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2019-12 WINNING THE PAPUANS’ “HEARTS AND MINDS”: ANALYZING THE INDONESIAN STRATEGY TO COUNTER THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY

Ismanto, Tri Yudha

Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64190

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

WINNING THE PAPUANS’ “HEARTS AND MINDS”: ANALYZING THE INDONESIAN STRATEGY TO COUNTER THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY

by

Tri Yudha Ismanto

December 2019

Thesis Advisor: Douglas A. Borer Second Reader: Robert E. Burks Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form Approved OMB REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2019 Master’s thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS WINNING THE PAPUANS’ “HEARTS AND MINDS”: ANALYZING THE INDONESIAN STRATEGY TO COUNTER THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY 6. AUTHOR(S) Tri Yudha Ismanto 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Papuan insurgents, the Organisasi Merdeka, emerged in 1965 to demand independence from , and their nationalist movement appears to be growing. This thesis analyzes the Indonesian government’s strategy to determine how it can more effectively counter the insurgents in Papua and West Papua provinces. Autonomy and military operations in those provinces have not stopped the resistance, and the Papuans cite their marginalization and human rights violations by the Indonesian government, persistent poverty, and a disputed history as primary grievances fueling their demands for independence. This thesis uses historical research to describe the root cause of the Papuan nationalist movement and analyzes two relevant case studies, East and Aceh, using McCormick’s diamond model, along with the counterinsurgency and insurgency theories. To identify the best strategy to counter the Papuan insurgency, three models are applied: the SIR model (to predict the likelihood of the insurgents’ influence spreading), multiple linear regression model (to find the correlation between autonomy and reduced insurgent violence), and game theory model (to provide an explanation for both actors’ strategic moves). The analysis finds that preventive actions, constructive dialogue, increased autonomy, and strengthened diplomacy are needed to address the Papuans’ grievances. Further, it finds special military operations and law enforcement are critical to maintain stability in the region.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF OPM, Papua, TNI, insurgents, COIN, security forces, autonomy, McCormick, GOI PAGES 155 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

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ii Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

WINNING THE PAPUANS’ “HEARTS AND MINDS”: ANALYZING THE INDONESIAN STRATEGY TO COUNTER THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY

Tri Yudha Ismanto Lieutenant Colonel, Indonesian Marine Corps S.Tr.Han, Indonesian , 2001 S.E., Krisnadwipayana University, 2014

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS (IRREGULAR WARFARE)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2019

Approved by: Douglas A. Borer Advisor

Robert E. Burks Second Reader

Kalev I. Sepp Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

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iv ABSTRACT

Papuan insurgents, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka, emerged in 1965 to demand independence from Indonesia, and their nationalist movement appears to be growing. This thesis analyzes the Indonesian government’s strategy to determine how it can more effectively counter the insurgents in Papua and West Papua provinces. Autonomy and military operations in those provinces have not stopped the resistance, and the Papuans cite their marginalization and human rights violations by the Indonesian government, persistent poverty, and a disputed history as primary grievances fueling their demands for independence. This thesis uses historical research to describe the root cause of the Papuan nationalist movement and analyzes two relevant case studies, and Aceh, using McCormick’s diamond model, along with the counterinsurgency and insurgency theories. To identify the best strategy to counter the Papuan insurgency, three models are applied: the SIR model (to predict the likelihood of the insurgents’ influence spreading), multiple linear regression model (to find the correlation between autonomy and reduced insurgent violence), and game theory model (to provide an explanation for both actors’ strategic moves). The analysis finds that preventive actions, constructive dialogue, increased autonomy, and strengthened diplomacy are needed to address the Papuans’ grievances. Further, it finds special military operations and law enforcement are critical to maintain stability in the region.

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vi TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION...... 1 A. RESEARCH QUESTION ...... 4 B. LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 4 1. Theories ...... 6 2. Analysis Tools ...... 11 C. METHODOLOGY ...... 14 D. CHAPTER OUTLINE...... 16

II. EXAMINING THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE CONFLICT ...... 19 A. WHAT IS OPM? ...... 21 B. WHY DID PAPUA MATTER FOR SOEKARNO AND THE ? ...... 24 C. DISPUTED HISTORY ...... 31 1. Road to Integration ...... 32 2. The Disputed Act of Free Choice ...... 35 D. NATIONALISM IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND GRIEVANCES ...... 37

III. COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL AND THE LESSONS LEARNED: THE FAILURE AND THE SUCCESS OF THE INDONESIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY ...... 41 A. EXPLAINING THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL...... 42 1. The Four Main Elements...... 42 2. The Five Strategies for Both the CF and the IF ...... 45 3. Feedback ...... 47 B. LESSON FROM THE FAILURE OF THE INDONESIAN COIN STRATEGIES IN EAST TIMOR ...... 48 C. LESSON FROM THE SUCCESS OF THE INDONESIAN COIN STRATEGIES IN ACEH...... 52 1. Phase I: A Weak Rebellion (1976–1979) ...... 54 2. Phase II: The DOM / Military Operation Area Period (1989–1991) ...... 55 3. Phase III: The Fall of Soeharto (1998–2003) ...... 56 4. Phase IV: Emergency Status/Martial Law and the Peace Agreement (2003–2005) ...... 58 D. CONCLUSION ...... 60

vii IV. ANALYTICAL APPROACHES ...... 61 A. FORECASTING THE SPREAD OF THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY WITH THE SIR MODEL ...... 62 1. The Model ...... 63 2. The Course of Action ...... 66 3. COA Analysis ...... 71 B. REGRESSION ANALYSIS ...... 73 1. The Facts and Assumptions ...... 74 2. Simple Linear Regression...... 75 3. Multiple Linear Regression ...... 81 4. Conclusion ...... 92 C. GAME THEORY ANALYSIS...... 94 1. The Game ...... 95 2. Strategic Moves ...... 98 3. Analysis of Strategic Moves ...... 98 4. Threat ...... 99 5. Promises ...... 99 6. Prudential Strategy ...... 99 7. Interval Scaling ...... 102 8. The Game with Cardinal Utilities ...... 104 9. Incentive or Negotiation ...... 106

V. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION ...... 109 A. RECOMMENDATION ...... 109 1. Prevention ...... 112 2. Increase and Optimization Autonomy with a Clear Platform ...... 114 3. Constructive Dialogue—Negotiation ...... 118 4. Strengthening Diplomacy ...... 119 5. Special Operation to Support Law Enforcement ...... 120 B. CONCLUSION ...... 122

LIST OF REFERENCES ...... 125

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...... 133

viii LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Methodology ...... 14

Figure 2. Political Map of Indonesia ...... 20

Figure 3. and Sultanates Map, 1885 ...... 26

Figure 4. The Island of Divided into Three Parts, 1885 ...... 29

Figure 5. McCormick’s Diamond Model of Counterinsurgency ...... 41

Figure 6. Map of East Timor ...... 50

Figure 7. Map of Aceh Province ...... 53

Figure 8. Three Methods of Analysis ...... 62

Figure 9. The SIR Model ...... 63

Figure 10. The Papuans Infected by OPM’s Influence ...... 65

Figure 11. The Infected Papuan Population and the Recovery Rate after Vaccination ...... 67

Figure 12. The Uninfected Papuan Population after Vaccination ...... 68

Figure 13. The Infected Papuan Population after Quarantine ...... 69

Figure 14. The Uninfected Papuan Population after Quarantine ...... 69

Figure 15. The Infected and Killed Insurgents after Eradication of OPM Influence ...... 70

Figure 16. The Uninfected Papuan Population after Eradication of OPM Influence ...... 71

Figure 17. The Life Expectancy Rate of Papuans vs. Number of Incidents of Insurgent Violence ...... 76

Figure 18. The Education—High School Graduation Rate of Papuans vs. Number of Violent Incidents ...... 77

Figure 19. The Unemployment Rate for Papuans vs. Number of Violent Incidents ...... 78

ix Figure 20. The Monthly Expenditure per Capita of Papuans vs. Number of Violent Incidents ...... 79

Figure 21. The Poverty Rate of Papuans vs. Number of Violent Incidents ...... 80

Figure 22. The Predicted Plot as the Result of Analysis, with R-square = 0.99 ...... 87

Figure 23. The Interaction between X2 Education and X3 Unemployment against Y Insurgent Violence ...... 89

Figure 24. The Interaction between X2 Education and X4 Monthly Expenditure against Y Insurgent Violence ...... 90

Figure 25. The Interaction between X2 Education and X5 Poverty against Y Insurgent Violence ...... 91

Figure 26. The Interaction between X3 Unemployment and X3 Unemployment against Y Insurgent Violence ...... 92

Figure 27. The Options of Interaction between the GOI and the OPM ...... 95

Figure 28. GOI and OPM Movement Diagram ...... 97

Figure 29. GOI Security Level ...... 100

Figure 30. OPM Security Level ...... 100

Figure 31. GOI’s and OPM’s Security Levels ...... 101

Figure 32. Interval Scaling of Cardinal Utilities for the GOI’s Options ...... 103

Figure 33. Interval Scaling of Cardinal Utilities for the OPM’s Options ...... 103

Figure 34. GOI vs. OPM Movement Diagram ...... 105

Figure 35. The GOI vs. OPM with Cardinal Utility Graph ...... 105

Figure 36. GOI vs. OPM Movement Diagram—After Negotiation...... 107

Figure 37. The GOI vs. OPM Revised Game Chart ...... 108

Figure 38. The McCormick Diamond COIN Model ...... 111

Figure 39. The Flow of the Three Analyses and Recommendations ...... 111

Figure 40. Percentage of Poverty—Papua and West Papua Provinces, 2009– 2018...... 115

x LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Results of COIN Strategies Used in Three Phases of FRETILIN’s Resistance ...... 52

Table 2. Results of COIN Strategies Used in the Four Phases of GAM Resistance ...... 60

Table 3. Dataset for Five Predictor Variables and the Dependent Variable over Ten Years ...... 75

Table 4. The R-square and the p-value of Predictor Variables in Simple Linear Regression ...... 80

Table 5. The Correlation between Y against X1, X2, X3, X4, and X5 ...... 82

Table 6. The Result of Step 1- Multiple Linear Regression, Y vs. X1, X2, X3, X4, X5 ...... 83

Table 7. The Result of Step 2 ...... 83

Table 8. Predictor Variables Having Interactions with One Another ...... 85

Table 9. The Parameter Estimates for the Fit Model ...... 86

Table 10. Options Available to the GOI ...... 96

Table 11. Options Available to the OPM ...... 96

Table 12. Options Available to the GOI with Cardinal Utilities ...... 104

Table 13. Options Available to the OPM with Cardinal Utilities ...... 104

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xii LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFC Act of Free Choice AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ASNLF Aceh National Liberation Front BPS Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of Statistics) CF Counterinsurgency Forces CIMIC Civil Military Cooperation CNRM Conselho Nacional da Resistancia Maubere (National Council of the Maubere Resistance) COA Course of Action COG Center of Gravity COHA Cessation of Hostilities COIN Counterinsurgency DEI DMP Dewan Musyawarah Papua (Papuan Consultative Council) DOM Daerah Operasi Militer (Military Operation Area) FORERI Forum for Reconciliation in Irian Jaya FRETILIN Frente Revolucionaria de Timore-Leste (The Revolutionary for an Independent East Timor) GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Aceh Free Movement) GOI Government of Indonesia IDR Indonesian Rupiah IF Insurgent Forces INP Indonesian National Police KIP Kartu Indonesia Pintar (Indonesia Smart Card) KIS Kartu Indonesia Sehat (Indonesia Health Card) KKB Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata (Armed Criminal Group) KKS Kartu Keluarga Sejahtera (Indonesia Prosperous Family Card) KNPB Komite Nasional Pembebasan Papua (West Papua National Committee) KODAM Komando Daerah Militer (Indonesian Military Regional Command) xiii KTP Kartu Tanda Penduduk (Identification Card) MARVIC Markas Victoria (Base of Victoria) MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly) MSG Melanesian Spearhead Group NGC New Guinea Council NYA New York Agreement NVMS National Violence Monitoring System OPM Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Papuan Free Movement) PEMKA Pembela Kebenaran (Truth Protector) PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) POLDA Kepolisian Daerah (Regional Police) PRM Papua Road Map PVK Papoea Vrijwilligers Korps (Papuan Volunteers Corps) SIR Susceptible, Infected, Recovery SOF Special Operation Forces SQ Status Quo TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces) TPN Tentara Pembebasan Nasional (National Liberation Army) ULMWP United Liberation Movement for West Papua UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNHRO United Nations Human Rights Office UNTEA United Nations Temporary Executive Authority USD US Dollar VC Vaderlandsche Club (Patriotic Club) VOC Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (United East India Company) WPNA West Papua National Authority WPCNL West Papua National Coalition for Liberation

xiv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) or the Free Papua Movement is a Papuan insurgency group who emerged in 1965 from Papuans dissatisfied with the integration of West New Guinea / West Papua into Indonesia. The insurgents demand independence for Papua, and seek to cease being a province of Indonesia. The OPM cites four main grievances behind their struggle: the disputed history of the integration after Dutch ; the Indonesian government’s marginalization of and discrimination against Papuans; the failure of development in fields such as health, education, and economic empowerment; and the Indonesian government’s violation of Papuans’ human rights.1 This group conducted multiple efforts to disrupt the political stability and security within Indonesia. Later, this rebel group evolved into the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), which includes political, religious, and military wings. The ULMWP has used each wing in order to expand its influence among Papuans, and has gained international support for its struggle with various propaganda campaigns that have distorted the image of Papuan conditions.

The Government of Indonesia (GOI) has conducted multiple approaches to resolve this problem since President Soeharto’s administration, which utilized military counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and infrastructure projects. The fall of president Soeharto in 1998, however, marked a milestone for Papuan insurgents and other Papuan nationalist movements, emboldening them to continue their efforts to secede from Indonesia. In 2001, the GOI granted a special autonomy status for the provinces of Papua and West Papua, and left the military approaches behind. The wave of Papuan nationalism and demand for independence has grown more extensive with the increase of popular and international support.

Using qualitative and quantitative methods, this thesis aims to answer the question of what is the best strategy to counter Papuan insurgency. The thesis begins with the

1 Muridan S Widjojo, Adriana Elisabeth Amirudin, Cahyo Pamungkas, and Rosita Dewi, Papua Road Map, Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present and Securing the Future (: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 2008), 2. xv historical approaches to describe the root cause of the conflict, including the road to Papua’s integration with Indonesia. It involves the decolonization of Papua from the Netherlands since the New York agreement between Indonesian and the Netherlands, and the consequences of the Act of Free Choice election. In addition, this thesis uses Gordon McCormick’s COIN model as a method to examine the successes and the failures of the Indonesian military’s COIN strategies in two different cases, East Timor and Aceh, as lessons for the further operation to counter the insurgency in Papua.

Furthermore, this study uses three analytical approaches. First, it uses the Susceptible, Infected, Recovered (SIR) model for forecasting the spread of Papuan insurgent influence on the population. This epidemic model analogizes treating the insurgency in the same way as treating the spread of an epidemic. The model provides three Course of Actions (COA) to counter the spread of the OPM’s influence on the population; namely, vaccination, quarantine, and eradication.

Second, the thesis then uses statistical analysisspecifically, the multiple linear regression modelto analyze and find the correlation between welfare approaches within the special autonomous status of both Papua and the West Papua provinces and the reduction of the insurgent violence. This model discusses the GOI’s welfare approaches to the Papuans as five independent variables, such as life expectancy, education, unemployment, monthly expenditure, and poverty. These variables are analyzed against the dependent variable, the number of incidents of insurgent violence. The result of this analysis provides a model to predict the number of incidents of insurgent violence in both provinces.

Third, this study uses the game theory model in analyzing the possibilities of negotiation with the Papuan insurgents to generate peace in Papua. The model provides a logical explanation of both players’ interactions with one another. Both players have respective options and defend their interests by increasing their security level. This model also demonstrates a strategic interaction and calculates the players’ responses as strategic moves, which includes the risk assessment. By using this model, both players could

xvi minimize their risk on the game and each player’s gain is the other player’s lossa zero- sum game.

In the end, this thesis provides a recommendation for peace in both Papua and the West Papua province. The result of the three analyses, the SIR model, the multiple linear regression model, and the game theory model, provides a plausible strategy to be implemented in Papua and the West Papua province. The recommendations are to prevent violence and the spread of the insurgency, to increase and optimize autonomy, to foster constructive dialogue, to strengthen diplomacy, and to implement special operations necessary to counter the Papuan insurgency and win the Papuans’ hearts and minds.

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xviii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Alhamdulillahi Robbil ‘Alamin, all the praises and thanks be to Allah, the Lord of the ‘Alamin, for his blessing and mercy, I have completed the thesis on time and met all of the requirements to achieve the master of science in defense analysis.

Special thanks to my thesis advisors, Prof. D. A. Borer and Prof. Robert E. Burks, for their extraordinary support and guidance in the process of writing my thesis. Their expertise was important for me as it provided a deep insight with which to build a sharp analysis on the subject of this thesis. Thank you also to Prof. Frank Giordano and Prof. Michelle Isenhour for their expertise in the modeling of conflict and the modeling of special operations, which helped me become a better strategic thinker.

To be at NPS is not as easy as it looks. I needed extra effort to accomplish all the jobs I have done. It was a great honor to be at NPS as it is a remarkable institution, and I was able to meet dedicated professors and faculty in this premier educational and research institution for defense and national security.

Lastly, “behind every successful man is a strong woman.” Thank you to my beloved wife, Indri, and my handsome boy, Nala, for their prayers and support during our stay in Monterey.

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xx I. INTRODUCTION

The reform era in 1998 was considered a milestone in Indonesian history that had a direct impact on Indonesian domestic politics and foreign policymaking. It was marked by the fall of president Soeharto in 1998, and it ended the 32 years of the authoritarian regime. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis that affected the Indonesian economy drove the Indonesian students and people to demand Soeharto resign from the presidency after his re-election as president for the seventh time. Soeharto’s resignation in May 1998 marked a new political era of spirited reform in Indonesia.

Following Soeharto’s resignation, President Baharudin Jusuf Habibie took office and became the third . He had to face many problems left by Soeharto’s administration, including uncertain domestic politics and international pressure. Moreover, disintegration issues emerged during this period, and three Indonesian provinces proposed a referendum to become independent states: East Timor, Aceh, and Papua. Multiple approaches have been conducted by the Indonesian government to defend its sovereignty, such as granting autonomy, carrying out military operations, and implementing infrastructure development in these provinces. Ultimately, however, Indonesia lost East Timor in 1999. This was not only a failure to gain East Timorese’s hearts and minds, but also a failure to secure international support. The Indonesian military’s repressive approaches worsened the situation and attracted international attention. Under the international pressure, president Habibie decided to compromise and gave the East Timorese the opportunity to conduct a referendum. Unlike the situation in East Timor, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) successfully ended the conflict in Aceh in 2005. The end of Aceh conflict was an example of successful strategies conducted by the Indonesian government to keep this westernmost province as an integral part of Indonesia.

What about Papua? It still nurtures the seeds of resistance towards the Indonesian government, which were planted in 1965 when Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) or the Papuan Free Movement Organization was formed. This resistance group, which demanded Papuan independence from Indonesia, cited number of grievances behind their struggle. Among these grievances were the disputed history before and after the Dutch colonization, 1 the integration process, and disappointment over the government’s policies that led to inequality, marginalization, and poverty. Today, these grievances are still the main reasons for their struggle.

In 2001, after considering the total number of the Papuan population, its economic potential, as well as relevant socio-cultural and socio-political factors, the GOI divided Papua province into two provinces, Papua and West Papua. This policy aimed to increase the government’s administration services as well as to ensure the development of the people for the advancement of both provinces, Papua and West Papua.1 The Indonesian government has also conducted strategic approaches, such as giving special autonomy status to both provinces. The autonomous status was expected to have a direct improvement on the welfare of the Papuan people.2 Through granting autonomous status, the GOI expects the Papuan people and its infrastructure to achieve parity in standards when compared with another society in another province. The GOI under president Yudhoyono issued presidential instruction No. 9 of 2017 about the acceleration of welfare development in both Papua and West Papua Province.3

In the security sector, to ensure the security in both provinces, the government has assigned the military and the police as security forces in both provinces. These security forces consist of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) / Indonesian Armed Forces and the Indonesian National Police (INP). The TNI consists of all military branches, the army, the navy, and the air force. Two Komando Daerah Militer (KODAM) / Regional Command structures cover both provinces. The 3rd Fleet and the 3rd Marine Forces are located in the West Papua Province, and are within coverage of the waters and archipelago in the eastern part of Indonesia. The 3rd

1 Laws of the Republic of Indonesia Number 45 of 1999 Concerning the Establishment of Central Irian Jaya Province, West Irian Jaya Province, Paniai Regency, Mimika Regency, Puncak Jaya Regency, and Sorong City (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 1999 Number 173, Supplement to the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3894), http://peraturan.go.id/uu/nomor-45-tahun-1999.html. 2 Laws of the Republic of Indonesia Number 21 of 2001 about Special Autonomy for the Papua Province (2001), https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/44901. 3 President’s Instruction No. 9 of 2017 about the Welfare Accelerated Development in Papua and West Papua Province (2017), https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/77318/inpres-no-9-tahun-2017. 2 National Air Defense situated in West Papua, covers the air zone in the eastern part of Indonesia. The Indonesian National Police assigns two Kepolisian Daerah Republik Indonesia (POLDA) / Indonesian National Police Regional Command units to cover the provinces of Papua and West Papua.

Nevertheless, marginalization, human rights violations, and poverty are still the primary reasons for the increasing influence of Papuan insurgency among the population. The poor level of education among the Papuan population is another factor for why people in Papua were easily influenced by the insurgents and their attempts to generate violence. A number of violent incidents that have occurred in Papua and West Papua were carried out by Papuan insurgents and their sympathizers in the last ten years. These incidents include the killing of 24 workers employed in the Trans-Papua road project in December 2018 which took place in the district of Nduga.4 The Papuan Nationalist Movement, in response to the allegations of racism issued by the Indonesian authority, violently attacked in , leaving a total of seven dead in August 2019,5 and another racial issue led to a massive riot in Wamena with a total of 30 dead in September 2019.6

Consequently, it is time for an effective solution to reduce and eliminate these grievances. Therefore, the Government of Indonesia, especially the office of the Ministry of Defense (MoD), should cooperate with other government components to formulate a strategy to address the Papuan grievances. This thesis aims to analyze the Indonesian Government’s potential strategy to counter the Papuan insurgency. Particularly, it investigates what viable action should be undertaken by the Indonesian Government to reduce the number of insurgents and diminish their influence in the provinces of Papua and the West Papua.

4 Rina Widiastuti, “Berikut Nama 24 Pekerja Jalan Trans Papua Yang Diduga Dibunuh [The Following Are the Names of 24 Trans Papua Road Works Allegedly Killed],” Tempo, December 4, 2018, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1152088/berikut-nama-24-pekerja-jalan-trans-papua-yang-diduga-dibunuh. 5 Ben Doherty, “Up to Seven Dead in West Papua as Protest Turns Violent,” Guardian, August 29, 2019, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/29/west-papua-deaths-as-protest- turns-violent. 6 “Papua Governor Apologizes for Deadly Riots in Wamena,” Jakarta Post, September 30, 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/09/30/papua-governor-apologizes-for-deadly-riots-in- wamena.html. 3 A. RESEARCH QUESTION

What is the best strategy to counter the Papuan insurgents? To answer this question, three analytical approaches are explored.

1. Using the Susceptible, Infected, Recovered (SIR) model to forecast the spread of Papuan insurgency.

2. Finding the correlation between the welfare programs within the special autonomy status granted to both Papua and West Papua provinces and the number of incidents involving insurgent violence in the provinces of Papua and West Papua.

