be substituted, meaning that and in failing to secure enough contracts to October 21, 1805. A combined French and all of them would have to wait before setting build the necessary number of ships of war.59 Spanish fleet of thirty-three men-of-war had sail. Melville would write again on September This motion showed that there was fear set sail from Cadiz on October 19, only to 5 to announce that the vessels were finally outside the Royal Navy that Great Britain was be immediately pursued by twenty-seven of ready, but a shift in winds to the westward in danger, despite its control of the English their British counterparts. The chase lasted two days later slowed the arrival of the fire Channel. In a response to Pitt’s accusations, two full nights. At daybreak on October 21, ships further.54 several naval officers proved that his motion the combined fleet noticed that the British The result of these delays was Cornwallis’ had been premised upon false principles. Pitt had separated into two columns; the French orders on September 29 and 30, which had believed that gun-vessels were needed to and Spanish concaved their line in response, instructed the lieutenants of the gun-vessels defend Great Britain’s shores from invasion so that their rear and van could fire upon and cutter that were to comprise the retinue when, in reality, the larger vessels that already the sides of the approaching British ships of fire ships to return to their previous constituted the Royal Navy’s permanent whilst the middle shot at the British front.67 stations, effectively cancelling Puget’s plan.55 fleet were preferable to execute that task. The British ships, utterly vulnerable, In another letter on October 16 addressed to Frigates and larger vessels could mount a occasionally fired shots to cover their Lord Melville, Cornwallis explained that greater proportion of guns, were far more advance with smoke.68 durable than any gun-vessel could be, were The particular service had immune to being boarded by the French Admiral Collingwood, who was leading

# Journal of Undergraduate Research and Scholarly Excellence – Volume VIII History

one of the columns aboard the Royal , (of which two are first-rates, the in port at Cadiz for long. Napoleon had broke through the enemy line at noon. A Santissima Trinidada, and the Santa prepared Brest, Rochefort, and Ferrol with melee of flying splinters, crashing masts and Anna), with three flag-officers, viz. enough stores for a force of its size, but smashing hulls commenced. Collingwood Admiral Villeneuve, the Commander- not Cadiz. The combined fleet had only gave the first ship he passed, theSanta Anna, in-chief; Don Ignacio Maria d’Alava, arrived there after Sir had (…) a broadside and a half into Vice-admiral; and Rear-admiral Don forced it south. Collingwood was aware of her stern, tearing it down, and killing Baltazar Hidalgo Cisneros.75 this, and on October 6 wrote to Nelson that and wounding 400 of her men; then, In the end, three of the enemy’s vessels the combined fleet had become completely with her helm hard a-starboard, she managed to flee back into Cadiz, but these isolated from any supplies out of France.82 It ranged up alongside so closely that the had been reduced to wrecks during the was under these circumstances that the fresh lower yards of the two vessels were battle. Fourteen ships from the combined British squadron tempted the combined fleet locked together. The Spanish Admiral, fleet were either burnt, sunk, or crashed onto with an avenue to escape, knowing that they having seen that it was the intention shore, and 20,000 men were taken prisoner.76 were desperate and could be intercepted. of the Royal Sovereign to engage to When news of this victory reached Great The Battle of Trafalgar occurred because leeward, had collected all his strength Britain, the populace broke out into the British had actively sought to bring the on the starboard; and such was the celebration.77 Their Royal Navy had managed enemy out from Cadiz’s harbour, rather than weight of the Santa Anna’s metal, that to win a decisive naval engagement against containing it through blockading methods. her first broadside made the Sovereign a blockaded enemy. The Battle of Trafalgar The destruction of the combined fleet heel two streaks out of the water.69 was not, however, a product of the blockade at the Battle of Trafalgar