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A Reassessment of the British and Allied Economic, Industrial And A Reassessment of the British and Allied Economic and Military Mobilization in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) By Ioannis-Dionysios Salavrakos The Wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Era lasted from 1792 to 1815. During this period, seven Anti-French Coalitions were formed ; France managed to get the better of the first five of them. The First Coalition was formed between Austria and Prussia (26 June 1792) and was reinforced by the entry of Britain (January 1793) and Spain (March 1793). Minor participants were Tuscany, Naples, Holland and Russia. In February 1795, Tuscany left and was followed by Prussia (April); Holland (May), Spain (August). In 1796, two other Italian States (Piedmont and Sardinia) bowed out. In October 1797, Austria was forced to abandon the alliance : the First Coalition collapsed. The Second Coalition, between Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Naples and the Ottoman Empire (22 June 1799), was terminated on March 25, 1802. A Third Coalition, which comprised Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and some small German principalities (April 1805), collapsed by December the same year. The Fourth Coalition, between Great Britain, Austria and Russia, came in October 1806 but was soon aborted (February 1807). The Fifth Coalition, established between Britain, Austria, Spain and Portugal (April 9th, 1809) suffered the same fate when, on October 14, 1809, Vienna surrendered to the French – although the Iberian Peninsula front remained active. Thus until 1810 France had faced five coalitions with immense success. The tide began to turn with the French campaign against Russia (June 1812), which precipitated the Sixth Coalition, formed by Russia and Britain, and soon joined by Spain, Portugal, Austria, Prussia, Sweden and other small German States. It proved successful in the spring of 1814 and forced Napoleon to abdicate. In February 1815, Napoleon managed to escape from exile and returned to France. The Seventh Coalition, between Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, was formed on March 25th, 1815. In June Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo. The intellectual aspiration of the present article is to explain the repeated failures of the first five and decisive success of the last two anti-French coalitions by analyzing the economic, not least industrial, and military mobilizations of the participating States. For that purpose, it will successively review the British, Prussian, Russian and Austrian cases, as well as that of minor allies, based on (predominantly British) historiographical sources. A final section provides an overall comparative assessment of the French and anti-French coalitions. Conclusions as to which factors proved most decisive will follow. Published/ publié in Res Militaris (http://resmilitaris.net), vol.7, n°1, Winter-Spring/ Hiver-Printemps 2017 Res Militaris, vol.7, n°1, Winter-Spring/ Hiver-Printemps 2017 2 Britain : Military, Industrial and Economic Mobilization (1792-1815) The country was not prepared for a long war. However, as hostilities continued, it managed over the years to mobilize critical demographic, economic, financial and industrial resources which, combined with a system of alliances, finally brought victory. The British War Effort : Army, Navy and Logistics In 1792, the British Army had 135 regiments. Between 1793 and 1801, its strength was increased threefold. In 1803, the infantry counted 126,677 men ; by 1806, nearly 329,000.1 However, due to annual recruitment deficits (of 11,000 on average after 1810), in January 1811 the force was down to 305,870,2 and in January 1814, the regular army comprised 233,837 men and the militia another 70,000.3 British cavalry officially increased from 190,000 in 1795 to 260,000 in 1801, but the actual number was slightly lower.4 The role of the Royal Navy was pivotal. During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, it enjoyed complete superiority over the French Navy in terms of numbers of ships and naval guns. In 1793, the British navy had 115 ships of the line as against 76 on the French side. In the short run, this changed in favour of France when in 1795 the occupation of Holland added 59 ships of the line from the Dutch fleet, and in 1797 another 76 ships from the Spanish fleet, to the French Navy. However, by 1800 the British had 93 ships of the line, 12 ships with 50 guns, 141 frigates, and another 256 ships of all other types (20 were rented). In 1814, the total was 91 ships of the line, 7 ships with 50 guns, 124 frigates, 248 smaller vessels. British