3. Determining possibilities to negotiate with the Papuan insurgents to generate peace in the provinces of Papua and West Papua

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Papua, or West Irian, was transferred from the Netherlands to Indonesia with the New York agreement, signed by Indonesia and the Netherlands on 15 August 1952.7 The United Nations (UN) issued resolution no.175 (XVII) that authorized the UN Secretary- General to form a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in support of the transfer process and maintain the law and order.8 Richard Chauvel argues, “the Netherlands agreed to transfer the administration of Papua to Indonesia, after the brief interposition of a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA).”9 The act of free choice (AFC) has been conducted, and as a result, the representative of the Papuan people preferred to be part of Indonesia.

7 “Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (New York Agreement),” Agreement no. 6311 (New York: United Nations, 1962), https://peacemaker.un.org/indonesianetherlands-westguinea62. 8 “United Nations Security Force in West Guinea,” United Nations, accessed March 1, 2019, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unsfbackgr.html. 9 Richard Chauvel, “Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaption,” Policy Studies, no. 14 (2005), 10. 4 P. J. Drooglever, however, claims that the integration of Papua was not carried out in fairness, and the people of Papua itself were not properly prepared to become part of Indonesia.10 He also expresses doubts about the results of the votes, as the results do not accurately reflect the majority of the population. Although he argues the AFC conducted in 1968 was not representative of the Papuan people as a whole, he supports that Papuan people need a better life, and that they can only depend on themselves to decide their future.

Muridan S. Widjojo argues that four major issues are at the root of the conflict in Papua. First, the GOI has perpetuated the marginalization of and discriminatory policies towards the people of Papua. Second, the failure of government welfare programs to encourage meaningful development in rural areas, particularly in health and education, and the failure to empower the economic strength of the local population. Third, the government must address the disparity between Papua’s historical status and that of Jakarta. Fourth, the issue of state violence and violation of human rights towards the Papuan people must be addressed.11 Specifically, Widjojo claims that these four issues need to be addressed through affirmative action. The actions to be undertaken include the increase of recognition towards the Papuan existence, the institution of a new paradigm of development, dialogue with the Papuan people, and reconciliation.12

Timo Kivimaki posits that to pursue the peace process, the GOI must establish a dialogue with the Papuan insurgents.13 He encourages the use of external actors to initiate this step, and refers to the same peace process that had been used in Aceh. The external actor could mediate the conflict, monitor the situation, and promote a solution.14 Both Widjojo and Kivimaki have agreed that dialogue could be one of the solutions. Widjojo,

10 P. J. Drooglever, An Act of Free Choice: Decolonisation and the Right to Self-Determination in West Papua (Oxford; New York, NY: Oneworld, 2009). 11 Muridan S Widjojo, Adriana Elisabeth Amirudin, Cahyo Pamungkas, and Rosita Dewi, Papua Road Map, Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present and Securing the Future (Jakarta: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 2008), 2. 12 Widjojo et al. 13 Timo Kivimäki, Initiating a Peace Process in Papua: Actors, Issues, Process, and the Role of the International Community (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2006), 1. 14 Kivimäki, 59. 5 however, was more concerned about how the Papuan people felt about the marginalization matter, and how that marginalization makes them feel different from the rest of Indonesia’s citizenry. Therefore, the agenda of recognition, the adoption of a new paradigm of development, and the reconciliation of the populations must run simultaneously.

1. Theories

Various counterinsurgency models and theories exist to give information towards a better option in countering the various groups of people called guerrillas, rebels, terrorists or insurgents. The counterinsurgency (COIN) theory is driven by the need to answer the question of why the insurgents fight against the government. What are their motives? Who is behind them? How can the government fight them? The use of literature in this thesis, a review of relevant literature is used to explore these questions. This review is divided into three different sections, one on the COIN theories, another on theories about insurgents, and the third on analysis tools.

David Galula and Roger Trinquier proposed theories of counterinsurgency, and the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3.24 demonstrates the use of these theories developed by Galula and Trinquier. This study argues that the Indonesian government needs to use these counterinsurgency theories to get a more in-depth understanding of the nature of the insurgents so as to better defend Indonesian sovereignty. There are contrasting theories that also exist, such as Vo Nguyen Giap’s guerrilla warfare theory, Mao Tse Tung’s revolutionary warfare theory, and Che Guevara’s Foco theory, all of which discuss how the insurgents conduct insurgency operations. These weapons of the weak are widely used by many rebel groups who have various motives to commit rebellion against the government, much like the Papuan insurgents.

a. Counterinsurgency Theories

This thesis mainly utilizes McCormick’s counterinsurgency diamond model, which explains the four main elements such as the states, population, insurgents, and the external

6 components.15 Dr. Gordon McCormick briefly examines the model within five lines as options to conduct COIN operations as well as the nature of insurgent operations. This general concept explains that the state and the insurgents are the main actors, and they conduct their own strategy to gain both internal and external support. Meanwhile, the U.S Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3.24 serves as the source of the doctrinal methods used by the U.S. military regarding COIN operations.16 It explains both insurgency and counterinsurgency theories, and describes how the population is the Center of Gravity (COG) in a counterinsurgency operation. In the case of the Papuan insurgency, however, this field manual seems to agree with the position of involving supporting states or other external elements explained by McCormick. Therefore, the U.S Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3.24 has a slightly different concept with regard to the Indonesian doctrine in counterinsurgency. Despite this disagreement, it still has important principles that can be implemented at the tactical level.

While the primary challenge of conventional warfare is massing firepower at the appropriate place and time to destroy the enemy, the key to success in counterinsurgency is massing intelligence derived from the local population to identify the enemy; the counterinsurgent is literally dying for that information.17

Galula and Trinquier were French Army officers, whose COIN theories are referenced in this thesis. They were able to create their theories after their observation of the insurgents’ movements during the wars in Vietnam and Algeria.18 The COIN theories of both Galula and Trinquier were driven by the French defeat by Viet Minh in Din Bien Phu, in Vietnam, in 1954. Both agreed that the main objective of the COIN operation is the

15 Gordon McCormick, McCormick’s Mystic Diamond: A Systems Model of Insurgency, Tribal Analysis Tools, accessed February 15, 2019, http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/ Research%20Tools%2001.html. 16 U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), AppendixA-3. 17 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), ix. 18 Andrew Mumford and Bruno C. Reis, The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare: Warrior- Scholarship in Counter-Insurgency, Studies in Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and National Security (Oxfordshire, UK: Taylor and Francis), 26. 7 population centric. Galula’s and Trinquier’s theories, however, have significant differences, such as their viewpoints, the measures to be taken, and the use of the army.

First, Trinquier and Galula have different viewpoints in examining the counterinsurgency. Trinquier proposes that the legitimate government use its political and military resources to oppress and defeat the insurgents, arguing that the government should overcome the insurgents who only have limited resources.19 On the other hand, Galula thinks about how to overcome the insurgents by “winning the hearts and minds” of the people.20 When people’s basic needs are fulfilled by the government, they will support the COIN theory proposed by Galula.

Second, Trinquier views that the measures to be taken for counterinsurgency, such as the strengthening of resources, include making an early identification of the insurgents. He uses the existing structure of the legitimate government. Thus, it is easier to counter the insurgents. When insurgents threaten security, the only action needed is to restore security. Meanwhile, Galula argues, “there should be a political answer to a political conflict.”21 The measures he offers would destroy the insurgency in two ways, security and politics. In terms of security, he proposes the destruction of insurgents and population control. In terms of politics, he offers to facilitate the new local leaders representing the majority of the population. He thinks that the restoration of a secure state is a precondition for any transformation.

Third, Trinquier believes that the purpose of the army is for homeland defense, and he recommends the authorization of extending the use of military force during the fight against insurgents by any means. Thus, the idea of giving full authority to the military could affect the psychology of the insurgents. On the contrary, Galula thinks that a military is a tool for higher political power. Therefore, he believes that civilian control is necessary to avoid any propaganda from the insurgents.

19 Roger Trinquier, “Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency,” Reference and Research Book News 23, no. 2 (2008): 44. 20 Bertrand Valeyre and Alexandre Guerin, From Trinquier and Galula to Petraeus, The French Legacy in the U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine (Nancy, France: Bialec Printing, 2010), 14. 21 Valeyre, From Trinquier and Galula to Petraeus, 17. 8 Both Trinquier and Galula have created a significant contribution to modern warfare theory and have pioneered useful concepts. Galula’s argument, however, is more acceptable in the contemporary world, and would be more applicable in countering the Papuan insurgency because he was more concerned about the use of the military as a tool under the civilian control.

b. Insurgency Theories

According to Crane Brinton’s The Anatomy of Revolution, revolution is defined as “a drastic, sudden substitution of one group in charge of running a territorial political entity for another group.”22 Thus, related to the term of revolution just described, the situation in China with Mao Tse Tung and that of Cuba with Che Guevara meet the definition defined by Brinton. Post-1945, Mao led the communist party. He fought and achieved glory against the Kuomintang and Japan as the stronger enemy in the revolutionary war. Mao’s basic theory was the use of people who have already been indoctrinated by the revolutionary army to obtain power and support the revolutionary movement called the People’s War. Meanwhile, Che Guevara created the Foco theory that was adapted for the situation and conditions in Cuba and inspired by Mao’s People’s War theory. Guevara’s Foco theory stressed the use of a small group of forces to spark the revolution. Mao and Guevara had similarities in the use of population to gain a victory. Mao and Guevara, however, had disagreements on how to carry out war. At the very least, there are three significant disagreements between Mao and Guevara. These differences are due to the different wars they fought, and how they adapted to the various kinds of environments. The key differences of their theories encompass “the goal, the condition necessary for revolution, and the phases of guerilla war.”23

First, Mao’s goal in the revolutionary war was to remove foreign invaders, achieve national unification, and secure independence. Mao views the use of irregular forces as the

22 Clarence Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1938), 4. 23 Kyle W. Fonay, “On Guerrilla Warfare: Two Takes, Mao vs. Guevara,” Small Wars Journal, accessed February 15, 2019, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/on-guerrilla-warfare-two-takes-mao-vs- guevara. 9 key to success. In contrast, Guevara’s goal was more concerned with the removal of the government system. Guevara argued that he preferred to use a small but regular army to trigger the revolution.

Second, Mao viewed the guerilla war as “the inevitable clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their endurance.”24 This means the people should be ready to respond to the incoming oppression before the guerillas begin. Guevara agreed with the general terms Mao established for the phases of war, but Guevara thought Mao did not put enough detail on the level of advancement from one stage to the next. On the other hand, Guevara argued that “these conditions, very rarely come to exist spontaneously and can instead be created through military action.”25 This revolutionary movement through armed action became the terms of Foco. It directly articulates the ability guerilla forces have to create the necessary conditions where they can fight and spark the revolution.

Third, Mao framed guerilla warfare in three phases. The first phase is the political work necessary to build the conditions at the lowest level that can inspire the people and their awareness. The second phase is to weaken the enemy, and at the same time establish a political base. The third phase involves the mobile warfare that has a specific job to destroy the enemy’s installations, and forces the regime change. The last two phases could exist on different fronts simultaneously. In phase three, Mao listed almost all the needs of supporting components, such as “equipment, training, health and hygiene, political bureaus, and the communication system.”26 On the other hand, Guevara posited that if the guerilla unit “reaches a respectable power, it ought to proceed to the formation of new columns.”27

24 Mao Tse-Tung and General Samuel B. Griffith, Mao Tse-Tung: On Guerrilla Warfare (San Francisco, CA: Hauraki Publishing, 2015), 41. 25 Ernesto Guevara, Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961), 56. 26 Mao and Griffith, 11. 27 Guevara, Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare, 57. 10 Despite the fact that there were differences in Mao’s and Guevara’s theories, both Mao’s and Guevara’s theories are still relevant today. Whether these theories are being used by the insurgents or not, the insurgency theories provide useful guidance for the Indonesian COIN forces to understand the nature of the insurgency and find potential weaknesses.

2. Analysis Tools

“Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model” is an article by H. Richard Yarger reflecting his disagreement with Gregory D. Foster’s opinion that “there is no official or accepted general theory of strategy in the United States.”28 Yarger argues that “Arthur F. Lykke, Jr.’s Army War College strategy model with its ends, ways, and means, is the core of the theory of strategy.”29

According to Yarger, when the term strategy is misapplied, it can cause an inappropriate meaning for strategy as “a plan, concept, course of action, or idea of a direction in which to proceed.”30 Thus, Yarger argues, “in order for the states to pursue survival, economic well-being, and enduring national values, the strategy defined as the way or concept, leadership will use the power or means, and geographic location to achieve the objectives or ends.”31 Moreover, he describes eight premises of a theory of strategy:

First, it is proactive and anticipatory.

Second, the strategist has to know the end-state that must be accomplished.

Third, the strategy must identify an appropriate balance among the objectives sought, the methods to pursue the goals, and the resources available.

28 Harry Richard Yarger, “Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College Strategy Model,” in U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, 3rd ed., vol. I (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 45. 29 Yarger, “Toward a Theory of Strategy,” 43. 30 Yarger, 43. 31 Yarger, 44. 11 Fourth, the political purpose must dominate all strategy.

Fifth, hierarchical. The U.S. Army War College defines the hierarchical levels of strategy: National security strategy, National Military Strategy, and Theater strategy.

Sixth, comprehensive. The strategist must have comprehensive knowledge about the level of potential with fully integrated effort with senior, co-equal and subordinate elements.

Seventh, it should be developed from a thorough analysis and knowledge of the strategic situation.

Eighth, some risk is inherent to all strategy, and the best any strategy can offer is a favorable balance against failure.32

Art Lykke articulates the form of the theory of strategy as the three-legged stool model of strategy that is: ends, ways, and means. If these three are not in balance, however, the stool will be put at higher risk.33 Thus, he proposes the image of a stool to provide a better understanding of a strategist and to communicate that ends (objectives), ways (strategic concept), means (resources), and risk. Also, Lykke’s theory of strategy has made a significant contribution towards future strategic thought. As a result of his lecturing and presentations, Lykke argues, “there was a proactive evaluation of strategy during development against the same standards of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.”34

In his article “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” Ivan Arreguin-Toft provides the idea of strategic interaction theory, which became one of the best predictors of asymmetric conflict. It also provides the fact that weak actors have won asymmetric conflicts increasingly more often since World War II.35 His argument is driven by the situation of the U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the U.S. military has had to engage a weaker, non-state actor with no end in sight. With the same subject discussion, Andrew Mack in his article, “Why the Big Nations Lose Small Wars:

32 Yarger, 43–46. 33 Yarger, 46. 34 Yarger, 48. 35 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International Security 26, no. 1 (2001): 93–128. 12 The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict” provides a pre-theoretical perspective on the outcome of the asymmetric conflicts.36 Arreguin-Toft is in harmony with Andrew Mack when talking about how the strong actor loses because of its political vulnerability.

Nevertheless, Arreguin-Toft explains his strategic interaction by outlining the trend of the strong actors losing asymmetric conflicts with greater frequency over time, and the challenges of other prominent theories to describe the outcomes of an asymmetric conflict. The arguments cover political vulnerability based on the regime type, the length of the conflict, and the interests of opposing actors. The example of Arreguin-Toft’s starting point for his analysis is, the strong actor will conduct an aggressive action like attack, which means direct and barbaric attack. Meanwhile, the weak actor will perform defensive operations, which involve direct defense and guerilla strategy. Thus, to explain his strategic interaction, he uses the game theory model where the winner or the loser of a conflict depends on the military strategy used by both actors.

Arreguin-Toft criticizes Andrew Mack’s asymmetry arguments, as summarized by Michael A. Jensen:

First, Mack argues that power is a poor predictor to resolve, but the conflict that is the nation as a strong actor has a full motivation to win. Second, Mack argues that the wars between the strong and the weak are protracted. Toft believes that sometimes the conflict ends quickly. Third, Mack’s argument on the political vulnerability is a function of interest, and interest is inversely related to power, then strong actors should always be defeated by their weaker adversary.37

After this review of the arguments of both Arreguin-Toft and Mack, Arreguin- Toft’s argument is likely best related to the analysis used to assess the Papuan insurgents, and this will be evaluated through the use of the game theory model. A protracted war is one that any nation seeks to avoid, and the need to find the best option for doing so is imperative.

36 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175–200. doi:10.2307/2009880 37 Michael A. Jensen, “A Strategy for Success: How the Weak Defeat the Strong,” International Studies Review 8, no. 4 (December 2006): 653–55, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2006.00634. 13 C. METHODOLOGY

Both counterinsurgency and insurgency theories acknowledge that securing the trust of the population is a strategic factor to be achieved, and the population becomes the center of gravity to be controlled, as stated earlier in McCormick’s diamond model. This thesis uses qualitative and quantitative methods to answer the research question (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Methodology

This thesis uses historical approaches to describe the nature of the Papuan insurgency and its root cause. Then, using McCormick’s diamond model, it analyzes the two relevant case studies, Aceh and East Timor, as lessons learned. Moreover, within the McCormick diamond model, three analytical approaches are explained. 14 1. Forecasting the spread of Papuan insurgents’ influence, using the SIR model.

2. Finding the correlation between the welfare approaches within the special autonomy status granted to Papua and West Papua provinces and the number of incidents involving insurgent violence in the provinces of Papua and West Papua.

3. Determining possibilities to negotiate with the Papuan insurgents to generate peace in the provinces of Papua and West Papua.

The first analytical approach uses the SIR epidemic model to predict the spread of the OPM’s influence among Papuans. This model actually predicts the spread of the epidemic. The model provides a logical comparison between how the spread of an epidemic can be applied to the diffusion of an insurgency. The insurgency achieves popular support by spreading its influence to the population. Much the same as treating an epidemic, the insurgent group’s influence is assumed as being the dangerous epidemic that can infect the population. This model provides three courses of action (COA) to prevent the spread of the epidemic. Every COA aims to prevent diffusion and they have their own respective negative and positive impacts upon the population.

The second analytical approach uses statistical analysis—the multiple linear regression model. This analysis aims to find the correlation, if any, between the implementation of GOI-sponsored welfare programs in the autonomous provinces and a reduction in the number of violent insurgent incidents. In this model, the correlation between the two is examined, and additional variables tested. The welfare approaches with various indicators, such as life expectancy, monthly expenditure, education, unemployment, and poverty rate, become predictor variables. The dependent variable is the number of incidents of insurgent violence.

The third approach uses the game theory model to find the possibilities for negotiation with the insurgents. This model aims to provide a logical explanation of the decisions both players, the GOI and the OPM, make in defending their interests. This model

15 also demonstrates a strategic interaction and the players’ responses as strategic moves, which includes a risk assessment. Ultimately, it gives a plausible explanation of the assessment and makes recommendations for pursuing peace in the provinces of Papua and West Papua.

D. CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter I—Introduction. This chapter provides an overview of and background to this thesis. It includes the research questions, the literature review, methodology, and the outline of this thesis.

Chapter II—Examining the Root Cause of the Conflict. This chapter explains the history of the integration of Papua as it became one of Indonesia’s provinces. This chapter also describes the decolonization process of Papua and its subsequent transition from the Netherlands to Indonesia. Further, the chapter discusses the origin of the OPM, the emergence of the nationalism identity movement, and the insurgents’ grievances.

Chapter III—COIN Model and the Lessons Learned: The Failure and the Success of the Indonesian COIN. This chapter examines the McCormick diamond model to identify the factors behind the failure in East Timor and the success in Aceh, and the chapter examines this information against both COIN and insurgency theories. These two case studies provide lessons learned that can be applied to Papua.

Chapter IV—Analytical Approaches. This chapter details three analytical approaches: the SIR model, the multiple linear regression model, and the game theory model. The SIR model is for forecasting the spread of OPM’s influence throughout the Papuan population and provides three COAs to prevent the spread. Statistical analysis, explored through the multiple linear regression model, is for finding a correlation between five independent variables and one dependent variable, the number of incidents of insurgent violence. Finally, the game theory model is for determining possibilities to negotiate with the Papuan insurgents to generate peace in Papua. The game theory model provides a logical explanation of both players’ options that safeguard their interests.

16 Chapter V—Recommendation and Conclusion. This chapter discusses the results of the analytical approaches. Then, it harmonizes the results of analytical approaches with the McCormick diamond model, and this yields a developed conclusion.

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18 II. EXAMINING THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE CONFLICT

There was a contention that the West Irianese, or Papuans, were not Indonesians and had no racial or ethnological links with Indonesians. Indonesia, however, was not a racial term, but a national and political one. Indonesia was inhabited by many kinds of ethnic groups with their own dialects and with more or less different customs.38

—Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, Ambassador to the UN, 1954

In this thesis, the term “Papua” means the Indonesian Papua as a whole, which has been divided into two provinces of Indonesia since 2004, Papua and West Papua. In the 15th century, Papua, also known by the Spaniards as Nueva Guinea, became West New Guinea, and during Dutch colonization it was known as the Netherlands’ New Guinea or West Papua. Soekarno, the first President of Indonesia, called this region Irian Barat, or West Irian. The name continued to change over time; Soeharto changed West Irian to Irian Jaya in 1973. In 2000, it became Papua under the presidency.

Papua is located in the easternmost part of Indonesia, and it is adjacent to the country of Papua New Guinea (see Figure 2). It has an area 3.5 times greater than the island, with 421,981 square kilometers of land surrounded by dense forest, mountains, and swamp in the coastal areas.39 In 2018, Papua was populated with a total of 4.2 million inhabitants.40 Today, 22.84% of the population is migrants composed of Asian ethnic groups and 73.57% are native Papuan people who consider themselves as a Melanesian race that can be easy to identify by their appearance.41 The population growth of migrants has been faster than the growth of the native Papuan population. This pattern has generated a situation marked by the domination of migrants in the urban areas, while the native

38 “The Question of West Irian (West Guinea): Report of the 1st Committee,” United Nation General Assembly, Ninth Session, Official Records, November 23, 1954, First Committee, 726th meeting, 389. 39 Rizal, “Sekilas Tentang Provinsi di Papua, [An Overview of the Papua Province],” Ilmu Geografi, March 31, 2018, https://ilmugeografi.com/ilmu-bumi/kepulauan/provinsi-di-papua. 40 Statistic of Papua Province and Statistic of West Papua Province (Strategic Indicator, accessed May 11, 2019), https://papua.bps.go.id/. 41 Aulia Adam, “Memutihkan Orang Papua? [Whiten the Papuans?]” Tirto, December 1, 2017, https://tirto.id/memutihkan-orang-papua-cmPk. 19 Papuan population remains settled in rural areas. Consequently, the native Papuans have felt that they were driven away and have become a minority in their homeland.

Figure 2. Political Map of Indonesia42

The conflict between the OPM and the GOI began during the history of the decolonization of Papua from the Netherlands. The OPM and its sympathizers have argued that the Netherlands granted independence to Papua in December 1961, while the Netherlands was supposed to hand over all of its colonies to Indonesia in 1949 as a result of the Round Table Conference (RTC). The OPM also opposed the result of the New York agreement. Chauvel argues, “Nicholas Jouwe, the OPM leader, wrote to President Kennedy to express Papuans’ opposition to the New York Agreement, not only because Papuans were excluded from the negotiations, but also, but also because Indonesia had shown that it was ignoring its international obligations.”43 Furthermore, the OPM has maintained that

42 Source: Taryono Pelabuhan Canggu, “Mengenal 34 Gambar Peta Provinsi Di Indonesia [Getting to Know 34 Images of the Province Map in Indonesia],” Seni Budaya (blog), June 8, 2017, https://senibudaya12.blogspot.com/2017/06/mengenal-34-gambar-peta-provinsi-di.html. 43 Chauvel, “Constructing Papuan Nationalism,” 33. 20 the Act of Free Choice (AFC) did not represent all of the Papuan people. In contrast, the Indonesian government claimed that the decolonization of Papua from the Netherlands was legal through the New York Agreement. Also, during the integration process, the AFC was under the supervision of the United Nations (UN).

