The Professiona/ Journal of the United States Air Force the objective and the dimensions of conflict

When Soviet invasion forces crossed the Afghan border in December of 1979, the reaction of American commentators, following initial cries of shock and outrage, was nearly uniform: The Soviets, it was argued, had made a "serious miscalculation"; they had reckoned without the forces of reiigiousiy inspired nationalism; they had gravely underestimated the seriousness of their transgression in the eyes of world opinion. The phrase "Russia's Vietnam" was repeated with monotonous regularity, and an optimistic few perceived the Soviet Union as sliding inexorably and helplessly into an unwinnable quicksand war.

The Vietnam analogy fails on at least two leveis. First, it would be difficuit to invent an economic geography and military topography more unlike the rice paddies and jungles of Indochina than the bare, arid valleys of the Hindu Kush and the Paropamisus mountains. Living in the midst of relative agricultural abundance, small Vietcong and Vietminh units could generally steal, extort—or grow — enough food for survival. Cover and concealment were abundant; water was almost never a problem. The contrast with Afghanistan's fragile ecosystem is stark. Low rainfall and a short growing season translate into endemic scarcity, and the disruption of a single planting or harvest season can mean disaster. Concealment is sparse, and water sources are apt to be tactically exposed. The schools of mufahiddin guerrillas have a very shallow sea in which to swim.

The second failing of the Vietnam analogy is more subtle: How can we evaluate Soviet chances without an understanding of Soviet objectives? We cannot be definitive, but our lead author provides the outlines.

From this observation flows another: Do Soviet means mesh with Soviet ends, or are they inherently incompatible? Our second article, "The Grammar and Logic of Conflict," offers a disciplined approach to these fundamental questions.

J. F. G.

The Soviet Invasion Of Afghanlstan...... 2 Dr. Seth Singleton Ira C. Eaker Essay Competition...... 21 The Gr ammar And Logic: O f Conflict...... 22 Col. Thomas A. Fabyanic. USAF ICBM VULNERABILITY, MOBILITY, AND ARMS CONTROl...... 32 Dr. Donald M. Snow Executive Stress...... 43 Col. Raymond Ci. Troxler, LhSAI- Lt. Col Harry P Wetzler, USAF The Mil it a r y Courtier And T he Illusion Of C ompetence...... 53 Dr. Donald D. Ghipman Ethics Theory For The Mil it a r y Professionai...... 63 Chaplain (Col.) Samuel D Maloney, Air National Guard In My Opinion Inside The Walls...... 72 Maj. FrankJ. Derfler, Jr.. USAF Patriotism, U ncle Sam Needs You!...... 76 Maj. James Burkholder, USAF Commentary On Strategic Planning...... 79 Capt. Frederick C. Beisser. USAF Lt. Col. Lawrencej. Hillebrand. USAF Books and Ideas Professionai. Ideals And Mil it a r yB ehavior...... 84 Dr. James H. But k J apan: T he Student Becomes The Teacher...... !...... 88 Dr. James H. Toner Çooperation And Confrontation...... 91 Lt. Col. Dallate L. Meehan, USAF The Rig h t Stüff: E mbarrassed HeroW orship...... 95 Capt. John M. Thomson, USAF Three Studies In Leadership...... 98 Dr. Joseph O. Baylen Potpourri...... |()() Contribulors...... III THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

D r . S eth Singleton

HE foreign policy of the Brczhnev Politburo, consistent since 1965, has four major interconnected elements: détente with the West, defined as the pursuit of mutually beneficiai trade and strategic arms control; consolidation and coordination ofthe Socialist community of communist na- tions under Soviet leadership; military growth of all types of forces; and expansion of Soviet and allied Socialist influence and presence in Asia and África as opportunity allovvs.1 Popular American opinion to the contrary, the first three elements have been considera- bly more successful than the last. In the late I970s, as evidence of the military and expan- ÉLonist character of Soviet policy mounted, sweral Soviet-connected Asian and African Times have changed. Vladimir Gtmcharov TASS commcntary. January 1980 Soviet-Afghan relaiions are a vivid example of relaiions of the new type among equal and independent States. Babrak Karmal, January 1980 There is no colonial power today which is capable of adopting the only form of contest which has a chance of succeeding, namely, the prolonged establish- ment of large forces of occupation. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of lhe Earth The danger of communist powers is not less than that of America. I hope the Muslim people of Afghanistan will soon achieve victory and real indepen­ dente and get rid of these so-called supporters of the working class. Avatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Marth 1980 nations have cooled toward the Soviets or aid and political support for their own ends defected outright. China, the most importanl and then rejected it when convenient. developing nation,.now leads the anti-Soviet Stronger policies binding Asian and African crusade. In the Islamic world the list of States to a permanent Soviet orientation former Soviet friends is long and growing: would have to be developed. At the same Sudan, Egypt. Eritrea, Somalia, Guinea, time, Soviet military power made a Soviet Nigéria, Iraq, Bangladesh, and now connection highly desirable for governments Afghanistan.2 and movements needing military' protection or the resources to win civil or local wars. Soviet emphasis on military intervention Times Have Changed: began with Soviet aid to Cuba and Vietnam. The Militarization of Soviet Policy Both countries faced confrontations against Since Lenin and the first Congress of the the United States. Military' aid to Egypt, Peoples of the East in August 1920, Soviet Syria, and Iraq was directed at Israel, con- political and ideological appeal has assumed sidered an outpost of American imperialism. a mutual interest against Western imperial- The Angolan intervention of 1975 began to ism between Third World peoples and the blur the anti-imperialist justification. While Soviet Union. But as Asian and African na­ the Angolan opponents of the Popular Move- tions achieve independente and gradually ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) consolidate control over their national were supported by the United States, China, economies, internai and local conflicts and South África, they were also African emerge to replace anti-imperialism as the liberation movements in their own right, as dominant issues.3 By the I970s, Soviet the Organization of African Unity policies relying on community of interest acknowledged. The next intervention, in against the West and bolstered by Soviet aid Ethiopia, brought Soviet power into a local had assured no permanent Socialist gains; war. Ethiopia was fighting Soviet-aided nationalist such as Gamai Nasser, Ben Bella, Somalia and a Marxist Eritrean secessionist Sékou Touré, and Mao Zedong used Soviet movement, and Soviet betrayal of the 3 4 MR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Moslem Somalis and the Moslem Eritreans African national leaders, including national did their image little good in the Middle East. Marxists or communists, continue to seek in- Fidel Castro tried and failed to mediate the dependence of foreign control when their conflict and promote a Marxist revolutionary need for protection diminishes.8 Soviet federation among Ethiopia, Somalia, and proclamations about the tighter bonds of South Yemen. The Vietnamese invasion of “socialist orientation” do not change that Kampuchea, in January 1979, showed Soviet unless the tighter bonds are somehow en- military support against communist allies of forced. China, and Soviet commentary at the time Soviet policy has been increasingly left no doubt that China itself might become squeezed into a narrow military mold a legitimate (in Soviet eyes) victim of Soviet because, as military capabilities grow and attack.4 Finally, in Afghanistan in December grow, other capabilities diminish. The Soviet 1979 the Soviet army was sent to repress a economy is in consistent, long-term. and popular revolt against a revolutionary perhaps accelerating decline,9 and one of the government without immediate invitation. many ramifications of this overwhelmingly The only remaining escalation of the con- important fact is that the Soviets are limited texts of Soviet military intervention would be in providing economic or even military aid to direct attack against a noncommunist coun- their friends on concessional terms. Even the try that had never invited a Soviet presence. poorest “socialist orientation” countries such The Soviets now claim that their military as Ethiopia are pushed to repay Socialist aid power is the necessary condition for the with hard currency earned by exports to the liberation of anyone else.5 “The changing West. Soviet subsidies to Cuba (perhaps S3 correlation of forces” has become almost a billion a year) and Vietnam (perhaps Sl synonym for Soviet military superiority, and billion a year) in support of counterinsurgen- in the Soviet view this shift in the world cy wars reduce the amounts available for balance of power is all-important. Unlike other, more peaceful purposes. earlier eras, the Soviet Union claims to de- In undertaking military interventions in- fend local revolutions against externai Africa, Indochina, and now Afghanistan, the enemies (always assumed to be some form of Soviets wished to create the image of over- “imperialist aggression”) and internai op- whelming clout and victory. They have position—even against the vast majority of gambled that demonstrating “the changing the people if necessary, as Soviet sources correlation of forces” might encourage more acknowledge.6 In addition to externai and in­ regimes “of socialist orientation,” and the ternai defense, the Soviet Union and its creation of new allied military forces capable Socialist allies are to provide direct assistance of undertaking “defense of the gains of in party-building and in ideological develop- Socialism” on a broader and broader scale.10 ment, toward the transition from military What actually has happened is that the rule to government by a vanguard party.7 Cubans are bogged down in Angolan gar- Nothing so far indicates that where they risons against the Union for the Total Inde- have undertaken a strong internai presence pendence of Angola (UNITA), and in Ethio- (Cuban troops, East German security police pian garrisons against the Eritreans and the training, Soviet advisers) the Soviets and their Somali guerrillas of the Ogaden. The V iet- allies have found some magic key which namese have some 200,000 troops in Kam­ transforms Thircl World friends into com­ puchea and are continuing to maintain, even munist members of the Socialist community. intensify, a militarized garrison State to sus- Cuba may be the model, but other Asian and tain the conquest of Indochina.11 Now SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN 5 Afghanistan caps the image of Soviet policy The Soviet citizenry is increasingly restless. as imperialism against growing people’s Everyone from dissidents to the Politburo resistance. an image increasingly shared by cites laziness and apathy among the workers Africans, Southeast Asians, and Islamic na- as an overwhelming problem; workers have tions of the Middle East. This vvas not what recently begun to form iIlegal unions and the Soviets had in mind. But the Afghanistan mount strikes.13 National tensions persist, invasion was necessary to preserve any hope although they should not be overemphasized of success for the policy of world prestige as an imminent danger to Soviet stability.14 based on victory and “the changing correla- The intelligentsia persist in refusing to be in- tion of forces." spired by shopworn Soviet Marxism. None of Militarization of policy must include the these circumstances can be quickly or easily home front. and the domestic policies of the changed without basic reforms that the pres- later vears of the Brezhnev Politburo provide ent leadership is unwilling to consider. So the ample evidence that the economy, the regime increasingly relies on patriotism and legitimization of the regime, and the very national security for its legitimacy. Since concept of Soviet citizenship are taking a 1976, when Brezhnev called for glorification more military cast. In spite of economic of Soviet military exploits in the Great difficulties, and obviously in response to Patriotic War against the Nazis, propaganda domestic critics of military spending, celebrating the military “guardians of Brezhnev and his colleagues have remained peaceful labor" has proliferated. Soviet world adamant that the Soviet military budget is not prestige linked to military prowess has been to be touched. .As Brezhnev put it in 1976: emphasized: Soviet citizens are told, simply, Nor should there be any doubi in anyone’s mind that that their country cannot be pushed around our Party will do everything to have the splendid any more. Armed Forces of the Soviet Union provided. in the The constitution of 1977 proclaims mili­ future as well, with all the necessan, means for fill- tary Service as a “sacred duty” of all citizens. ing their responsible task of standing on guard over The constitution also mentions Soviet the Soviet people s peaceful labor and acting as the patriotism in a way that indicates its function bulwark of world peace.12 of integrating the nationalities. General Alek- Politburo spokesmen have since constantly sandr Altunin's civil defense program seems reiterated the sanctity of the military budget, more another means of inculcating national citing NATO rearrnamenl and nuclear security consciousness among citizens than a missiles for Europe, Chinese aggressive prelude to nuclear attack. Other measures, designs, and now the world outcry over such as oath-taking at military induction Alghanistan. Massive diversion of resources ceremonies and the activities of military to military production accelerates Soviet reservists in the schools, reinforce the mili­ economic decline; opportunity costs include tar}’ flavor of Soviet patriotism and com- the diversion of technical manpower and munist legitimacy. creativity as well as resources away from lhe The internai prestige of the Communist civilian economy, and lhe disruption which Party and its leadership would suffer, occurs when civilian production is arbitrarily perhaps severely, if in its first campaign since interrupted to fili shortfalis in defense indus- World War II lhe Soviet Army were to fail to try. Soviet leaders take pride in the efficiency subdue ill-armed and disorganized Afghan of the militar^’ economy, which has become tribesmen. That the Soviet people are told lhe leading example of the economic that the Afghan people are really on the capability of social ism. Soviet side just compounds the problem; vic-

Modem Suviet erpupuienl use d in Afghamstan < onlrasts slarkly irilh lhe primitive means avaiiahle tu lhe resisling mujahiddm soldiers nj Islant, pausing heside u hurned- oul Societ BTR-60armoredpersonnel cnrner (Jai mg page). . . . Al a euruvan slup (nghl), and— to underseore lhe poinl— Inheswen proudly dtspluy a wildly vaned assortmen! ofpersonul anus (ahove ), ineluding sporting njles, Betgian FN automalu njles, and hall- action Briltsh .303 Enjields—ar copies lhereof. 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIF.W tory should be easy. To the extern it is not easy, “imperialist aggression,” not local resis- Relations of a New Type among tance, must be put forward as the reason, and Equal and Independent States this too must heighten internai pressures The invasion of Afghanistan was under- toward the garrison State and a new cold war. taken to uphold credibility and save a posi- Thus the rebellion in Afghanistan, about tion in which a great deal has been invested. to topple and replace the revolutionary But it stretched Soviet claims that Soviet regime of “socialist orientation” established power is used only to defend threatened peo- in April 1978, presented the Soviet leadership ples against imperialism when invited to do with an immensely important decision affect- so. Earlier claims for Cuba, Vietnam, ing Soviet credibility and the success or Angola, and even Ethiopia were credible failure of past and current policies. Unlike (although less and less so) in that regard. África or Indochina, Afghanistan was clearly Afghanistan was not. By sending an invasion the Soviets’ own show and sole respon- force to depose and replace the existing sibility—in Afghanistan “proletarian interna- government, by taking over administration of tionalism” meant that the Soviets must carry the country, and by lying about the circum- the burden. If the Soviet Union touted its stances, the Soviets, willv-nilly, crossed a ma­ military might as the necessary condition for jor policy threshold. the triumph of socialism in the Third World, The direct use of Soviet combat troops out- then failed to use it in a neighboring country side the Warsaw Pact countries broke a pre­ of long-standing predominant Soviet in- cedem of Soviet restraint upheld since World fluence when “socialist orientation” was War II and naturally raised fears of a new about to be defeated, the consequences within policy of Soviet conquest. But the more the Soviet-led Socialist community and serious change in the rules of the game was among its “socialist orientation” allies might Soviet intervention apparently without an in- be immense. Cuba and Vietnam could easily vitation from the existing Afghan govern­ draw the conclusion that in spite of their ment of President Hafizullah Amin. The in- bluster the Soviets were willing to defend the vitation, or lack of it, distinguishes legally gains of socialism only to the last Cuban or sanctioned intervention from international the last Vietnamese. Well before the aggression. Afghanistan invasion Soviet writers had The Soviets say that “the USSR acceded to mentioned rollback of socialist orientation, a request which the Afghan government had particularly in África, as a serious problem.*5 repeatedly made during 1977-78; a request If the “April revolution" in Afghanistan were for military aid in response to armed inter­ defeated by rebels favored by China, the vention by imperialist forces which began West, and anti-Soviet Islamic nations, the ex- immediately after the April revolution and ample might be contagious. Ultimately, “the which is continuing to this day.”16 This state- changing correlation of forces” could be ment does not claim an immediate invitation, reversed, thus bringing down the whole re- only a “repeated” one made at least a year cent edifice of Soviet policy. before when Afghanistan^ government was In this context, discussion of the offensive led by Prime Minister Taraki, not Amin. As or defensive nature of Soviet policy misses far as “imperialist aggression” is concerned, the point. The Soviets were pushed into opt- the growing internai rebellion certainly ing for “defense of the gains of socialism” by received sanctuary and some aid via Pakistan the only means available, an invasion by but little from elsewhere.17 A Soviet article of Soviet troops. March 1979 contains a reasonable descrip- SOI'!ET INVASION OF AFCHANtSTAN 9 tion of the rebellion, if the usual rhetoric is fali into line, for example the French Com- discounted: munist Party. Cuba, notably, has remained A "holy war” has been proclaimed against the largely silent. Revolution by the so-called Moslim Brothers, a reac- Until Afghanistan, only communist coun­ tionary terrorist grouping of a conservative Moslim orientation. Demagogically exploiting Islamic tries had been subject to a Soviet veto backed slogans, the Afghan Moslim Brothers, who have ex- by force of arms over their internai evolution. tensive ties with similar groupings in other countries “Limited socialist sovereignty” was first ap- of the Easi. are trying to exen pressure on the plied to the nationalilies of the Soviet Union socially backward masses of working people in both town and village. . . They serve the interesl of the and their ostensibly separate Republics; later reactionaries in the region and are being exploited to Eastern Europe (the so-called Brezhnev by imperialisi circles to conduct activities directed Doctrine). The invasion of Kampuchea to against the national interests and the peoples remove an unbelievably brutal regime, like Revolution of Afghanistan. >8 the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian inter- Postinvasion statements now attribute the ventions in Europe, was justified as restoring rebellion almost entirely to “imperialist ag- true socialism in a communist country. But gression,” citing the United States, Britain, Third World countries “of socialist orienta­ China, and Pakistan as the sources of the tion” were presumably free to change their rebellion and claiming that conflict would orientation, as Egypt and Somalia and now cease the minute the outside agitators stop- Iraq have done. The Afghanistan precedent ped their activities. indicates that the Soviet Union will now It is interesting to compare the Soviet inva- decide when and where “socialist orienta­ sion of Afghanistan with Soviet aid to North tion” is to be made “irreversible” by inter- Y'ietnam a decade before. Soviet vocabulary vention. has not changed at all: defense against “im- Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of perialist aggression" justifies aid to Friendship and Cooperation of December threatened governments as a duty of 1978 provides for military cooperation, and “proietarian internationalism.” Circum- Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky cited this stances have changed entirely: in 1972 Soviet article to the Security Council as a basis for surface-to-air missiles were shooting down intervention. Another article of that treaty B-52s over Hanoi, but in 1980 Soviet forces provides for mutual consultation and ap- cross an international boundary without in- propriate action—presumably whatever the vitation and are instrumental (the details re- two parties agree to—in the event of a threat main murkv) in the murder of a friendly to the peace. All the Soviet treaties of friend­ president, with no “imperialists” anywhere ship and cooperation contain almost identi- in sight. cal language, and nothing in any of them im- The Soviet leadership was not willing to plies any unilateral action. In the past, these say that they could not afford to lose. and that treaties intimated Soviet backing for local they now considered Afghanistan their turf wars; India’s 1971 treaty preceded by four and would not tolerate a hostile government, months the war with Pakistan over which would be a true if not commendable Bangladesh, Egypt’s 1971 treaty preceded the explanation. Instead, the Soviets have 1973 October War, and Vietnam’s Novem- resorted to stonewalling by propaganda and ber 1978 treaty preceded the January 1979 to a degree of lying unheard since Stalin’s invasion of Kampuchea.* Afghanistan was time. The genuflection now required from *Virtnam has similar treaties with Laos and Kampuchea. The April Soviet friends as part of “proietarian interna­ 1980 visito! Hcng Samrin and Pen Sovanto Moscow did not produce a tionalism" hurts the credibilíty of those who Soviet-Kampuchean treaty 10 AIR UN1VERSITY REVTEW the first use of these treaties to justify Afghan rebellion, and no available evidence unilateral Soviet action. (See Table I.) indicates any Soviet master plan or timetable The Politburo has made no proclamations for conquest of the Middle East or of Asia. about the universal “irreversibility” of Soviet policy generally responds to oppor- “socialist orientation” and will choose “ir- tunities and accepts setbacks as they arise. reversibilities” according to specific circum- The style of Soviet policy is also generally to stances. For example, Mozambique is now focus on one country at a time rather than on adopting a more capitalist economic policy, regions. Nevertheless, the invasion of and the new Zimbabwe government of Afghanistan was prompted in part by Robert Mugabe vvhich was helped to power strategic considerations, and its consequences by Soviet and Cuban arms shows every sign certainly include military threats to neighbor- of joining Zambia and Tanzania in non- ing countries and the possibility of further alignment. The Soviet Union has at present Soviet adventures. neither the capability nor the intention of What the Soviets fear is the grand encircle­ controlling political events in Southern ment of the Soviet Union linking China, África. But the Afghanistan precedent must Japan, the United States, and Western unsettle Mengistu of Ethiopia or dos Santos Europe. The most serious change that has of Angola, where large Cuban forces are al- occurred in the world position of the Soviet ready present, or the regime in South Yemen. Union over the past twenty years has been The fate of Hafizullah Amin serves as a the defection of China and, now, the rapidly warning—or as an incentive to establish burgeoning Chinese-Japanese-NATO en- security independent of Soviet power. tente cordiale. Today, China is singled out as the most evil adversary, not only “the I6th member of NATO" but the equivalem of Geopolitics: Preventing Encirclement Nazi Germany.19 Soviet policies designed to and Opening Possibilities split China from Japan and the West and to Geopolitics is often a refuge for the lazy isolate China in Asia have failed completely. analyst, and American writers generally over- Japan opted for a Chinese connection in spite emphasize geopolitical and military-strategic of Soviet pressure by signing the Japanese- explanations for Soviet policy. The Soviet in- Chinese friendship treaty of August 1978, vasion of Afghanistan was a response to the which contained the anti-Soviet hegemony clause.20 Soviet initiatives to create an Asian security treaty isolating the Chinese failed to win Indian or Southeast Asian support. In Table I. Soviet treaties offriendship and cooperation this as in other areas the Soviets then turned índia 1971 more toward military means, encouraging Egypt 1971 (abrogated March 1976) and aiding the Vietnamese to conquer Kam- Iraq 1972 puchea and eliminate the Pol Pot govern­ Somai ia 1974 (abrogated November ment allied to China. 1977) The Chinese response to the Kampuchea Angola 1976 invasion, which the Chinese now tout as a Mozambique 1977 prelude by proxy to the Afghan one, was in­ Vietnam 1978 vasion of North Vietnam and demonstration Ethiopia 1978 of will against Soviet threats and acceleration Afghanistan 1978 of the rapprochement with the United States South Yemen 1979 to a point just short of military alliance. SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN 11 Chinese-Soviet talks failed in September American. A Soviet Afghanistan demonstrat- 1979. The response of the Association of ing Soviet resolution and power and the in- Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was ability of Islamic forces to contain lhe Soviet stifTened opposition to the V ietnamese and military juggernaut could lead to numerous the Soviet Union. future opportunities to steer Iran, or On the other front, NATO finally decided Pakistan, or both, in a Soviet direction. Soviet in December 1979 to counter Soviet militar)' aid to the Baluchis in Pakistan and Iran supremacy in Europe with new American could be used as a lever to pressure those theater nuclear weapons. Soviet efTorts failed countries or divide them.22 Iran or Pakistan to persuade West Germany to reject the new might accepl the sort of Soviet aid and friend- weapons, which would have aborted the ship provided Afghanistan in the twenty decision. Secretary Brezhnev’s gesture of years before the 1978 coup, perhaps with withdrawing troops from East Germany was ultimately similar results. spurned. The increased pressure against East Thus, Soviet efforts to split the encircle­ Europe dissidents, notably the Prague ment or achieve a favorable détente in Charter 77 trials in October 1979, had no Europe or with China had already failed. -neffect. Thus, in Europe as with China, Soviet The West Europeans and Chinese had made efforts to pressure, influence, or divide the their decisions. The Americans had decided enemy coalition had failed. to “gamble on the Peking card"23 and were The Iranian revolution drasticallv in­ moving toward rearmament, with the rest of creased the stakes in Afghanistan. While the NATO reluctantly in tow. The record of the demise of the Shah was a major Soviet gain, Carter administration and its necessary Iran had the wrong revolution. In the long preoccupation with the hostages in Teheran run, Islamic resurgence and self-assertion would imply an ineffective American pose a major threat to the Soviets, blocking response. These circumstances, plus the opportunities for Soviet influence and carry- threat from Islamic Afghanistan and the ing the possibility of dissent among 50 favorable possibilities of Soviet Afghanistan, million Soviet Moslems.21 An anti-Soviet impelled the invasion. Islamic Afghanistan, complemented and One widely held view sees the invasion of aided by Islamic governments in Pakistan Afghanistan as part of a military pincer and Iran. would create an anti-Soviet Islamic movement designed to encircle the Persian bloc on the border of the Central Asian Gulf with the other part of the pincers in Soviet republics. A link between that bloc Ethiopia and South Yemen. Afghanistan and China or the West or both—a role play- may eventually be useful in that regard. But if ed by Pakistan since the mid-l960s—would the Soviet game was control of Gulf oil, why complete encirclement of the Soviet Union not concentrate ort Iran or Iraq and do the from Norway to Japan. job directly? Why frighten and alienate all Conversely, the Iranian revolution might the Gulf nations without arriving there? be strongly influenced by a Soviet demonstra- Afghanistan is a landlocked country far from tion of will and authority, which the Soviets the water and relatively far from the oil fields. could contrast to American weakness, Alienating Iran and accelerating Iraq’s shift vacillation, irresolution, and incompetence. to a European orientation hardly helps the The Soviets are avid. sometimes too avid, stu- Soviets control the Gulf. The demonstration dents of history who realize that Iranian of European communist soldiers shooting foreign policy has traditionally bent toward çleyout Moslems has not helped the Soviet externai pressure, be it Russian. British. or cause on the Arabian península either. Saudi Arabia has recently patched up its the wrong place to invade as part ofa strategy quarrel with North Yemen. The Soviet of military control of Persian Gulf oil. Union has reportediy advised Mengistu of Will the Soviets’ own oil needs impei more Ethiopia to start seriously negotiating with invasions? Depending on whose estimate is the Eritreans—yet another sign that the accepted,25 and understanding that explora- Soviets must now placate anti-Soviet Islamic tion and the marginal costs of increasing pro- opinion and policy. All the talk of warm- duction are as variable and unpredictable in water ports notwithstanding (much of it the Soviet Union as anywhere else, the originates in China),24 Afghanistan seems Soviets will probably be short ofoil sometime 12 SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN 13 during lhe I980s. They have several options: Probably most important to Rússia have been the political profits gained by treating Afghanistan with cut domestic consumption, cut back ou deliv- generosity and careful respect. Friendly relations cries to Eastern Europe. buy more oil, or ex- and assistance have demonstrated to lhe rest of the propriate oil on the cheap by military con- Muslim world, especially Turkey, Iran, and the quest of an oil field and the nation that hap- Arab States, that lhe Russians are willing to help a pens to contain it. Muslim people whom they could easily conquer or The last alternative seems the most exploit.26 unlikely. The Soviet nuclear energy program Newell is not wrong; for the period 1919 to is designed to provide an alternative energy 1978, he is quite right. Times change. source. The Soviets buy many essential goods Soviet-Afghan contacts began when Amir now from nations of all political persua- Amanullah Khan expelled British control sions — Moroccan phosphates, Iranian during the Third Afghan War, a minor affair natural gas, Malaysian rubber, American, lasting some three weeks in May 1919. Canadian, and Argentine grain. Oppor- tunities to make favorable deals for oil with Amanullah invited Soviet envoys to Kabul svmpathetic regimes “of socialist orientation” and hoped to rely on the new Soviet power as would certainly be welcome. The Soviet a counter to the British. From the Soviet side, Union will certainly try to encourage friendly cooperation with Afghanistan was part of the or allied governments among the oil States, general effort to incite the Moslem world probably to guarantee supply to Eastern against the British, who were then supplying Europe vvhile Soviet oil is consumed at the White Russian armies in the Russian civil home. Certainly the temptation to persuade, war. The keystone of Soviet policy was pressure, or intimidate oil States may increase alliance with the Turkish nationalist move- as Soviet military power grows and the ment of Kemal Pasha, later Atatürk, who, economic squeeze intensifies. But the Soviets like the Soviets, wanted the British out of have shown no inclination so far to disrupt Constantinople, the Transcaucasus, Iran, the world oil business, of which they are now Afghanistan, and even índia. Amanullah of a major and interconnected part. Afghanistan thus developed cordial relations Soviet control of Europe’s oil supply is with both Kemalist Turkey and Soviet worth worrying about, but that control is not Rússia, promoted by the propaganda of the likely to come by direct military conquest — Comintern encouraging nationalism and or to be deterred by commitments against in- liberation of the peoples of the East from Bri­ vasion. Put differentlv, the Ayatollah Kho- tish imperialism. meini's efforts to purge the University of This Soviet-Islamic alliance of mutual in- Teheran probably have far more bearing on terest had a Central Asian flaw. In the after- Soviet control of the Persian Gulf than do the math of the revolution, Central Asian American aircraft carriers standing offshore. Moslems rose in revolt against the reestablishment of Russian rule. The Rus­ sian settlers and the Soviets called the rebels basmnchi—bandits—and sent forces to sup- Soviet-Afghan Relations press them. Turkish and Soviet aspirations and the Rebellion clashed when Enver Pasha, leader of the Richard Newell wrote in 1972 that Turkish triumvirate during the world war, "Afghanistan has served as a showcase for was sent by the Soviets to Central Asia to Russia’s good intentions in her dealings with organize Moslem forces against the British. Moslem nations.” Further, Enver went over to the basmachi instead but 14 A IR UNI VERSITY REVIE U' was killed in April 1922 before he could probably involved (Colonel T. E. Lawrence mold an effective force against the Russians. was then serving on the northwest frontier The Red Army drove the basmachi out of under the alias of “Airman Shaw”), and the their city bases at Bokhara and Khiva (sites Soviets did not intervene. Half a century of the khanates conquered by Rússia in 1868 later, in somewhat similar circumstances, the and 1873) and away from the valleys, then Soviet Union did intervene to prevent gradually suppressed rebellion in the hills. Islamic conservatives and the tribes from Mopping-up campaigns against the basmachi deposing another friendly antitraditional including Soviet forays against sanctuaries in Afghan regime. This illustrates rather pre- Afghanistan continued until 1931. cisely what the Soviets have in mind by “the Amanullah treated with the Central Asian changing correlation of forces.” leaders at Bokhara as well as with the Soviets, Soviet influence again became paramount but the Soviets refused to respond with after the rise to power of Prince Daud, which hostility. The Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty coincided with the death of Stalin in 1953. of February 1921 even recognized the inde- Daud chose political dictatorship and pendence of Bokhara and Khiva “in accor- economic development and turned to the dance with the wishes of the people”27— Soviets as his main source of help. Political wishes which turned out to be those of the energies were diverted to the cause of greater Soviet troops. In return, Amanullah prom- Pushtunistan, reuniting Pushtuns across the ised not to actively aid the basmachi. While Pakistan border with the Afghan kingdom. historical parallels must be treated carefully, Pakistan's membership in the Central Treaty they are interesting in this case. The Soviets Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast use the term basmachi in speaking of the Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) made a Afghan rebels28 and are following much the tilt toward the Soviet Union logical. same counterinsurgency strategy. They also Khrushchev and Bulganin stopped in Kabul are trying to gain friendship and neutrality on their 1955 tour, which opened an active from Pakistan despite Pakistani sympathies, Soviet foreign policy in Asia on the basis of ethnic links, and sanctuary for the Afghans. economic aid and political support for “na- Taking KemaFs secular nationalist tional democrats.” The Afghan army became Turkey as his model, Amanullah attempted Soviet supplied and trained; by 1976, a total reform and modernization in the I920s with of 3725 Afghan officers had received Soviet Soviet aid. The 1921 treaty included a Soviet training.30 (That so many have recently subsidy of a million rubles a year and provi- deserted is one more testimony that instruc- sions for technical assistance. The Soviets tion does not ensure political loyalty.) Mod- provided a small air force whose purpose was ern roads were built from Central Asia to to put down rebellion by the tribesmen op- Kabul and Kandahar and the Kabul airport posed to unveiling of women. secular educa- also. Newell says the Soviet aid program was tion, and other reforms. A British official generally efficient and unobtrusive. reported that “the so-called Afghan Air Force The Soviets accepted Daud's removal in is to all intents and purposes a Russian Ser­ 1963 and Daud's return in 1973 in the coup vice and may indeed be regarded as a Rus­ that toppled the monarchy and Zahir Shah. sian advanced base ”29 Amanullah was over- In 1975 a major credit of $437 million was thrown in 1928 by rebellion sparked by an- extended, equal to about one-fourth of all nouncement of measures against corruption previous Soviet aid. When the April 1978 and the local authority of the mullahs and by coup occurred, Soviet influence was already the unveiling of the queen. The British were established. Soviet involvement in the coup is SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN 15 uncertain; Hannah Negaran raises lhe senting himself and his Parcham government possibility that Soviet pilots may have flown as more gentle and reasonable. In contrast to the planes that tipped the battle against Taraki and Amin, who jailed and executed DaucTs forces.31 recalcitrant mullahs, Karmal promises The two Marxist factions which cooper- religious freedom from persecution. His ated to overthrow Daud were Khalq (masses) officials begin speeches with readings from and Parcham (flag). Both groups grew from a the Koran. Political prisoners were released common organization founded in early from Kabul prison in January; the crowds 1965.32 According to Negaran, Khalq is turned the release into an anti-Russian riot. based among Pushtuns, the largest ethnic Ethnic out-groups such as the Hazaras of group, and Parcham among Tadzhiks, the central Afghanistan have been promised largest minority who share nationality with more equitable treatment. But such efforts to the Tadzhiks of the Soviet Union. Parcham defuse hostility do not overcome the resis- was stronger among students at Kabul tance to the foreign occupation on whose University and among military officers, while back the Karmal government exists, nor do Khalq had more rural support.33 The revolu- they create an effective army or administra­ tionary government after the coup was a tion. As army and administrative cadres con­ \coalition with Taraki of Khalq as Presidem tinue to defect, they are replaced by Soviets, and Hafizullah Amin, also of Khalq, as which worsens the problem. Recreating an foreign minister. Babrak Karmal, leader of Afghan army and administration will take a Parcham, became, vice president. In the long time even if open rebellion recedes. ensuing purge of Parchamis, Karmal was ex- Soviet occupation may be accepted and iled as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, then Afghanistan become another Mongolia, with recalled. He elected to stay in eastern Europe Soviet advisers including Central Asians per- to return in December 1979 with the Soviet meating the government and Soviet soldiers forces. permanently stationed in the country. True Soviet advisers operated throughout the legitimacy allowing the Karmal government Afghan army and the government from the to survive without a substanlial permanent first year of the new regime. Many civilian Soviet presence seems out of the question. advisers were Tadzhiks and Uzbeks (also a Soviet-managed counterinsurgency in minority in Afghanistan). The Soviet Central Afghanistan is a combination of politics, Asians were recalled in summer 1979 as propaganda, and firepower designed to rebellion grew. Strident Marxist secularism stabilize the Karmal regime. Its major ele- and too many Russians bred rebellion in a ments seem to be the following: pattern like that of the I920s. The September 1979 coup that replaced Taraki with Amin • Isolation of the cities from the led to even more direct repression and coer- countryside by military control of urban cion (for example, the village massacre areas. Th is seems reasonably well in hand widely reported in the Western press), which following the suppression of the general accelerated army desertions and the break- strike in Kabul in late February. down of administration. As Amin’s army and • Creation of a political organization to the Afghan government withered away and control the population, within the urban and Kabul itself became insecure, the decision to settled areas. The earliest model in Soviet ex- invade was taken in Moscow. perience is the Red Guards of the Russian Karmal has tried to placate and conciliate revolution; later models are the Ethiopian as much of the opposition as possible, pre- kebelle, or revolutionary committees 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW organized as armed cells in urban neighbor- message that the Soviet Union has won and hoods and in villages under party control. will impose its will regardless. This basic • Disruption of the rural bases of revolt, message can be widely received if constantly by tank and helicopter attacks that do not risk repeated. heavy casualties to Soviet troops. The Soviets • Use of Afghans from one area or tribe seem to accept that the end of the revolt in to repress others. This is, of course, the classi- rural areas need not come quickly. A strategy cal technique of imperial conquest and con­ of slowly isolating the mujahiddin from settled trol. areas irnplies a long Soviet stay in • Diplomacy to isolate the rebeliion from Afghanistan but also allows the number of outside support. The propaganda about troops, recently estimated at some 85,000 foreign inspiration for the resistance is one within Afghanistan and another 30,000 on way to do this; any countrv effectively aiding the Afghan -Soviet border, to be kept as low the rebels will thus confirm the Soviet view. as possible.34 The origins of such a strategy Talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Gro- in Russian military history extend even myko and India’s Mrs. Indira Gandhi, be­ beyond the basmachi campaign to the Russian tween the Soviets and the Pakistanis, and the campaigns against ShamiFs Islamic resis- Cuban Foreign Minister's March 1980 visit tance movement in the Caucasus in the mid- to Pakistan and índia were all designed to nineteenth century. gain Pakistani acceptance of the Karmal • Depopulation, if necessary, of some regime and the Soviet presence supporting it rural areas and the consequent creation of a in return for Soviet and Indian guarantees to refugee population in Pakistan. The rural Pakistan. Soviet proposals that Ethiopia areas are the bastions of reactionary opposi- negotiate with the Eritreans and possible tion and one way to eliminate the sixteenth moves toward defusing the potential confron- century life-style on which that opposition tation in the Yemen may be part of a rests is physically to remove the population diplomatic strategy to appease the Saudis and before eventual rural resettlement and devel- Iraqis and others and divert them from pro- opment. By summer 1980 there vvere about viding encouragement or assistance. 600.000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan; • Containment of disaffection among the 500.000 (largely Pushtuns) in the Northwest Soviet population by minimizing casualties Frontier Province and another 100,000 in and by focusing public attention on the Baluchistan.35 By late 1980 the number vvas American grain embargo, the Olympic closer to one million. The refugees may serve boycott, and other anti-Soviet acts to put as a recruitment base for the guerrillas, but Soviet reaction in the context of national without an effective central guerrilla solidarity directed at the West. organization the camps may become centers of political rivalrv inhibiting the resistance. Most important, the refugees destabilize H o W effective will Soviet Pakistan and thus increase Pakistan's counterinsurgency be, and how effectively willingness to come to terms with Soviet will Soviets be at sealing off major outside aid Afghanistan and send them home. to the guerrillas? As of mid-April 1980, Drew • Intensive radio propaganda designed to Middleton reported that approximately impose Soviet definitions of reality. The ma­ 100,000 guerrillas are in the field, that the jor message is that the rebeliion represents border with Pakistan can not be effectively American, British, Chinese, and Pakistani sealed, and that Soviet taetics are roadbound aggression, combined with the underlying and therefore unable to eliminate the guer- The vulnerability of the Afghan agricultura! tconomy to military actwn is suggested by the primitive food production and distribution system (righl). . . Xiawlajalal Eddm, a military leader of the Hezb i Islami resistance organiza! ion u orking out of Peshawar. symbolizes the divergence among mujahiddin groups (lower nght). rilIas.36 One evident conclusion is that the in- surgency will be strong and widespread enough to receive effective aid if anyone is willing to provide it and Pakistan is willing to allow the transit of arms. VVho are the insurgents? Those fighting in Afghanistan are called simplv mujahiddin, soldiers of Islam. As the case with most in- surgencies. divisions exist among political ex­ ile groups based in Pakistan and between the exile politicians and the guerrilla comman- ders, although \ve have little information about the commanders. Among the exile groups. the largest is Hezb i Islami. the Islamic Party. led by Gulbuddin Hakmatyar. Like Karmal. Hakmatyar’s political training carne in student politics at Kabul University, but on the other side; Hakmatyar led a suc- cessful student movement to oust Parcham and Khalq control of Kabul University stu­ dent council in 1973.37 Hezb i Islami claims that most of the mujahiddin belong to its movement. In Pakistan, Hezb i Islami is op- posed by a coalition of five other groups, of which the strongest is Jamiat Islami, the Islamic Society, led by Burhaniddin Raban- ni. also formerly at Kabul University as professor of Islamic Iaw. So far Hakmatyar and Rabanni have been unable to agree on sharing of power between Hezb i Islami and Jamiat Islami and its partners. This division could easily become a pattern of allegiance to different national sources of money and arms or alliance with opposed groups and factions within Pakistan. Rabanni is reported working with the Saudis, while some anti-American statements of Hezb i Islami sound much like Iranian ones. A split between Iranian-sup- 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ported and Saudi- and Iraqi-supported rebel question, the United States must decide what factions could introduce, and perhaps al- is more important than what else. ready has introduced, the fundamental Ira- Afghanistan is now engaged in people’s nian-Arab conflict within Middle East war against a foreign invasion that has Islamic politics into the Afghan rebellion. become a brutal counterinsurgency cam- paign. American principies upholding self- determination imply direct aid to the resis­ Islamic Self-Determination, tance. Feasibility is another matter. Direct Soviet Imperialism, and assistance acts to confirm the Soviet claim American Response that the Afghan mujahiddin are merely exten- In Afghanistan, the increasing Soviet sions of “imperialist aggression” against reliance on military means of policy has socialism. But lack of effective assistance spilled over into international aggression. leaves moot the unspoken Soviet claim that While the invasion involves the clash of in Southwest Asia they are the only ones with Soviet and American principies and interests the power to control events and the will to and has changed American perceptions of make their decisions stick. Will the example Soviet policy, the people most affected are the of Soviet conquest stiffen Islamic resistance Afghans and their neighbors. Ayatollah Kho- to further imperialist adventures or impei meini s remark that the danger of communist Islamic nations to bend toward the side of powers is not less than that of America means superior local power? tvvo things. First, the Soviet threat is recog- Apart from the specific importance of the nized in Iran and throughout Southwest Asia Middle East and Southwest Asia, the invasion and the Middle East. Second, the Islamic of Afghanistan raises a more general ques­ peoples and their governments want self- tion: Under what circumstances, for what determination against any and all outside reasons, and to what extern will the United forces. Thus, one subtle yet crucial distinc- States act in support of those resisting Soviet tion for United States policy is between aid- and allied military intervention? The other ing Islamic resistance to Soviet imperialism current cases include Kampuchea, Eritrea, and uses of American power that ignore in­ the Somali guerrillas of the Ogaden, and terests of Islamic nations. UNITA in Angola. What if armed resistance While the invasion of Afghanistan was develops in Poland or elsewhere in Eastern probably not part of a preplanned Soviet Europe? A coherent policy demands criteria strategy to control Persian Gulf oil, a for making these decisions. stabilized Soviet Afghanistan indeed would Ultimately, United States response de- be a step in that direction. Should a line be pends on perception of Soviet policy and the drawn and, if so, where? Lest we become nature of the Soviet regime. Aleksandr mesmerized by spaces on maps, the obvious Solzhenitsyn argues that the Communist point is that any threshold requires coopera- Party of the Soviet Union is a utiited faction tive relations with the people who live, and so ingrained in its hostility to all other forces, those who rule, in Pakistan, in Iran, and so wedded to the use of coercion, and so im- throughout the Arab Middle East. As Iran permeable to outside influence that the only demonstrates most vividly, these nations may choice for any reasonable policy future is to have conflicts with the United States quite wage war, hot or cold, against it. Soviet apart from the relations of either with the power will be used to its limits for repression Soviet Union. Be the issue hostages, and expansion, hence the only variable is the Pakistani nuclear plans, or the Palestinian strength and will of the forces opposing SOI’lET 1NVAS10N OF AFGHANISTAN 19 koviet communism.38 The other view holds EviDENCE including the origins of the inva- ithat while Soviet leaders are confirmed sion of Afghanistan indicates that within ILeninists they are relatively rational people, basic Leninist precepts Soviet foreign policy perhaps unfortunately tempted by a recent is pragmatic in the search for opportunities absence of clear signals concerning détente and reactive to circumstances. It is not neces- or the International rules of the game. The sar\' to force Soviet communists to renounce Politburo can accept a range of different Lenin to get them to pursue gains of social- policies as it evolves from the Brezhnev era ism by means other than military aggression. (as it must, for Brezhnev and other kev The aim must be to dissuade the Soviets from figures such as Suslov and Kirilenko will their present militarist course. retire; Kosygin now is gone). While the re­ Ripon College cent trend has been toward an increasingly Ripon, Wisconsin Russian nationalist and militarist policy,39 Soviet behavior can be altered by vvhat the The photographs were lakcn by Galen L. Gccr. tourtesy of Soldier of United States and other nations do. Fortune magazine.

