MEGA-IRRIGATION AND NEOLIBERALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL STATES

MEGA-IRRIGATION AND NEOLIBERALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL STATES: EVOLUTION AND CRISIS IN THE GHARB PLAIN, by Paola Minoia

MINOIA, P. (2012): ‘Mega-irrigation and neoliberalism in post- in many postcolonial states. More specifically, it colonial states: evolution and crisis in the Gharb Plain, Morocco’, Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography 94 (3): aims to contribute to the geographical debate about 269–286. the importance to build environmental histories to scrutinize power relations and impacts in historical- ABSTRACT. This article explores the development, evolution and ly situated socio-natural settings. impacts of large-scale irrigation schemes in the formation of the postcolonial state of Morocco and in more recent neoliberal dec- The theoretical framework is situated in the ades. In particular, the article focuses on the Gharb Plain in the political-­ecology perspectives that look at society Sebou River basin, which was targeted by huge investments to be- and nature as deeply intertwined, and at engineer- come the core region for national development. In this area, three ing interventions in the landscape as political acts, stages of development – colonial, early independent, and the ag- gressive politique des grandes barrages post-1970 – have creat- aiming to produce new socio-natural landscapes ed two clearly different and successive landscapes. The traditional that are coherent with the decision-makers’ strate- landscape has been overlain, and largely obliterated, by colonial gies (Swyngedouw 1999; Robbins 2004; Minoia and postcolonial governmental landscapes, reflected through dif- 2006; Heynen et al. 2007). The need to focus eco- ferent spatial, economic, cultural, and political patterns over time. In the present, a fourth stage of neoliberal development is occur- logically appropriate and socially just insights ring in the landscape, in which diffused poverty and ecosystem col- (Davis 2009) well integrates post-development ge- lapse coincide with greater concentrated wealth and the building of ographies in deconstructing official, internation- technological infrastructures. The article aims to complement criti- al narratives that would explain the current crisis, cal studies on neoliberal environments, by focusing in particular on the manipulation, dispossession and commodification of water and especially in the countries of the Global South land resources in irrigated agriculture in Morocco. These emerging (Escobar 1995). Studies in environmental histo- rationalities are closely related to the changing policies of the con- ry allow positioning specific facts of water and na- temporary Moroccan state. ture re-engineering in line with globally dominant Keywords: mega-irrigation schemes, Morocco, neoliberalism, governmentalities (McNeill 2000; also Swearingen postcolonial development, state territorialization 1988, for a Moroccan case study). Critical research on neoliberalism and its effects is also considered, in terms of changes of political, social and economic Introduction nature that are induced by external pressures, espe- The Gharb irrigation scheme is an example of mega- cially in developing countries, by international fi- projects, typical of many state development policies nancial agencies (Harvey 2005; McCarthy 2007). during the past century, and of postcolonial states in This work also builds upon literature that has the past 50 years. Considered as economic engines, studied impacts of neoliberal water policies (e.g. their territorial impacts have largely been disregard- Castro 2007; Goldman 2007) and further develops ed until recent times, when their contradictions have a critical analysis of the water demand management become more evident because of progressive state approaches that are currently so popular internation- disengagement, connected to a critical economic ally. Davis’ (2006) contribution is also relevant, for environment. the way she relates neoliberalism and agricultural The Gharb’s history is not only significant for restructuring policies and deconstructs declention- the exploration of the development, evolution and ist colonial environmental narratives in Morocco. impacts of large-scale water schemes in the forma- However, also due to the different geographical tion of the Moroccan state, as it allows exploring focus of this article, which is on an irrigated plain critical phenomena that are commonly experienced (while Davis’ case is based in the rain-fed South),

© The author 2012 269 Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography PAOLA MINOIA territorialization and hydro-political theories have Hydraulic territorialization in postcolonial more centrality here. states As for the case study, this article will initially fo- The territorializing nature of water infrastructures cus on the territorial changes superimposed on the has been explored for decades (e.g. Wittfogel 1957; Gharb Plain, part of the Sebou catchment area, which Hunt and Hunt 1978; Waterbury 1979), explaining were pushed by planners with the intent to create a the ways in which mega-engineered projects have core productive region that would power the national influenced the development processes of places economy and enforce the political project of the new through the control over their human and natural re- nation-state. Second, the article will observe the im- sources. According to McNeill (2000, p. 150): pacts of the recent neoliberal developmentalism, in which the state has selectively reduced its directive Churchill ... Lenin, Franklin Roosevelt, Nehru, role in the agricultural sector, while new trade agree- Deng Xiaoping, and a host of lesser figures saw ments and landownership structures have led to a re- water in much the same way, and encouraged turning foreign presence. This governance shift has massive water projects in the USSR, the United also produced relevant impacts, despite the minor en- States, India, and China. They did so because gineering intervention that occurred in this phase. In they all lived in an age in which states and socie- fact, the new rules have contributed to a further dis- ties regarded adjustments to nature’s hydrology possession of natural resources from the local com- as a route to greater power or prosperity. munities and thus increased their vulnerability. These consequences have been observed Thus the inclusion of nature in the socio-political through a close contact with the studied areas and construction allows deepening of the concept of ter- their actors, to access different sources and to re- ritory over which powers exercise their own strate- cord local insight. Fieldwork has been very impor- gies (Delaney 2005). By establishing infrastructures tant for this study. Visits completed between 2005 and setting up new rules, hydraulic territorialization and 2008 have allowed access to a large amount of reflects and incorporates features of the social order literature that is locally available on issues related to that creates them. In postcolonial contexts, and par- politics and water-related fields either in Morocco or ticularly in the first decades of independence, this the Gharb and that includes, besides books and arti- order has tended to be coherent with, and support- cles, unpublished theses, newspapers, governmen- ing of, the production of strong nation-state terri- tal reports and statistics. Visits to the Gharb Plain torial discourses. The construction of regimes has have allowed observation, semi-structured and un- followed the ideal model of the Keynesian wel- structured conversations. A field trip and two sem- fare national state, characterized by an ‘autocentric inars were also organized with a class of Master circle of mass production’, although not consider- students in geography of the University of in ing the need to secure mass consumption, but ‘se- 2007, as part of a course I gave as a visiting lecturer. cured through a distinctive mode of regulation that These events allowed observation of the landscape was discursively, institutionally and practically ma- and questions to be raised, particularly through in- terialised’ (Jessop 2002, p. 55). New infrastruc- terviews with regional technical officers working in tural works that are functional of new production the water and agricultural sectors in the Gharb, con- schemes and activities have been conceived by sultants involved in the water management reform, state powers as material signs for territorial control, and local farmers, including women, whom we met while their symbolic power entails a significant so- in the fields and in small towns. While the experts cial transformation and is often constitutive of new provided local statistics that had not been published national identities (Turco 1988). Similar models in national reports, the aim of the interviews with have been performed in non-developing countries; farmers and local residents was to gather qualitative particularly, the experience of Spain under Franco insight into the ways certain political and manage- reported by Swyngedouw (2007) illustrates the ment changes have been enacted in that particular linkages between nationalism and techno-­natural context, how they have been perceived, and what material infrastructures in articulating a new geo- personal consequences they have led to in peoples’ graphical project. However, the peculiarity of the lives (Secor 2010). A very important experience was postcolonial countries resides in their limited sov- also the discussion of the students’ findings in class, ereignty, which continues after the financial crisis to interpret experiences and meanings. started in the 1980s and in the internal governance

