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The Politics of Patronage Appointments in Argentina's And
www.ssoar.info Unpacking Patronage: the Politics of Patronage Appointments in Argentina's and Uruguay's Central Public Administrations Larraburu, Conrado Ricardo Ramos; Panizza, Francisco; Scherlis, Gerardo Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Larraburu, C. R. R., Panizza, F., & Scherlis, G. (2018). Unpacking Patronage: the Politics of Patronage Appointments in Argentina's and Uruguay's Central Public Administrations. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 10(3), 59-98. https:// nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-11421 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung- This document is made available under a CC BY-ND Licence Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu (Attribution-NoDerivatives). For more Information see: den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/deed.de Journal of Politics in Latin America Panizza, Francisco, Conrado Ricardo Ramos Larraburu, and Gerardo Scherlis (2018), Unpacking Patronage: The Politics of Patronage Appointments in Argentina’s and Uruguay’s Central Public Administrations, in: Journal of Politics in Latin America, 10, 3, 59–98. URN: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-11421 ISSN: 1868-4890 (online), ISSN: 1866-802X (print) The online version of this article can be found at: <www.jpla.org> Published by GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Latin American Studies and Hamburg University Press. The Journal of Politics in Latin America is an Open Access publication. -
La Congruencia Aliancista De Los Partidos Argentinos En Elecciones Concurrentes (1983- 2011) Estudios Políticos, Vol
Estudios Políticos ISSN: 0185-1616 [email protected] Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México México Cleric, Paula La congruencia aliancista de los partidos argentinos en elecciones concurrentes (1983- 2011) Estudios Políticos, vol. 9, núm. 36, septiembre-diciembre, 2015, pp. 143-170 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Distrito Federal, México Disponible en: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=426441558007 Cómo citar el artículo Número completo Sistema de Información Científica Más información del artículo Red de Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal Página de la revista en redalyc.org Proyecto académico sin fines de lucro, desarrollado bajo la iniciativa de acceso abierto La congruencia aliancista de los partidos argentinos en elecciones concurrentes (1983 -2011) Paula Clerici* Resumen El presente artículo ofrece un estudio sobre la congruencia de las alianzas electorales en Argen- tina entre 1983 y 2011. Lo anterior a partir de dos acciones: primero, ubicando empíricamente el fenómeno; segundo, conociendo el nivel de congruencia que los partidos han tenido en su política aliancista en los distintos procesos electorales que se presentaron durante el período considerado. La propuesta dedica un apartado especial al Partido Justicialista (PJ) y a la Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), por su importancia sistémica. Palabras clave: alianzas partidistas, partidos políticos, congruencia aliancista, procesos electorales, .Argentina. Abstract This article presents a study on the consistency of the electoral alliances in Argentina between 1983 and 2011. From two actions: first, locating empirically the phenomenon; and second, knowing the level of consistency that the parties have had in their alliance policy in the different electoral processes that occurred during the period. -
The Year in Elections, 2013: the World's Flawed and Failed Contests
The Year in Elections, 2013: The World's Flawed and Failed Contests The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Norris, Pippa, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran Martinez i Coma. 2014. The Year in Elections 2013: The World's Flawed and Failed Contests. The Electoral Integrity Project. Published Version http://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/ Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11744445 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA THE YEAR IN ELECTIONS, 2013 THE WORLD’S FLAWED AND FAILED CONTESTS Pippa Norris, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran Martínez i Coma February 2014 THE YEAR IN ELECTIONS, 2013 WWW. ELECTORALINTEGRITYPROJECT.COM The Electoral Integrity Project Department of Government and International Relations Merewether Building, HO4 University of Sydney, NSW 2006 Phone: +61(2) 9351 6041 Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.electoralintegrityproject.com Copyright © Pippa Norris, Ferran Martínez i Coma, and Richard W. Frank 2014. All rights reserved. Photo credits Cover photo: ‘Ballot for national election.’ by Daniel Littlewood, http://www.flickr.com/photos/daniellittlewood/413339945. Licence at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0. Page 6 and 18: ‘Ballot sections are separated for counting.’ by Brittany Danisch, http://www.flickr.com/photos/bdanisch/6084970163/ Licence at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0. Page 8: ‘Women in Pakistan wait to vote’ by DFID - UK Department for International Development, http://www.flickr.com/photos/dfid/8735821208/ Licence at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0. -
Encuesta De Satisfacción Política Y Opinión Pública