Notes 1 Scc Secretary Brezhnev’.s Report o/ the CPSU Central Com/nittee. is over, Mozainbique may be expec ied 10 rcduie Cuban and Easi Ger- XXl'th Congress of the CPSU Mosum , 1976 u pp 5-41. ulso N I man presente and concenlrale on economic development Lebcdev and N M Nik<*I‘skii. cdiiurs. The Foreign Poluy of lhe Soviet 9. Gregory Grossman. “The Domestic Economy,” pp 59-64 in Union Moscou. 1976. »n Russianj Brezhnev'> specch and its nfTicial Kennan lnslitule for Advanced Russian Sludies Occasional Paper cxcccsis are divided into scctinnson the So< ialíst community, national #38. “The USSR and lhe Sources of Soviet Policy." Pravda did not libcraiton. and relatiuns with the West (detente). with a final seclion publish its annual statisties on the growth in earlv 1980. perhaps ihai integrates ihem as pan of “lhe world revolutionarv prucess." because growth was negative 2 ‘Soviet Geopoiitical Momentum: Myth or Menace?" The Dtfense 10. Samoilenko. “Social Essence of Modern Wars and the Armies,'' .Vlonitor, Januarv 1980. provides .generally accurate short country sur- States that " the externai function of these armies of countries of veys and some inicresting chans of Soviet influence over time. world* socialist orientalion is secondly, to render pttssible military sup- wide See also Seth Singleton. '‘Soviet Policy and Socialist Expansion port and help to other peoplcs struggling for their political inde[x-n- in Asia and África," Armed Forces and Soeiely, Spnng 1980, pp 339-69. dence " 3 Soviet publications have begun to acknowledge the shift from II Beijing Revtew, 14 April 1980, pp. 9-10. anti-imperialism to local conflicts, see. for example, E Tarabrin. 12. Brezhnev. Reporl oj the CPSU CentraI Commiltee, p 99 “África in a New Round of the Liberation Struggle." World Politics and 13. See Amncsty International, Pnsoners of Conseienee in the USSR International Relations. February 1979, p 36 (in Russian). Their Trealment and Condiltons. second edition, 1980, pp. 21-22 4 As lhe Soviets threatcned "hands off Socialist Vietnam!” in radio 14 The recent rediscovery of the national question in the Soviet broadcaMs and in the press. Pravda said that the Pol Pot government Union by American analysts and the informed public has exaggerated had been ovenhrown because it was a Chincse-typc regime and lhe presumed degree of animosity among the nationalities Isolatcd ter- thereforc violated Socialist principies The author was “Aleksaridrov.” rorist acts such as the 1978 Moscow subway bombing by an Artnenian the name over which Politburo pronounccments appear. group may occur but are ver> infrequent. The now widely reported fact 5. “The decisive suecess in the struggle for freedom and indepen- that Tadzhik and Uzbck Soviets cadrcs were withdrawn from dence which the national liberatinn movement in Asia and África at- Afghanistan in summer 1979 may have been due more to Afghan rr- tained were predelermincd hy the growth of the mighl of lhe USSR sentmcnl of their modemized ethnii compatriots than to sympathy of Emphasis added This quotation. from The Foreign Poluy of the Soviet the Soviets for Afghan resistancc. Union. p 101. is representaiive of manv similar statements. usually 15 See V Vorobycv, “Colonialist Policies in África," International linlced to Cuba. Vietnam. or Angola Affairs, Moscow, Septembcr 1978. p. 48 6. Soviet General V F Samoilenko. in a paper delivered in 1978 16 Survwal, March-April 1980, pp 68-69. entitled “Social Esscnee of Mudem Wars and the Armies," argued that 17 Robcrt Trumbull. “Command Chain of Afghan Revolt Is Net­ the function of the army in countries ’of socialist orientalion" is “to op- Work o f Exiles in Pakistan," Meie York Times, April 16. 1979, p A4. press organized and nonorganized resistance” of any capitalist or pre- Hannah Ncgaran. “The Afghan Coup of April 1978," Orbis. Spring capitalist gruup This would cenainly irulude more than 90 perccnt of 1979. p 103 the population of Afghanistan. 18 L. Mironov and G Polyakov, “Afghanistan: The Beginning of a 7 Bons Ponomarev. Practical Socialism and Its International Sig- New Life." International Affairs, Moscow, March 1979, p 49 nificancc. Communist. No 2. Januarv 1979 (in Russian) provides the 19. G. Apalin. "Pekíng, lhe West, and Détente," International CPSL \ aulhoritative definnion of vk ialíst orienlation and assistance Affairs, February 1979; V Borisov, "The Foreign Policy Course of Pek- to it. which emphasize* building a vanguard party and also effectivc de- ing. World Economy and International Relations (in Russian), August WdopmeM 1978, E Litvin and M Shmclcv, “Gamble on the Pcking Card," World 8 Moçambique is a current example Now that the Zirnbabwe war Economy and International Relations (in Russian). Octobcr 1978. 20 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

20 ''The Contracting Parties declare lhat ncilher of ihem should don, 1972). pp 187-88. seck hegemony in lhe Asia-Pacific region and lhat each is opposcd to 27 Ludwig W Adamec. Afghanislan \ Foreign Affairs lo lhe Mtd- efforis of any olher coumry or group of countries to establish such Twenlielh Cenlury (Tucson, Ari/ona. 1974), p. 61; Ministry of Foreign hegemony" Tcxi m Ptking Review, 18 Augusl 1978. Affairs of lhe U.S.S R.. Somei-Afghan Relalions 1919-1969 Doeumenls 21 Craig Whilncy of lhe Aírw York Tunrs re|>ons lhat al prescnl and Materials, Moscow, 1971. pp. 28-31 contain lhe lext of thc treaty (in Soviel Central Asians are supportive ol lhe Sovicl war in Afghanistan. Russian). sccing lhemscives as modernized and differeni Iroin their backward 28 Craig Whilncy in lhe New York Times, April II. 1980, p. A6. and reactionary Afghan fcllow Moslems, New York Times, April II. Soviel books commemorating Soviel-Afghan fricndship emphasizc Bri- 1980, pp Al and A6 tish supporl to lhe basmachr, sec L B Tcplinskii. Fifty Years of Soviel- 22. Baluchis live in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Baluchi gucr- Afghan Relatmns 1919-69, Moscow, 1971. pp. 50-52 (in Russian) rillas supported frt>m Afghanislan have held oul against Pakistani army 29. Adamcc. p 108, also Gunthcr Nollau and Hans Wiehe, Russias forays for scveral years. South Flank (New York, 1963), p. 103 23. The Sovicis noted U.S. Secrctary of Treasury Morgenthaus visil 30. CIA, Communisl Aid lo lhe Less Developed Countries of the Free during lhe Chinese-Vietnamcse border war in early 1979 and par- World, 1976 (Washington. 1977), p 6. lirularly Vice Presidem Mondalcs August 1979 speech in Peking. 31 Hannah Negaran, 'T he Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution when Mondale cmphasized mulual security interests as lhe basis for and International Security," Orhis, Spring 1979, p. 101 Chinesc-American cooperation Now thc United States is bcginning 32 Rii hard Newell, writing beforc lhe 1978 coup, notes lhe key role military-related sales following Secretary Brown's visil of Babrak Karmal in lhe university-based agitation against govemmen- 24 Thc Chinese emphasizc a geopolilical intcrprelatmn of Soviel lal corruplion of 1965. The Pohlics of Afghanislan, p. 166. aelivilies lhat they now call a "dumb-bell strategy" direi Ir d al China, 33. Negaran, p. 97. with lhe Slrail of Malacca joining lhe Pacific and Indian Occans. .As 34 Drew Middleton. New York Times, April 21. 1980, p A8. for Afghanistan: 35. The Times (London), March 18, 1980. A Soviel Afghanistan plus a warm-water pon on lhe Indian Ocean 36 Drew Middleton. New York Times, April 21. 1980. p. A8. would lead lo a grip on lhe Culfoil supply lane and a crowning mili- 37 "The Muslims' Dividcd Alliance,” Far Easlem Eeonomic Review, tarv move lo outflank Western Europe. February 29, 1980. pp 21-23 See also The Times (London). Januarv Beijing Review, 25 lebruars 1980. pp 8-9 Chinese insisience that the 11. February 2, March 3, and March 18, 1980. for discussion of thc ex­ goal of the Sovicis is domination of Europc and the crude geopolilical ile factions. interpretaiions of Soviel a< ts serve Chinese purposes by cncouraging 38. Mosí recently, see A. Solzhenitsyn, “Misconcepiions about American and Europcan militarv responses Rússia Are a Threat lo America,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 1980. 25. The CIA eslimate is lhai Soviel oil produetion will peak in lhe Solzhenitsyn*s views and similar ones are less casy lo dismiss in 1980 mid-1980s Soviel eslimales are rnuch more optimistic. CIA Prospeds than in 1970 or 1960. foi Soviel Oil Produetion, April 1977, and Prospecls for Somei Uil Produe- 39 On lhe Russian nationalist trend. sec Alcxander Yanov, The Rus- hon: .4 Supplernental Analysts, Julv 1977 In 1979 the rate of increase of sian New Righl. University of Califórnia Press. 1977 While Yanov oil produetion dropped sharplv New York Times, November 20, 1979, pessiinislically predicis a lightening merger of Soviet communism and p Dl tradiiional Russian nalionalist authorilarianism. his analvsis is lhat of 26. Richard S Newell, The Polihrs of Afghanistan (Ithaca and Lon- various social groups and policy positions lhal mav vary in strength.

Islamic Concept of War War is ordained for Muslims who must fight in the vvay of Allah against those who fight against them. Fighting for lhe right cause is an act of worship in Islam. It is our religious duty to prepare for defence, aequire weapons, train and willingly accept any challenge. In fact no act of worship can surpass lhe sacred duty of bearing arms but all this must be done for the sake of Allah. Our wars are not to be fought for loot or plunder but to preserve our way of life and to promote it. Wing Commander Javaid S. Butt, RAF.. Shaheen, Journal of the Pakistan Air Force. Deccmber 1978, p. 11 IRA C. EAKER ESSAY COMPETITION

IR University takes pride in announcing the first Ira C. Eaker Essay Competition. This competition is open to all United States Air i Force personnel: active duty. Reserve, and Air National Guard. Its purpose is twofold: —A First, to honor the continuing achievement of General Ira C. Eaker and his colleagues. vvho lifted American military might from the surface of the Earth into the third dimension of aerospace. — Second. to memorialize the indomitable martial spirit so central to the success of their efforts. a spirit that nourishes a perception of military Ser­ vice as a calling rather than a mere occupation. Essays should address problems of strategy, doctrine. leadership. or some combination thereof. vvithin the overall context of military exploitation of the aerospace médium. First. Second. and Third Prize Medallions will be awarded to the winners as vvell as U.S. Savings Bonds in the amounts of $2000. $1000. and $500. Honorable Mention recognition certificates will also be awarded. The essay competition is funded by a permanent grant from the Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation, made through the United States Strategic In­ stituto of Washington. D.C. Essays in the competition should be 2000 Io 4000 words and typewritten. double-spaced. on standard-size paper. The author s name and address should appear only on a cover-sheet tille page. Address entries to The Edi­ tor. Air University Heview. Building 1211. Maxwell AFB. Alabama. 36112. Entries for the first competition mus! be received or postmarked by 1 [une 1981. Essays are submitted with the understanding that rights of first pubiicalion belong to Air University Heview, the? professional journal of the Air Force. Io be released after the competition at lhe Edilor s discretion. THE GRAMMAR AND LOGIC OF CONFLICT differing concepts by statesmen and soldiers

COLONEL THOMAS A. FABYANIC N THE upening lines of his final major However, those who practice statecraft and work. War and Politics, Bernard Brodie re- thus set the political objectives for which wars minds us of the Glausewitzian axiom that are fought and those who pursue correlative I“war has its own language but not its own military aims are exposed to intellectual logic.”1 The language, of course, is the mili- studies that tend to focus primarily on either tarv means to achieve the political objective political or military aims. The argument here in war. which presumabiy is derived through is not that statesmen and military profes- logic. Despite the fact that the axiom may be sionals tend to ignore the relationship of self-evident, both statesmen and soldiers* means and ends in conflict situations but periodically have had to be reminded of its rather that each retains a circumscribed fundamental importance. Perhaps, for rea- emphasis or focus that refiects one’s formal sons all too obvious in the current and pro- education. One is reminded of former Secre- jected world environment, further need for tary of State Cordell Hull’s statement shortly such a reminder ought to be more than the before the attack on Pearl Harbor: “I have international community should be asked to washed my hands of it, and it is now in the tolerate. Yet, the recent history of conflict hands of. . . the Army and the Navy.” and suggests that the relationships of ends and General George C. MarshalPs response to a means require our constant attention. British proposal during World War II: “I Moreover, the growing sophistication of the would be loath to hazard American lives for former and the quantum increases in the po- purely political purposes.”3 This apparent tential of the latter argue persuasively for lack of an interdisciplinary approach more precise analysis and greater clarity. becomes more significant when viewed in the Such outcomes are both necessary and possi- context of the increasing complexity of con- ble, and perhaps they can be achieved fiict in the modern period, wherein political through properly structured intellectual objectives reflect sophisticated notions of efforts that affect both the attitude and deterrence, behavior modification, percep- behavior of those who concern themselves tion and misperception in international with the means and ends of conflict. politics, and other equally abstract ideas. My fundamental hypothesis is that those Likewise, military aims are becoming more who practice statecraft and the art of war ap- complex, and at certain leveis of conflict the parently do so as a consequence of learned “theory and practice of war” refiects more of behavior, acquired through formal education the former than the latter to such an extent and practical experience. In a relative sense, that the synthesis of the two needs careful the latter is a limited source of knowledge for and continuing examination. any one individual, simply because one’s The complexities of ends and means tend adult experience is too narrow to serve as a to become more obvious when viewed basis for questions of war and peace. Formal through an analytical framework that at- education, by contrast, offers the benefit of tempts to identify and assess various catego- man's collective wisdom and appears to be ries of uncertainty. Four categories of uncer- the dominant influence for those involved in tainty, defined as incomplete knowledge, are issues of conflict.2 used in this analysis of political and military objectives. Though initially developed in Throughuut chis articlc ihe lerm statesmen rcfcrs to those individuais **ho formulatc the political ubjectivcs of war; it mcludcs those who analysis of the impact of uncertainty on hold high public office and those within civilian cducaliona! institu- weapon system procurement, these categories tions who contribute. dircctly nr indirectly, to national sccurity and defense policy The term toldiers is used interchangeably with profes- appear to have general analytical validity.4 >ional officcrs *>r military pmfessionals. • The first category isprocess uncertainty, 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW and it is externai in nature. It is a function because the two groups tend to view the of issues largely beyond the control of the variables with differing and at times contrast- military in that it results from initiatives ing perceptions, the normative relationship of undertaken by one’s own government or an means and ends is not support of the latter by actor in the international community. For ex- the former but a relationship that is recipro­ ample, although the military may have a say cai in nature. In theory, the political objec­ in its government’s deliberations concerning tives are formulated with sufficient clarity to arms limitations or arms transfers, the mili­ permit the establishment of military aims that tar)' professional must reaet to the eventual serve the ends of policy. But in reality, the political decision. Likewise, the military complex nature of political and military ob­ professional must assess and, vvhen appropri- jectives leads to an interactive process that ate, attempt to respond to political and mili­ results in outcomes more representaiive of a tar)' initiatives undertaken by existing or po- synthesis than a priori reasoning. tential adversaries. In these and other types of situations, the military’s role is reactive, that is, it accommodates to uncertainty created by processes externai to the militar)' institution. Formal education . . . offers the • By contrast, program uncertainty is in­ benefit of man's collective ternai in nature and occurs as a consequence wisdom and appears to be the of the interaction among various institutional components. For example, how well a com- dominant influence for those in- bined arms force can be expected to operate volve d in issues of conflict. as an orchestrated whole would be, in part, a function of its program uncertainty. • The third category is target uncertainty. Perhaps the most important element to be For our purposes, target refers to the real or understood in the process of arrivingat politi­ perceived militar)' aim or objective. cal and military objectives is the differing • The Final category is technological un­ perceptions held by statesmen and soldiers. certainty; it attempts to identify the degree to Statesmen appear to view objectives in vvhich incomplete knowledge exists about the relatively abstract terms, if for no other rea- strategic and tactical reliability of technologi­ son than to permit some latitude for deter- cal systems. This categorization notwith- mining whether objectives eventuallv are standing, one should recognize that some achieved. Moreover, the objectives frequently overlap exists, and that the degree and type of are characterized by a degree of ambiguity uncertainty exist at arbitrary points across a that allows for modifications as events un- continuum of incomplete knowledge. fold. In short, statesmen usually formulate objectives that seek to affect a change in behavior through the flexible use of force, Complexities of Political and they reserve the right to determine when and Military Objectives: that condition has been achieved. A Broad Framework for Analysis By contrast, the military professional tends In an effort to determine political and mili­ to view military objectives in more absolute tar)' objectives, the thought process, deci- terms. VVhile recognizing the preeminence sions, and actions of statesmen and military and characteristic abstractness of political ob­ professionals must, of necessity, reflect a jectives, the military professional is required similar set of factors or variables. However, to establish military objectives of sufficient GRA MMAR AND LOGIC OF CONFUCT 2b clarity to permit the orderly planning, abstract notions of how military force should organization, and employment of military be used to attain political objectives. For lhe forces. Precise and explicit language is essen- most part, military professionals have been tial in order to assure comprehension and forced to accommodate themselves to these compliance through various leveis of organi- new formulations. They have done so reluc- zational command. As the military profes- tantly because of the fundamental assump- sional establishes the objectives, certain tions that underlie the concepts are at odds values, norms, and tradilions tend to in- with the learned behavior of the military fluence the manner in which he proceeds. professional. Of these two concepts, deter­ For example, by training and education, the rence probably has caused the most concern professional officer is dedicated to the goal of and some frustration among the military. winning. Expressions such as “Damn the torpedoes! Go ahead!” and “In war there is no substitute for victory.” are learned strategic nuclear deterrence responses that often reach the conscious levei In 1946 four civilian analysts at Yale Univer- and most certainly exist in the subconscious sity published a major work that established of manv professionals. Such notions condi- the basic rationale for the concept of deter­ tion the manner in which the professional rence in the nuclear age.5 Their analysis led officer establishes and pursues militar)-objec­ to conclusions that differed markedly from tives. traditional military views. One could argue, therefore, that the Thus, the firsi and most vital step in any American learned behavior of those responsible for ar- security program for the age of atomic bombs is to ticulating political and military objectives take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of at- tack the possibility of retalialion in kind. The writer leads each in different directions. Statesmen in making that statement is not for the moment con- strive for abstractness and a measure of flex- cerned aboul who will win the next war in which ibility while militar)- officers would consider atomic bombs are used. Thus far the chief purpose the establishment of an unclear or uncertain of our military establishment has been to win wars. military objective as totally unprofessional. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert These differences become more pronounced ihem. It can have almost no other useful purpose.6 as one moves from the issue of formulating Thus, at the outset of the nuclear age, an objectives to questions concerning the leveis American civilian educational institution at which conflict occurs and the actual pro- became the source of a concept that cess of using force. challenged the basic objective of conflict as seen by the military professional. Although the notion of deterrence has since become the The Leveis of Warfare and cornerstone in U.S. defense policy, some the Process of Using Force military professionals continue to challenge The leveis of conflict have undertaken certain aspects of the deterrence concept. notabie change since the end of World War Fortunately, little disagreement, if any, exists II. and it is instructive to note that the new between statesmen and soldiers about the formulations are primarily the result of basic need to deter nuclear war, for it is a efforts by civilian theorists from within the widely accepted axiom that no political ob­ academic community. Two of these con- jective could justify initiation of nuclear con­ cepts—strategic nuclear deterrence and coer- flict. The divergence of views between the cive diplomacy—are al opposite ends of a two groups stems from difficulty the military continuum of conflict and reflect relatively officer cxperiences in an attempt to translate 26 A I R ( A71 ERSÍ T) RE l IE I»' into practice the concept of deterrence; that Other uncertainties associated with deter­ is. how does an officer translate the abstrac- rence are just as significant, yet they fali with- tions of conceptual thought into military in one’s internai structure and thus are sub- terms that lead to practical application? The ject to some control. The first of these is civilian theorist can argue that the ultimate program uncertainty—a function of what objective is to deter nuclear war and that Clausewitz refers to as friction. It is the ele- nuclear vveapons possess utility only for that ment that makes the simple things of end. But it is the responsibility of the military theoretical war so difficult in practice. “Fric­ officer to go beyond deterrence and. as tion is the only concept that more or less cor- Michael Howard stated recently, “think what responds to the factors that distinguish real to do if deterrence fails.”7 It is at this point war from war on paper.”8 that the learned behavior of the statesman Perhaps the only means through which and soldier diverge. Both can accept the one can reduce the consequences of friction validity of deterrence as an objective, but the is through practice and experience. But since soldier finds it difficult to establish a com- practice and experience are unavailable and patible military objective. unlikely for nuclear war, the professional Some military officers argue that deter­ officer must accept a high degree of program rence will possess credibi 1 ity only if a nuclear uncertainty or friction. The only real alterna- war-fighting capability exists. Others carry tive option for the professional officer is to the debate further by calling for nuclear convey his sense of concern to the statesmen, forces that are capable of “winning'’ a and quite frequently that approach results in nuclear exchange. In essence, such argu- demands for redundant military capability, ments by officers are attempts to reduce the that is, larger force structures. If the demands degree of uncenainty associated with the are viewed as unreasonable, statesmen can deterrence concept. Military training and rationalize rejection by pointing out that the education make clear to the professional military officer “will always argue that the officer that an analysis of the categories of danger of war requires increased armaments; uncertainty is required for any challenging he will seldom argue that increased arma­ situation, and. given the lack of empirical ments make war practical or desirable. He al­ data about nuclear war, such an analysis ways favors preparedness, but he never feels becomes essential. Of the various categories prepared.’'9 In such an instance, statesmen of uncertainty, the officer understands that may tend to minimize real or perceived un­ process uncertainty is of utmost importance certainty by relying on assumptions that may because it is externai to the military scheme have little basis in fact. of things and thus beyond the military’s in- Another internai category of uncertainty fluence. As examples, the status and that produces tension between soldiers and capabilities of one's allies could change; statesmen is the issue of targetry. and the one's own government, intentionally or establishment of deterrence as the cor- otherwise, might place the military at a disad- nerstone of U.S. defense policy has inten- vantage by political action; or the potential sified this stress. The military officer who adversar* could effect a significant tech- concerns himself with the question of targetry nological breakthrough. In each of these in­ in strategic warfare tends to place primary stantes, the professional officer needs to con- emphasis on the need for counterforce target- sider the net consequences in terms of one's ing, that is, the use of one's strategic forces own capability and. perhaps more important, against selected military capabilities of the how to hedge against such eventualities. adversary. By contrast, statesmen concerned GRAM MAR AND LOGIC Oh CONFUCT 21 with the issue of deterrence quite often view dundancy, which ai limes requires the use of such an approach as dangerous because backup systems of more proven reliability. counterforce targeting may be perceived by Statesmen, of course, may well view such ap- the adversary as a threatening first-strike proaches as expensive, wasteful, and pro- capability. Thus, vvhat the professional vocative, the complexities of technological officer sees as risk avoidance is seen by the uncertainty notwithstanding. statesmen as risk escalation. coercive diplomacy At the opposite end of the conflict continuum . . . statesmen usually formulate is the notion of coercive diplomacy, and like deterrence, it is a product of scholars and not objectives that seek to affect a soldiers.10 Coercive diplomacy is charac- change in behavior through the terized by attempts to affect the motivation or flexible use of force, and they will of the opponent; it is more a test of com- mitment or resolution and less a test of reserve the right to determine strength or capability. Coercive diplomacy ivhen that condition has been calls for the use of military power in “an ex- achieved. . . . the military emplary, demonstrative manner, in discrete and controlled increments, to induce the op­ professional tends to view mili- ponent to revise his calculations and agree to tary objectives in more absolute a mutually acceptable termination of the con­ terms. flict.''11 Force is coupled and orchestrated with inducements and incentives to produce a “carrot and stick” approach to conflict resolution. The final category of uncertainty, Under appropriate circumstances, states­ classified as technological uncertainty, is par- men vvould tend to favor such an approach to ticularly serious vvithin the context of deter­ conflict for several reasons. Perhaps foremost rence. Military' professionals are aware that is the fact that military force clearly is subor- an inverse relationship usually exists between dinated to political objectives throughout the technological sophistication and tactical suc- process of force application. The cir- cess when new weapon systems are cumscribed tasking of the force tends to limit employed. Rarely do highly sophisticated its size and capability and, moreover, permits weapon systems perform ‘‘as advertised" un- the exercise of direct, high-levei command til the “bugs” have been worked out in exten- and control systerris and procedures. Such sive operational use. Therefore, there is con- characteristics provide greater assurances to cern about the reliability of systems integral statesmen that military organizational struc- to the concept of deterrence, and a perceived tures and their tasking can be controlled to need exists to reduce the uncertainty in ways accommodate a changed political environ- that may not be acceptable to statesmen. For ment. Since compromises, negotiations, and example, the military professional may insist bargaining with the adversary are part of the on various means of testing weapon systems conceptualization of the employment of mili­ under conditions as realistic as possible in tary force, the use of limited force and the ex- order to increase the confidence factor. Alter- istence of high-confidence command and natively, he may argue for considerable re- control capability permit a relatively assured 28 A IR UNI VER SI TY RE VIE W response to escalation and deescalation operation challenges the learned behavior efforts. Coercive diplomacy has a measure of patterns of the military professional. Actions appeal to statesmen in that its aftermath pre- that he may wish to take as a matter of pru- sents fewer political problems and thus tends dence concerning the size, composition, to assure a greater degree of stability to the capability, and disposition of force may be settlement. viewed by statesmen as inappropriate or However, the very factors that make an ap- counterproductive. The timing of force proach to the use of force attractive to states­ deployment and employment, viewed as criti­ men are those that cause concern to soldiers. cai by the statesmen, may be inconsistent Indeed, translating into practice a theory call- with established military procedures. More ing for the use of force in a discrete and con- significantly, it may become necessary to pass trolled manner poses formidable challenges command and control of the tactical situation and provides a major test for military compe- to the statesmen. On this latter point, one tency. should recognize that the military' finds it The first and perhaps most difficult task is professionally embarrassing to have civilians the establishment of the military objective interfere in the conduct of military' opera- that correlates with the political objective of tions, the rationale for such control notwith- modifying the calculations of the adversary. standing. >2 Unlike more traditional approaches, wherein the military objective could be the acquisition of territory, neutralization of the opponent’s military capability, or some modification of Precise and explicit language is the adversary’s political or socioeconomic essential in order to assure com- system, coercive diplomacy requires military prehension and compliance efforts that appropriately can challenge the resolution of the adversary. In the Cuban through various leveis of organi- missile crisis, for example, the United States zational command. established a quarantine of Cuba as a tactical military objective. Formulated by statesmen and not soldiers, it could do little to affect the In addition to the obvious complexities in- Soviet missiles already deployed in Cuba. herent in the process of coercive diplomacy, Nevertheless, it conveyed the proper message, its intricate nature becomes more fully and subsequent steps taken by the United manifest when viewed in terms of the various States added to its viability. The United categories of uncertainty described earlier. States quickly withdrew inward the perimeter Process uncertainty, which is externai in of the quarantine by about one-third of the nature and beyond control of those employ- original distance, and eventually it allowed ing coercive diplomacy, is a major issue of two ships to pass before halting a Panama- concern. Successful coercive diplomacy re­ nian ship under registry to the Lebanese but quires the existence of numerous precondi- chartered by the Soviets. For the military tions, some of which largely are dependent planner, who must consider a multiplicity of on the perceptions one holds of the adver­ contingencies for the type of operation sary. For example, the belief by the United described, the establishment of a dear and States that there exists a favorable asymmetry forthright statement of the military objective in motivation between it and an adversary becomes extremely difficult. may prompt the United States to apply coer­ Moreover, the execution phase of such an cive diplomacy. But if the asymmetry favors GRAMMAR AND LOGIC OF CONFUCT 29 the adversary (as was lhe case in Vietnam), jective virtuallv assures similar uncertainties then coercive diplomacy is unlikely to suc- about the militar)- objective. Some militar)' ceed. How to hedge against this major source officers might fmd this condition sufficiently of uncertainty is a formidable problem for frustrating to warrant abrogating this respon- the soidier and one that is likely to place him sibility to statesmen who, by training and at odds with the statesmen. The former educalion, feel more comfortable with understand that if the asymmetry in motiva- abstract notions. But aside from the issue of tion or resoluteness is judged erroneously, formulation, there remains the uncertainty then the most likely eventual niilitary about attainment. Since a fine Iine appears to recourse is to embark on a course of gradu- exist between realistic perseverante and slub- ated escalation, an option that probablv will born adherence, one may not know when a not be favored by the U.S. military for the foreseeable future. Of equal seriousness is that element of in- complete knowledge we have referred to as Modem conflict, with all its po- program uncertainty or friction. Coercive tential for sophistication and diplomacy is highly sensitive to precise tim- ing for threat conveyance, force application, destruction, can find relevance in and force withdrawal. Because of friction the Clausewitzian axiorn that (once again we use the term in a Clause- witzian sense) and the inherent nature of "war has its oivn language but not coercive diplomacy, a well-orchestrated mili- its own logic." tary undertaking cannot be assured. The militaty professional must deal adequatelv with numerous, complex, and interrelated given levei of militar)- effort has achieved its variables such as lack of high-confidence purpose. One should also recognize that the levei inteliigence, hastily organized units learned behavior of the militar)’ professional from different Services, unorthodox pro- would tend to encourage him less toward cedures, possible geographic remoteness of prudence and more toward assertiveness. the target area, limited combat support, and a Finally, coercive diplomacy lends itself to host of other factors. Both the nature and high leveis of technological uncertainty, par- number of these variables suggest that opera- ticularly because the demands are quite high tions to which thev apply will not be charac- and the margin for error is small. The inverse terized by efficiency and that the probabilities ratio between technological sophistication of success can be increased only slightly and tactical reliability referred to earlier is through detailed planning and a high degree particulariy relevant for coercive diplomacy. of competence at everv levei of command. Since the right amount of force, used in the An equally significam category of uncer­ appropriate manner, remains an essential in- tainty associated with coercive diplomacy is gredient in this process, one must have a high the proper identification of the target. Since confidence levei in the Systems to be the political objective of coercive diplomacy employed. Higher than expected failure rates focuses on the calculations and not the for certain systems might significantly reduce capabilities of the adversary. it is likely that force capability and send an erroneous signal the militar)- professional will fmd it par- in what is essentially a test of resoluteness. ticularlv difficult to identify a suitable target. On the other hand, adding redundant In a sense. the vagueness of the political ob­ systems to compensate for possible tech- 30 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW nological failure may send an equallv er- roneous signal. M

Auchor’s note: I am indcbicd lo Dr. Paul H B Godwin, Air Univcr- Siudy Tcam." United State» Air Force Acadctny, I August 1971 sity. for his assístance in lhe formulation of tht* cooccptual framework 5 Bcrnard Brodie. Tht Ahsolulr Weapun Âlomu 1‘ower and World used in ihis articlc I also wish Io (hank Sccretary A A. Zimmerman of Ordtr (New York: Harcourt. Brace, 1946). lhe International Standing Conferem c on Confim Studies (Englundj 6 tbid., p. 76. Emphasis in the original for permission to publish this articlc 7 Michael Howard. “The Forgolten Dimensions of Strategy," Foretgn Affatrs, Summcr 1979. p 983 8 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and iranslated by Michael Howard and Petcr Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Pres», 1976). Noles p I 19. 9. Samuel P Huntington, Tht Soldier and thr Slalr (Cambridgc. 1. Bcrnard Brodie. War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973). Massachusctts: Harvard University Press, 1957, reprim edition. New P 2.L Wilbcrt E Moore, The Rrofessmns Foles and Rui es (New York York Vintage Books), p. 69 Russcll Sage Fuundalion, 1970), pp. 43-47 10. Alexander L Georgc, David K Hall, and William E Simons, 3. Quoted in Coloncl Roben G. Gard. Jr .. “The Military and The Lirnilr of Coereive Difilnrnaty (Boston Littlr, Brown, 1971 i American Socieiv.” Foretgn Ajfatn, July 1971. p 699. 11. Ibid., p 18. 4 I am indebted to Lieutenani Coloncl John F Cíuilmartin. USAF. 12. Gard. p. 701 for this com epiuah/aiion For funher dist ussion. sce Coloncl Roben 13 Thoinas C Schelling, Arms and Influenrr (New Haven: Yale K Lochrx et al Final Repori of lhe USAF Acadcmx Risk Analysis University Press, 1966). p. 89

Four weeks after Dresden we atiacked the ancient cathedral city of Würzburg and shaltered one of the finest Tiepolo ceilings of Europe in lhe bishop’s palace. The bomber crews were particularly happv to obliterate Würzburg because ihey knew that the deadly German tracking and fire-control radars were called Würzburg radars. Nobody told the crews that the city of Würzburg had as much to do with the radars as our own cathedral city of Winchester had to do with Winchester rifles. I began more and more to envy the technicians on the other side who were helping the German night fighter crews to defend their homes and families The night fighters arçd their sup- porting organization put up an astonishing performance, continuing to fighl and to cause us serious losses until their last airfields were overrun and Hitler‘s Germany ceased to exist. They ended the war morally undefeated. They had the advantage of knowing what they were fighting for. Not, in those last weeks of the war. for Hiller, but for the preservation of what was lefl of their cities and their people. We had given them at the end of the war the one thing that they lacked at the beginning, a cause clean to fight for. Freeman Dyson, Dislurhing lhe Universe (New York. 1979). p 39 I