270 © The author 2012 Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography MEGA-IRRIGATION AND NEOLIBERALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL STATES relations (Sidaway 2007), as explored later in this With reference to the water sector, many gov- article. ernment institutions started disengaging from the Particularly during the first decades, the new in- engineering maintenance tasks, as part of wider pro- dependent states made the largest efforts in their plans cesses of decentralization and privatization that per- of economic modernization, in which mega water- meated policies throughout the world, particularly engineering projects played a great role (Showers from the 1980s. A situation of clear state domination 2011). While the first infrastructures were mainly to over the main infrastructures and working proce- provide water for agriculture, to control floods and to dures was then replaced by a situation of govern- transform allegedly unproductive areas into highly ance uncertainty. productive lands, later dams became multipurpose, also meant to produce hydroelectric energy (McNeill 2000). However, despite propaganda and rhetorical Neoliberal developmentalism in irrigation claims referring to the shared benefits of these struc- Neoliberal pressures have been moved to postco- tures for all, these infrastructures have been more at- lonial countries throughout the globe. However, tractive for potential investors rather than for local their application has been internalized in different communities. The reason is that by aiming at oblit- ways and encountered various obstacles, particular- erating previous livelihoods and territorialities, ly in states where authoritarian powers are still the considered as pre-­modern, such projects have com- main regulators. Despite clear modernization of the monly dispossessed local communities of their tra- new public administrations, some typical features of ditional rights over the natural resources, and thus Western neoliberal states are lacking, like the ‘le- created new marginalized, exploited and poverty gal framework allowing freedom of businesses and stricken groups (World Commission on Dams 2000). corporations’ (Harvey 2005, p. 64). For instance, Critical literature has in fact described the undemo- Morocco’s political system (makhzen) is based on cratic nature, dubious economic benefits, and disas- neopatrimonialism, ensuring the power base to its trous environmental consequences of mega-projects leaders (Bicchi et al. 2004; Cammack 2007), and (e.g. Shiva 2002; Flyvberg et al. 2003). Examples of on manipulated propaganda. The deployment of ne- these processes have been observed in different are- oliberal policies, supported by foreign aid, has in- as of the world, such as in southern Egypt (McNeill tersected both the protection of corporate interests 2000), in the Sudanese New Halfa scheme (Bertoncin as well as the long declared land reform. Moreover, et al. 1995) and Merowe dam (Hashim 2010), in the some critical aspects related to the agricultural sec- Tunisian Lake Ichkeul (Smart 2003), in the Turkish tor make water privatization difficult to achieve in Great Anatolian Project (Ward 1997), in the Lesotho Africa, not least because of the low economic attrac- Highlands Water Project (Transformation Resource tiveness of irrigation networks for private investors Centre 2000) and in the Chinese Three Gorges pro- (McNeill 2000), particularly in the MENA region ject (Duan and Steil 2003). (Ahmad 2000). The scarce response of private sec- Postcolonial governments have not been the tor companies to replace public water providers has sole or even the strongest players in their own ter- produced fundamental gaps in the management sys- ritories. The international influence over investment tem of irrigation schemes. Who should then take decisions in irrigation schemes of different coun- over the management of large-scale infrastructures tries has been remarkable during the whole twenti- and of the irrigation services? eth century through a number of ways: first, through Declentionist environmental narratives have direct investments by enterprises of colonial origin, blamed both farmers and public institutions for hav- particularly in the early years of the decolonization ing depleted water resources and thus for their in- processes (e.g. Waterbury 1979; Swearingen 1988); capacity to manage them (Davis 2006). In line with second, by an intensification of international mar- these ideas, to solve irrigation mismanagement and ket relations, by increased production of crops for the problems of water scarcity it has caused, wheth- exportation (e.g. Bicciato and Faggi 1995; Akesbi er the responsibility of public offices or farmers, a 2006); lastly, by intensified international aid and fi- new approach came into existence, that of water de- nancial loans, mainly channelled by the World Bank, mand management. In contrast to the water supply and subjected to strict conditionalities in the field of approach, typical of the previous decades in postco- macro-economic and institutional reforms (Harvey lonial countries and expensively applied by strong 2003, p. 181). state apparatuses to construct dams and canalization

© The author 2012 271 Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography PAOLA MINOIA networks, the water demand management approach scarce resources (UNDP 2006). However, prob- proposes soft interventions. The concept includes lems arise when the real stakes are not direct sourc- environmental and Malthusian concerns with re- es, but rather complex infrastructures and schemes spect to the exhausted resources. Solutions are that have been established and governed by central- sought through new water-saving regulations, con- ized, authoritarian powers for so many years. The sidered as having lower impact than infrastructures situation is worsened by the fact that the handing and able to rationalize uses of available resources over has not been preceded by amelioration works (FAO 2002). in the schemes (e.g. restoration of canals, clean up However, water demand management is not from silt and weeds, or introduction of water me- a neutral response to the problems caused by bad ters to record the consumed volumes) or by a full irrigation practices, but embeds clear neoliberal reorganization of the irrigation cycles to allow in- principles in natural resource management. Three dependent crops. The reality is that obsolete giant principles are particularly strengthened in the new networks are simply proposed to farmers’ groups policy reforms that are applied worldwide: tech- that have their lands and their living there (i.e. in nical modernization, state disengagement and Sudan, on which see Omer 2008). Finally, the en- pricing. trance in new international trade agreements in First of all, water demand management re- an overall situation of market uncertainty has in- quires modernization of the irrigation networks es- creased insecurity among the producers, since they pecially to avoid water losses. The wide presence cannot benefit from public subsidies, considered of open gravitational canal networks that were typ- to disrupt the market competition. Consequently, ically installed during the past decades is consid- the devolution of irrigation management to farm- ered the main barrier to solve leakage, evaporation, ers has not empowered the majority of them; on the excessive withdrawals and water stealing (Varela- contrary, it has created dramatic consequences for Ortega and Sagardoy 2003). Technical knowledge many small producers. Wealthy landowners have is more appreciated then traditional knowledge, increased their accumulation of land sold by the im- considered as obsolete, particularly if crops are poverished categories and have means to access al- meant to compete internationally. Attempts to re- ternative sources of water, if the canals are silted or cover traditional water tools and networks, like the infested by weeds, for instance groundwater sourc- foggara or khattara in Northern Africa, mainly be- es through engine-­powered pumps (e.g. Bertoncin long to cultural projects funded by international et al. 1995; Minoia and Guglielmi 2008). donors on a small scale (Laureano 2001). Besides The third key element of these soft tools is the know-how, purchase of new tools and use of ener- market pricing, which, according to an economic gy increase production costs that small farmers can approach, would regulate the consumption of water hardly afford. (Ahmad 2000), promote conservative uses of scarce The second neoliberal principle, state disen- resources and alleviate losses (Oubalkace 2007). gagement, is connected with the rhetoric of de- Despite various contradictions related to the appli- mocratization of economic and political systems. cation of prices to a non-marketable good (Petrella Public–private partnerships are meant to contrast 2001; Swyngedouw 2005), pricing mechanisms the presence of strong state control over water and have been applied in most developing countries. land resources. Contrarily to the principle of water The shift in water management, from subsidized re- supply management that was requiring state inter- sources towards regimes of full-cost pricing, has a ventionism, the principle of demand management questionable economic rationale, since the intro- means to empower water users, and to respond to duction of new technologies increases water tar- their real irrigation requirements. If sales of irriga- iffs, thereby making water even less accessible to tion schemes are not feasible for lack of interest by poor users. On this subject, and mainly on the re- external corporations, as earlier mentioned, the exit lated question of access to drinking water as a com- strategy for the state is to hand over the schemes to mon good, there is already abundant research (e.g. the same farmers, despite the spread idea of their Laurie 2007), while the issue of pricing of water inability to run the networks efficiently. These de- in the irrigation sector is less addressed by geogra- cisions are supported by international aid pro- phers in development studies. Because of its rele- grammes, based on the theoretical principle that vance, I will consider this issue in the case study of farmers are the best actors to manage carefully their Gharb.

