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Can Civil Society Organizations Solve the Crisis of Partisan Representation in Latin America?

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Can Civil Society Organizations Solve the Crisis of Partisan Representation in Latin America? Can Civil Society Organizations Solve the Crisis of Partisan Representation in Latin America? Kathryn Hochstetler Elisabeth Jay Friedman ABSTRACT This article takes up the question of whether civil society organiza- tions (CSOs) can and do act as mechanisms of representation in times of party crisis. It looks at recent representation practices in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, three countries where political par- ties have experienced sharp crises after several decades of mixed reviews for their party systems. At such moments, any replacement of parties by CSOs should be especially apparent. This study con- cludes that the degree of crisis determines the extent that CSOs’ representative functions replace partisan representation, at least in the short term. Where systems show signs of re-equilibration, CSOs offer alternative mechanisms through which citizens can influence political outcomes without seeking to replace parties. Where crisis is profound, CSOs claim some of the basic party functions but do not necessarily solve the problems of partisan representation. he words political party and crisis have become regular compan- T ions in the study of Latin American politics. The empirical referents range from longer-term patterns, such as the instability of partisan iden- tification, to short-term crises resulting in the collapse of party systems. Political parties’ abilities to meet performance, legitimacy, and repre- sentation expectations have all been questioned (e.g., Hagopian 1998; Mainwaring et al. 2006; Pearce 2004). In other contexts, scholars have argued that such crises should lead—and have led—to a transformation of mechanisms of representation: “citizens across the world have shifted from older and traditional forms of representation, such as polit- ical parties and unions, to ‘newer’ modes, such as social movements, informal citizen groups and nongovernmental organizations” (Chandoke 2005, 308). This transformation implies a radical move beyond the parameters of the state-society relationship suggested by pluralism, wherein competing interest groups lobby politicians but parties retain a monopoly on repre- sentation (Dahl 1961). We call such arguments the “crisis of representation hypothesis” because the change in modes of representation is explained primarily through the failure of traditional representation systems (Bartolini © 2008 University of Miami 2 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 50: 2 and Mair 2001; Chandoke 2005; Lawson and Merkl 1988; Lawson and Poguntke 2004). The implication is that the scope of nonparty representa- tion is an inverse function of the quality of partisan representation. The crisis of representation hypothesis was first developed in the European party literature, and clearly does not explain developments in all of Latin America. In some countries, party system meltdown has led to the reinvention of populist mediation by such leaders as Alberto Fuji- mori in Peru and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. Citizens in such countries do not have the option of choosing between partisan and “newer” modes of representation, which we refer to collectively as civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs are weak or have been largely crowded out. In other Latin American countries, however, party crisis does coexist with significant civil society self-organization. The crisis of representa- tion hypothesis prompts us to examine developments in those countries more closely, to see whether CSOs are able to play more extensive rep- resentational roles when parties are weakened. To do so, we compare Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, three coun- tries where political parties have experienced sharp crises since 2000 coupled with an upsurge of CSO activity. If the crisis of representation hypothesis has any relevance in Latin America, it should be evident in such countries. Our cases represent a spectrum of crisis intensity, rang- ing from total party system collapse (Bolivia) to partial collapse (Argentina) to delegitimation of the governing parties (Brazil). The hypothesis suggests that there should be more evidence of a substitu- tive shift to the newer CSO forms of representation in Bolivia, and pos- sibly Argentina, than in Brazil. While the hypothesis assumes that CSOs can actually act as repre- sentational mechanisms, this is far from an accepted understanding of their possible roles. Therefore, we begin by offering a conceptual explo- ration of CSOs as modes of representation, using the traditional mecha- nism of political parties as a point of comparison. The discussion also provides the foundation for assessing the different levels and kinds of representation that CSOs might perform. Insider strategies of CSO rep- resentation largely serve as complements to partisan representation, while outsider strategies seek to replace it. Thus the crisis of represen- tation hypothesis anticipates that CSOs will move toward outsider strate- gies as parties founder. The empirical sections of this article characterize the nature and extent of the recent party crises in these three countries, as well as the roles of CSOs during and (if applicable) after the crises. We conclude that there is general support for the crisis of representation hypothesis that the depth of party crisis is related to the scope of nonpartisan rep- resentation. Only in cases of severe crisis is the replacement thesis par- tially upheld; in Bolivia, CSOs really are using outsider strategies to HOCHSTETLER AND FRIEDMAN: CIVIL SOCIETY 3 claim direct party roles alongside parties, including agenda setting, effective decisionmaking, fielding candidates, and checking or revoking executive power. In the more circumscribed crises in Argentina and Brazil, CSOs do not replace parties as mechanisms of representation— and they do not even try to, except for a brief period in Argentina at the height of the crisis in 2001–2, when the nation cycled through five pres- idents in just a few weeks. In both countries, however, even insider CSOs can carry out important representational functions. POLITICAL PARTIES AND CSOS AS MECHANISMS OF REPRESENTATION A curious disconnect exists between theoretical studies of representa- tion and most empirical studies. Theoretically, representation is a con- tested concept, with multiple meanings (e.g., Manin 1997; Pitkin 1967; Saward 2001). At its core, the concept demands that the values and interests of citizens in some way guide those who stand for them in col- lective political processes—functions that could be performed in many ways. Yet empirically, scholars have tended to restrict their focus to the world of parties, elections, and electoral systems, often without com- ment (e.g., Kitschelt 2000; Powell 2004; Przeworski et al. 1999). This article challenges that empirical restriction. It argues that CSOs also can perform what Bartolini and Mair call the political integration functions of partisan representation: articulating and aggregating interests and integrating and mobilizing citizens (Bartolini and Mair 2001). Thus, although CSOs do not generally engage in the specific democratic elec- toral form of representation particular to parties (Peruzzotti 2006; Rehfeld 2006), they fulfill a range of other functions (Friedman and Hochstetler 2002; Fung 2003; Gurza Lavalle et al. 2006). Understanding both parties and CSOs as mechanisms of representation requires careful attention to their structural similarities and differences. Representation by Political Parties Political parties are the primary channel for representation in democra- cies. Following V. O. Key’s influential formulation, parties perform three major groups of functions, each of which is central to representation: parties in the electorate, parties as organizations, and parties in govern- ment (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000, 5–10). Similarly, parties may fail at one or some subset of these functions. In their role of relating to the electorate, parties serve as interpreters for the voting public, presenting different ways to understand political issues and helping voters to determine their general political interests and identities. In doing so, some parties engage in extensive organizing, 4 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 50: 2 reaching deep into civil society. But many serve exclusively as electoral vehicles that become dormant between electoral cycles. Party-society ties have long been weak in Latin America, but they continue to weaken in the posttransition democracies. Even where party systems were once based on more programmatic and mass-participatory linkages, those ties have now loosened. Personalist, patron-client, and charismatic linkages prevail. The result is party-society relations grounded largely in parties’ electoral ambitions, a thin relationship with little interest and legitimacy for citizens (Pearce 2004; Roberts 2002; Taylor-Robinson 2001). Similar processes are at work in Europe, albeit from higher historical levels of integration (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Lawson and Poguntke 2004). In both old and new democracies, citizens are increasingly consumers rather than subjects of politics (Bartolini and Mair 2001, 333). Parties as organizations perform the functions of recruiting elites for office and running their campaigns. Articulating interests and aggre- gating them into broad programs of government are related functions. Latin American parties have generally performed these party functions comparatively well, with the notable exception of the programmatic function. Many Latin American parties lack coherent programs of gov- ernance
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