To examine the root cause of the conflict, this chapter explains what the OPM is, and addresses two questions. First, what factors made both Soekarno and the Netherlands think that Papua was important? Second, what was the disputed history between the GOI and the OPM? To answer the first question, the role of the Tidore Sultanate’s political and economic control over Papua is explained. President Soekarno argued that Papua was under the Tidore Sultanate’s control, and he was intended to end the Netherlands’ colonization and unify all of Dutch East Indies (DEI) as part of Indonesia.44 Yet, the Netherlands refused to hand over West Guinea to Indonesia after the RTC in 1949 due to the influence of internal factors. To answer the second question, this chapter examines the disputed history, which covers the integration process since the RTC; the disputed date of independence of the West Papua state on December 1, 1961; the New York Agreement (NYA); and the disputed results of the AFC. Finally, the chapter explains the emergence of the Papuan nationalist identity, and the grievances that drive it towards a bigger movement today.

A. WHAT IS OPM?

OPM is the resistance movement against the Indonesian government that emerged in 1965 in response to the integration of Papua by the Indonesian government. Since the withdrawal of the UNTEA in 1963, the Papuans began social and political life under the West Irian of Indonesia. On July 26, 1965, a guerrilla group calling themselves OPM emerged having been founded by an Arfak leader named Johan Ariks, who was a former member of the New Guinea Council (NGC), as a reaction to the unsatisfactory result of the

44 Kathryn Pentecost, “A Brief History of the Dutch East Indies – Part 1,” The Indo Project, December 2, 2013, https://theindoproject.org/a-brief-history-of-the-dutch-east-indies-part-1/. 21 NYA.45 The OPM influence spread fast in the area of Manokwari, and it was supported by other former NGC members and the Papoea Vrijwilligers Korps (PVK), or the Papuan Volunteers Corps, who were trained by the Netherlands to fight against the Indonesian military. The birth of the OPM was marked by the first attack on the TNI barracks in Manokwari, where three members were killed on 28 July 1965.46 The attack was triggered by the TNI’s arrests of PVK members who refused to demobilize.

Bobby Anderson argues, “the OPM never acted as a parallel state. And while the OPM was initially a political wing, with the Tentara Pembebasan Nasional (TPN) designed only as one of the OPM’s armed wings, the TPN emerged as the more active group.”47 The OPM became the pioneer of the pro-independence movement, yet there were several other pro-independence organizations emerging with the same goals. The ethnic diversity, rural terrain, and class differences made it difficult for them to communicate, and they lacked a unified command structure as a consequence. Because of their division into several factions, they tended to compete with one another. The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) report argues, “there is no single armed front that reports to a political wing nor any shared strategy. On pro-independence websites and in comments to the press, members present the familiar image of a guerrilla army, with a supreme commander presiding over regional commands that span the provinces of Papua and West Papua.”48 With their similar grievances, however, their sense of differentness from other Indonesians increased in response to incidents of racial abuse, such as the latest

45 David Webster, “‘Already Sovereign as a People’: A Foundational Moment in West Papuan Nationalism,” Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia 74, no. 4 (Winter 2001–2002): 518, https://doi.org/10.2307/3557804. 46 George Junus Aditjondro, “Sejarah OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) [The History of OPM (Papua Free Movement Organization],” Goresan Jiwa anak Kampung Wilayah Perbatasan (blog), December 2, 2016, https://thopilusaisnak.wordpress.com/2016/12/02/sejarah-opm-organisasi-papua-merdeka/. 47 Bobby Anderson, “Papua’s Insecurity: State Failure in the Indonesian Periphery,” Policy Studies, no. 73 (2015): 36. 48 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, The Current Status of the Papuan Pro-Independence Movement. IPAC Report no. 21 (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2015), 2, http://www.understandingconflict.org/en/conflict/read/43/The-Current-Status-of-the-Papuan-Pro- Independence-Movement. 22 incident related with the racial abuse of Papuans in Malang, August 2019.49 This incident unified Papuans, and massive protests have occurred in major cities throughout the Papua and West Papua provinces, including in Jakarta.

Although there is no evidence that the OPM is one entity, it is believed these Papuan insurgents are divided into three elements, the armed group, the political wing, and the diaspora. The armed group is called the TPN, or National Liberation Army, and it formed as the military wing. They mainly operate in rural areas, and lack weapons, training, and personnel. Also, they do not have a single command structure. The TPN is divided into three armed groups based on the territory that they occupy; the TPN MARVIC (Markas Victoria) who operate in the north; the TPN PEMKA (Pembela Kebenaran), or Defenders of Truth, who operate mainly in the highland of Puncak Jaya, Tingginambut, and Paniai; and the TPN PEMKA who operate in the Jayawijaya mountains, as well as across the border in Papua New Guinea.

The political wing and diaspora consist of three coalitions: the West Papua National Committee (KNPB), the West Papua National Authority (WPNA), and the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL).50 Chauvel argues, “the dynamic of the political effort began after the fall of President Soeharto in 1998 with the FORERI (Forum for Reconciliation in Irian Jaya) that [was] intended to develop a political program and reinterpreted the history of Papua’s integration into Indonesia.”51 The KNPB’s political tactics adopted the East Timor case. They are now provoking the security forces to violate the human rights of Papuans in order to attract international attention. Moreover, the political wing keeps spreading their influence among the population, and they particularly operate within schools and universities.

49 Seto Wardhana, “Protests against Racial Abuse of Papuans Kick off in Jakarta,” Jakarta Post, August 22, 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/08/22/protests-against-racial-abuse-of- papuans-kick-off-in-jakarta.html. 50 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Current Status of the Papuan Pro-Independence Movement,” 2. 51 Chauvel, 10. 23 The diaspora wing is mainly the exiled OPM that struggles abroad like Benny Wenda, who claimed himself as the leader of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP). The ULMWP formed in 2014 to voice their struggle abroad. There were several attempts to bring their case to the UN. In January 2019, Wenda attached himself as one of the Vanuatu government’s delegation and presented a petition (he claimed that 1.8 million Papuans signed the petition calling for a referendum) to the UN Human Rights Office (UNHRO), which was not on the UNHRO’s agenda.52 The ULMWP was also involved as an observer in the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), an organization of Melanesian countries includes Solomon islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and Papua New Guinea. Despite its status as an observer, the ULMWP was recognized as the representative of the Papuan people. Thus, the infiltration of Benny Wenda into Vanuatu’s delegation and the ULMWP involvement in the MSG indicated that the OPM’s struggle was supported by foreign countries.53

Although the establishment of the ULMWP provided new energy for the movement, the three elements do not have a clear platform, and they fail to have a shared strategy between factions and elements. These conditions weakened their movement capacity, slowing down their speed for further struggle. In addition, the political wing does not have the capacity to put the military wing, the TPN, into a state of direct subordination.

B. WHY DID PAPUA MATTER FOR SOEKARNO AND THE NETHERLANDS?

The reason that Soekarno intended to liberate West Papua from the Netherlands emanated from the history of the Islamic kingdom, the in the Moluccas, which controlled most of Papua. Soekarno appointed Zainal Abidin Syah as the first governor of West Irian in 1956, and Zainal also served as the of Tidore in 1947– 1967. In the 15th century, four sultanates called the Moluku Kie Raha became the pillars of political and economic power in the region, the Sultanate of Tidore, the Sultanate of

52 Stephen Wright, “Papuans Get Independence Petition to UN despite Obstacles,” Associated Press News, January 30, 2019, https://apnews.com/2c648a8e04a34c4b9f6c0a6e2d42e2ea. 53 Wright. 24 Ternate, the Sultanate of Jailolo, and the Sultanate of Bacan.54 Titik Pudjiastuti argues that those four rulers were siblings and the descendants of Jafar Shidiq, a Javanese Islamic scholar who married a Ternate princess.55 Only two kingdoms, however, were greatly developed in terms of political, economic, and military powers in the region, the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore. Drooglever argues that the , which covered the area of the western and southern parts of the Moluccas, reached the and the Greater Sunda Islands, while the Sultanate of Tidore covered the eastern part of Moluccas as far as the western part of New Guinea (see Figure 3).

54 Titik Pudjiastuti, “Moloku Kie Raha Community and Their Old Manuscript Heritage,” IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science Sci. 175 012059 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1088/ 1755-1315/175/1/012059. 55 Pudjiastuti. 25 Figure 3. Ternate and Tidore Sultanates Map, 188556

Tidores’ interest in Papua was not only political control, but also in the context of spreading the Islamic religion and culture, and expanding the trade network.57 The Sultanate of Tidore led the Uli-Shiva, or the federation of nine alliances, as a trade partner to dominate the trade route and expanded its influence over the region of , the

56 Source: Elisee Reclus and A. H. Keane, Empires of Ternate and Tidor, Antique wood-engraved map, 1:20,000,000 (London: J.S. Virtue & Co, 1885), https://www.antiquemapsandprints.com/ternate-and- tidore-sultanatesempires-indonesia-east-indies-1885-old-map-267739-p.asp. 57 Wuri Handoko and Syahruddin Mansyur, “Kesultanan Tidore: Bukti Arkeologi Sebagai Pusat Kekuasaan dan Pengaruhnya di Wilayah Periferi [The Sultanate of Tidore: Evidence of Archeology as the Center of Islamic Power and Its Influence in the Region],” Berkala Arkeologi 38, no. 1 (June 29, 2018): 17–38, https://doi.org/10.30883/jba.v38i1.246. 26 Seram islands, Myakyan, Buru island, Jailalo, and the Aru islands, until they reached west of Papua.58 Thomas Walker Arnold posits that the Islamic kingdom of Tidore ruled the mainland and islands of today’s West Papua province since the , and that it inherited the area that was under the conquered Sultanate of Bacan, such as Waigeo, Missol, Waigama, and Salawati.59

The Moluccas region, where the Sultanate of Tidore was located, was widely known as the premier spice producer in international trade. Spices in the Moluccas fetched a reasonable price in Europe, and the spices became one of Europe’s favorite commodities. In the 15th century, many Europeans came to the Moluccas, such as the Portuguese and the Spanish, and they formed trade and political agreements with both the Ternate and Tidore sultanates. The trade and political agreements, however, brought with them occupation by the Portuguese and Spanish.

Kings represented the Sultanate of Tidore’s administrative official in Papua. The first king who had direct contact with the Sultanate of Tidore was King Gurabesi, the king of Raja Ampat. In 1534, King Gurabesi supported the Tidore sultanate in the fight against the Portuguese occupation, and forced the Portuguese to withdraw from Tidore by deploying a large fleet of kora-koras in the .60 The Gurabesi support to the Sultanate of Tidore was an indication of the relationship between the sultan of Tidore and the Papuan kings had been established many centuries ago. The sultan assigned his officials the title of King, Kimelaha, or Mayor of the entire area of Raja Ampat on the west coast and north of Papua to the bay of Geelving. They were required to collect taxes to be paid to the Sultanate of Tidore.

In 1667, Saifudin, the Sultan of Tidore, concluded a different agreement with the Dutch official, Admiral Speelman of the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) or

58 Irsyad Hidayat, “History of the Kingdom of Tidore Ternate With Its Heritage,” Steemit, January 2, 2018, https://steemit.com/history/@irsyadhidayat/history-of-the-kingdom-of-tidore-ternate-with-its- heritage-78a8594066ace. 59 Thomas Walker Arnold, The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith (London: Constable, 1913), 387. 60 Drooglever, An Act of Free Choice, 23. 27 United East India Company (VOC).61 The contents of the agreement were that the VOC recognized the rights and sovereignty of the Sultanate of Tidore over the territory of Papua. As for the Netherlands, they were given the monopoly rights to the in the Sultanate of Tidore’s territory. Despite the fact that the relationship between Tidore and the Papuan people was recognized by the Dutch, the Dutch impoverished Tidore and weakened its control over its periphery.62

Soekarno argued that the 141st meridian line drawn by the Netherlands in 1828 was evidence of Papua being under the control of the Sultanate of Tidore. The Netherlands established this line as the eastern frontier of the territory, which allowed the Sultanate of Tidore’s territory to cover all areas in between the 141st meridian in the south and Cape Bondpland (Tandjung Djar), east of Humboldt Bay (Teluk Yos Sudarso), in the north.63 The Netherlands’ reason for drawing a straight line and dividing the New Guinea islands was that it was concerned about the U.K. and the German occupation east of New Guinea Island. The Netherlands wanted to make sure that the U.K. and Germany would not move the border to the west while both countries annexed the east of New Guinea in 1884. The U.K. declared the southern coast and the Germans annexed the northern coast of New Guinea. In April 1885, as the result of the London agreement, the island of New Guinea was divided into three parts (see Figure 4).

61 Sagimun Mulus Dumadi, Benteng Ujung Pandang (Jakarta, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1992), 109. 62 “Indonesia History - Sultanate of Tidore (1450-1904),” Global Security, accessed October 6, 2019, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/history-sultanate-tidore.htm. 63 The U.S. Department of State, International Boundary Study- Indonesia – Papua New Guinea Boundary, No. 160 (Washington, DC: Office of the Geographer Bureau of Intelligence and Research, February 7, 1977), https://fall.fsulawrc.com/collection/LimitsinSeas/IBS160.pdf. 28 Figure 4. The Island of New Guinea Divided into Three Parts, 188564

A B C

Note: A identifies the Dutch possessions; B, the German possessions; and C, the British possessions.

In 1898, Papua divided into two administrative regions under the Ternate sultanate. One was located in the northern part of the island parallel with Germany’s East Guinea with Manokwari as its capital, and the other one was located in the southern part of the island, including the Onin Peninsula and Raja Ampat group of islands with Fak-Fak as the capital.65 Therefore, the administrative offices in Fak-fak and Manokwari were evidence that Papua was under the control of the Tidore sultanate.

64 Source: “Map of New Guinea 1906, German New Guinea (or Kaiser Wilhelm’s Land) Shown in Green, in Red, Dutch in Brown.,” The British Empire, accessed June 14, 2019, https://www.britishempire.co.uk/images2/newguineamap1906large.jpg. 65 Drooglever, An Act of Free Choice, 32. 29 While Soekarno desired to end the Netherlands’ colonization and refused to allow West New Guinea to become the Netherlands’ puppet country, the Netherlands positioned West New Guinea as an important region for their future settlement. After the RTC, the Netherlands acknowledged Indonesia as a sovereign country without the region of West New Guinea. Soekarno demanded the Netherlands surrender its entire colony under the DEI, including West New Guinea, to be transferred to Indonesia as a sovereign country. Against this backdrop, the question then becomes, why was Papua important for the Netherlands? It was because of the economic necessity and the uncertainty factor of other DEI colonies, which had many nationalist movements.

The economic factor was one of the reasons why the Netherlands refused to hand over Papua to Indonesia. The Netherlands was inspired by Australia, which had been successfully occupied and settled by European immigrants while the indigenous Aboriginal people were still living under a tribal concept and had no knowledge of colonialism. As a result of World War I, although the Netherlands was not a major military actor in the war, the nation experienced the impact of the war in Europe, which caused massive destruction and generated an economic crisis in the Netherlands. Thus, in the 1920s, there was an idea among Dutch politicians to start a new life far from the war-ravaged Europe.66 The condition of Australia when the Europeans first arrived on that continent was not so different from the condition of Papua when the Dutch came to this island. In 1936, Jean Jacques Dozy, a Dutch researcher, discovered a large amount of gold and copper deposits at Ertsberg, Dom, and Grasberg, which could increase the Netherlands’ economy following World War I.67 Therefore, the condition of West New Guinea was that it had a vast fertile area and an abundance of natural resources, and it was inhabited by uneducated indigenous people who knew nothing about nationalism. This made the idea colonizing of West Guinea promising for the Dutch people. According to Christian Lamber Maria Penders:

66 Christian Lambert Maria Penders, The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945–1962 (Manoa, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 407. 67 Michael Thomsen, “Notes from Meetings with Jacques Dozy by Michael Thomsen Describing the Initial 1936 Discovery of the Ertsberg, Dom and Grasberg Outcropping Copper Deposits, Irian Jaya, Indonesia,” October 2015, https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.4666.4407. 30 If Java, Sumatra, etc., should be severed from the Netherlands within the foreseeable futurewhich God forbid!then that does not need to be the case for West New Guinea. New Guinea does not belong to the Indies Archipelago either geographically or geologically. The human, the animal, and the plant of New Guinea also have a strong Australian character. One might very well refer to New Guinea as “Netherlands Australia”… Neither the Javanese, the Acehnese, nor the inhabitants of Palembang have any right to this “empty” country. The Dutch were the first to occupy it, and have the right to use it for the population surplus of the Netherlands.68

The second reason the Netherlands refused to relinquish Papua was that they realized the uncertain future of other areas of its DEI. The emergence of the nationalist movement that recognized the colonial oppression in the DEI occurred in the areas of Java, Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes in the 1920s. The only region that did not have a nationalist movement against the Dutch was in West New Guinea. Therefore, the Netherlands preferred West New Guinea for the next settlement rather than other islands of the DEI. Meanwhile, the Vaderlandsche Club (VC), the Dutch conservative organization, emphasized that the highlands of Papua were suitable for settlement by Dutch farmers.69 The Netherlands also argued that Papua did not have any relation with Indonesia as the native Papuan people were ethnically and culturally different from many other Indonesians.

C. DISPUTED HISTORY

Two disputed histories have helped the OPM legitimize their resistance to the GOI. First, the OPM and its sympathizers have argued that December 1 marks the day Papua was granted independence by the Netherlands in 1961. It became one of their reasons for demanding independence from Indonesia.70 In contrast, David Webster argues that indeed the West Papua flag was hoisted for the first time on December 1, 1961, but it was hoisted side by side with the flag of the Netherlands, and the absence of Papuan people during the NYA in 1962 indicated the state of Papua did not exist.71 Second, the OPM argued that

68 Penders, The West New Guinea Debacle, 57. 69 Penders, 57. 70 Webster, “Already Sovereign as a People,” 507. 71 Webster, 507. 31 the self-determination process was throughout an unfair process because the AFC only involved the selected representatives of the Papuan people. Meanwhile, the GOI argued that the AFC was a fair process throughout because it was monitored by UN representatives. It was legalized by UN resolution 2504 on November 19, 1969. With that said, most of the Papuan representatives preferred to be part of Indonesia.

1. Road to Integration

Directly conflicting viewpoints were maintained, however, between the parties as to whether the transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia should also include the Residency of New Guinea.72

After the RTC in 1949, the Netherlands had prepared further steps to retain Papua and prevent it from becoming part of Indonesia. They provided significant investment in infrastructure, education, and health in Papua. The Nieuw Guniea Raad or New Guinea Council (NGC) formed in February 1961 aimed to derail the West New Guinea integration with Indonesia.73 The NGC, led by J. H. F. Sollewijn Gelpke, had 28 members who were Papuans still loyal to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.74 They were people who had privileges in the Dutch colonial period. This method, the formation of the NGC, was also used by the Netherlands from 1945 to 1949 in forming states to divide the Indonesian people. Furthermore, the Netherlands and its NGC provided the supporting attributes such as an anthem and flag for West Papua.75

The RTC results concluded the point that the Netherlands must transfer all of its colonies of the DEI to the Republic of Indonesia and recognize Indonesia as an independent and sovereign state. The RTC was held in Den Haag from August 23 to November 2, 1949,

72 United Nations Security Council, Special Report to the Security Council on the Round Table Conference, Report no. S/1417 (New York: United Nations, November 10, 1949), 17, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/472484. 73 “Pelurusan Sejarah 1 Desember 1961, Bukan Sebuah Kemerdekaan Papua [History Straightening December 1, 1961, Not an Independence of Papua],” West Papua Info (blog), March 30, 2010, https://westpapuainfo.wordpress.com/2010/03/30/pelurusan-sejarah-1-desember-1961-bukan-sebuah- kemerdekaan-papua/. 74 “Report Anthony van Kampen 1: Installation of the New Guinea Council,” Stichting Papua Cultureel Erfgoed (PACE)(blog), accessed July 1, 2019, https://www.papuaerfgoed.org/en/fi/1200/88. 75 Chauvel, “Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaption,” 9. 32 to resolve the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands and to reach an agreement for full transfer of authority to the Republic of Indonesia. Although the Netherlands tended to refrain from discussing the issue of Papua during the conference, the premier of Indonesia, Mohammad Hatta, successfully led the Indonesian delegation to achieve an agreement of recognition of Indonesia’s sovereignty and successfully conveyed the issue of Papua in the RTC. The RTC result concluded that the dispute over Papua was to be settled in one year.76 The issue of Papua, however, was not settled within a year. The Netherlands violated the agreement by refusing to hand over Papua to Indonesia and claimed the territory as theirs without further negotiation with Indonesia. Thus, Indonesia, as a member of the UN, submitted a resolution concerning the dispute to the UN, which questioned the status of Papua in 1954.

On November 23, 1954, the GOI successfully brought the New Guinea case to the UN General Assembly’s ninth session and was supported by the Soviet Union, as well as some of the Asian and African countries.77 Indonesia, however, failed to get the majority vote because most of Western countries were still on the side of the Netherlands. In 1955, the Asian African Conference supported the Indonesian position over Papua and asked the UN to resolve the dispute peacefully.78 At the same time, Indonesia strengthened its economic and military diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union. Indonesia received military equipment and arms support from the Soviet Union.79 Although the dispute over Papua was already under discussion in the UN General Assembly, there was no UN resolution concerning the dispute until 1961.

76 United Nations Security Council, Special Report to the Security Council on the Round Table Conference, 24. 77 Colin Brown, “Indonesia’s West Irian Case in the UN General Assembly, 1954,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 7, no. 2 (1976): 265. 78 “List of Multilateral Cooperation - United Nations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, April 8, 2019, https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/134/halaman_list_lainnya/united-nations-un. 79 Larisa M Efimova, “Soviet Policy in Indonesia during the ‘Liberal Democracy’ Period, 1950– 1959,” The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) e-Dossier No. 26, November 8, 2011, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/soviet-policy-indonesia-during-the-liberal-democracy-period- 1950-1959. 33 On 1 December 1961, the NGC was inaugurated and the Papua flag, the morning star, was raised. It was hoisted beside the flag of the Netherlands. The OPM argued that by hoisting the flag and singing the anthem, Papua could be recognized as a state, while there was no recognition from the UN and other countries. Chauvel argues, “the Dutch had recognized the flag’s (morning star flag) intended symbolism and confirmed its status by means of Netherlands New Guinea.”80 Nevertheless, there was no proclamation of independence on that day. Thus, the claim of 1 December 1969 as the independence day of Papua had no legal basis and was rejected by the GOI.

Due to the deadlock and the Netherlands’ unlawful attitude, Indonesia responded with a declaration of Trikora or the People’s Three Commands on 19 December 1961, calling for “preventing the establishment of the puppet state of Papua, raising the red and white flag in West Irian, and preparing general mobilization to defend the independence and integrity of Indonesia.”81 Thus, with the support of the Soviet Union, the military campaign “Mandala” launched and was intended to expel the Netherlands’ forces from West Irian. Indonesia’s close ties with the Soviet Union and other communist countries made the United States and other Western countries decide to support Indonesia in the Papua case. The United States’ concern about Indonesia was that it would fall under the communist bloc, while at the same time the United States was busy combating communism in Vietnam.82 As a diplomatic approach, President Soekarno met President Kennedy and pursued the United States’ support. The United States’ pressure was effective in causing the Netherlands to accept the NYA.