Encuesta de Satisfacción Política y Opinión Pública #ESPOP Abril 2018 1 Metodología • Estos son hallazgos de la encuesta de satisfacción política y opinion pública de la Universidad de San Andrés. En total fueron realizadas 1004 entrevistas entre el 16 y el 23 de Abril de 2018 a adultos de 18-64 años conectados a internet, en Argentina. • La encuesta se realiza en 23 provincias y la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires vía el Panel online de Netquest. La muestra es proporcional al tamaño de las provincias (con algunos ajustes para garantizar base de lectura) y representativa a nivel de las regiones. Las provincias fueron agrupadas en 5 regiones: NOA, NEA, Cuyo, Centro, Patagonia, y Buenos Aires dividida a su vez en CABA, GBA e interior de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. Se aplicaron cuotas de sexo, edad y nivel socioeconómico. • La encuesta versa sobre satisfacción con el desempeño de los poderes políticos y las políticas públicas y sobre la opinion respecto de los principals líderes politicos nacionales, grupos y sectores, ministros y gobernadores. Algunas preguntas siguen una serie de tiempo basada en la encuesta de Indicadores de Satisfacción Política Institucional (ISPI) realizada por la Universidad de San Andrés e Ipsos de Marzo de 2016 a Mayo de 2017. En la presente investigación se modificaron las escalas numéricas de satisfacción y opinion (antes de 1-10) por escalasordinales de 4 categorías (dos positivas y dos negativas). Los valores de las series de tiempo fueron recategorizados para ser comparabales con las nuevas mediciones. • Cuando los resultados no sumen 100, eso puede deberse a redondeos computacionales,, respuestas múltiples o la exclusión de los que no saben o no contestan. -
Figure A1 General Elections in Argentina, 1995-2019 Figure A2 Vote for Peronists Among Highest-Educated and Top-Income Voters In
Chapter 15. "Social Inequalities, Identity, and the Structure of Political Cleavages in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, 1952-2019" Oscar BARRERA, Ana LEIVA, Clara MARTÍNEZ-TOLEDANO, Álvaro ZÚÑIGA-CORDERO Appendix A - Argentina Main figures and tables Figure A1 General elections in Argentina, 1995-2019 Figure A2 Vote for Peronists among highest-educated and top-income voters in Argentina, after controls Table A1 The structure of political cleavages in Argentina, 2015-2019 Appendix Figures - Structure of the Vote for Peronists Figure AA1 Vote for Peronists by income decile in Argentina Figure AA2 Vote for Peronists by income group in Argentina Figure AA3 Vote for Peronists by education level in Argentina Figure AA4 Vote for Peronists by age group in Argentina Figure AA5 Vote for Peronists by gender in Argentina Figure AA6 Vote for Peronists by marital status in Argentina Figure AA7 Vote for Peronists by employment status in Argentina Figure AA8 Vote for Peronists by employment sector in Argentina Figure AA9 Vote for Peronists by self-employment status in Argentina Figure AA10 Vote for Peronists by occupation in Argentina Figure AA11 Vote for Peronists by subjective social class in Argentina Figure AA12 Vote for Peronists by rural-urban location in Argentina Figure AA13 Vote for Peronists by region in Argentina Figure AA14 Vote for Peronists by ethnicity in Argentina Figure AA15 Vote for Peronists by religious affiliation in Argentina Figure AA16 Vote for Peronists by religiosity in Argentina Figure AA17 Vote for -
Argentina's Delegative Democracy: a Case Study
ARGENTINA’S DELEGATIVE DEMOCRACY: A CASE STUDY A dissertation presented by Florencia Inés Gabriele to The Department of Political Science In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of Political Science Northeastern University Boston, Massachusetts December 2013 1 ARGENTINA’S DELEGATIVE DEMOCRACY: A CASE STUDY by Florencia Ines Gabriele ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the College of Social Sciences and Humanities of Northeastern University December, 2013 2 ABSTRACT This study analyses why Argentina remained an immature and underdeveloped delegative democracy rather than a fully-liberal democratic polity. Following the work of Guillermo O’Donnell this work explores the quality of, and serious deficiencies in, Argentina’s democracy. This work pays special attention to presidential use and misuse of Decrees of Necessity and Urgency by as a means to govern alone, thus bypassing Congress and how there is no existing check and balances in the government in this regard. Observing delegative democracies, this work also examines the following: the use of economic restrictions, use of policies such as nationalizations, privatizations, management of the federal budget, international relations of the country, restriction on the media, behavior of the judiciary branch, changes in the national constitution, and decreasing role of the Vice President. This work analyzes the relationship between democracy, decrees of necessity and urgency, laws sanctioned by Congress and inflation using transfer function models. Democracy is measured using the Polity IV dataset. There is a causal relationship among the explanatory variables (inputs) —the numbers of laws passed by Congress, inflation, and number of DNU — and Democracy (output). -
Argentina | Freedom House Page 1 of 5