272 © The author 2012 Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography MEGA-IRRIGATION AND NEOLIBERALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL STATES

Figure 1. Sebou Basin and Gharb Plain.

Rationale of the Gharb case study Water control and territorial changes in the The conceptual framework exposed in the first Gharb Plain sections will structure a narrative of the political-­ The Gharb Plain is located in the lower portion of ecological history of the Gharb case. Political, social the Sebou catchment and flows across the Atlantic and natural aspects are intertwined in the production coastal plain (Fig. 1). In terms of water volume, it process of the nation and its physical environment, is the richest river in the country. Water control has in accordance with the governmental model and the long been the main focus of the territorial organiza- modernization culture. Through the exploration of tion of the Gharb Plain and, as a result, it has deeply the Gharb, I aim to present a territory that has been modified both ecosystems and human territoriali- heavily remodelled by the postcolonial and neolib- ties. In many ways, the history of the Gharb can be eral utopias of growth. Following a historical anal- seen as a process involving different social and in- ysis of the main territorializing facts in this region, I stitutional actors, with the water-soil system as the will demonstrate that despite huge engineering and main resource for their reproduction, empowerment technological interventions, many farmers are now and building their development assets. unable to access natural resources of sufficient qual- Before the French Protectorate, established ity to secure their livelihoods, and to rebuild their in 1912, the water and soil potentials of the Gharb own territoriality. Plain attracted nomadic communities of main- The presentation will be developed in two sec- ly Arabic groups as far back as the twelfth centu- tions. The first, based particularly on Swearingen’s ry and mixed to indigenous Amazigh tribes. Le Coz historical account (1988), will present the evolution (1964) presents an in-depth description of the local of the region from the colonial times to the realiza- communities and their territorialities before heavy tion of the great Projet Sebou and some produced state planning from the 1970s destroyed their spa- impacts. The second section will then focus on the tial organization. Their livelihoods were based on current neoliberal phase, which is causing nega- crop and grazing depending on a flexible relation tive pressures on the environment and the local with the land, on the variability of floods, and thus, communities. on soil humidity and composition. Their villages (douar) were established on elevated zones near the Sebou and the Beht rivers, protected from the flood

© The author 2012 273 Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography PAOLA MINOIA risks. Permanent marshes (merja) could not be uti- pasture lands. This caused a progressive decline of lized, but in spring and summer their edges were the traditional rural livelihood, which induced an in- sufficiently dry to be used for livestock grazing. ternal migration towards urban centres. Between Muddy-sandy alluviums and hydromorphic soils 1910 and 1960, the Gharb’s urban population in- were exploited by biennial rotations, which alter- creased from 130,000 to 540,000 inhabitants, partic- nated cereals with pastural fallow lands. The main ularly concentrated in the triangle of Kénitra–Souk El crops were grown in winter, with sorghum and mil- Arbaa–Sidi Kacem, with a consequent alteration of let cultivated in the spring and summer. their tribal organization (Royaume du Maroc 1970). Strong patterns of territorial control only start- ed in the twentieth century, opening an era of great physical and social changes, performed through new Postcolonial institutional setting political systems. In the next paragraphs I will fo- The first decade after independence (1956) was cus on the most significant historical discontinuities characterized by institutional reforms to affirm that occurred in the territorial management: the co- the new state’s administrative competence and so- lonial reclamation, the postcolonial institutional set- cial legitimacy in the country. New public bod- ting and the Projet Sebou. I will analyse the current ies were established with clear responsibilities in state of implementation of the management plans the fields of water and agricultural management. and their impacts, and will then focus on the pres- After years of trials, in the 1960s an office for ag- sures induced by the current neoliberal state disen- ricultural valorization was created, and then divid- gagement policy. ed into regional offices (ORMVA, Offices régionaux de mise en valeur agricole, or Regional Offices of Agricultural Enhancement). In the Gharb, the re- Colonial reclamation gional office named ORMVA du Gharb (ORMVAG) Soon after the establishment of the French acted as the lead institution, handling the equip- Protectorate, the Gharb region was considered for ment, management needs and scheme valorization. its agricultural potential. However, to expand its The Agricultural Investment Code (1969) guided production, to the extent of re-constituting the old the sector modernization process (Belghiti 2005; ‘Granary of Rome’ (Swearingen 1988), it was con- Akesbi 2006). sidered necessary to overcome some physical ob- The new state also needed to build social trust stacles: marshes and seasonal floods. In 1917, the among the people. With social expectations in fa- Séjournet Plan, named after the French engineer vour of a state redistributive role, one of the key de- who proposed it, designed the first hydraulic works: clared policies was the nationalization of lands that drainage of the central merjas, soil removal and the were confiscated to colonial settlers, to be followed digging of canals connecting the wetlands to the by an agrarian reform to return dispossessed lands Sebou and Beht rivers. No consideration was paid to to local populations. The reform, however, has not the contemporary use of lands of the local tribes. A been more than a rhetorical discourse, since the land great flood in 1927 justified a -re launch of the plan distribution favoured other interests, mainly the di- and the construction of El Kansera dam (1935), the rect state control of the productive resources, and first one to be installed in the Sebou Basin. then the agrarian bourgeoisie. State companies were These technical interventions were truly territo- created in the early 1970s in order to handle the rializing factors. The new infrastructures introduced fields recovered by land reform: mainly large prop- spatial manoeuvre of water floods, obliterated the erties of over 100 ha (El Gueddari 1998). The re- bases of the traditional livelihoods and were accom- maining land was granted to the rural bourgeoisie, panied by a social reorganization, responding to the rather than to the rural poor indigenous, to build a new spatial design that had given the Plain new pro- closer political alliance with the first group (Levau ductive functions. The first beneficiaries of the new 1976; Swearingen 1988). land availability were the new settlers, who also in- troduced pumping from the rivers and considerably modified the agricultural techniques. Patterns of ag- Projet Sebou ricultural exploitation, as described by Swearingen Centralized state control and large infrastructural (1988), served the European market’s demand. The development were partly influenced by foreign in- continuous reclamation of the merjas reduced the stitutions. In the mid-1960s, following the World

