The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons

JULY 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 7 The Terrorist Threat tiers of armed forces personnel to guard operations occur. It operates a tightly nuclear weapons facilities, the use of controlled identification system to to Pakistan’s Nuclear physical barriers and intrusion detectors assure the identity of those involved in Weapons to secure nuclear weapons facilities, the the nuclear chain of command, and it also physical separation of warhead cores uses a rudimentary Permissive Action By Shaun Gregory from their detonation components, Link (PAL) type system to electronically and the storage of the components in lock its nuclear weapons. This system al-qaìda has made numerous protected underground sites. uses technology similar to the banking statements about a desire to obtain industry’s “chip and pin” to ensure that nuclear weapons for use against the With respect to personnel reliability, even if weapons fall into terrorist hands United States and Western interests.1 the Pakistan Army conducts a tight they cannot be detonated.6 While many of these statements are selection process drawing almost rhetorical hyperbole, the scale of the exclusively on officers from Punjab Finally, Pakistan makes extensive use potential destructiveness of nuclear Province who are considered to have of secrecy and deception. Significant weapons, the instability and “nuclear fewer links with religious extremism or elements of Pakistan’s nuclear porosity” of the context in Pakistan, and with the Pashtun areas of Pakistan from weapons infrastructure are kept a the vulnerabilities within Pakistan’s which groups such as the Pakistani closely guarded secret. This includes nuclear safety and security arrangements Taliban mainly garner their support. the precise location of some of the mean that the risks of terrorist groups Pakistan operates an analog to the U.S. storage facilities for nuclear core and gaining access to nuclear materials are Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) detonation components, the location of real. Moreover, militants have recently that screens individuals for Islamist preconfigured nuclear weapons crisis attacked a number of Pakistan’s nuclear sympathies, personality problems, drug deployment sites, aspects of the nuclear facilities, including an August 21, 2008 use, inappropriate external affiliations, command and control arrangements,7 incident at the Wah cantonment, widely and sexual deviancy.3 The army uses and many aspects of the arrangements understood to be one of Pakistan’s main staff rotation and also operates a “two- for nuclear safety and security (such as nuclear weapons assembly sites. person” rule under which no action, the numbers of those removed under decision, or activity involving a nuclear personnel reliability programs, the In an effort to provide insight on weapon can be undertaken by fewer reasons for their removal, and how the scale of the threat, this article than two persons.4 The purpose of this often authenticating and enabling will first outline Pakistan’s current policy is to reduce the risk of collusion (PAL-type) codes are changed). In nuclear safeguards, and then identify with terrorists and to prevent nuclear addition, Pakistan uses deception— a series of weaknesses in the country’s weapons technology getting transferred such as dummy missiles—to complicate nuclear security that could result in to the black market. In total, between the calculus of adversaries and is likely terrorist groups such as al-Qaìda or 8,000 and 10,000 individuals from to have extended this practice to its the Pakistani Taliban gaining access to the SPD’s security division and from nuclear weapons infrastructure. sensitive nuclear material. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Military Intelligence Taken together, these measures provide Pakistan’s Nuclear Safeguards and Intelligence Bureau agencies are confidence that the Pakistan Army Pakistan has established a robust set involved in the security clearance can fully protect its nuclear weapons of measures to assure the security of its and monitoring of those with nuclear against the internal terrorist threat,8 nuclear weapons. These have been based weapons duties.5 against its main adversary India, and on copying U.S. practices, procedures and against the suggestion that its nuclear technologies, and comprise: a) physical Despite formal command authority weapons could be either spirited out of security; b) personnel reliability structures that cede a role to Pakistan’s the country by a third party (posited to programs; c) technical and procedural civilian leadership, in practice the be the United States) or destroyed in safeguards; and d) deception and Pakistan Army has complete control the event of a deteriorating situation or secrecy. These measures provide the over the country’s nuclear weapons. a state collapse in