altered Napoleon’s The fury of the moment prevented system that had been employed up until this plans for Great Britain, and thus had anyone aboard the Royal Sovereign from point; a unique set of circumstances, along significant strategic consequences for the calculating exactly how long their ship had with a conscious effort on behalf of the Royal Navy. The emperor’s primary focus been fighting alone, but after at least twenty British to remain hidden led the combined following the battle was no longer invasion, minutes, the other British ships cut through fleet to its decision to set sail and leave Cadiz. but rather to defeat Great Britain by ruining the line as well.70 Trafalgar was more a product of Howe’s its commerce with the .83 Nelson had led his in the Victory alternative plan to the blockade system.78 The Napoleon’s Berlin Decree of November 21, towards the enemy’s van in what would come battle originated not when the combined 1806, had placed all the British islands under to be known as “the Nelson touch,” feinting fleet left port on October 19, but rather on blockade, and had forbade British vessels to mask his true intention of piercing August 20, 1805. Collingwood had been from entering French ports. He followed its centre where the flagship under Vice- sailing off Cadiz with three men-of-war, one this order up on , 1807, with Admiral Villeneuve was positioned.71 As he , and a bomber when he encountered the Milan Decree, which declared any ships closed in on his adversary, the enemy ships thirty-six French and Spanish vessels. The that submitted to searches by the Royal Navy surrounding Villeneuve fired probing shots combined fleet was sailing for the port when to be denationalized.84 to gauge Nelson’s distance. Then finally “(…) they noticed Collingwood’s small force and Napoleon had enacted his Decrees a shot passed through the Victory’s main-top- sent sixteen ships after him. In a display of without having any fleets capable of gallant-sail; the hole in which being perceived skillful seamanship, the British squadron enforcing them. Great Britain, by contrast, by the Enemy, they immediately opened managed to outmaneuver and elude the had issued on May 16, their broadsides, supporting an awful and pursuing enemies as it fled towards the Straits 1806, and , 1807, which tremendous fire.”72 Twenty men were killed of Gibraltar. After the French and Spanish effectively ended France’s maritime trade. and thirty wounded before the Victory had gave up the chase, Collingwood reversed and The first Order in Council had declared the even fired a purposeful shot in response.73 resumed his station of Cadiz, sending one entire European coast from Brest to the Nelson’s flagship finally crashed through of his ships out onto the horizon to make Elbe under blockade, while the three issued the enemy’s line at twenty minutes past noon. fake signals, as if to a larger force of British on November 11 did the same to every port The Victory ran aboard the Redoubtable, the ships so that the combined fleets would be that belonged to a nation or colony hostile to two becoming locked together in a mess intimidated into remaining in port.79 Great Britain. The Royal Navy was now charged of rigging and cannon fire. The Temeraire When news of Collingwood’s encounter with maintaining a paper blockade; it did not have came to Nelson’s aid and ran itself aboard spread, Nelson was immediately dispatched the resources to watch every port as closely as had the other side of the Redoubtable, but not to provide his assistance. While on route, been required prior to the Battle of Trafalgar, but before the La Fougueux had managed to run Nelson wrote to Collingwood asking that its unquestioned dominance of the seas meant alongside it. The four men-of-war fought on, “(…) no may take place, but also that that it did not have to. The Royal Navy was able to entangled in the centre of the raging melee. no colours be hoisted: for it is as well not employ its fleets in such a manner as to make the It was during this frenzy that Nelson received to proclaim to the enemy every ship which approaches to the European continent sufficiently his mortal injury, as a French marksman shot may join the fleet.”80 Repeating Howe’s ideas, dangerous as to dismay any merchant vessels from him through the left breast.74 Nelson sent another letter to Collingwood attempting