274 © The author 2012 Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography MEGA-IRRIGATION AND NEOLIBERALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL STATES

Bank recommendations to solve the national finan- Wide pressures have been generated in local terri- cial problems, an economic strategy was developed tories, their communities and the environment, but with the aim to strengthen the primary sector and nowadays there is a gap of responsibility to address particularly exports. Water was considered a strate- them. The following section will describe some of gic but uncertain resource, thus large-scale hydrau- the impacts suffered by the Gharb region as a conse- lic planning started to become central. Based on a quence of the la politique des digues of the 1970s– preliminary study supported by UNDP and FAO, 1980s and the following period of financial crisis. the huge Projet Sebou was launched in 1970 with the aim of transforming the river basin area into a strong economic region (Royaume du Maroc 1970; Impacts of the mega hydraulics Swearingen 1988). In the Middle Atlas, where the dams are physical- This project was in line with the water sup- ly located, local spaces have been devastated, with ply management approach, considering water as a no compensation for their inhabitants, who had to transferable input to be stocked and then moved into leave their villages (Aderghal and Agoumi 2000). deficit areas. Massive public investment was co- But even in the Gharb Plain, Projet Sebou has pro- ordinated by the central government and support- duced some unforeseen impacts. ed by foreign sponsors, mainly through the World Population increase has induced extended land Bank (World Commission on Dams 2000). So far, occupation that has endangered the original land- installed infrastructures include ten large dams, scape, ecology and livelihoods in the transient mar- forty-­four small dams, a channel for water transfers, gins of the marshlands (merja). In Western Gharb, thousands of pumping stations and wells, and wide communities living in tribal villages (douar) still networks of irrigation and drainage canals. Other in- practice rain-fed agriculture and complementary terventions are planned for the coming years (ABH livestock along the merja borders. However, their Sebou 2006). livelihoods are challenged on two fronts. On the one Implementation of the entire plan was supposed hand, the new environmental regulations limit the to be reached in 24 years, but it soon became clear right of pastoral activities, like in the Merja Zerga, that the target was overambitious. However, the fa- recognized as a Ramsar site since 1980. On the other vourable conditions of the Gharb plains made this hand, in the western fringe of the merja and limited area the first one to host the new infrastructures. In by coastal dunes, land is not accessible as it has been this region, the agricultural intensification of cash enclosed in intensive farming companies, outside crops (e.g. rice, oilseeds and horticulture), and the the ORMVAG scheme. The presence of groundwa- introduction of new crops (like sugar cane), were ter near the surface has in fact attracted new inter- sustained by the agro-industries (Boulassel et al. national investors who have installed greenhouse 2001), while ORMVAG invested in experimen- productions of high market value (watermelons, tal laboratories to introduce new species (e.g. the pineapples, avocados, peanuts, bananas, strawber- Centre Technique des Cultures Sucrières in Kénitra) ries, and flowers); but the excessive pumping is al- and in further infrastructural investments such as ready creating concerns for the increased salinity of roads, water supply and electricity, primary educa- water (ABH Sebou 2006). On the other side of the tion and dispensaries (Belghiti 2005). ORMVAG Gharb, on the eastern Gharb-Chrarda hills, not cov- intervention has also included seed distribution, ered by the engineered networks, local communities marketing, transportation services, settlements and are restricted in small holdings that are less and less rural street networks. As it was said by Mohamed able to grow cereals for self-consumption. Fertility El Hammouni, Chief of the exploitation service of collapse and soil erosion cannot be addressed by the irrigation network (ORMVAG) interviewed in shifting cultivations to other areas, since what was November 2007, ‘There is nothing but the Office in traditionally considered collective land has been en- the Gharb … but unfortunately now there is an eco- closed and sold; thus deprived farmers are forced to nomic crisis. Since 1990 ORMVAG cannot inter- migrate (Berriane and Aderghal 2008). vene anymore’. Even in the Central Gharb the irrigation scheme The Gharb, however, cannot be reduced to a pro- is facing various obstacles. While the networks were ductive space, as it is a complex region needing a expected to rationalize water uses and intensify pro- more articulated governance system than a special- ductivity, the poor consensus gathered among local ized institution like the ORMVAG could handle. farmers has actually undermined the functioning of

© The author 2012 275 Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography PAOLA MINOIA the irrigation rules. Farmers interviewed in this area développement de l’élevage, SNDE). According to in May 2006 and November 2007 argued that the official data, these companies received 135,000 ha, state did not actively involve or empower the people and the remaining land was distributed over a decade working in the scheme, and that they felt abandoned to 21,000 tenants organized in 671 cooperatives and in the most critical phases. 11 unions (MADRPM 2006). Other sources, howev- Vulnerable groups integrated as manpower into er, claim that even these lands included large areas the scheme can hardly make a living. Responding to granted to the establishment elite, including the roy- market-driven agricultural goals rather than to the al family, while landless farmers were substantially needs of the original tribal groups, and disregard- neglected (Swearingen 1988; Najjar 2006). ing the previous territorialities that were based in the As a matter of fact, the government engaged a Gharb Plains, the project appears to have caused not policy that increased social disparity, allowing land only a physical change, but also social desegrega- accumulation at the hands of a minority of landown- tion and economic problems. ers (Swearingen 1988). Big owners have been tar- geted by special benefits, such as authorization for private pumping from the rivers and groundwater, Socio-economic disequilibria discounted taxation, easy access to credit and mar- The arguments in this section and the qualitative keting facilities (Boulassel et al. 2001). As for the analysis reflect conversations and debates that I small units, the national laws have set limitations have had with local officers, consultants, farmers, for the minimum sizes of holdings: 5 ha in irrigat- students and researchers. Quantitative data have ed lands, according to the Agricultural Investment been acquired through official statistics, research re- Code (BO 1969), and 10 ha in rain-fed lands, ac- ports and newspapers articles. cording to the law for the rain-fed land (bour) rec- Officialstatistics report the situation of the Gharb lamation schemes (BO 1995a), and forbid the region as presenting a poverty rate of 20.5 per cent traditional inheritance subdivision system below against 14 per cent at the national level (Royaume these minimum sizes. However, families remain du Maroc 2008). These data are surprising consid- compliant with the customary rules and so the sit- ering the massive investment that has been made in uation remains one of extreme parcelling, although the Gharb for so many decades. However, it can be many of these small properties are registered as fully explained by the selective effort that has been combined with other ownerships, thus creating the made in this region: investment has been exclusive- so-called indivisible properties, meaning that the ly devoted to dominant groups, to strengthen their different co-owners cannot either rent or sell their cash productions, at the expense of local communi- parcel independently. More than a decade ago, ties and their food security. Bensouda Korachi (1998) calculated that 62 per cent Land tenure has been a discriminating factor for of the overall cultivated land of the region was reg- the socio-economic wealth in agriculture. In post- istered in this category, and that the average hold- colonial Morocco, the priority assigned to the de- ing of small farmers was only 1.09 ha. No official velopment of extensive irrigated and mechanized statistics are available to monitor this hidden situ- farming was incompatible with the expected land re- ation, but some independent studies have reported form. Land reform, despite the promises, has failed the evolution of this increasing land fragmentation to redistribute land to local farmers. Two spectacu- for some areas. A recent survey in three douars lo- lar operations of recuperation of colonial domains, cated on the right bank of the Sebou River (Rgrega, mainly exploited for arboriculture (vineyards, cit- Ouled Moussa and Oled Mansour) reports that on rus and olives) and horticulture, were established the lands obtained by the reform and managed col- in 1963 over 316,380 ha and in 1973 over 446,005 lectively, each farmer has been assigned between ha (Ghannam 2005; El Farah 2007). However they 1.2 and 3 ha, well under the thresholds indicated by were handed over, respectively, to large landown- law (Poncet et al. 2008). Another survey is based in ers and to new state companies: the Society of the rural areas of and , Kénitra Agricultural Development (Société de développe- province (Hilali 2004). This is now the most dynam- ment agricole, SODEA), the Society of Agricultural ic area or region, although land is not connected to Land Management (Société de gestion des terres the irrigation networks of the Sebou project; howev- agricoles, SOGETA) and the National Society er productive labour does not make farmers wealthi- for Livestock Development (Société nationale de er. More than 60 per cent of the households are based