On 15 August 1962, both Indonesia and the Netherlands signed the NYA no. 6311. Chauvel observes, during the agreement, “both the Indonesians and the Dutch appointed Papuans to their respective delegation,”83 meaning, there was no reason that the Papuans were not involved in the negotiation between the GOI and the Dutch. This agreement was

80 Chauvel, “Constructing Papuan Nationalism,” 19. 81 Budi Hernawan, Torture and Peacebuilding in Indonesia: The Case of Papua (New York: Routledge, 2018), 54. 82 Hernawan, 54. 83 Chauvel, “Constructing Papuan Nationalism,” 29. 34 supported by many UN members, such as the United States, the U.K., and Australia. This agreement required the Netherlands to transfer the authority of Papua to the UNTEA and required a referendum or self-determination for the West Irian people no later than the end of 1969.84 The UNTEA ran the administration of Papua until 1 May 1 1963, and transferred the authority and responsibility of Papua to the GOI. West Guinea was renamed as West Irian and the GOI appointed E. J. Bonay, a native Papuan, to be the first governor of West Irian in recognition of his work in integrating West Irian into Indonesia.85

By 1965, the GOI had to face the internal and external political problems. The Indonesian withdrawal from the UN and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) coup attempt decreased Soekarno’s legitimacy and led to the change of Indonesian leadership. In 1967, Soeharto came to power and his regime, called the “new order,” was supported with military domination in all sectors. Soeharto preferred a military approach to stabilize the country, including the communists and the OPM. On the international stage, Soeharto’s approach was opposite to Soekarno’s. Soeharto resumed Indonesia’s membership in the UN and abided by the NYA in implementing the AFC.86 Further, Soeharto successfully crushed the PKI, and at the same time, he also restored international relations and achieved support from Western countries. Thus, Soeharto’s policy in West Irian was supported by Western countries.

2. The Disputed Act of Free Choice

It should also be borne in mind that the General Assembly Resolution of UN 1514 (1960) concerning the right to decolonization does not mandate the application of a “one person one vote” system as the only way to process decolonization.87

84 John Saltford, “United Nations Involvement with the Act of Self-Determination in West Irian (Indonesian West New Guinea) 1968 to 1969,” Cornell University Press; Southeast Asia Program Publications at Cornell University, no. 69 (April 2000): 74. 85 Chauvel, “Constructing Papuan Nationalism,” 34. 86 John Saltford, The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962–1969: The Anatomy of Betrayal (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003), 223. 87 Andri Hadi, “Papuans Need Democracy Not Separatism,” The Jakarta Post, July 30, 2004, https://westpapuareview.wordpress.com/tag/separatism/. 35 To abide by the NYA, the GOI organized the AFC from July 14 to August 2, 1969, under the supervision of the UN. The purpose of the AFC, as mentioned in the NYA article VIII, is “formulation of the question in such a way as to permit the inhabitants to decide whether they wish to remain with Indonesia or whether they wish to sever their ties with Indonesia.”88 The AFC was monitored by the UN and international journalists. The UN- appointed monitoring team was led by Ortiz Sanz, a Bolivian diplomat who was tasked to assist, advise, and participate in the AFC. The UN team arrived in August 1968 during the most severe of Indonesian domestic, economic, and political conditions. Thus, the GOI proposed the representative voting system as described in the NYA, due to challenges posed by geography, multiple languages among tribes, transportation, and illiteracy.

The OPM and pro-nationalists of Papua argued that the AFC excluded most Papuans and the representatives who voted were under various forms of intimidation and Indonesian military pressure. Also, the mechanism of voting was determined by representatives of groups with no direct “one man one vote” system, which meant this vote was through an unfair process. In contrast, Andri Hadi notes that the UN Resolution 1514 (1960) did not mention a “one man one vote” system as a decolonization process, and points to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, wherein the incorporation of Sabah and Sarawak did not apply the “one man one vote” system.89

In fact, article VIII did include a provision for “consultation (musyawarah) with the representative councils on procedures and appropriate methods to be followed for ascertaining the freely expressed will of the population.”90 Thus, the Dewan Musyawarah Papua (DMP) or the AFC Deliberation Council was formed in eight districts as a preparation for the AFC. Each DMP consisted of regional representatives selected by the

88 “Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (New York Agreement),” No. 6311, United Nations, August 15, 1962, 282. 89 Hadi, “Papuans Need Democracy Not Separatism.” 90 “Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (New York Agreement).” 36 people, by community organizations, and traditional elements of tribal leaders, with a total 1,062 people.91 Hence, there was no violation done by the GOI in the AFC process.

As Papua is inhabited by various tribes, Hadi posits that the application of the “one man one vote” system may even provoke unnecessary conflicts among tribes.92 Also, the role of the TNI during the AFC was to secure the voting process and protect all of the voters. Cahyo Pamungkas observes that each of the DMP members was escorted by one TNI member in civilian clothes. The purpose of the escort was to secure the DMP members from any intervention by anyone.93 Furthermore, despite the fact that the AFC was disputed, the AFC was concluded with UN Resolution 2504 on November 19, 1969. It was accepted by 84 countries and rejected by 30 countries, which means that the majority recognized the result of the act.94

D. NATIONALISM IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND GRIEVANCES

The pro-nationalist movement today is growing even more prominent than it was in the 2000 Papuan spring. It is indicated by a high number of violent incidents that have occurred recently. Any small issue, as long it is related to racism, could spark unrest in the region, as Widjojo mentioned in his Papuan Road Map (PRM). As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the conflict in Papua is rooted in four major issues. One of the major issues was just discussed, the disputed history. The other three are the marginalization of Papuans, the government’s failure to empower the Papuan people economically, and the violation of Papuans’ human rights. Chauvel, on the other hand, argues that besides the historical grievances, political and economic factors were crucial in defining the rest of the grievances.95

91 Cahyo Pamungkas, “Sejarah Lisan Integrasi Papua ke Indonesia: Pengalaman Orang Kaimana pada Masa Trikora dan Pepera [The Oral History of Integration of Papua into Indonesia: The Experience of the Kaimana People in the Period of the Trikora and the Act of Free Choice],” Pusat Penelitian Sumberdaya Regional, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, March 2015, 102, DOI: 10.15294/paramita.v25i1.342. 92 Hadi, “Papuans Need Democracy Not Separatism.” 93 Pamungkas, “Sejarah Lisan Integrasi Papua ke Indonesia: Pengalaman Orang Kaimana pada Masa Trikora dan Pepera,” 102. 94 Pamungkas, 102. 95 Chauvel, “Constructing Papuan Nationalism,” 16. 37 The pan-Papuans’ identity is driven by their unique culture and racial appearance. Chauvel asserts that “Papuans considered themselves as Melanesian, while Indonesia was racially Malay.”96 The Melanesian race can be seen in their appearance, notably their dark skin and curly hair which differentiates them from other Indonesians, although many and Timorese have similar characteristics to Papuans. Another significant element that distinguishes them from other Indonesians is Papuan customary law, which existed long before colonization. Chauvel observes that “Papuans did not share istiadat (customary law) nor had the pre-colonial experience of kingdoms and sultanate with Indonesians.”97 Furthermore, Christianity became a core element in Papuan identity compared to the majority of Indonesians who are Muslim. Within Christianity, the churches became key institutions in everyday Papuan life, although the local government already provides any institution that the people need.98

The Dutch and Indonesian rule shaped the pan-Papuan identity. The Papuans felt that under the Dutch administration, Indonesians only held middle and lower-ranking positions in the administration, while the Dutch officials held the most senior positions. Meanwhile, since Indonesia took control, Indonesia put the locals (Papuans) in the middle and lower-ranking positions, which created an intense rivalry between Papuans and Indonesian officials.99 With autonomous status, however, the local government of Papua and West Papua has broader authority in internal politics. For instance, the chief of districts must be a Papuan elected through an official election process. Thus, increased Papuan authority in politics and government will reduce the sense of marginalization.

Addressing another grievance, the GOI’s transmigration program aims for the equitable economic development in Papua. Unfortunately, the transmigration led to demographic transformation, which posed a severe problem linked to the economic grievance. Walker Connor argues, though, “Economic deprivation is not a necessary

96 Chauvel, 16. 97 Chauvel, 16. 98 Richard Chauvel, Papuan Nationalism: Christianity and Ethnicity (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 206. 99 Chauvel, “Constructing Papuan Nationalism,” 16. 38 precondition for ethnonational tensions. Economic differentials are but one of several possible catalysts. A mass influx of outsiders into an ethnic homeland, for example, is a far more potent one.”100 Thus, when migrants began to dominate the economy, the indigenous people felt marginalized and were made to feel like foreigners in their own land. Anderson notes “the indigenous Papuan also had difficulty competing against migrants for jobs or business opportunities that led to discrimination.”101 Furthermore, the impoverished condition of indigenous people contrasted greatly depending on the resources available in their own land, such as the Grassberg gold mountain.

As mentioned previously, Papuans have experienced discrimination and racism from Indonesian government officials and institutions. Chauvel explains, “Papuans were treated by Indonesian teachers as dumb and unable to speak Indonesian well, and also Papuans were kept in the lower positions by Indonesian officials and were regarded as incapable of anything better.”102 In one recent example of such racism, Papuan students were called “monkey [s]” by one of the Indonesian authorities.103 This incident of racism sparked massive unrest in almost every big city in Papua and other provinces.

Over time, Papuans’ most remembered grievances have centered on human rights violations. Notably, the Indonesian military has violated human rights while conducting an operation against the OPM, such as the murder of the Theys Hiyo Eluay, the Papuan Presidium leader, in November 2001. Nevertheless, the TNI members who committed the violations were not held accountable and went unpunished, which generated the view that a sense of impunity exists within the TNI. This uncertain condition of justice has fueled Papuans’ distrust of the GOI and its ability or willingness to bring the perpetrators of violence to justice. Eventually, those grievances become weapons for the OPM and other pro-independence organizations to influence the Papuans and to gain international attention.

100 Walker Connor, From a Theory of Relative Economic Deprivation towards a Theory of Relative Political Deprivation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 121. 101 Anderson, “Papua’s Insecurity: State Failure in the Indonesian Periphery,” 40. 102 Chauvel, “Constructing Papuan Nationalism,” 45. 103 Wardhana, “Protests against Racial Abuse of Papuans Kick off in Jakarta.” 39 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

40 III. COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL AND THE LESSONS LEARNED: THE FAILURE AND THE SUCCESS OF THE INDONESIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY

COIN involves all political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic action that can be taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.104

Dr. Gordon McCormick’s diamond model of counterinsurgency is used in this thesis as a tool to assess the failure and the success of the Indonesian COIN strategies in the past, such as the ones applied in East Timor and Aceh. Also, in the Papua case, the model is essential in analyzing the Indonesian strategy to counter the OPM (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. McCormick’s Diamond Model of Counterinsurgency105

104 Department of the Army, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FMI 3–24.2 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2009), 1–2, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-24-2.pdf. 105 Source: Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special Warfare 18, no. 2 (September 1, 2005): 6. 41 A. EXPLAINING THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL

The diamond model provides a symmetric shape between the state and the insurgent forces (IF) along with their contrasting interests and strategies to achieve their respective objectives. In this case, the state is represented by COIN forces (CF). The model provides five strategies for both the CF and the IF; the strategies would determine the success or the failure of each force.

The model consists of four main elements: the state/CF, IF, population, and the external sponsor/international community. The population and the external sponsor are essential factors and are contested by both actors, the CF and the IF, to achieve their respective goals. Also, the CF and IF need feedback from both the population and the international community to assess the strengths and the weaknesses of each actor’s strategies.

1. The Four Main Elements

The diamond shape model indicates four main elements in every corner that have interactions with one another, which the top and the bottom elements are contested by the left and right elements, the CF and the IF.

a. The State/Counterinsurgency Forces (CF)

The state is the legitimate government that encompasses the elements of the CF, such as the political, diplomatic, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic action.106 The CF aims to defend the sovereignty of the state, including its territorial integrity, and support the legitimacy of the government. The advantage of the CF is that it could utilize as many resources as the state has, and the CF’s security, the military, and the police apparatus have already been established.107 The disadvantages of the CF are that the CF is identifiable by its infrastructure, uniform, and vehicles. By contrast, the CF needs

106 Department of the Army, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 1-2. 107 Michael Freeman and Hy Rothstein, Gangs and Guerrillas: Ideas from Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism, Report number NPS-06-FY2011-001 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 15, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/50084. 42 intelligence information to be able to identify the IF, which can blend in with the local population, and presumably, most IF members have a kinship within the population.

Government legitimacy becomes essential to gain popular support. The CF must able to win the population’s hearts and minds with pro-people approaches that fulfill the people’s needs. The CF also must use its resources to disrupt the insurgents’ influence on the people by campaigning successfully in the disputed area. Further, the CF, with its diplomatic elements, must secure the CF’s interests in the disputed region by building and strengthening the international relationship with many countries.

b. The Insurgent Forces

The IF consists of an organized movement or group of people who struggle within a state against the legitimate government.108 The nature of the IF’s objective could be to overthrow, replace, or separate the region from the unitary state to achieve the group’s political goals.109 The IF not only actively engages in armed fighting but also appeals to or attempts to influence such elements as the media, the government opposition, the scholars, and the diaspora. The advantage of the IF is that it has a strong relationship with the population, such as kinship and blood ties. Also, the IF members are typically locals and know better than the CF about the terrain. The IF traditionally claims that its fight is in the name of the people. Thus, because they share a similar ethnicity and ideology, the population could be a sanctuary for the IF. Besides the population, the IF exploits its diaspora to expand and maintain international support. Members of the related diaspora often struggle in their foreign states as well and typically have similar grievances and suffer from the same conditions as those in their home country. In this way, their movement extends its campaign abroad. The disadvantage of the IF is that it has limited resources. Faced with this limitation, the IF inevitably must use guerrilla tactics, and sometimes violence, to achieve its goals. Yet, the IF’s violent action could diminish international support and popular sympathy at home for the insurgent movement.

108 Department of the Army, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 1-1. 109 Department of the Army, 1-1. 43 c. The Population

The population is the people who live in the affected state and who are considered as a non-combatant in the conflict area. The population is contested between the CF and the IF. In tactical terms, the population is meant as a COG for both the CF and the IF. The people most likely want a good and prosperous life and a secure environment to guarantee their safety in their daily activities. For instance, in 1999, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), or Aceh Free Movement, collected a pajak nangroe or unofficial levy and taxes from the Acehnese people by coercion in order to support the GAM’s struggle.110 Unlike official taxes, however, these were only for the group’s benefit, not for the people’s welfare. The GAM’s actions were opposed by the Acehnese people and caused a reduction in popular support for the insurgents. Eventually, the GAM was no longer supported by the majority of the Acehnese. Therefore, whoever gets the population’s support, either the CF or the IF, will most likely win the necessary political support and achieve their goals.

d. The External Sponsor/International Community

Both the CF and the IF need the support of the international community to achieve their respective goals. The international community could be a state, an international organization, or any group that represents a certain kind of community who have a direct and indirect relation to both the CF and the IF. For example, one of the supporting factors behind East Timor’s independence from Indonesian was the role of Jose Ramos Horta, a 1996 Nobel Prize winner, and Mari Alkatiri in the international community. Ramos Horta’s first struggle was in Angola and Mozambique in 1980, both of which had experienced colonization.111 Later, Ramos-Horta’s struggle finally reached the UN and Australia, which supported the independence of East Timor. Mari Alkatiri’s successful international campaign enabled the establishment of the Frente Revolucionaria de Timore-Leste (FRETILIN) or the Revolutionary for an Independent East Timor political party’s external

110 Craig Thorburn, “Building Blocks and Stumbling Blocks: Peacebuilding in Aceh, 2005–2009,” Indonesia, no. 93 (2012): 117. 111 Geoffrey C. Gunn, Timor Loro Sae: 500 Years (Macau: Livros do Oriente, 1999), 5. 44 office in Maputo, Mozambique.112 The struggle of Ramos Horta and Alkatiri further discussed in detail later in this chapter. Thus, as with the population, the external sponsor/ international community has a significant role in supporting both the CF and the IF to achieve their respective goals.

2. The Five Strategies for Both the CF and the IF

The model provides five strategies for both the CF and the IF, which the strategies indicated by the arrows towards the population and external support elements and/or towards actor’s strategies.

a. Strategy 1: Acquiring the Population’s Support

Both the CF and the IF require popular support to achieve their goals. Yet only one of these two actors will ultimately gain that support, making this a zero-sum game. In short, one side’s loss is a win for the other.113 The CF’s advantage of having more resources could help it gain popular support by fulfilling the people’s needs. In doing so, the CF could enhance government legitimacy and gain control over the population. Conversely, if the CF fails to fulfill the people’s needs, the people could turn their support to the insurgents. Despite the CF’s abundant resources, it needs popular support to get information about the IF. In contrast, the IF with its limited resources also needs popular support. The IF with its “fight for the people” slogan wants to gain the people’s support to acquire resources, such as logistics and personnel. Hence, with popular support, the IF can grow its political power to achieve its goals.

b. Strategy 2: Disrupt the Opponent’s Support in the Population

Strategy 2 is the continuation of Strategy 1. The success of Strategy 1 has an implication for both the CF’s and the IF’s execution of Strategy 2. With Strategy 2, as a result of the strong relationship with the people, the CF could disrupt and degrade the IF’s

112 Antje Missbach, Separatist Conflict in Indonesia: The Long-Distance Politics of the Acehnese Diaspora (Florence, MA: Routledge, 2017), 226. 113 Freeman and Rothstein, “Gangs and Guerrillas,” 17. 45 influence in the population and gather information about the IF’s infrastructure.114 The CF’s main objective in Strategy 2 is to separate the people from the IF and isolate the IF. Once the IF’s infrastructure is revealed by intelligence collection, the CF can trace the IF’s base, leadership, and its resources network. In contrast, if the IF gains control of the population, the IF could disrupt the CF’s influence on the population and enable the IF to achieve a stronger influence on the people. Using its close relationship with the population, the IF could grow its forces and decrease the government’s legitimacy.

c. Strategy 3: Attack the Opponents

Strategy 3 is the continuation of both Strategy 1 and Strategy 2. The intelligence collection in Strategy 2 enriches the CF’s knowledge about the IF’s strategic position and leadership. Thus, direct action is the next strategy to be implemented with sufficient information for both the CF and the IF. The CF, with its large number of forces, tends to exercise the aggressive attack straight to the enemy’s vital objective and leadership. The IF, however, could easily identify this action unless the CF uses covert and special ops tactics that could be more silent during the attack phase. In contrast, the IF with its limited resources tends to exercise defensive action to survive. As the weak actor, the IF most likely uses guerrilla warfare to conduct the attack, which does not intend to achieve a quick and decisive win. Arreguin-Toft explains, “if guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws.”115

d. Strategy 4: Disrupt the Opponent’s External Support

Strategy 4 aims to disrupt both actors on the international stage. As the strong actor, the CF has diplomatic tools that can be used to disrupt the IF’s external support with counter-propaganda and taking action in an international organization like the UN. The CF’s legitimacy can become an indicator of whether a state is strong or weak in the international sphere. Meanwhile, the IF relies on the diaspora and countries sharing the

114 Freeman and Rothstein, 17. 115 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 104. 46 same fate and vision. For example, the OPM is supported by the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. In 2018, both the president of the Solomon Islands, Manasseh Sogavare, and Vanuatu’s prime minister, Charlot Salvai, voiced the issue of Papua in the United Nations.116 Thus, the CF should take diplomatic action to counter the argument of those OPM supporters. The IF’s strategy is not only to secure their own international relationships but to disrupt the CF’s international relationships, by exploiting the diaspora and ethnic similarities with groups in foreign states. Moreover, to conduct a rebellion, the IF needs weapons, supplies, and external financial aid, the flow of which the CF can directly disrupt.117

e. Strategy 5: Gain External Support

Strategy 5 is related to Strategy 4 with the focus on the external environment. Whichever actor gains strong support from the international community is most likely able to disrupt the opponent’s external support. State legitimation on the international stage becomes a decisive factor that could place the CF in a stronger position than the IF. For example, in the Aceh case, after 30 years of conflict, both the GOI and the GAM signed a peace agreement in late 2005. Although many factors contribute to the peace process, one of the significant factors driving this peace agreement was the strong legitimation of the GOI and support for the GOI in the peace process. The IF, however, will employ its campaign highlighting human rights violations, marginalization, and inequity to get international attention. Thus, as seen in the East Timor case discussed later in this chapter, when the IF gains international attention, the CF receives international pressure that favors the IF’s demands.

3. Feedback

To achieve goals, both actors must consider the feedback from the population and the international community. Feedback is crucial for both actors to evaluate the success

116 “Indonesia Hits out at Vanuatu at the UN over West Papua,” Radio New Zealand, October 1, 2018, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/programmes/datelinepacific/audio/2018664896/indonesia-hits- out-at-vanuatu-at-the-un-over-west-papua. 117 Freeman and Rothstein, “Gangs and Guerrillas,” 18. 47 and the failure of accomplished strategies. An actor who tends to disregard feedback would most likely fail to achieve its goals. For instance, in the East Timor case, the GOI ignored the FRETILIN’s diplomatic approach overseas. Thus, with the Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Maubere (CNRM) or National Council of the Maubere Resistance formed by Xanana Gusmao (the surviving leader of the FRETILIN) in 1988, the FRETILIN successfully drew international attention using a diplomatic approach for independence.118 The international pressure on the GOI indicated that feedback from the international community was not in favor of the GOI. Besides the feedback from the international community, the feedback from the domestic population was also critical. The CF and the IF must analyze their strategies and consider the impact on the population. When both actors produce collateral damage, it will most likely reduce popular support. Thus, both actors must maintain a feedback mechanism to evaluate their strategies.

B. LESSON FROM THE FAILURE OF THE INDONESIAN COIN STRATEGIES IN EAST TIMOR

With McCormick’s diamond model examined, the discussion now focuses on the Indonesian COIN failure in the East Timor case and the success of the Indonesian COIN strategy in the peace of Aceh previously mentioned. Within those two cases, the model provides an assessment of which strategies failed and which succeeded. Ultimately, the suitable strategies from those cases should be applied by the GOI in the Papua case.

The international pressure on Indonesia in the East Timor case, especially from the United States and Australia, was mainly about human rights violations when the Indonesian military conducted a military operation in East Timor. The United States put pressure on East Timor by imposing a sanction and suspending all military cooperation as well as putting an embargo on military equipment. In contrast, Australian Prime Minister John Howard did not impose any sanctions but proposed a vote on self-determination in favor

118 Maria J Stephan, “Fighting for Statehood: The Role of Civilian-Based Resistance in the East Timorese, Palestinian, and Kosovo Albanian Self-Determination Movements,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs - Tufts University Press 30, no. 2 (2006): 61. 48 of the independence of East Timor.119 As explained in Chapter I, the pressure influenced Habibie’s decision to offer the people of East Timor the opportunity to vote on a referendum, which Soeharto would not let happen. As a result of the referendum, in August 1999, 78% of the East Timor people demanded independence.120

Regardless of the history of the Indonesian occupation in East Timor, in 1975 East Timor became Indonesia’s 27th province, after the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) / People’s Consultative Assembly’s decree in 1978121 (see Figure 6). Since then, welfare approaches became Soeharto’s priority to gain popular support in East Timor while many other provinces were still underdeveloped. The development in East Timor in all aspects was significant, such as infrastructure, government building, schools, and employment opportunities that could create stability. Nevertheless, the East Timorese pro- independent group, the FRETILIN, resisted and attacked the Indonesian military compound and the governmental office.

119 Kai He, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy after Soeharto: International Pressure, Democratization, and Policy Change,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8, no. 1 (January 2008): 12, https://doi- org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1093/irap/lcm021. 120 He, 11. 121 Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Managing Indonesia’s Transformation: An Oral History (Singapore: World Scientific, 2013), 266. 49 Figure 6. Map of East Timor122

Arreguin-Toft argues that the strong actor will most likely conduct an aggressive attack, while the weak actor will conduct defensive actions to survive and get the population’s sympathy and external support.123 In response to the FRETILIN’s attack, the repressive military operation contributed to the failure of Indonesian COIN strategies in East Timor. The aggressive attack produced collateral damage, killing as many as 200 East Timorese and branding this incident as the Santa Cruz massacre of 1991.124 Consequently, the GOI lost popular support, and the FRETILIN gained legitimacy.