to defy their blockade. They “(…) The fighting lasted three full hours until on October 10 that read “(…) if the weather is controlled the approaches from the Atlantic to all Admiral Gravina finally broke off with ten fine (…) and we are in sight, [the combined fleet] the northern continental ports; and at Gibraltar ships towards Cadiz. Minor skirmishes only will never move; and should it turn bad, we may those to the Mediterranean.”85 The Royal Navy’s followed, when five of the enemy ships be forced into the Mediterranean, and thus leave blockade system was now its greatest asset, decided to return in an effort to save their them at liberty to go to the westward (…)”81 He acting as a deterrent which facilitated the growth comrades. These were beaten off, and the understood that the French and Spanish needed of Great Britain’s commerce and industrial British squadron claimed to be lured out of Cadiz as quickly as possible, and power while simultaneously draining France of that the most effective way to do so was to mask its resources and straining Napoleon’s ties with the numbers of the growing British squadron. his continental allies.86 (…) nineteen ships of the line The combined fleet could not remain From the years 1793 to 1805, the Royal

Journal of Undergraduate Research and Scholarly Excellence – Volume VIII # History

Navy had attempted to contain enemy 26To J. E. Blackett, Esq. Triumph, off Mahon, July 65Bennett, G. Pg 238. naval forces through an onerous blockade 11, 1799 in Ibid. Pg. 104. 66Colville, Q. Pg 148, 208, 210, 219. 27Triumph, Torbay, August 18, 1799 in Ibid. Pg. 105. 67To W. Marsden, Esq. Euryalus, off Cape system which required its ships to maintain 28White, J. (1806) Memoirs of the Professional Life of Trafalgar, October 22, 1805 in Collingwood, C. Pg a constant presence outside hostile ports. the late Most Noble Lord Horatio Nelson. J. Cundee. Pg 106- 161-162. This approach to was tactically 120, 174-176. 68Ibid. Pg 171. inefficient because it allowed enemy fleets to 29Ibid. Pg 78. 69Ibid. Pg 172. 30Clarke, J., M’Arthur, J. (1810) The life of Admiral 70Ibid. Pg 175. maintain fleets in being, it did not allow the Lord Nelson, K. B. from his lordships manuscripts. Caldell and 71Bennet, G. Pg 191. Royal Navy to take advantage of its superior Davies. Pg 451-452. 72Beatty, W. (1825) Authentic narrative of the fighting forces and it placed an unnecessary 31Ibid. Pg 456. death of Lord Nelson: comprising several interesting strain on British naval personnel. A more 32Ibid. Pg 457. circumstances preceding, attending and subsequent 33White, J. (1806) Memoirs of the Professional Life of to, that event. W. Mason. Pg 25. aggressive system of baiting its enemies into the late Most Noble Lord Horatio Nelson. J. Cundee. Pg 78-82. 73Ibid. Pg 28. open-water battles would have allowed the 34Ibid. Pg 83-85. 74Ibid. Pg 29, 32. Royal Navy to exercise its advantages and could 35Ibid. Pg 88-92. 75To W. Marsden, Esq. Euryalus, off Cape have eliminated the threat that the French and 36Ibid. Pg 93-94. Trafalgar, October 22, 1805 in Collingwood, C. Pg 37Ibid. Pg 100-104. 163-164. Spanish fleets posed to Great Britain. 38Ibid. Pg 105. 76To J. E. Blackett, Esq. Queen, November 2, 39Ibid. Pg 106-120. 1805 in Ibid. Pg 183-186. References 40Ibid. Pg 128. 77Rodstock, W. (1806) The British flag 1Maine, R. (1957) Trafalgar: Napoleon’s Naval 41Ibid. Pg 96. triumphant! or, the wooden walls of old England: Waterloo. C. Scribner’s Sons. Pg 254-258. 42Ibid. Pg 173. being copies of the London gazettes, containing the 2Barrow, J. (1838) The life of Richard, earl Howe, K. 43Ibid. Pg 169. accounts of the great victories and gallant exploits -G., admiral of the fleet, and general of marines. J. Murray. Pg 44Ibid. Pg 174. of the British fleets, during the last and present war; 216, 218-219. 45Clarke, J. Pg 606. together with correct lists of the admirals and captains 3Bennet, G. (1977) The Battle of Trafalgar. Batsford. 46Bennet, G. Pg 138. in the several engagements: to which is prefixed, an Pg 30. ‘The Nelson touch’ initially referred to Lord address to the officers, seamen, and marines, of His 4Ibid. Pg 23, 26. Nelson’s tactics for the Battle of Trafalgar, but later Majesty’s fleets. Rivington. Pg 3-4. 5The term ‘man-of-war’ was used to describe all more generally referred to his particular leadership style. 