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Regional Insecurity and State Weakness As Harbinger of Terrorism and Insurgency in Mali

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Regional Insecurity and State Weakness As Harbinger of Terrorism and Insurgency in Mali Regional Insecurity and State Weakness as Harbinger of Terrorism and Insurgency in Mali DISSERTATION Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Einer Doktorin der Staatswissenschaften (Dr. rer. pol.) Am Fachbereich 6: Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften der UNIVERSITÄT Koblenz-Landau Vorgelegt im Promotionsfach Politikwissenschaft Schwerpunkt Sicherheitspolitik Am 16. Juni 2017 Von Marie-Theres Beumler Geb. am 27.03.1987 in Hamburg Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Siegmar Schmidt Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Rainer Tetzlaff Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich die als Dissertation vorgelegte Abhandlung in keinem anderen Verfahren zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades oder als Prüfungsarbeit für eine akademische oder staatliche Prüfung eingereicht habe, dass ich die vorgelegte Abhandlung selbständig verfasst, keine anderen als die von mir angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt und die den benutzten Werken wörtlich oder inhaltlich entnommenen Stellen kenntlich gemacht habe. Hiermit erkläre ich, dass die Gelegenheit zum vorliegenden Promotionsverfahren nicht kommerziell vermittelt worden ist und dass ich insbesondere keine Organisation eingeschaltet habe, die gegen Entgelt Betreuer und Betreuerinnen für die Anfertigung von Dissertationen sucht oder die der Doktorandin obliegenden Pflichten hinsichtlich der Prüfungsleistungen ganz oder teilweise erledigt. Marie-Theres Beumler Hamburg, den Curriculum Vitae Zur Person Geburtsdatum 27.03.1987 Geburtsort Hamburg Nationalität deutsch Bildungsweg 2006 Halepaghen – Schule in Buxtehude Abitur 2007 – 2010 Ethnologie und Französisch Universität Hamburg Bachelor of Arts 2010 – 2012 Peace and Conflict Studies European Peace University Austria Master of Arts Berufserfahrung 07/2012 – 07/2018 BMVg Offizier: Hauptmann des Heeres ZOpKomBw: Analystin islamistischer Terrorismus, Naher und Mittlerer Osten FüAkBw: Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin und Dozentin, Fokus: Islamistischer Terrorismus, Naher und Mittlerer Osten, fragile Staatlichkeit BMVg: Stellvertretung Referenten Mit besonderem Dank an Prof. Dr. Siegmar Schmidt, der dieses Projekt ermöglich hat. Ebenfalls gebührt mein besonderer Dank Professor Dr. Tetzlaff. Table of Contents Introduction I Part One: Theoretical Approach, Methodology and Research Design 4 1. Theories in International Relations 4 2. Introducing the Theoretical Approach: Regional Security Complex Theory 6 2.1. Regional Security Complex Theory and the International Community 12 2.2. The Framework of the Theory 14 2.2.1. The Military Sector 15 2.2.2. The Political Sector 16 2.2.3. TheSocietal Sector 17 2.2.4. The Economic Sector 18 2.2.5. The Environmental Sector 18 3. Introducing the Research Design 19 3.1. Relevance of the Research and State of the Art 23 3.1.1. Relevance of the Research for Terrorism Studies 27 4. Introducing the Methodology 29 4.1. The Case Study Method explained 29 4.2. The Necessity of in-depth Analysis of non-state Actors 30 4.3. Weighing Criticism of Theory and Methodology 32 4.4. An Overview of the Sources 33 5. Essential Definitions for the Research Topic 35 5.1. The Difference between Terrorism and Insurgency: A short Comparison 35 5.1.1. The Strategy and Nature of Terrorism 35 5.1.2. Insurgency Movements as a political Phenomenon 39 5.2. State Weakness, its Meaning and Consequences 41 5.2.1. Worse than weak: State Failure 44 5.2.2. Civil War and its Impact on weak States 46 5.2.3. Authority: Ungoverned Territories and their Impact on States 47 5.2.3.1. Ungoverned Territories and Terrorism: Uncovering the Links 48 5.2.3.2. A Lack of Law Enforcement Capacities as a Sign of State Weakness 49 5.2.3.3. Capacity: Administrative Weakness and the Relevance of Social Services 49 5.2.3.4. Legitimacy: An important Indicator of State Weakness 50 II. Part Two: Introducing the main non-state Actors in Mali and its Neighborhood 52 1. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: The Development of a regional Threat 52 1.1. Forerunners of AQIM: The Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) 54 1.1.1 The Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) 56 1.1.1.2. The Structure and Strategy of the GSPC 57 1.1.1.3. The GSPC Leadership 58 1.1.1.4. The Influence of the GWOT on the GSPC 59 1.2. The Establishment of AQIM: A regional Game Changer 60 1.2.1. The Ideology of AQIM: A short Introduction to Salafism 64 1.2.2. The Structure and Organization of AQIM 66 1.2.2.1. AQIM’s Leadership 68 1.2.3. The broader Picture: AQIM’s Strategy and Goals 71 1.2.4. Assault Tactics used to conduct Attacks 73 1.2.5. Finance and Weaponry: Two Essentials for Terrorist Groups 75 1.2.6. The Recruitment Policies of AQIM 77 1.2.7. AQIM’s Relationship with Al Qaeda Central 79 1.2.8. AQIM’s Relationship with the local Population 79 1.2.9. The Relationship with other militant Groups 81 1.9.1. AQIM and Ansar Dine 82 1.9.2. AQIM and MUJAO 83 1.9.3. AQIM and the MNLA 84 1.10. Summary 85 2. The Tuareg: A regional Source of Instability? 