ICBM VULNERABILITY, MOBIUTY, AND ARMS CONTROL the decisional horns ofdilemma

D r . D onald M. Snow

UCH heat and controversy in the The ICBM vulnerability problem has, of last Fresidential election focused on course, been the product of ongoing and pro­ the State of American strategic jected improvements in multiple-vvarhead nuclear forces and their comparison andwith guidance technologies that have MSoviet counterparts. A lightning rod indecreased th is circular error probables (CEPs) debate, discussed in extensive forums that in- spectacularly, to the point of achievinga high cluded the floor of the Democratic National single-shot kill probability (SSKP) against Convention, was the projected vulnerability even hardened targets like ICBM silos (so- of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles called hard-target kill capability). This (ICBMs) to a preemptive strike by counter- achievement is significant both for targeting force-capable Soviet missiles, a problem that against retaliatory Systems and the vital com- one leading commentator has described as mand and control links needed to manage “the strategic issue of the 1980S .”1 strategic resources in a wartime environment. 32 ICBM AND ARMS CONTROL. 33 Much of the current debate of what to do punishment threat the deterrenl base and has about ICBM vulnerabilitv has centered on formed the basis of strategy and force re- proposals to utilize constrained mobile bas- quirements. ing (the multiple protective shelters or MPS In the early 1960s, this threat definition system) of the missile experimental (MX) as was canonized as assured destruction and a countermeasure. As I argued in the July- became mutual as the Soviets built their own August 1980 edition of the Review, the pro- nuclear forces to parity. With both sides posed system has conceptual problems lhat possessing secure second-strike forces, pre- render it less than an optimal solution. Im- emptive incentives were minimized, and the plicit in that assessment, the MPS system result was stability in the nuclear relation- seeks to please two masters, force in- ship. Klaus Knorr explains, “As long vulnerability and arms control verifiability, as . . . the conditions of the mutual balance when these two requisites are not entirely of terror . . . prevail, it is hard to think of compatible. By seeking to compromise these conflict objectives valuable enough to justify two ends. the result is a less than satisfactory lhe deliberate initiation of large-scale nuclear overall resolution. The purpose of this article war. 1 is to explore some of the reasons why incom- Regardless of whether forces are aimed at patibility exists. population concentrations or infrastructure One of the basic problems with the pro- targets, the basis is the punishment threat. posed solution to ICBM vulnerabilitv is that Once the force leveis necessary to assure it appears to be a discreet response to a destruction threat are established, the specific problem. This narrow vievv may be emphasis moves toward stabilizing the rela- mistaken. The implications of hard-target tionship. As Fritz Ermarth puts it: kill capability and how it is countered have The essence of U.S. “doctrine” is to deter central consequences for the entire strategic deter- nuclear war at relatively low leveis of arms effort rence system. If uncountered, improved ac- ("arms race stability") and strategic anxiety ("crisis curacy threatens the survivability of retaliato­ stability”) through the credible threat of catastrophic ry forces that has been a prime ingredient in damage to the enemy should deterrence fail.3 the retaliatory strategy underlying American Two corollaries relevant to the missile ac- policy. If countered by recourse to a decep- curacy improvement question flow from tively based mobile system like MX, the these basic preferences. The first relates to results could greatlv complicate arms control force characteristics. Forces must be in- processes based in the ability to monitor com- vulnerable to preemptive attack to ensure pliance by nonintrusive means. their availability for retaliatory missions (sur­ The purpose of deterrence is to convince a vivability) and they must be capable of over- potential aggressor not to attack. It is ac- coming adversary defense efforts and reach- complished through one or both of two ing targets (penetrability). threats. These threats are the promise that Accuracy improvements affect these re- you have sufficient counterforce to stop and quirements in different ways. Accuracy im­ thus frustrate aggression, thereby denying provement approaching hard-target kill goal accomplishment, or to inflict such capability makes fixed offensive systems massive punishment on the aggressor as to vulnerable and thus decreases retaliatory make the costs prohibitively high. Since capacities, but improved accuracy also deploying effective missile defense Systems is strengthens the assured destruction threat by outlawed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) enhancing single-shot kill probability. Fewer Treaty. the absence of defense has made the warheads need to be dedicated to given 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW targets, creating the ability to broaden target difficult to control. The Creative nature of coverage or to keep more forces in strategic scientific research and decentralization of the reserve. American research system make the results of The second corollary relates to targeting efforts difficult to predict and control. The plans. Assured destruction strongly implies basic nature of Science and engineering is countervalue targeting or aiming retaliatory precision, so that “regardless of official forces at things people value most, such as doctrine, teams of scientists and engineers do their lives and the necessities for postwar and will inevitably discover ways of improv- recovery like factories, roads, and electric ing system performance.”4 Control is made power generators. Countervalue targeting more difficult because what happens . . is does not require enormous accuracy, al- a composite of behavior taking place in at though accuracy improvements do allow least three distinguishable, but overlapping greater target discrimination away from gross arenas [war planning, system and force ac- urban concentrations to more discrete targets quisition, and the public debate].”5 In that like recovery capacities. organizational setting, coordination prob- The alternate targeting strategy is counter- lems are inevitable. force, and counterforce targets can be divided Accuracy improvements in reentrv vehicle into two categories: strategic retaliatory forces (RV) and warhead design have been the and residual forces remaining after an initial result of two technological processes: reduc- nuclear exchange. Counterforce strategy tions in warhead size. allowing more guid- against retaliatory forces (ICBMs and com- ance equipment to be placed in existing mand and control facilities) requires attain- systems; and Computer miniaturization, per- ment of hard-target kill capability, since a mitting more guidance to fit in available missile not destroyed can be used in retalia- space. The first notable breakthrough was tion. To the extern that attaining counter­ the multiple independently targetable reentry force capability makes the targeting plan at- vehicle (MIRV) bus, which is a postboost tractive, the result is a threat to in- vehicle that was a technological by-product vulnerability and is destabilizing. of the space program.6 Its testing was com- Missile accuracy improvement began in pleted in 1968, with initial deployment in earnest during the latter 1960s, largely 1970. These breakthroughs in guidance tech- because of two interrelated factors. First, the nology have allowed spectacular CEP reduc- early McNamara Defense Department's tions and new possibilities across the decision not to deploy more than 1054 land- spectrum of weapon systems. based ICBMs and 656 submarine-launched The cumulative effect has been to create ballistic missiles (SLBMs) meant that the possibility of hard-target kill and, hence, enhanced American capability would have to counterforce capability. At the war planning come from improvements in existing systems. levei, these developments Second, Soviet strategic expansion was evi- . . . affect (lie entire spectrum of accuracy. mobility. dent by the latter 1960s. For a variety of the multiplicity and discrimination of available political, bureaucratic, budgetary, and tech- strike weapons, yields, surveillance, command, con­ nological reasons, it was decided that trol, Information and Communications, as well as American strategic advantage was best served associated means for obtaining intelligence and lor by engaging in a qualitative rather than analysis and decision.7 quantitative competition. The ability to select targets with a high degree Once engaged, the outcomes of this pro- of confidence also strikes at some long-held cess were unpredictable, incrementai, and notions about how nuclear war would be ICBM AND AR MS CONTROL 35 fought: “What we see here is nothing less our deterrent position; Soviet attainment of than decoupling of two ideas which have the same capacity is destabilizing because it been closely conjoined since 1945 and will tempt them to launch a preemptive at­ perhaps since 1861: tlie ideas of strategic tack against our ICBMs. Former Secretary of warfare and of mass destruction.'8 Defense James Schlesinger authored this These technological developments attack American position and explained it before a the heart of the strategic consensus based in subcommitte of the Senate Foreign Relations the assured destruction threat. Considera- Com mittee: tions of preemption to dilute retaliatory We have to distinguish among disarming first strike, capacity and target selectivity to limit damage no first use, and counterforce. Counterforce can go challenges basic tenets without offering ob- against any military target. It can go against IRBM sites as opposed to ICBM sites. It would go against vious alternate bases. One observer con- airfields or army camps. It has a range, and one can cludes that “teehnology can destabilize the go counterforce rather than countervalue without strategic balance and thus provide less, rather necessarily putting himself into a position of having than more. security.”9 Senator Frank a disarming first-strike capability.11 Church, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, vvorried about the Tammen elaborates the virtues attributed to mutual effects on secure second-strike the American improvement program: calculations: “If these forces are deployed, Two points generally are made in favor of a new hard-target warhead program. First, it would in- each natioms fear of a first strike will be dra- crease efficiency by reducing the number of matically increased.”10 These potential con- warheads now targeted against one hard facility. sequences have forced attempts to rationalize Second, it would allow greater flexibilitv and hence what technology has made possible. effectiveness in targeting command posts, nuclear Justifications for missile accuracy improve- weapons storage facilities, Communications centers, ments have been and continue to be highly and other hardened sites that may remam vulnerable controversial. The basic reason for this con- in a second-strike environment.12 troversy is that the capability is Damoclean in This retaliatory-preemptive division makes nature and thus produces schizophrenic ex- the discussion schizophrenic. Because we planations about its good and bad effects. maintain that our basic intentions are The positive and negative edges of the retaliatory, possession of a capability with ob- Damoclean sword can be restated. Positively, vious preemptive implications will tempt the improved accuracy broadens target coverage Russians to think about striking first but will by permitting fewer warheads to be aimed at not create the same temptation for us. various targets and, once achieved, allows Such a distinction is simply incredible and targeting of things bevond the capabilities of creates aJekyll-Hyde dichotomy wherein Dr. less accurate delivery systems. Negatively, JekylPs role is assigned to the United States retaliatory systems like the fixed, land-based and Mr. Hvde’s to the Soviets. Further, it ICBMs are among those additional targets. assumes that the United States would not be The result is the ICBM vulnerability issue tempted to swallow the potion counterforce and countermeasures to it. capability provides and assume Hyde-like This Damoclean character makes discus- qualities. The argument becomes especially sions of accuracy improvement schizoid. In strained when applied to damage limitation the American debate, this schizophrenia can arguments; in a retaliatory strike, we could be summarized as follows: American posses- destroy empty Soviet ICBM silos to prevent sion of counterforce capability is stabilizing their reloading or holding missiles in reserve because it enhances flexibilitv and improves but would not engage in the more fruitful 36 A IR UNJVERSITY REVIEW damage limitation activity of destroying those the open pursuit of such capabilities since 1974 has silos before their deadly contents had been considerably raised Soviet suspicions. especially as it dispatched. Any Soviet planner who accepted accompanied the failure to reach a SALT agreement our reasoning would be a quite rightful can­ based on the Vladivostok accords.15 didate for assignment to a Siberian power The emergence of counterforce-capable station. weaptm systems and their justifications are The problem underlying th is inconsistency controversial and create very real problems is, of course, the relationship between for both sides. The thorny nature of these capabilities and intentions and the extern to difficulties is well demonstrated in the ongo- which intentions can be inferred from physi- ing debate about the MX, which adds an cal capacity. Defenders of the Schlesinger arms control dimension to the controversy. thesis do not deny that hard-target kill The proposed MX would be an extremely capabilitv is an outgrowth of our accuracy sophisticated addition to the current improvement program (in fact, they generally American ICBM inventory of Titan, applaud it) as well as that of the Soviets. Minuteman II, and Minuteman III missiles. Rather. the imputation of a Soviet preemp- The MX is extremely powerful. with a “ . . . tive intent derives from Soviet public disdain throw-weight that would be at least four for the assured destruction concept and their times as great as . . . the current Minuteman advocacy of counterforce targeting as part of III"16 (which has about half that of the war winning and recovery should deterrence Soviet SS-18 “heavy” missile). The MX has fail. Similarly. the controlled, second-strike hard-target kill capability with a CEP now application of our counterforce capability is estimated at .05 nautical miles, compared to supported by our public advocacy of second- projections for the Soviet SS-17, SS-18, and striking and our emphasis on limiting a SS-19 counterparts in the 1000-foot range by nuclear war should it occur. the early I980s. That the Soviets must find th is distinction What makes the MX all the more suspicious is pointed out by Paul Warnke: remarkable is the variety of modes in which it “The fine tuning of our nuclear weapons can be deployed. MX could be housed in and delivery Systems could create fears of silos or in a variety of mobile modes without counterforce attack on the other side and seriously degrading its performance. hence bc destabili/ing.">3 Speaking directly Th is MX quality adds an arms control to the so-called Schlesinger doctrine, dimension to the whole problem area. A VVilliam Kincade argués: mobile MX responds directly to ICBM In terms of perceptions, however, his separation of vulnerability, but its enormously sophisti- targeting doctrine from hardware and his denial of cated guidance system makes it hard-target first-strike intentions were somewhat academic, kill capable and raises the range of controver­ since the U.S. was pursuing simultaneously a war- sy that counterforce capacity engenders. The fighting targeting and emplovment doctrine and debate becomes arms-contro! relevant missile accuracy improvements which lend them- because, as a hedge against Soviet hard-kill selves to first-strike interpretation.14 capability, MX is most effective when using Raymond Garthoff adds that espousing the some deceptive form of deplovment (so that virtues of counterforce represents a doctrinal the Soviets would not know which aim points movement away from assured destruction to target and consequently would have to and ties the issue to the SALT process: destroy them all, in the process depleting a I he reversal of American stated policy on the large part of their warheads). Deceptive destabilizing nature of counterforce capabilities, and deplovment can violate national technical ICBM AND AR MS CONTROL 37 means of verification provisions that have siloing in alternate, harder sites such as deep formed the basis of successful arms control caves generate little support. Objections arise agreements and hence creates concerns vvith- from two sources: the activity is very expen- in the arms control community. Each sive, and its effects would be temporary. Col- characteristic merits elaboration. in Cray summarizes these objectives: “ . . . It is no surprise that land-based, fixed-site the arithmetic is not promising for its effee- ICBM forces should be the first system to tiveness (e.g., and increase in nominal silo become vulnerable: they are in known, im- blast resistance from 2.000 to 3.000 psi . . . movable locations and are hence the easiest can be offset by an improvement in missile to target. Since a large portion of each side's CEP of 50 feet.po arsenais are ICBMs (about one-third of — Missile defense was aclively debated in deliverable U.S. megatonnage and over 80 the latter 1960s and early I970s (theJohnson percent of Soviet megatonnage ), “The ques- Sentinel and Nixon Safeguard proposals), tion for the decade, for both superpovvers in and a Safeguard configuration was built at the I980s with respect to the structure of their Grand Forks and was operational for a short strategic forces, should be what to do about time. ABM was ultimatelv rejected because land-based ICBMs."17 of questionable effectiveness and cost given John Newhouse summarizes the various projected offensive improvements like ways to deal with a vulnerable Minuteman MIRV. In addition, the incompatibility of force: “(1) dismantling all or part of it; (2) active defenses with strategy was raised (an superhardening the silos; (3) defending it; (4) effective ABM system would make putting it on mobile launchers."18 Adopting penetrability questionable and partially a launch-on-warning (LOVV) firing policy undermine deterrence stability notions), and can be added to th is list. Each possibi lity has the debate culminated with the ABM Treaty. advantages and disadvantages that can be Projected breakthroughs in laser and summarized: charged-particle beam research20 have — Dismantling the ICBM force is advo- ballistic missile defense potential, however. cated by those who maintain that: a nonsur- — If other options are rejected, the remain- vivable force component creates a temptation ing possibilities are to move to a LOW firing to preempt and is worse than no force; and it plan or to go mobile. LOW involves firing makes more sense to invest in more surviva- missiles when one detects an incoming ble systems like SLBMs (as reflected in the missile force to ensure that forces are not United States “one-way freedom to mix” destroyed in their silos and is often con- proposals in SALT I). Dismemberment is demned as crisis destabilizing. Unless an opposed on the grounds that: ICBMs have alternative antidote to the vulnerability positive characteristics not shared by other problem is found, however, “Those branches systems (e.g., positive prelaunch command of American and Soviet military Services that and control, delivery accuracy, high believe they must continue to press the case payload); and the ICBMs have important for land-based missile forces will . . . be missions (e.g., creating “corridors” for even more tempted to stress launch-on-warn­ penetrating bombers by destroying Soviet air ing as an option.’’21 Some form of mobility defenses) and pose offensive and defensive thus becomes more attractive than the alter- problems for the Soviets that would not be natives. present in their absence (essentially a defense MX's hard-target kill capability causes of the Triad concept). concern, not only because counterforce —Additional hardening of existing silos or capability challenges traditional deterrence 38 AIR UNIl'ERSITY REl'IEIV stability notions (as discussed earlier) but sites so they can be counted in a manner also because of Soviet force structure. The similar to nuclear submarines), some count- Soviet Rocket Forces are the preeminent arm ing imprecision occurs; as Newhouse puts it, of Russian strategic capability. As a result, arms control “stability relies on knowing ICBM vulnerability is a much greater Soviet what the other has.”24 Even supporters of than American problem and makes MX a mobile systems like MX agree there is an particularly threatening possibi lity: “MX arms control cost in the decision to go could appear to the Soviets to constitute a mobile. Cray, for instance, States bluntly that credible First-strike threat against their land- . . . most of the land-mobile possibilities would based missiles, which are the backbone of place intolerable strain upon national technical Soviet strategic forces.”22 means of verification. American officials might be A credible U.S. counterforce capability compelled to choose between a SALT III regime could force the Soviets into a mobility deci- that cannot be adequately verified and the demise of sion for most of the same reasons as are being the SALT system. discussed in the United States. The Soviefs Sidney D. Drell agrees, stating dourly, “The more limited technological base would be a verification problems raised by this option disadvantage for them in a “mobility race”: [mobile missiles] could mean the end of arms targeting from a fixed site is considerably control by negotiated agreement.”26 easier than targeting the same weapon from a There is an obvious paradox in this situa- varietv of potential points, the correct one of tion. On the one hand, arms race stability is which can only be known in advance if one best served by verifiable limitations through plans to preempt. A Soviet decision not to arms control agreements like SALT. On the compete in mobile missiles could lead them other hand, crisis stability is best served by to other firing options like launch-on-warn- having secure forces. If land-based systems ing. The potential effect would be . . are to remain part of the deterrent force, crisis instability and preemption incentives mobility is the most effective way to sustain that are undesirable,”23 and there is some that security. Thus, the accomplishment of evidence that the U.S.S.R. has already recog- the dual U.S. preferences for arms race nized this problem. stability and crisis stability are subjected to Even if the mobile missile question is strain in a world of hard-target kill capable detached from counterforce capability (e.g., a weapon systems: verifiable agreements re- less accurate mobile missile), mobility re- quire adversary knowledge of launcher num- mains an arms control problem. The basic bers that entails simultaneously some in- problem is that the more mobile a basing crease in the ability to target systems. Know­ system is, the more secure it is, but that ing that forces are vulnerable raises incen­ security is bought at the expense of arms con­ tives for preemptive or launch-on-warning trol verifiability. The result is a basic dilem- firing postures and contributes to crisis in­ ma for policymakers: the purpose of mobile stability. Systems is to evade the detection that would Attempts to reconcile this dilemma are allow an enemy to destroy them. The more troublesome. First, if a U.S. decision to go efficiently the systems are hidden, the more mobile is followed by a Soviet decision to do secure they are against counterforce-capable likewise, it is quite possible that the Soviets Soviet weapons. While verification improve - would go to a less verifiable mobile basing ments are possible (e.g., cooperative agree- mode, such as road mobile. Second, decep- ments to open silos periodically for inspec- tion and precise verification are not entirely tion, only constructing missiles near launch compatible. The extra missile shelters in the ICbM AND ARMS CONTROL 39

MPS system. for instance. could be loaded an arms control issue relevant to SALT.30 with excess missiles in a crisis, and even ran- Cray bases this observation on the contention domly opening holes for inspection does not that MX development is necessary to moti- entirely overcome the cheating potential of vate the Soviets to a serious concern about putting extra missiles in the shelters. Cer- the issue: “MX is the system that should per­ tainlv the United States vvould suspect the suade very tough-minded Soviet officials that Soviets of attempting such deception, and the hard-target counterforce race cannot be there is little reason to believe the U.S.S.R. won.”31 Thus, continued MX development would not harbor the same suspicions about to whatever point it takes t<> convince the our system. The only way to reinstate precise Soviets becomes a bargaining chip for future verification is through cooperation and in- arms control discussions. trusive monitoring. As one analyst puts it, This argument raises objections. If MX “In terms of the intrusiveness of the monitor­ deployment becomes inexorable because of ing procedures and the amount of U.S.- perceived necessity or if it requires deploy­ Soviet cooperation required, verification in ment to convince the Soviets to take the issue an MPS environment is without precedent in seriously, there is the very real question of strategic arms control.”27 vvhether there would be anything substantial If precise verification and mobilitv are in- to discuss in post-MX arms control negotia- compatible and the decision is reached to tions. sacrifice arms control security for secure Some observers question how serious the forces, one possible outcome is “. . . that ICBM vulnerability problem is. On the basis mobile deplovments vvould touch off a of elaborate Computer simulations of poten­ destabilizing arms race.”28 Georgi Arbatov, tial Soviet attack scenarios taking into ac- director of the Soviet U.S.A. Institute, con- count a variety of variables, John D. curs in this conclusion: Steinbruner and Richard L. Garwin main- T he arms race could take a course . . . which would make new agreemenis on limiting and reduc- tain that a successful attack would require ing armaments far more difficult. if not altogether such substantial force depletion as to make impossible, due to the insurmountable obstacles for the prospect unappealing. They conclude: their verification.29 The strategic forces of the Soviet Union, even if very There is not universal agreement either aggressively modernized, will not be sufficient to that mobile missiles are arms control destruc- threaten with true credibility the decisive destruction tive nor that the ICBM vulnerability issue of the United States Minuteman force.32 vvarrants developing and deploying such Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, stressing Systems. Cray, one of the leading advocates of the number of unpredictable factors such an the MX, poses the interesting argument that attack would entail, agreed in 1978: the vulnerability-mobility problem only In recognizing that the MINUTEMAN vulnera­ becomes an arms control issue if the United bility problem is a serious concern for us, we also States moves ahead in developing the system: realize that the Soviets would face great uncertain- Silo vulnerability . . . does not become an arms ties in assessing whether they have the capability we control problem capable of being addressed fear . . ,33 seriously in SALT, until it is first approached as a Others disagree about whether defense problem. When the Soviet Union . . . ob­ serves that the United States is in the process of both vulnerability in one Triad Ieg would seriously solving its silo-vulnerability problem, and . . . is tempt the Soviets to attack the ICBM force. developing a major threat to Soviet silo-housed Some observers, for instance, contend that ICBMs, then silo vulnerability . . . should become unless all retaliatory systems can be attacked 40 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW simultaneously (including bombers and sub- to ensure that limits are being honored would marines), the Soviets will remain deterred. be through constam, on-site monitoring (to Since the Soviets have neither the depressed guarantee warheads are not switched). The trajectory SLBM capability to attack alert SALT II solution on MIRV (any system bombers nor effective antisubmarine warfare tested as a MIRV is considered against the (ASW) capacity to pose a threat to SLBM limil) simply encourages deployment to that forces, U.S. retaliatorv capabilities are not limit. seriously compromised. Critics of this posi- If deployment is either highly likely or in- tion counter that survivable Systems in all evitable, a second reality must be faced: we three Triad legs are necssary for deterrent do not truly know what the consequences oí stability; that the surviving forces are the least ICBM vulnerability are. This uncertainty is accurate (SLBMs) and most questionablv important for at least two reasons. First, un­ penetrable (bombers); and that once an at­ certainty itself is destabilizing in terms of tra- tack was completed. the United States could ditional notions about stable deterrence be left with the unattractive alternatives of based in the sure belief that any nuclear retaliating with a massive countervalue attack usage would be suicidai. To the extern that inviting a similar response or of accepting a counterforce attainment allows calculating fait accompli. potential advantage through preemption, the basie threat mechanism is weakened. Uncertainty has a second effect that makes deployment more likely than it would be T he preceding discussion has otherwise. Although predicting with absolute attempted to convey the complexity and con- confidence the effect of ICBM vulnerability tentiousness of the ICBM vulnerability- may not be possible, enumerating the mobility issue. Despite fundamental dis- possibilities is. Some of these possibilities agreements about the nature of the problem could be no less than catastrophic, providing and its solution, some central realities must considerable momentum to counter the be dealt with. These realities require Solu­ “worst case.” In the case of ICBM tions with important long and short run con- vulnerability, the most effective counter- sequences for the strategic nuclear relation- measure is the development of deceptivelv ship between the United States and the based mobile systems. Soviet Union. The decision either to develop and deploy The central fact, of course, is that both the MX or not to do so contains implications United States and Soviet Rússia will attain that could alter significantly the strategic hard-target kill capability in the next few nuclear balance. l he final determination in- years. The history of abstinence from deploy- evitably places one on the horns of dilemma: ing technologically possible innovations is the decision not to go to mobile systems in- sufficiently dismal as to suggest that pinpoint evitably has negative consequences for tradi- accurate systems will enter strategic arsenais tional notions regarding stable deterrence; soon. This likelihood is enhanced by the fact the decision to do so raises negative arms that the kinds of improvements that lead to control implications that even the most in- greater accuracy (e.g., Computer guidance) genious verification schemes do not entirely are very difficult to verify.34 Bans or limits on overcome. Ii does not appcar possible to have numbers of such warheads, even if adequate it both ways. definitions could be reached, are unpromis- There is legitimate contention about the ing; as with MIRV, the only way physically extern vulnerable ICBMs threaten strategic ICBM A Ni) ARMS CONTROL 41 stability bui ii is undeniable that there is Reali/ing these contingencies would bring some impact. Minimally. tliis is true because into question both the survivability and deterrence is at heart psychological: one is penetrability of second-strike forces that have deterred to lhe degree that one believes in lhe been the linchpins of deterrence stability no- catastrophic consequentes of a nuclear at- tions for twenty years. At best, vulnerable tack. The more certainly one believes that a forces are a tempting larget for preemption nuclear action would be suicidai, the more and create pressures either for a preemptive firmly is one deterred. and thus the more sla- or launch-on-warning counterdoctrine that ble is the nuclear relationship. would be crisis destabilizing. At worst, large- The simple fact that people can and do scale system vulnerability could force ex- calculate the potential advantage that an un- amination of deterrent system maintenance, countered hard-target kill attainment pro- with no alternative basis readily apparent. vides vveakens the deterrent threat. Such clis- The decision to develop deceptive mobile cussions have concentrated on the effect ol systems is no less damaging to arms control Soviet attainment on the integrity of U.S. efforts. The Gray argument that continued deterrent posture. but the reverse is equally development is needed to make missile ac- true. Given the heavy ICBM dominante in curacy pari of lhe arms control agenda is un- Soviet forces, American attainment of the convincing: the cat would clearly be out ol capability is even a great concern to them. the bag at that point. The ability to develop and they necessarily must assume that the precisei}- veriftable agreements was a major United States is engaged in calculations item in the SALT II ratification debate as is about the sarne advantages attributed to their advocacy of the proposed MX system. As the possession. This Soviet problem may create discussion has tried to demonstrate, these tvvo an equally importam horn of dilemma for positions are not as compatible as some have them in terms of hovv they can counter argued and raise some thornv problems to be American hard-target kill capability. resolved. Uniuersily of Alabarna, Tuscaloosa

Notes Strate^y rtnrl Sn t tonal Sn urity Pomts of I /ru t YYashinglon American I C o lin S (iruy The Sirategu h-nes Triad Knd of the Roatl?** Fntcrprisc Institute for Public Pnlic\ Research. I977i. p. 115 Pnm^n AJJarrs. July 1978. pp 771-89 12 T.immcn. p 126. Ftnphasis .iddcd - Klaus Knorr, On tht I s<\ of Xltliftirv Power tn the N ufltttr Age 13 Paul Warnke. Seouid Letture.” in Paul (' Warnke and l Pnnccion New Jcr\r\ Princcton Laiivcrsity Press. 1966). pp 88-89. James I. Buckley, Strntcgn Suffiticnt) Ptnt > Research. 1972). p. 30 Thoughi. Inirrtuíhniiêil Seeunty. Fali 1978. pp 138-39 14 VVilliam II Kincade. “Rc|>eatu>g Histnry l he: Civil Delense 4 Colin S (iras lhe future r»f Laud-Bascd Missile Fortes.” Debate Renewed.** inOrnntioiml Setnriiy. VVinler 1978. pp 107-8 Adelphi Puperi Vo 140 Londoti International Institute <»f Stratcgic 15. Raymond L (iartholi, Mutual Deterrence and Stratcgic Arms Studicv Wintrr 19771. p 4 Limilatinn in Soviet Polic\. InletnaOotuil Sctitnly. Smitmei 1978. p. 5 Ermanh. p 142 138 6 Konald I Taiiuueii. U / P l and t/w Ann\ K utt An Inlrrpreln/ion aj |t> Colin S Cray. "The* Future oI I.and-Bascd Missile Forces, p Deferiu Siralrvi New York Pracgcr. I973j 12. 7 ll.irry (. («elber. "SALT and lhe StraicgK Iuture.” Orhis. Sum- 17 Colin S (irav. ‘Soviet-Americ an Stratcgic Compeiition Instru- mrr 1978. p 289 tnenls. Doc trines. and Purposcs ' in Prangcr and I^ibric. edilors. p. 8. Ibid p. 290. 285 9 Paul ( \Vtrnke ‘Arms Control A Cdoha! Impcrativc.” Uultrhn 18. John Ncrvhousc*. Coltl íhtwn Tht Sttrry aj’SAl.T[ New York llolt. nf the Aêmiw Vííw /m/), Junr 1978. p 33. Rinehan and Winstoii, 1973). p 25 10 SAI.l II. l.mkage. and National Scc urity. Irtns (.ontrol Today, 19. Colin S (irav. ".Soviet-American Sirategic Com|x*tiiinn,‘’ p August-Septcmbcr 1978. p I 291. II Testitiiotty ..I James S« hlesmger. T S -L S S K Stralcga 20 Dr Barrs J Smemofl. "Stratcgic and Arms Control Implica* P**li» irs. ui Rotor’ J Prangcr and Rogcr P Labrie. etliiors. \'u, Imr tions ol l.ascr Wcapons A Prcliminary Assrssmcni." Air Vnwerstfy 42 A IR UNI VERSITY RE VIE W

Rtvirw. January-Fcbruary 1978. pp. 38-5U; Donald M. Show. "Ovcr Bulletin of ihr Alonu< Scientists, May 1977. p. 39. lhe Straicgii: Hori/on Dirciied Energ>' Transfer Weapons and Ar ms 27 Stephen M Meyer. "Verificatinn and thc ICBM Shell-Game." Omirtil," Atmi Cuntrol Today, November 1979, pp. I, 8-9; Donald M Inlernuliunat Security, Fali 1979. p 63 Show. "Lasors, Gbangcd-Pariiile Bcams and thc Strategic Future." 28 Conover. p. 39. Pohtual Srienie Quatlerty, Suimner 198U. pp. J77-9-4 29 Georgi Arbatov. "The Dangers of a New Cold War." Rullelin aj 21. Fred C Iklc. “Can Detcrrencc Lasi Oui lhe Century?" in thr Átomo Surnhsh. March 1977. p. 38 Frangcr and L-abric, cdilors, p. 65. 30. Cray, "The Strategic Forces Triad," p. 779 22. Kobcrt S Mct/.gcr, "Cruise Missiles: DilTereni .Vlissions, 31 Ibid., p. 788 Diffcrenl Arrns Control Impacls." Arms Conlrol Today, January 1978, p 32 John D Steinbruner and Richard L. Garwin, "Strategic 2. \ ulnerability The Balance betwecn Prudente and Paranóia." Interna­ 23. C Jobnston Conover. "G S Strategic Weapons and Delcr- tional Security, Summer 1976. p 169. renic," Rand Paper Sr nr* Xn P-r)9b7 I Santa Monica. ( Califórnia: Rand 33 Harold Brou n, Department of Defense, Annual Report, Final irar Corporation. August 1977. p 28 1979 (Washington: Government Printing ()ffice, February 2, 1978), p 24 Ncwhouse, p. 26. 63 25 Cray, "The Kulure of Land-Based Missile forces, p 29 34 For an claborate exatnple ol this position, see Les Aspin, "SALT 26 Sidncy D Drcll, "Beyond SALT II A Missilc Test Quota." oi No SALI Hullehn uj thr Atomu -V< rentis/í. Junc 1978. pp. 34-38

Air University Establishes the Airpower Research Institute The Air University has established, within the Air War College, a new organization called the Airpower Research Institute (ARI). The Airpower Research Institute will pro- vide a setting in which in-depth background studies relating to airpower as an instrument of national policy can be conducted to provide a sounder basis for decision-making at the highest echelons, where the formulation and evaluation of options and recommendations on airpower strategy and policy take place. The basic assumptions of the Institute are that military forces cannot be employed successfully without adequate conceptual preparation and that the Air Force mission will continue to face formidable challenges in the areas of doctrine, strategy, and employment. Research projects at the Airpower Research Institute are to be pursued by both active- duty and reserve Air Force officers and civilian research associates who will normally work individually, though an interdisciplinary approach may be used on projects which require a variety of backgrounds for comprehensive analysis. This mix of academics, military officers, and civilians from the Department of Defense, in which a variety of viewpoints and backgrounds will come into play, coupled with close interaction with Air University professional military education institutions, is expected to provide an atmosphere that will be a constant source of intellectual stimulation. The Airpower Research Institute will concentrate its efforts on (1) technical, politico- economic, and military trends that are pertinent to the long-range planning efforts of the USAF and its major components; (2) past, present, and future airpower-employment con- cepts in terms of doctrine, strategy, and technology; and (3) military professionalism and the challenges of military officership in a changing environment. Its produets will be published by Air University and receive wide dissemination throughout the Air Force, lhe Department of Defense, other government agencies, and relevant civilian communities. I hose desiring more information on the Airpower Research Institute may write Air­ power Research Institute. Air University (ATC), Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 36112, or call (205) 293-7074 or AUTOVON 875-7074. EXECUTIVE STRESS the symptoms, and the cure COLONEL RAYMOND G. TROXLER Lieu t en a n t Colonel Harry H W etzler

ORTY is the most common age for heart attacks in the Air Force. Studies have shown that Air Force members between F32 and 42 years of age are increasingly vulnerable to cardiovascular disease, and the incidence of heart attacks goes up dra- matically during these years. After age 40 the

0 aae 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW rate in the Air Force begins to decline but from the harmful stress that can harm our continues to rise in the civilian population. It bodies? First, we must define harmful stress: is well documented that age increases one’s Harmful stress is best defined as a real or per- risk of a heart attack. The decline in the rate ceived real threat to our physical or psy­ of heart attacks in the Air Force after 40 may chological self. When we experience a stress, be due to an increase in retirement of those our body’s physiological and psychological personnel at risk. defenses are mobilized to meet it. The result Evidence will be presented to show that is known as “tension.” As the brain perceives th is rapid rise in heart attacks betvveen 32 a stress, the resulting tension releases and 42 ma\ be related to psychological slress. adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH), In a recent issue of the Journal oj the American which in turn releases a second hormone, Medicai Associaiion, it was reported that cortisol. The presence of cortisol helps the “.stress related conditions are responsible for body fight stress by increasing mental alert- S10 to S20 billion annually in loss of in­ ness and muscle strength and by pushing up dustrial productivity."1 blood pressure and accelerating heart rate. The key question that must be answered is The hormone also plays a vital role in pro- what causes increased stress in military mem- viding emergency energy by breaking down bers as they approach age 40? We know that stored sugar and fat and releasing these ele- stress is causecl by change, and the severity of ments into the blood. the stress is related to our confidente in our Cortisol is so vital for the resistance of the ability to handle that change. Betvveen 30 and human organism to stress that when patients 40 we begin to consider making changes in do not produce enough of the hormone, our lives. We begin to wonder about our surgeons must give it to them the day before ability to handle our rapidly increasing job their surgerv so they can survive the stress of responsibilities and the increased competi- the operation. The daily levei of cortisol tion for promotion. We worry about whether varies by a preset pattern. Th is pattern is we should retire, and if we retire, how can we called the diurnal curve of cortisol. It is set by make enough money to afford advanced our exposure to light and dark. (See Figure education for our children? Gail Sheehy, in 1.) When we cross more than one time zone. her book Passages, has identified the age be- tween 30 and 40 as the adult “midlife crisis."2 She claims it is accompanied by a sudden change in the proportion of safety Figure 1. Daily cortisol curve and danger we feel in our lives. Quoting Sheehy, “Somewhere between 35 and 45 if we let ourselves, most of us will have a fu 11 - out authenticity crisis.”