To fight the GOI, a strong actor, the FRETILIN needed to unify all of the resistance elements and planned the resistance movement. The FRETILIN could not conduct a typical Indonesian military operation and tended to use guerrilla tactics. Moreover, the CNRM formed under Xanana Gusmao’s leadership successfully unified the three resistance groupsthe armed resistance front, the political front inside Indonesia, and the diplomatic

122 Source: “Map of Timor Leste (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste),” Map N All, accessed August 2, 2019, http://www.mapnall.com/id/Peta-Timor-Leste_1072683.html. 123 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 95. 124 Christopher Paul, Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies, RR-291/2-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 379. 50 front overseasto fight for independence.125 The CNRM also carried out a clandestine operation and underground movement to provoke the East Timorese people to fight against the Indonesian military and government, and successfully drew international attention.126 Jose-Ramos Horta, the FRETILIN’s diplomatic branch leader, actively spoke about the Indonesian military abuses in East Timor and campaigned to the world about self- determination for East Timor to gain international support.127 Additionally, the Santa Cruz incident was criticized as a human rights violation and criticized by the international community. Thus, the FRETILIN’s successful diplomatic approach of bringing the issue of human rights to the international community was a failure for the GOI, which could not prevent or disrupt the FRETILIN’s sources of external support.

Referring to lines 2 and 4 of McCormick’s model, we can identify two main failures of the Indonesian government in East Timor. Greg Wilson argues that the strike to the insurgent (line 3) is allowed only after lines 1 and 2 are accomplished. However, Wilson also posits that “military forces conducting a counterinsurgency operation typically ignore lines 1 and 2 of the model and attempt to target the insurgents or terrorists (line 3) directly.”128 In fact, the large scale “search and destroy” operation by the Indonesian military in East Timor generated collateral damage that impacted the population and reduced the East Timorese people’s support to the GOI.

Therefore, there were two failures of the Indonesian COIN strategies in the East Timor case. First, the GOI failed to erode the FRETILIN’s influence on the population (line 2). The insurgents used their propaganda successfully to gain popular support. Meanwhile, the Indonesian military tended to execute attack missions to destroy the guerrillas, but these missions had a negative impact on the population (line 1). Second, the GOI failed to degrade the insurgents’ external support (line 4). The international pressure, achieved with the support of the East Timorese diaspora and international lobbying by East

125 Stephan, “Fighting for Statehood,” 61. 126 Paul, Paths to Victory, 378. 127 The Carter Center, Observing the 1999 Public Consultation Process in East Timor (Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center, June 2000), 8. 128 Freeman and Rothstein, “Gangs and Guerrillas,” 17. 51 Timorese people like Ramos Horta, indicated the success of the East Timor insurgents and enabled FRETILIN to gained external sponsors. A summary of the results of the Indonesian COIN strategies in East Timor are depicted in Table 1.

Table 1. Results of COIN Strategies Used in Three Phases of FRETILIN’s Resistance

Popular External GOI Phases Years Strength Outcome support sponsor legitimacy I 1976–1977 5000129 No No High COIN win II 1979–1987 1350130 Yes No High COIN win III 1987–1999 2000131 Yes Yes Low COIN loss

C. LESSON FROM THE SUCCESS OF THE INDONESIAN COIN STRATEGIES IN ACEH

There is a great deal of diversity in the way in which divided societies approach territorial accommodation as a mechanism to settle the ethnic conflict.132

The GAM, also known as the Aceh Free Movement or Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), emerged in 1976 and was declared by Hasan Tiro as a small rebel group aimed to re-establish Aceh as a sovereign state, separate from Indonesia. The main issue focused on centralization that led to the exploitation of Aceh’s natural gas resources and generated unfair revenue sharing from the Acehnese people received only a small benefit. Also, an increasing number of other ethnic groups began migrating to Aceh, especially from Java, and were considered by the GAM as a neo-colonialist.

129 Louisa May Alcott, Michael Geoffrey Smith, and Moreen Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 40. 130 Emile LeBrun, Robert Muggah, and James Turton, “An Historical Overviewof Small Arms Availability and Arms Control in Timor-Leste,” TLAVA - Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment 1 (October 2008), 4, www.timor-leste-violence.org. 131 LeBrun, Muggah, and Turton, 5. 7 In April 1999 some reports estimated Mahidi’s strength at 2,000 members with 500 weapons 132 Stefan Wolff, “Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Merits and Perils of Territorial Accommodation,” Political Studies Review 9, no. 1 (2011), 36. 52 Aceh is the westernmost province in Indonesia (see Figure 7). On 15 August 2005, the GOI under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency and the GAM/ASNLF, finally reached peace after 30 years of conflict by signing the Helsinki Agreement. The military operation and the long process of peace talks had already taken place before the tsunami in 2004. Nevertheless, the tsunami that devastated most of the central economic and governmental services of Aceh had more than 170,000 casualties and accelerated the peace agreement in Aceh.

Figure 7. Map of Aceh Province133

133 Source: “Map of Aceh, Nama Kabupaten/ Kota Di Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam [Name of Regency / City in the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam],” Negeri Pesona, accessed August 3, 2019, https://www.negeripesona.com/2013/05/nama-kabupaten-kota-provinsi-nanggroe-aceh-darussalam.html. 53 Undeniably, the role of the third party involved in the peace process was significant. It was one of many factors that contributed to the peace agreement. The GAM complied with releasing all of its demands for independence and agreed to disarm. In exchange, the GOI provided broader autonomy to Aceh Province, ensuring that 70% of Aceh’s resources remained in Aceh. Furthermore, amnesty was granted to the GAM fighters, who ultimately became the local political party.134

Despite the successful resolution in this case, the Indonesian COIN strategy did not always win during the 30-year conflict. The fall of Soeharto in 1998 initiated a transition to democracy, and the GAM successfully exploited the independence issue in this period to gain legitimacy.135 To explain the GAM’s resistance movement against the GOI from 1976 until the Helsinki agreement, we must view four phases as milestones.

1. Phase I: A Weak Rebellion (1976–1979)

In this phase, the Acehnese people perceived that the GOI was legitimate, while the GAM was organizationally weak and considered a criminal organization by the people. The first GAM armed attack in 1977 targeted the American shared oil exploration company, Mobil Oil and PT Arun (Indonesian oil and gas company). During this period, GAM had no control over any territory and was unable to develop strong popular support.136 Also, there was no support in the international community for the GAM movement. After GAM’s first attack, the GOI responded with military operation and economic approaches. The military operation approach successfully destroyed GAM, its structure, and its ability to resist until 1979. Some of the leaders were imprisoned, and others fled abroad, such as Hasan di Tiro and his followers who sought political asylum in Sweden 1979.137 Using economic approaches, the GOI initiated road projects and

134 Paul, Paths to Victory, 411. 135 Paul, 407. 136 Paul, 404. 137 Heyder Affan, “Sosok pendiri GAM, Hasan Tiro,” BBC News Indonesia, June 3, 2010, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2010/06/100603_profilhasantiro. 54 television relay in rural areas.138 The GOI successfully maintained control over Aceh through these approaches and the GAM movement vanished.

2. Phase II: The DOM / Military Operation Area Period (1989–1991)

In this phase, GAM gained support from external and internal audiences and its organization grew larger and better equipped until 1991. Since the exile of Hasan di Tiro and his followers in Sweden, Tiro reorganized the Aceh government in exile and made a connection with the Libyan government in order to get international support. In 1986, GAM made contact with the Libyan government and received training and reorganized the movement’s structure according to the Libyan leader Muammar Qhadafi’s program supporting insurgent movements worldwide.139 In 1989, between 150 and 800 Libya- trained GAM members, including Muzakir Manaf and Sofyan Dawood, returned to Aceh through Malaysia and Singapore.140 Numbers of ex-military and police who were mostly Acehnese also supported the GAM, which resumed its resistance movement by launching a series of attacks on the military, police, and migrants. The latter capitalized on the grievances of the Acehnese people against migrant workers whose activities violated Islamic thought, and earned popular support for the movement among the Acehnese people.

The GOI responded with broader security measures. Soeharto launched a military operation and declared Aceh as a Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM) or military operation area. With the declaration of the DOM, the military could operate with impunity until 1998.141 By late 1991, no sign of GAM activities existed.142 Two factors indicated that the GAM had weakened in this period. First, the GAM no longer received aid from Libya due to the withdrawal of Qaddafi’s sponsorship to the armed movement, which weakened

138 Michael L Ross, “Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia,” The World Bank vol. 2: Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions (2005): 42, DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-6049-1. 139 Tim Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989–1992 (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1995), 69. 140 Ross, “Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia,” 43. 141 Ross, 44. 142 Ross, 47. 55 GAM resistance. Second, GAM revenues no longer were collected because the TNI succeeded in restricting any logistical lane to the GAM. Since the DOM was declared, Aceh was considered politically stable until 1998. The DOM, however, produced human rights violations that generated distrust of the central government, and because of that, the GAM regained significant support.

3. Phase III: The Fall of Soeharto (1998–2003)

The fall of president Soeharto in 1998 marked the third phase of the resistance when the GAM re-emerged. The GAM successfully exploited the GOI’s foundering public image and lack of credibility due to corruption, human rights violations, and economic issues, to gain popular support and raise funds.143 Indonesia’s political transition from Soeharto to the new president Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie generated a wave of ethno-nationalism. The referendum granted by Habibie in East Timor had a direct impact on the movement demanding a referendum in Aceh and Papua. Habibie lifted the DOM status in Aceh, which benefitted the GAM by enabling them to reorganize and reequip themselves. Popular support for the GAM grew stronger with the return of GAM members from exile, and in reaction to the atrocities committed by the TNI, which began to be revealed in the press.144 By 2001, the GAM was able to control 80% of the villages and disabled the government’s institutions, such as schools and government offices.145

With the shift of the Acehnese people’s opinion in its favor, the GAM’s strength increased significantly to 1,000–2,000 armed fighters in 1999.146 Numbers of the new generation of GAM especially came from those who lost their family during the DOM era. The GAM’s revenue also rose remarkably. The movement obtained funds for their struggle through three main areas: pajak nangroe / unofficial levies, diaspora donations, and

143 Ross, 47. 144 Paul, Paths to Victory, 408. 145 Ross, “Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia,” 50. 146 Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002), 101. 56 crimes.147 The crimes committed by GAM members were to fund their struggle, and relied mainly on drug trafficking and kidnapping for ransom.148 The marijuana cultivation in Aceh that contributed to 30% of South East Asia’s marijuana trade also increased the GAM’s revenue and was used to obtain weapons from Thailand and Cambodia.149

Without the DOM status and with only the presence of very limited security forces in Aceh, the GAM brutally attacked government officials and had a direct armed engagement with the security forces. The GAM was also targeting non-Acehnese and vital economic targets, such as natural gas facilities. The GOI, under the Habibie presidency, responded to the GAM resurgence with reconciliation approaches by allowing Aceh to apply Islamic law, enforce human rights abuses investigation, and enjoy limited political autonomy. After Abdurrahman Wahid took office in 2000, however, the military remained as the GOI’s primary approach.150 In April 2001, the GOI offered a special autonomy status to Aceh to decrease the tensions. Unfortunately, the autonomy funds were misused in support of the GAM movement. Then, the GOI deployed 25,000 troops. The tasks were softened from those of the military offensive to a security measures operation for restoring security and public order, and the police were given a greater responsibility in this effort. In 2002, the GAM violated the Cessation of Hostilities (COHA) initiated by the Henry Dunant Centre and committed human rights abuses by killing the GOI’s informers who worked for the TNI and police. Eventually, in this phase, the GOI was unable to defeat the insurgents; the GAM was able to increase its strength by gaining popular support and was able to control territory, including the governmental services.

147 Kristen Schulze, “The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization,” Policy Studies, no. 2 (2004): 24, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/ PS002.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=31983. 148 Schulze, 27. 149 Schulze, 27. 150 Paul, Paths to Victory, 409. 57 4. Phase IV: Emergency Status/Martial Law and the Peace Agreement (2003–2005)

This phase began in May 2003 when the GOI under the Megawati presidency applied martial law and declared an emergency status in the province. The TNI took over all of the abandoned government offices (occupied by the GAM), and the TNI officers assumed responsibilities as acting district and sub-district officials to keep the system of tgovernment working. During the one year of the military offensive, the mass evacuation of civilians was enforced; TNI gave a special identity card to the people, a Kartu Tanda Penduduk (KTP) merah putih or red-white ID card, to differentiate GAM and non-GAM. Thus, as the result of the year-long military campaign, the TNI successfully disrupted GAM’s communication and supply lines. The GAM no longer held any territories and was unable to move freely; they disappeared, especially in urban areas. With the internal division clashes after the loss of GAM members during combat, GAM’s leadership weakened. The GAM’s will to fight was reduced due to the fact that most of them were tired of combat. This led many of them to surrender.

In 2004, the change of Indonesian leadership from Megawati to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono led to the continuation of the peace process between the GOI and the GAM. In December 2004, the tsunami hit Aceh and led to mass destruction, with a total death toll of more than 170,000 people, and accelerated the ongoing peace process. The international community emphasized the need for an immediate peace agreement between both parties and focused on humanitarian relief. Therefore, the international community also played a role in accelerating the peace accords after the tsunami. In 2005, both the GOI and the GAM signed the peace agreement in Helsinki that benefitted both sides. Aceh’s autonomy status of 2001 increased and gave exclusive authority to the government of Aceh to regulate the province’s affairs and interests under the system of the Republic of Indonesia, and dignified reconciliation towards sustainable social, economic, and political development in Aceh.

Measured by McCormick’s model, Indonesian COIN strategies were not always successful. One failure was the GOI’s inability to maintain stability in Aceh, particularly after the fall of Soeharto that led to the lifting of the DOM status. Trinquier argues that 58 government legitimation is critical, and the government has to use its resources to defeat insurgents.151 Thus, the first two phases can be considered a success for Indonesian COIN strategies in Aceh (line 3). The GOI, with the COIN forces, exploited its power to suppress the GAM with the declaration of the DOM status in Aceh. The GOI successfully gained control of the population (line 1) and disrupted the GAM’s popular support (line 2). Although by the end of 1979 the GAM had disappeared, the group was able to gain international support and receive Libyan aid in the form of training, funds, and equipment (line 5). It was indicated that the GOI failed to disrupt Libyan support to the GAM during Phase I to Phase II (line 4)

In Phase III, the lifted the DOM status in Aceh led the GAM bluntly to enhance their capacity. With the remaining arsenal that was hidden since Phase II, the GAM was able to strengthen its level of resistance from Phase II (line 1) and disrupt government control over the population (line 2). Mao argues that the second phase of revolutionary warfare is using forces to target the political system while government legitimacy is low.152 Hence, the low level of legitimacy of the GOI after the fall of Soeharto was exploited by the GAM to gain popular support. In this phase, the Indonesian COIN strategy was considered a loss.

Lastly, in Phase IV, the COIN forces successfully crushed the GAM (line 3) and took over the occupied territory (line 1). The COIN forces were able to resume abandoned governmental services. Hence, with public services functioning, such as hospitals and schools, the GOI regained popular support (line 1). Furthermore, international pressure was also critical and encouraged the GOI (line 5) to end the conflict. Thus, with the peace agreement signed by both parties, overall, the Indonesian COIN strategies were considered as a win.

151 Trinquier, 44. 152 Mao and Griffith, Mao Tse-Tung: On Guerrilla Warfare, 11. 59 Table 2. Results of COIN Strategies Used in the Four Phases of GAM Resistance

Popular External GOI Phases Years Strength Outcome support sponsor legitimacy I 1976–1979 25–200153 No No High COIN win II 1989–1991 200–750154 No Yes High COIN win III 1998–2003 27,000155 Yes Yes Low COIN loss IV 2003–2005 30,000156 Yes No High COIN win

D. CONCLUSION

McCormick’s counterinsurgency model gave a clear picture of both actors fighting over the population and for international support to achieve their respective goals. The success or failure of the strategies proposed by the model depends on both actors playing the game. The model provides a valuable technique in assessing in what areas the failed and the successful strategies occurred. Thus, the lessons of Indonesian COIN failure in East Timor need to be re-evaluated, while the success of the COIN strategies in Aceh may become a role model for handling the conflict in Papua. In the next chapter, based on lessons learned from the past COIN strategies, the three analytical approaches are examined.

153 Ross, , “Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia,” 36. 154 Ross, 36. 155 Ross, 36. In 1999–2000, GAM increased again to an estimated 3,000 fighters, and during the COHA phase to an estimated 5,500 fighters, while the rest were supporters. 156 Schulze, “The Free Aceh Movement (GAM),” 30. Indonesian military intelligence claims that 583 members of GAM are “Libyan graduates,” 5500 fighters and the rest were sympathizers. 60 IV. ANALYTICAL APPROACHES

Various types of COIN theories have been established. They consist of various perspectives with different ends, ways, and means depending on the situation. Despite the differences in the theories, both the state and the insurgents believe that the population and external factors are essential to winning the battle for “hearts and minds.” To achieve those objectives, Galula argues that fulfilling the people’s basic needs is necessary for gaining popular support, while by contrast, Trinquier suggests using coercion to gain popular support. Both COIN theorists agree wholeheartedly, however, the help of the population is a crucial element in winning the war.

From an insurgency standpoint, guerrilla tactics are inevitable to achieve the movement’s goals, whether those goals are to expel foreign invaders or to overthrow the legitimate government. These tactics were considered necessary because insurgents have limited power and resources. Mao Tse Tung, with his three phases of guerrilla warfare, demanded the support of the population to maintain the resistance and expel the Japanese as the foreign invaders. The insurgents needed popular support for safe shelter, communication and information, training, recruiting, and logistics against the stronger enemy. Similarly, international support is significant to increasing insurgents’ legitimacy and can be gained by conducting propaganda campaigns and distorting information about the real situation.157

This chapter focuses on the three elements of counterinsurgency: the COIN forces, the insurgent forces, and the civilian population (see Figure 8). Three methods are provided as analytical approaches. The first method is the SIR model for forecasting the Papuan insurgency from 2020 to 2023. The result of this model provides strategies to prevent the spread of the insurgent influence on the population. Second, the multiple regression model provides an analysis of the correlation between two or more variables to answer the hypotheses that a higher level of welfare will generate a greater reduction in the number of violent acts by the separatist movement. And third, the game theory model provides a

157 Mao and Griffith, Mao Tse-Tung: On Guerrilla Warfare, 98. 61 logical explanation for both players’ decisions and actions. In this case, the players are the GOI and the OPM that are taking their respective options. This method is used to minimize risk for both players, where each player’s gain is the other player’s lossa zero-sum game.

Figure 8. Three Methods of Analysis

A. FORECASTING THE SPREAD OF THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY WITH THE SIR MODEL

A SIR model is an epidemiological model that computes the theoretical number of people infected with a contagious illness in a closed population over time.158

The dynamics of the Papuan insurgency have changed since 1965. Some of the insurgents surrendered because they realized that there was no use in resisting and living in the jungle far from ordinary life. Nevertheless, some of them also kept up their struggle to achieve independence from Indonesia. The OPM is a highly decentralized organization and known to encompass three different and competing groups that have different motives. Despite similar goals, there was no evidence that the OPM and the other pro-independence

158 Eric W. Weisstein, “SIR Model,” Wolfram Math World, accessed September 30, 2019, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/SIRModel.html. 62 activists accommodate a shared strategy. This can be seen by their divided territory and their lack of communication with one another. Nevertheless, the spread of the OPM’s influence with its ideology has increased since the GOI failed to resolve the Papuans’ grievances. Robert E. Burks argues, “the spread of radical ideologies is key to fanaticism, recruitment and terrorist activities. Understanding the contagion dynamics of radical ideologies is fundamentally important for sociological research and counter-measures.”159 In this chapter, the SIR model assumes that the spread of OPM’s ideology would be similar to the spread of a dangerous epidemic. Based on McCormick’s model, this analysis focuses on part of the strategy/line 2; that is, disrupting the population’s support for the insurgents and the converse.

1. The Model

It is assumed that the initial populations are the combination of West Papua (937,458 people in 2019) and Papua provinces (3,322,526 people in 2019), where the total population (N) is 4,259,984 people. It is further assumed that the birth and mortality rates remain balanced from 2020 to 2023 and that it is a closed system—that is, there are no incoming or outgoing people for this time period. The variables of this model include: the Susceptible (S) is the Papuan population; the Infected (I) is the active member of the OPM and the people influenced by the OPM’s ideology and become OPM supporters; and the Recovered (R) is the population that has been recovered from infected population (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. The SIR Model

159 Robert E. Burks, “Lesson 8, Epidemic Models of Public Violence and Support (System of Discrete Dynamical Systems) – DA2410 Modeling for Military Decision Making” (Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July 31, 2018). 63 S +I+ R = N The infection rate (k) is the rate of the OPM influence on the Papuans. The domain is months (n) = {0,1,2,3…36} for three years ahead. It is assumed that there are no immunities present, such as lack of security forces, and education that failed to anticipate the spread of the OPM’s ideology. Thus, the strong OPM influence has significantly touched every zone of Papuans’ social life, and there is no Recovered population and recovered rate (m). The initial condition of the OPM active fighter is I0 = 780 spread throughout the region, and it was the actual data in 2018.160 Therefore, S0 = 4,259,204.

a. Susceptible Population (S)

The susceptible population can be modeled by taking the previous day’s susceptible population (Sn-1) and accounting for those who were infected on that day. To determine how many were infected, we assume a 100% interaction rate between the infected and susceptible population. This interaction is not a fully realistic assumption but allows us to calculate a worst-case scenario and adjust from there, if necessary. Given a 100% interaction rate, we then multiply that with an infection coefficient (k) to end up with the following equation: = ( )( )

𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛−1 − 𝑘𝑘 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛−1 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛−1 b. Infected Population (I)

The infected population is modeled by taking the previous day’s infected population (In-1) and adding the newly infected k(Sn-1)(In-1) to that total. It is assumed that no insurgent will die nor surrender. Also, there is no factor to move individuals to the Recovered bin. On the other hand, the infected population could be cured; or the Papuans already infected could turn back against OPM and support the GOI as a result of proper education, welfare, and approaches that are humanitarian or military. The infected population can be modeled with the equation: = + ( )( )

𝑛𝑛 𝑛𝑛−1 𝑛𝑛−1 𝑛𝑛−1 𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼 𝑘𝑘 𝑆𝑆 𝐼𝐼 160 This data was collected from Indonesian Army - Kodam Cendrawasih, which only defined the number without exact location. 64 c. Infection Rate (k)

It is assumed that the OPM spreads its resistance ideology against the Indonesian government constantly and gains more supporters every month. Thus, to find OPM’s influence rate, or the k-value, the number of susceptible in month 0 is subtracted from the number in month 1 and that is divided by the negative initial infected multiplied by those in month 0. As a result, k-value = 0.00000023. = k ( )( ) 𝑆𝑆1−𝑆𝑆0 Figure 10 depicts the infection rate −of𝐼𝐼 0the𝑆𝑆0 OPM’s influence throughout the Papua and the West Papua provinces. Within 18 months, the OPM could infect all Papuans with its separatist ideology. The chart shows a parabolic shape that will likely be critical for predicting the spread of OPM’s influence. As the governor of Papua has stated, “there are no Papuans with Indonesian souls.” This makes sense compared to the infection/influence rate for the Papuan population unless the GOI has a serious and proper strategy to address this problem.161

Figure 10. The Papuans Infected by OPM’s Influence

161 “Gubernur Papua: Belum Ada Orang Papua Berjiwa Indonesia [Governor of Papua: There Are No Papuans with Indonesian Souls],” Tempo, January 10, 2016, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/734620/ gubernur-papua-belum-ada-orang-papua-berjiwa-indonesia. 65 d. Recovered Population (Rn)

During this process, it is assumed that there is no a recovered population because there was no guarantee from security forces during this time period, and the GOI failed to address the Papuan grievances. Thus, the recovered rate m = 0, and the equation for the recovered population is:

= + (I )

𝑅𝑅n 𝑅𝑅n−1 𝑚𝑚 n−1 2. The Course of Action

Given the assumptions just mentioned, the model shows a high-speed dispersion of OPM influence without proper “vaccination” and special treatment like “quarantine” applied to the uninfected population. Thus, three different COAs can be applied to prevent the infection/influence of the OPM. First, there is “vaccination,” which means a proper education, welfare, and other social programs to prevent the spread of “infectious” OPM. Second, “quarantine” means to protect the uninfected population by isolating them from the OPM’s influence. The last resort is “eradication,” which the special military operation can apply to the OPM to diminish the group and its infrastructure.

a. COA 1, Vaccination

The vaccination concept here is the same as the one for preventing the spread of the influenza virus in the winter; people must take a flu shot to protect their body from the influenza virus. The analogy of vaccination could be applied to the Papuans to make the population resistant to the bad influence of the insurgency and to counter the OPM contagion. Without a proper “vaccination,” the spread of the insurgent influence is unstoppable, as depicted in Figure 10. The form of “vaccination” against OPM’s ideology could be a proper education of the Papuans with a curriculum anchored in Indonesian history, and encouragement of scholars and historians to do research and strengthening of the Indonesian position in Papua. Any approach that addresses Papuan grievances is necessary to persuade the Papuans to stay as Indonesians; such approaches include effective economic development and empowerment of the indigenous Papuans. It will become a good “vaccination” to prevent the OPM’s influence and will be a cure for the

66 infected. The role of the provincial government is important to the implementation of this “vaccination” program throughout the provinces of Papua and West Papua.