losses between 1793 and 1815 were 32 ships of the line (5 from enemy action, 27 by exposure to various hazards) as well as 473 ships of all types due to various causes (but only 152 from enemy action).5 By 1815, the Royal Navy had 214 cruisers and 800 smaller ships.6 The number of commercial vessels increased from 14,310 in 1789 to 24,860 in 1815. The losses of British commercial shipping from French action were limited. Between 1793 and 1800, a total of 3,466 British commercial ships were captured by the French.7 Another source points out that during 1793-1815 the average annual losses of commercial shipping were just 2% of the fleet’s strength ; however, in the open seas the losses were up to 5%-6% annually due to both weather conditions and French action.8 Naval construction increased substantially over the period : “warship building in the (…) years of the Napoleonic War was virtually double that of the previous four major wars 1 McNab (ed.), 2009, pp.106-107. 2 Partridge & Oliver, 1999, p.2. 3 Knight, 2013, pp.438 and 441. 4 McNab (ed.), 2009, op.cit., p.160. 5 Glover, 2003, p.181. 6 James, 2001, pp.155 and 179. Also : Harvey, 1994, p.125. 7 Glover, 2003, op.cit., p. 197. 8 Rodger, 2004, p.559. Res Militaris, vol.7, n°1, Winter-Spring/ Hiver-Printemps 2017 3 of the eighteenth century. Between 1803 and 1815, 518 new warships measuring 323,136 tons, were built; 84 per cent of these were built by contract (72 per cent by tonnage). Private shipyards built 436 warships (228,176 tons), while the Royal Dockyards built only 82 warships (94,960 tons). A further 52 [ships] (15,510 tons) were built in Bermuda, Halifax, Bombay and Penang”.9 Table 1: British versus French Navy Year Britain (ships of France (Ships of Britain France the line) (*) the line) (Cruisers) (Cruisers) 1790 145 (**) 73 131 64 1795 123 56 160 65 1800 127 44 158 43 1805 136 41 160 35 1810 152 46 183 31 1815 126 52 151 31 Source: Rodger, 2004, op.cit., p.608. (*)=Ships of the Line fought in line because their guns were static. There were many types of such ships. Some had many guns (100 and more). Then there were those with 84-98 guns. The third category was that with 64-80 guns. The fourth category was that with light vessels defined as frigates with 50-60 guns.10 (**)=Including 15 ships with 50 guns each, after that year these were considered cruisers. Table 2: Strength of British Commercial Fleet Year Number of ships Tonnage in tons Number of sailors 1789 14,310 (9,558) 1,395,172 (1,078,374) 108,962 (80,299) 1792 16,079 (10,663) 1,540,145 (1,186,610) 118,286 (87,589) 1802 20,568 (13,446) 2,128,055 (1,642,224) 154,530 (113,670) 1815 24,860 (17,346) 2,681,276 (2,139,301) 177,309 (135,006) Source: Harvey, 1994, op.cit., p.62. The numbers in brackets refer exclusively to English trade. The numbers outside brackets refer to the combined strength of Britain, Ireland and the colonies. The supply requirements of the British Army and Navy were colossal. Every Army horse needed 9 kg of fodder per day, thus 112 horses needed one ton of fodder. Every battery of 6 field guns required 6 horses per gun and another 6 transport carriages. In addition, 18 ammunition wagons were needed and each needed 4 horses. Furthermore, 4 more carriages with 2 horses each were required for the transport of other supplies (water, medical equipment, etc.). Finally, 18 horses were needed for the officers. In total, 134 horses were needed for the transportation of 1,206 kg of fodder whereas total needs for food were around 2 tons.11 The fighting conditions which the British Army had to endure where negative, but gradually improvements occurred. To illustrate, in the battle of Talavera (summer 1809), the British soldiers involved fought unpaid for two months and 9 Knight, 2013, p.363. According to this source, between 1739 and 1802 there were 386 months of war during which 694 warships were built in British merchant and State yards combined (same page). 10 Ζouridis, 2007, pp.4-15. According to Harvey, 1994, p.121, between 1793 and1815, the French captured 8 frigates and 2 ships of the line (one with 80 guns, another with 50-54 guns). In accidents, Britain lost 4 ships of the line with 98 guns and more, 1 ship with 80 guns, 17 ships with 74 guns, 6 ships with 64 guns, 5 ships with 50-54 guns and 58 frigates. In addition, the French captured 3 ships of the line with 74 guns, 1 ship with 50-54 guns and 9 frigates. However, these 13 vessels were re-captured by the British during the hostilities. Finally the British captured the following French ships : 9 ships of the line with 98 guns or more, 19 ships with 80 guns, 87 ships with 74 guns, 24 ships with 64 guns, 9 ships with 50-54 guns and 229 frigates.
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