W hat is stress? Stress is any- thing that requires the body to change. Since the only objective evidence of life is growth, and growth is a change, then it follows that stress is an inherent part of life. The real question is how do we separate the beneficiai stress that results in growth time

46 A IR UNI VERSITY RE 17 E W between mental stress and atherosclerosis.5 In our so-called civilized society, stress still Why do stress hormones increase the evokes the same primitive response. How- amount of cholesterol if high blood ever, instead of burning this sugar and fat as cholesterol can cause coronary artery dis- fuel, we sit behind our desks and fuss and ease? Blood cholesterol levei is adjusted by an fume. There is no place for the increased enzyme called HMG CoA reductase. When blood fat to go except into the arteries. the cholesterol levei in the blood is high, the If we are really convinced that stress con- enzvrne is turned off. It is turned back on tributes to high blood cholesterol and when the levei is low. The mechanism works atherosclerosis, we have no alternative but to like a faucet that turns the flow of cholesterol attack the cholesterol problem by finding the into the blood on and off. Unless this adjust- main sources of stress in our lives. Knowing ment mechanism fails, blood cholesterol will about the relationship between stress and remain normal. coronary artery disease may give us a chance The body must be able to adapt to an im- to reduce our risk of having a heart attack by balanced diet. So it uses any of the major ele- identifying the stress in our environment and ments of food—starch, protein, and fat—to either eliminating it or learning to cope with substitute for a defieiency in any of the three. it more effectively. The central compound that allows this substitution is acetyl coenzyme A (acetyl- CoA). The majority of the blood cholesterol The Symptoms is manufactured by the body from acetyl- On the average, the main source of stress CoA. (Normally only one-third of cholesterol in our lives is related to our jobs. In an comes from the diet.) American Management Association survey The stress hormones adrenalin and cor- of middle and top managers, 2685 reported tisol spur cholesterol production by increas- on job stress.7 The following were listed as ing the amount of acetyl-CoA. This upsets the main causes of job stress: heavy the body's natural balance. In addition, it has workloads with the time pressure of been recently reported that, in tissue culture, unrealistic deadlines, conflicting personal cortisol activates the HMG-CoA reductase goals and supervisor’s goals, reward systems faucet.6 not based on job performance, lack of feed- It is possible that when stress is combined back, responsibility without authority, and with a high cholesterol diet in humans the in- uncertainty about the future of the organiza- creased production of cortisol, caused by the tion. stress, could lead to a higher blood Psychologists who have studied the rela­ cholesterol. A high blood cholesterol is tionship between performance and stress tell known to result in coronary artery disease. us that putting more pressure on subordi- Why would the body produce too much of nates usually leads to more performance. We a substance so harmful to itself? The purpose get less work from those individuais who do of the biochemical effects of stress on the not care about their performance and are body was to give primitive man the emergen- under no stress. But when some pressure is cy energy supply he needed to cope with generated and anxiety increases, so does per­ danger. The stress response increased man’s formance. (See Figure 2.) chances for survival because increased leveis If the executive is already a high achiever of blood sugar (brain fuel) and blood fat who has risen in the system because of his (muscle fuel) gave him the power to cope production, he probably generates his own with stress. stress. At the optimum stress levei one shows

48 A IR UNI VERSITY RE 17E W that most women pause to reconsider both may also try to think about two or more the inner and outer aspects of their life and things at the same time. (For example, even try to find the proper balance between their though someone is speaking with him and is innate talents and their aspirations. Men, on asking for his attention, he thinks about the other hand, react to the midlife crisis with something else.) He begins to neglect all the thought that it is their last chance to pull aspects of his life except his work. He finds it away from the pack. Men begin to neglect all difficult to take leave. He eats, works, and other aspects of their personalities to fit the moves rapidly. He talks as fast and as ex- narrovv role of the organization man. Cor- plosively as he can. As the time pressure porations encourage their employees to feel builds even further, he finds himself becom- that their performance is the only criterion of ing irritated in traffic jams and while waitine their self-worth.11 in lines. He becomes extremely impatient The effect of any stress on an individual is and irritable with those around him. He does the additive effect it has on the sum of the ex­ not trust others, he takes on excessive respon- ternai and internai stresses already present in sibilities because he thinks his co-workers that individual. The stress comes from our cannot handle them nearly as well as he can. jobs, our degree of hostility, our age (with its He tries to fight battles he knows he will associated crisis), our perception of time probably lose and then becomes upset when pressure, and our feelings about our own he loses the battles. As his hostility builds, he performance. But there is one final source of begins to feel lonely, and it becomes difficult stress often overlooked. This is the stress for him to confide in anyone. He becomes posed upon us by our society. Our society sets isolated from his family, friends, and from certain goals for us that society feels are his work group. As a result, he has trouble worthwhile. These goals are based on our solving family problems and delegating age. Between 30 and 40, according to society. responsibility. Worst of all, he feels too guilty we should (as a result of our hard work) have to relax. Even if he realizes that he is on the a comfortable home, a happy marriage, and wrong side of the stress curve, he feels guilty feel as though our future is secure. If an in­ when he tries to relax and recover his effi- dividual has accepted society’s timetable. ciency. when he does not meet it, he finds himself The Type A executive is a high performer; questioning his self-worth. This questioning he has acquired his current position because of one's self-worth is often the basis for the of his high performance. In his drive for ad- midlife crisis. Our perception of our self- vancement, he generates much of his own worth is at the root of the majority of our stress. If he is a peak performer, he is almost stress. always at the top of the stress-performance Excessive job pressure is associated with a curve. When additional stress is generated by kind of behavior identified as “Type A his superior, his subordinates, or his environ- behavior" by two cardiologists named Fried- ment, his stress tolerante is taxed to the max­ man and Rosenman. Individuais with Type imum. And, if the stress continues unabated, A behavior have a two-to-six times increased then lhe executive begins to become ineffi- risk of heart attack.12 The essence of Type A cient. behavior is hurry and hostility. When the Anyone who drives a sports car or flies an Type A executive is pressed to his maximum, airplane knows that these machines have he feels a severe sense of time urgency. In tolerance limits or red lines on their instru- response to this time urgency, he tries to work ments. What we often do not realize is that on two or more projects simultaneously. He our body also has a red line. When we go EXECUTIVE ST HESS 49 bevond ihís, we are ín danger of stressing our Without guilt, we should include daily bodies beyond their capabilities. Not only do “relaxation” lime. Unfortunately, society’s we feel time pressure, hostility, and inefh- work ethic makes one feel it a sin to relax. ciency, we also endanger our health. Th is is After a stressful day, the only way we can especially dangerous for the high-perfor- remove ourselves from the downside of the mance executive who thinks that the solution stress-performance curve is to schedule some to all of his problems is simplv to vvork a little relaxation lime—even if we think it is a sin. harder. Why is it a sin to relax, if it makes you a more The real solution. of course, is to withdraw efficient executive? If the job pressure is high, temporarily from the stress, consider alterna- we should get away from the office at lunch tive coping mechanisms. and choose the ap- time, and we should not talk about business propriate one. If one has difficulty vvith a during coffee breaks or at lunch time. If we chosen coping mechanism, then he should worry about our work problems at home, this seek help. also prevents us from getting proper relaxa­ tion. A good mechanism to counteract this worry is to develop a hobby that demands The Cure total concentration. It is impossible to think Two of the best ways to cope with execu­ about work problems while engaging in such tive stress are time management and effective a hobby. Finally, w'e should carefully plan delegation.13 The most important aspect of our day so that we never neglect our familv time management is to schedule daily unin- time. Family time can give us a great escape terruptable planning time; usuallv this is from our worries. Failing to spend time with done at the beginning or the end of each our families usuallv causes familv problems work day. The executive should take that that will increase our stress. time to make a list of those things which he Another important part of off-duty relaxa­ has to do (both long- and short-range goals tion is to plan leisurely, less-structured vaca- should be listed). He must prioritize his list, tions. If we rigidly “flight plan” our vacations placing the most important things at the top. (for example, schedule ourselves to be in He must list a reasonable number of things to Philadelphia by 8:00 A.M., New York by do and set realistic deadlines for himself and 6:00 PM., and Boston by the next morning), for those who work with him. Deadlines we will return from our vacation more ex- must be realistic because the executive and hausted than when we Ieft. Leisurely vaca­ his subordinates need sufficient time to do a tions are our best chance to get back to the good job. He or she should make everv effort effective side of our stress tolerance. The to finish the first item on the list before begin­ secret of managing our time is to withdraw ning another. The executive should con- from our stress to give ourselves more plan­ centrate on one task at a time; just as it is im­ ning and Creative time and enough time to do possible to add three columns of numbers at a better job. the same time, it is impossible to work on Regarding delegation, the question is not three problems simultaneously. We should “Can the executive delegate?” but “Since he study each problem in-depth in order to has the power to delegate, why doesn’t he?” avoid making superficial decisions. We There are certain prerequisites for proper should also avoid partial decisions because delegation. We must have realistic goals we often have to retrace our steps to complete clearly in mind before we can ask others to the decision. This wastes even more of our help us with them. We have to learn to accept time. our limitations so we will know when to ask 50 A IR UNI t ERS! TY RE VIE W for help. And we have to accept others’ is that we communicate them poorly. One of limitations so we will know when we have the main problems with communication is pushed them beyond their limitations. that the higher the executive goes, the more Furthermore, we have to learn from our own he is expected to listen. While he was taught mistakes, which are inevitable, and teach our how to read and write in the educational subordinates to learn from theirs. Givingour- system, no one has ever taught him how to selves excessive negative self-talk about our listen. Effective listening is an art. Not only mistakes decreases self-confidence and. do we not listen, but we occasionally inter- lherefore. our ability to delegate. It would be rupt people so much that they cannot finish better for our whole team to learn from their explaining to us what they really wanted tc mistakes and then just “press on.” tell us yet we expect them to listen to our or- Another factor in delegation is the com- ders. munication link between the top and the bot- Above all, we need to keep our sense of tom of our organization. The chief of the humor because angry people lose their organization should periodically talk directly creativity and do not delegate well. When we with the lowest ranking individual in the delegate, we have to give both negative and organization. If we find that those in the positive feedback. For example, we may cri- trenches have a different concept of our ticize our subordinates for not meeting organization than those at the top, we can suspense dates, but how often do we, in turn, only conclude that there is something wrong give positive feedback when someone does with our communication system. Poor com- meet a suspense date? munication decreases effective delegation. In general, a thorough knowledge of our Another advantage of occasionally talking to jobs increases our power to delegate, which those in the trenches is that they, after talking gives us more time to plan and be Creative, with the boss, will feel that the organization increases our success, and decreases our thinks that what they do is important. Those stress. New jobs are stressful because we lack who think their work is important work th is job knowledge. The better we know our harder with less stress and more readily ac­ jobs, the less our job stress. cept tasks delegated to them. Another way to show people that their work is important is to integrate goals of the The Prevention of Stress organization with the goals of subordinates. The basic causes of job stress are the fear Th is is a good motivator to help people ac­ of not being able to do a job adequately to cept delegation. As leaders, we should ask satisfy our superiors and ourselves and not ourselves, '‘Of the so-called ‘paper-pushers’ being able to accomplish goals we consider in the Air Force, how often do they feel that worthwhile. Another way of saying this is that what they do is contributing to the mission of job stress is a lack of confidence in our ability the Air Force, to fly and fight?” to do an adequate job or accomplish some­ We need to expect the best from everyone thing worthwhile. who works for us. If we assume that a subor- If we deFine doing a good job as success, dlnate is a poor performer, then when we we know that our successes in the past have delegate to him, he generally will not disap- raised our levei of self-conFidence. Logically, point us. We also need to improve the com­ then, success should raise our self-conFtdence munication skills between subordinates and and lower our stress or at least increase our superiors. One of the main reasons our or- tolerance for stress. Since a certain minimum ders are not carried out exactly to our liking levei of self-conFidence is necessarv before EXECU17 VE VTRESS 51 one can attempt to succeed, the road to suc- you give them positive feedback on their suc- cess mu st begin by finding a way to gain this cesses, you will build their self-esteem. But minimum levei of self-confidence. never forget that negative feedbac k, given ap- Self-confidence is the outward expression propriately, makes positive feedback even of our self-image. Self-image comprises the better. sum of all the negative and positive beliefs we Success breeds even more success. It have about ourselves. If a person has more becomes addictive; the more the members of negative than positive beliefs, this person has the group succeed, the more they want to a negative self-image. If the reverse is true, succeed. The more confidente they have in the person has a positive self-image. Our self- themselves, the bigger the challenge they will image is acquired not only from the opinion accept. The greater the challenge they accept, vve have of ourselves but also from the feed- the greater their successes will be. This intox- back and social responses we get from those icating spiral does have a 1 imit. The bigger people in our lives who are important to us— challenges present bigger opportunities of our work group. our family, and our friends. success as well as bigger chances of failure. Our job is a key factor in our self-image. If To continue to succeed, one must be able to we intend to prevent stress in our lives, it is handle the risk of failure that accompanies a very important that we choose our job very big challenge. A group can best handle a carefullv. If at all possible our job should be large risk if that group has synergy. Synergy is chosen with respect to our natural talents and mutually beneficiai goal setting in its highest our personal expectations of ourselves. Ex- state of perfection. There is almost no pecting to succeed too soon in our lives often challenge or risk too big for an organization results in personal disappointment and a that possesses a large amount of synergy. lowering of our opinion of ourselves. People The first beneficiai effect of synergy is that who fail to live up to their own expectations the members of the organization develop a are especially prone to stress. great amount of loyalty to the group and to One’s job should be chosen with personal the group leader. Second, synergy results in a goals in mind. Attainable, well-defined goals highly developed form of teamwork which are easier to achieve and thus help lower increases chances that the group will suc­ one's personal stress. Commit your goals to ceed. Finally, studies have shown that syn­ paper. Be positive and specific. A goal “to ergy decreases psychological stress.14 Thus, become a better person” is neither specific synergy is the key to success without distress. nor measurable. and since successful attain- A low levei of synergy can be created by ment of this goal cannot be defined, the goal the group leader. Low synergy develops when can not be achieved. beneficiai group goals are perceived as per- Once a job is chosen, acquire as much sonally beneficiai ío each member of the knowledge about that job as possible. This group. High synergy develops only when will ensure that those you work with will each member of the group accepts the group think of you as an expert source of informa- goals as beneficiai, not only to himself but tion. Their reliance on you for information also beneficiai to his or her “significam will boost your opinion of vourself. others.” Our “significam others” are all Next, learn to set mutually beneficiai those who depend on us to do a good job (for goals. When you get someone to agree to example, our family and the other organiza- help you achieve a goal. make sure he gets as lions that are dependem upon our group). much out of it as you do. Try to enjoy helping The highest degree of synergy is achieved the other people in your group succeed. If when each member of the group perceives 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the group goals as beneficiai to the Air Force develops in wartime is evidence that svnergy and the nation. increases the ability of each member of the Air Force groups develop their highest group to take a risk. This is proved by the fact degree of svnergy in wartime. The goal to that in wartime risking one's life becomes a vvin the war becomes everyone's goal. Win- common. everyday occurrence. ning the war is obviously beneficiai to each member of the group, their families, the other organizations that are dependent on the S u ccessfu l leaders aetively promote group group. the entire Air Force, and the entire svnergy. The real challenge for peacetime nation. Studies claiming that svnergy reduces militarv commanders is to set goals for the stress may also apply to vvartime. I had a one- group that the group members can believe year combat tour in Vietnam at one of the will be worthwhile to themselves, their sig­ largest outpatient clinics in Southeast Asia. nificam others, lhe Air Force, and the nation. During that entire tour, 1 never had to treat a This is difficult because the common enemy heart attack nor did I hear of any other physi- in peacetime is mediocrity and apathy as well cian's treating a heart attack. While this may as those who would deprive our country of its be partly attributed to preremote medicai freedom. screening, the complete absence of heart at- Brooks Air Force Base, Texas tacks in what would normallv be considered a very stressful situation is very significant. The aulhors wish to acknowledge the conlribulions and assistance «*f Di Eugene A Sprague and Anne E Shermer in the preparaiion of this fhe high group comradery (svnergy) that article.

Notes agenient Association Survey Report New York American Manage­ 1 P I Rtist h Stress .ind Illness. fnurnnl of thr Anirrimn Medicai ment Association). Assona/mn, 1979. vt»|. 242. pp 427-28. 8 Karl A Menninger and W. C. Menninger. "Psychoanalytic Ob- 2 (i.nl Sheehv Passagr v PrcdulnhU Crises

THE MILITARY COURTIER AND THE ILLUSION OF COMPETENCE

D r . D onald D. C m pma n

53 54 4 IR UNIVERSITY REVIEW True, he had a good record, but as Hei ler skills But brief reflection suggests that the meaning States, this was not important. Kagle soon of minimum functioning in society is very hard to learned his untidiness and his inability to pin down. People function differently in society and “fit” were signs of incf)mpetence. Eventually, some do it in ways offensive to others.4 a neat, accommodating person replaced him, In addition the difficulty of defining the and the Corporation moved on. term competence exacerbates the problem. Ac­ Though the account is fiction, Heller cording to Peter Drucker, the exact criteria focused on one of the more perplexing for competence change as the situation problems of our time: the difficulty of changes.5 For instance, ordinarily a hospital evaluating competence. For years corpora- considers only surgeons capable of operating, tions have used sophisticated methods to yet in a dire emergency any medicai doctor, select competent executives. Despite this, re- even a psychiatrist, could operate. Similarly, cent reports indicate these procedures are United States Air Force Regulation 60-1 out- often “replete with problems.”2 Like cor- lines a number of skills each pilot must porations, the military has had extensive ex- possess before participating in flight opera- perience with personnel assessment. Yet, con­ tions; yet section 1-7 specifically allows com- tinuai modifications in the officer effective- manders to waive “any regulation when nec- ness reports (OERs) indicate that problems essary to carry out a combat mission.”6 Thus, exist here, as well. According to sociologist based on the situation, the term competence is Morris Janowitz: open to broad interpretation. After forty years of research and development of Generallv, competence is a value judgment military personnel selection practices, it is abun- assigned to some type of performance. It is a dantly dear that there is no satisfactory and reliable social concept that includes a comparative technique for locating personnel with leadership po- assessment of worth within differing situa- tentials.3 tions. To judge competence, one must com­ pare achievement within the specific cir- Although the military' and corporations cumstances to the very best instance of a have had sophisticated personnel assessment similar performance, for example, an ex- programs for some time, the public schools cellent pole vault to the world's best pole are just now adopting them. After years of vault. In many organizations this type of falling scholastic scores and increasing social evaluation occurs every day. but as Kagle's promotions, educators have decided to be situation indicates, performance is sometimes more specific in their evaluations of compe­ not the significant criterion. tence. Florida, Oregon, and other States are Today competence is judged in terms of attempting to accurately assess student com­ two basic considerations in relation to the petence. In some cities, even teachers were task: administered competency tests; nevertheless, Technical skills—how well a person uses his most of these efforts produced vague results. vocational knowledge to accomplish the task; In fact, a recent Harvard journal essay ques- Social skills—how well a person under- tioned the validity of evaluating educational stands and motivates people. competencies: Recently, social skills have become in- Discussions often proceed as if competencies or skills creasingly significant. John D. Rockefeller can be easily identified. Efforts have been made to use experts or “objective analysis" to determine said he would pay more for “the ability to those skills needed by adulls to “function” or to deal with people than any other ability under ‘survive" in society. These efforts have resulted in the sun.”7 Military professionals have con- very detailed specifications of competenc ies and life stantly emphasized interpersonal skills as an THE MILITAR Y COURTIER 55 important offlcerlike characteristic. In lhe a few basic courses, and discipline was rigid. corporate world, Michael Maccoby has dis- In 1893, the Committee ofTen found only 27 cerned that social skills have become such a different subjects being taught in most high fine art that a new breed has emerged—the schools.10 Thus, schools were an unchanging corporate gamesman.8 In this era where ap- system saturated with rules, catering to the pearance often takes precedence over sub- demands of colleges. Subject matter was stance, where process often counts as much committed to memory, and the teacher’s job as result. and where "being people-oriented” was to drill the students. By such means, one is as important as "sales records,” there is lit- historian noted, attention, imagination, judg- tle wonder that too often competence is mis- ment, reasoning, discrimination and “other judged. powers of the mind” were taught.11 Compe­ Evaluating the competence of the teacher, tence was assessed in terms of how well the officer, or corporate executive is indeed teacher imparted information, drilled for difficult. Over the years the criterion has mastery, and disciplined the class. If the changed and the process has become more teacher failed, he was technically incompe- complicated. Placing definitive parameters tent. on the social or the technical dimensions of Determining the competence of the mili- competence and then trying to delineate the tary officer during the nineteenth century was minimum performance is not an easy task. also an uncomplicated task. Competence was Yet, this was not the case for the educator, judged in terms of the number of years an officer, and businessman during earlier officer had served. The more sênior the times. At the turn of the centurv, competence officer, the more competent he was. was a one-dimensional term based on pri- Although efficiency reports appeared, they marily technical skills. were short and without much forethought. In the first years of this centurv, nearly 80 For example, the following was extracted percent of the American work force was from one of the earliest Army reports on engaged in production of goods. America record: was a nation of independentlv owned farms, I forward a list of officers of the______arranged factories, and small businesses. These agreeable to rank. Annexed thereto you will find all lhe observations deem necessary to make. Lieuten- builders, farmers, and artisans were the ant Colonel ...... A good-natured man. craftsmen whom Maccoby described as the Ensign ------The very dregs employees imbued with a sense of self-worth of the earth. Unfit for anything under heaven. God based on "technical skills, discipline, and self only knows how the poor things got an appoint- reliance.”9 Competence was determined by ment.12 the quality of a product or the cash value of a While seniority was an archaic system, Service. Usually, there was a tangible object many officers believed any other method was that could be compared to a similar item. unthinkable: The employee knew if he failed to produce a Promotion by selection would be subjected to politi- good product, he would be fired. Thus, in cal influence, that ambitious officers would be prone most cases the employee developed his tech­ to devote more of their lime to bootlicking than to nical skills to do the job competently. soldiering, that men of long and failhful Service Similarly, the teacher of the I900s was also would be victimized by juniors with political in­ technically oriented. Typically he did not fluence leapfrogging over their backs.13 worry about developing social skills, since Thus, the evaluation of the businessman, these were taught by the family and church. the teacher, and the officer during those early High school students were required to study years was a fairly uncomplicated process. 56 A/R UNIVERSITY REVIEW Cornpetence vvas judged in terms of technical In a parallél development, teachers began skills while social skills remained insignifi- experimenting with various adaptations of cant. The ultimate test for cornpetence rested John Dewey’s progressive philosophy. Dur- on tangible factors in either the production of ing the 1940s, “Life Adjustment” was a con­ goods, recitation of facts, or total active mili­ cern of educators as they changed their tary service. classroom techniques to account for group But time brought change. By the mid- socialization. Teachers were prompted to set twentieth century. less than 50 percenl of the aside discipline and memory lessftns in favor American working force was producing of group activities. For the First time, goods. According to Maccoby, only 18 per- classroom topics included such lessons as cent of all workers were self-employed.14 “How to be liked." “Developing school VVith this social change. cornpetence gained spirit," and “Clicking with the crowd.” This an additional meaning. As giant corporations entire movement, commented Richard developed and governmental bureaucracies Hofstadter, forced students to abandon the grew, social skills became an important part old virtues of eompetition, ambition, of cornpetence. creativity, and analytical thought for the new By the I940s business managers were say- values of consumption, social compliance, ing society had evolved from a world of and graceful adaptation to a passive things to a world of people. Too long, Elton hedonistic style.17 Mayo complained, businessmen had Before this era, teacher cornpetence was neglected the human side of organizational judged by how well students mastered subject development. According to Mayo, profes- matter. But as the Dewey philosophy became sional schools were failing to equip young more accepted, cornpetence was judged by managers with a single special skill that the teacher's ability to generate group in- could be used in ordinary human situations. teraction. A teacher who constantly forced Thus the prospective junior executive began his students to dwell exclusivelv on subject receiving intensive humanistic training in matter, wrote William Whyte, “often fòund management methods. He had to read about himself censured."18 group dynamics, organizational develop­ These mid-century changes had an effect ment, and motivational theory. “Dignity,” on the Armed Forces. Not only was Dewey a “satisfaction,” “inspired leadership," and controversial figure in education, he was cri- “effective teamwork” became the common ticized in some military circles. For the most elements of this humanistic vocabulary.15 part, stated Samuel Huntington, the military This training provided the proper blend of blamed Dewev’s “inadequate and worthless managerial technical skills and social skills. philosophy" for graduating students who Out of this era emerged the “organization­ failed to respeet traditional American al man,” an individual who believed the values.19 Concurring, Major General Nor- group was a source of sustenance and man T. Kirk, Army Surgeon General, in creativity.16 A worker was still evaluated by 1943 claimed that Dewey’s “progressively his job, but in addition he was asked to pro- educationed" students were the “first to crack mote oragnizational rapport. Concern for the under the strains of war."20 group"s well-being assumed additional value Influenced by this progressivism, the old in the judgment of performance. Conse- military standards of cornpetence were quently, in the evaluation of a businessmarTs reevaluated. After World War II, concern for cornpetence, social skills gained additional group cohesion became a part of the military value as a basic criterion. leadership philosophy. A 1948 studv of the THE MILITARY CUURTIER 57 German army indicated effective fighting Implying that anyone who lacked social units were often the bv-product of officers skills was slightly inhuman. Charles Silber- vvho demonstrated concern for cohesive man opened this era with a plea to social relations.21 A Doolittle committee was deemphasize technology. Don’t forget, he in- convened to review these theories and sisted. a few years ago a German technical redefine the role of the military leader. Even- socieiy devoid of human concerns annihi- tually, wrote Janowitz, the leader's image lated six million Jews. The racial riots, changed from that of a commander to a assassinations, and Vietnam War were signs "junior executive and the Doolittle commit­ that American humanism was eroding. Dur- tee institutionalized the philosophy of basing ing the I970s. Silberman wanted schools to discipline on "manipulation and group con­ teach students to understand their own per- sensos."22 sonal feelings and those of others.24 Since promotion based on seniority was no Following Silberman's plea, schools ex- longer the criterion, efficiency reports were perimented with the open classroom philoso­ used to judge competence. Besides judging phy. Adopted from the British, this teaching an officer's effectiveness, these repons often mode provided opportunities for students to "measured how well he pleased the boss. ' 23 move about the class developing social skills Military competence. therefore, was no as they interacted with their peers. Colleges. longer simply a measure of technical skills in a continuing effort to be fair to all stu- but one involving social skills. dents, lowered standards as they gave away Thus, nurtured by a progressive philoso­ high grades to keep some young men from phy in education. business and military, the draft. Other institutions bent over back- social skills gained acceptance as a criterion ward to keep students eligible for federal in the judgment of an individuafs compe­ work-studv programs and to sustain their tence. To be competent, one had to display enrollment. both technical and social skills. With slipping standards, teacher compe­ For a while, a competent person was ex- tence more and more was judged by student pected to possess a balanced portion of both classroom critiques. Popularity became a social and technical skills. But as the nation standard by which many ambitious educators poised to enter the seventh decade, once conducted their classes. In a sense, social again, the meaning of competence changed. skills had become an institutional necessity. Out of the promise of affluence and the In the business world, the gamesman ap- threat of nuclear holocaust, there developed a peared. Too independent and too denouncement of the old values. Corporate unorthodox to be recognized earlier. this in­ life with its tendency to minimize individual dividual viewed projects and human relations differences became a part of the “establish- in terms of career options as if they were a ment.’- Dallas, Watts, and My Lai ushered game. In American folklore, wrote Maccobv, into focus what many individuais believed Tom Sawyer was a prototypic gamesman was an undue reliance on technology without who motivated others to do the job by humanistic concerns. Some people felt the “manipulating them.” Describing a contem- military-industrial complex had become all porary gamesman, Maccoby wrote of an ex­ encompassing. decreasing the individual to ecutive who created a seductive environment an automaton. “Do not fold, spindle, or by the proper placing of his glamorous secre­ mutilate” carne the call from individuais who taries.23 Although the gamesman often believed that they were being treated as mere worked to accomplish his goals, he seldom objects. failed to advance the organization. Yet the old 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ethics were eroding. For instante, in one dividual is entirely self-centered. He is a 1973 survev, businessmen perceived that “the product of the “me generation” and believes ability to promote oneself' was more impor- he is entitled to his share. He is an image tant in the corporate world than being maker who constantly manipulates people honest.26 As in education, social skills had and events, to ensure he is perceived as a become a criticai corporate attribute. competent person. Just when and where this character began appearing is difficult to determine. Harper’s W hile business and educa­ editor Lewis Lapham first identified this in­ tion were in the process of making subtle dividual as an "American Courtier.” In a changes, the military introduced vast sense, commented Lapham, he is similar to modifications. After Vietnam, the Armed the Renaissance man of the court who spent Forces adopted an all-volunteer concept all of his time trying to please the prince. Bor- based on the rationale of making the military rowing from the works of La Bruyère, similar to corporations. The trend was ob- Lapham described the courtier as: vious, and Charles Moskos traced the signifi­ ... a man who knows the ways of the court, is cam indicators in his essay “From Institution master of his gestures. his eyes, and his face; he is to Occupation.”27 Though not as astute as deep and impenetrable; he pretends not to notice in­ the gamesman, officers realized career ad- juries done him. he smiles to his enemies, Controls vancement and the assessment of their com- his temper, disguises his passions. belies his heart, petence often depended on personal relation- speaks and acts against his real opinions.29 ships. To succeed, suggested Sarkesian, an The courtier attempts to project himself as officer had to do more than simply fulfill his a competent individual who is wise in the technical responsibilities: ways of organizational politics. He has read He must be politically astute and seek out the centers all the books on how to dress properly, exer- of power and manipulate them. An officer on the cise organizational power, and play the asser- way up must be able to identify the tickets that need tiveness games. He admires everything and punching and must also have access to those praises whatever he is expected to praise. The superiors or peers who can open appropriate courtier knows that in these times of imita- doors.28 tion food and imitation materiais, ap- Thus, as teachers became overly con- pearance can be deceptive. Concurring, two cerned with student critiques, as corporate managerial experts recently told businessmen gamesmen became commonplace, and as that all the competente in the world is useless officers became politically astute, social skills if “the right appearances are not properly gained additional importance. Now it was made.”30 Former U.S. Senator J. William not only an advantage but an absolute Fulbright made this assertion concerning the necessity to be able to manipulate others. increasing numbers of courtiers in the na- Within this social context, a new character tion's capital: appeared. While Whyte’s organizational The new breed of Congressperson seems more in- man was primarily concerned with group clined to test the market first, to ascertain what is in cohesion and while Maccoby’s gamesman current demand. and then to design a program to fit focused on developing amusing strategies, the market. Products of the media age, the new this new breed employs social skills to breed of legislators, it seems, aims not to convey an enhance his image. Unlike the organization­ idea but to project an image.31 al man and the gamesman who were con­ Is there no concern for the job? Yes, but cerned with institutional goals, this in­ the courtier uses the job as another means of THE MILITARY COUR7 IER 59 developing his image of competence. In siderations. No longer is it improper to retire education, the courtier uses the classroom to on the job. The employee who has gained perfect his social skills. One such professor tenure in his organization can with all due told me he alvvays graded according to who respect simply let his daily assignments slide. was influential in his class. Not surprisingly, For example, a New England probation the local mayors son graduated with honors. officer often leaves the office “to do some Since, in this particular institution, student checking on a couple of court cases,” but in- critiques were influential in deciding promo- stead he goes home to work in his rose tion and tenure, this particular courtier made garden. If he maintains good relations with sure he projected an image of competence. the other leveis of the organization, such ac- After learning the schedule for the next tion is condoned. In many organizations classroom critiques, he planned his strategy. employees are retained despite the fact they He sent a colleague to meet his class the day aceomplish little more than maintaining rap- before the critique. His colleague, a gruff, port. scholarly old gentleman, was not in class very In addition, the federal government and long before he began debunking progressive large unions have increasingly emphasized educational methods. After this harangue, the job as a “means” rather than as an the students looked forward to the return of “end.” No longer is the quality of the product their courtier. The next day they welcomed or Service the only criterion of organizational him back eagerly. Gallantly, he returned with policies. Today, if a product or a service is a number of their papers upon which he had judged “good,” it must satisfy regulations written words of praise. Now, with the class governing the conditions of its development; in the proper mood, the secretary was urged thus, any company producing a quality ob- to administer the student critiques. With a ject is under censure if in the process the air high score on the only instrument designed to or the water is polluted. A society that once evaluate his job performance and with con­ was primarily “result-oriented” has become tinuai use of his courtier social skills, this more “process-oriented.” And what are the professor was singled out as one of the most criticai judgment elements of competence in competent college teachers. He was pro- a process-oriented organization? moted and tenured. The courtier had suc- Labor unions are traditionally process- ceeded, and in the process the job had oriented. Working hours, pay, and sick leave become another means of furthering his are their prime interests. Seldom does a end—“building the right image.” union strike to improve the quality of a prod­ The courtier believes his values are noble uct. Today, even professors and other white- since accomplishing the job is not always im- collar workers have joined unions in quests portant. In budget-based organizations, such of better working conditions. as education and government, incompetence, In England, where more than twelve indifference, and misdirection are often million are represented by unions, political suspected but difficult to prove. To the cour­ conservatives are claiming this “process tier, making a decision is not as important as orientation” is bankrupting the society. One projecting the right image of a person who official noted that Britain produces no more actually knows what he was doing. Steel than it did in 1957, no more cars than it In the process, more and more, compe­ did in 1960, and despite the North Sea oil, tence becomes a judgment of one’s social the country’s standard of living compares skills. Delegating the job as a secondary con- favorably only with that of Brazil.32 sideration has initiated new ethical con- Like unions and businesses, contemporary 60 AIR UN1VERSITY REVI EW government has an inclination to be social porations, and the military all condone the skills oriented. Big government, one expert courtier. Trying to succeed, an employee at- agrees, tends to undermine the significance tempts to determine for himself the hierarchy of job efficiency. In the United States one of of organizational values. On seeing the suc- every five workers is employed by govern­ cessful individuais, the ones with influence ment. This constant growth has increased the and high incomes, are those who perfect their difficulty of deciding where one employee's image, the diligent worker adopts these responsibility ends and another's begins. values. The courtier develops not out of Government workers in the pay grade of deviousness but out of the complexity in GS-4 may be assigned entirely different tasks; organizations that are process-oriented. yet. when salary increases are announced, Ultimately he arises out of the narcissistic few go empty-handed. Government, States culture in organizations that have allowed in­ Tom Bethell, is increasingly dominated by dividuais to use their manipulative social one of the most ominous trends of our time: skills for self-aggrandizement. A person solving problems on paper will be The institutionalization of social skills has paid more than the person who is out on the initiated new research on how to utilize this production line actually working, contribut- craft. Nationwide advice is available on how ing real input to provide Solutions.33 to avoid work and yet succeed. Books and In some ways the federal government is in- magazines clearly present the message: sisting vve follow the British example of Forget the job and concentrate on refining focusing on the process instead of the prod- your social skills. If you want a bigger salary uct. When private industry has a federal con- and control of others, then you must learn to tract, for instance, often the quality of the grab for power. Since power is the most im- final product is partially determined by the portant organizational ingredient, you must company's degree of compliance with learn how to get it and how to use it. With government regulations. The completion of a just a few lessons, notes one expert, you can federal iy funded rapid transit system is learn to intimidate others. Another author judged in part by how many jobs the com- claims you should not worry about others, pany provided for the hard-core unemployed. they are neurotic anyway; you need to spend An entire government bureau was more time promoting yourself. A recent established to ensure these policies, the magazine article reported women are failing regulating of the job process, are properly ad- in business because they tend to focus too ministered. much on the job and not enough on develop- And so by insisting that the process of a job ing office alliances.34 Pick up any magazine is in compliance with regulations and paying and you can learn how to perfect your court­ high salaries to those who develop regula­ ier skills for a more successful life. Seldom is tions, the government indicates the product is work or job performance mentioned. of secondary importance. In this situation, Paraphrased from the best selling book the courtier can refine the social skills, make Power: How to Get It, How to Use It by the right appearance, and successfully move Michael Korda, here are some typical sug- up the organizational ladder. gestions for the fledgling courtier: A critic might point out there have always been courtiers. This, I do not dispute. Yet • To gain recognition, create an artificial never have so many institutional forces en- catastrophe, then proceed to fix it. couraged the development of this character. • In offering your opinion, be silent, im- Schools and unions, government and cor- passive, alert, visible until evervone else THE XII LHA IIY COURTIER 61 has spoken his piece. then fire away in nalure of its complexity, had to use systematic complete safety. business techniques. During the 1960s, • When accepting bad news, pretend that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in- you could care less. corporated cost effectiveness, systems • When you are approached for a pay analysis, and zero defects into the U.S. raise. make the person feel guilty and Armed Forces. Eventually the military also force him to apologize for being so ob- adopted some related business ethics. The tuse. (A good technique: Ask the per­ organization man, the gamesman, and the courtier found their way into the profession. son to get you some aspirin because you Commenting on this, Gabriel and Savage are so sick.) wrote: • Create a legend outside the organiza- The cumulative impaet of this change in ethical tion by attending the right parties and perspectives within the military has been to bring conventions. about the rise and emulation of the “offtcer as • On every paper make a minor correc- entrepreneur,” the man adept at managing his own tion telling the originator that you are career by manipulating the system. . . .36 just adding the fmishing touch. Although many have accused Gabriel and • To be promoted. pattern your style after Savage of sensationalism, in part their book a recently promoted worker and trv to was based on the Army War College study. be dramaticallv different from the in­ In 1970, an Army War College team traveled dividual who was fired. to Vietnam to survey the professionalism of • Before retirement try to create an aura officers. The results were so controversial the of an elder statesman. Write no memos, report was not released until several years enter no arguments, acquire a reputa- later. In Vietnam, among other things, they tion as a peacemaker, and if possible found the courtier. In some situations, stated smoke a pipe. this report, officers were so occupied with • To encourage another to retire, keep “maintaining an image of personal success,” him involved in all decisions and make they failed to develop effective fighting him feel uncomfortable by constantly units.37 Thus, using social skills to his advan­ referring to pop music, new dances, tage, the courtier made his transition from and posh restaurants. the corporate world to the military. • Women should learn that flirtation, The military is aware of the courtier ethic flattery, and seductive innuendos can and has begun to deal with it. Many are call- be turned into a technique of control.35 ing for a return to “ofricership” and a reap- praisal of old ethical considerations of Duty, The preceding list is from one book. There Honor, and Country. A joint conference on are, however, several books written to take professional ethics is meeting to consider the advantage of this crisis in competence. For consequentes of these new ethical values. the most part. they are filled with suggestions Yet, as author-sociologist Daniel Bell notes, for promoting flattery, gestures, and passion the future for the courtier looks bright. In the into full-fledged courtier power plays. Corning decades, writes Bell, society will be Although these books are for the corporate structured almost exclusively upon Services, executive, many of the suggestions have thus: become a part of the military way. As the ln lhe daily round of wcrk, men no longer confront military adopted corporate techniques, in- nature. as either alien or beneficeni, and fewer now evitably the courtier followed. In the years handle artifacis and things. The post-industrial after World War II, the military', by the very society is essentially a "game” between persons.38 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVI EH’ Th is is the reality of the new courtier ethic. plays for self-aggrandizement. In those in- No longer is man’s relationship to nature or stitutions which fail to recognize this new to the machine a primary concern. We have ethic, the courtier will multiply. In this en- evolved into an era in which man must inten- vironment, the courtier, unlike Heller’s sify his awareness of others. In this environ- character, Kagle, proclaims his importance, ment the refinement of social activities will declares his ability to “fit,” and manipulates become increasingly important, but we need the system to reinforce his own significance. to ensure that these courtier skills are not Yet if there is any truth to Samuel Hun- subverted by a few with narrow interests. tington’s statement that the subordination of What began as an attempt to bring social the “will of the individual to the will of the skills into the evaluation of competence, has group,”39 rates high in the military value through the vears, evolved into misuse of system, then one can easily see the courtier’s these concerns. Contemporary authors have self-aggrandizement is ethically dangerous. filled books with ways in which an individual Squadron Officer School can parlay social skills into courtier power Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Notes 20 New York limes. December 20, 1943. 1 Joseph Heller. Somethmg Happened (New York Ballantine Books. 21 Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz. “Gohesion and Disintegra- 1974), p 42 tion in the Wehrmachl in World War II." Public Opuuon (fuarterly. 2 Atlanta Journal and Cnnslilution. 20 November 1977 1948, pp 280-315. 3. Morris Janowitz The Professional Soldier A Social and Political 22 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. pp. 38-44 Portrait (New York Free Press, 1960), p 48. 23 Sam C. Sarkesian, The Professional Arrny Officer in a Changing 4 Walt Hancy and Gt-orge Madaus, “Making Sense of the Com- Society (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975), p. 67 pctency Testing Movement,” Harvard Edmatwnal Reoiew, November 24 Charles E Silberman, Cnsis tn the Classroorn The Remaking in 1978, pp 462-81. American Education New York: Vintage Books. 1970). p. 7. 5. Peicr F Drucker. Management Tasks, Practices, Responsibilities 25 Maccoby, p. 141 (New York Harper and Row. 1973), p. 346. 26 Dale Tarnowicski, The Changing Success Ethic An AMA Survey 6 Air Force Regulation 60-1, 15 August 1978, p 12. Report (New York: American Management Associalion, 1973), p. 2. 7 Paul Hersev and Kenncth H Blanchard. Management oj Organt- 27 Charles Moskos, “From Institution to Occupation," Armed zational Bthavior Utihzing bluman Resources (Englewood Cliff. New Forces and Society. November 1977, pp 41-47 Jersev Prentice-Hall. 1977), p 7. 28. Sarkesian, p. 75. 8 Michael Maccoby. The Gamesman (New- York Simon and 29 Lewis H. Lapham, “The American Courtier,” Harper's, October Schuster, 1976) 1978, pp. 9-17 9 Ibid . p. 51 30 Margarei Hennigand Anncjardin. “The Managerial VVoman." 10 Richard Hofstadtcr, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New Cosmopohtan. December 1977, pp. 252-310 W»rk: Vintage Books, 1962), p. 342. 31 J William Fulbright. “The Lcgislator as Educator,” Neiv York 11. Ellwood P Cubberlcv Puhln Education in the United States A Times. May 26, 1979. p. A-19. Sludy and Interpretation of American Education History (Cambridge. 32. Jerernv Seabrook. “ l he Worker s Pyrrhic Victory.” New York Massac husetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), p. 513 Times. April 10. 1979. p A-19 and Richard Blystone. “Strikes Now 12. Stonewall P Winsion. “Merit Raiing of Officers in the Armed Commonplace as British Disease Sprcads,” Montgomery Adver/iser. Forces.’* University of Texas. 1959. p. 16 March 23, 1979. p 29 13. Richard 0 TConnor, Blaik Jack Pershing (New York: Doubleday 33. Tom Bethell, “The Wealth of Washingtoa,** Harper’s. June and Company. 1961). p. 76 1978. pp. 41-61 14 Maccoby, p 88. 34 Hennig and Jardin, pp. 252-310 15. Charles R. Milton. Ethus and Expediency in Personnel Manage­ 35. Michael Korda, Power How to Get It. Hoir to Use It (New York ment A Criticai History of Personnel Philosophy (Columbia: University of Ballantine Books, 1975). South Carolina Press, 1970). p 175 36. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Cnsis m Command 16 William H Whyte, Jr., The Organizatton Man (New York: Mismanagement m the Army (New York Hill and Wang, 1978). p 22. Doubleday and Company. 1956) 37. United States Army War Collcge, “Study on Military Profcs- 17. Hofstadtcr, pp. 356-57 sionalism, 1970,” unpublished paper, United States Army War Col- 18. Whyte, p 56. lege, Carlisle Barracks, Pcnnsylvania, 1970 19. Samuel P Fluntington, The Soldier and the State The Thenry and 38. Daniel Bell. The Corning of the Post-lnduslnnl Smie/y 1 I enture m Politics of Civil Mihtary Relations (Cambridge, Massac husetts: Harvard Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books. 1973), p. 127 University Press. 1957). p. 311. 39. Fluntington, p. 63. ETHICSTHEORY FOR THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL

Chaplain (Colonel) Samuel D Malonev North Carolina Air National Guard

HE United States is increasingly con- their members. Throughout the past decade, cerned with ethics. More professors are military professionals at the Service teaching courses in ethics and more academies and educational centers have T students are studying ethics than ever before.shown increasing interesl in the study of ethi- Incidents in Vietnam and Washington have cal principies. Most officer training schools reminded us that people in all walks of life now include at least an elective on profes­ are vulnerable to doing what is wrong. sional ethics, in which officers are en- Professional groups — lawycrs, doctors, couraged to construct codes of ethics for the leachers. engineers. business managers. and military Service. Perhaps we are realizing that others—are structuring codes of ethics for right and wrong may differ from common 63 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW practice, majority opinion, or what the ists for establishing what is obligatory and systern will tolerate. Perhaps we as a nation what is right. Originally, these were religious are beginning to see the fallacies in the ethi- questions referring to the will of God. They cal relativism of “doing your own thing.” We now have become questions for the citizen may even be ready to acknowledge the com- and military professional. plexity of ethical decision-making and move Military personnel, more than most beyond the dominating principie of personal citizens, live under a sense of oughtness, or public happiness. Some of us are ready to aligned with a strong base of order, obe- assert that, in addition to such preeminent dience, and discipline. We have taken oaths values as beneficence and justice, ethical admitting us into the ranks of the military. As behavior also involves past commitments, officers we affirmed a commissioning vow. present relationships, and future hopes. We swore to “support and defend the Con- Th is article will probe some of the com- stitution of the United States.” plexities of acting ethically within the mili- As citizens we are also obligated to honor tary systern. I propose to direct your thinking constitutional justice, civil law, and the social in three vvays: (1) to identify the fundamental and ethnic mores of our communities. The pressures that are upon us all, that is, the ethi­ primary ethical pressures upon us, however, cal bases or theories to which we are respon- are such formal mandates as telling the truth, sive; (2) to highlight the importance of cer- keeping promises, respecting property, and tain areas where ethicalproblems ahound; and preserving life. These constitutive or univer­ (3) to reaffirm some hasic principies to guide sal norms are the mortar without which us. social institutions would crumble. While such norms need not be regarded as absolute moral restrictions, the burden of proof is al- The Complex Ethical Pressures ways upon those who would take exception The complex ethical pressures upon the to them. military professional are the rules, goals, and Rule-oriented living has a long history in situations that provide the context and cri- Western religions. The orthodox Jew, by the teria for determining what is right and beginning of the Christian era. lived under wrong, good and bad. The moment of deci­ an elaborate complex of conditional and un- sion-making or action-taking for the military conditional laws. The covenantal require- professional is crowded with signals emanat- ments of Mosaic Law consisted of 613 in- ing from rule-oriented obligations, goal- junctions: 365 “thou shalt not" prohibitions oriented aspirations, and situation-oriented and 248 “thou shalt” obligations. Far from demands. Each individual is responsible for burdensome, the Law clearly defined what jugglingthe moral claims from these sources God would have the believer do and not do; it and for determining which signals merit provided the moral framework for life. The priority. Law was significam by omissions as well as inclusions, an observation memorialized in rule-oriented obligations the following rhyme. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife; His ox Rules most commonly provide the primary thou shalt not slaughter. But thanks be to God therc criteria for ethical judgments. The questions is no law Against coveting thy neighbors daughter. “What ought I to do?” and “What is right for For the Christian, law has been redefmed me to do?” reflect not only a sense of obliga- as living in an obedient relationship with tion but also an awareness that a standard ex- God through heeding the teachings of Jesus. ETHICS THEORY FOR THE M1IJTARY 65 The Sermon on the Mount, lhe ethical example, should I submit false reports— catechism of the earlv Church, and the whether of body counts, flying hours, or Thomistic understanding of moral lavv have materiel readiness—when I perceive my best provided a deontologicar interpretation of interest lies in false reporting? No, for this niorality. The pressure upon the Christian is maxim cannot be universali/ed without not to be conformed to this world but to be destroying the maxim by rendering all report­ transformed in order to prove what is the ing invalid. A second valuable expression of good and acceptable and perfect will of God the categorical imperative is: “Act so that vou (Romans 12:2). treat humanity, whether in your own person Today the followers of Islam are more or in that of another, always as an end and rigidlv fundamental than either Jews or never as a means only.”3 (We will return to Christians in their understanding of morality this self-explanatory binding rule later.) Kant as obediente to a set code or to religious did not discuss what one should do when leadership. Islam means “to submit,” and a categorical imperatives conflict. Muslim is “one who has submitted." The Koran. the recited teachings of Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam, defines the essential goal-oriented aspirations duties decreed bv Allah and binds the In addition to citing rules, we determine believer to loyal subjection. which decisions and actions are ethical by The rule-oriented approach to ethical referring to goals. The previous question was theory establishes in given standards the cri- “What ought I to do?” The questions here teria for determining right and wrong. are “What is good?” or “What goal should I Dilemmas exist when two or more obliga- seek?” The criteria for determining right and tions conflict. One must sometimes choose wrong are no longer historical standards but between what one believes God commands future consequences. The good decision or and what the State requires, between what a action is measured by its ability or promise to superior officer orders and what regulations attain a desired goal. Aristotle defined the prescribe. or between what law exacts and good all men seek as happiness.4 Jeremy what personal conscience dictates. The Bentham elaborated this happiness principie philosopher Immanuel Kant is the premier of ethics as the principie of utility, “that prin­ exponent of a method for determining funda­ cipie which States the greatest happiness of all mental obligations. For Kant the supreme those whose interest is in question, as being principie of morality is good will, and “the the right, proper, and only right and proper first proposition of morality is that to have and universally desirable, end of human ac­ moral worth an action must be done from tion.”3 In the hands ofjohn Stuart Mill, the duty,"1 irrespective of consequentes. The greatest happiness principie was enlarged to subject maxim by which duty is determined include the general good of all: “the happi­ is the categorical imperative, that which is ness which forms the utilitarian standard of binding without exception. Two expressions what is right in conduct, is not the agenfs of the categorical imperative are especially own happiness, but that of all concerned.”6 meaningful. The first is: “I should never act Popularly stated, this goal is “the greatest in such a way that I could not also will that good for the greatest number.” my maxim should be a universal law.”2 For For the military professional, goal-oriented aspirations are a combination of the public good and personal happiness. On the public ’A» rclaiing tn the ethics of duty or moral obligations side is an array of national goals and military 66 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW objectives. Our aim is to assure the security fitting?” In situation ethics the particular cir- of the United States, defend against aggres- cumstances of a situation provide the criteria sion, and aid our allies. The more immediate for determining right and wrong. Here, each objective is accomplishing the mission. This situation is unique, without precedent. Judg- may range from training personnel and ments must be relative to the circumstances; maintaining weapon systems to delivering the circumstances determine what actions personnel and supplies, striking targets, or should be laken. Without the binding and defeating enemy forces. C)n the personal side, unexceptionable absolute of love, situation we want job satisfaction, recognition, promo- ethics would have mirrored the permissive tion, financial security, high OER/APR rat- society in which it emerged. Of rule-oriented ings, a happy home, and an overall sense of judgments, Fletcher said, “Situation ethics fulfillment in life. keeps principies sternly in their place, in their I have identified the ethical theories by role of advisers without veto power.”7 which we judge right and wrong as pressures A major limitation of situation ethics is its because the signals we get from these theories focus on the unusual, once-in-a-lifetime cir- are frequently in tension. Our goals are often cumstance. It is not geared to day-by-day liv­ at odds with each other. Conflict between ing; it provides no game plan. The situations goals and rules, moreover, is also common. in which we must make ethical decisions, This confusion in life may be likened to a after all, have a sameness about them to football game. While ultimately the goal is to which rules or goals do apply. Any realistic score points, immediate choices have to be person knows that under certain conditions made among short-yardage plays, long-yard- we must act situationally. When shot down age plays, passing, running, kicking, field behind enemy lines, we know we will lie or goal, or touchdown efforts. Whatever the steal to survive and return to friendlv forces. decision, all actions are governed by set rules This admission, however. does not mean that and called plays. If the bali is advanced but ethical theory should tolerate lying or stealing the rules violated, the team can be penalized or should make easy my evasion of the for­ valuable yards. If the signals are ignored, a mal mandates on which civilization is struc- broken play and iost yardage may result. tured. While none would fault the impor- Sometimes when the quarterback sees that tance situationists place on acting in a loving the play called in the huddle will not work, manner, love is a motive, an attitude; love is he resorts to callingan “audible;” that is, he not a program with content. Situation ethics adjusts to an unexpected defensive align- resists systematization; it can never be nor- ment. The audible introduces us to a third mative. Without appropriate checks and tvpe of ethical judgment, the situation- balances, situation ethics could lead to ethi­ oriented decision. cal anarchy. Military professionals do occa- sionally find themselves in circumstances where regulations and mission objectives fail situation-oriented decision to provide sufficient guidelines. In those rare In the early I960s a popular way of making instances the aptitude for innovative leader- moral decisions received new definition: ship can be a virtue. situation ethics or the new morality. Both When followed inflexiblv, any of the three leading proponents, Joseph Fletcher and approaches to understanding the bases for John A. I Robinson, were churchmen. The our ethical judgments can result in moral significant questions they asked were “What aberration: exclusive attention to rules can is appropriate to the situation?” or “What is result in legalism; rigid adherence to Mill s ETHICS THEORY FOR THE MILITARY 67 utilitarian goal of lhe greatest good for lhe complaint included in the 1970 Army War greatest number can promote a tvranny of lhe College’s Study on Military Professionalism is majority; and preeminent attention 10 situa- this: “Across the board the Officer Corps is tions can result in loss of directives and moral lacking in their responsibility of looking out chãos. for the welfare of subordinates.” Being a commander is working with peo­ ple. The military is people. America is peo­ The Predominant Ethical Problems ple. The military exists to serve lhe people of Studying ethics lheories without relating America. However it may have been under- them to lhe predominant ethical problems of stood in the past, militar)- leadership is now militarv professionals would be merely an in- measured by management and motivational tellectual exercise. These theories are tools to skills. Leadership is more than giving orders; help us think more clearlv about our deci- anyone can give orders. The skilled leader sions and actions. Three overlapping areas in knows how to motivate the people on whom vvhich our theories may be applied to he depends to accomplish the mission. Peo­ problems are people, integrity. and career. ple are the focus of every command and the heart of every mission. people Human needs are a militarv commanders prevailing problem. I asked a newly ap- integrity pointed group commander what he con- The second major ethical concern for mili­ sidered the hardest part of his responsibility. tary professionals is probably integrity. I Without hesitation he replied, “Making peo­ asked the Commander of the North Carolina ple decisions is the most difficult part of Air National Guard what he eonsidered to be being a commander.” He was rapidly dis- the greatest ethical problem in the Air Force; covering the complexities of leading people. he answered: “Integrity, especially in report- People have needs, they have frailties, and ing.” The Army War College's Study on Mili­ they have great potential. People need con- tary Professionalism (1970) supports this per- sideration, recognition, stroking, and en- ception. Integrity is a major concern of that couragement. study. Typical of the remarks from question- In 1976 as a group project. students of the naires were these: Air Command and Staff College prepared CPT: . . . reluctance of middle officers to render Guidehnes for Command: A Handbook on the reports reflecting the true materiel readiness of their Management of People for Air Force Commanders unit. Because they and their raters hold their leader­ and Supervisors. Ghapter 2 is entitled “Solving ship positions for such short periods, they feel that even one poor report will reflect harshly upon their Problems Involving People.” This chapter abilities. lists 57 eniries on problem situations from MAJ: I am concerned with honesty—trust—and ad- “AWOL" to “ Weight Control.” It makes no ministrative competente within the Officer mention of such human problems as abor- Corps. . . . Command influence impairs calling a tion, incest, homosexuality, sexual deviance, “spade a spade.” gambling, marital problems, moral MAJ: . . . The system forces unethical reporting and problems, religious problems—the kinds of practices, and punishes variation. problems chaplains confront on a regular This last remark is especially significant, basis. These are problems people have vvhich for it places the blame on the system. The a commander cannot ignore. A recurring system does create pressure, and it is certainly 68 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW not errorless. Integrity, however, is a human one officer in the Study on Military Profes- concern; people operate, perpetuate, and sionalism observed: “It takes a great deal of validate any system. Responsibility for moral personal courage to say wthe screwup occur- integrity cannot be shifted. Some systems red here' rather than passing the blame to the may make honesty more difficult than others, lower levei.” but the system only reveals what an in- The September 1977 issue of Human dividuaTs values really are. Ethically alert Behavior magazine reported the results of a military personnel will always be disturbed survey of 173 American generais conducted by the variances between the ideal standards by Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard (U.S. proclaimed by the Services and lhe actual Army, Retired). All the generais had served practices that overtly deviate from those stan­ in Vietnam between 1965 and 1972. This ar- dards. At a meeting of the Inter-University ticle was summarized by the Washington Post Seminar on Armed Forces and Society meet­ and reprinted in local newspapers. The sum- ing at Maxwell Air Force Base in October mary reads: 1976, a graduate of the Air Force Academy Kinnard found an uneasiness among generais over voiced his great disillusionment after only handling of the war. More than half, for example, four months at his first assignment. The dis- felt search and destroy missions at the center of the crepancies between the ideais espoused by American stralegy should have been better executed. Asked why generais had not spoken out during the the USAF Academy and the operative stan­ war, Kinnard, now a political Science professor at dards of an Air Force base were leading him the University of Vermonl, said, “The only thing I to consider resigning his commission. can think of is careerism.”8 General George C. Marshall once ob­ career served that decisions requiring moral courage Integrally related to the problem of integrity are much harder to make than decisions per- is the problem of placing career before taining to physical courage. The reason? honor. The military professional should be “This is when you lay your career. perhaps concerned about his or her career. Achieve- your commission on the line.” Establishing ment ranks high in the officer's code of priorities between goal-oriented career values. A fine line, however, separates valicl aspirations and rule-oriented obligations may concern of ones success in the military from be the most difficult moral choices officers excessive, unhealthy careerism. Crossing this face. fine line is a problem not unique to the mili­ tary. John Dean s Blind Ambition and John The Abiding Ethical Principies Ehrlichman’s Washington behind Closed Doors Military professionals can never stray from confirm the prevalence of excessive career­ the time-honored principies of “Duty, ism. Whatever the profession, personal ambi­ Honor, Countrv” and remain true to their tion can cloud ethical judgment and make calling. The three ethic theories outlined — fools of us all. In the military, preoccupation rule-oriented obligations, goal-oriented with career can lead us to be yes-men for the aspirations, and situation-oriented deci­ commander instead of constructive critics. It sions—are useful in the Service of “Duty, can lead us to cover up for the commander. It Honor, Country.” These theories together can lead us to keep unwelcome reports from with the three abiding principies can be ap- him. It can lead us to cover for ourselves in plied to the difficult problems suggested our effort to look good at all costs. It can lead under the subtopics of people, integrity, and us to do what we know is morally wrong. As career. ETHICS THEORY FOR THE MILITARY 69

duty: conduct I-11 relationships. Kant’s dictum applies: person-oriented leadership people are ends in themselves, never means. T h e m ilitary Services are ju st that— Services. The real obscenity in lhe world is objectifying Thev exist to defend and support hum an people, treating them as things rather than as values. The key personnel in the m ilitary for persons. I like the counsel of a staff officer prom oting these Services are the m ilitary associate. He advised me as follows: “I have professionals. T h e duty of the m ilitary never gone wrong by treating those under me professional is to conduct person-oriented as people and respecting them as such.” leadership, leadership consistem w ith the fundam ental com m itm ents o f this nation. honor: exemplify moral integrity Most military professionals are aware that those they seek to lead are people first and Any code of ethics devised for military soldiers, sailors, or airmen second. They professionals undoubledly will contain arti- have entered the military with unique per- cles that emphasize the importance of profes­ sonalities and individual sets of motivations, sional and personal integrity and that recog- interests, attitudes, and values. They share nize the professional officer’s responsibility to basic needs for survival. belonging, esteem, be an example of integrity for subordinates. and self-realization. Each of these needs The current Chief of Army Chaplains, writ- must be met in turn for the next to become ing for Parameters some years ago, reported operative. Although servicemen wear on a study of ethics among businessmen con- uniforms. they also participate in an intricate ducted by Harvard Business Review. The study network of civilian relationships. They have revealed a double-edged situation: some wives, children, husbands, parents, hopes, businessmen felt pressured to compromise fears. dreams, religious ideais, and names. their integrity in order to please their The successful leader remembers that he or superiors; others felt pressured by bosses who she is dealing with whole beings, people who expected integrity. The study concluded: “If are infinitely more than mechanics, clerks, you want to act ethically, find an ethical typists. technicians, artillerymen, or pilots. boss.”9 The lesson for the militar)- is: If you In our desire to achieve our military mis- w'ant integrity to prevail in the military, act sions successfully, we are sometimes tempted ethically yourself and expect ethical actions to depersonalize those with whom we work from your subordinates. along with those against whom we fight. The Integrity, like person-oriented leadership, latter attitude is especially prevalent. We is a whole-person concept. A former Chief of reduce the enemy to objects; we take away Air Force Chaplains reminds us: their names and nationalities and call them . . . integrity is not just truthtelling, or kindness, or “Huns" or "Gooks” or simply “little yellow justice, or reliability. Integrity is the State of my bastards.” We try to protect our own self-im- whole life, the total quality of my character, and it is age by pretending that the enemy we are kill- witnessed by the moral soundness of my responses in ing is less than a human being with a name every life situation.10 and with a family. Similarly but more subtly, Integrity is not something that can be turned we depersonalize our associates in the mili­ on and off. It reflects the value Systems in tary when we treat them as hands or troops which our lives are grounded. The recent who are there to do our bidding or to advance series of articles on integrity in T1G Brief has our careers. Person-oriented leaders respect purposefully sought to generate discussion the personhood of each individual in the and thought about integrity throughout the command; they establish I-Thou rather than military. The remarks by General Bryce Poe 70 A IR UNI VERSITY REVIE W II. Commander, Air Force Logistics Com- more self-confident leaders who will realize half of what comes into their baskets is crap and that they mand, merit particular attention. He said: should worry about things that are important.12 We must remember the complete meaning of “in- tegrity”—that it includes not just honesty but also Admirai Stockdale would have us regain our sincerity and candor. Our code of behavior must not moral bearings and rediscover the power and tolerate shallowness, expediency, or deception. This rigidity and uncompromising adherence to stan- the courage available when we have commit- dards does not in the least tnean that we must be ted ourselves to fundamental integrity. self-righteous or lack compasston. On the contrary, individuais who recognize that people make country: initiate moral mistakes, even when they are doing their levei-best. concem in America not only display integrity themselves, but reinforce that of their subordinates. In the last analysis. integrity is an entirely personal The moral quakes of Hiroshima, My Lai, thing. Importam to anyone, it is absolutely vital to and Watergate have fractured the conftdence the miliiary professional who has responsibility for of many in America’s current commitment to human life and public property. As General Douglas honor, integrity, and high humanitarian MacArthur once said. our code “embraces the high- ideais. Those events have changed the way est moral laws and will stand the test of any ethics or Americans think about themselves; they have philosophies ever promulgated for the uplift of mankind. Its requirements are for the things that are produced a tidal wave of moral uncertainty, right, and its restraints are from the things that are self-doubt, alienation, and rebellion. Just as wrong.” VVhether we labei that code, “Dutv. Honor, thinking well of self is vital for personal men­ Country,” or simply, “Integrity”— the requirement tal health, so apparently must a nation have a is the same.11 good self-image for its corporate well-being. Fevv officers have tried so vigorously to in- One of the great national tasks for the I980s, culcatc an appreciation of integrity among therefore, is the recapturing of a spirit of those for whom they had responsibility as moral integrity in America. Military profes- Admirai James B. Stockdale. While presidem sionals with their avowed commitments and of the Naval VVar College, he inaugurated a goals occupy a favorable position in the course on the “Foundations of Moral United States. They can lead the way. They Obligation. His course was built on princi­ can become the catalvsts who initiate pies that became profoundly meaningful for throughout society a reawakening of integrity him during 2714 days of imprisonment and and moral awareness. torture in Hanoi's Hoa Lo prison. He claims Through philosophy and ethics, is it possi- that he was sustained as a prisoner of war ble for the military—and through the mili­ (POW) more from what he had learned in tary for the nation—to regain its moral con- philosophy than from what he had read in cern and its concomitant moral self-confi- survival manuais. He knew that man needs dence? Wilson Carey McWilliams has pro- more than buzzwords and acronyms; he jected this possibi 1 ity. In Military Honor After needs the enduring principies articulated by Mylai, he tentatively conjectures that mankind's most thoughtful spirits. His stu- “perhaps the Army may, in its own interest. dents read fromjob, Epictetus, Plato, Aristot- help free civilian America to rediscover its le, Kant, Mill. Emerson, Dostoevski, and the own honor.”13 He implies that the Army can existentialists. He said: First find its own moral compass. Mc­ Williams and Sir Thomas More have similar I think this is the only way to teach a sophisticated audience “duty, honor, country.” I'm not trying to hopes. Long before he was made Henry make fundamentalists out of them. I'm not trying to V II Es Lord Chancellor, More debated make warmongers out of them. I'm trying to make whether moral philosophy had any place “in ETH1CS THEORY FOR THE MILITARY 71 the council of princes.” His conclusion was ends never as means to ends; consistently ves. but only subtly and obliquely. “You must perceive enemies, peers, subordinates, and strive.” he vvrote, “to guide policy indirectly, superiors as persons of great value. Dis- so that you make the best of things, and what honesty, misrepresentation, and false report- you cannot turn to good, you can at least ing can only be reversed if key professionals make less bad. For it is impossible to do all insist on honor and exemplify integrity. things well unless all men are good, and this Selfish careerism that exalts personal advan- I do not expect to see for a long time.”14 tage above the vvell-being of others and of the vvhole can only be reduced if commanders T he vvisdom of More has supplied a neces- stop rewarding self-aggrandizement and sary clue to the reality of the human situa- become models themselves of responsible tion. Military professionals can pioneer a Service. Reshaping the moral climate within return to fundamental integrity, though not the military and the nation needs only a few by bold frontal attacks. Thev must start with dedicated professionals to make a beginning. themselves as individuais vvho, like Thomas Then, beyond the levei of individual exam- More. commit themselves to First principies ple, must come unit exarnple—a squadron, a and to selfless goals. They must be company, a battalion, a group, a base, a post, courageous people vvho place “Duty. Honor, a division, a major command, a Service. To Country” ahead of careers, people vvho say that noble end studies of ethics in the military the cover-ups stop here. The exploitation and are committed. objectifying of people can stop if leaders in Davtdson Cullege sensitive positions consistently treat people as Davidson, North Carolina

Mole» (Philadelphia: Westminsler Press. 1966), p. 55 1 Immanuei Kant, Eoundatums of thr Mrtaphvsics of Morais, trans- 8 Charluttr Observtr, August 21. 1977. Scction A, p. 22. lated b\ Lcwis V\ Beck f Indianapolis Bobbs-Merrill, 1959). p. 16. 9. Kcrmii D.Johnson, Chaplain, Colunei, USA. "Ethical Issuesof 2. Ibid . p. 18. Military Leadership." Paramelers, vol. IV, no 2, 1974. p. 38 3 lbid . p 47 10 HenryJ Meade, Chaplain. Major General. USAF. “Commit- 4 Aristotle Xnomathaen Elhirs, translated b\ Manin Osrwald (In- ment lo Integrity,” Air Unwrrsity Rtview, March-April 1977. p 88. dtanapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1962), Book I, Part 4 11 Brycc Poe II, General, USAF, "Integrity," 7/(7 tíricj, 20 Octo- 5 Jcrems Benlham "An Inlroduction Io ihr Principies of Morais ber 1978. p. 2. and Uegislation Edwtn A. Burtt. editor. Thr Ençtish Thtlusophrrs frorn 12. Charlollt Obsrrver, April 16, 1978, Section A, p. 2. Baron lo Mill (New York: Modcrn Librarv, 1939), p. 791 13 Wilson G. McWilliams, Military Honor Afirr Mylat (New York 6 John Sluart Mill. "Utilitariamsm," in Ençlish Thitosophrrs, p Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1972). p. 32. 908. 14 Thomas More, Utopia, cdited by H V Ogden (Arlington 7 Joscph Fleuhcr. Silualion Ethics. Thr Nrut Morahty Heights, Illinois: AHM Publishing Corp.. 1965), p 23 opimon

INSIDE THE WALLS

M ajor FrankJ. Derfler,Jr .

WANT to talk about thc VAN bomb. No, VAN does not stand for Eanadium /Inhydrous Vucleus. VAN stands for van, as Iin Chevy, Dodge, deliverv, or moving. Call it a truck bomb if vou like. Mv main point, which I will put right here to ensure under- standing, is that the U.S.S.R. has some Fine nuclear delivery vehicles (pardon the pun, but it Fits in every form) that are perfectly in- visible to ballistic missile early vvarning system (BMEWS), sound and surveillance system (SOSUS), or satellites. Not only are we open to nuclear devastation but vve have little or no way to respond. \ The name of our national defense strategy has gone through many contortions. We have IN MY OP/NION 73 heard the Creative name game go from frontation of opposing goals is bound to massive retaliation, through essential bring instability. If the conflict reaches lhe equivalente, to mutually assured destruction. “sticking point,” where neilher side will back These names share one feature: commitment down, it could escalate to the use of conven- to second strike. VVe have vowed not to strike tional armed force. Being able to think a the first strategic nuclear blow. Th is position move or two ahead, the Soviets probably real­ has led us to invest great sums and energies ize that if U.S. forces begin to lose, the in tactical warning devices. These warning nuclear threat will become a more inviting devices are meant to detect incoming missiles option to U.S. leaders. so \ve can give our own military forces and At this point. we have to step in and con- elements of national power a fevv precious jecture that the U.S.S.R. does not want an minutes to launch, hide, or harden. Sophisti- all-out nuclear exchange. They may talk cated radars scan space, space satellites watch about surviving such an exchange, but it the ground. and ground radars watch for in­ would certainly be less than a winning prop- tercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or osition. At the verv least, they would like to sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) attack. limit severely any destruction of their home- SOSUS aids in keeping track of SLBM sub- land. One way to preclude an opponent from marines. We have erected electronic trip taking such a threatening position is to oc- wires that will give warning ifthe enemy tries cupy that position First. to sneak into our camp. But, as an old saying The delivery of nuclear weapons can be goes. the best way to penetrate a fortress is to viewed as a logistics problem. You have an be on the inside when the gates are closed. If item (a warhead) you want to have at a cer- the enemv is inside our fortress walls and our tain place at a certain time. If you think like a ring of warning devices. and then if our logistician, you see you have many alterna- warning devices survive. they might tell us tives for delivery. You can use special only of the incoming second strike. messengers (like missiles and bombers), For purposes of this discussion. we will which are expensive; you can rely on com- assume that the enemy is the Soviet Union. mon carriers (truck, rail. etc.); you can pre- Actually, there are manv foreign govern- position the item; or you can use all three ap- ments and organizations operating within the proaches. We think a lot about stopping (or geopolitical borders of the United States that at least spotting) the special messenger, but could fit the scenario, but we will name the we are wide open to delivery of unwanted U.S.S.R. as the hypothetical enemy. The goods by the common carrier and to pre- Soviets have held a steady course in foreign positioned devices. But, then, we could policy and military affairs. As Joseph Alsop hardly expect a U.S. common carrier to put it: deliver a Soviet nuclear warhead, could we? Since the Grand Prince of Moscow first claimed sole We could indeed! rule of Muscovy, the Russians have always pushed The Soviet Union operates at least five forward: have often been pushed back; but have in- commercial companies in the United States varíably ended up by pushing forward farther than which do business in freight. Amtorg (New before.1 York) is the oldest. It was incorporated in The Russians continue to use all of their 1924 to trade in U.S., Soviet, and third coun- elements of national power to benefit their try goods. It is wholly owned by the Soviets expansion. Correspondingly, the United and has a branch in Moscow called Mosam- States will use its instruments of power to torg. Other companies in the United States counter Soviet expansion moves. The con- with open Soviet interests include a tractor 74 A IR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW company, Belarus Machinery of U.S.A., Inc. kilotons as a minimum) is still a large, heavy (Milwaukee); a shipping agency, Morflot package. But it could be handled by truck. A American Shipping. Inc. (New Jersey); a twenty-kiloton surface burst can destroy ar- fishing and fleet service organization. U.S.- mored vehicles and hardened struetures out U.S.S.R. Marine Resources Company, Inc. as far as 550 meters. It can destroy airplanes (Seattle); and a chartering agent, Sovfracht in the open and communication facilities at (U.S.A.), Inc. (New York). These companies many times that distance. The bomb size use lheir own trucks and ships, lease and could be practically several times 20KT. charter transportation, and consign ship- The United States depends on warning ments to other carriers. If I were a Soviet and real-time command and control. Warn­ logistician trying to deliver a package in the ing will allow the use of existing Communica­ United States, I would eertainly consider tions to launch bombers into survivable posi- using these companies. Other countries and tions and will tell us who the enemy is. power groups have similar, but perhaps not Warning will also enable the National Com­ as extensivc, commercial connections. mand Authorities to get into safe havens. If If we were to develop a scenario for the use we are deprived of warning, our command, ofvan bombs, we would start with the United control, and communication Systems will be States and the U.S.S.R. eyeball-to-eyeball in very lucky to survive. If we are simply some part of the world—with neither side deprived of Communications, we will be in a blinking. We would postulate a dangerous very poor position to survive blackmail or but conventional military conflict in progress coercion. The van bomb could be used as or threatening. We could see the Soviet either a first strike or as a blackmail weapon. leaders wanting another option besides In either case, the targeting strategy would be nuclear destruction or backing down. As in- to destroy the retaliatory weapons on the surance, they would have inserted a number ground (missile capsules and bombers), of nuclear devices into the United States dur- destroy the links to the survivable forces ing more quiet times to provide the “other (Communications), and prevent the National option" or an element of surprise. These Command Authorities from reaching safety. could be brought in under diplomatic seal, Certain “deliveries” would involve a little disguised in freight shipments, or by simple deception: a truck breakdown on a rough smuggling. (If thousands of tons of mari- Montana highway a few hundred yards from juana can enter the country successfully over a Minuteman control capsule, for instance. predictable routes, eertainly a determined But most deliveries in cities like Washington, power could bring in a few tons of contra- D.C., could be to previously rented offices band.) Standard commercial shipping orders and garages and to legitimate freight depots. would start some large crates moving from The target planners will have no problem ob- pre-positioned locations within the United taining an adequate circular error of pro- States to places like Washington, D.C., bability with th is delivery system. Omaha. Grand Forks, Great Falis, Bremer- The Russian approach to military opera- ton, Norfolk, and Honolulu. These crates tions concentrates on shock, surprise, and would be large and heavy, perhaps needing mass. Blackmail is not their style, but the use power attached for “refrigeration." A suit- of infiltrators, deception, and surprise cer- case- or satchel-size nuclear weapon may ex- tainly is. If we ignore lhe complex blackmail ist, but not in practical form. A warhead cap- scenarios and simply examine a First strike able of being handled safely, going off when from within by perhaps two dozen van planned, and doing considerable damage (20 bombs, we can easily postulate the loss of the IN' MY OP/N/ON 75

top leadership, the loss of much of the bom- cotton candy, but we need to add a few bands ber and some of the ICBM force, and the o f Steel to strengthen the survivable co m - almost complete severing of the standard m unication lin ks to all nuclear strike forces. communication links to the remaining W e have a credible retaliatory capability only retaliatory forces. The confusion factor over if we can control and launch our retaliatory the source and nature of the destruction forces. C o m m u n ica tio n satellites are still would be tremendous. The identity of the p h ysically survivable, but their transm ission striker could only be inferred, and then not paths are certainly vulnerable to the al- hastilv. By the use of this one simple. inex- mospheric effects of nuclear explosions. Ex- pensive weapon-delivery System, the Soviets tremely-low-frequency (ELF) radio signals (or any other povver so inclined) could seem to be usable despite atmospheric dis- achieve total surprise, create chãos, and ruption, but the installation of any greatly reduce the counter-strike capability of meaningful ELF system has been put off by the United States. environmental factors. We must get our The “command link" to a van bomb can priorities in order and fmd the Solutions range from the absurdly simple to the needed to provide solid links of comm unica- esoteric. Most large cities in the United States tion that w ill survive the intrusion o f a Tro jan have direct distance dialing with Moscow. horse into our fortress. W e m ust be able to Agents could simply receive orders over the pass the order to fight even if the alarm s do telephone. The appearance of a certain ad on not ring first. Providing adequate and sur- network TV could be a message to move. vivable Communications is the most effective Direct commands relayed by satellite to the practical solution to the threat of surprise at- van bombs could also be used. Links like tack from any source. these could enable the plan to be initiated The prospect of internai sabotage leading without automatically going full course. off a nuclear exchange has not been dis- cussed very often, but it certainly is a poten- tial avenue of attack in a free society. We can Now vve come to the point do little to limit commerce and the move- vvhere we must ask what action is appropriate ment of goods and people, but we can shore and practical to stem this threat. We are an up our own internai system so as to better open and free society. We cannot shut down withstand attack from inside our own walls. commerce and restrict trade because of Air Command and Staff College “what if" scenarios. We will probably never Maxwell Air Forre Base, A labam a espouse a “first strike” strategy. Prudent ac­ tion would, however, close a few “chinks” in the armor. I cannot speculate on covert ac- Note tions or actions to provide for the increased I Newsweek, November 13. 1978, p 35 survivability of the National Command Author’s nole: Alter ilus articlc was subinittcd for publicaiion, the Authorities, but these should be considered. White Mouse issued a series of Presidcnlial Direi lives eont erned with One of the most obvious holes to be patched eontinuity of govcmmcnt. flcxible response, and telceommunications is in the area of vulnerable Communications. policy for national securitv Our national w'eb of Communications is Other Sources Information on Sovict industries in the United States rarac from an much like cotton candy—it is thick and made um lassified Central Intelligcnee Agenty Report, "Sovict Comtncreial up of millions of threads, but terribly soft. Opcrations in the West," ER 77-10486, Scptcmbcr 1977 Information on the cffeets of a 20 kiloton nuclear wcapon carne from When exposed to any heat, it melts away. We Department of the Army Pamphlct 39-1. "Nuclear Weapons Effects have some stronger threads embedded in that and Analysis." May 1959 PATRIOTISM, UNCLE SAM NEEDS YOU!