Assuming that the infection rate (k) in COA 1 is 10% lower than the infection rate in the initial data without vaccination, then k = 0.000000023. The effect of “vaccination” could help to reduce the number of insurgents. Assuming the recovery rate (m) is bigger than the k, then m = 0.15. Given that infection and recovery rates, although the susceptible (Sn) reducing 76 Papuans join the OPM, this COA gain is Rn = 117, or the number of previously infected Papuans who have recovered and surrender themselves to be part of Indonesia in the first month. At the end of month 36, this COA results in a total of 1,920 recovered Papuans who have become part of Indonesia’s fight against the insurgents, while the number of infected is reduced to 112 remaining insurgents (see Figure 11 and Figure 12). The equation for this vaccination model is: = + ( )( ) ( ) and

𝑛𝑛 𝑛𝑛−1 𝑛𝑛−1 𝑛𝑛−1 𝑛𝑛−1 𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼 𝑘𝑘=𝑆𝑆 +𝐼𝐼 ( − 𝑚𝑚) 𝐼𝐼

𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛−1 𝑚𝑚 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛−1

Figure 11. The Infected Papuan Population and the Recovery Rate after Vaccination

67 Figure 12. The Uninfected Papuan Population after Vaccination

b. COA 2, Quarantine

The COA 2 begins with establishing a border control, border security, and freedom of movement program.162 This border control plan, including the control of the movements of all uninfected Papuans, establishes roadblocks and checkpoints; there is also a cyber patrol controlling the Internet and media. This “quarantine” effort aims to isolate the uninfected population and contain them in the area with a proper guard to keep them separate from the OPM. The Internet and media could be a strong conductor of the insurgent’s influence; however, if the GOI is able to control the Internet and media, this action will most likely help the COA 2. Due to isolation, it is assumed that the infection rate (k) is reduced 100% from the initial k, although there is no recovery during this COA. Then, k = 0.0000000023, and there is no recovery rate. As a result, the model increases to 8 Papuans infected in the first month and to 328 Papuans infected in month 36. The number of infected Papuans still increases, but not significantly. It means that the COA 2 also makes a significant contribution in reducing the number of infected Papuans (see Figure 13 and Figure 14). This COA ends up without Rn and is expressed by the following equation: = + ( )( ) ( )

𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛−1 𝑘𝑘 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛−1 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛−1 − 𝑚𝑚 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛−1 162 Department of the Army, 7-4. 68 Figure 13. The Infected Papuan Population after Quarantine

Figure 14. The Uninfected Papuan Population after Quarantine

c. COA 3, Eradication

This COA focuses on the seek-and-destroy operation that goes straight to the heart of the OPM, targeting its leadership, and destroying their will to fight. This operation must be supported with proper intelligence information to minimize collateral damage that could impact the population. Within a difficult area of operation such as the highlands of Papua that is characterized by rugged terrain and unpredictable weather, ideally, this operation

69 should be done with special operation forces (SOF)—small units that use decentralized movement to find and attack the enemy.163

Given that the model for the spread of infection is , and the kill rate is

(m) = , the kill rate (m) of the SOF must be greater𝑘𝑘 than𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛−1 the𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛− 1infection rate of the OPM, 𝑚𝑚which𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛−1 is . Since the population number changes, the largest value indicates that if the extermination𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛−1 rate is high enough to counter the infection rate, the number for the Susceptible Sn population will fall, and the extermination rate will remain higher than the infection rate. Assuming the kill rate (m) = 0.25, with this COA, the SOF in month 7 kills 290 insurgents. Also, with a constant operation and routine rotation of the SOF members, the operation reaches 1,891 people killed in month 36 (see Figure 15). However, ten insurgents are able to escape and could create another threat in the future if the operation were to stop at this point. At the same time, this COA also produces a reduction of the Papua and the West Papua populations (see Figure 16).

Figure 15. The Infected and Killed Insurgents after Eradication of OPM Influence

163 Department of the Army, 5-4. 70 Figure 16. The Uninfected Papuan Population after Eradication of OPM Influence

3. COA Analysis

The SIR model in this analysis offers a way to forecast the spread of the insurgents’ ideology/influence and provides several COAs to prevent an “epidemic,” which means the analogy of predicting the spread of an epidemic could be applied in predicting the spread of insurgent movement’s influence on the population. Although there is no detailed information about factors that affect the spread of the OPM’s ideology, such as terrain, weather, and the OPM’s own capabilities, the SIR model helps in giving an illustration to determine the strategy to be taken in the future. The assumptions provided in this model give a sense of closure to the conflict when the OPM’s influence rate is calculated in months (n). There are three COAs considered to prevent the diffusion of the dangerous “contagion.” The result of the three COAs analyses is:

a. COA 1:

Given the assumption that the infection rate is 10% lower than the actual infection rate, and the recovery rate is 0.15, COA 1 effectively reduces the number of infected without risking the susceptible population. At the end of 2023, total recovery reaches 1,920 persons, while leaving 114 people infected. The effective implementation of autonomy could be an indicator

71 for the success of this COA. Therefore, this COA requires the GOI to work hard in addressing the Papuans’ grievances.

b. COA 2:

Given the assumption that the infection rate is 100% lower than the actual data due to the “quarantine” effect that is slowing down the dispersion of the OPM’s influence, COA 2 effectively obstructs the OPM’s influence. The total number of infected is 819, and it stops increasing in month 6. On the other hand, isolation is more effective on land, while the GOI still needs improvement in managing isolation of the Internet and media. The isolation approach also could impact the Papuans’ freedom of movement.

c. COA 3:

Given the assumption that the infection rate is 10% lower than the actual infection rate, and the kill rate is 0.25, this COA effectively reduces the number of infected, which remains at ten people in month 36. Nevertheless, it also reduces the total population by 1,891 people and could produce collateral damage and attract negative international attention. Nonetheless, this COA will most likely be used as the last option while the military operation will affect the population’s economic cycle due to the need for civilian evacuation and could reduce the GOI’s popular support.

The three COAs have their respective positive and negative effects. Among the three, COA 1 is most likely the best due to its effectiveness without significant risk. Yet, the three strategies could be combined as a unified COA to counter the OPM’s influence on the population. In sum, this model of analysis finds that, without prevention, the OPM’s influence easily spreads throughout the Papuan population, creating an “OPM epidemic.”

72 B. REGRESSION ANALYSIS

After 18 years of the special autonomy status implementation in both Papua and the West Papuan province, it has not shown a significant result as expected. The Papuan nationalist movement, backed by the OPM, is remarkably growing bigger and often produces violence. It can be seen in the killing of 19 trans-Papuan road workers in the Nduga district, December 2018;164 the riots in the major cities of Manokwari, Sorong, , as a result of racial abuse of Indonesian officials in Malang, August 2019;165 and the violent unrest that killed 32 non-Papuans in Wamena district, September 2019.166

The granted special autonomy aims to give broader authority to Papuans to regulate and manage themselves. It confers to Papuans the responsibility to govern and regulate the natural resources for the prosperity of Papuans, and includes the socio-cultural and economic empowerment of indigenous Papuans. Nevertheless, even with total budget spending of as much as 12 trillion IDR (approximately 850 million USD) in 2018, this autonomy has failed to stem the separatist movement and related violence.167 That being said, the autonomy that was supposed to have a direct impact on the indigenous Papuans failed to address their grievances about poverty, low levels of education, poor health conditions, and high levels of unemployment.

This analysis focuses on the interaction between the GOI and the Papuans. It also refers to the McCormick diamond model that suggests the strategy / line 1 of acquiring popular support. This section offers a statistical analysis of factors that affect the frequency of insurgent violence as revealed with the multiple linear regression model. According to

164 “West Papua: Conflicting Reports Surround Attack That Killed up to 31,” Guardian, December 5, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/05/west-papua-fears-of-spiralling-violence-after- attack-leaves-up-to-31-dead. 165 “Thousands Riot in Papua, Parliament Building Torched,” New Straits Times, August 19, 2019, https://www.nst.com.my/world/2019/08/514240/thousands-riot-papua-parliament-building-torched. 166 “Thousands of Wamena Residents Wish to Flee after Deadly Unrest,” The Jakarta Post, September 27, 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/09/27/thousands-of-wamena-residents- wish-to-flee-after-deadly-unrest.html. 167 Indonesian Ministry of Finance, Informasi APBN 2018 [Information of the State Bugdget - Indonesia - 2018], Directorate General of Budget, (Jakarta: Indonesian Ministry of Finance, 2017), 29, https://www.kemenkeu.go.id/media/6552/informasi-apbn-2018.pdf. 73 Michelle Isenhour, “the model provides an explanation about the relationship between two or more variables and a response variable by fitting a linear equation to observed data. The value of the independent variable X is associated with the value of the dependent variable Y.”168 The dataset in this analysis is the combination of the data from both provinces, Papua and West Papua, which is limited only to the factors that have a direct impact on the autonomy. Two different analyses are conducted, the simple linear regression and the multiple linear regression. The results of these analyses will answer whether there any linear relationships between the predictor variables and the number of incidents of insurgent violence.

1. The Facts and Assumptions

The statistical dataset was collected from the Indonesian official institutions and various sources over ten years. The independent variables were collected from the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) from 2009 to 2018 (see Table 3). In addition, the dependent variable, the number of incidents of insurgent violence from 2004 to 2014, was collected from the National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) Indonesia. The rest of the insurgent violence data from 2015 to 2018 was collected from various sources, such as online newspaper articles. This analysis uses five predictors/dependent variables: health life expectancy rate (in percent), education in high school level rate (in percent), unemployment rate (in percent), monthly expenditure per capita rate (in IDR: Indonesian currency), and poverty rate (in percent).

168 Michelle Isenhour, “Modul 13, Multiple Linear Regression II - DA3410 Modeling for Military Decision Making,” (Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February 15, 2019) 74 Table 3. Dataset for Five Predictor Variables and the Dependent Variable over Ten Years169

Education Health Life Monthly High Unemployment Poverty Insurgent Year Expectancy Expenditure per School (%) (%) Violence (in years) Capita (in IDR) level (%) X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 Y 2009 64.31 39.66 5.75 603829.50 36.62 38 2010 64.45 43.93 5.88 603829.50 32.70 26 2011 64.61 40.17 6.39 661116.50 29.89 39 2012 64.74 38.26 5.53 725858.00 28.85 49 2013 64.91 45.37 4.27 836836.50 29.33 33 2014 64.99 52.70 5.90 832251.50 27.03 44 2015 65.15 52.81 4.25 929992.50 27.11 8 2016 65.21 52.95 5.05 972894.00 26.99 4 2017 65.23 53.11 5.74 1100876.50 26.43 9 2018 65.55 44.31 4.44 1124696.00 25.39 7

2. Simple Linear Regression

To see the mathematical relationship between the two variables X and Y, each individual predictor variable will be inspected. Thus, the linear relationship model with the general equation would be y = β0 + β1x, where y is the number of incidents of insurgent violence, β0 is y-intercept, and β1 is the slope. In simple linear regression, the model is actually called a linear probabilistic model y = β0 + β1X + εi. There is an additional εi defined as the random error and the level of significance is 0.05; thus, the confidence level is 95%. In this way, the five variables are used to predict the dependent variable, which is the number of violent insurgent incidents. In presenting the data, this analysis includes graphs resulting from simple linear regression analysis that show the correlation between each dependent variable and the independent variable.

169 Adapted from Dataset collected from: Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics Database, “Strategic Indicator,” accessed June 15, 2019, https://bps.go.id/; The National Violence Monitoring System, “Violence in Papua and the West Papua Province,” accessed June 15, 2019, http://snpk.kemenkopmk.go.id/; and Frendy Kurniawan, “Kekerasan bersenjata yang terus terjadi di Papua [Armed violence that continuously occurs in Papua],” Tirto, December 6, 2018, https://tirto.id/kekerasan- bersenjata-yang-terus-terjadi-di-papua-da75 75 a. The Number of Incidents of Insurgent Violence (Y)

The number of incidents of insurgent violence is the dependent variable. In other words, this variable depends on the other five to predict the number of violent incidents committed by the insurgents, in this case the OPM. Between 2009 and 2014, the number of incidents is higher than in the other years in the dataset. This indicates that the security level was low and autonomy did not meet the target. The insurgent violence could be in the form of armed criminal activities, such as robbery, rape, murder, attacking the government agencies, and intimidation.

b. Life Expectancy (X1)

One of the indicators reflecting the health status of Papuans is their life expectancy. The life expectancy rate is the estimated average age to which someone is expected to live. On average, the life expectancy of Papuans in both provinces is gradually increasing. However, the dataset shows that the increase of the life expectancy is not significant. That means the quality of health is need more improvement, which likely contributes to the reduced life expectancy. By contrast, as life expectancy increases, the number of incidents of the insurgent violence also decreasing, as depicted in Figure 17.

Figure 17. The Life Expectancy Rate of Papuans vs. Number of Incidents of Insurgent Violence

76 c. Education—High School Level (X2)

The education rate uses the rate at which Papuans graduated from high school or the equivalent, with the approximate age at graduation from 16 to 18 years old. The school participation rate in urban areas is higher than in the rural areas. Not all Papuans continue to higher education or go to universities due to the lack of education facilities in rural areas and economic factors. The result of the simple linear regression shows that the number of violent insurgent incidents decreased over the period of dataset. It means the predictor variable, education, has a negative correlation; an increase in the number of Papuans completing a high school education correlates to a decrease in insurgent violence (see Figure 18).

Figure 18. The Education—High School Graduation Rate of Papuans vs. Number of Violent Incidents

d. Unemployment (X3)

The unemployment rate is the proportion of unemployed Papuans to the total of the workforce. The unemployment rate for 2018 of 4.44% is lower than it was in 2017, at 5.74%. That said, 95.56% of Papuans absorbed all jobs available. Among the employed, however, the agricultural sector has the highest employment rate, 67.75%, due to the low

77 level of education. Figure 19 depicts a correlation between the higher unemployment rate and an increase in the number of violent insurgent incidents.

Figure 19. The Unemployment Rate for Papuans vs. Number of Violent Incidents

e. Monthly Expenditure per Capita (X4)

A. Massaid explains that “monthly expenditures per capita in IDR (Indonesian currency: Rupiah) are costs incurred for the consumption of all household members for a month divided by the number of household members.”170 The average monthly expenditure per capita of Papuans has improved from over time. The standard of living is increasing as represented by per capita expenditure per month. This is also an indicator that the Papuans’ economy is increasing. The following graph shows that the increase in the monthly expenditure rate correlates with a reduction in the number of violent insurgent incidents (see Figure 20).

170 A. Massaid, M. Hanif, D. Febrianti, and N. Chamidah, “Modeling of Poverty Percentage of Non- Food Per Capita Expenditure Using Least Square Spline Estimator,” IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering, 546 (2019): 5, doi:10.1088/1757-899X/546/5/052044

78 Figure 20. The Monthly Expenditure per Capita of Papuans vs. Number of Violent Incidents

f. Poverty (X5)

The high level of poverty in both provinces is due to the low level of education, lack of infrastructure, and geographic isolation of many rural areas that are difficult to reach. Papua and West Papua provinces have the highest rate of poverty in the nation, above 25% in 2018. The poverty rate is one of the driver for the resistance movement, and the rate remains high even though Papua is rich in natural resources. Figure 21 depicts how the increase in the poverty rate corresponds to an increase in the number of violent insurgent incidents.

79 Figure 21. The Poverty Rate of Papuans vs. Number of Violent Incidents

The five scatterplots depict the linear relationship between the number of incidents of insurgent violence and the five predictor variables. The scatterplots show that only two predictor variables have a linear relationship indicated by the p-value less than α = 0.05, that is, life expectancy and the monthly expenditure per capita variables. Despite the fact that only two variables are statistically significant, the summary statistics show that each of them has differences, such as the correlation and the coefficient determination that have dissimilar results from one another. Among the five dependent variables, only monthly expenditure has an R-square greater than 0.5. It means that only the monthly expenditure variable has a strong correlation with the number of incidents of insurgent violence. Table 4 displays the R-square and the p-value of all predictor variables with various results. Therefore, the next step is using the multiple linear regression model to find the fit model.

Table 4. The R-square and the p-value of Predictor Variables in Simple Linear Regression

Monthly Health Life Education Unemployment Expenditure Year Expectancy High School Poverty (%) (%) per Capita (in years) level (%) (in IDR) X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 R square 0.487 0.376 0.268 0.563 0.238 p-value 0.024 0.059 0.125 0.012 0.152

80 3. Multiple Linear Regression

Unlike simple linear regression, multiple linear regression uses more than one variable get more evidence to predict the response variable. Thus, the five predictor variables tested with the models can be expressed as:

where:

• i = 1, …, n • = random error

• 1 ≡ the coefficient that defines the relationship between Life Expectancy (X1)

𝛽𝛽and the number of violent insurgent incidents, assuming all other variables are held constant.

• 2 ≡ the coefficient that defines the relationship between Education - High

𝛽𝛽School Level (X2) and the number of violent insurgent incidents, assuming all other variables are held constant.

• 3 ≡ the coefficient that defines the relationship between Unemployment (X3)

𝛽𝛽and the number of violent insurgent incidents, assuming all other variables are held constant.

• 4 ≡ the coefficient that defines the relationship between Monthly Expenditure

per𝛽𝛽 Capita (X4) and the number of violent insurgent incidents, assuming all other variables are held constant.

• 5 ≡ the coefficient that defines the relationship between Poverty (X5) and the

𝛽𝛽number of insurgent violence, assuming all other variables are held constant.

To test the hypothesis that the parameters are equal to zero ( n = 0), or not equal to zero ( n ≠ 0), this analysis uses stepwise regression. Isenhour explains𝛽𝛽 , “the general idea of the 𝛽𝛽stepwise regression is the continuation of multiple linear regression by building the regression model from a set of candidate predictor variables by entering and removing

81 predictors ina stepwise mannerinto the model until there is no justifiable reason to enter or remove any more.”171

a. Correlation between Variables

Prior to begin the multiple regression process, first, we need to consider the correlation value between all variables, the result of which can show us the strength of the correlation between the X and Y variables. Table 5 shows that X1, X2, and X4 have a strong correlation with Y.

Table 5. The Correlation between Y against X1, X2, X3, X4, and X5

X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 Y X1 1 X2 0.626 1 X3 -0.591 -0.282 1 X4 0.969 0.647 -0.546 1 X5 -0.916 -0.607 0.403 -0.841 1 Y -0.698 -0.614 0.518 -0.750 0.488 1

b. Stepwise (Backwards) Regression

Isehhour posits, “the general idea of the stepwise (backward) regression is to enter all predictor variables into the model and then drop the least significant variable.”172 Therefore, several steps conducted in this process by eliminating the least variable in every step until the remaining variables are statistically significant.

(1) Step 1

In this step, the multiple linear regression is applied to all predictor variables. Then, the highest p-value among the five variables will be removed (see Table 6).

171 Michelle Isenhour, “Modul 13, Multiple Linear Regression II - DA3410 Modeling for Military Decision Making” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February 5, 2019). 172 Isenhour, “Modul 13, Multiple Linear Regression II - DA3410 Modeling for Military Decision Making” 82 Table 6. The Result of Step 1- Multiple Linear Regression, Y vs. X1, X2, X3, X4, X5

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Intercept 3065.411 6284.593 0.487 0.651 X1 Life Expectancy -43.817 95.908 -0.457 0.671 X2 Education Level -0.916 1.04 -0.881 0.428 X3 Unemployment 0.599 9.252 0.065 0.951 X4 Expenditure -2.887E-05 0.000129 -0.223 0.835 X5 Poverty -4.544 4.848 -0.937 0.402

Table 6 shows the regression for Y against X1, X2, X3, X4, X5 result, for which the Unemployment variable (X3) has the highest p-value. It means the variable X3 does not have significant correlation to the number of violent insurgent incidents. Thus, this variable is no longer used in the next step.

(2) Step 2

This is the same procedure as step 1. In step 2 we use Microsoft Excel ToolPak to perform data analysis and regress Y against the predictor variables X1, X2, X4, and X5. As a result, the variable with a p-value greater than 0.05, which is X3, will no longer be used in the next analysis model (see Table 7).

Table 7. The Result of Step 2

Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Intercept 3316.623 4424.859 0.749 0.487 Life Expectancy -47.603 68.035 -0.699 0.515 Education -0.918 0.930 -0.987 0.368 Expenditure -2.533E-05 0.000105 -0.241 0.819 Poverty -4.721 3.588 -1.316 0.245

Table 7 depicts the result of step 2. It shows that none of predictor variables fit the model; all of them have p-value > 0.05. Since p-value is greater than α for 1, 2, 4, and

𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽 83 5, we fail to reject the null hypotheses and conclude that there is not enough evidence to

𝛽𝛽support the alternative hypothesis that the regression coefficients 1, 2, 4, and 5 do not equal zero. Therefore, the five predictor variables do not have a linear𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽relationship𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽 with the dependent variable, the number of violent insurgent incidents. In short, the patterns of insurgent violence are not correlated with any one of the five predictor variables.

A further step is the stepwise (forward) regression in which additional columns of interactions continuous between predictor variables will be used. This regression is expected to have a better result.

c. Stepwise (Forward) Regression

Isenhour asserts, “the general idea of the stepwise (forward) regression is to build the regression model from a set of candidate predictor variables by entering and removing predictors — in a stepwise manner — into the model until there is no justifiable reason to enter or remove any more.”173 The forward regression’s goal is to end up the model with a reasonable and useful regression model

(1) Step 1

For analysis, the fit model uses JMP (computer programs for statistical analysis), which can regress multiple variables. The initial five predictor variables having interactions with one anotherfor instance, variable X1*X2are combined to form one separate column (polynomial). After the interactions, the analysis has a total 20 predictor variables, as depicted in Table 8. However, among 20 predictor variables, only eight predictor variables have p-value less than 0.05.

