Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments

Mali: Beyond Counterterrorism WP Wolfram Lacher and Denis M. Tull S The international military intervention in is fraught with risks. The current cam- paign against extremists in Mali’s north could easily turn into a conflict between local communities. Attacks on civilians by the Malian army and African troops could cause the situation to escalate further. Progress in the north requires a government in the capital that has widespread support, which is currently lacking. The EU train- ing mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) will be confronted with the coup leaders of 2012 and ethnic in the army. By intervening, external actors are embarking on a long- term involvement in a complex conflict. To minimize these risks, stronger external focus is needed on the political process in Bamako, and the coordination of regional and international efforts must improve.

The widespread assumption that interven- regional approach that was agreed in tion in Mali is about fighting extremist January 2013. groups is misleading. At the heart of the war are two closely intertwined crises. First, the conflict in the north is fundamentally Complex dynamics in northern Mali between elites from rival tribal and ethnic To understand the conflict in Mali, one groups, some of whom, for tactical reasons, has to look below the surface of the three have allied themselves with heavily armed Islamist extremist groups – Al-Qaida in the extremists. Second, the government in Muslim Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement Bamako has been largely paralysed ever for Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa since a military coup deposed President (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine – that control the Amadou Toumani Touré in March 2012. As north. a result, the government has been unable The conflict has its roots in tensions to win any allies in the north. A lack of re- between northern elites that had been gional security cooperation was also partly growing over recent years. Tuareg tribes to blame for the increasing extremist pres- of aristocratic descent saw their hitherto ence in northern Mali, and for the situation dominant position in region increas- escalating into a violent conflict in January ing eroded by the policies of the Malian 2012. The underlying reasons for this lack leadership under President Touré (2002– of cooperation persist – despite the joint 2012). To exert control over the north,

Wolfram Lacher is an Associate in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 7 Dr. Denis M. Tull is Head of SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division February 2013

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Touré drew on leaders of Tuareg groups elites was that they stood to lose power formerly vassal to the aristocrats, as well if they terminated the alliances with as Arab tribes from and extremists. regions. Touré relied on militias from these ’s military intervention has groups and gave them free rein to partici- changed the game. It has raised the politi- pate in northern Mali’s flourishing drug- cal costs for the armed groups. French trafficking trade. With Mali’s leaders and military advances have weakened the bar- their allies involved in criminal activities, gaining position of the armed groups vis-à- AQIM was also able to expand its presence vis Bamako. Consequently, the tactical in the north. The vast sums of ransom alliances began to disintegrate shortly after money that European governments paid for the French military intervention began on the release of hostages played an important 11 January 2013. Some rebel factions are role in this development. Ransom money more likely enter into negotiations. Telling- created shared interests between terrorists, ly, the MNLA approached France even tribal leaders and high-level Malian deci- before the intervention, to offer its services sion-makers. It also fuelled local rivalries, as in fighting the extremists. As the militarily did control of the drug trade. When Tuareg weakest group, the MNLA had no bargain- fighters returning from Libya’s ing power. When the French military inter- arrived in Mali in autumn 2011, the power vention began, many Ansar Dine fighters balanced tipped in favour of Tuareg groups who had left the MNLA because of military that had been on the losing side of Touré’s weakness subsequently returned. This ex- divide-and-rule policies. plains why, when French troops arrived in These groups include both the National the regional capital of Kidal in late January Movement for the Liberation of 2013, the MNLA was able to announce that (MNLA), which launched the rebellion in it was now controlling the town. The same 2012, and the leadership of Ansar Dine. The reasoning was behind the split of Ifoghas rift between the current leaders of the two Tuareg leaders from Ansar Dine to form the groups had already emerged during the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA) in late 1990s conflict in northern Mali, as well as January. the 2006-09 rebellion. Ideological differ- Current trends suggest that the armed ences play only a secondary role today, as groups in the north are splintering into they did then. The ethnic militias that until their respective ethnic and tribal compo- the military coup had fought in the north nents. Ansar Dine’s Berabiche Arabs in on the government’s side partly fled to January formed their own brigade, Ansar southern Mali or Niger. Partly, they joined al-Sharia, which has close ties to AQIM. The the extremists or formed a separate MUJAO’s Lamhar Arabs and Songhai could – the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA). The also form their own militias, which would three extremist groups won their dominant leave behind a hard core of regional jiha- position by entering into tactical alliances dists. To evade French military strikes, the with tribal leaders, criminal networks extremists will fragment into small groups, and regional jihadists. These alliances some of which will move into neighbour- relied on the financial power that the ran- ing countries, while others will remain in som money had brought to AQIM and the northern Mali to adopt guerrilla tactics. MUJAO, which formed when it broke away The latter trend was already apparent in from AQIM in late 2011. Local factions tried early February 2013. Armed groups in the to use these alliances to gain military sup- north would no longer posed a direct mili- remacy over their rivals in the north and tary threat to Bamako – but conflict in thus manoeuvre themselves into position northern Mali was far from over. for potential negotiations with the national The big risk in this scenario is that con- government. The dilemma facing local flict dynamics in the north would develop