MajorJ ames Burkholder ATRIOTISM must not be stored in remains that appeals to patriotic beliefs are closets and brought forth for airing only important, if not vital, elements of our on holidays and special occasions. Patriotism recruiting programs. But this must always be is a living quality that must be nurtured and a basic tenet because a military force “drawn examined to ensure positive growth. Once from an apathetic population and motivated matured, it must be strong enough to survive mainly by high pay rather than Service to the the chailenges of criticism, conflict, im- nation is a thin reed upon which to lean.”2 prisonment, or personal sacrifice. Military However, the use of patriotic appeals in personnel need to become involved in a con- recruiting is not the real issue before us. The tinuing process of giving life and substance to important issue is the action taken in the patriotism, for it is a basic element in the sur- years following a person's enlistment to sus- vival of both our military and our nation. Yet tain and reinforce the patriotic ideais that there is little if any training or instruction in may have motivated the enlistment in the first patriotism. We study leadership, tactics, place. All too often, the military' can be com- management, and politics, but what of pared with the individual who saves and patriotism? Is it any less important in today's sacrifices to purchase a new automobile and military' organization and age of technology? then fails to maintain it properly. In much Individuais have their first formal contacts the same manner, we recruit with patriotic with the military through our recruiting appeals, but, once the people are ours, we programs, and in these programs we appeal often ignore their basic motivations and leave to the basic emotions and patriotic motiva- them to their own resources. tions of our potential recruits. Of course, our Major commercial firms consider modem posters and slogans make more sub- employee motivation and job satisfaction as tle appeals than the posters and slogans of the vital elements of the management process. past, but they retain their basic appeals to Numerous and diverse personnel programs patriotism and individual emotions. Many extol company virtues and products. They people view the Revolutionary War pôster strive for a sense of belonging and purpose with its cry “God Save the United States” among their employees, and reinforce the and many of the posters and verbal appeals workers' allegiance, production goals, and from World War I and World War II as over- company products. ly dramatic for a technological society. Thus, I believe the Air Force could profit from we no longer see such phrases as ‘‘Be an industry's example in this respect. The mili­ American Eagle!” “Mine Eyes Have Seen tary community provides Services unequaled the Glory,” and a painting of Uncle Sam say- in the civilian community, for our “product” ing “I Want You.”1 Instead, we use posters is protection of our American way of life: in- and slogans that emphasize opportunities for dependence, freedom, and deterrence from training and self-improvement. Nevertheless, aggression. As military offtcers, we are the subtle images of “Duty, Honor, Coun- professionally obligated to motivate our peo­ try,” and patriotism undergird all of these ple, extol our products, proclaim our goals, more sophisticated appeals. The simple fact and reinforce our patriotic ideais. 76 /.V MY OP/NION 77 Patriotic motivation is not a peculiar re- expounded by Colonel Bondarenko. quirement of our American society. The Nevertheless, the principies and goals Soviet military depends on patriotic training underlying Soviet programs demand ex- and reinforcemenl to a far greater extern than amination, consideration, and possible ap- the U.S. militar)-. It may seem somewhat plication within our military. strange to equate patriotism with commun- Any study of the Air Force and patriotism ism, because we tend to categorize patriot­ should consider the problent of retaining ism, human rights, freedom, and equality in offtcer and enlisted personnel. Normally, rea- the section of our mental bookshelves iabeled sons for separating from the Service include a “America.” Nevertheless, the Soviet military number of complex interrelated issues such considers patriotic motivation a matter of pri­ as pay, lack of responsibility, lack of job mar)- importance. Lieutenant Colonel Bon- satisfaction, or rating disparities. However, darenko of the Soviet army provided some in- many of the irritants may stem from more sight into Soviet philosophy when he wrote: subtle issues. For example, do our people The Soviet way of life itself creates favorable condi- lose their drive, their purpose, or their sense tions for the patriotic education of servicemen and of accomplishment because of a lack of the whole of the people. This education occupies a patriotic reinforcemenl or encouragement? prominent place in ideological work in lhe Soviet Have they perhaps lost the feeling for the Armed Forces It is carried out as a complex, with a basic qualities of “Duty, Honor, Country,” variety of means, forms and methods.3 and patriotism once envisioned in their Colonel Bondarenko further stated that idealistic youth or discussed with their patriotic education includes “political in- recruiters? At the risk of suggesting an im- struction, thematic get-togethers” and proper assumption, 1 must confess I have . . apart from regular political studies, never heard anyone State that he was leaving wide use is made of lectures, reports, talks, the service because of excessive emphasis on meetings with veterans of the Great Patriotic patriotism or emotional appeals to patriotism. War and of specially selected slides and mo- Correlation between patriotic motivation and tion pictures. retention would be an elusive task. Neverthe­ Soviet patriotism is not an abstract notion. It finds its less, all Air Force officers must give more expression in everyday military Service. The Soviet than passing consideration to the problem. serviceman lives up to his lofty mission, stinting no What actions can officers, commanders, effort in his self-denying labour for he realises his and future commanders take in reinforcing personal responsibility for the security of the Soviet the patriotic ideais of our people? What are Union and of the entire socialist community.4 some of our possible options and Solutions? Numerous other militar)- publications con- There are obviously no hard and fast, ir- tain lengthy discussions of the “military- revocable rules. And our difficulties are often patriotic indoctrination”5 of Soviet youth and compounded by tendencies to classify the fact that “of all patriotic obligations, the patriotic fervor as religious beliefs. Many ‘sacred duty' of militar)' Service ‘in defense of people consider patriotism and religious con- the Motherland’ is the highest calling.”^ victions as personal issues closed to public Such articles should be more readily avail- analysis and inspection. But professional able to U.S. Air Force officers because they officers must not hesilate to discuss their provide interesting insights into the patriotic patriotic understandings, beliefs, and emo- training and motivation employed by the tions rather than store them in the hidden Soviets. I am not an advocate of such lengthy recesses of their minds. and periodic “patriotism seminars” as those We may not be as straightforward and 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW open as the late General Daniel “Chappie" and strength of character which defies any adversary James, Jr., but he certainly provided an out- to try to disrupt our orderly growth and diminish our standing example for emulation when he ex- aspirations through chãos, violente, or subversion.9 pressed his professional commitment in these Another noted m ilitary leader expressed words: the idea that we m ust be able to motivate i am a member of the military. I make no bones even the young airm an who drives a car for about that. I chose to be in the Service of my country lhe m otor pool day after day. W e m ust, in because I felt it was the best way that I could serve this great Nation of mine. And I consider myselfvery som e way, be able to m otivate him and instill fortunate to call myself a practicing American and to w ithin him a feeling that he is perform ing an try to demonstrate at every turn that I possibly can, important Service for his country and helping that I consider this the highest honor afforded any his country accom plish its goals. A task of man.. . . this m agnitude is co m plex and challenging, Develop for yourself the pride that must be neces- sary for you to develop your power of excellence— particularly if we have not sorted out in our it’s the onlv power on Earth thafs worth investing in. m inds the m otivations that drive us toward And, you use that to propel yourself to the top of our own m issions. We must not onlv under- your field no matter vvhat it mighi be; and from up stand ourselves and know our beliefs but also there on top with authority, you can do more than provide examples for others to emulate. satisfy the ills of your people below, than you can Ultimately, we must examine our patriotic from under the bottom with a brick. Don’t tear it down—build it up. Perform, perform, excel, excel, attitudes and convictions, refuse to hide them contribute, contribute, be patriotic, and be proud, be in mental storage closets, and muster the American—that’s all I ever knew, and that's all I courage to express them openly. And we know now.7 must not feel ashamed or humiliated in ap- The Air Force, in my opinion, badly needs pealing to patriotic ideais in our efforts to more outspoken members like General motivate ourselves and our people. The James—individuais vvho are not afraid to words expressed by General John Roberts as speak openly of patriotism and their inner commander of the Air Training Command, motivations. perhaps best describe the real spirit of dedi- The average offícer or noncommissioned cated officers: officer may not be so eloquent as General When I speak of leadership, I mean the spirit which enables us to rise above the mundane, to see James but like him he needs to become a beyond the narrow, parochial interests of our im- “praeticing American." We can take up the mediate requirements. I mean the ability to lead challenge posed by General Paul Carlton in those under us to share our vision, to share our com­ this statement: mitment, and to join us in serving this nation with pride in their own professionalism and love of coun­ . . . Iet's every one of us resolve that we'll get back on that patriotic bandwagon. proudly wave the flag, and try.9 set ourselves back on the path of Service to country U.S. Air Force Academy. Colorado

Notes I 'Recruiting Through the Ycars,” Snldiers, February 1979. pp. 1977. pp 115-29 41-43 6. Ibid., p. 1 18. 2. Colonel W. VV Yale, 'No Will. Nn Win—No Wav, ' Army. July 7 Major General Tlmmas E Clifford. A Tribute lo General 1977. p. 28 James,” Air Fone Poltcy Letter for Commanders, February 1979, pp. 3. Licutcnant Colonel Ye. Bondarcnko, ‘Patriotic Education of 27-28. Sovict Serviccmen,” Snriet Military Rtview, Mart h 1977. pp. 36-37 8. General Paul K Carlton, “Pereeiving the Challenge.” .*l/r Fone 4 Ibid., p. 37. Pòlicy Letter/nr Commandtrs, October 1976. p 14. 5. For example, scc Licutcnant Cnmmandcr David M Gist. “The 9 Licutcnant General John VV Roberts. “Spirit of America. .•!*> Militari/ation oí Sovict Youth.” Naval War Gollege Review, Summcr Force Poltcy Letter for Commandtrs, April 1976. p. 25 commentary

To encourage reflt-clion and dt-baie on arliclrs appcaring in lhe Reiieu. lhe l.dilor wekonu-s rrplirs ofTcrinsj limeis. cogenl commenl lo be presenied in ihis deparimeni Irom lime to time. Uthough conlent will lend lo afTcct lenglh and formal of responses, lhes should be kepi as brief a> possible. idealls ssilhin a maxim um 500 ssords. l he Rtiicu reserves lhe pre- rogaiivc lo edil ur rejeei all submissiuns and lo exlend lo lhe aulhor lhe opporlunily lo respond.

ON STRATEGIC PLANNING

A Comment by Captain FrederickG. Beisser

In his article ‘‘Militarv Strategy. The Forgotten to changing world situations, and degraded our Art.“ Lieutenani Colonel VVilliam T. Rudd weapon systems through on-again off-again makes a number of very valid points which sug- budgeting supporl for long-term items such as lhe gest much-needed changes in our mililary B-l bomber and naval straiegic needs. strategy * He has. however. tasked the Depart­ ment of Defense w iih some actions that exceed its authority but which must occur prior to lhe suc- Improving Grand Strategy Development cessful implementation of his major command- The cure may lie in making a "purple suit”* level straiegic planning functions; he has also national straiegic analysis and planning system or overlooked sevcral potential changes at the organi/.ation which reports on an independem departmental levei which could be made now to basis to the Presidem as suggested. Note, how­ increa.se the militars strategii planning awareness ever. that we already have the National Security and the capahilities of our ofTicer corps at Council, which was created by statute in 1947, to minimum cost. advise the President on integration of domestic, As rioted in his article, the absence of a grand foreign, and mililary policies relating to national or national strategy and related objeetives has security so as to enable departments and agencies seriouslv affected militarx thinking and resulted to cooperate more effectively in matters involving in a resource allocation mode of thinking. I would national security.' The council is not a decision- add that this has also caused an unnecessarily or policymaking body, which may contribute (o large amount of crisis management. confused lhe problem. li is. by its nature, a crisis manage- both our allies and our cnemies as to our rcaction ment forum to assisi the President. But within lhe l.irunrl W ilh a m T Kiidd. Mililary Str.iirijv The f»tri|ni* len An 4o Cmnruii Ktntur July-Ao«uo 198». pp 85-93 *0>nvn(mt( of membem from morr lhan une of ihr mililary servires 79 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

council there is an interdepartmental committee allocate defense resources in a manner to achieve known as the Planning Board. Its members guard these purposes.5 The continued dispute over their departmental interests (on the negative side) these issues certainly supports Colonel Rudd’s re- and must resort to interagency bargaining for quest to improve our strategic planning. After vvhat the iraffic w ill bear to arrive al final posi- many years, the major problem in our strategic tions on policy w hich originated in their depart- force policy continues to be whether merely to ment and are being coordinated through the offset U.S.S.R. capability to threaten our strategic co u n cil. Budgetary considerations are very forces or to acquire a matching capability to general, and proposals do not undergo cost destroy U .S.S.R. land-based missiles. The benefit or economic analysis. Last, the Planning specific im plications of this (Carter adm inistra- Board is not Creative in areas of uncharted policy, tion's) policy (countervailing at time of vvriting) only review ing and adjusting to existing policy.2 have not been clarified. T h e com position of the The President already has the option of using strategic forces continues to be determined in a the National Security Council (Planning Board) piecemeal wav.6 as a policymaking instrument. However, to elimi- A natural result of all this is that the “ basic nate the problem s o f paitisanship and agency m ilitary purposes of U.S. Forces are in serious parochialism , a significam term o f appointm ent is dispute.’’7 O ur strategic force policy has pro- needed that exceeds the Presidents term o f office ceeded on a piecemeal basis, which is no longer and once appointed cannot be revoked. The Plan- acceptable. Such vital factors as threat assess- ning Board should become the “purple suit” of ment, strategic stability considerations, future the National Security Council and should be affordability o f alternatives. and S A L T considera- headed by a fifteen-year appointee, as is done tions dictate the need in our government for a vvith the Com ptroller General of the U nited coherent worldvvide national strategy for a longer States. term and one to which the purpose and structure Staff members should come from a form of of our forces is closely linked. joint career Service o f carefully selected officers Improved strategic planning must also be from Defense, State, and several other depart- coupled vvith appropriale funding, aimed to sup- ments. These military and civilian officers (at the port attainment of strategic objectives. Too fre- 06 levei after reaching the Planning Board) quently, congressional budget cuts have been should be groomed for this Service through aim ed at end items or com m odities in operating assignments in a number of different departments budgets that by themselves appear innocuous. A or agencies,3 culm inating in a permanent switch recent article bv Lieutenant General Hans H. to the Planning Board. Subsequently, these Plan- Driessnack, Com ptroller of lhe A ir Force, ex- ning Board members in “purple suits” would also plains the problem.8 Perhaps it is time for Con- serve tours vvith the A ir Force, Navy, Arm y, or gress to begin using a m ission-oriented method of higher strategic planning staffs in DO D . State, collecting budget requirem ents as the executive and perhaps, the Office of Management and branch has done. Then, cuts in particular com- Budget, bringing vvith them strategic planning ex- modities can be readily evaluated as to their effect pertise. on meeting national objectives. The importance of making changes in develop- ing national strategy cannot be overemphasized. Improving Strategic Planning Abilities This becomes painfully obvious vvhen one real- izes that "the annual budget is the basic planning It is interesting to note that our colleagues in document of the federal government."* The most sig- the U .S.S.R. have significam opportunity to studv nificam issues in defense policy are to define the m ilitary Science at advanced leveis. I here are m ilitary purposes of the U nited States forces and over 100 m ilitary schools vvith courses ranging COMMENTA R Y 81

from four to five years. M ajor areas of study are em programs do not need to be eliminated, but doctrine. strategy. operational art, and tactics. Ii is DOD could contractually require the offering of also estimated tliat several hundred Soviel officers M.S./M.A. degree programs in strategic policy hoid Candidate of Military Science degrees.9 analysis, internationa! relations, or military histo­ Viewed anolher way. graduate military univer- ry from currently participaling institutions. In- sities in the U.S.S.R. ofier advanced schooling in terschool cooperative agreements could allow ex- military Science ai 17 locations. equivalem pansion to smaller bases by guarameeing roughly to master’s degrees. In addition, transferability of course work. postgraduate work is also encouraged in m ilitary • A change in the requiremenls for tuition disciplines at the doctoral levei.10 assistance would ensure participation in these Com pare these with a review of The College programs. Either eliminate the two-year active- Bluehouk. vvhich shows only five institutions in the duty Service commitment for military science United States ofiering a bachelor's degree in m ili- degree programs presently required of officers or tan science and none at the master’s levei.11 pay fu 11 tuition if a grade of B+ or higher is There must be corrective action soon. aehieved. • A recent step in lhe right direction is the AFIT program in strategic and tactical Sciences. T he A ir Force and the Depart- However. the number of officers able to partici- ment of Defense (D O D ) can easily encourage pate will be limited. more intense study of strategic planning. Several If the above changes were to be implemented, suggestions seem in order a not-so-long-range benefit might be lhe oppor- • Ensure that all larger base libraries are tunitv for the doctor of military science degree to stocked w ith appropriale books to allow indepen- become a reality in the United States. dem study. Effeclive supervisors encourage professional reading so the books w ill not be lN GENERAL, I agree with Colonel Rudd. unused. The A ir University can quickly develop a Strategic planning has been serifiusly neglected. suggested list in four basic sections covering m ili- Now is the right time to improve strategic plan­ tary science. military history, strategic planning ning at both DOD and national government and policy analysis, and defense studies. In addi- leveis with taxpayer support reawakened by re- tion, each library should carry lhe entire Soviet cent world events. M ilitary Thought series, w hich few now do. • Encourage on-base programs to provide TUSLOG Detachment 10 (USAFE) degree programs at larger bases in curricula useful to lhe m ilitary rather than m erely creating Caplain Hcisscr is Chiei. Aircouniing and Finamx- Bram h, TUSl.OG a foundation for an officer's second career. Pres- Deiachnu-ni 10 (USAFE).

Notes 1 Senaior Hcnr\- VI Jai kV(11 editor, / hr Xotionul Sftunli Counnl 7 Ibid , p 163 Nrvs York Frederick A, Pracger 1965). p 30. 8 l.ieulenani General Hans II Dricssnac k. “The Kcy to Readí- 2 Ibid . pp. 34-35 ness O&M" in Air Pont, October 1980. pp 57-63 3 Ibtd . p. 12. 9 American editnr's commenl, The OJfenswt (A Soviel View) by 4 Jowph A fv. hman. editor. Stltieig Xalional Pnonlirs— Thr 1980 Colonel A A Sidorcnko. translated under auspices of United States bwlgrl 'Washington Thr Brookings Inslituliiin. 1979). p vii Air Force (Washington: Government Printing OITicc. 1970). Emph.isi» added 10 AFP 200-21. Smirl Aenspatr Uandbmk. May 1978, pp 157-58 5 Ibid . p. 15 11 The College Bluehouk, seventeemh edition (New York: Mac- 6. Ibtd . p. 16 millan, 1979). p. 638 Comment by Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence J. Hillebrand

Lieutenant Colonel Rudd makes three valid in this context it can have three strategies: growth, points: that there is a need for a national strategy maintenance of status, and decay. Disregarding which is well organized and has widely based the latter, perhaps an error to those who espouse polilical support; that a m ilitary strategy to com - zero growth or lhe inevitability of decreasing plement the national strategy must be developed; resources and energy, we have two national and that elite m ilitary strategists should be iden- strategies rem aining. tified, trained, and used to best implement the na- • Maintenance of current status— defined as tional m ilitary strategy. maintenance of the "American Way.” Diversity, Colonel Rudd supports lhese points by iden- no lim itation on rewards for initiative, no lim ita- tifying many logical benefits, such as unity of pur- tion to lhe accum ulation of material possessions, pose, developing effectiveness, m inim izing inter- free competitive markets, no restrictions on travei service disharmony, and keeping the focus on or the other blessings that make our country best. ability to meet the need— not just the program - • Grow th— an increase in politically con- management goals of time, performance, and trolled geography, or percentage of energy and cost. T h e logic of his posilion is unassailable. resources consumed per capita; increase in However, he makes no recommendation about wealth, power, and population. how the diversity of the Am erican national O f these two, the m ilitary im plem enting strategy character could contribute to national security. is easiest to develop and implement to achieve T h e issue is not whether the m ilitary Services growth. Growth is the easiest to define, measure, could be better organized and managed to meet and, if the means are available, aecomplish. Great national objectives but what our national objec- m ilitary leaders (e.g., A lexan d er, Caesar. lives are. Napoleon, and Hitler) were able to achieve suc- O ur nation has been characterized by its reac- cess in meeting their plans for growth. T h e objec- tive unplanned behavior. United States political tive was clear, the enemies’ capabilities measured. and m ilitary involvem ent has sprung from social and conflict successfully planned on the political, pressures, not reasoned, long-planned acts of ex- social, and m ilitary' levei. Little intraservice pansion or avengement. The war vvith México, bickering on the relative value of tactical versus lhe Civil War, the Spanish Am erican War, and strategic M arine versus Arm y tactical air versus W orld Wars I and II were preceded by consider- helicopters was necessary because leaders could able periods of time to gain public support and relativelv easily ascertain whether that solution overcome isolationist tendencies; they required could meet the need. the exploiting of some dramatic anti-American Maintenance of the status quo is the most action. T h e recenl war in Southeast Asia with its challenging. It requires m aintaining capabilities planned finite application of power without a to overcom e from all leveis o f threat and conflict. clearly defined condition of victory, failed. We It is most difficult to define a status quo that in- have succeeded when the goal was plain and cludes "spheres of influence,” changing political easily perceived and not so well otherwise, which altitudes and desires by the citizenry, and rising supports Colonel Rudd's obvious point that we expectations by the world at large. need clear. unambiguous objectives. But what If the United States should choose an ag- stralegies then can there be? gressive posture to overcome some threat, out- I he State has been likened to an organism, and produce or develop a superiority over or defeat 82 COM MENTAH Y 83

some political entity, the strategy is sim pler lo menl requires eapabilities ranging from those design, defining lhe required means is clearer, against terrorist lo m utual assured desiruetion. It and positive contributions are easier to idenlify follows that there w ill be ehanges in priorities as and attain. O n the other hand, m aintaining a these eapabilities cannot all be supported to the status quo is basically defensive, reactive, and, ac- same degree at the same time. Colonel Rudd is cording to some scholars who decry maginot line eorrect. T h e m ilitary must be “can do,” however, thinking, doomed to essential failure. for as t itizens we are always charged w ilh defin- There is no denying that having a clearly ing what we want— a m uch more difflcuIt task. defined goal is best. Implementing a national Rarnstein Air Force Base, Gerrnany military strategy in these uncertain times requires Lieutcnant Colont-I Lawrence J. Hillebrand is Cornmandcr, greai flexibilit\ and risk. T lie m ilitaiy establish- Delachtnenl 9, ESD-Europc.

Major Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF, has been selected by the Air University Review Awards Committee to receive the annual award for writing the out- standing article to appear in the Review during fiscal year 1980. His article, "Alienation, Anomie, and Combat Effectiveness," was previously designated outstanding in the September-October 1980 issue. The other bimonthly winners for 1979-80 were John M. Collins of the Library of Congress, “ Princi- pies of Deterrence," November-December 1979; Wing Commander )eremy C. Saye, RAF, "Close Air Support in Modern Warfare," January-February 1980; Major Donald J. Alberts, USAF, “Tactical Air Power within NATO: A Growing Convergence of Views," March-April 1980; Dr. (ames Brown of the Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, “Challenges and Uncertainty: NATO's Southern Flank," May-)une 1980; and Lieutenant Colonel William T. Rudd, USAF, “ Military Strategy, The Forgotten Art," july-August 1980. PROFESSIONAL IDEALS AN D MILITARY BEH AVIOR

D r .James H. Buck

EVE LAT I O N S about Abscam (Arab Scam),R the FBFs “sting” operation involving cor- ruption among congress- men, are but the latest in a series of incidents of ethical or moral lapses of wrongdoing. Within the past decade, two dozen other congressmen were charged with illegal acts. Continuing exposés of vice and not-so-petty corruplíon araong public cam.t This splendid anthology provides the olTicials at every levei of government result raw material for learning about ethics less in moral outrage and more in a vague through logical grouping and graduated ex- sense of moral ill-being—a nonspecifie posure to 31 authoritative and intellectually malaise about moralitv and ethics, an uncer- appealing articles by a variety of scholars tainiy about the State of human conduet. Edited by Cí)lonel Malham M. Wakin, Although Mark Twain wrote a cemun- ago Associate Dean of the United States Air that there probably is “no distinctly native Force Academy (USAFA), Professor of American criminal class except C-ongress, ii Philosophy, and long-time teacher, this work is unfair to single out public ofíicials for was developed as a text for the ethics course unethical conduct. Others deserving mention required of all juniors at the USAFA. include corporate personnel tied to bribes Throughout, it deals with the kinds of ques- and other unsavory activity with foreign tions that are worth the attention of all governments. corporations, labor racketeers, professionals. government bureaucrats, and military per­ Clearly. the military has engaged in some sonnel vvho engaged in or tolerated immoral serious thinking about ethics over the past and unethical activities in Vietnam and several years. This introspection has been elsewhere. diffuse, but two themes predominate.1 The Probably man’s conduct today is not more first theme is an underlying personal dis- distant from his ideais than it was in earlier satisfaction with the military’s status in times. Yet, his awareness of transgression is society, coupled w'ith a desire both to preserve heightened remarkably by the instantaneous a unique life-style and to strengthen the visual coverage of Watergate, the media autonomy of the military within its profes- massage of Vietnam. Koreagate, and the sional sphere. The second theme is the con- constant drumming of the print media. cern with ethics, primarily the gap between All professions are affected by unease professional ideais and professional behavior. about ethics (the intellectual concept of right Ethical conflicts result when institutional de- conduct) and moralitv (the act of doing mands and organization behavior are coun- right). Lavvyers seek to reestablish a reputa - terposed to individual ethics that reject tion for integrity sullied by Watergate; doctors careerism. struggle with the ethical aspects of abortion, Concern with ethics is not new to military DNA experimentation, mind control, and professionals. Historically, a hereditary mili­ test tube babies; and the courts have ruled tary class, or more recently, corporate mili­ that biotechnicians may patent novel living tary groups have seen themselves as conser- organisms which they invent, reasoning that vators of the crucial elements of a society’s life is largely chemistry, calling forth the ethics. Generally, thé society has reciprocated counterargument that this is not so. In any and looked to the military as the moral ex­ event, ethics is being more vvidely debated emplar. No doubt there are mixed opinions lately; although one wonders if it is not like about the American case; maybe exemplar is the weather that everyone talks about but no too strong a word. Nevertheless, cheating at a one does anything about. Service academy makes national headlines However, the book War, Morality, and lhe while academic chiseling goes unnoticed Military Profession does do something signifi­ almost everywhere else. The American

tMalham M. Wakin, editor, War, Morality, and the Military Profession (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, $24.50), 531 pages. 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW public may well believe that the military these selections will hardly settle the function so crucially involves moral integrity seemingly interminable and emotion- that any hint of dishonesty must become a charged arguing about professionalism, officer- matier of paramount concern. Certainly mili­ ship, leadership and management (Are these tary officers insist on integrity; at the same words really mutually exclusive?) and time, some are obsessively watchful that their whether the military is evolving as an oc- self-image is not tarnished by those who fail cupation rather than a profession. What it to measure up or by those who point out that will do is refine the parameters of discussion the institution or their colleagues do not and provide the basic stuff for reasoned dis- measure up. course about the nature and future of the Expectations for the professional military, profession. Three excellent selections by as Professor Wakin points out in his in- General Sir John Winthrop Hackett include troduction to War, Morality, and the Military “The Military in the Service of the State," Profession, are indeed demanding: wherein Hackett concludes that “the highest Military knowledge and competence are not enough; service of the military to the State may well lie we insist that they be conjoined with courage, in the moral sphere.” (p. 125) Separate treat- loyalty, obedience, subordination of the self to the ment is given by various authors to the topics greater whole, and most importantly, with moral in­ of “Integrity," “Truthfulness and Upright- tegrity. ness," “Duty, Honor, Country,” “Loyalty, The virtues of loyalty, obedience, selflessness, Honor, and the Modern Military,” and to and integrity are praiseworthy personal at- “Conflicting Loyalties and the American tributes for any endeavor, but they are not Military Ethic." Colonel Wakin's enlighten- fundamentally necessary to all that passes for ing chapter, “Ethics of Leadership,” un- success in modern America. To the militarv/ tangles ethos, ethics, and military honor; il- officer. however, they are absolutely crucial to luminates some of the complexities of obe­ his professional function; and, hence, their dience, loyalty, and moral commitment in exaggeration is imperative. terms of real cases (the Lavelle incident); Professor Wakin argues correctly that th is evaluates the utility of formal written codes of nonexclusive set of virtues is a major moral behavior; and discusses the need to under- tie between morality and the military’ profes- stand that one’s approach to ethics must go sions. The second major connection lies in beyond the simple bifurcation between the nobility of the profession: doctors save relativism and absolutism and to know that lives; lawyers preserve law and justice; the pragmatism and relativism are not identical. military protect and secure the institutions What we ask of today’s leader, Wakin writes, and quality of life in a morally sound nation. is that he be neither absolutist nor relativist but retain a balanced perspective that under- stands the fu 11 complexity which character- izes the interweaving of moral value with T he readings are grouped into military function. We ask him to be that good two parts: (1) Ethics and the Military Profes­ man, that wise man, that lhe Greek sion and (2) War and Morality. philosopher could advise subordinates to find The first part includes samples of seminal and imitate. (p. 216) civilian scholarship which has so informed The second part of the anthology is about the professional officer about his own State: the morality of and in war. The morality of writings by Samuel P Huntington, Morris war has generally been dealt with historically, Janowitz, and Charles Moskos. A reading of in the Christian world, in terms of the classi- BOOKS AND IDEAS 87 cal just war theory. This theory, essentially a tual energy has been spent in the quest for a set of criteria to judge whether a war is just or world without war, and this elusive goal con­ unjust, is critically reviewed in Donald A. tinues to engage the world’s political leaders. Wells’s chapter, "How Much Can ‘The Just Some success has been achieved: at least the War’ Justify?” The theory holds that a war is major powers of World War II have found just if it is declared bv a legitimate national ways, so far, to avoid making war on each authority, is embarked on for a just cause, if other. Theoretically, a world without war is fought with the right intention, and employs possible; actually, wars seem more frequent just means. Furthermore, the use of force and more widely distributed geographically. must have some chance of success, else it is So long as the probability of war exists, the irrational. Wells doubts that war had moral professional military must be concerned with significance in the past; he is certain that “to- the moral and ethical dilemmas of war and dav the just war justifies Armageddon if our in war. hearts be pure, and this is to justify too much.” (p. 270) Other contributors deal with twentieth- REQUIRED reading for the military, War, century views of just and unjust wars (one Morality, and the Military Pru/ession focuses at- might speak with equal accuracy of moral tention on the serious ethical dimensions that and immoral wars). To the pacificist, who is invade and guide the thinking of military also necessarily absolutist. all war is immoral. leaders. Careful reading and study of the To F. R. Struckmeyer, defense against active more complicated dilemmas presented by attack is morally justified, as he points out in this anthology can serve several importam his chapter “The Just War' and the Right of purposes. It can stimulate the moral imag- Self-Defense.” Richard Wasserstrom pro- ination, help to dispel moral mvopia, en- vocatively analyzes the assertions that warlike courage sensitivity to the moral aspects of response to aggressive war is justifiable and everyday life, develop analytical skills, aid that the initiation of war is never justifiable. ethical reasoning, and contribute to an Elizabeth Anscombe deals with the killing of understanding and toleration of the moral the innocent and the principie of double ambiguity which, by its very nature, com- effect in her essav ‘‘War and Murder.” poses the dilemmas of ethical reasoning and Several chapters highlight the moral moral choices. dilemmas inherent in war. Telford Taylor, Dr. Wakin's frequent observation that “the Columbia University law professor, former unexamined ideal is not worth dying for” is brigadier general, and Chief U.S. Counsel correct. Ethical dilemmas merit frequent and for the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, writes serious discussion by the military profession. about “War Crimes” and “Superior Orders The easier it is to discuss them now, in and Reprisals.” British philosopher R M. peaceíime, the easier it will be to make sound Hare answers the question “Can I Be ethical decisions in the face of wartime Blamed for Obeying Orders?” Richard pressures. Krickus examines the moral ambiguity and lhe University of Geórgia, Athens legal uncertaintv about lhe use of chemical and biological weapons. A final chapter by Gregory S. Kavka explains “Some Paradoxes Note 1 S C. Sarkcsian. "An Empirical Reasscssmcnl of Military Profcs- of Deterrence.” sionalism." in Franklin D Margiotta, editor, The Changwg World of the A marvelous amount of human intellec- American Mililary < Bmjldcr. Colorado Westvicw Press, 1978), pp. 51-5J JAPAN: THE STUDENT BECOMESTHE TEACHER

Dr .James H. T oner N 1853 and again in 1854 American war- thrown Japan into political turmoil. The ships under the command of Gommodore assassination of Prime Minister Yuko Matthew C. Perry anchored in Tokyo Bay. Hamaguehi, in November 1930, led to the IPerry had been sent by the United States seizure of power by his rivais, the militarists, government to open trade relations with who invaded Manchuria the next year. Japan. The signed treaty opened tvvo Japanese expansion continued. The Japanese Japanese ports to American trade and ended militarists strengthened their hold on the Japaivs isolation from other countries. Ofthe government, and in late 1941 General Hideki signing of the agreement on 31 March 1854, Tojo became Prime Minister. Perry’s chronicler offered this account: An American Army officer, MacArthur. It was now sunset, and the Japanese prepared to helped restore Japan to the family of nations depart with quite as much wine in them as they after World War II. Allied Military Occupa- could well bear. The jovial Matsusaki threw his tion of Japan began in late August 1945 and arms about the Commodore’s neck, crushing, in his officially continued until 28 April 1952, tipsy embrace, a new pair of epaulettes, and repeat- ing, in Japanese, with maudlin affection, these when the Japanese peace treaty went into words as interpreted into English: “Nippon and effect. During the oceupation, Japanese war America, all the same heart.”1 criminais were tried—seven were executed— and a remodernization and democratization Four score and seven vears later, the Japanese of Japan were begun. On 3 May 1947 the and Americans were at war. new Japanese constitution went into effect; An American Naval officer, Perry, helped the emperor's divinity was renounced; the to bring Japan into the family of nations in army and navy were essentially dissolved, 1854. In 1867, Emperor Mutsuhito regained and war was abjured as an instrument of his power—the so-called Meiji Restoration — statecraft. Serious and substantial reforms from the Shogun, the military governor of were introduced into practically every aspect Japan vvhose warrior class had held power of Japanese life. since 1 192. During th is post-Perry period of When the oceupation ended, JaparTs total enlightened rule, Mutsuhito and his suc- produetion was about one-third that of Brit- cessors eliminated the feudal system, ended ain or France. By the late I970s, her gross na- the samurai or warrior class, proclaimed tional produet was as large as that of Britair Japan's first constitution in 1889, generally and France combined and more than hal modernized the country, and increasingly en- that of the United States. Ezra Vogei, chair tered into international trade. In fact, the man of Harvard's Council of East Asiai samurai had given way to the zaibatsu, the fi­ Studies and author of Japan as Number One nancial moguls who helped to develop, in the Lessons for America, points out that if Japar late nineteenth century, some of the firms were an American State it would rank fifth ir which are today internationally known. By geographical size, following Alaska, Texas 1930, however, a major power struggle had Califórnia, and Montana.t Its 115,00(),00(

tEzra F. Vogei, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (Cam bridgt Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979, $12.50), 272 pages.