173 Isenhour, “Modul 13, Multiple Linear Regression II - DA3410 Modeling for Military Decision Making.” 84 Table 8. Predictor Variables Having Interactions with One Another

Entered Parameter Estimate nDF SS “F Ratio” p-value [x] Intercept 794.007999 1 0 0 1 [ ] Life Expectancy (in years) 0 0 0 . . [x] Education 2.2517748 4 940.8418 512.82 0.03311 [x] Unemployment -322.55818 3 640.4944 465.481 0.03406 [x] Monthly Expenditure -0.0005437 2 1163.253 1268.097 0.01985 [x] Poverty 40.2903657 2 692.3591 754.761 0.02573 [ ] Life Expectancy*Education 0 0 0 . . [ ] Life Expectancy *Unemployment 0 0 0 . . [ ] Life Expectancy*Monthly Expenditure 0 0 0 . . [ ] Life Expectancy*Poverty 0 0 0 . . [x] Education*Unemployment 4.09981813 1 605.0457 1319.157 0.01752 [x] Education*Monthly Expenditure 7.24E-06 1 67.13913 146.381 0.0525 [x] Education*Poverty -1.1219342 1 374.4132 816.318 0.02227 [ ] Unemployment*Monthly Expenditure 0 1 0.458661 . . [ ] Unemployment*Poverty 0 1 0.458661 . . [ ] Monthly Expenditure*Poverty 0 1 0.458661 . . [ ] Life Expectancy*Life Expectancy 0 0 0 . . [ ] Education*Education 0 1 0.458661 . . [x] Unemployment*Unemployment 11.5950399 1 118.8004 259.016 0.03951 Monthly Expenditure*Monthly [ ] 0 1 0.458661 . . Expenditure [ ] Poverty*Poverty 0 1 0.458661 . . Note [x] = predictor variables that have p-value < 0.05, enter the model

(2) Step 2

Table 9 displays eight variables entered in the model. The next step is to regress eight variables and find the best fit model.

85 Table 9. The Parameter Estimates for the Fit Model

Coefficient Estimate Std Error t Ratio p-value| Lower 95% Upper 95% Intercept 794.008 71.348 11.13 0.0571 -112.565 1700.581 X2 Education 2.252 1.391 1.62 0.3522 -15.417 19.921 X3 Unemployment -322.558 11.681 -27.60 0.0231* -471.03 -174.086 X4 Monthly Expenditure -0.000544 2.99E-05 -18.19 0.0350* -0.000924 -0.000164 X5Poverty 40.29 1.573 25.62 0.0248* 20.306 60.275 X2*X3 4.099 0.113 36.32 0.0175* 2.665 5.5341 Education*Unemployment X2*X4 7.24E-06 5.99E-07 12.1 0.0525 -3.636e-7 1.48E-05 Education*Monthly Expenditure X2*X5 Education*Poverty -1.122 0.0393 -28.57 0.0223* -1.621 -0.623 X3*X3 11.595 0.72 16.09 0.0395* 2.441 20.749 Unemployment*Unemployment Note: The red number indicates the variables that have a p-value <0.05

d. The Final Model

Table 9 indicates that eight variables are entering the final model. Thus, the final model is:

The predicted average number of violent insurgent incidents =

794.01

+ 2.25*Education

- 322.56*Unemployment

- 0.000543*Monthly Expenditure

+ 40.29*Poverty

+ 4.1*Education*Unemployment

+ 0.00000724*Education*Monthly Expenditure

- 1.12*Education*Poverty

+ 11.59*Unemployment*Unemployment

, adjusted R-square = 0.99

86 e. Result of the Analysis

The result of the analysis shows that the predicted plot of the number of incidents of insurgent violence has a linear relationship with predictor variables, except for the Life Expectancy variable. The result of the analysis also produces a significant correlation value with R-square = 0.99 (see Figure 22).

Figure 22. The Predicted Plot as the Result of Analysis, with R-square = 0.99

Furthermore, in reporting the analysis, we can explain each predictor variable on the model as follows:

(1) X2—Education—High School Level

On average, a 1% increase in education - high school level (X2) variable equates approximately to a 2.25 % decrease in the number of violent insurgent incidents, when all other coefficients are held constant. We can be 95% confident that the true value of the decrease in the number of incidents of insurgent violence correlated to a 1% increase in the education - high school graduation rate is between 1.51% and 3.35%.

87 (2) X3—Unemployment

On average, a 1% increase in unemployment (X3) equates to approximately a 322.56 % decrease in the number of violent insurgent incidents, when all other coefficients are held constant. We can be 95% confident that the true value of the decrease in the number of incidents of insurgent violence correlated with a 1% increase in unemployment is between 174.08% and 471.03%.

(3) X4—Monthly Expenditure per Capita

On average, a 100,000 IDR increase in monthly expenditure (X4) equates approximately to a 54.4% decrease in the number of violent insurgent incidents, when all other coefficients are held constant. We can be 95% confident that the true value of the decrease in the number of incidents of insurgent violence correlated with a 100,000 IDR increase in monthly expenditure is between 16.4% and 92.4%.

(4) X5—Poverty

On average, a 1% increase in the poverty rate (X5) approximately equates to a 40.29% increase in insurgent violence, when all other coefficients are held constant. We can be 95% confident that the true value of the decrease in the number of incidents of insurgent violence correlated with a 1% increase in the poverty rate is between 20.30% and 60.27%.

(5) X2*X3—Education High School Level * and Unemployment

As the result of the interaction between (X2 and X3) education and unemployment affecting one another, on average, a 1% increase in the education rate that interacts with the unemployment rate equates approximately to a 6.35% decrease in insurgent violence, when all other coefficients are held constant. We can be 95% confident that the true value of the decrease in the number of incidents of insurgent violence correlated with a 1% increase in the poverty rate is between 2.66% and 5.53% (see Figure 23).

88 Figure 23. The Interaction between X2 Education and X3 Unemployment against Y Insurgent Violence

(6) X2*X4—Education High School Level * Monthly Expenditure per Capita

As the result of the interaction between (X2 and X4) education and monthly expenditure affecting one another, on average, a 1% increase in education (i.e., the high school graduation rate) that interacts with the monthly expenditure rate equates to an approximately 2.97% decrease in insurgent violence, when all other coefficients are held constant. We can be 95% confident that the true value of the decrease in the number of incidents of insurgent violence correlated to a 1% increase in the poverty rate is between 0.036% and 1.48% (see Figure 24).

89 Figure 24. The Interaction between X2 Education and X4 Monthly Expenditure against Y Insurgent Violence

(7) X2*X5—Education High School Level*Poverty

As the result of the interaction between (X2 and X5) education and poverty affecting one another, on average, a 1% increase in education that interacts with the poverty rate equates approximately to a 1.13% decrease in insurgent violence, when all other coefficients are held constant. We can be 95% confident that the true value of the decrease in the number of incidents of insurgent violence correlated with a 1% increase in the poverty rate is between 0.62% and 1.62% (see Figure 25).

90 Figure 25. The Interaction between X2 Education and X5 Poverty against Y Insurgent Violence

(8) X3*X3—Unemployment * Unemployment

As the result of the interaction between (X3 and X3) unemployment and unemployment that affecting one another, on average, a 1% increase in the unemployment rate that interacts with the unemployment rate equates approximately to a 310.97% decrease in insurgent violence, when all other coefficients are held constant. We can be 95% confident that the true value of the decrease in the number of incidents of insurgent violence correlated with a 1% increase in the poverty rate is between 2.44% and 20.74% (see Figure 26).

91 Figure 26. The Interaction between X3 Unemployment and X3 Unemployment against Y Insurgent Violence

4. Conclusion

Two regression methods were used for analysis to determine the best predictor variables. First, the simple linear regression aimed to investigate the simplest mathematical relationship between two variables, wherein the individual predictor variable was tested against the dependent variable, the number of incidents of insurgent violence. Second, multiple linear regression with stepwise regression aimed to find the relationship between several independent variables and dependent variables.

Simple linear regression reveals the correlation between individual predictor variables as X and the dependent variable as Y. As a result, five predictor variables differ from one another. Nonetheless, the plots depict that all of the independent variables have a linear relationship, while only two variables have a p-value < 0.05. At the very least, simple linear regression was able to display the correlation among the variables X and variable Y.

92 Multiple linear regression, with the stepwise (forward) method, has successfully established the model to predict the number of incidents of insurgent violence. Among the five predictor variables in the dataset, only one fails to predict the number of incidents of insurgent violence. The four independent variables most likely fit the model to predict the number of incidents of insurgent violence, while the interaction among predictor variables needed a better result. Therefore, the variables for education (high school graduation rate), unemployment, monthly expenditure per capita, and poverty are essential in predicting the number of incidents of insurgent violence. That means the four variables have linear relationships with the number of incidents of insurgent violence.

Furthermore, the analysis establishes a model that provides a plausible explanation for the GOI in countering the Papuan insurgency, particularly in dedicating significant amounts of special autonomy funds to education and economic development programs to address the Papuans’ welfare. The model is plausible compared to reality. For instance, the OPM, the insurgents, have no permanent job to earn money for living. The increase in job opportunities provided by the GOI is vital to offer an alternative to insurgent recruiting and to reduce the number of violent attacks from existing OPM members. The Papuans who do not complete their education will most likely face unemployment, and later become insurgents.

As Papuans’ monthly expenditures per capita increase over time, their basic needs also increase. The model shows that a higher monthly expenditure by Papuans corresponds with a decrease in insurgent violence. Thus, one way to increase the Papuans’ monthly expenditure to fulfill their basic needs is by giving them subsidies and incentives. By receiving subsidies, the Papuans could have better living conditions and would most likely dampen their push for independence. Lastly, poverty is still a fundamental issue for Papuans and it needs to be addressed properly. The increase in the poverty rate could also increase the number of violent insurgent incidents.

93 C. GAME THEORY ANALYSIS

Game theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers.174

Game theory in this chapter is used to analyze the strategic interaction between two players, the GOI and the OPM. This model reflects the rational options or course of action and interests of both players, in which both players must be able to set their objectives and alternative strategies, and choose the available strategy to maximize their objectives.175 Afterward, the outcomes, as the consequences of their strategies, are interpreted as the possible solution for both players, as indicated by the Nash Point.176 The logical explanation of possible options that both players use against each other to reach the best solution minimizes risk and maximizes payoffs. Both players, the GOI and the OPM, seek what is best for them. Ultimately, each player’s gain is the other player’s lossa zero-sum game.

In this model, both players have conflicting interests. The OPM as a separatist organization typically demands self-determination or independence as its goal, and the GOI as the state has the objective to protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty with any means to achieve state political stability. In this analysis, the term “special autonomy” refers to the GOI increasing the special autonomy status already granted to the provinces of Papua and West Papua in 2001. That status gave exclusive authority and self-governance to the governments of Papua and West Papua provinces to regulate their affairs and interests under the system of the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, the game shows the interactions between players that led to the most viable options for the GOI to counter the Papuan insurgency.

174 Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 1. 175 Miroslav Feix, “Game Theory Toolkit and Workbook for Defense Analysis Students” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 1, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/3368. 176 Frank Giordano, “Lesson 17, Nash Arbitration - DA4410 Model of Conflict” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, November 19, 2018). 94 1. The Game

The two players face consequences in this conflict. The GOI as a protector of territorial integrity has three choices: First, doing nothing and not responding to the OPM’s demand, but risking the lives of the people and disrupting the political and security stability that led to the separation of Papua; second, expanding the “special autonomy” status, and continuing to maintain the state’s security and political stability; and third, conducting military operations to crush the OPM. The two players involved in the game, the GOI and the OPM, each have their options. Doing nothing and ignoring the situation is most likely an option that will be avoided by the GOI. Therefore, to understand the set-up of the game and how the options interact with each other, we can use the letters and the combination of letters that produce a result depicted in Figure 27.

Figure 27. The Options of Interaction between the GOI and the OPM

OPM Keep up resistance and Accept Autonomy demand independence (Surrender) (Resist)

C D Gives Special Autonomy A AC AD (Autonomy) GOI Military Operation B BC BD (Attack)

There are four possible results:

AC – GOI expands special autonomy; OPM resists and demands independence. AD – GOI expands special autonomy; OPM accepts autonomy. BC – GOI conducts military operation; OPM resists and demands independence. BD – GOI conducts military operation; OPM accepts autonomy.

95 To have a better understanding of how the game is played, parameters are established with a rank order for the available options of both the GOI and the OPM. Two general assumptions have been made in this game. First, both players are rational; second, both players attempt to maximize their individual payoffs. For the analysis, the rank order for the GOI and the OPM are shown in Table 10 and Table 11, respectively. The numerical interpretation from one to four of ranking or weighting the options is necessary in order to illustrate the Nash Equilibrium.

Table 10. Options Available to the GOI

GOI’s options: Ranking Category Remarks GOI expands special autonomy status, does not use force. 4 Best OPM accepts special autonomy and stops resisting. GOI uses force. 3 Next-Best OPM stops resisting and accepts autonomy. GOI uses force. 2 Least-best OPM keeps resisting and demanding independence. GOI expands special autonomy but loses Papua. 1 Worst OPM resists and gets international support for independence.

Table 11. Options Available to the OPM

OPM’s options: Ranking Category Remarks OPM keeps resisting; gains international support and 4 Best independence. GOI does not use force and expands special autonomy. OPM keeps resisting and rejecting autonomy. 3 Next-Best GOI uses force. OPM stops resisting and accepts autonomy. 2 Least-best GOI uses force. OPM is destroyed and accepts autonomy. 1 Worst GOI expands special autonomy.

96 Figure 28 depicts potential moves in the game; the numbers shown for each move reflect the ranking of the options listed and the Nash Equilibrium. The Nash Equilibrium is “a point at which no player can benefit by departing unilaterally (by itself) from its strategy associated with an outcome.”177 The blue arrows indicate the GOI’s decisions, and the red arrows indicate the OPM’s decisions. As seen in the diagram, the GOI does not have a dominant strategy, which means the GOI’s decision depends on the OPM’s decision. No matter what the GOI chooses, the OPM keeps resisting. The diagram shows the payoffs and both arrows are towards BC (2, 3), which means this point is the Nash Equilibrium. The payoff of this step is the GOI conducts the military operation, and the OPM continues to resist. Therefore, the OPM will stay with its intention and demand independence. In contrast, the GOI is still figuring out what is the best way to solve this situation, either to grant expanded special autonomy or to deploy a larger military operation to maintain stability. Then, to find a positive resolution, the GOI must consider a strategic move as the next step.

Figure 28. GOI and OPM Movement Diagram

177 Giordano, “Lesson 17, Nash Arbitration - DA4410 Model of Conflict”) 97 2. Strategic Moves

In the analysis of zero-sum games, both players choose their strategies/options simultaneously without communicating with each other. Then, according to Philip Straffin, Michael Macasey, and Arthur Benjamin, “when one player can move first and make his move known to the other player, or when the players can talk to each other before they move; commitment, threats and promises become possible.”178 Therefore, the facts that must be identified are:

• Strategy A: represents the GOI’s strategic move to expand special autonomy. • Strategy B: represents the GOI’s strategic move to attack or deploy the military operation. • Strategy C: represents the OPM’s strategic move to continue resisting and demanding independence. • Strategy D: represents the OPM’s strategic move to stop resisting and accept autonomy. • A dominant strategy for the OPM is to continue resisting. • There is no dominant strategy for the GOI. • The Nash Equilibrium occurs at (2, 3).

3. Analysis of Strategic Moves

GOI’s perspective is as follows: a. The result of a simultaneous game without communication would be BC

(2,3).

b. The GOI moves first:

1) If the GOI does A, the OPM does C. The outcome is (1,4).

2) If the GOI does B, the OPM does C. The outcome is (2,3).

178 Philip D. Straffin et al., Game Theory and Strategy, vol. 36 (Washington, DC: American Mathematical Society, 1993), 87. 98 The result is that the GOI will do (2, 3), which is the better outcome.

c. The OPM moves first:

1) If the OPM does C, the GOI does B. The outcome is (2,3).

2) If the OPM does D, the GOI does A. The outcome is (4,1).

The result is that the OPM will do (2,3), which is the better outcome.

Outcomes: Both the GOI and the OPM have no first move better than the outcome without communication.

4. Threat

Suppose the GOI wants the OPM to play D. The OPM does C, and the GOI does A (to hurt itself, since the GOI does the opposite of what it would normally do). The outcome is (1,4). The outcome does not hurt the OPM, and the GOI cannot let the OPM choose C because it helps the OPM. The GOI cannot get the OPM to choose D with a threat. So, there is no threat.

5. Promises

Suppose the GOI wants the OPM to play D. The OPM does D, and the GOI hurts itself by doing B. The outcome is (3,2), which helps the OPM from 1 to 2, while the GOI decreases from 4 to 3. Thus, it is a promise and eliminates a point (4,1). Yet, after eliminating (4,1), it does not work when the OPM chooses C, which can still increase the utility. Then, the GOI is unable to get the OPM to choose D with a promise.

After analyzing the strategic moves, there is no better option left for the GOI than the point of BC (2,3). Although there is a threat, it does not help to increase the GOI’s value for a better option to deal with the OPM.

6. Prudential Strategy

It is necessary to analyze each actor’s security level to narrow down the best possible solution while neither the GOI nor the OPM can benefit from a conservative strategy. The GOI is also unable to use a threat or promise with the OPM. Thus, the GOI 99 must attempt to maximize its outcome while the OPM attempts to minimize the GOI’s outcome.

Figure 29 depicts the results of the GOI’s payoffs, with the GOI maximizing its outcome and the OPM minimizing its outcome. The Indonesian security level is 2, and the prudential strategy is B.

Figure 29. GOI Security Level

Figure 30 depicts the results of the OPM’s payoffs, which is the OPM maximizing its outcome and the GOI minimizing its outcome. The OPM’s security level is 3, and the prudential strategy is C.

Figure 30. OPM Security Level

100 The graph in Figure 31 illustrates the two security levels and shows the outcomes from the individual games. The security levels of both the GOI and the OPM are (2,3). The prudential strategy does not allow any further progress, and it is indicated by the outcome (2,3), which means the GOI should always play B, and the OPM should always play C. The strong actor, the GOI with the direct attack, will not reduce the OPM’s will to resist. Therefore, as the result of the prudential strategy is not satisfying enough, the GOI is going to revise its strategic options with the method of interval scaling, which visualizes the best options for negotiation and the shifting of priorities.

Figure 31. GOI’s and OPM’s Security Levels

101 7. Interval Scaling

Straffin argues, “a scale on which not only the order of numbers but also the ratios of differences of the numbers is meaningful is called an interval scale.”179 The interval scale allows illustrating the most preferred options for the GOI and the OPM. The starred numbers appear on the preferences of the GOI, and the OPM is the cardinal utilities. Straffin asserts, “numbers reflecting preferences on an interval scale are called cardinal utilities.”180

Figure 32 illustrates the cardinal utilities for the GOI’s options. The options for the GOI are obvious and ranked by the assigned number that represents the preferences. The GOI does not conduct the military operation and expands special autonomy, and the OPM stops resisting, which is the best option and is awarded a “10.” The next-best option is that the GOI conducts the military operation or attacks, and the OPM stops resisting, which is the desired end-state for the GOI. The military operation mainly supports law enforcement in maintaining the security and stability in Papua, and is awarded a “9.” The least-best option for the GOI is to conduct military operations or attack, and the OPM continues to resist.

This situation could have two results: First, it will be worse for the OPM as this option could kill as many of their members; second, this option also needs significant effort and energy on the part of the GOI to conduct a military operation. The measured military operation must minimize civilian casualties that could draw international attention, and must not risk of the loss of international support. Thus, this option is awarded a “4.” The worst option available is that the GOI does not conduct a military operation and gives full autonomy to both Papua and West Papua provinces, while the OPM keeps resisting, and OPM sympathizers could misuse the autonomy funds to support the OPM’s struggle to gain independence. Therefore, this option is awarded a “1.”

179 Straffin et al., 36–50. 180 Straffin et al., 36–50. 102 Figure 32. Interval Scaling of Cardinal Utilities for the GOI’s Options

Figure 33 illustrates the cardinal utilities for the OPM’s options. The OPM continues resisting while the Indonesian government does not conduct a military operation and only gives autonomy is the best option for OPM. Thus, it is awarded a “10.” The next- best option for the OPM is continuing to resist, and the GOI conducts military operations or attacks. This option would allow the OPM to think twice that they could be in danger if they have to fight the Indonesian military. On the other hand, there were some experiences of military operations that failed in Papua that could make the OPM underestimate the Indonesian military while the OPM also knows the terrain and weather conditions of Papua and West Papua well. Thus, this option is awarded a “4.” The least-best option for the OPM is that it stops resisting and surrenders, while the Indonesian government conducts military operations or attacks. This option is awarded a “2.” The worst option for the OPM is to stop resisting, and the GOI gives autonomy. Therefore, this option is awarded a “1.”

Figure 33. Interval Scaling of Cardinal Utilities for the OPM’s Options

103 8. The Game with Cardinal Utilities

The revised game using the cardinal utilities is illustrated in Table 12 and Table 13. Meanwhile, the matrix of the strategic moves that shows the Nash Equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 34.

Table 12. Options Available to the GOI with Cardinal Utilities

GOI’s options: Ranking Category Remarks GOI expands special autonomy status; does not use force. 10 Best OPM accepts special autonomy and stops resisting. GOI uses force. 9 Next-Best OPM stops resisting and accepts autonomy. GOI uses force. 3 Least-best OPM keeps resisting and demands independence. GOI expands special autonomy but loses Papua. 1 Worst OPM resists and gets international support for independence.

Table 13. Options Available to the OPM with Cardinal Utilities

OPM’s options: Ranking Category Remarks OPM keeps resisting; gains international support and 10 Best independence. GOI does not use force and expands special autonomy. OPM keeps resisting and rejecting autonomy. 4 Next-Best GOI uses force. OPM stops resisting and accepts autonomy. 2 Least-best GOI uses force. OPM is destroyed and accepts autonomy. 1 Worst GOI expands special autonomy.

104 Figure 34. GOI vs. OPM Movement Diagram

Figure 35 illustrates the movement diagram of both the GOI and the OPM with the same outcome as the original game. The Nash Equilibrium is BC (3,4), with the GOI conducting a military operation and the OPM continuing to resist.

Figure 35. The GOI vs. OPM with Cardinal Utility Graph

105 Notice the gap in the movement diagram, which is illustrated in Figure 35. The movement diagram opens an opportunity of a gap that allows for a new negotiation set. The revised game also suggests the Nash Equilibrium at the point (3,4) and the security level at the point (3,4) as Status Quo (SQ). According to the movement diagram, the GOI does not have a dominant strategy. In order to divert the OPM’s dominant strategy in column C, the GOI must increase its strategy to BD (9,2) from BC (3,4). Thus, the GOI should negotiate or give an incentive to the OPM to increase the OPM’s cardinal utility above a security level with a “4” or higher.

9. Incentive or Negotiation

As in the Aceh case, at the point of negotiation there is a need for a third party to stand in the middle and mediate between both actors, putting forward a peace settlement under the frame of the GOI. The negotiation set was in the line of Pareto optimal at or above the security level of both actors. The player’s security level is the lowest level that the player can tolerate in his position. Otherwise, it will hurt the player (see Figure 35).

As a defender, the GOI calculates the most likely options that the OPM will take and considers the consequences of the GOI’s choices. The GOI will most likely minimize the risk of losing Papua. The military approach would most likely be put behind, while the broader autonomy approaches would come to the forefront as the main weapon to deal with the OPM. Therefore, in order to find the best option, it is possible to negotiate with the OPM to find a cooperative solution and benefit for both the GOI and the OPM. Thus, the movement diagram changes (see Figure 36).

