Analyzing the Indonesian Strategy to Counter the Papuan Insurgency
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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2019-12 WINNING THE PAPUANS’ “HEARTS AND MINDS”: ANALYZING THE INDONESIAN STRATEGY TO COUNTER THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY Ismanto, Tri Yudha Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64190 Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS WINNING THE PAPUANS’ “HEARTS AND MINDS”: ANALYZING THE INDONESIAN STRATEGY TO COUNTER THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY by Tri Yudha Ismanto December 2019 Thesis Advisor: Douglas A. Borer Second Reader: Robert E. Burks Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form Approved OMB REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2019 Master’s thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS WINNING THE PAPUANS’ “HEARTS AND MINDS”: ANALYZING THE INDONESIAN STRATEGY TO COUNTER THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY 6. AUTHOR(S) Tri Yudha Ismanto 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Papuan insurgents, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka, emerged in 1965 to demand independence from Indonesia, and their nationalist movement appears to be growing. This thesis analyzes the Indonesian government’s strategy to determine how it can more effectively counter the insurgents in Papua and West Papua provinces. Autonomy and military operations in those provinces have not stopped the resistance, and the Papuans cite their marginalization and human rights violations by the Indonesian government, persistent poverty, and a disputed history as primary grievances fueling their demands for independence. This thesis uses historical research to describe the root cause of the Papuan nationalist movement and analyzes two relevant case studies, East Timor and Aceh, using McCormick’s diamond model, along with the counterinsurgency and insurgency theories. To identify the best strategy to counter the Papuan insurgency, three models are applied: the SIR model (to predict the likelihood of the insurgents’ influence spreading), multiple linear regression model (to find the correlation between autonomy and reduced insurgent violence), and game theory model (to provide an explanation for both actors’ strategic moves). The analysis finds that preventive actions, constructive dialogue, increased autonomy, and strengthened diplomacy are needed to address the Papuans’ grievances. Further, it finds special military operations and law enforcement are critical to maintain stability in the region. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF OPM, Papua, TNI, insurgents, COIN, security forces, autonomy, McCormick, GOI PAGES 155 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. WINNING THE PAPUANS’ “HEARTS AND MINDS”: ANALYZING THE INDONESIAN STRATEGY TO COUNTER THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY Tri Yudha Ismanto Lieutenant Colonel, Indonesian Marine Corps S.Tr.Han, Indonesian Naval Academy, 2001 S.E., Krisnadwipayana University, 2014 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS (IRREGULAR WARFARE) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2019 Approved by: Douglas A. Borer Advisor Robert E. Burks Second Reader Kalev I. Sepp Chair, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Papuan insurgents, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka, emerged in 1965 to demand independence from Indonesia, and their nationalist movement appears to be growing. This thesis analyzes the Indonesian government’s strategy to determine how it can more effectively counter the insurgents in Papua and West Papua provinces. Autonomy and military operations in those provinces have not stopped the resistance, and the Papuans cite their marginalization and human rights violations by the Indonesian government, persistent poverty, and a disputed history as primary grievances fueling their demands for independence. This thesis uses historical research to describe the root cause of the Papuan nationalist movement and analyzes two relevant case studies, East Timor and Aceh, using McCormick’s diamond model, along with the counterinsurgency and insurgency theories. To identify the best strategy to counter the Papuan insurgency, three models are applied: the SIR model (to predict the likelihood of the insurgents’ influence spreading), multiple linear regression model (to find the correlation between autonomy and reduced insurgent violence), and game theory model (to provide an explanation for both actors’ strategic moves). The analysis finds that preventive actions, constructive dialogue, increased autonomy, and strengthened diplomacy are needed to address the Papuans’ grievances. Further, it finds special military operations and law enforcement are critical to maintain stability in the region. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................4 B. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................4 1. Theories ...........................................................................................6 2. Analysis Tools ...............................................................................11 C. METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................14 D. CHAPTER OUTLINE.............................................................................16 II. EXAMINING THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE CONFLICT ............................19 A. WHAT IS OPM? ......................................................................................21 B. WHY DID PAPUA MATTER FOR SOEKARNO AND THE NETHERLANDS? ...................................................................................24 C. DISPUTED HISTORY ............................................................................31 1. Road to Integration ......................................................................32 2. The Disputed Act of Free Choice ................................................35 D. NATIONALISM IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND GRIEVANCES .........................................................................................37 III. COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL AND THE LESSONS LEARNED: THE FAILURE AND THE SUCCESS OF THE INDONESIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY ......................................................41 A. EXPLAINING THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL.................42 1. The Four Main Elements.............................................................42 2. The Five Strategies for Both the CF and the IF ........................45 3. Feedback .......................................................................................47 B. LESSON FROM THE FAILURE OF THE INDONESIAN COIN STRATEGIES IN EAST TIMOR ...............................................48 C. LESSON FROM THE SUCCESS OF THE INDONESIAN COIN STRATEGIES IN ACEH.............................................................52 1. Phase I: A Weak Rebellion (1976–1979) ....................................54 2. Phase II: The DOM / Military Operation Area Period (1989–1991) ...................................................................................55 3. Phase III: The Fall of Soeharto (1998–2003) .............................56 4. Phase IV: Emergency Status/Martial Law and the Peace Agreement (2003–2005) ...............................................................58 D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................60 vii IV. ANALYTICAL APPROACHES ........................................................................61 A. FORECASTING THE SPREAD OF THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY WITH THE SIR MODEL ...........................................62 1. The Model .....................................................................................63