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The Royal Navy's Blockade System 1793-1805: a Tactical Paradox

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The Royal Navy's Blockade System 1793-1805: a Tactical Paradox The Royal Navy’s Blockade System 1793-1805: A Tactical Paradox Patrick Braszak Throughout the French Revolutionary The Royal Navy’s blockade system Admiral Howe (then the commander-in- and Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain relied counteracted their advantage at sea because chief of the Channel fleet) had put to sea heavily upon its maritime forces, known it discouraged French and Spanish ships from Port St. Helens with twenty-two men- collectively as the Royal Navy. The Royal from leaving port, meaning decisive open- of-war and six frigates in search of a French Navy’s blockade of the European continent water conflicts could not occur.7 The Royal convoy that he had heard was coming back during this period thwarted Napoleon Navy kept a constant presence outside its from North America and the West Indies.13 Bonaparte’s ambitions for the invasion enemy’s ports to prevent hostile expeditions Howe’s intelligence was validated when, on of Great Britain, cut France off from its against Great Britain. By doing so, the British May 19, an American vessel out of Brest overseas resources and facilitated England’s contained their adversaries but allowed them reported that a French fleet composed of rapid imperial and economic growth.1 The to maintain a fleet in being: not active, but twenty-four men-of-war and ten frigates had blockade system, however, only became always ready to become so. The British left two days earlier to protect their valuable a viable strategy once Great Britain had would commit the same tactical error during homeward-bound convoy.14 Outnumbered achieved naval supremacy over France the First World War — despite being under by six ships, Howe nonetheless set off, following the Battle of Trafalgar. Prior blockade, Germany’s Hochseeflotte posed and on May 25, he destroyed two French to this pivotal moment, the Royal Navy’s a continuous threat to Britain’s merchant corvettes that had mistaken his ships for blockade system had put its ships at a tactical navy, until it was thoroughly diminished at their own convoy. Knowing that the French disadvantage against enemy vessels. This the Battle of Jutland.8 Regardless of the were close, Howe steered northwards until fundamental flaw, masked by the broader historic period, Britain’s naval enemies were on May 28, several of his advance frigates successes of the blockade system, was only predominantly safe under a blockade system, spotted the opposing fleet far to the south- overcome by the skill of the Royal Navy’s and furthermore posed a constant threat to east. Howe gave chase and was rewarded ablest admirals and captains. British domestic and foreign interests.9 when the Revolutionaire, a three-deck warship, There were numerous difficulties that Many of the Royal Navy’s most struck its flag by the end of this first day.15 blockading squadrons had to contend prominent figures recognized these tactical Howe spent the beginning of the with while at sea. Ports enjoy the luxury deficiencies, and thus despised the blockade following day enduring shots directed at of concentrated land and naval defences, system. This included Richard Howe, who, his van; the French fleet would pull away, making attack impractical. Blockading as Admiral of the fleet, held the Royal Navy’s then haul their wind and concentrate their squadrons had to cope with bad weather, highest rank. During his correspondence fire upon the leading British ships before which could drive them from their positions with Lord Chatham, Howe argued that the again fleeing.16 He decided at noon to give and allow enemy fleets opportunities to Royal Navy should keep its fleets anchored the signal to break through the French line, escape port — or enter port. The blockade within the relative safety of friendly ports, but after this maneuver was completed, the system was ruinous to the ships, hard on the with only frigates acting as sentinels to watch British found themselves too dispersed to morale of seamen, and incredibly expensive. the enemy’s coast for movement.10 This be able to concentrate on any portion of Blockades also robbed the Royal Navy method ultimately encouraged open-water the segmented French fleet. May 30 and 31 of public support throughout the Wars naval battles. It would be easier for enemy were spent recovering from the confusion, because they inhibited significant fleet fleets to put to sea without British men-of- which was prolonged due to particularly actions from occurring.2 war anchored off of their ports — but their foggy conditions. On the morning of June 1, The Royal Navy’s greatest strength was movements would be relayed back to the however, the French admiral decided to haul its prowess