Argentina | Freedom House Page 1 of 5 Argentina freedomhouse.org Popular support for President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner continued its decline in 2014, due primarily to inflation and insecurity. Officials devalued the peso by 19 percent in January in order to shore up international currency reserves (which fell to a seven-year low in 2014), prompting a surge in inflation. An estimated 24 to 30 percent annual inflation rate during the year eroded the purchasing power of Argentines and increased the incentive to buy black market dollars. Inflation rose in spite of the government’s price watch agreement—Precios Cuidados (“protected prices”)—which mandated reduced prices on more than 150 products sold in the largest supermarket chains. Argentina also struggled with declining public safety in 2014 as the country played an increasing role in the international drug trade. In April, a 24-hour general strike by labor unions brought large portions of the country to a standstill, affecting public transportation and government offices, and threatening the movement of the soybean harvest. Strikers demanded higher pay, lower taxes, and an increase in living standards amid the rising inflation. The Fernández administration attempted to meet the country’s persistent economic uncertainty with pragmatism. By agreeing to a $5 billion settlement, the government resolved a two-year dispute with Repsol, a Spanish company whose controlling stake in an Argentine oil firm had been nationalized in 2012. The national statistics agency made efforts to increase transparency by reporting more credible inflation data, and the government exercised fiscal restraint by cutting expensive and unsustainable water and natural gas subsidies. -
The Role of Political Parties in Promoting Women in Politics - Upla Women's Network Contribution
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN PROMOTING WOMEN IN POLITICS - UPLA WOMEN'S NETWORK CONTRIBUTION INTRODUCTION The Women's Network of the Union of Latin American Parties (UPLA) is a political platform that seeks to promote and strengthen the participation and positioning of women in public decision-making roles in Latin America and the Caribbean. We believe that the practices, policies and values of political parties can have a profound impact on women's political participation and representation. That is why the Network decided to join the iKNOW Politics e-discussion on “The Role of Political Parties in Promoting Women in Politics” to exchange knowledge on the role of political parties in promoting women’s participation and political representation. We prepared our contribution and discussed these important topics more widely during online discussions among members of the UPLA Women’s Network in August and September 2019. COUNTRIES THAT PARTICIPATED IN THE PREPARATION OF THIS DOCUMENT (COUNTRY, NAME OF REPRESENTATIVE(S) AND POLITICAL PARTY): Argentina Congresswoman Sofía Brambilla (PRO) Bolivia Local Assemblywoman Cinthya Mendoza (Demócratas) Chile Former Congresswoman Claudia Nogueira (UDI), Congresswoman Catalina del Real MP (RN) Colombia Senator Nadya Blel (PCC), Gina Segura (PCC) Costa Rica Mariana Fernández (PRSC) Dominican Republic Daysi Sepúlveda (FNP) El Salvador Congresswoman Martha Evelyn Batres (ARENA), Claudia Alas de Ávila, Member of PARLACEN (ARENA) Honduras Congresswoman Johana Bermúdez (PNH) Panama Gina Correa (CD) Peru Nadia Ramos (PPC), Gisela Tipe (AP), Milagros López (AP) 1. DO POLITICAL PARTIES IN YOUR COUNTRY PUBLICLY EXPRESS COMMITMENT TO GENDER EQUALITY? IF SO, IS THIS COMMITMENT REFLECTED IN THEIR ACTIONS (E.G. -
The Transformation of Party-Union Linkages in Argentine Peronism, 1983–1999*
FROM LABOR POLITICS TO MACHINE POLITICS: The Transformation of Party-Union Linkages in Argentine Peronism, 1983–1999* Steven Levitsky Harvard University Abstract: The Argentine (Peronist) Justicialista Party (PJ)** underwent a far- reaching coalitional transformation during the 1980s and 1990s. Party reformers dismantled Peronism’s traditional mechanisms of labor participation, and clientelist networks replaced unions as the primary linkage to the working and lower classes. By the early 1990s, the PJ had transformed from a labor-dominated party into a machine party in which unions were relatively marginal actors. This process of de-unionization was critical to the PJ’s electoral and policy success during the presidency of Carlos Menem (1989–99). The erosion of union influ- ence facilitated efforts to attract middle-class votes and eliminated a key source of internal opposition to the government’s economic reforms. At the same time, the consolidation of clientelist networks helped the PJ maintain its traditional work- ing- and lower-class base in a context of economic crisis and neoliberal reform. This article argues that Peronism’s radical de-unionization was facilitated by the weakly institutionalized nature of its traditional party-union linkage. Although unions dominated the PJ in the early 1980s, the rules of the game governing their participation were always informal, fluid, and contested, leaving them vulner- able to internal changes in the distribution of power. Such a change occurred during the 1980s, when office-holding politicians used patronage resources to challenge labor’s privileged position in the party. When these politicians gained control of the party in 1987, Peronism’s weakly institutionalized mechanisms of union participation collapsed, paving the way for the consolidation of machine politics—and a steep decline in union influence—during the 1990s. -
