july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7

The Terrorist Threat tiers of armed forces personnel to guard operations occur. It operates a tightly nuclear weapons facilities, the use of controlled identification system to to ’s Nuclear physical barriers and intrusion detectors assure the identity of those involved in Weapons to secure nuclear weapons facilities, the the nuclear chain of command, and it also physical separation of warhead cores uses a rudimentary Permissive Action By Shaun Gregory from their detonation components, Link (PAL) type system to electronically and the storage of the components in lock its nuclear weapons. This system al-qa`ida has made numerous protected underground sites. uses technology similar to the banking statements about a desire to obtain industry’s “chip and pin” to ensure that nuclear weapons for use against the With respect to personnel reliability, even if weapons fall into terrorist hands United States and Western interests.1 the conducts a tight they cannot be detonated.6 While many of these statements are selection process drawing almost rhetorical hyperbole, the scale of the exclusively on officers from Punjab Finally, Pakistan makes extensive use potential destructiveness of nuclear Province who are considered to have of secrecy and deception. Significant weapons, the instability and “nuclear fewer links with religious extremism or elements of Pakistan’s nuclear porosity” of the context in Pakistan, and with the Pashtun areas of Pakistan from weapons infrastructure are kept a the vulnerabilities within Pakistan’s which groups such as the Pakistani closely guarded secret. This includes nuclear safety and security arrangements Taliban mainly garner their support. the precise location of some of the mean that the risks of terrorist groups Pakistan operates an analog to the U.S. storage facilities for nuclear core and gaining access to nuclear materials are Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) detonation components, the location of real. Moreover, militants have recently that screens individuals for Islamist preconfigured nuclear weapons crisis attacked a number of Pakistan’s nuclear sympathies, personality problems, drug deployment sites, aspects of the nuclear facilities, including an August 21, 2008 use, inappropriate external affiliations, command and control arrangements,7 incident at the Wah , widely and sexual deviancy.3 The army uses and many aspects of the arrangements understood to be one of Pakistan’s main staff rotation and also operates a “two- for nuclear safety and security (such as nuclear weapons assembly sites. person” rule under which no action, the numbers of those removed under decision, or activity involving a nuclear personnel reliability programs, the In an effort to provide insight on weapon can be undertaken by fewer reasons for their removal, and how the scale of the threat, this article than two persons.4 The purpose of this often authenticating and enabling will first outline Pakistan’s current policy is to reduce the risk of collusion (PAL-type) codes are changed). In nuclear safeguards, and then identify with terrorists and to prevent nuclear addition, Pakistan uses deception— a series of weaknesses in the country’s weapons technology getting transferred such as dummy missiles—to complicate nuclear security that could result in to the black market. In total, between the calculus of adversaries and is likely terrorist groups such as al-Qa`ida or 8,000 and 10,000 individuals from to have extended this practice to its the Pakistani Taliban gaining access to the SPD’s security division and from nuclear weapons infrastructure. sensitive nuclear material. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Military Intelligence Taken together, these measures provide Pakistan’s Nuclear Safeguards and Intelligence Bureau agencies are confidence that the Pakistan Army Pakistan has established a robust set involved in the security clearance can fully protect its nuclear weapons of measures to assure the security of its and monitoring of those with nuclear against the internal terrorist threat,8 nuclear weapons. These have been based weapons duties.5 against its main adversary India, and on copying U.S. practices, procedures and against the suggestion that its nuclear technologies, and comprise: a) physical Despite formal command authority weapons could be either spirited out of security; b) personnel reliability structures that cede a role to Pakistan’s the country by a third party (posited to programs; c) technical and procedural civilian leadership, in practice the be the United States) or destroyed in safeguards; and d) deception and Pakistan Army has complete control the event of a deteriorating situation or secrecy. These measures provide the over the country’s nuclear weapons. a state collapse in Pakistan.9 The fact Pakistan Army’s Strategic Plans Division It imposes its executive authority that Pakistan has been willing to fire on (SPD)—which oversees nuclear weapons over the weapons through the use of U.S. soldiers during the latter’s ground operations—a high degree of confidence an authenticating code system down incursion into Pakistan’s tribal areas in the safety and security of the country’s through the command chains that is on September 12, 200810 removes any nuclear weapons.2 intended to ensure that only authorized debate about whether Pakistan would nuclear weapons activities and In terms of physical security, Pakistan 6 David Blair, “Code Changes ‘Secure’ Pakistan War- operates a layered concept of concentric 3 Shaun Gregory, “Nuclear Command and Control in heads,” Daily Telegraph, February 9, 2004. Pakistan,” Defense and Security Analysis 23:3 (2007). 7 This includes the issue of pre-delegation during crises. 1 “Bin Laden has Nuclear Weapons,” BBC, November 4 Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martelline, Nuclear 8 “Zardari Says Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons are Safe,” 10, 2001; “Al Qa’ida Threaten to Use Pakistani Nukes,” Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan Reuters, April 27, 2009. Independent, June 22, 2009. (Como, Italy: Landau Network, 2002). 