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The Professiona/ Journal of the United States Air Force the objective and the dimensions of conflict When Soviet invasion forces crossed the Afghan border in December of 1979, the reaction of American commentators, following initial cries of shock and outrage, was nearly uniform: The Soviets, it was argued, had made a "serious miscalculation"; they had reckoned without the forces of reiigiousiy inspired nationalism; they had gravely underestimated the seriousness of their transgression in the eyes of world opinion. The phrase "Russia's Vietnam" was repeated with monotonous regularity, and an optimistic few perceived the Soviet Union as sliding inexorably and helplessly into an unwinnable quicksand war. The Vietnam analogy fails on at least two leveis. First, it would be difficuit to invent an economic geography and military topography more unlike the rice paddies and jungles of Indochina than the bare, arid valleys of the Hindu Kush and the Paropamisus mountains. Living in the midst of relative agricultural abundance, small Vietcong and Vietminh units could generally steal, extort—or grow — enough food for survival. Cover and concealment were abundant; water was almost never a problem. The contrast with Afghanistan's fragile ecosystem is stark. Low rainfall and a short growing season translate into endemic scarcity, and the disruption of a single planting or harvest season can mean disaster. Concealment is sparse, and water sources are apt to be tactically exposed. The schools of mufahiddin guerrillas have a very shallow sea in which to swim. The second failing of the Vietnam analogy is more subtle: How can we evaluate Soviet chances without an understanding of Soviet objectives? We cannot be definitive, but our lead author provides the outlines. From this observation flows another: Do Soviet means mesh with Soviet ends, or are they inherently incompatible? Our second article, "The Grammar and Logic of Conflict," offers a disciplined approach to these fundamental questions. J. F. G. The Soviet Invasion Of Afghanlstan......................................................................................... 2 Dr. Seth Singleton Ira C. Eaker Essay Competition........................................................................................................21 The Gr ammar And Logic: O f Conflict.......................................................................................22 Col. Thomas A. Fabyanic. USAF ICBM VULNERABILITY, MOBILITY, AND ARMS CONTROl..............................................................32 Dr. Donald M. Snow Executive Stress....................................................................................................................................43 Col. Raymond Ci. Troxler, LhSAI- Lt. Col Harry P Wetzler, USAF The Mil it a r y Courtier And T he Illusion Of C ompetence............................................. 53 Dr. Donald D. Ghipman Ethics Theory For The Mil it a r y Professionai........................................................................63 Chaplain (Col.) Samuel D Maloney, Air National Guard In My Opinion Inside The Walls............................................................................................................................72 Maj. FrankJ. Derfler, Jr.. USAF Patriotism, U ncle Sam Needs You!.......................................................................................76 Maj. James Burkholder, USAF Commentary On Strategic Planning................................................................................................................79 Capt. Frederick C. Beisser. USAF Lt. Col. Lawrencej. Hillebrand. USAF Books and Ideas Professionai. Ideals And Mil it a r y B ehavior...................................................................... 84 Dr. James H. But k J apan: T he Student Becomes The Teacher...........................!.........................................88 Dr. James H. Toner Çooperation And Confrontation...........................................................................................91 Lt. Col. Dallate L. Meehan, USAF The Rig h t Stüff: E mbarrassed Hero W orship..................................................................95 Capt. John M. Thomson, USAF Three Studies In Leadership.....................................................................................................98 Dr. Joseph O. Baylen Potpourri.......................................................................................................................................|()() Contribulors................................................................................................... III THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN D r . S eth Singleton HE foreign policy of the Brczhnev Politburo, consistent since 1965, has four major interconnected elements: détente with the West, defined as the pursuit of mutually beneficiai trade and strategic arms control; consolidation and coordination ofthe Socialist community of communist na- tions under Soviet leadership; military growth of all types of forces; and expansion of Soviet and allied Socialist influence and presence in Asia and África as opportunity allovvs.1 Popular American opinion to the contrary, the first three elements have been considera- bly more successful than the last. In the late I970s, as evidence of the military and expan- ÉLonist character of Soviet policy mounted, sweral Soviet-connected Asian and African Times have changed. Vladimir Gtmcharov TASS commcntary. January 1980 Soviet-Afghan relaiions are a vivid example of relaiions of the new type among equal and independent States. Babrak Karmal, January 1980 There is no colonial power today which is capable of adopting the only form of contest which has a chance of succeeding, namely, the prolonged establish- ment of large forces of occupation. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of lhe Earth The danger of communist powers is not less than that of America. I hope the Muslim people of Afghanistan will soon achieve victory and real indepen­ dente and get rid of these so-called supporters of the working class. Avatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Marth 1980 nations have cooled toward the Soviets or aid and political support for their own ends defected outright. China, the most importanl and then rejected it when convenient. developing nation,.now leads the anti-Soviet Stronger policies binding Asian and African crusade. In the Islamic world the list of States to a permanent Soviet orientation former Soviet friends is long and growing: would have to be developed. At the same Sudan, Egypt. Eritrea, Somalia, Guinea, time, Soviet military power made a Soviet Nigéria, Iraq, Bangladesh, and now connection highly desirable for governments Afghanistan.2 and movements needing military' protection or the resources to win civil or local wars. Soviet emphasis on military intervention Times Have Changed: began with Soviet aid to Cuba and Vietnam. The Militarization of Soviet Policy Both countries faced confrontations against Since Lenin and the first Congress of the the United States. Military' aid to Egypt, Peoples of the East in August 1920, Soviet Syria, and Iraq was directed at Israel, con- political and ideological appeal has assumed sidered an outpost of American imperialism. a mutual interest against Western imperial- The Angolan intervention of 1975 began to ism between Third World peoples and the blur the anti-imperialist justification. While Soviet Union. But as Asian and African na­ the Angolan opponents of the Popular Move- tions achieve independente and gradually ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) consolidate control over their national were supported by the United States, China, economies, internai and local conflicts and South África, they were also African emerge to replace anti-imperialism as the liberation movements in their own right, as dominant issues.3 By the I970s, Soviet the Organization of African Unity policies relying on community of interest acknowledged. The next intervention, in against the West and bolstered by Soviet aid Ethiopia, brought Soviet power into a local had assured no permanent Socialist gains; war. Ethiopia was fighting Soviet-aided nationalist such as Gamai Nasser, Ben Bella, Somalia and a Marxist Eritrean secessionist Sékou Touré, and Mao Zedong used Soviet movement, and Soviet betrayal of the 3 4 MR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Moslem Somalis and the Moslem Eritreans African national leaders, including national did their image little good in the Middle East. Marxists or communists, continue to seek in- Fidel Castro tried and failed to mediate the dependence of foreign control when their conflict and promote a Marxist revolutionary need for protection diminishes.8 Soviet federation among Ethiopia, Somalia, and proclamations about the tighter bonds of South Yemen. The Vietnamese invasion of “socialist orientation” do not change that Kampuchea, in January 1979, showed Soviet unless the tighter bonds are somehow en- military support against communist allies of forced. China, and Soviet commentary at the time Soviet policy has been increasingly left no doubt that China itself might become squeezed into a narrow military mold a legitimate (in Soviet eyes) victim of Soviet because, as military capabilities grow and attack.4 Finally, in Afghanistan in December grow, other capabilities diminish. The Soviet 1979 the Soviet army was sent to repress a economy is in consistent, long-term. and popular revolt against a revolutionary perhaps accelerating decline,9 and one of the government without immediate invitation. many ramifications

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