78See pages 2 and 3. ships larger than frigates during the age of sail because 47Nelson had moved from his own ship, the St. 79To Mrs. Collingwood, Dreadnought, off Cadiz, of the line ahead formation that they traditionally George, to the smaller Elephant for the battle so that August 21, 1805 in Collingwood, C. Pg 148-149. employed in battle. ‘Sail-of-the-line’ and ‘line-of- he could maneuver in the narrow Danish waters. 80From Lord Nelson, Victory, September 25, battle ships’ were two other monikers that were used 48Clarke, J. Pg 606-608. 1805 in Ibid. Pg 153. interchangeably to describe these vessels. 49White, J. Pg 174-176. 81From Lord Nelson, Victory, October 10, 1805 6Mahan, A. (1898) The influence of seapower upon the 50Captain Puget to Cornwallis, Foudroyant in Ibid. Pg 157. and , 1793-1812. Little, Brown & Cawsand Bay, June 23, 1804 in Leyland, J. (1902) 82To Lord Nelson, October 6, 1805 in Ibid. Pg 155. Co. Pg 194. Dispatches and letters relating to the blockade of 83Mahan, A. Pg 184-185, 197. 7Bennet, G. Pg 48. Brest, 1803-1805. Navy Records Society. Pg 5-6; 84Ibid. Pg 272, 290. 8Ibid. Pg 48. Ibid. Pg 3-4. To be denationalized was the naval equivalent of being 9Osborne, E. (2004) Britain’s economic blockade of 51Ibid. Pg 4. declared an outlaw. Germany, 1914-1919. Taylor & Francis. Pg 83-84 52Ibid. Pg 5-6 85Mahan, A. Pg 272, 283-288. 10Barrow, J. Pg 217-218. 53Ibid. Pg 2-8; 86Maine, R. Pg 254-258 11Ibid. Pg 218. Lord Melville to Cornwallis, Admiralty, July 10, 12Ibid. Pg 233-234. 1804 in Ibid. Pg 8-9; 13Port St. Helens is located in the south of England. Lord Melville to Cornwallis, Wimbledon, August 14Barrow, J. Pg 230-232. 9, 1804 in Ibid. Pg 9-10; 15To “strike a flag” means to surrender in naval Memorandum by Captain Brisbane, Glory, August terms. The phrase is taken literally from the act of 16 1804, in Ibid. Pg 10-11; removing the national flag from its place atop a mast. Cornwallis to Lord Melville, Glory, off St. Helen’s, 16The term ‘van’ refers to the leading ships in a fleet. August 17, 1804 in Ibid. Pg 11-12. To ‘haul wind’ in nautical terms means to turn 54Ibid. Pg 12; the front of the ship towards the point that the wind Lord Melville to Cornwallis, Wimbledon, August is blowing from. The French fleet performed this 26, 1804 in Ibid. Pg 13-14; maneuver in order to expose their broadsides to the Lord Melville to Cornwallis, Admiralty, September comparably-vulnerable fronts of the British ships. 5, 1804 in Ibid. Pg 14-15; 17Barrow, J. Pg 230-232. Admiral Young to Cornwallis, Plymouth Dock, 18Ibid. Pg 233-234. , 1804 in Ibid. Pg 21. 19Collingwood, C., Collingwood, G. (1829) A 55Cornwallis to the lieutenants of the Rifleman, selection from the public and private correspondence of Vice- Pelter, Biter, Thrasher, Phosphorus, By the Hon. William Admiral Lord Collingwood: interspersed with memoirs of his life. Cornwallis, Admiral of the White &c. in Ibid. Pg 26; G. & C. & H. Carvill. Pg 25; Cornwallis to Lieutenant Higginson (Happy The names of ships often remained unchanged Return) in Ibid. Pg 27. after they were captured, which is why many of the 56Cornwallis to Lord Melville, 16 October 1804 Royal Navy’s vessels from the period in question had in Ibid. Pg 29. French or Spanish names. 57Barrow, J. Pg 218-219. 20Collingwood, C. Pg 3. 58Brenton, E. (1838) Life and correspondence of 21To J. E. Blackett, Esq. Excellent, off Toulon, May John, earl of St. Vincent. H. Colburn. Pg 206-207. 11, 1796 in Ibid. Pg 38. 59An Officer of His Majesty’s Navy (1804) An 22To J. E. Blackett, Esq. Excellent, Still off Toulon, answer to Mr. Pitt’s attack upon Earl St. Vincent, and September 25 1796 in Ibid. Pg 42-44; the Admiralty, in his motion for an enquiry into the To J. E. Blackett, Esq. Excellent, Gibraltar, state of the naval defence of the Country, on 15th of December 5, 1796 in Ibid. Pg 44-45. March, 1804. H. Ebers. Pg 2. 23Carthagena can also be spelled Cartagena. Both 60Ibid. Pg 3-6. refer to the same city in Spain. 61Mahan, A. Pg 111-115. 24To J. E. Blackett, Esq. Excellent, off Cadiz, 62An Officer of His Majesty’s Navy. Pg 6. January 26, 1798 in Collingwood, C. Pg 84-87. 63Ibid. Pg 6. 25To J. E. Blackett, Esq. Excellent, off Cadiz, 64Colville, Q., Davey, J. (2013) Nelson, Navy & January 26, 1798 in Ibid. Pg 85-88. Nation: the Royal Navy & the , 1688- 1815. Conway. Pg 148

# Journal of Undergraduate Research and Scholarly Excellence – Volume VIII