9 “US Has Plans to Secure Pakistan’s Nuclear Weap- 2 Lt. Col. Zafar Ali (SPD), Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets and 5 Personal interview, General Kidwai, Director General ons,” Daily Times, May 16, 2009. Threats of Terrorism: How Grave is the Danger? (Washing- of the SPD, , March 2005; Personal interview, 10 “Shots Fired in US-Pakistan Clash,” BBC, September ton, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007). Bruno Tertrais, French Ministry of Defense, June 2007. 25, 2008. july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 use force to resist attempts by the United most significantly the August 21, 2008 at entry points to facilitate access— States to secure Pakistan’s nuclear attack when Pakistani Taliban suicide suggests the credibility of such an assets without its consent. Similarly, bombers blew up several entry points assault on a nuclear weapons facility; the use of U.S. precision strikes to to one of the armament complexes at this is especially true because in a destroy the weapons would need to the Wah cantonment, considered one number of these attacks the security rely on perfect intelligence and would of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons has been poor and disorganized, and the risk not only significant radiological assembly sites.14 terrorists have been able to escape and hazards at strike targets, but also the remain at large. ire of the Pakistan Army and the wider The significance of these events is Islamic world. difficult to overstate. Civilian nuclear The risk of the Pakistani Taliban or weapons sites—those sites where al-Qa`ida gaining access to nuclear Despite these elaborate safeguards, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are weapons, components or technical empirical evidence points to a clear set manufactured, assembled or taken knowledge takes on an even graver of weaknesses and vulnerabilities in for refurbishment—are typically less dimension once the possibility of Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security protected than military sites where collusion is introduced. It is widely arrangements. nuclear weapons are stored, deployed accepted that there is a strong element and operated, a problem the Pakistan within the Pakistan Army and within Pakistan’s Nuclear Security Weaknesses Army has now moved to address.15 the lead intelligence agency, the ISI, When Pakistan was developing its that is anti-Western, particularly nuclear weapons infrastructure in the The attacks at the Wah cantonment anti-U.S., and that there also exists an 1970s and 1980s, its principal concern highlight the vulnerability of nuclear overlapping pro-Islamist strand.17 This was the risk that India would overrun weapons infrastructure sites to at is attributed to the “Islamization” of its nuclear weapons facilities in an least three forms of terrorist assault: the Pakistan Army, which is the result armored offensive if the facilities were a) an attack to cause a fire at a nuclear of a number of factors: General Zia-ul- placed close to the long Pakistan-India weapons facility, which would create Haq opening the doors of the Pakistan border. As a result, Pakistan, with a a radiological hazard; b) an attack to Army to Islamists in the late 1970s;18 few exceptions, chose to locate much cause an explosion at a nuclear weapons family and clan links to Islamists and of its nuclear weapons infrastructure facility involving a nuclear weapon extremists; the corrosive impact of to the north and west of the country or components, which would create a what is widely seen as the Pakistan and to the region around Islamabad radiological hazard; or c) an attack with Army being asked to turn their guns on and Rawalpindi—sites such as Wah, the objective of seizing control of nuclear their own countrymen at Washington’s Fatehjang, Golra Sharif, Kahuta, weapons components or possibly a behest; and the corruption of pro- Sihala, Isa Khel Charma, Tarwanah, nuclear weapon. On the latter point, Western political and military leaders. and .11 The concern, however, is Pakistan’s usual separation of nuclear that most of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are weapons components is compromised to No screening program will ever be able close to or even within areas dominated a degree by the need to assemble weapons to weed out all Islamist sympathizers by Pakistani Taliban militants and home at certain points in the manufacture and or anti-Westerners among Pakistan’s to al-Qa`ida. refurbishment cycle at civilian sites, military or among civilians with nuclear and by the requirement for co-location weapons expertise. Yet, there are at least The Pakistani Taliban and al-Qa`ida are of the separate components at military four levels of concern about collusion. more than capable of launching terrorist sites so that they can be mated quickly attacks in these areas, including within if necessary in crises. Furthermore, the First, those with access to nuclear Islamabad and Rawalpindi. They emergence of new terrorist tactics in weapons facilities, but not to the have also proved that they have good Pakistan (and of Pakistani terrorists weapons or components themselves, intelligence about the movement of in India) in which groups of armed could facilitate the access of security personnel, including army, combatants act in coordination on the terrorist groups to nuclear weapons ISI and police forces, all of whom have ground16—sometimes in combination sites, acting as a significant force been routinely targeted. A series of with suicide or vehicle bomb attacks multiplier for the kind of terrorist attacks on nuclear weapons facilities attack seen at Wah in August 2008. has also occurred. These have included 2007. an attack on the nuclear missile storage 14 “Pakistan Bombers Hit Arms Factory,” BBC, August facility at Sargodha on November 1, 21, 2008. 