276 © The author 2012 Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography MEGA-IRRIGATION AND NEOLIBERALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL STATES on small holdings of 0.1 up to 4 ha; around 20 per reduced groups of students, after the primary lev- cent are landless; while the remaining land is ex- el, access secondary and professional schools, with ploited in medium and large farms. Agriculture has the result that 47.8 per cent of the population over been intensified by new private investments using 10 years are illiterate (Royaume du Maroc 2008). groundwater pumped from the aquifer and introduc- Children’s contribution to the family income is also ing drip irrigation methods during the period 1984– considered to be one of the reasons for the relatively 1992, mainly due to outsider entrepreneurs from high fertility rate: 2.7 children per woman compared Rabat, Casablanca and, more recently, from Spain. with the national average of 2.5 children. The new Moroccan landholders are mainly pub- Local food security has been neglected as far lic officers or businessmen with no previous in- as production choices are concerned. According to volvement in farming. In fact, they are absentees, Moussaoui et al. (2003), in spite of the Gharb’s eco- and have expanded valuable cultivations through nomic contribution to the national GDP, 28 and 15 rental of land from the group of small landhold- per cent of the population respectively do not meet ers, particularly those having micro-holdings. The their minimum requirements in calories and pro- latter cannot ensure their own subsistence only teins, and 6.6 per cent of children suffer from acute through their land, and for this reason a common malnutrition. This situation is particularly dramatic practice is to rent it out to the new class of agricul- in remote villages. Female-headed households with tural entrepreneurs and to offer their workforce to children and older family members are a common them in exchange for salaries. A consultant report reality in many douars, and rely on revenues of men for the government (Chiche 2007) presents the av- and young boys working on the large farms, in the erage amounts gained by the small holders for both main towns or abroad. Neither farming nor livestock the rented land (around MAD 3000 ha/year, corre- raising are their source of living, particularly since sponding to EUR 266 or USD 372 in 2007) and the the neoliberal changes from the 1990s. farming work (from MAD 3000 to 7500 per year If the first migratory trend was mainly from and capita). The low rental fees are due to the low the overpopulated and poor highlands of the High value of land unless it is equipped with private wells Gharb and Chrarda to the equipped Central Gharb, a and pumps with electric engines, which only large second phase, started in the 1980s, is characterized entrepreneurs can afford to have. Salaried employ- by flows from the Central Gharb to reach the urban ment, though precarious, is considered to offer more and industrial centres of Larache, Tanger, Kénitra, security than direct farming for small landholders, Tétouan and Casablanca. From the 1990s on, this and is surely the only possible income for landless flow has been integrated by a mobility of farmers families, who are mainly young and do not possess towards the rich farms of the western Gharb. New any cattle, if they do not have direct access to any households have been established around industrial borehole. Farmers in this group are paid less than and farming poles and near the cities. In the Gharb– MAD 3 per day and live in very poor shelters with Chrarda–Bni Hssen region, urban growth is calcu- no access to safe water. lated at a rate of 2.3 per cent a year compared with The area around Kénitra is more dynamic. The 0.7 per cent of demographic growth in the rural are- capitalistic farming system of this province attracts as, and particularly due to the rural–urban migration labour from a wide area. According to Poncet et al. flow, largely towards the regional centre of Kénitra (2008), many among the most skilled workers of the (Royaume du Maroc 2008). However, this mobil- Central Gharb have left their fields to be employed ity has not ensured better social conditions of the in the new companies of Kénitra. For those who can migrants, since they have often settled in informal keep their own farming in small holdings, the main slums that are deprived of basic services, such as crop is fodder to feed the cattle (one to two head) to water, electricity, sanitation and so forth. The situ- provide some earning through milk production, sale ation has become worse because of the recent eco- of calves and capital security. However, small hold- nomic crisis that has resulted in closure of industrial ers remain particularly vulnerable and exposed to plants. According to the same official source, 12,490 poverty. people were employed in the region in 1999, which Salaried work in farming also attracts children has decreased to 8727 in 2003; between 2002 and from the age of 11–12 years, leaving the school 2004, agro-industrial production has declined by 27 to contribute to their families’ subsistence. This is per cent. the main reason why, in the rural Gharb, only very Therefore, a new social re-composition has been