88 BOOKS AND IDEAS 89 people live in that fairly compact archipel- prospect of a return to power of a totalitarian ago, making it the most densely populated dictatorship. major country in the world. About thirty per- VogeTs book, which may be read with cent of its food supplies must be imported, high profit by both Asian specialists and and about eighty-five percent of its energy general readers, is particularly optimistic resources must also be obtained from foreign about Japan’s politics.3 “If the term suppliers. Given their rather exigent circum- “democracy’ is used to signify the expression stances. one can see why the Japanese have of diverse interests in the political arena and turned, vvith astonishing success, to interna- the capacity of the government to satisfy those tional business and commerce. President interests,” Vogei writes, “it could be argued Charles de Gaulle of France once rather that Japan is now a more effective democracy peremptorily dismissed a Japanese prime than America.” Japanese parliamentary minister as a “transistor salesman.” But as democracy, institutionalized in the bicameral Herman Kahn and Thomas Pepper point Diet, appears to be remarkably stable and out.t “Japan is almost certain to become . . . strong.4 Emperor Hirohito performs the largest. . . trading nation in the world.” ceremonial duties as head of State; the prime Japan, says Kahn, is very likely “to become a minister is chosen by the Diet and is, as head superpower as well as a superstate.”2 Some of government, particularly accountable to transistor, some salesman! the 511-member House of Representatives. Ezra VogeTs book is readable. informative, The Liberal Democratic Party has been the and provocative. He wonders in print chief political actor in Japanese politics, but whether a Western nation can learn from the its domination seems no longer assured.5 East. Vogei does not look on Japan as a Thejapanese Communist Party is politically utopia, but he contends that “Japan has dealt weak and, aecording to the forecast of more successfullv with more of the basic Rodger Swearingen, theJCP seems to be “in- problems of postindustrial society than any sinuating itself into the ranks of Eurocom- other country. It is in this sense . . . that the munism.”tt In short, Japanese political in- Japanese are number one.” It is incorrect. stitutions and procedures appear resilient Vogei asserts, to regard Nippon (meaning and mature. “source of the sun”) simply as “Japan, Inc.” How much we in the United States—with Vogei contends that the Japanese economic our federal, presidential, pluralist political powerhouse is, in part, the product of a system—can learn from thejapanese unitary, relatively homogeneous society in which parliamentary system can be debated.6 In- “communitarian values” provide purpose, creasingly, however, American businessmen cohesion, and loyalty. Although Vogei are turning to their Japanese counterparts to praises Japanese social purpose, he admits study Japanese industrial practices. As Vogei that the strong pressure for conformity could put it: “No structure in the West compares help restrict dissent and stifle individualism. with thejapanese firm in its capacity to in- He doubts, however. that there is any troduce rapid change and to provide iden-

t Herman Kahn and Thomas Pepper, The Japanese Challenge: The Suc- cess and Failure of Economic Success (New York: Thom as Y . Crow ell, 1979, $10.00), 162 pages. t+Rodger Swearingen, The Soviet Union and PostwarJapan: Escalating Challenge and Response (Stanford, Califórnia: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, $14.95), 340 pages. 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW tification for a substantial part of the popula- tion of China. Swearingen uses a Chinese tion.” In this connection, Rodney Clark’s Communist military document, which was book is essential.f The book is a clear, con- intended to assure cadre and soldiers that cise, and relatively complete study of man- China’s tilt toward the United States was agement practice in contemporary Japan. merelv tactieal and lemporary (p. 169), as a Clark agrees with Vogei that the term Japan, basis for his conclusion that lhe Asian Inc. is incorrect. Although Clark s book will strategic situation is increasingly complex— be of interest primarily to the dose student of and perilous. international economics or of comparative Despite Article 9 ofJapan’s Constitution— business management, the generalist will the “ MacArthur Constitution” — the find Clark's chapter “The Company, Society, Japanese appear to be embarking upon a and Change” to be useful for its insight into “substantial course of limited rearmament. the nature of authority, the sociological back- dictated, it would seem, in no small measure ground of company structure, and the prin­ by the alarming Soviet naval buildup in the cipal organ izational differences between Pacific area and the increasing military American and Japanese firms. This book. in stature of the People’s Republic of China and conjunction with Kahn and Pepper’s, will be ofNorth Korea concomitant with decreasing valuable reading for anyone whose goal is to U.S. commitments in Asia.” (p. 203) understand the procedures and prospects of Swearingen’s conclusion: “All of this sug- the mercantile Japanese. gests, rather ominously, that — Moscow s The student of international affairs will policy of détente notwithstanding—we may want to read Swearingen’s book. which is a be witnessing only the First stage of the lucid treatment of the relationship between escalating Soviet challenge in Northeast Asia the Soviet Union and Japan. World War II and of lhe increasingly vigorous Japanese ended formally between Japan and the response.” (p. 220) Valuable, too, are 80 U.S.S.R. in 1956, when they agreecl to sign a pages that give the texts of 38 treaties between peace pact; Japan entered the United Nations the U.S.S.R. and Japan from 1956 to 1977. the same year. But Swearingen contends that there rernain “fundamental issues” to be T he Japanese have much to teach us in the resolved between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. West. As Kahn and Pepper put it, the His book is a coherent catalogue of Japanese have learned to combine the ma- difficulties in the Russo-Japanese relation­ chine and the garden. They write that “ . . . ship, dating particularly from the war of Japan is the quintessential example of a 1904-1905 (which was ended. of course, at country that consciously sought a marriage of the behest of President Theodore Roosevelt, traditional and modern, native and foreign, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906 East and West. The slogans of the Meiji for his efforts). For example, questions still era—for example, ‘Western knowledge. exist about Sakhalin Island, about the Kuril Eastern morais’—show a deep-rooted belief Islands, about certain other islands across the in synthesis.” (p. 32) Perhaps it is time, at Nemuro-kaikyo Strait at 44°N and 146°E. least in some areas of politics and business, and about other matters which appear in- for the Japanese to become the teachers and transigent. Complicating things is the ques- for us, the countrymen of Perry and

tRodney Clark, The Japanese Company (New Haven: Yale University Press, I979, $17.50), 282 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 91

MacArthur, to become the students. Then, Ccmiany and lhe post-World War II Japanese governmenl. The former cmploys a federal syslem. a parliamcnlary syxtcni wíili a perhaps it can again be said, as it was in bicameral parliarncnl (Bundeslag and Bundesrai). at cremonial prrsi- 1854: “Nippon and America, all the same dency, and a chancellorship. The laiier employs a unilary syslem a parliarnentary syslem willi a bicameral Uiei (Housc o( Representaiive heart.” and Mouse of Councilors), a consliiulion.il inonart hy wiili lhe emperor as ceremunial head of siale, and a prime minisier Bolli namms use a Norwich Univer si ty varialion of propornonal reprcsenialion in elc< ling legislaiors. and both nations serio lo have aci epled lhe fundamentais of demot ra> y in poliii- cal cullures which. before 1945, probablv would have correctly been called "aulhoritarian " Notes 3 At lhe lime of writing. Prime Minister Ohira had licrii defeatcd 1 Quotcd in Thumas A. Bailcv, .4 Diplomallc History uf lhe American in a surprise nu-confidcnce volc He had dissolved the Mouse of Kepre- Peoptt, sevenlh edition (New York: Applcton-Cciitury-Croflx, 1964), p seniatives and sei 22June 1980 as lhe dale for general clcctions The 310 Japanese werc also s< hrdulcd lo choose halfofthc 232 members of the _> This quntation mav bc fnund on p. xii uf thr Kahn and Pepper House of Councilors on lhe same dav Ohira died on 12 June 1980 book. To pursue ihis subjcct. sec Herman Kahn, The EmergingJapanese 6 l he term unilary is often misused. A unilary siale is onc in which Superstate (Englewood Cliffs, N.J Prentice-Hall, 1970) regional or local govemmcntal inslilulions do nol have legal or ron- 3 Rcadrrs mav be imercsied alvo in Frank Langdi.m. Tulilm m Japan siitulional guaranlees of auionomv Alihough Japan does have nine . Boston: Lntlc. Brown, 19671. and VVarrcn M Tsuncishi. Japanese "large regions,” forlv-seven "prefectures." and a "melropolis ['••Itlual Style (Nev\ York Harper and Row. 1966) Pnrdrainatii com- i lokvo). its governmenl is unilary. as is thal. say. ol (Jreal Briiam Bs parison. sec "The Swarming Lobbyists." Time. Augusi 7, 1978, pp contrasi. lhe American. Sssiss Wesi Gcrman. Australian, or Canadian 14-22; and Kevm Phillips. "The Balkanization nf America. Harper's. governmenls are "federal'' because lheir siaies. canlons, laender, or May 1978. pp 37-47 provim es have cenain assuranees ol limilcd autonomy. Thal a coumry 4 The siudenl of governmenl will be impressed al lhe comparisons chooscs a unilary siruclure of governmenl by no means indicates lhal ii lo be made beiween the Bonn governmenl in lhe Federal Republic of is noi dcmocraiic or pluralislit

COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION an interpretation of Soviet-Americanelationsr

Lieu t en a n t Colonel Dallace L. M ef.han

There are now two great nations in the world which, of multipolar power relationships. Since startmg from different points, seern to be advancing World War II, in particular, there have been toward the same goal: / allude to the Russians and the major changes in alliance systems, financial Americans. . . . Each seems called by some secret relationships, and the relative strengths of the design oj Providence one day to hold in its hands the majdf- powers. We have seen the reemergence destinies of half the world. of a strengthened Europe, the economic and Alexis de Tocqueville, 18351 industrial miracle of Japan, sweeping changes in a post-Mao leadership that ap- HE crucial challenge for security in the pears to be establishing a radically new Tworld today revolves around relations be- Chinese foreign policy, and new complexities tween the United States and the Soviet associated with the Third World caused Union. It is true, of course, that in recent largely by the growing dependente on years we have witnessed a trend toward natural resources by the industrialized na­ global interdependence and the development tions of the West. 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW But while all of these changes introduce sian-American (Alaska) to the United States. complications in the International System, the The purchase of Alaska by the United very survival of that system, indeed the physi- States marked a high point in Russian- cal security of the world, continues to depend American cordiality, however, and a gradual most importantly on relations between the deterioration in relations set in, stemming United States and the Soviet Union. Th is largely from a conflict of interests in the Far was true at the end of World War II, when East. After the turn of the century, World the Soviet Union was largely a continental War I soon garnered the attention of the power, and is even more apparent now that world, and it was not until the Russians' own she has matured into a major superpower of revolution in 1917 that U.S. attention again global militar^' dimensions. turned to the eastern giant. Unfortunately, Relations between the United States and that attention revolved around the folly of the Soviet Union are usually examined in misguided intervention in the Russian Civil light of our post-World War II experiences, War, a chapter in U.S.-Soviet relations that often beginning with Stalin's expansionist Russians are not likely long to forget. policies and the development of the Soviet American involvement can be summed up as bloc of satellites in Eastern Europe. But as a classic case of attempting to project com- Tocqueville's analysis shows, it was already mitment beyond capability resulting in bitter- clear to the careful observer of a centurv and ness, frustration, and recrimination. a half past that Rússia and the United States What followed were the years of nonrecog- were destined to play the most influential nition, 1920 to 1933, during which commer­ roles in the world. cial relations and trade flourished. American In this light, historian John Gaddis traces reluctance to extend official recognition the roots of contemporary Soviet-American rested largely on ideological grounds with relations back some two hundred years to the Soviet world revolutionary activity the chief American Revolution.f For nearly a century, justification. Relations based on the abstract although there were some antagonisms, rela­ principies of ideology gave way to common tions between the two States were relatively interests during the 1930s when the growing cordial. Those disputes that did arise (mainly power of Germany and Japan served as the territorial and commercial) did not occur impetus for the establishment of formal because of the wide gap in ideological princi­ diplomatic relations in 1933. But as Gaddis pies that separated them. It is interesting to quotes from American Ambassador William recall that it was the Russian autocracy that C. Bullitt, writing in 1935: “It is perfectly played the role of established governmental clear that to speak of ‘normal relations' be­ conservatism during those years, while the tween the Soviet Union and any other coun- young American republic was in many ways try is to speak of something which does not the most revolutionary (and expansionist) and cannot exist.”2 Thus, it carne as no government of its day. Both nations seemed surprise when the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August determined to keep diplomacy insulated from 1939 was announced. ideology and even territorial disputes were re- Russia's World War II activities, including conciled largely as a result of the sale of Rus­ her attack on Finland, despite the illusions of

tjohn Lewis Gaddis, Rússia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: .4n Interpretive History (New York: John W iley and Sons, Inc., 1978, $6.95), 309 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 93 the Grand Alliance following Hitler's attack West considered the Soviet Union mere grist on the Soviet Union, were clear indications for the Nazi mill. Herein, both books make of the impasse in Soviet-American relations clear, lay the motivation behind Stalin’s ex- that would soon mature under the descriptive pansionism into Eastern Europe and the title of the Cold War. creation of the Soviet’s own version of a cor- don sunitaire. SOV IET point of view of earlv U.S.-U.S.S. R. relations, as set forth by Professors Sivachev and Yakovlev in a T he development of Stalin’s volume prepared for a University of Chicago European empire is treated in much better Press series entitled “The United States and detail by Professor Vojtech Mastny, himself a the World: Foreign Perspectives," differs native of Eastern Europe.t+ Mastny not only surprisingly little from that presented byjohn explains the roles played by Stalin and the Gaddisà The Sivachev-Yakovlev volume Western leaders but, more important, gives a thus serves as an excellent companion to the graphic account of political developments Gaddis book in that the two are nearlv within the Eastern European countries them- parallel in size, scope, and documentation. selves. It is customary to credit Stalin with an Bv the time of the World War II Grand inexorable expansion of Soviet dominance Alliance, some differences in Soviet and toward the West. But while unmistakenly American viewpoints become more apparent. more aggressive since the Yalta conference While both books clearlv illustrate that the early in 1945, the pattern of Soviet policy was Soviet Union bore the brunt of the war (the still erratic and inconsistent rather than pre- Red Army confronted more than 200 enemy meditated and methodical. Contrary to popu­ divisions throughout most of the war, lar opinion, Yalta decided no partition of the whereas, until the Normandy invasion of world. In all probability, Mastny contends 1944, the British and Americans rarely faced “the map of Europe would look very much more than 10 German divisions at one time), the same if there had never been the Yalta the Soviet version understandably devotes conference at all.” (p. 253) Often overlooked twice as much space to the war vears as does in Western analyses of World War II political the Gaddis book. developments and the Cold War it ushered in Perhaps most interesting and eertainly in- is the crucial role of domestic politics within structive is the Soviet Union's sense of impa- the individual countries and nations of tience that characterized her feeiing toward Eastern and Central Europe. The Polish the Western Allies. Coupled with a tradi- uprising, the Czechoslovak model, tionally defensive complex or “siege men- Romania's coup d’état, the division of Ger- tality," it is little wonder that the delay in many, and a nonaligned but Communist opening the second front at Normandy in Yugoslavia and Albania are all persuasive 1944 helped convince the Russians that the arguments in favor of Primai der Innenpolitik,

tNikolai V. Sivachev and Nikolai N. Yakovlev, Rússia and the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, $12.95), 301 pages. tfVojtech Mastny, Rússia ’s Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, /941 -1945 (New York: Colum bia U niver­ sity Press, 1979, $16.95), 409 pages. 94 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW the determination of foreign policy by foolishly adulterated into a grandiose scheme domestic issues. of anticommunism, it lost its usefulness as a practical doctrine of foreign policy. With the beneflt of sharp, if not perfect, hindsight, it Perceptions by the United should be apparent that the foreign policy of States of Soviet-Ameriean relations are often the U.S.S.R.—and especially Soviet expan- clouded by moral judgments of, and emo- sionism under Stalin and his heirs—has been tional reactions to, the alien political and motivated first and foremost by considera- social system of communism, especially in tions of security and defense of the Soviet vievv of developments since World War II. Union to which the interests of international Hugh Seton-Watson, distinguished professor communism were sacrificed time and again. of Russian history at the University of Lon- It should follow that what is at stake, pro- don, provides a well-balanced account of the nouncements of détente notwithstanding, is trends in world communism during the not a permanent settlement of all differences decades of the I960s and I970s.t There have in Soviet-Ameriean relations but rather the indeed been substantial gains in the growth elimination or at least the neutralization of and spread of communism throughout the specific and immediate issues to minimize world. The resurgence of Communist parties the risks of war. in the politics of Western Europe, so-called Eurocommunism, is but one of the more SOVIET-AMERICAN relations are likely to re- contemporary developments that cause con- main in the limelight of U.S. foreign policy cern in the West. Communist influente in for the foreseeable future. Those relations the Third World is another. Professor will continue to be characterized by elements Seton-Watson puts these phenomena in ex- of both cooperation and competition in an cellent perspective as he highlights the suc- increasingly complex international environ- cesses and failures of communism in vir- ment. An ideological war against commu­ tually every country where it has played a sig­ nism is too simplistic a rationale for nificam role. American foreign policy. In the words of With regard to Soviet-Ameriean relations, George Kennan, “Americans are going to however, one must be careful not to confuse have to learn to curb their traditional impa- moral disdain for the political and social pre- tience and settle down for the long haul of cepts of communism as an ideology with the competitivo coexistence with the Soviet more traditional conflict of interests between Union in a turbulent world.”3 major powers. American obsession with Air Cnmmand and Staff College Communist “ultimate objectives” beclouds Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama issues and endows communism with an om- Notes niscience it does not deserve. The U.S. post- 1 A Ir xis de To* qtieville. De mm nu j in Amerna. ] P M.tvcr and Mas war policy of containment, for example, l.erner. edilnrs. translatcd bv George Lawrencc (New V>rk. 1966). pp. 378-79. while originally conceived as a selective 2. Tcstimony by Charles lí Bohlen befbre the Senatc Gommiticc on measure designed to counteract Soviet ex- Foreign Relations, Heanngs nn lhe Sommation of C harles h. Bnhlen, U.S Senaie. 83d Congress, Isi Session, 1953. p. 34 pansionism, was strategically sound during 3. George F Kennan. “The United States and the Soviet Union. the late 1940s and early 1950s. But when 1917-1976,” Foreign Affairs, July 1976. pp. 670-90

tHugh Seton-Watson, The Imperialist Revolutionaries: Trends in W orld Communism in the I960s and I970s (Stanford, Califórnia: Hoover In- stitution Press, 1978, $6.95), 157 pages. THE RIGHT STUFF: EMBARRASSED HERO WORSHIP

CaptainJ ohn M. T homson

HIS is not the first time Tom VVolfe has and driving a fast sports car and showing up Tdescribed “the right stuff." A number of punctually for beer call at the Officers’ Club years ago he published a piece entitled “The thus became two more components of the Last American Hero” about Junior Johnson, right stuff. a stockcar race driver in North Carolina. John Glenn did neither. In fact, in his Johnson was admired by the good old boys unabashed patriotism and religious devotion and girls. not only for his racing victories but and (worse yet) his embarrassingly public also for his driving in “the whiskey busi- declarations on those subjects, he was some- ness." Both required risk-taking, and both thing of an anachronism. Unlike the others, proved that Johnson was a possessor of the Glenn performed more than the required sort of phvsical courage that is a primary amount of physical exercise, something component of the right stuff. In fact. which, as VVolfe observes, fighter jocks as a moonshining. because of its illegality, may breed avoid, preferring instead to abuse their have been the more significam of the two ac- bodies horribly by heavy drinking and going tivities. VVolfe calls Junior Johnson the “last" without sleep just to prove they can still per- American hero. apparently because there is form like champions. Instead of a sports car, nothing particularlv heroic about him in the Glenn owned an old Peugeot and while sta- old-fashioned sense. He is no paragon of vir- tioned at Langley AFB, Virgínia, drove it tue. and there is nothing chivalric about his home to Arlington on the weekends to be treatment of women. All he shares with the with his family. Most true brothers of the heroes of romance is his willingness to face right stuff would never admit that wife and danger and risk his life. children had such importance in their lives. The Right Stuff is a celebration of some The Right Stuff is really just an updated ver- other latter-day American heroes, the test sion of the code of American masculinity, pilots of the I950s, especially those who previously described in such classics as The became the Project Mercury astronauts.t Red Bndge of Courage and A Farewell to Arms. Like Junior Johnson, the pilots who tested The protagonists of Stephen Crane’s and Er- the century series, and later the X-series, nest Hemingway’s stories who abide by the were risk-takers. men who found meaning in code know that it is forbidden to talk about life by “pushing the outside of the envelope,” such/subjects as honor and heroism. John by “hanging their hides out over the edge.” Glenn violated the code by actually speaking But ofcourse the pilots could not be in lhe air forbidden words—words such as God, all of the time. and they found off-duty ac- Honor, and Country. There was no doubt, tivities to complement their dangerous however, that Glenn was a possessor of the profession in the manner that moonshining right stuff; his was just the Presbyterian complemented Junior Johnson’s. Owning variety. For although he was not selected for

+Tom VVolfe, The Right Stuff (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1979, $12.95), 436 pages. 95 96 AIR UN/VERSITY REVIEW the first flight, he proved his election to saint- tions they suffered during their physical and hood, as Wolfe puts it, by being selected for psychological testing and continuing into the the first orbital flight and becoming the one operational phase. Even on the day of the most fawned upon by the press and most first launch. while the world was kept waiting lionized by the public. for four hours because of cloud cover at the The other astronauts found themselves Cape, Alan B. Shepard, America’s first having to play the role that John Glenn had astronaut, found himself begging for permis- created. Aside from their death-defying sion to go to the bathroom. Having expected profession, they were ordinary men who had the flight to last only fifteen minutes, the heroism thrust upon them by a press and designer of the spacesuit had not provided a public vvhose patriotic fervor was a reaction means for him to void his bladder. By the end to the Cold War. Behind the scenes they were of the four-hour wait Shepard was in agony. cheating on their wives, getting drunk, an- Finally, after much consultation, the flight gling for the first flight, trving to get enough controller allowed Shepard, pilot and money to move into a nice neighborhood, superhero, to urinate into his suit. and grousing about the way they were being Tom Wolfe has been matched only by treated. By letting us see the human comedy Joseph Heller in his ability to capture the behind the scenes, Wolfe deflates our heroes ironies of life in the armed forces. “If you and emphasizes the irrationality of the can’t take a joke, how come you’re in the Air apocalyptic panic that we indulged in when Force?” That is the sort of remark a fellow is the Russians put a satellite into space before likely to hear when, after three years in a we did. missile silo in North Dakota, he is reassigned One characteristic shared by all “the boys” to Thule, Greenland, or when, with a wife is the Pilot Ego. In fact, says Wolfe, they just about to complete her ninth month, he would not have minded, once a year, “a little gets 24-hour notice that he is going on a 90- adulation on the order of the Pope’s.” Conse- day TDY to Okinawa. quently, the glory heaped on John Glenn was Wolfe finds much about the experience of difficult for the others to accept. To think that being a pilot amusing and misses no oppor- Glenn, who substituted the Protestam ethic tunity to poke fun. For example, in the wake for the “holy coordinates” of Flying & Drink- of the hysteria following Sputnik, President ing and Drinking & Driving (Wolfe’s ironic Eisenhower decided that the astronaut candi­ upper case), should achieve such a triumph! dates would be selected from amongthe mili- Wolfe savors the irony fully, for it is the sort tary test pilots. Those who met NASA’s re- of thing typical of the Mercury Program and, quirements were ordered to Washington to indeed, of Service life in general. For exam- be given the opportunity to volunteer. The ple, one irony that the astronauts were project and the orders were Top Secret, so the acutely aware of, but which the rest of the men were ordered to report to the Pentagon world seems to have missed entirely, was the “disguised as civilians.” This proved im­ fact that they were not going to do any flying; possible. Aside from such undisguisable the flights would be programmed. They were physical characteristics as crewcuts, suntans, mere passengers, riding, they noted, in a cap- and “the unmistakable cocky rolling gait of suie, not a ship. In fact, as Chuck Yeager fighter jocks,” the 35 pilots assembled were pointed out to them, a monkey was going to all wearing the same clothes—“pathetic- make the first flight! They were going to be lookingcivilian suits" that cost about a fourth “lab rabbits.” That truth was repeatedly as much as their wristwatches. brought home, beginning with the humilia- The pilofs fancy wristwatch, with, accord- BOüKS AND IDIiAS 97 ing to Wolfe, “dials for recording everything 115,000 feet. After reaching an altitude of short of the sound of enemy guns,” is one of over 100,000 feet. Yeager lost control of the the telling details that ensure that The Right plane and was eventually forced to eject. Stuff will be enjoyed by members and former Fven though the experiment was a failure, members of the Air Force. We recognize im- Wolfe manages through a virtuosic display of mediately Wolfe's description of the watches New Journalistic techniques to make the “as practically fraternal insígnia among the reader understand the courage and in- pilots.” The expensive, complicated watch is telligence required to come out of such an ex- as much a part of a pilot’s gear as his perience alive. sunglasses. I would like to ask Wolfe, though, In fact, Wolfe’s mockery is directed not so if he still finds pilots or military men in much at the men themselves as it is at their general as easy to spot in their ciwies as he image—an image created by the press in did in 1959. It seems to me that, partly reaction to the national panic following Sput- because they are better paid and partly nik. Wolfe makes clear the ludicrousness of because they have grown more sophisticated the panic, particularly among politicians and about such things, military men no longer the press “and other technological illiterates look so out of place in civilian clothes. with influence.” In such places as Congress For all the delight that Wolfe takes in and the New York Times, our race to catch up describing the trappings and rituais of the with the Soviets took on the dimensions of men with the right stuff, he does not deni- “Armageddon, the final and decisive battle of grate their achievements in the history of the forces of good and evil." This does not aviation. One comes to realize that the satiri- sound like the same New York Times that pro- cal tone only barely conceals his admiration voked the ire of Spiro Agnew. In fact, the for them—an admiration verging on hero press comes in for at least as much satire as worship. He points out. for example, hovv the pilots do. Of the unanimously sycophan- fickle we have been in awarding them fame. tic reaction of the press to the astronauts, Chuck Yeager vvaited a long time before he Wolfe says, it seemed as if the press “were a w-as recognized as the first man to break the great colonial animal . . . made up of count- speed of sound. and it only carne about in less clustered organisms responding to a connection with an inaccurate movie. Such single nervous system.” In “matters of na­ records, however, are not what th is book is tional importance,” the press was determined about. For Wolfe, the fact that these men to establish (and the ironic italics are were facing death evervday is enough to Wolfe's) “the proper emotion, the seemly senti- make them heroes. He contrasts Pete Con- ment, the fithng feelings. ” The press, says rad, a Princeton graduate, with other mem­ Wolfe, was a Genteel Beast, “the consum- bers of the Class of “53. Conrad went to work mate hypocritical Y’ictorian gent.” simply evervday knowing that the mortality rate of getting rid of “all Information that muddied test pilots was 23 percent and frequently the tone and weakened the feeling.” As found himself attending funerais for fellow Wolfe sees it, the press has not changed in the flyers. The greatest mortality risk his Prin­ intervening years. These days it presents a ceton classmates faced, says Wolfe, was unified front on the subject of ofFicial corrup- “choking on a chunk of Chateaubriand.” tion, setting the properly indignam tone. During one 36-week period at Edwards Af'B, Califr trnia. 62 pilots were killed. One need only read Wolfe s account of Yeager’s unsuc- T om Wolfe is one journalistic organism cessful attempt to take the NF-104 up to who has succeeded in separating himself, for 98 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the most part, from the Genteel Beast. Or has of Americans in Iran, and the Soviet invasion he? In reading his work it often seems that of Afghanistan, the proper emotion (italics nothing is sacred, that. like “Saturday Night mine) is jingoism. Commentators have Eive” or National Lampoon, his purpose is remarked that the nation is returning to the amusement, no matter at whose expense. mood of the 1950s. We Americans have a Nevertheless. a serious messagc does emerge tendency to overreact, to regard everything as from The Right Stuff, and it might be one well a crisis. The danger of developing a vvar worth heeding in these days when politicians mentality is that th is time it may not lead to and the press are telling us that, as a resnlt of the moon. pressure from the oil cartéis, the imprisoning Department of English United States Air Force Acaderny

THREE STUDIES IN LEADERSHIP

D r .Joseph O Bavlen HE three books reviewed here are dispar­ lhe Royal Navy can be ascribed to the in- Tate in subject matter but have a common fluence of his navy captain uncle, though his theme—the character of the men who made own charm and simplicity endeared him to Britain a great world power in the late eigh- both superiors and subordinates. Nelson’s in- teenth and nineteenth centuries and helped tense dislike of the French and strong distrust the nation survive during its decline in the of the reformers of his time were exceeded twentieth century. As such, these works are only by his hatrcd of corruption. relevant to students of historv as examples of In 1793, Nelson became commander of leadership and decision-making. the Agamemnon and by 1796 was a com- Horatio Nelsont is an excellent subject for modore, well on the way to becoming an ad­ the psychohistorian, a classic example (like mirai. But the year was not a happy one for his inveterate enemy Napoleon Bonaparte) of Britain. Everywhere the French were suc- the slight, short man compensating in his cessful, and Nelson was beginning to feel the work and personal life for feelings of physical strain of war. inferiority. During his earlv inconspicuous During the serious British naval mutinies career, he demonstrated courage and high in 1797, Nelson was transferred to the spirits. Nelson, once emerging from a deep Theseus and lauded for his commands at the depression, told a friend: "I will be a hero, siege of Cadiz and in the battles of Abukir and confiding in Providence, I will brave ev- Bay, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar. ery danger." His rapid early advancement in Britain needed a hero; thus Nelson

tE rnle Bradford, Nelson: The Essential Hero (New York: H arcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977, $12.95), 367 pages. BOOKS AND IDF.AS 99 returned to sea in March 1 798 and soon was has far more substance than John Watney’s in command of a Mediterranean fleet. His pleasant, but thin, portrait of the Churchill main task was to determine the objective of family. Bonaparte and his expedition, which had sailed southward from Toulon. Nelson guessed that the French vvere set either on the ^vJTHOR John Watney takes conquest of Sicily or Egypt. On 1 August the reader on a hurried view of lhe 1798, he found lhe French fleet at Abukir Churchills from Arabella in the seventeenth Bay. In the battle that ensued. Nelson van- century to Winston in the twentieth.f quished the French and isolated Napoleon in Emphasis is on the family tradilion of mili- Egypt but was himself blinded temporarily by tary Service, which is apparent only in John a forehead wound. It was one of the most Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough; complete naval victories ever recorded, and Winston’s father, the tragic Lord Randolph he was now the “brave, gallant immortalized Churchill; and Winston himself. There is no Nelson,” a hero to all of Europe. Nelson denying that the family was “creative, ec- returned to England where he was hailed as a centric, gifted, elegant.” Of course, the real conquering hero and invested with a peerage. hero of the book is Winston, and its most As the Napoleonic wars intensified, original part is Watney's brief reminiscence Nelson returned to sea and became second in of “Winston at War.” For a history of the command of the Channel Fleet. On 2 April Churchills, one must still turn to A. L. 1801, he brilliantly destroved the fleet of Rowse’s chronicle of the family. Napoleon's Danish ally and assured Britain's dominance in the Baltic Sea and the dissolu- tion of the League of Armed Neutrality. ^Zh URCHILL's close assoei - From 1803 to 1805, Nelson parried and ate and political heir. Sir Anthony Eden, Earl chased the skillful French Admirai of Avon, was quite unusual in the way he Villeneuve and the combined Franco- wrote his autobiography.tt For political rea- Spanish fleets in the Mediterranean, the sons, he began with the last period of his life Atlantic, and the West Indies. The final con- and worked backward. Thus, while the pre- test occurred at Cape Trafalgar in late Octo- vious three volumes are the record of his ber 1805. Although the battle was a resound- career as Foreign Secretary for Neville ing victory for Nelson, he was defeated by Chamberlain and Churchill and ChurchilFs death. successor as Prime Minister, the fourth Nelson has been the subject of numemus volume highlights his childhood and youth. biographies, but few' (including a more re- Il is an interesting account of Eden's soul- cent study by David Walder) surpass Brad- searing experiences- on the western front in ford’s study in detail. clarity, and interest, and World War I. It is a restrained and poignant presentation of Nelson as a great naval com- memoir of Service in one of the deadliest wars mander with all the frailties of an ordinary in human history by a man who endured human being. Bradford’s biography certainly senseless carnage and rose from platoon

tjohn Watney, The Churchills: Portrait of a Great Family (New York: Gordon-Crem onesi, 1977, $17.95), 168 pages. t+Anthony Eden, Another World, 1897-1917(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1977, $7.95), 175 pages. 100 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW leader at the age of eighteen to adjutant at of that class bom to rule Britain, even though nineteen to brigade major at tvventy. But the historians recorded him as one of Britairfs real meaning of Eden s early years is sum- least successful prime ministers. med up in the remark: “I had entered the holocaust still childish and I emerged tem- In a sense, these books are a commentary on pered by my experience and bereft of many and study of leadership—two successes and friends, but with my illusions intact, neither one failure. But then stories of success and shattered nor cynical, to face a changed failure are proof of the fact that nothing is an world.” Eden certainly epitomized the unqualified success or an unmitigated failure courage and resilience of the last generation in the lives of men. Geórgia State University, Atlanta

Potpourri

Warships of the World, Escort Vessels by Bernard The Taylor and Swanborough compendium is Ireland. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1979. divided into two parts: ‘Ttrst-line aircraft—fighters, 153 pages, S 12.50. bombers. lactical and strategic transports and anlisub- M ilitary Aircraft of the W orld byjohn W. R. Taylor marine aircraft,1’ and “seeond-line aircraft—combat and Gordon Swanborough. New York: Charles aircraft, obsolescent types, light transports and Scribner’s Sons, 1979, 224 pages, SI2.95. irainers." Each part is arranged alphabetically by Both of these books are comprehensive, accurate. aircraft manufacturer; information provided indudes and current. but neither has achieved any degree of engine type, span, length, emptv weight, maximum originality, fiair, or creativeness. Page after page of gross weight, maximum speed, range, and armament. dry facts and figures punctuated only with black and The authors also give a brief history of the system's de- white photographs and a few drawings do not tend velopment and significam foreign sales. In addition. to generate much enthusiasm in the reader. Ire- front, top. and side aspect drawings accompany all en- land’s book is the second in a three-part series on tries in part one. The index lists each aircraft by combat ships and is arranged alphabetically by manufacturer, nickname, model number. and NATO country, listing the designation or name of each designator. class of ships followed by the function served Ireland’s book on escort vessels is the more valuable (destroyer, frigate, etc.). Vessels within each class in that it trcats a subject which is not already repre- are then identified by name and pennant number, sented by a plethora of similar works. Taylor and For those ships procured from the navies of other Swanborough"s book is just one of several such nations, the original name and pennant number are almanacs available. also listed. For each ship the author gives the year Captain James H. Smith, USAF laid down, year launched, and year completed as Air Defense Weapons Center well as the typical displacement, length. beam, Tyndnlt AFfí. Florida draught. machinery (power plant), armament, helicopters assigned, and members of the class that have been transferred, disposed, canceled, or lost in combat. Short paragraphs accompany each entry that give descriptions of the equipment or ordnance and identify any nonstandard configurations. An in- Energy Crisis, Volume 1 1969-73 edited by Lester A. dex of ship names and a list of pennant numbers are Sobel et al. New York: Facts on File, Inc.. 1974. 263 also included. pages. SI 1.95. BOOKS AND IDEAS 10! Energy Crisis, Volume 2 1974-75 edited by Lester A. Ismay, Paul-Henri Spaak, Dirk U. Slikker, and Manlio Sobel et al. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1975, 213 Brosio as they led NATO during 1952-71 Jordan con- pages. SI0.95. tinually emphasizes the importance of individuais and Energy Crisis, Volume 3 1975-77 edited by Lester A their personalities as he chronologically examines the Sobel et al. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1977, 223 course of international events from NATO’s inception pages. SI 1.95. through West Germany’s reconciliation, France’s defection, and, finally, NATO’s revitalization under The saga of fóssil fuel continues to take viclims and Brosio by 1971. make villains the world over. From cutbacks in flying VVhile Jordan's study is of signiftcance to the politi­ to devising wavs to fight energy-austere wars. the cal historian, it is also noteworthy to lhe military' leader professional Air Force officer knows what it means to trying to grasp the complicated issues of the NATO be on the shon end of an energv crisis. In America we alliance. Past troop cuts, military squabbles, and find ourselves in gas lines for the second time in six nuclear weapon problems are woven into the analysis years, with monthly utility bilis now greater lhan lhe by balancing NATO’s military aspects with the politi- a ver age mortgage payment of not so very long ago and cal and economic. In the process one gets a feel for the the energv consumers are the victims. military’s place in the realm of international affairs. Many individuais and institutions must share the Moreover. Jordan shows how a military leader who blame for our fuel-starved status simply pointing understands the intricacies of NATO and the multina­ fingers at OPEC or the Department of Energy will not do That is why the professional officer needs compen- tional politics, like the brilliant and adroit Supreme diums such as Energy Crisis to get an enlightened poinl Allied Commander Europe, General Norstad, can of view. have a profound influence on the NATO establish- Beginning with the embryonic signs of shortages in ment. 1969, Sobel will guide vou along energy's ever-worsen- Easily readable and well documented, Jordan’s ing destructive path as fuel supplies grow into a crisis study captures lhe imponance of the individuais w'ho of monolithic proportions. Getting their contents from shaped NATO’s history. the weekly publications of Facts on File. these volumes Captain James B. Smith, USAF describe energv happenings through January 1977, the Holloman AFB, New México brink of our present energv debacle. Each volume mixes chronological and topical organization along with a handy subject index. Of course, many of the reports are controversial, so the editors take delicate care to produce a balanced viewpoint throughout. SALT, Nonproliferation, and Nuclear Weapons- Whether vour energv research takes you to per- Free Zones: An Introduction by Richard Dean sonalities, nations, events, institutions. discoveries, car­ Burns. Northridge: Califórnia State University, ieis. or statistics, these works are sure to elevate your 1979, no price given. knowledge—and blood pressure. Burns’s work is a well-written overview of perspec­ Lieutcnant Colonel David C. Whitiock, USAF tives on arms control and disarmament. He effectively Department of Enghsh discriminates between the two, and then offers an ex- United States An Fone Academy cellent argument that arms control is part of an overall process seeking world peace and stability. His discus- sion of the impact of the nuclear era on the interna­ tional scene is comprehensive. However, a word of caution! If this presentation is used as an introduction Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in to the subject, the reader should be aware that much Multinational Diplomacy by Robert S. Jordan. more extensive research will be required in some areas Boulder. Colorado: YVestview Press, 1979. 300 to completely understand them. For example, his dis- pages. S20.00. cussion of deterrence strategy and international at- For those who believe individuais shape lhe course tempts at nuclear control and nonproliferation policies of history, Political Leadership in NATO will be a are rather brief. On the other hand, if the work is used welcome addition to the study of diplomacy. Robert as a refresher by someone well versed in the field, it is Jordan’s purpose is to portray the First four NATO excellent. secretaries-general as individuais within NATO rather Lieutcnant Colonel William A. Wuest, USAF than to describe NATO history as a political system or Air Command and Staff College a military coalition. He reviews the tenures of la>rd Maxwell AFB. Alabama 102 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Eurocommunism & Eurosocialism: The Left Con- The author of this biography met General von fronts Modernity edited by Bernard E. Brown. Ravenstein only once. while von Ravenstein was a New York: Cyrco Press, Inc., 1979, 408 pages, prisoner of war (POW) in Egvpt and the author was S 18.95 cloth, $9.95 paper. one of his guards. Although the only words spoken were a brace of “Good Mornings!” the effect on the The growth of the Socialist and Communist parties young guard must have been profound for him to have in Western Europe has caused concern in the United written a biography three-and-one-half decades later. States about the stability of individual countries and Ryder has painted a glowing portrait of von Ravenstein the viability of the NATO alliance. Bernard Brown’s the man: brave, resourceful under all circumstances, compendium of the works of ten scholars provides an chivalrous, a peacemaker after the war. In this sense excelleni insight into the politics of the contemporary his book is a success. European left. In others. however, it is a disappointment. especially The preparation of the volume was initiated by a for the military historian. Three times as much space is syrnposium at the City University of New York in late devoted to his experiences as a POW, for example, 1976. Only those European countries with at least 10 rather lhan to his wartime experiences as a panzer percent of the legislative vote for Socialist or Com­ commander in Poland, France, the Balkans, and munist parties were considered. These countries were especially North África. Ryder fails to address some Britain, Germany, Sweden, France, Italy, and Portugal. questions that need answers. How did von Ravenstein The ten authors evaluated these six countries in recent develop lhe leadership qualities that he demonstrated (since 1960) historical perspective. Although the style throughout his career? Why was he selected for the and format of the authors vary, their overall approach panzer corps in 1937, vvhen he had been militarily in- is to evaluate the impact of modernization on the left in active for much of the 1920s and 1930s. and had been each country. an infantry officer prior to that? Why was he so suc- Modernization has brought about a dramatic in- cessful as a panzer leader? His exploits as commander crease in productivitv, created nevv vvealth throughout of the 21 st Panzer Division in North África deserve society, and changed the balance of social forces. The more attention than they receive, particularly during left has, in the post-World War II reconstruction era, lhe swirling tank batiles of Operation Crusader and had to reevaluate the role of the working class in this RommeFs “Dash to the Wire." In this sense the book increasingly complex and scientifically oriented fails to do justice to von Ravenstein. and anyone seek- economy. The size of the intellectual class and number ing fresh insights into armored operations during lhe of students have also grovvn markedly. Additionally, the war will be disappointed. rapid growth of the European economy has been able to satisfv. in pari, societv's requirements for higher Captain Daniel T. Kuehl. USAF wages and increased social welfare and still leave cash Grantl Fnrks AFB, North Dakota flow for reinvestment for profits into corporate capital investments. I he left has been faced then with the problem of deciding how this new wealth should be redistribuied AirFields of the Eighth: Then and Now by Roger A. and on whal principies it should be based. Leadership Freeman. London: Battle of Britain International, must decide if the left’s historical demands for equality Ltd., 1978, 240 pages. S33.50 special presentation, can be achieved within the current politica 1 Systems. S23.50 regular. The volume provides an excellent, scholarly look at During World War II tens of thousands of the left in Europe and should be of value to those in- American airmen and thousands of American aircraft terested in contemporary European politics or the were stationed on the “unsinkable” aircraft carrter, study of socialism and communism. Great Britain. Using a then and now technique, this book deals with 68 airfields linked with the largest of Major Frederic E. McCoy, USAF the American air forces, the Eighth. A briet history of The Brooktngs Institutinn each field (up to the present), a map, and “then and Washington, D.C now” photographs are included. The result is a we!l- done collection, which although of limited value to the student of the air war, will be of interest to any who flew from these bases. Ravenstein: Portrait of a German General by Row- Kenneth P Werrell land Ryder. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1978, Department tj History 208 pages, S 14.95. Radford l fnirrrstty BOOKS AND I DICAS 103