12 2007, an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear 15 The Pakistan Army has strengthened the security 17 This has many expressions, including the unwilling- airbase at Kamra by a suicide bomber at some civilian sites by the deployment of extra troops ness of Pakistani soldiers to fight in the tribal areas, the 13 on December 10, 2007, and perhaps and through the training of police and civilian nuclear involvement of Pakistan Army officers in protecting al- security personnel. These measures, however, have not leged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad while 11 “Expansion at Pakistan’s Nuclear Sites,” Institute for been widely implemented due to the immense pressure he was on the run between September 2002 and Febru- Science and International Security, May 19, 2009. on Pakistan’s security forces because of the operations in ary 2003, and the involvement of Pakistani officers in as- 12 Bill Roggio, “Suicide Bomber Kills Eight at Pakistani the Pashtun belt and to manpower problems partly due sassination attempts against Pakistan’s nominally pro- Airbase,” The Long War Journal, November 1, 2007. to terrorist attacks on Pakistan’s security forces. Western president, General Pervez Musharraf. 13 Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda, Taliban Targeting Pakistani 16 “Pakistan Taliban Chief Brags of Attack on Police,” 18 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism (Ar- Nuclear Sites,” The Long War Journal, December 11, Washington Post, April 1, 2009. monk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Press, 2005). july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7

Second, some individuals with nuclear exists that Pakistan might be similarly weapons duties could facilitate— incentivized to move to such a “coercive through intelligence, or directly—access option.” This remains extremely to nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons unlikely in the present context, not least components, circumventing two-person given the level of terrorist threat to the and other procedural obstacles. Pakistani state itself. Nevertheless, it forms a necessary strand of the calculus Third, technocrats with pro-terrorist or about the transfer of nuclear weapons anti-Western sympathies could transfer to terrorist groups in Pakistan.23 their knowledge to al-Qa`ida or to the Pakistani Taliban. There is already Conclusion the well-known case of two senior The risk of the transfer of nuclear Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission weapons, weapons components or (PAEC) scientists, Sultan Bashirrudin nuclear expertise to terrorists in Pakistan Mahmood and Chaudhry Abdul Majeed, is genuine. Moreover, knowledge that who traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 such a transfer has occurred may not and again shortly before 9/11 for become evident until the aftermath of meetings with Usama bin Ladin himself, a nuclear 9/11 in Pakistan or elsewhere the content of which has never been in the world. It remains imperative that disclosed.19 Combined with the example Pakistan is pressured and supported, of AQ Khan, the so-called “father” above all by the United States, to of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb who was continue to improve the safety and arrested in 2004 for masterminding the security of its nuclear weapons and to largest nuclear proliferation network ensure the fidelity of those civilian and in history, the cases of Mahmood and military personnel with access to, or Majeed point to what has been termed knowledge of, nuclear weapons. The the “porosity” of the nuclear context in challenge to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons Pakistan and the real risk of nuclear from Pakistani Taliban groups and from technology and of related technology al-Qa`ida constitutes a real and present being sold to terrorists on the black danger, and the recent assaults by the market by those involved with Khan Pakistan Army on some of these groups or with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in FATA and in the NWFP is a welcome program.20 development. Nevertheless, more steps must be taken before the threat The final risk, and one that is usually is neutralized and Pakistan’s nuclear overlooked, is that the Pakistan Army weapons no longer pose an existential could itself decide to transfer nuclear danger to the rest of the world. weapons to a terrorist group. One argument for this, described in Philip Professor Shaun Gregory is Director of the Bobbitt’s Terror and Consent,21 is that states Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) can become pressurized or incentivized at the University of Bradford in the United to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist Kingdom. He was formerly a visiting fellow groups because they are responding to at the Institute for Strategic Studies in threats from an external power but fear Islamabad (ISSI) and at the Institute for the consequences of being identified Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) in as the origin of a nuclear strike. In the New Delhi. He is the author of many papers context of severe international pressure and reports on Pakistani nuclear weapons, on the Pakistan Army—particularly by terrorism, and state stability. His latest India or the United States22—the risk book, Pakistan: Securing the Insecure State, will be published in 2010. 19 Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, Nuclear Jihad- ist: The Man Who Sold the World’s Most Dangerous Weapons (New York: Twelve, 2007). 20 Adrian Levy and Katherine Scott-Clarke, Deception: 23 It is an interesting aside that Pakistan Army Chief of Pakistan, the United States and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Staff Mirza Aslam Beg was instrumental in passing nu- Weapons (New York: Walker and Company, 2007). clear weapons technology to a regional and sectarian ri- 21 Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent (London: Allen val, Iran, in the 1980s simply for money for the Pakistan Lane, 2008). Army. The lesson is clear: under certain circumstances, 22 For example, in a context in which the United States senior figures in the Pakistan Army may be willing to was attempting to “take out” Pakistani nuclear weap- transfer nuclear weapons technology, even when it is ons by precision airstrikes or by the insertion of special irrational to do so as in the case of Iran, empowering a forces teams. regional and religious rival.