© The author 2012 277 Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography PAOLA MINOIA produced in the region, with growing cities and in- natural lakes and watersheds that are considered dustrial areas attracting labour flows, but destroying of international importance (i.e. Lake Ichkeul in the traditional social structure and increasing pov- Tunisia and the Great Sebkha of Oran in Algeria, erty. In more recent years, migration from the ru- listed as Ramsar areas) are degraded by water diver- ral areas to foreign destinations, particularly to and sion and artificial storage systems. through Spain, has become more common. While The ecology of the Gharb coastal plains, located the national trend is reported by the Annuaire statis- downstream and targeted by wide agricultural and tique du Maroc (Haut Commissariat au Plan 2008), industrial development requiring water withdraw- with an index of –3.2 in 2005–2006 and –3.0 in als and pollutant discharges, has been heavily modi- 2006–2007, official data do not report the migra- fied. The drainage of the merjas has caused a loss of tion rate from the rural Gharb. However, visits to the important habitats, hence an impoverishment of bi- fields and interviews with local people, public offic- odiversity and ecosystem functions. Waterbird spe- ers and researchers suggested that emigration is a cies have been affected by the disappearance of the very common strategy among the Gharb population. Merja Dawra and nearby wetlands that constituted In November 2007 we interviewed a group of a shelter for large populations. A comparative study women in Souk el Arbaa. They had husbands and by Green et al. (2002) on the conservation status of other family members in Europe, especially in Moroccan wetlands and birds’ habitats, with respect Spain. We discussed the use of their remittances in to the situation assessed in 1978 by Morgan (1982), terms of investment for the future. In most cases, shows a dramatic decrease in recorded species. The they did not consider farming in the Gharb Plain to reasons are diverse: drainage, water extraction, fish- be a viable economic activity for their families, al- ing, hunting and egg collecting, overgrazing and though it had been important in the past. For them, reed cutting, pollution, siltation, urban and road de- farming presented too many risks of failure com- velopment, and tourism. pared with the opportunities offered by other sec- Some merjas have received noteworthy atten- tors, and therefore, they did not use remittances to tion by conservation movements and are now pro- buy new land, water pumps or farming machines. tected by national and international regulations. The Rather, their goal was to improve their family’s life Zerga and Sidi Bou Ghaba wetlands have been rec- in the urban centres, building a new house, buying ognized as Ramsar sites and biological reserves. a car and establishing new commercial activities Nevertheless, they are still threatened by continuous downtown, while others were waiting for a visa to agricultural intensification that lowers the freshwa- join their family members, since they could not see a ter levels entering the merjas, by industrial and ur- future for their children and themselves in that area. ban expansion, and lastly, by the tourists of the new There was indeed a common perception that people resorts built along the nearby sandy beaches. were vacating the village. They acknowledged that The growth of informal settlements without the family reunions abroad would definitely break proper sanitation facilities is also causing pollution the douar linkages and cultures, but they did not see in both the surface water and the water table (Nassali them as a priority. et al. 2005). The Sebou, particularly in the Gharb area, is the most heavily polluted river in Morocco (El Gueddari 1998). The main cause is the exten- Environmental impacts sive use of fertilizers and pesticides in agricultural The construction of dams in the Sebou Basin has activities on the Plain, and the pollution of activi- produced environmental changes in the region that ties upstream. Chemical and organic pollution cause were mostly unexpected, since the instalments were eutrophication of the rivers and of the dams’ res- not preceded by any adequate impact assessments ervoirs, particularly El Kansera Dam, biodiversity and protection measures (World Commission on loss and contamination of the groundwater used by Dams 2000). In fact, the ecosystem values were the population for drinking purposes (Debbarh and completely neglected. Some of the main environ- Badraoui 2002). mental problems include loss of wetlands, alteration The impact of agricultural runoff also affects soil of water and soil quality, degradation of the river quality. The primary outcomes are salinization and banks and coastal erosion (Laalou 1985). These im- waterlogging, mainly due to excessive irrigation and pacts are similar to those suffered in other coastal insufficient drainage (Boulasselet al. 2006). Finally, areas of the Mediterranean region, where wetlands, the pumping of groundwater for coastal greenhouse

278 © The author 2012 Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography MEGA-IRRIGATION AND NEOLIBERALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL STATES cultivations causes pressures on the aquifer, deter- only selectively neoliberal: while it publicly advo- mines seawater intrusion, and thus, salinization of cates the reduction of formal regulation, free trade the resource. and labour market flexibility, it utilizes existing in- frastructural investment to support certain corpo- rate interests, unequal landownership and division Reflections of neoliberalism in the Gharb systems. scheme This selectivity is also applied within the differ- The analysis has so far supported the reconstruction ent economic sectors. While the presence of state of the Gharb history and the political strategies be- companies in the primary sector is drastically de- hind it. It has also unveiled the aggressive approach creasing, tourism appears to be the new frontier for of the new Moroccan state, involving environmen- economic growth, internationalization and country tal, agricultural and social engineering experiments, modernization (Alami 2004). A good indicator of and its consequences, in terms of a weakening of the the lower ranking of agriculture production in the local people to react to overall environmental deg- macro-economic picture is the dismantlement of the radation, political insecurity and economic reces- state rural development companies: SNDE has al- sion. This section presents the current debate around ready been sold, while SODEA and SOGETA have the main policy changes that have more recently oc- been for sale since 2004 (El Mahjoub 2005). The curred in the Gharb. After decades of strong activ- first phase of the liquidation programme has been ac- ity in water and production management, the state complished by handing over 44,000 ha to national, has started applying a new governance model of but also Spanish and French investors. The second neoliberal influence. The discussion covers the ap- phase, involving 38,500 ha, is ongoing, and is con- propriateness of the new institutional framework to firming a return of foreign presence to direct man- support the economy and the communities that have agement of land resources (Najjar 2006; El Farah been so heavily changed by the Projet Sebou. 2007). In contrast, as already mentioned, public re- The description of the main changes will reflect investment is evident in the tourism sector. The con- the points covered earlier in the theoretical review, struction of new airports, roads and resorts has been and will particularly refer to the policy reforms re- finalized to increase the international attractiveness ferred to as state disengagement (and decentrali- of Morocco, and thus, to gather hard currency. One zation), modernization and pricing. These aspects example is the activity of the National Investment have been discussed in the field and then support- Society, a Moroccan public holding that in 2008 ac- ed by data gathered from secondary sources, mainly quired important shares in an investment group of newspapers and reports. Abu Dhabi, SOMED, specialized in tourism resorts, From the analysis it is evident that despite the in- with the aim of increasing the hotel sector’s capaci- creasing need for coordinated governance of such a ty in Morocco (OBG 2008). complex region and of the new challenges, the direct As for the agricultural sector, the presence of the involvement of the state is decreasing. The econom- state continues in the form of normative and institu- ic crisis that had determined a lack of financial re- tional changes. Decentralization in water manage- sources was requiring a change from the plan, which ment has been promoted by the Water Law 10/95 would not mean state abandonment at this stage. (BO 1995b). The law established River Basin Nevertheless, the structural adjustment programmes Agencies, including one for the Sebou, which would of the World Bank and new trade agreements have take over some of ORMVAG’s tasks, particular- been asking for a public disengagement in economy ly those related to water monitoring, but not farm- and service provision. A worldwide trend is chang- ing. The new water law embeds the water scarcity ing the institutional and economic frameworks in concerns, and for this, promotes the application of various countries, leading to decentralization and new water-saving measures, in line with the wa- progressive privatization of services, under the in- ter demand management principle. Coherently, the fluence of international neoliberal approaches that plan to complete the infrastructural instalment of the guide aid programmes (Goldman 2007). In practice, Sebou only allows the introduction of new irriga- the state does not retreat completely, but takes on tion tools, like sprinkler and drip irrigation, and rec- new functions of production and control of the new ommends a substitution of all old gravity canals that legal and institutional assets aiming to facilitate the are still dominant in the Gharb (ABH Sebou 2006). deregulation. The contemporary Moroccan state is Since these tasks will not be carried out by either the