A Noble Treason: The Revolt of the Munich Stu- allogether, the reader gains a better understanding of denls against Hitler by Richard Hanser. New the overall policy process as well as the problems of York: G. P Putnams Sons. 1979, 310 pages, $12.50. policy impiementalion. Credit must be given to the edi­ tor for this result. A few chapters, however, tend to read A Noble Treason tells the story of a group of German much like a textbook; however, even here, one can students, called the VVhite Rose, which produced anti- glean some valuable information from the stalistics, Nazi leaflets between the summer of 1942 and Febru- graphs, and tabulated data. arv 1943. The author relates the background of those As for some of lhe details. this volume claims that involved. what they did, and the outcome. the Carter administration’s handling of defense policy At firsi glance the story is one of high idealism and has strengthened NATO’s military capability vis-a-vis courage But the way the story is told indieates that the that of lhe Warsaw Pact. This redress of American students attempted to bring down a brutal regime with neglect receives high marks from the authors, because a mimeograph machine while making no preparation it is a reversal of a trend that began prior to this ad- for the inevitable efforts of that regime to crush them. ministration. Their efforts at times read more like a college prank With regai d to the rest of the globe, however, lhe gap than a serious effort to undermine or overthrow Hitler. between defense policy rhetoric and military capability The problem is of course in lhe telling. The narra- poses a problem. This is best demonstrated in África tion is much overdone. The author is forced to pad the where American security policy is described as ineffec- story ; there is just not enough material for a 300-page tive by the authors. book In addition. it seems as if the story was written to The overall conclusion of this volume is that the be seen. not read. As the author has done a number of things for television. this may be the case. United States is in a period of global military retrench- Besides making a good short story, a poor long one, meni, w hile the military posture of the Soviet Union — the book is marred by the failure to put the story into throughout the globe—is on lhe upswing. Perhaps the context. The reader is never told if there were other major fault of this entire book is that the authors offer German groups similar to the VVhite Rose or what im- very few policy prescriptions. The editor does attempt pact this group had. By confining the story to the back­ to alleviate this shortcoming by suggesting some ground, activities, trial. and execution of the members "general directions” the administration ought to pur- of the organization, the reader is left in a vacuum. So sue and these are interesting. while the record of this unusual band of students Lieutenant Colunei Richard A. Slowik, USAK should be known. it is unfortunate that Hanser has I9th Bomhardment Wing written this way. The VVhite Rose deserves better. Robins A TB. Geórgia Kenneth P. Werrell Department of History Rudford Unwersity Extraterrestrial Civilizations by Isaac Asimov. New York: St. Martin s Press, 1979, 282 pages, S10.00. Defense Policy and the Presidency: Carter’s First “Are we alone?” With this question, Isaac Asimov Years edited by Sam C. Sarkesian Boulder, Col­ begins his new book on one of the most provocative and popular topics of recent thought and discussion: orado: Westview Press, 1979, 341 pages. S 18.00. intelligent life and civilization beyond our earth. With In a criticai assessment of lhe Carter administra- his usual wit and style, Asimov gives the reader some tion s handling of national security affairs—during its thought-provoking (though possibly disappointing) First two years in office—this volume gives the ad- answers. ministration rather low marks. The gap between policy The most significam conclusion that Asimov reaches pronouncements and resulting national security is that there are approximately 350,000 planeis with capability, under Presidem Carter, is carefully advanced civilizations in our galaxy alone! This scrutinized by several authors. Almost in unison, they result may sound somewhat staggering, perhaps arrive at a similar conclusion: "The President ... is even unbelievable, but lhe number is arrived at by unable to inspire confidence, provide a firm sense of usingcalculations based on fundamental astronomi- direction, and manage his staff in developing cohesive cal observations and a few reasonable assumptions. policies.” Apparently, then, extraterrestrial civilizations Editor Sam C. Sarkesian has done an admirable job abound in our galaxy. If this number is correct (and in organizing this book. Each chapter provides a Asimov assumes that it is), the next logical question different viewpoint on defense policy, yel, taken is, "Where is everyone?” 104 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW After discounting “UFOs” (unidentified flying ob- thousands, than anyone in history. This work is “his jects) as extraterrestrial vehitles, he concludes lhat the story”—from his first test under fire at age seventeen to earth is nol being visited by celestial neighbors simply his final encounter with combat at age sixty-eight. He because the distantes between these civilizations are writes in an easy-to-read, direct style and departs from too large. The 630-light-year average separation be­ the detailed and descriptive combat reporting which tween planets with advanced civilizations, combined made him famous. with the assumption that the speed of light is the ulti- Under MarshalTs expert tutelage as a soldier-writer, mate speed limit, accounts for our seeming "alone- you will have a firsthand view of World Wars 1 and II, ness” in the galaxv. Even a short "hop” under these Korea, and Vietnam. You will see the behind-the- restrictions would take thousands of years, which scenes dealings between high military command and rrtakes interstellar travei extremely unlikely. heads of State and marvel at MarshalTs influence on This book will serve as an excellent introduction to such leaders as Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton. If the subjects of “life in space” and “extraterrestrial there is one dominant trait that led to his success, you civilization,” especially for the interested individual will agree it was his love for the human element in with little background in astronomy. Asimov uses a combat and his calling to stay with combat danger long logical, straightforward approach to his subject, hold­ enough to understand lhe ordeal of troops. ing the reader s altention with details. facts, and anec- This book will captivate your attention, kindle your dotes. interest in MarshalTs previous works, and impress on Unfortunately, the book lacks some features that you that his life was just as exciting as he had adver- would have made it more useful and instructive, such tised. as diagrams and photos. Some of the coneepts pre- sented might be easier to comprehend if accompanied Major C. R. Armstrong, USMG by a "visual explanation.” Also, Asimov makes no Air Command and Slaff College referente to the vast literature in this field; a bibliogra- Maxwell A EB. Alahama phy would be helpful to the reader who wishes either to check out Asimov's facts and assumptions or in- vestigate the subject further. Even so, Extrater- restrial Civilizations serves as a good introduction to Typhoon and Tempest at War by Arthur Reed and the fascinating subject of intelligent life in space. I Roland Beaumont. New York: Charles Scribner's would recommend it highly to anyone wishing to Sons, 1979. 176 pages. S 14.95. learn something more about this cosmic question. The authors have combined a wealth of excellent photos with a well-written narrative spiced with Captain Joseph P Bassi. USAF numerous firsthand accounts to tell the story of lhe Leanmmth, A ustralia development and role of the Hawker Typhoon and Tempest fighters. Originally designed as a replacement for the Hur- ricane and Spitfire. the first Typhoon prototype was Bringing Up the Rear: A M em oir by S. L. A. completed in September 1939, but produetion delays Marshall edited by Cate Marshall. San Rafael, and the Battle of Britain delayed introduction into Califórnia: Presidio Press, 1979, 303 pages, SI2.95. operational Service until September 1941. Although "I led a more exciting life than any American in my plagued with serious airframe and power plant century.” These words of Samuel Lyman Atwood problems, the Typhoon eventuallv won acceptance Marshall present the theme of his memoir. Military from aircrews as an outstanding low-altitude intercep- professionals have been entertained and educated by tor and ground support aircraft. his previous twenty-nine works on combat and leader- The Tempest aircraft was plagued also by technical ship, but only after reading his memoir can one come problems and other delays, but, fortunately, it was in- to know this giant of a soldier-writer and appreciate his troduced into Service in time to help counter the V-l long, illustrious Service and worth to our nation. threat to London and was responsible for the destruc- One of America’s most renowned, honored, and tion of 632 V-ls. prolifk military historians. Marshall describes his own Typhoon and Tempest continued to perform ad- career as no other author could do. A military analyst mirably in the ground-attack role during the Allied in- and historian. war correspondem, strategist, tactician, vasion and conquest of Germany, however, the Corning and combat leader who rose from private to brigadier of the jet age sealed the fate of these outstanding pro- general, he States that he probably had personal ex- peller-driven fighters and they faded into history at the perience with more troops in the field, by the tens of end of World War II. An attempt was made to resur- BOOKS AND IDEA S 105

rect the propeller aircrafi with the introduction of lhe cal questions concerning democratic processes. Finally, Sea Furv into the Royal Navy, but this was doomed to he appears to vindicate the judgmenl of lhe distruslful, failure and ended with their removal from Service after especially those of the last generation, and demands the Korean War. that they be taken more seriously. This discourse may be tough going for the military Major Robert J Scauzillo, USAf mind in a military setting, where questions and cross- Afountain Home AFB. Idaho currents of opinion cause organizational and institu- tional problems. Nevertheless, the book sheds light on historical movements and may give helpful insight to those who wonder why discontent rises sharply at cer- Distrust and Democracy: Political Distrust in Brit- tain times, as it did in the I960s. Such insight makes ain and America by Vivien Hart. New York: reading Distrust and Democracy worthwhile. Cambridge University Press, 1978, xvii +• 251 Or. PorterJ. Crow pages, SI9.95. West Faliu Beaeh. Florida Vivien Hart grounds his study in Demosthenes' suggestion that democracy depends on the capacity of a people to govern themselves, a capacity sustained in spite of continuing suspicion of officeholders and in- stitutions. Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Suspicion (or distrust) is defined as the perception Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period by of a discrepancy between the democratic ideal and the Shahrough-Akhavi. Albany: State University of political reality. This perception is reflected from New York Press, 1980, 255 pages, S29.00, S9.95 frustration at lhe failure of the process to meet expecta- paper. tions and demands. To the popular imagination, the Islamic revolution If Hart's book sounds like a dissertation, it is. His in Iran is a pu/.zlement. The apparently cavalier relin- work began as a doctoral thesis for the Department of quishing of power by the Shah. the spectacle of Government at Harvard. The slowest reading and most religious zealots running chaoticallv in the streets, and baroque writing is at the beginning. Once Hart finds the sudden entrance upon the political scene of his own voice, though, the content moves fairly rapidlv vituperative clerical revolulionaries have shocked to succinct conclusions. Western sensibilities. The mind of the average citizen .American readers will be especially interested in in the West finds itself prey to a demonology of "Grass Roots Politics in Kansas" and the discussion of bearded mullahs and, in desperation, attributes a 'Rank and File Liberalism." Much of the content is stupidity to Ayatollah Khomeini that might be ade- profound in its implications concerning commitment, quately explained by malice alone. civic duty, social concern, and problem-solving. The The root causes of revolution in Iran are, of course, trick in studying Distrust and Democracy is to pause from extraordinarily complex, not the least of which is the time to time, to savor the profundity before going on. search for a balance between secular and religious For example: power. To these ends, Shahrough-Akhavi has written an impressive historical sociology of lhe relations be­ . . . man is in various ways diminished against his tween the clergy and State during the Pahlavi period. full potential. Thus, man is Creative; but his crea- Professor Akhavi has. not written a typology of the tions come to control him and dispel his natural revolution; rather, he restores perspective to a much- spontaneity. Further, the act of produclion has neglected causai factor at the heart of the Iranian become a means to other ends, not a satisfaction in dilemma as he strips away its obscurity and exposes to itself. Man should be free and self-directed; but his analysis the component parts of a deceptively life has become subservient to externai constraints. monolithic institution. Man should be social; yet he is isolated from other The problem of Iranian state-clerical relations, as men by those same social circumstances which pre­ Akhavi points out in his excellent introduction, is the vení fulfillment ... . (pp. 20-21) adjustment of Shi’i theory of government to changing By focusing on the dimensions and impact of historical circumstances, the basis for which is the selected groups of political attitudes and political dis­ Koranic injunction that requires the clergy to “com- trust, Hart tries to take a step toward identifying mand good and forbid evil.” The power of arbitration unavoidable limitations on understanding as well as that the clergy exercises over the communily in the finding more substantial answers to significant politi­ gradual elaboration of this principie is immense. Ac- 106 AIR UNÍVERSITY REVIEW cording to the author, the ultimate authority for lhe in- Zedong—is one of a few “great men” to have emerged lerpretation of ihis injunction did noi lie with the elergy in the 1930s and 1940s to play a leading role on lhe but with the word of lhe Hidden Imam. It was the stage of world polities. Mao was the “Great Helms- elergy who, in lhe natural process of historical evolu- man,” lhe “Supreme Leader,” or the “Red Sun of Our tion, arrogated to themselves this authority and acted as Hearts.” Zedong means “Anoint the East," and that is, though they had been deputized by the Imam to pre­ essentially, what Mao tried to do throughout his leng- pare for his kingdom on earth. In the process of thy life: to anoint the East with the chrism of Sino assumption, a dispute arose in the 18th century be- sociaiism. A voracious reader, a lover of poetry, a man tween two schools of thought: the Akhbari school, con- of iron will, Mao Zedong was an insatiable revolution- tending that in the absence of the Imam no elerie had ary. the right to exercise independent judgment on matters Ross Terrill argues that one cannot understand Mao of law when the Imam’s word was available in without knowing something of lhe oppressions visited religious texts; and the Usuli school, on the other hand, upon China by those who sought to plunder the Mid- claiming the need for mujtahids—those exercising inde­ dle Kingdom. Mao himself once gave the Opium War pendent judgment. It was the latter school that pre- (1839-1842) as lhe base date for his revolution; he vailed in view of what they saw as inevitable conflicts of seemed never to forget the signs he had seen as a young interpretation. man in a colonized Chinese city: one barred dogs from In a short review it would be impossible to do justice a city park and the other barred Chinese. From his to Iranian historv. The richness of its primary docu- early experientes, Terrill contends, Mao fashioned mentation and its exhaustive detail are prodigious, and both his own character and the character of his revolu- the author must be congratulated for a fírst-rate job of tion. Although he very narrowly averted a firingsquad research. Therein lies the book’s great strength and, in 1927. Mao had "a personal Tire in him” that lueled perhaps, its greatest weakness. Akhavi ciai ms to have his inexorable quest for power. lie contended that an written a preliminary essay; the fact of the matter is, he army was like fish; the people, like water. He believed, has attempted a definitive study. Scholars do tend to as Marx probably did not. that peasants could and want the last word, and in this author’s case, it has would triumph in the revolution. Despite lhe suffering made him too cautious in his conclusions: Professor of the Long March. in which about ninetv percem of Akhavi concludes that modernization by secular rulers his troops were lost. Mao fashioned an armed force, a ignored the traditional sectors of society at a cost to strategy, and an ideology, which. by 1949, captured their own efforts; that the elergy miscalcuiated the China. meaning for its own institution of social change in the “Political power,” Mao wrote. “grows out of the twentieth century; that a weak state ahvays encourages barrei of a gun.” Although Mao is remembered prin- greater social involvement by the elergy; and that no cipally as a guerrilla strategist, Terrill persuasively categorical statement can be made concerning the il- points out that Mao was more a scholar than a soldier. legitimacy of temporal power in the Shi'i view. I was Terrill fairly lauds Mao for sitting in his study and very much disappointed, not because what the author working out his own ideas: “Few modern rulers of a says is false but because the reader can learn the same major nation—de Gaulle was one—have done that." truisms by reading any number of inferior works. Dare Mao was a devotee of the night-long philosophical dis- one suggest that Professor Akhavi provide us with a cussion, poetry, and precision in writing; but, he was theory that can carry and sum up the generalizations equally at home as the student of realpolitik, in con- implicit in his scholarship? tending, for example, that the West was having the Despite these reservations, Akhavi has produced an wool pulled over its eyes by the Soviet Union. As Mao important piece of work. I look forward to his next told the late President Ceorges Pompidou of France, opus and hope that it will be more accessible to the American power was ebbing. During his latter vears, general public. Mao seemed to be trying to protect China by enlisting Dr Lewis Ware the support of the United States. Documenltiry Research Dudsion TerrilTs book will be valuable background reading Air Unwcrsity (ATC) for anyone interested in Asian polities. Events in Asia—particularly events in China—are described through the eyes of Mao, who is treated, on balance, rather sympathetically by Terrill. This will not be the Mao by Ross Terrill. New York: Harper & Row, 1980, definitive biography of Mao if only because of Terrill s 481 pages. SI7.95. writing, which is too often choppy and poorly devel- Mao Tse-tung (1893-1976)—or if one romanizes oped. Consider, for example, this metaphor: “Jiangxi Ch inese characters in the pinyin manner, Mao [Province] had been mere masturbation, alongside this BOOKS AND IDEAS 107 fui! intercoursc with the radiant bride of China (at least tion quality; theories of fertilily decline; resource and a portion of her), in a well-protected place with no environmental consequences of population and serious interruptions.” (p 162) Such terrible writing economic growth; population redistribution; human mars what is otherwise a good general biography of aspects of population programs; and the management Mao and a useful survey of Chinese politics during his of national population programs. The general tone of lifetime. the work is pessimistic for the short run and optimistic One wonders if Premier Hua Guofeng or Zhao for the long run. Zivang will one day condemn Mao as Khrushchev did Some chapters are probably too technical or Stalin in 1956. Terrill glosses over the horrors of Mao's detailed for lhe general reader, but the 60-page in- totalitarian China and concludes lhat “China might troduction and epilogue by Professor Hauser merit have been beiter off if he had died twenty years earlier close reading by those who need to understand the na­ than he did.” (p. 431) Yet the book is generally flatter- tional security environment. Hauser concludes that the ing in its accounts of Mao s rise and rule. short run will bring more human misery arising from As the end neared for Mao, he could tell the rapid urbanization, mass migration, and population Australian prime minister, "I have an appointment maldistribution. For lhe long term, if the relation of with God.” (p. 381) Those who read Terrill s book leveis of living between the LDCs and more developed mav find themselves wondering how the appointment nations takes on the aspect of a zero-sum game. the went. prospects are heightened for more tension, alienation, Dr. James H Toner hostility, and violence. Norwich University Dr. James H Buck Northjield. Vermont University of Geórgia, Athens

World Population and Development, Challenges Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats in and Prospects edited by Philip M. Hauser. New Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru by Ellen Kay York: Syracuse University Press, 1979, 704 pages, Trimberger. New Brunswick, New jersey: Transac- SI8.00 cloth. S9.95 paper. tion Books, 1978. 196 pages. S14.95. Can the world survive with 70 percent of its popula­ Ellen Kay Trimberger’s Revolution from Above pre- tion poor and 30 percent affluent? Do the earth’s sents an abstract sociological model of an increasingly limited resources make it possible for lesser-developed common type of revolution. Trimberger, a sociology countries (LDCs) ever to reach the leveis of living professor at a Califórnia State College, defines a achieved in the United States or Europe? These are im­ revolution from above as one directed by high military portam questions. and civilian leaders of the old regime, involving iittle Philip Hauser, Director Emeritus of the Population participation and violence by the masses, undertaken Research Center at lhe University of Chicago, has pragmatically, and destroying the economic and politi- assembled in this volume the research results of 34 cal base of the former upper class. She bases her model scholars from many nations, who take stock of world on four revolutions previously considered unusual; the population problems. The book is both an inventory 1868 Meiji Restoration in Japan, Atatiirk's 1923 and an appraisal of the problems of population and de­ takeover in Turkey, Nasser’s 1952 assumption of power velopment in a world divided more and more into in Egypt, and the formation of the Peruvian military “haves" and “have nots.” As the position of the LDCs government in 1968. worsens relative to the more developcd countries, the Trimberger contends that mass revolutions from LDCs are increasingly aggressive in their drive for below are exceptional historical phenomena, possible their “fair share” of the world’s bounty. only when the apparatus of the State loses its ability to To match the 1970 European per capita gross na- support the status quo and initiate a revolution from tional product (CNP) by the year 2000. the LDCs, above. It is her judgment that the preconditions for even with no population increase, would have to in- revolutions from above are becoming prevalent in crease their CNP about tenfold, compounded annually many Third World nations. at less than 8 percent. Such is probably hopeless, even The focus of this study is purely theoretical in an under this totally unrealistic population assumption. academic sense, rather than practical. and will interest Yet incrementai improvements are possible. Contribu- most military personnel only in a tangential sense. The tors to this volume address such topics as women, author admits that “there can bc no general lheory of population. and development; investment in popula­ revolution (or of social change) applicable to all 108 AIR UNIVERS/TY REVIEW societies ai all times . . Every revolution is unique in Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials some respects ... all general theories of revolution Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy by Stephen have been useless as analytic or predictive tools. We D. Krasner. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton cannot predict the outbreak or outcome of revolution.” University Press, 1978, 402 pages, 520.00. (PP 1*2) Captam Steven E. Cady, USAF Amidst a current atmosphere of international Hq USAF economic turbulence, it is rather obvious that such issues as inflation and the energy crisis have a definite impacl on the responsive formulation of U.S. national security policies. Along this line. Professor Krasner’s highly original work provides a refreshing reassess- 1940—The Last Act: The British Forces in France ment of the complex set of relationships between U.S. after Dunkirk by Basil Karslake. Hamden. Con- foreign policy and American economic interests necticut: Archon Books. 1979, 283 pages, maps, abroad. Rejecting two major interpretations of the S25.00. basic interrelationships between State and society, i.e. interest group liberalism and Marxism, Krasner con This is a sad tale, plainly told, of military disaster tends instead that the State is an autonomous entity act and what might have been. The author’s father, Sir ing pritnarily out of national interests that cannot bt Henry Karslake, retired from Service as a lieutenant- explained merely by class or group motivations. Par- general in 1938 and described by a friend as “the best ticularly for its efforts to define preeisely the dimension general in the British army,” was plucked from a of contemporary U.S. national interests abroad, his Hampshire village on 22 May 1940 and sent to France work should prove to be thought-provoking reading for to try to mend the British Expeditionary Force’s broken interested military professionals and serious students of lines of communication. This book recounts how international affairs. neither he nor anyone else could have succeeded. His “statist" approach. by which Krasner attempts It is full of lessons, old and new. For example, to to reach a clearer definition of the contemporary have no clear chain of command is and always has thrusts and scope of U.S. national interests, is been a certain recipe for trouble; so it is now to try to progressively developed on the basis of fifteen case operate on the ground without air support. Very sênior studies that cover twentieth-century American raw generais like to promote their friends, are angry when materiais policy from the days of U.S. “gunboãt someone else promotes their rivais, and are not always diplomacy” in Latin America to its controversial in- large-minded enough to keep planning and per- volvement in Chile during the 1970-73 rule of Marxist sonalities apart. President Salvador Allende. Of special interest as 1940— The Last Act records several heroic stories, background for current events is Krasner's treatment one of which tells about the battalion of the Royal of American-Iranian relations in the context of oil Sussex Regiment that went into action near Amiens resources over the past three decades. On the basis of 701 strong; after every round of ammunition had been his case studies, he assens that during the present cen- ftred, the 70 survivors surrendered. Karslake is no ad- tury, American national leaders have generally been mirer of Gort or of Brooke, or of the French high com­ able to formulate and execute a consistem array of mand in general. Repeatedly, he explains how plain foreign policy objectives that have assured a steady fighting men like Brigadier Beauman could ac- flow of resources into the United States, even in the complish while staff officers and politicians doubted. face of substantial international and domestic con- He might have taken “The Triumph of Doubt” for straints. His painstaking effort in detailing twentieth- a subtitle. In one chapter Franklin D. Roosevelt would century U.S. foreign policy development in line with have dismissed as “iffy”; he maintains that the Cher- trends in the private sector's raw materiais investments bourg península might have been held by resolute men makes a solid case for both his “statist" interpretation against RommePs exhausted tank crews in mid-June and for reachinga fuller comprehension ofastate's na­ 1940, a foreshadowing of the great “Sledgehammer" tional interests in politico-economic sphere. delusion of American planners in 1943. By mid-June, Since the resource-rich Third World can be ex- there were not many resolute men left. pected to play a key role in the development of U.S. Understandably, Karslake writes with his mind foreign policy and in the overall progress of global made up and unravels confusion with great skill. His economic interdependence in the years ahead, this readable book carries conviction. work deserves more than a passing glance. While well- Dr. Michael R. D. Foot researched and amply supported by much tabular and London, England graphic data, its original and highly innovative analyti- BOOKS AND IDEAS 109 cal approach to this complex topic mighl offer rcason bclated appearance, it will be a valuable research aid enough to recommend this work as a "must-read for the student of naval history who will be delighted to item. find appended to it an extensive bibliography, albeit Dr Joseph E. Thach. Jr one with surprising lacunae. For the military profes- OJJict of lhe Assislant Serrelary sional, it has less to offer but does suggest the range of u) Defense for Pubtn Affairs questions historians are asking about the U.S. Navy, questions that may also be asked about the other Ser­ vices. Versatile Guardian: Research in Naval History Dr. Lloyd J Graybar edited by Richard A. Doenhoff. Washington: Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond Howard University Press, 1979, S17.50. Despite the inordinate time lag between the ex- cellent National Archives Conference on Naval Histo­ In Command of France: French Foreign Policy ry (1974) and the publication of its proceedings, this and M ilitary Planning, 1933-1940 by Robert J. book in most ways fulfills the promise of the meeting Young. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard from which it derived. There are only two faults worth University Press, 1978, 340 pages 4- index, S 17.50. noting: the dating of two of the papers (those on Ad­ Robert J. Young goes beyond the clichês about the mirais Bradley Fiske and Chester Nimitz) and the folly of the Western democracies in lhe 1930s and unevenness of quality and approach of the articles. For reconstructs—not uncritically—the diplomatic and instance, it seems curious that two articles in a volume strategic thought of French leaders. His well- sponsored by the National Archives contain no docu- researched account shows that the French did not mentation and a third makes only a few references to neglect German power; indeed, they were almost ob- secondary sources. sessed by it. Unable to match Germany’s demographic However, attention should be given to those con- and industrial strength and taking for granted continu- tributors to Versatile Guardian who have done well. ing German hostility, France unsuccessfully sought Most of these papers are thoroughly documented, in- safety in alliances. British support was uncertain, and formative, and cover a broad range of American naval allies in eastern Europe proved liabilities, not assets. history—World War II, the Revolution and wars of the Rather than preventing war, security pacts with these nineteenth century, international relations and the nations threatened to draw France into war should navy, and technology. In keeping with the format of the Hitler move east. Unable to match German power, conference, many of the authors pay special attention France could only hope to contain it diplomatically. to archival sources available for research in naval Young’s study of interwar France is worth attention history. Among these are Dean Allard, “The Naval of American military readers since the United States Historical Center and the Resources of Naval History,” today finds itself in a similar situation. In an interna­ K. Jack Bauer, “The Navy in an Age of Manifest tional system without a sovereign, each State must rely Destiny,” and David F. Trask. “Research Oppor- on its own efforts to survive. Geography and the limita- tunities in the Spanish-Cuban-American War and tions of conventional weaponry and later our World War I.” Bauer and Trask, for example, suggest superiority over the Soviets muted for Americans the 147 lopics for research in naval history and are helpful dilemmas posed for less fortunate States. France’s in suggesting types and locations of sources where struggle to deal with a military threat from a position of these and other naval history questions may be strategic inferiority is .thus a story of unusual signifi- researched. cance at a time when America’s privileged position is Another of many provocative articles in the disappearing. volume—actually a commentary on three of the papers about World War II — is that by Clark Reynolds. He Dr. Daniel F. Harrington goes beyond the scope of the typical commentary by Indiana University. Bloomington raising interesting observations about research oppor- tunities: the need for a career profile of World War II naval leaders and a study of such subspecialty groups as the Gun Club (officers who before and during the war were identified with the battleship force of the U.S. Getting Strong, Looking Strong: A Guide to Suc- fleet). cessful Bodybuilding by Boyer Coe and Bob Sum- Versatile Guardian offers a good mixture of worth- mer. New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1979, 192 while papers and discerning commentary. Despite its pages, S7.95. 110 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW With increasinglv compressed schedules and seden- gain the toning and conditioning benefits of weight tary work routines, greater numbers of blue suiters are training without looking like a defector from the East lurning to the weighl room—and with good reason; German Olympic swimming squad. Getting Strong, there are few ways to pack more conditioning into less Looking Strong is a useful book even for those who are time. For the individual pressed for time (or with a less not interested in extremes of musculature. than all-consuming passion for distance running or racketball) who wants to maintain a reasonable stan­ J F. G. dard of fitness, this little book offers a surprising arnount of usable information. The first problem is getting past the dust cover il- First Strike by Douglas Terman. New York: Charles lustration a shaven, oiled, and flexed Boyer Coe, dis- Scribner’s Sons, 1979, 368 pages, S 10.95. playing his best professional Mr. Universe/Mr, America form. But don't be turned off by the “His eyes flicked down to the altimeter now and transparent narcissism; there is something to be said watched it unwind through a thousand feet. We’re far for doing anything constructive supremely well, and beyond structural limits, he thought abstractedly, but the authors undoubtedly know an enormous arnount the air speed was bleeding off. Ifs worth a try, he about the care and feeding of the human body. thought. and hit the flap switch." What else would The bottom line is that the straightforward, well- “Our Hero” do with an Aztec caught in a thunder- written text has a great deal of commonsense—and bumper? often counterintuitive—information for those who Douglas Terman, a former Air Force officer, has want the conditioning benefits of weight training with- drawn heavily on his flying and yachting experience to out becoming a Charles or Charlene Atlas. We are told produce a thriller in which the lonely protagonist must which exercises develop which muscles and why. We save the world from the implacable Soviet menace. But are cautioned about the hazards of inadequate warm hold on; ifs not that bad. The situation is believable, ups and the dangers of overdeveloping one muscle though unlikely, the characterizations are realistic, and group at the expense of the others. Cautions on the use the action is of the edge-of-your-seat variety. And, for of drugs and steriods are included; there are also useful once, the military, political, and cultural details are tips on diet, which are of value even to those who, like well researched and cleverly described. myselt, have serious reservations about the need for First Strike will make an enjoyable respite between dessicated liver, no matter how good it may be for you. professional military education lessons on a rainy Finally, there is an informative afterword on Saturday. bodvbuilding and women; the female reader who has Captain Julius F Sanks. USAF endured this far will be relieved to learn that she can Los Angeles AFS, Califórnia

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "Soviet Percep- tions of the Strategic Balance" by Dr. Daniel S. Papp, Geórgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, as the outstanding article in the (anuary-February 1981 issue of the Review. the contributors

FrancisSeth Singlctun A B . Harvard Gollcgc; l.ieulenant Colonel Harry P. Wel/lcr MA PhD Vale University) is professor i l SAFA. M D University o| l tah) is an av.iv polities and govemment ai Kipon College, tatu professor of preventivo medie inc at thr Wist onsin He has caughi ai Yalr and as a visilor Donald M. Snow HA MA University »l l iiilornied Services Universily of Health ai the University of Chicago and ihr University Colorado. PhD . Indiana University) svas visit- S. iem es and is certificd by lhe American Board oí Dar cs Saiaam i Tanzania) and has served in mg professor of National Securtiy AfTairs. Alt ol Prcvcntivc Medii ine Previous a.ssigiinieuts thr International divisiun «*f lhe Budgn Burcau. Ctnninand and Stall College. Maxwell AFB. have im luded duties as an inielltgeuc e «ifficer at Execulivc Ofllcc of ihc Presidem Dr Singlclon Alabatna. bcfnrc returning u» lhe University of 11(| Straiegic Air Coiumand and instruetor at has published aruclcs on Sovict and African Alabama, Tuscakiosa, on 1 Januars 1981 as l S Alt l orce Atadetny I le is a graduate of Air ailairs m Armed Furtes and Society, Slavu Review. assoei a ic professor of political Science and Dircc- Comtnand and Stall Col.lgge Pan -Afnr an Journal. and nlher publicutions and is tor of lnicrnutional Sludics. Dr Snow is the lhe author of A frita w Penpertue < I9t»8i author of Nuclear Stuilegy in n Dynamit World American Fuliry in lhe I980s < 1980) He has publtshcd aniclcs in profession.il and academit journals and is a previous award-winning con- trihutor «»* the Review

f ■V' i4 Coloncl Thomas A. Fabyanic iB A, Syracuse Univenity. Ph D . Si Louix Univcrxitv n. Dtrer- Donald D. Chipman (BA.. Califórnia State lor Airpowcr Resrarrh Institute. Air Univcrsitv Universily, Chico, Ph D . Florida State Univer­ • ATC), He served as an air operai lons siaíT Colonel Kaymond G. Troxlcr (B A. Univer- sily) is thr Commandant‘.s Advisor on Eduta- ufficer. United States Sirike/Readincss Cotn- stty of South western Louisian.i; M D , Universily tion. Squadron OfTiccr School. Maxwell AFB. rnand; Chief. Hisi«»ry oí VVarfare Sludiev. Air of Louisiana School of Medicine) is Chief of Alabama Hc has served as a professor of educa- War College and USAF Research Ass««« iate at Clinicai Pathology USAF School of Acrospace liou and history at Ccorgia Southwcstcrn Col- Oilumbia Univenity Durmg the war m In­ Medicine. Brooks AFB. Texas He has served as legr. Amcricus. and was .» U S Navv llight dochina. he «omplcted 200 combat somes in the Wing Flight Surgcon. 4t>f.fth Training Wing, officcr and navigator for the EC-I2I Typhoon F-4 Phantoin ainraft He is author of Strategu Rcpublic of Vietnam. and has bcen appointed Rcconnaissancr Squadron in Agana, Guam. Dr Air Altark m ihr United State* .-lir Forre A Cair Military Consultam in Pathology to the Surgcon Chipman is coauthor of Philusophical Refletiions Study i 1977 i and srveral .inicies on mililary sub- General He serves as asso» iate professor of on Fducallon and Society and (.'ritual Issue» in jetts. Cnlonel Fabyanic is a DÍMÍngui*hrd Crad- pathology at thr Universily of Texas Medicai Philnsophy nj Educatnm and has publishcd severaI uate of Air War College and a previous contribu - School. San Antonio. Dr Troxlcr tias published arlicles m academit journals. He is a graduate of for Io the Review a nuinber uí profcs&ional articles Squadron Officcr School.

111 currcntly an Air Officcr Cominanding at U.S. Air Force Acadcmy Hc has .served as Assistam Chicí of Opcmtions and Training Division, USAFE. and Chicf of thc Standardization Evaluation Division, TAC. As a sênior pilot lie has flown 225tombat missions m thc F-4. served as an ALO/FAC living thc 0-2. and has flown thc F-I1IF Major Burkholdcr is a graduatc o| Air Command and Stalí Collegc.

Chaplain (Coloncl) Samuel D. Maioney, Licutcnant Coloncl Dallacc L. Mechan North Curolina Air National Guurd (A B MA Naval Postgraduate Schooh is Chiei. Davidson Collegc, B I) Th.M . Th D Union Regional Studics Branch, Air Command and Theologiial Scminary) is Pmfcssor of Rehgion Staff Collegc, Maxwell AFB. Alabama Hc has and Humamties at Davidson Collegc North served as commander of an airbome missile Carulina. Formerly, hc served as an adjunct squadron and assígnmcnts in Japan, South professor at McCorniick Thcological Seminarv America. Vietnam and Germany Hc has in Chicago During World War II hc was an published artu les in Military Revieu and thc aircraft commandcr in thc Pacific theater Hc Revtew Coloncl Mechan is a graduatc of thc ha» Iccturcd ai National War Collegc. Air Com* Dcfcnsc Languagc Instttutc i Russian >, Air Com- mand and Staff Collegç, Command and General mand and StafT Collegc. Industrial Collegc of Stafí Collegc, and thc Professional Militarv thc Armcd Forres, and Air War Collegc Kducatioti Centcr Chaplain Maloncy has publishcd numcmuN articlc» in Tnr Heel Times.

James H. Buck Ph D American Universitv) is Assot iate Vice Presidcnt for Academit A fiai rs at thc Universitv of Geórgia He is «oauthor of Curnparative Pulitú >, editor of The Modem Japanese Militarv System, and has c ontributed chapiers to Cwitian Contra! uf thc Militarv, Foreign Pohcy and I .V Xalwnal Secunty. and Nonnucltar Confhits m thc Xuclear Age Dr Buck served on thc faculty at thc United States Militarv Acadcmy and thc Air War Collegc

Major FrankJ. Derfler, Jr. i M.Fxl Univcrsiiv Captain John M. Thomson B A Memphis of South Caro li na i. is assigned lo Hq USAF Hc State Universitv, M A . Universitv of Minnesota) has served a\ Chícfof thc Tactical Communica­ is an instruetor of English United States Air tions Operai ions Division at Hq PACIAF Major Force Acadcmy and fatully sponsor for Derfler i\ a frequent contributor to technical, ICARUS, magazine of tadet treativity at thc Air hobby. and profcssional militarv publications Force Acadcmy. and a writer on tcchnological matters with mili­ tarv va ial. and cconomic implicai ions Major Dcrllcr is a graduatc of Air Command and Staff Collegc and a previous contributor to ihc Revtew

James H. Toner i Ph I) , Universitv of Notrc Damcj is Assistam Professor of Government at Norwich Universitv and a fcllovv of thc Intcr- Universitv Seminar on Armcd Fortes and Soricty He was assistanl professor at Notrc Damc. where hc taught International rclations. Joseph C). Bavlen i B Ed Northern Illinois Dr Toner served as an ofTtter tn thc U S Armv Universitv; MA Emorv Universitv; PhD. from 1968 to 1972. In 1973. hr was selectcd as a Universitv <•! New Mexiioi is Rcgcnis Pmlessor General Douglas Mat Arthur Statcsman Scholar of Historv Geórgia Si.uc Universitv Atlanta His anides and reviews have appcared in Anny, Geórgia Hc was a Guggcnheim Fcllovv in Militar v Reuieu. Revtew uf Palilu ínternaliunal 1958-59 and a Fulbright-Havs Sênior Lcvturcr Review of ffntnry and Rnlitiial Snerue, and Xaval in thc United Kingdom in 1961-62 and 1972-73 Major James A. Burkholdcr. Jr. B S Univcr- War College Revtew. Dr Toner is a previous con­ Dr Bavlen is aulhor of four books and numeious sity of Idaho, M PA . Boise State Universitv), is tributor io thc Revtew artu les. editorial staff advisers

Lieu t en a n t Colonel J ohn F. G uilmar t in. Jr ., USAF M ajor Gen er a l J ohn W Hust on Editor Chtef Office of Air Force History Major Theodore M Kluz, USAF C olonel Robert J. 0 ’Brien, J r Associale Editor Hq Air Force Systems Command ieu t en a n t olonel avid hea J ack H. Moonev L C D J S Managtng Editor Hq Air Traimng Command J ohn A. W est c o t t C olonel J ohn D. W illiams Ari Director and Production Manager Hq Military Airlifl Command

E nrique Gaston F rancis W. J ennings Assoctate Editor, Air Force Service Information & News ('.enter Spanish Language Editwn C olonel Mic h a el P Mc R aney L ia Mid o si May Patterson Hq Strategu Air Command Associale Editor, C olonel J ohn H Price Portuguese Language Editwn Hq Tactical Air Command Hattie Dix o n Min t er L ieu t en a n t Colonel J erry B H endrix op Copy Editor Hq United States Air Force Acaderny Pr o fesso r 1 B H olley.J r ., Duke University Major General, Air Force Reserve (Ret) C olonel Glenn E. W asso n, USAF (Ret ) L ieu t en a n t Colonel David R M et s, USAF (Ret )

attention The Air University Review is the professional journal of lhe United States Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is to present innovative thinking concerning Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air Training Command, or Air University. Rather, the contents reflect the authors' ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thoughtful and informed contributions are always welcomed.

Address manuscnpis to Editor Air University Review, Bldg 1211, Maxwell AFB. AL 36112 Review telephone listings are AUTOVON 875-2773 and commercial 205-293-2773 Printed by Government Printing Office Address subscriptions to Superintendem of Documents. GPO. Washington DC 20402; yearly $13 00 domestic. $16 25 foreign; single copy $2.25 domestic. $2 85 foreign. Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2 Authority to publish this periodical automatically expires on 30 January 1982 unless its continuance is authorized by the approving authority prior to that date. Distribution: reader- per-copy ratio is one to every ten USAF personnel. military or civilian

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