86 2.1. The traditional social and political Organization of the Tuareg 88 2.2. The Tuareg in Mali after Colonization: A Succession of Conflicts 90 2.3. How the Tuareg migrated to Libya 94 2.4. Violent non-state Groups among the Tuareg 96 2.4.1. The MNLA and its Role in the 2012 Insurgency Movement 96 2.4.2. Ansar Dine: An Islamist Tuareg Group 97 2.5. Summary 98 III. Part Three: Mali, its Neighborhood and Prospects for Regional Security Cooperation 100 1. Regional Cooperation 101 1.1. Systems of enhanced Security Cooperation in West Africa 102 1.1.1. The African Union and its Influence on regional Stability 103 1.1.2. Institutionalized Security: The Role of ECOWAS 104 1.2. Regional Security Cooperation: Counter-Terrorism 110 1.2.1. The Pan-Sahel Initiative 111 1.2.2 The Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership 111 1.3. Conclusion 113 1.4. Excurso: The Role of France in Mali: Overlay? 114 1.4.1. France’s Security Policies in Mali after Decolonization and prior to 2012 114 1.4.2. Continuation of the “Françafrique”? 117 1.4.3. France’s Military Engagement in Mali 2012 120 1.4.4 Conclusion 123 2. The State of Mali 126 2.1. The Development of Democracy in Mali 125 2.1.1. Governance: Authority and Legitimacy as Harbingers of institutional Strength? 130 2.1.2. A chronological Account of the Events in March 2012: Insurgency and Coup 132 2.2. An Overview of Civil War and internal Conflict in Mali: Sustainable Instability? 133 2.2.1. Tuareg Rebellions in Mali: Causes and Consequences 133 2.2.2. Interrelations and Causes for Insurgency and Coup 137 2.3. Ungoverned Territories: The North as a Pariah to Stability 139 2.3.1. Illicit Traffic: Exploiting the northern Power Vacuum 142 2.3.2 Authority: Mali’s Lack of Law Enforcement Capacities 144 2.3.3. An Assessment of Malian Armed Forces 145 2.3.3.1. Counter-Terrorism Initiatives in Mali 147 2.4. Capacity and Legitimacy: Analyzing the Administration 148 2.4.1. The Provision of Social Services 148 2.5. Conclusion: Mali: a weak State in 2012 150 3. Algeria’s Role in the Region and its Influence on Mali 155 3.1. The History of Algerian Colonization 157 3.1.1. Governance: Authority and Legitimacy of the Algerian State 160 3.2. Civil War and Internal Conflict 161 3.2.1. The Black Decade: Islamism and Violence 162 3.3. The Existence and Scope of Ungoverned Territories in Algeria 163 3.3.1. The Strength of Algerian Law Enforcement Capacities 164 3.3.2. The Algerian Armed Forces 164 3.3.3. Algerian Counter-Terrorism Efforts 165 3.3.4. Le Concorde Civile: An Approach to end radical Islamism in Algeria 167 3.4. Conclusion: The Influence of Algeria on stability in Mali 168 4. The Influence of Libya after 2011 on the Events in Mali 169 4.1. The Relationship between Gaddafi and the Tuareg 170 4.2. The Outbreak of Violence and the Fall of Gaddafi 171 4.3. Repercussions of the Events in Libya on the Sahel-Sahara Region 173 4.4. Conclusion: Libya’s regional Dimension and its Effects on Mali 175 5. Mauritania: Shared Threats and Security Cooperation with Mali? 176 5.1. Supranational ungoverned Territory and its Consequences 177 5.2. AQIM in Mauritania: Expanding its Presence? 179 5.3. Mauritanian Security Forces 181 5.4. Conclusion: How Mauritania and Mali influence each other’s Stability 182 6. Niger and Mali: Shared Concerns or just Neighbors? 183 6.1. Threats and Security Challenges in Niger and their Effects on Mali 183 6.1.1. The Tuareg in Niger: A remaining Challenge to Stability? 184 6.1.2. Ungoverned Territory as a future Challenge 187 6.2. A short Overview of the Nigerien Security Forces 187 6.3. An important geostrategic Location: Neighborhood Effects 188 6.4. Conclusion: The Security-Interrelation between Mali and Niger 189 IV Part Four: Findings 192 1. Validation of the Hypothesis 192 1.1. Validation of Hypothesis I 192 1.2. Validation of Hypothesis II 195 1.3. Validation of Hypothesis III 196 2. Answering the Research Question: Which Factors led to the Failure of the Malian State in 2012? 198 3. Mali after 2012: Recent Developments and Threat Assessment 200 3.1. The Aftermath of the Secessionist-Islamist Insurgency: Opération Serval 200 3.1.1. After Serval: Opération Barkhane 204 3.1.2. The Resurgence of Violence 206 4. Conclusion: What State Weakness and RSCT reveal in the Case of Mali 210 5. Recommendations: How to move towards sustainable Stability 213 6. Bibliography 220 Acronyms AFISMA African-led International Support Mission to Mali AIS Armée Islamique du Salut AQ Al Qaeda, general franchise Al Qaeda Central Groups’ core led by the Emir al Zawahiri, based in Pakistan APSA African Peace and Security Architecture AQAP Al Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula AQI Al Qaeda
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