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ORMVAG or the Basin Agency, the government has the creation of AUEAs was supposed to facilitate ac- launched a programme of improvement of large irri- cess to water rights by using collective withdrawals. gation schemes with the aim of guiding a transfer of But although farmers are formally entitled to occu- responsibilities from the state to the farmers, in line py small landholdings, the reality is a very low ef- with the international principles of public–private­ fective occupation. In November 2007, according to participation (El Hammouni, interview 2007). an ORMVAG officer responsible for the agricultur- Under the programme, farmers who are not al- al extension in Souk el Arbaa, only 20 per cent of the ready members of cooperatives, producers’ con- holdings were effectively occupied. This low and sortia or large companies have to form new water scattered presence does not allow the present farm- associations (Associations d’usagers de l’eau agri- ers to work in a group and reach the minimum re- cole, AUEAs). AUEAs should, theoretically, deal quirements to be entitled to the new irrigators. The with a number of technical and economic manage- weak implementation of this programme indicates ment tasks relating to the public schemes. However, the difficulties in working with specific technical in reality, although 48 associations have been creat- and budget interventions that are not supported by ed in the Gharb region, their practical influence in coherent policies and in close relation with farmers’ the organization and distribution of water is irrel- needs. evant (Belghiti 2005). The failure is widely recog- The other relevant change introduced by the nized and it was also admitted by two ORMVAG government was the new pricing system, justi- officers interviewed in 2007. Various reasons ex- fied as an economic incentive in the water alloca- plain the poor effectiveness of the AUEAs: financial tion decision made by producers (Tenneson and constraints, as they have not received the public sup- Rojat 2003). Already proposed by the Agricultural port from ORMVAG that was originally foreseen; Investment Code of 1969, the water tariffs were in- lack of capacity, as their constitution was not sup- itially aimed to cover equipment and maintenance ported by adequate training given to the farmers tak- costs. However, despite the law, ORMVAG kept the ing on new functions; and lack of acceptance at the pricing low to encourage farmers’ participation in grassroots level, as their creation responds to top– the large irrigation schemes. From the 1990s, this down decisions and is not based on preliminary di- policy has changed, and the previous low tariffs alogue with the stakeholders. Ranvoisy (2001) also are now criticized for having caused waste of water mentioned the lack of freedom within the AUEA ad- and for having impeded substantial fee collection, ministrations, which should include ORMVAG rep- thus making ORMVAG dependent on the state’s, resentatives on their boards. decreasing co-financing (Ait Kadi 2002; Frenken To stimulate the application of modern irrigation 2005). tools, a national programme for promotion of local- However, the cost recovery problem cannot be ized irrigation was also launched in 2002. It pro- solved by increasing the water fees. The farmers’ ca- posed subsidies and technical advice to equip new pacity to pay is very low, and this new policy has surfaces and reconvert existing irrigation systems already widened the group of non-paying users, par- (El Hasnaoui et al. 2005). The government provided ticularly in a general situation of decreasing agricul- incentives covering 30–40 per cent of the installa- tural revenues. Paradoxically, the areas where the tion costs and the enhancement of regional exten- water-saving systems have been applied are those sion services (Royaume du Maroc 2006). However, where farmers are facing greater difficulties. The their application has been low. On the one hand, application of sprinklers has in fact increased the large farmers have shown minimal interest in this equipment costs, and made the irrigation scheme programme, as they prefer to continue pumping wa- dependent on expensive energy sources to run the ter freely and directly from the river or the ground- tools. According to the chief of the network of Souk water. On the other hand, most farmers cannot afford el Arbaa, interviewed on 21 November 2007: the remaining costs, particularly in situations of ex- treme fragmentation of the land tenure. In fact, small The cost of water for cubic metre is higher where farmers have the greatest difficulties in accessing sprinklers are used, than in the areas where the new irrigation facilities because they are authorized gravitational systems are still in use: respective- to use water from private machines only, provided ly, 0.52 dirham and 0.30 dirham per m3. When that they use a minimum of 420 hours of irrigation farmers do not work on their fields, they still per year (Boulassel et al. 2001). Even in this case, have to pay the minimum amount of 3000 m3. In

280 © The author 2012 Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography MEGA-IRRIGATION AND NEOLIBERALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL STATES

these conditions, farmers do not accept the bill- consistent with the scale of the issue. In line with in- ing system. ORMVAG officers have reported ternational advice given by UN agencies and bilat- many insolvency cases, with farmers indebted eral donors, to build consensus among the parties, for more than 10 years. The collection of fee is a the government has undertaken a National Water critical and conflicting issue, and has brought to Dialogue since 2006. This programme is organized acts of sabotage on irrigation tools. in focus groups, facilitated by external consultants, to discuss a revision of the tariff system, to encour- Another cause of uncertainty in the farming reve- age the farmers’ compliance and to get their coopera- nues is the decreased power of the Gharb products tion. The programme is enforced by foreign support. in the international markets. The Gharb scheme has For example, in the rural area of Mnasra, local stake- always been particularly focused on cash crops. holder groups have been activated by the interna- Towards this aim, during the previous phase, tional MedWet programme Dialogue on Water in the ORMVAG had allowed farmers to get connected Middle East and North African Region with fund- to the irrigation network, provided that they devot- ing from German development cooperation agen- ed the main share of their fields to some crops of cies. The absence of a government institution in the interest for the scheme. Contracts were then estab- coordination of the meetings is well appreciated by lished between farmers and local agro-industries, the international donors, for they see the presence of for the cultivation of sugarcane, sugar beet and rice. external consultants as neutral and environmental- The available water was then also used by the farm- ly friendly in the discussion forum. However, in this ers to cultivate some other crops, mainly for food. proposed decision-making process, there are factors ORMVAG also supported the industrial productions of ineffective governance for at least three main rea- with subsidies. But once ORMVAG’s role sudden- sons. First, public institutions, like the rural com- ly declined, since the 1990s, subsidized economies munes, play a minor role and are positioned at the were not allowed anymore, and local industries had same level as any other stakeholder, in spite of their difficulties in maintaining their contracts with the delegation. A second weakness derives from a pro- producers. cess relying on outsiders acting as experts in water During the current decade, other factors inter- saving and pricing, rather than on farmers’ empow- vened to weaken the agro-industrial economy of the erment, and as facilitators, despite their poor local Gharb. The entry into force of free trade agreements, knowledge, with a clear mission of guiding the de- first among the Arabic Nations (2004) and then be- bate towards a set of pre-determined goals. Finally, tween Morocco and USA (2006), made the national the discussion is kept at the local level, which is not production collapse as a result of the more com- appropriate when dealing with issues related to the petitive goods produced in the other countries. For nationally wide agricultural and economic decline. example, rice produced in the Gharb, which consti- International aid agencies have a responsibility for tutes 95 per cent of the whole national production this, but still continue their programmes in the field, (ABH Sebou 2006), cannot be traded even within so far with poor practical results, while the central the country, since the demand can be met by cheap- governmental institutions appear distracted – or per- er Egyptian rice. As a consequence, the main sug- haps disillusioned. ar refineries and rice treatment plants of the Gharb are now closed, causing an interruption of the sup- ply contracts with the farmers, and therefore, the end Conclusions of a secure system of water access for them. Also This article has discussed the interaction between for cereals, water tariffs have made local crops more water infrastructure and territorial power in post- expensive than imported products. This economic colonial states and particularly in Morocco. It has unsustainable loop has thus caused various dysfunc- investigated the shift from mega-engineered devel- tions in the irrigation system: it has induced increas- opmentalism towards neoliberal policies. It aims ing abandonment of the fields by farmers, which is to complement critical studies on neoliberal envi- then reflected in a progressive lack of care and main- ronments, by focusing in particular on the manip- tenance of entire sections of the irrigation network ulation, dispossession and commodification of (Kharbouchi 2005). water and land resources in irrigated agriculture in So far, no solutions are emerging for this prob- Morocco. These emerging rationalities are closely lem. The responses are weak and do not seem related to the changing policies of the contemporary