in battle. Its men were better Royal Navy, who would then move its fleets to the wind and form a line with his twenty- trained than those of their adversaries; at to intercept. Howe reasoned that: six sail (some ships had joined the French the time of the Revolutionary War, British (…) the two contending fleets fleet from nearby ports while others had gun crews could fire three times faster than might then engage on something become separated).17 the French crews.3 This allowed the British like equal terms, as to their state and The action between the two fleets ensued to capture far more French and Spanish condition, each of them fresh from at nine in the morning. After a little more than ships than they lost throughout the Wars, their respective ports; whereas a one hour of furious fighting, the French admiral despite the inferior designs of the Royal blockading squadron, keeping the sea decided to flee northward where he again Navy’s vessels. The French and Spanish for months without being relieved, and formed a line with roughly a dozen of his ships. men-of-war had broader beams and deeper exposed to all kinds of weather, ought Noticing this, ten more French ships bore away droughts, which meant that they were larger, not to be considered on a par with an to join their comrades; Admiral Howe’s fleet sturdier, and capable of carrying far greater enemy of equal force fresh from a port, was too dispersed, and had sustained too much armaments.4 The Spaniards’ monstrous men-of- and still less in a condition to follow damage to their masts and rigging to prevent war that stood four decks tall, such as the Santissima them, perhaps to a foreign station (…)11 the escape. Seven French ships, however, were Trinidada and the Santa Anna, were exemplars of Howe’s confidence in the Royal Navy’s too crippled to flee, and were thus abandoned the technical advantage which Britain’s adversaries prowess was well-founded, for he himself to be seized by the British.18 The British vessels enjoyed.5 That these two vessels sunk following had been involved in a victorious action could be repaired, but the French had lost the Battle of Trafalgar shows the mastery of the against a larger fleet early in the French a significant portion of their naval force by Royal Navy at open-water engagements.6 Revolutionary War.12 On May 2, 1794, abandoning them to Howe’s fleet. # Journal of Undergraduate Research and Scholarly Excellence – Volume VIII History Admiral Howe’s gallant victory, dubbed While Collingwood’s experiences In all reasonable expectation, “the Glorious First of June,” exemplified blockading Toulon exemplified the dangers the French fleet ought not to have the Royal Navy’s prowess and revealed why of waiting outside an enemy’s port while escaped us; and I had always hopes many of its most prominent figures abhorred war waged on inland, his experiences off of our coming up with them, until a blockade system designed to avoid similar Cadiz illustrated the difficulties of bringing we sailed into Port Mahon, which is a battles. One such man was Vice-Admiral a blockaded enemy to battle. Collingwood’s very narrow harbour, from which you Lord Collingwood, who had been present on frustrations with Cadiz were apparent on cannot get out without great difficulty. that occasion sailing under Admiral Howe as January 26, 1798: he had been goading There we remained, until the enemy (then) Captain of the Barfleur.19 Unbeknownst the enemy’s fleet of thirty men-of-war by had got so far the start, that it was not to him at the time, Collingwood was destined cruising with just six of his own, yet was possible to come up with them. We to spend the remainder of his life fighting consistently denied release from boredom by arrived at Brest the day after them, and the French. From the beginning of the the enemy’s ardent refusal to sail from their finding them snug, came [to Torbay]; French Revolutionary War in 1793 to his port. Collingwood had received intelligence - at all which there has been great death in 1810, Collingwood spent all but one indicating that the Cadiz fleet planned to lamentation in the fleet.27 year at sea. It was a fitting culmination to join twenty-six other line-of-battle ships Despite the considerable efforts that a perilous fifty-year career — the seasoned from Carthagena and Toulon. He could do had gone into containing the enemy fleets, Vice-Admiral had served forty-four years little to prevent this dangerous possibility they had managed to escape and travel abroad in active employment by the end of because Collingwood had become convinced through the Straits of Gibraltar, and then a his life.20 As a dedicated servant of country that the Cadiz fleet would only move when considerable distance northwards along the and cause, Collingwood’s disapproval of the they were certain they could avoid battle coast of Spain and France.
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