New Victories for Kirchner LADB Staff
University of New Mexico UNM Digital Repository NotiSur Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) 9-19-2003 New Victories for Kirchner LADB Staff Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur Recommended Citation LADB Staff. "New Victories for Kirchner." (2003). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/13188 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in NotiSur by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LADB Article Id: 52610 ISSN: 1089-1560 New Victories for Kirchner by LADB Staff Category/Department: Argentina Published: 2003-09-19 With little more than 100 days in office, Argentine President Nestor Kirchner has new reasons to celebrate. He signed a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), one day after failing to meet a payment, that most analysts saw as a coup for the president. And, his political strength has increased with the victory of candidates he endorsed in elections in several provinces and the city of Buenos Aires. Kirchner, who marked 100 days in office Sept. 1, has seemed a far cry from recent Argentine political leaders, whether on issues of IMF renegotiations, human rights, relations with the US, trade, or domestic policies. Kirchner continues to enjoy high public support. He has the most prestige of any president in recent years, and few people have much negative to say about him, said political consultant Enrique Zuleta Puceiro of the firm OPSM. In a recent OPSM poll, respondents gave Kirchner high marks for initiative, independence of criteria, and leadership, with percentages near 70%. -
“Bringing Militancy to Management”: an Approach to the Relationship
“Bringing Militancy to Management”: An Approach to the Relationship between Activism 67 “Bringing Militancy to Management”: An Approach to the Relationship between Activism and Government Employment during the Cristina Fernández de Kirchner Administration in Argentina Melina Vázquez* Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET); Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani; Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina Abstract This article explores the relationship between employment in public administration and militant commitment, which is understood as that which the actors themselves define as “militant management.” To this end, an analysis is presented of three groups created within three Argentine ministries that adopted “Kirchnerist” ideology: La graN maKro (The Great Makro), the Juventud de Obras Públicas, and the Corriente de Libertación Nacional. The article explores the conditions of possibility and principal characteristics of this activism as well as the guidelines for admission, continuing membership, and promotion – both within the groups and within government entities – and the way that this type of militancy is articulated with expert, professional and academic capital as well as the capital constituted by the militants themselves. Keywords: Activism, expert knowledge, militant careers, state. * Article received on November 22, 2013; final version approved on March 26, 2014. This article is part of a series of studies that the author is working on as a researcher at CONICET and is part of the project “Activism and the Political Commitment of Youth: A Socio-Historical Study of their Political and Activist Experiences (1969-2011)” sponsored by the National Agency for Scientific and Technological Promotion, Argentine Ministry of Science, Technology and Productive Innovation (2012-2015), of which the author is the director. -
Argentina's 2015 Presidential Election
CRS INSIGHT Argentina's 2015 Presidential Election October 26, 2015 (IN10378) | Related Author Mark P. Sullivan | Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs ([email protected], 7-7689) Argentines went to the polls on October 25, 2015, to vote in the first round of a presidential race to succeed President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who hails from the Peronist party's leftist faction known as the Front of Victory (FPV). The close results set up a second round on November 22, 2015, between Daniel Scioli, governor of Buenos Aires province running under the banner of President Fernández's FPV, and Mauricio Macri, mayor of Buenos Aires, heading the Let's Change coalition that includes center-right and center-left opposition parties. In the first round, with 97% of the votes counted, Scioli received 36.86% of the vote, Macri received 34.33%, and Sergio Massa, a deputy in Argentina's Congress who heads a centrist dissident Peronist faction known as United for a New Alternative (UNA), received 21.34%. A second round is required since no candidate received 45% of the vote or 40% of the vote with a 10- point lead. The contest is significant since it is the first time in 12 years that a Kirchner will not be president. Fernández is serving her second term since 2007, when she succeeded her husband, the late Néstor Kirchner, who served one term beginning in 2003. Fernández is ineligible to run for a third consecutive term, although she would be eligible to run again in 2019. Going into the first round, many observers believed that any of the leading candidates for president would espouse more market-friendly policies than those of the current government, which include currency and price controls and import restrictions.