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Moroccan state that have embraced some well es- inclusion as a local labour force in the big project tablished ideas promoted by international donor had been quite passive, the current crisis has induced agencies and bilateral donors. abandonment of the fields and migration flows to- In particular, the analysis has been grounded wards more dynamic agricultural enterprises out- on the Gharb Plain’s case study. Two distinct eco- side the irrigation scheme, to the urban centres or, nomic and political phases have been recognized: more recently, to foreign countries. first, the massive public involvement in the national Significant change has been witnessed in the economy by instalment of mega-structures, as a way past two decades, connected to the neoliberal pol- to consolidate and modernize the new independent icies, and expressed by three main factors: first, a state; and a subsequent neoliberal phase, in which general economic disengagement of the state from the state still keeps normative control, but is induced the agricultural sector, either as a provider of wa- to abandon the control of economic sectors to the ter and other basic services, or as a supporter of benefit of new international actors. A returning for- farmers through subsidies; second, the signature of eign presence seems to be producing a new form of free trade agreements that has left producers in di- corporate colonialism in the Gharb. rect competition with stronger international com- This study also brings to light that no serious at- petitors and does not allow the state to intervene to tention is being paid by policy-makers to the fact help them avoid market failure and all related so- that these changes involve the destiny of the major- cial consequences; and third, the introduction of ity of the local population, who are suffering from water demand management policies, through in- current institutional abandonment, territorial deseg- stitutional and legislative reforms, decentralized regation and increased poverty. There is continuous management and ineffective stakeholder partici- friction between the rigid, post-Keynesian spatial pation. It is unrealistic for farmers, having execut- formations created by the postcolonial state through ed ORMVAG’s rules for decades, to suddenly take the Sebou irrigation project and the local territorial- responsibility for the technical management of the ities. This relation has become contradictory to the networks or even make investments to introduce current neoliberal setting of the scheme. new water-saving technologies in their fields. Even Projet Sebou has been maintained as a frame- the decentralized activities of environment monitor- work for regional development for more than four ing and water quality control appear difficult to ap- decades, despite its rigidity and the negative impacts ply. So far, the disempowered ORMVAG is putting it has produced. The projet has been very accurate particular emphasis on the identification of pricing in considering the physical and technical features in methods that could avoid insolvency and the aban- the design of the irrigation scheme, but it has disre- donment of fields. There is currently a programme garded the ethnic, social and the ecosystem values. of focus group meetings in the fields, involving wa- The territorial organization of the local tribes, based ter user associations and agricultural producers, on the douar centrality, has been obliterated, despite called by ORMVAG through the intermediation of deep anthropological research being undertaken by national and international NGOs, in order to build Le Coz (1964) at the beginning of the irrigation pro- a common agreement on tariffs (Chiche, interviews ject. The state did not directly target socio-economic in 2007 and 2008). The role of private associations wealth as the first priority of the plan, since – in line in local development issues is becoming more and with the neo-classical economic principles – this more relevant, but this trend raises issues of demo- would have been driven by macro-economic devel- cratic representation since the strongest groupings opment as a trickle-down effect. act on the basis of particular, rather than common in- I have argued that, despite the massive amount terests (Mosse 2001). of resources spent for the infrastructural develop- There are issues in the Gharb resulting from the ment of the irrigation scheme, poverty remains a impacts produced by the national investment pro- great issue in the region. In this context, the current grammes exclusively focused on the cash crop sec- sale of irrigation supply blocs has made farming in tor, but the official policies underestimate and do the district even more difficult for small landowners. not seem to prioritize them. Political decisions seem At the same time, spatial and environmental chang- to be completely disconnected from the local situ- es have produced a detachment between the local ation. New trade agreements have contributed to populations and the Gharb territory. While their a further weakening of national production, since

282 © The author 2012 Geografiska Annaler: Series B © 2012 Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography MEGA-IRRIGATION AND NEOLIBERALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL STATES importations are more competitive than internal Acknowledgements production. Environmental concerns seem to have I wish to thank the EU–Erasmus Tempus pro- received more consideration in recent trade agree- gramme and the Italian Ministry of Research for ments and market choices, while social problems are funding the research on which this article is based. hardly addressed. Productivity remains the target I wish to thank all colleagues who have support- and not rural poverty. New agricultural programmes ed my fieldwork, particularly Mohamed Berriane of environmental sustainability, including water- and Mohamed Aderghal (University Mohammed V saving practices, are funded by donor agencies, with – Agdal of Rabat) for their hospitality and advice, the aim of enlarging the market opportunities of eco- the class of Moroccan students who participated logical productions. However, only wealthy farm- in the interviews and Anna Brusarosco for sharing ers can benefit from these new projects. Without the first steps of the research work in this region. production support and market access, smallhold- I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers and ings cannot sustain a family living and therefore are the journal’s editor for their comments that helped abandoned. Emigration is the alternative to starva- to strengthen the scientific arguments of this article. tion and lack of a sustainable future on the land. Water-saving and demand management are em- Paola Minoia braced by policy-makers as solutions to the current Department of Geosciences and Geography crisis. However, these solutions are misplaced if University of Helsinki they do not consider the agricultural, environmental PO Box 64 and social restructuring that have reshaped the area. FI-00014 University of Helsinki In light of this, this article has critically scrutinized Finland water demand management policies and three cor- Email: [email protected] related concepts both theoretically and through the Gharb experience: technical modernization, state disengagement and water pricing. The challenges in References applying these soft tools, and their outcomes, have ABH SEBOU (2006): Débat national sur l´eau. Le bassin hy- been explored. draulique du Sebou. Agence du Bassin Hydralique du Sebou, Rabat. More generally, the study has integrated issues ADERGHAL, M. and AGOUMI, M. 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