Pakistan.9 The fact Pakistan Army’s Strategic Plans Division It imposes its executive authority that Pakistan has been willing to fire on (SPD)—which oversees nuclear weapons over the weapons through the use of U.S. soldiers during the latter’s ground operations—a high degree of confidence an authenticating code system down incursion into Pakistan’s tribal areas in the safety and security of the country’s through the command chains that is on September 12, 200810 removes any nuclear weapons.2 intended to ensure that only authorized debate about whether Pakistan would nuclear weapons activities and In terms of physical security, Pakistan 6 David Blair, “Code Changes ‘Secure’ Pakistan War- operates a layered concept of concentric 3 Shaun Gregory, “Nuclear Command and Control in heads,” Daily Telegraph, February 9, 2004. Pakistan,” Defense and Security Analysis 23:3 (2007). 7 This includes the issue of pre-delegation during crises. 1 “Bin Laden has Nuclear Weapons,” BBC, November 4 Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martelline, Nuclear 8 “Zardari Says Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons are Safe,” 10, 2001; “Al Qa’ida Threaten to Use Pakistani Nukes,” Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan Reuters, April 27, 2009. Independent, June 22, 2009. (Como, Italy: Landau Network, 2002). 9 “US Has Plans to Secure Pakistan’s Nuclear Weap- 2 Lt. Col. Zafar Ali (SPD), Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets and 5 Personal interview, General Kidwai, Director General ons,” Daily Times, May 16, 2009. Threats of Terrorism: How Grave is the Danger? (Washing- of the SPD, Islamabad, March 2005; Personal interview, 10 “Shots Fired in US-Pakistan Clash,” BBC, September ton, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007). Bruno Tertrais, French Ministry of Defense, June 2007. 25, 2008. JULY 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 7 use force to resist attempts by the United most significantly the August 21, 2008 at entry points to facilitate access— States to secure Pakistan’s nuclear attack when Pakistani Taliban suicide suggests the credibility of such an assets without its consent. Similarly, bombers blew up several entry points assault on a nuclear weapons facility; the use of U.S. precision strikes to to one of the armament complexes at this is especially true because in a destroy the weapons would need to the Wah cantonment, considered one number of these attacks the security rely on perfect intelligence and would of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons has been poor and disorganized, and the risk not only significant radiological assembly sites.14 terrorists have been able to escape and hazards at strike targets, but also the remain at large. ire of the Pakistan Army and the wider The significance of these events is Islamic world. difficult to overstate. Civilian nuclear The risk of the Pakistani Taliban or weapons sites—those sites where al-Qaìda gaining access to nuclear Despite these elaborate safeguards, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are weapons, components or technical empirical evidence points to a clear set manufactured, assembled or taken knowledge takes on an even graver of weaknesses and vulnerabilities in for refurbishment—are typically less dimension once the possibility of Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security protected than military sites where collusion is introduced. It is widely arrangements. nuclear weapons are stored, deployed accepted that there is a strong element and operated, a problem the Pakistan within the Pakistan Army and within Pakistan’s Nuclear Security Weaknesses Army has now moved to address.15 the lead intelligence agency, the ISI, When Pakistan was developing its that is anti-Western, particularly nuclear weapons infrastructure in the The attacks at the Wah cantonment anti-U.S., and that there also exists an 1970s and 1980s, its principal concern highlight the vulnerability of nuclear overlapping pro-Islamist strand.17 This was the risk that India would overrun weapons infrastructure sites to at is attributed to the “Islamization” of its nuclear weapons facilities in an least three forms of terrorist assault: the Pakistan Army, which is the result armored offensive if the facilities were a) an attack to cause a fire at a nuclear of a number of factors: General Zia-ul- placed close to the long Pakistan-India weapons facility, which would create Haq opening the doors of the Pakistan border. As a result, Pakistan, with a a radiological hazard; b) an attack to Army to Islamists in the late 1970s;18 few exceptions, chose to locate much cause an explosion at a nuclear weapons family and clan links to Islamists and of its nuclear weapons infrastructure facility involving a nuclear weapon extremists; the corrosive impact of to the north and west of the country or components,

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