106 Figure 36. GOI vs. OPM Movement Diagram—After Negotiation

The two approaches, giving autonomy and launching the military operation, did not change the OPM’s demand for independence. In contrast, negotiation, in the form of dialogue, will most likely be preferred to ease the OPM’s grievances and most likely to revise its preference. This negotiation gives benefits to both the GOI and the OPM. The OPM’s “least-best” option increases from a “2” to become a “5.” Thus, after the game is revised, the point BC (3,4) is no longer the Nash Equilibrium.

Therefore, the result of the interaction between the GOI and the OPM after the game is revised is that the SQ points of the y-axis increase from 4 to 4.6 (see Figure 37). Hence, the Nash Point as a fair solution for both players lies at 0.5 of the y-axis of the OPM’s security level and 0.5 of the x-axis of the GOI’s security level. As soon as the Nash point as the arbitration point located in (6.32, 6.675) is reached, both players can meet and decide their respective decision on the negotiation set line and cooperate with each other. As a result, the GOI and the OPM should cooperate and play 55.3% of point (3, 8.75) and 44.67% of BD (9.5) (see Figure. 37).

107 Figure 37. The GOI vs. OPM Revised Game Chart

In interpreting the result, it shows that there is no dominant strategy for both players. The result of the game is that the GOI and the OPM must meet in the negotiation set in the area of yellow line in Figure 37. Both players secure their interest, respectively. The GOI persuades the OPM to play in column D, and the GOI will play in a “9,” which is the next-best option for the GOI (the GOI uses force, OPM stops resisting and accepts autonomy). The OPM also will not play below “4,” which is also the OPM’s next-best option (OPM keeps resisting and rejecting autonomy, GOI uses force). Therefore, the analysis of this model finds that the best strategy for the GOI is to counter the Papuan insurgency in the form of negotiation, such as the establishment of a constructive dialogue with Papuans.

108 V. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

A strategy is the employment of the instruments (elements) of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives.181

A. RECOMMENDATION

The Government of Indonesia is aware that Papua and West Papua provinces have strategic importance for Indonesia. Indonesia will not let the region become independent, like what happened in East Timor in 1999. P.T. Freeport Indonesia (PTFI), the U.S. mining company that has operated in the region since 1967, reports that the company contributes to 0.6 percent of Indonesia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 48 percent of Papua’s Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP), and 94 percent of Mimika Regency GRDP in 2017.182 That contribution is only from one source, the PTFI. There are more resources available in the region, such as tropical forests known as the largest in Indonesia, oil, and waters that have potential for the fisheries industry.

In terms of employment, as of March 2018, PTFI employs a total 7,028 workers, 2,888 of whom are indigenous Papuans.183 Yet, the job opportunities for the indigenous Papuans are still mainly limited to the agricultural sector due to the lack of qualified workers for the mining company. Within that situation, evidence of the marginalization of Papuans is widespread and sparks the feeling that Papuans do not deserve to control or directly benefit from the resources on their land.

181 Yarger, “Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College Strategy Model,” 1. 182 Ambarani Nadia Kemala Movanita, “Pembayar Pajak Terbesar, Freeport Sumbang Penerimaan Negara 17,2 Miliar Dollar AS [the Largest Tax Payer, Freeport Contributes to State Revenue 17.2 Billion U.S. Dollars],” Kompas, December 22, 2018, https://money.kompas.com/read/2018/12/22/142513326/ pembayar-pajak-terbesar-freeport-sumbang-penerimaan-negara-172-miliar-dollar. 183 Michael Agustinus, “Puluhan Tahun Menambang Emas Di Papua, Berapa Setoran Freeport Ke RI [Decades of Gold Mining in Papua, How Much is Freeport Deposit to Indonesia?],” Detik Finance, August 30, 2017, https://finance.detik.com/energi/d-3621157/puluhan-tahun-menambang-emas-di-papua-berapa- setoran-freeport-ke-ri. 109 Despite the abundance of natural resources and potential for economic development in the provinces of Papua and West Papua, they are beset by armed violence from the OPM, which is growing increasingly dangerous. The insurgents have been able to obtain weapons and ammunition from various sources. Furthermore, OPM’s political wings actively spread propaganda in the region and have their push for Papuan independence has gained momentum following recent incidents of racial abuse in Malang that generated massive protests in major cities in Papua and West Papua provinces. Meanwhile, exiled OPM leaders, like Benny Wenda, have also sought international support by distorting information about the situation in Papua, such as the genocide issue, which was a fraud.

Therefore, this chapter provides a recommendation for the GOI to develop and implement a sound strategy to deal with the Papuans and to counter the OPM. The soft approaches are most likely achievable rather than hard approaches like a large military operation. The OPM’s provocation to force the TNI to commit a larger military operation is desirable only for the OPM. The insurgents rely on the likelihood of military operations producing collateral damage, enabling the OPM to weaponized human rights issues to weaken Indonesia’s position on the international stage. At the same time, with the abundant resources available in Papua, the GOI must devise a strategy to minimize the inequity in the Papuans’ living conditions and secure their support. As a guide to develop a sound strategy, the GOI can refer to the three analyses in Chapter IV, which represent the domestic environment in analyzed according to McCormick’s diamond model. Analysis A represents the strategy/line 2 of the model, analysis B represents the strategy/line 1 of the model, and analysis C represents the strategy/line 3 of the model (see Figure 38). The result of the three analyses provides potential strategies and leads to the recommendations discussed in the following sections (see Figure 39).

110 Figure 38. The McCormick Diamond COIN Model184

Figure 39. The Flow of the Three Analyses and Recommendations

184 Source: Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” 6. 111 1. Prevention

Analysis A, which used the SIR model forecasting the extent of OPM’s influence on the population, showed the expected outcome if GOI takes no action to prevent the spread of OPM’s ideology. This prevention effort is one of the soft approach strategies most likely to avoid risking any lives of either the GOI or the OPM. As witnessed in the 1999 Aceh case (after the DOM status was lifted), the absence of government officials in rural and other areas enabled the GAM, a similar insurgent group, to strengthen its powers and even take over the government. That said, the spread of GAM in Aceh would be the same as the spread of OPM in Papua if the GOI failed to control and maintain government presence in the region. In the case of Papua and West Papua provinces, the Papuans can be divided into three categories, the pro-government faction, the insurgent supporters, and the neutral population. It is first necessary to prevent the neutral Papuans from being influenced by the OPM’s ideology, and pull them to the right track to support the GOI and move into the pro-government category; second, it is essential to exploit those who are pro- government to act as the GOI’s agent for changing the insurgents’ narrative. As a result of analysis A, there are two strategies available for discussion and recommendation.

a. Vaccination as Prevention

This analogy is applied to prevent the spread of a “contagion” from the insurgents. The OPM’s influence is strongest mainly in the highland areas, where the population has a lower level of schooling compared to the general population of Indonesia and educational infrastructure is limited. Therefore, the first step for prevention is providing educational facilities in all places in the region. This effort is plausible since the autonomy budget covers the areas of education and health. Then, the curriculum must be considered. Establishing a proper education focused on Indonesian nationalism as a whole, regardless of race, culture, and religion, is necessary. In addition, the specific curriculum for Indonesian history must be addressed to reinforce a mindset that the Papuans are Indonesian. This curriculum is to be applied not only in rural areas but in every district of Papua and West Papua provinces.

112 After the implementation of educational development programs, the GOI must publicize the development effort that aims to develop Papua and West Papua as equal to other provinces in Indonesia. Not every Papuan, however, has access to electronic media or the Internet. Therefore, the GOI should utilize local institutions, such as the church, the customary council, and the GOI representation, including the TNI and the police, to spread this information. In turn, these “vaccination” efforts could reduce the Papuans’ support for the OPM.

b. Quarantine as a Separation of the OPM from the Population

Quarantine is used to separate and restrict the movement of well persons who may have been exposed to a communicable disease to see if they become ill. These people may have been exposed to a disease and do not know it, or they may have the disease but do not show symptoms. The quarantine can also help limit the spread of communicable diseases.185

The quarantine analogy entails isolating the OPM from the local population to block the insurgents from having any form of communication with the population. The dynamic of the OPM is that they have kinship among the tribes and depend on their kinship as a source to recuperative power.186 Physical isolation can be achieved in the form of establishing roadblocks, border control, and checkpoints. Also, it is essential to cut their lines of communication, such as by limiting Internet access in the area that is alleged to be the OPM’s base. Thus, with the Internet and media in the GOI’s hands, OPM members will become desperate, and at the same time, it will reduce their influence on the population.

Another form of quarantine effort is to increase the counterintelligence capabilities for all of the intelligence services. The early detection of OPM’s intelligence, plans, and sources of support is critical to anticipate any kind of incident in the future. Although the OPM has proven survival capabilities, it is unclear how the OPM members get money for living expenses besides their criminal activities. Furthermore, it is essential to determine

185 “What Is the Difference between Isolation and Quarantine?” U.S Department of Health and Human Services, accessed October 23, 2019, https://www.hhs.gov/answers/public-health-and-safety/what- is-the-difference-between-isolation-and-quarantine/index.html. 186 Department of the Army, 1-23. 113 how the OPM gets its weapons other than from attacking the careless soldier and police. For sure, there is a signal that OPM members are receiving either internal or external financial support so they can buy their weaponry and fund their movement. Thus, the isolation effort is not only physically applied, but also could be applied in another form like cyber patrols to disrupt their financial support. In terms of effort, separating the OPM from its supporters (or sources) is easier than hunting them in the dense forest.

2. Increase and Optimization Autonomy with a Clear Platform

An economic growth would not only eradicate poverty but also lead to greater equity.187

The questions to be addressed before concluding this “autonomy” section are: does the autonomy work? If yes, what are the parameters? Those two questions arise when the armed violence committed by the OPM increases, and pan-Papuan nationalism is growing. The implementation of autonomy became one of the issues among the Papuans since there was a lack of clarity on the plan and its operationalization.188 With its large budget for economic development and social welfare programs in Papua and West Papua provinces, their transition to autonomous status was supposed to address the basic grievances of the Papuans, such as the poverty issue.

Analysis B focused on the strategy/line 1 of McCormick’s model, which is to win the popular support. The analysis used the multiple linear regression model to find the relationships between the incidents of insurgent violence and five predictor variables: Papuans’ life expectancy, level of education, unemployment rate, monthly expenditure, and poverty rate. The ten-year dataset showed that all variables fluctuate from time to time. However, the result of analysis B suggested that four independent variableseducation, unemployment, monthly expenditure, and povertyhave a linear relationship with the dependent variable, the number of incidents of the insurgent violence.

187 Amitav. Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia - International Relations of a Region (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2012), 163. 188 Kivimäki, 58. 114 From the past ten years of data, it is evident that the fundamental variable of poverty has exhibited a decreasing trend (see Figure 40). This trend suggests that autonomy has worked in both provinces. Consequently, it will affect another variable like monthly expenditure. The lower the poverty rate, the higher the Papuans’ monthly expenditure rate is likely to rise.

Figure 40. Percentage of Poverty—Papua and West Papua Provinces, 2009–2018189

Nevertheless, the decrease in the rate of poverty does not necessarily correlate with a decrease in the number of incidents of insurgent violence. The poverty rate or the other variables must have interactions with each other in order to find the fit model of predicting the rate of insurgent violence. In short, the interaction of independent variables with one another requires a simultaneous effort to have a better result, which is the reduction of insurgent violence. Thus, an increase in the autonomy budget will be one of the solutions to accelerate the peoples’ development, the economy, and the infrastructure in Papua and West Papua provinces.

189 Adapted from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, BPS.go.id, the combination of percentages of poverty in Papua and West Papua provinces, 2009–2018. 115 a. Increase the Health Services and Facilities

Although the life expectancy variable does not have significant correlation with the number of violent acts committed by the insurgents, the life expectancy data indicates that the health of the Papuan is has increased from time to time, but not significant. The fluctuating and poor condition of Papuans’ health needs to be addressed. For instance, there have been recent public health emergencies, such as the measles outbreak in Asmat regency that left 71 children dead and 646 infected, and the 2018 case in which 218 were found suffering from malnutrition.190 In sum, the programs under autonomy failed to address these conditions, which would likely provide momentum for the insurgents to boost their movement. Therefore, autonomy should be able to improve and expand the health services and facilities throughout the Papua region to counter the sense of abandonment by the government.

b. Increase Educational Services and Infrastructure

The dataset showed that the level of education, as measured by the percentage of Papuans who graduate from the high school, is a significant variable. It must be noted that not every district has a high school facility like in urban areas. If the district has one, it is most likely in poor condition and lacks the proper number of teachers. Therefore, the improvement of educational services and facilities is a high priority for the GOI. This effort can reduce the number of incidents of insurgent violence and increase the value of human development. Also, education is related to more and better job opportunities, particularly in global companies that operates in Papua, such as P.T. Freeport Indonesia, which require the workers to be sufficiently educated to qualify for skilled employment.

c. Create Job Opportunities for Indigenous Papuans

The increase or decrease of the unemployment rate for Papuans could be correlated with the number of incidents of insurgent violence. As in the Aceh case, the peace

190 Yanuar Nugroho, “Tantangan Masalah Kesehatan Papua [the Challenges of Papua’s Health Problems],” Tempo, January 31, 2018, https://kolom.tempo.co/read/1055762/tantangan-masalah-kesehatan- papua/full&view=ok. 116 agreement requires the former combatants of GAM to secure a job during the reconstruction of Aceh after the tsunami. This method can be applied in Papua by offering proper jobs to OPM members. There must be a clear platform, however, and the GOI must be able to guarantee that the job is available not only for former OPM members but also for all Papuans. Moreover, to avoid the impression of marginalization, the autonomy funds should be included in the policy to send young Papuans to become doctors, nurses, engineers, and other types of public services practitioners. Then, those who are educated can serve as civil servants in Papua and West Papua provinces.

d. Subsidies

The GOI recently issued a Kartu Indonesia Pintar (KIP) or Indonesia Smart Card, Kartu Indonesia Sehat (KIS), and a Kartu Keluarga Sejahtera (KKS) or Prosperous Family Card for the poor people. These cards allow poor Indonesian people to more easily access education and health facilities and meet the basic cost of living.191 In reality, this form of subsidies did not meet the GOI’s target, and many people took advantage of getting these subsidies. Therefore, the GOI must set priorities in helping people meet their daily needs. For example, addressing the fact that Papuans in rural areas do not even have access to adequate food and clean water should be a priority. Another example is the price of a sack of rice in Papua is higher than it is in Java or other areas in Indonesia. Therefore, to alleviate the unequal cost burden, increased subsidies are needed for and would be more effective in improving Papuans’ economic condition.

e. Economic Empowerment

Besides the subsidies, another form of economic empowerment could come from a loan provided by the GOI to the Papuans. The loan could improve their economic conditions and standard of living if they spend the loan on establishing and growing their own business. There must be a government institution to lead the Papuans to be more

191 Andylala Waluyo, “Presiden Jokowi Luncurkan 3 Kartu Untuk Rakyat Miskin Indonesia [President Jokowi Launches 3 Cards for Indonesia’s Poor People],” Voice of America, November 3, 2014, https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/presiden-jokowi-luncurkan-3-kartu-untuk-rakyat-miskin/2505763.html. 117 creative with the home industry, and the GOI could accommodate the product for commerce.

f. Autonomy Watch Institution

In 2011, President Yudhoyono issued a presidential decree for the acceleration of development in Papua and created a special unit called Unit of Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4B). This unit aimed to control and monitor the implementation of the special autonomy in Papua and West Papua provinces. This unit, however, was no longer available after the leadership change to Presiden Joko Widodo. Therefore, a new institution under the current administration is needed to monitor the implementation of autonomy, especially to avoid the misuse of the autonomy budget and ensure the autonomy budget addresses the right targets.

3. Constructive Dialogue—Negotiation

Analysis C, which employed the game theory model, concluded that the Nash point is located on the negotiation set line. According to that conclusion, there is nothing the GOI can do other than to put the problem on the negotiation table. This result was problematic, because the GOI will most likely avoid compromising with the OPM. On the one hand, the GOI could adopt a “barbaric” strategy using its resources to destroy the OPM, but on the other hand, those strategies seem disproportionate to the OPM’s capabilities. Moreover, such an approach could undermine the GOI’s reputation and weaken Indonesia’s position on the international stage. Arreguin-Toft argues, “barbarism has been used to destroy an adversary’s will and capacity to fight. When will is the target in a strategic bombing campaign, for example, the strong actor seeks to coerce its weaker opponent into changing its behavior by inflicting pain (destroying its values).”192 Yet, the barbarism strategy would not be an alternative to be used by the GOI due to the human rights violation issues of the past. Therefore, it is appropriate to refer to the Aceh case, and to remember that a constructive dialogue is necessary as long as it is under the auspices of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

192 Arreguín-Toft, 101–2. 118 a. The Need for the Third Party

The first dialogue between the GOI and the Papuans occurred during President B.J. Habibie’s administration in 1999. That dialogue led to the formulation of the special autonomy law. Then, why did the success of the first dialogue in 1999 fail to maintain the peace? Timo Kivimaki argues, “the implementation of the law itself was the problem. The dialogue should seek to modify the special autonomy law in a way that produces mutual benefit and [is] mutually acceptable for both sides.”193 In this case, the GOI must offer a clear platform for negotiations. In the Aceh case, the GOI and the GAM committed to the result of the MOU Helsinki under the supervision of the independent institution, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). Thus, the form of constructive dialogue between the GOI and the OPM must specifically address the agenda of the re-formulation of the special autonomy and its implementation, and nothing else. This dialogue must be monitored by an independent institution agreed upon by both parties.

b. Addressing the Root Cause

Chauvel asserts, “the principle of self-determination and how the principle was not upheld in Indonesia’s conduct of the Act of Free Choice have become the centerpieces of Papuan Nationalism.”194 The integration process of Papua as a part of Indonesia through the AFC is contested by the Papuan pro-independent activists who have their own agenda. In fact, the integration process, since the NYA and the result of the AFC, was concluded with UN Resolution 2504 on November 19, 1969. Nevertheless, this dispute can be ended by reconciliation through dialogue between the GOI and the representatives of the Papuans, including local leaders, tribal chiefs, religious leaders, and other public figures.

4. Strengthening Diplomacy

In the East Timor case, the GOI failed to degrade the insurgents’ external support, the step located on line 4 of the McCormick model. Similar to the East Timor case, the exiled OPM members have also been actively seeking international support by

193 Kivimäki, 55. 194 Chauvel, 83. 119 campaigning with misinformation that distorts the image of Papua abroad, alleging a GOI- sponsored genocide campaign, human rights violations, marginalization of Papuans by government institutions, and persistent poverty. There is reason to worry about Benny Wenda and his supporters’ maneuvers abroad. One recent incident occurred in which Wenda successfully infiltrated Vanuatu’s delegation to present a petition (he claimed that 1.8 million Papuans signed the petition for a referendum) during the UN general assembly.195 This shocking incident must be anticipated with strong diplomacy.

Therefore, to disrupt external support to the OPM, there must be specific guidance for all Indonesian diplomats to understand the history of Papua and the GOI policy towards it. Then, they can defend the argument that Papua is legally part of Indonesia. Also, it is important to strengthen diplomatic cooperation with all neighboring countries that support Papua’s independence, such as what happened in Nauru and Papua New Guinea that has turned to support Papua as an integral part of Indonesia.

5. Special Operation to Support Law Enforcement

As the strength of the OPM is far behind that of the TNI in terms of budget, manpower, and weaponry, the insurgents would never be able to defeat the TNI and the Indonesian National Police with a direct attack. Instead, the OPM likely will employ a series of political tactics to gain popular support. Arreguin-Toft argues, “the weak actors will win if they apply an indirect strategy against the direct strategy of the strong actor.”196 As determined by analysis C, the OPM will most likely provoke the TNI as was done in the Aceh case. In that case, the GAM expected the TNI to respond to the provocation with brutality, the killing of civilians, and the burning of their houses. The TNI would then fall into the trap set by GAM.197 Thus, with this argument, the military option would likely be the last resort. In response to the escalation of the violence, however, a small-scale operation is suitable and can be achieved by deploying a small-scale trained unit that works

195 “West Papuan Separatist Hands Petition to U.N. Human Rights Chief,” Reuters, January 27, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-papua-un/west-papuan-separatists-hand-petition-to-u-n- human-rights-chief-idUSKCN1PL0K7. 196 Arreguín-Toft, 108. 197 Ross, 49. 120 in parallel with the Indonesian National Police to support law enforcement and maintain stability.

The GOI has categorized the OPM as a Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata (KKB), an armed criminal group, which is still the domain of the Indonesian National Police. Nevertheless, with the increase of violence, especially in the rural areas that pose a geographic challenge, the INP does not have the capability to pursue the OPM. Thus, the TNI, with its Komando Daerah Militer (KODAM) or Indonesian army regional command, could deploy the special operation forces to support law enforcement.

At least three special operation strategies could be implemented in Papua and West Papua provinces to support law enforcement. First, there could be a counterintelligence operation. This operation could be in the form of counter-propaganda against the OPM, including cyber operations, counter-narratives, and clandestine operations. The presence of foreign and OPM intelligence involved in every violent incident in Papua is questionable, however. Their presence could be seen on the pattern of the insurgent violence with specific momentum, such as the recent racial abuse case. This incident, the racial abuse case that happened in Malang recently, would not be able to mobilize thousands of Papuans protesting against the GOI, destruction of government’s facilities, and raise the spirit of pan-Papuan identity without an intelligence network.

Second, there could be a small-scale military operation with the objective of either targeting leadership or capturing OPM members and bringing them to the court. Also, there could be mapping and prevention of potential OPM recruitment activities. This strategy fits with the findings of analysis A, in which the COAs suggest an eradication of the insurgents. However, the negative aspect of this option is that the total Papuan population decreases, if the OPM still insists on resisting.

Third, there could be a territorial operation. This operation would be equivalent to the U.S. military type of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) operation. This operation mostly targets a village that is alleged to support the OPM, or an underdeveloped village. This operation aims to win Papuans’ hearts and minds with the actions that address basic

121 needs for Papuans, such as providing health services, building bridges and roads, and other activities demanded by the people.

B. CONCLUSION

Since the OPM emerged, the methods of resolving the Papuan conflict have occurred during three periods. The first period was from 1963 to 1998. In this period, the GOI was still focused on maintaining its legitimacy and forgot to fulfill Papuans’ basic needs. The GOI implemented a security approach by forcing Papua to become a DOM. The second period is between 1998 and 2014 and is marked by the fall of President Soeharto in 1998 as a turning point. In this period, the GOI under President B.J. Habibie’s administration had different approaches from those of the previous period. He agreed on granting special autonomy to the Papua and lifted the DOM status in the provinces. B.J. Habibie, with his special autonomy policy, divided Papua into two provinces, Papua and West Papua. In 2011, President Yudhoyono’s administration attempted to strengthen that autonomy and accelerate development in Papua. The third period is from 2014 until today, under President Joko Widodo’s administration, which still maintains the special autonomy status and is expanding the military structure in both provinces to maintain stability and sovereignty.

Beyond considering the conclusions just described that were derived from applying McCormick’s model and carrying out three analyses, the GOI must listen to the Papuans when they are expressing their needs. Anderson argues, “Papuans don’t only need to have their suffering recognized; they need institutional reforms to mitigate further abuses.”198 Also, the GOI must review its development policies and other programs that have been accomplished in Papua, to assess whether they are in accordance with the Papuans’ actual wishes, such as addressing transmigration and the mining program. The GOI must really map out what is needed there, rather than what it wants or what it thinks is needed there.

In addition, if the proposed strategies work, then the OPM and other Papuan nationalist groups should be willing to give up their weapons and leave their push for

198 Anderson, 49. 122 independence. In that event, the GOI must consider further steps to reintegrate the former OPM members into the community and treat them as the government treats other Indonesian people. In anticipation of the success of this step, further research on the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process is essential.

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