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into a war between groups based on dif- armed groups might be persuaded by ferent ethnic and tribal groups, similar credible offers of positions in the national to what happened in the 1990s. In late administration or the military – although January 2013, the Malian army’s Imghad such an approach would constitute a hard Tuareg militias who had earlier fled to sell in the country’s south. Once the armed Niger, led by Major Colonel Hadj Gamou, groups have been weakened to the point joined the Franco-Malian offensive. The that an inclusive political process can involvement of ethnic militias in Malian begin, negotiations could begin that would military offensives is likely to escalate the lead to further-reaching concessions. One conflicts between ethnic groups and tribes of these could be truly decentralising the in the north. Some armed groups will prob- country – decentralisation was agreed in ably distance themselves from the jihadists the 1990s but never actually implemented. to avoid coming under attack from the But for such a process to succeed, there has French army. But it is also possible that to be an effective government in Bamako – some tribal groups, like the Berabiche and and that has not been the case since the Lamhar Arabs, could see the war as a fight coup last year. against their communities, and ally them- selves even more closely with the extrem- ists. In any case, the supposed counter- The political crisis in Bamako terrorism mission that external actors Since the putsch, little progress has been are engaged in is likely to reveal itself as made in efforts to return to a constitu- an intervention in a conflict internal to tional order and to form a functional gov- northern Mali. The conflict in the north ernment. Mali’s interim president Dion- is neither primarily due to on regional counda Traoré, the coup leaders under jihadism, nor to a “Tuareg problem”. In- Captain , and former prime stead, rivalries oppose the elites of different minister consistently Tuareg groups, as well as Tuareg and other blocked each other. Diarra’s forced resig- communities in the north. To resolve this nation in December 2012 showed that the conflict will be a far more difficult and coup leaders were continuing to exercise protracted task than fighting a hard core their veto power. They gradually consoli- of extremists. Even if regional jihadists dated their position within the army and partially move into neighbouring coun- security apparatus. Units loyal to ex-presi- tries, the conflict in northern Mali would dent Touré were dissolved and leading be likely to continue. officers imprisoned. Allies of the coup Until France intervened, there were few leaders continue to dominate the govern- incentives for the armed groups to try and ment and act as a counterweight to the negotiate a solution. They were under no interim president. military pressure whatsoever and their France’s military intervention and the position was too strong for them to start international community’s increasing making compromises that would be accept- involvement in Mali are also changing the able to other communities in the north. balance of power in Bamako. The fact that The difficulty of balancing the diverging the extremist offensive towards Mali’s interests of northern Mali’s communities heartland was only stopped by the French and political factions will be a major ob- intervention exposed the coup leaders’ stacle to negotiating a solution. One pos- incompetence. President Traoré, who had sible approach would be a gradual process been widely unpopular as a representative whereby individual groups are encouraged of the Touré-era political establishment, to switch their allegiances to the govern- gained support after he appealed to Paris ment through a combination of military for help. French influence became visible pressure and incentives. Some leaders of in late January 2013, when several officers

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from ‘bérets rouges’ elite units were able, the government’s own crisis of legiti- released from jail. Such influence, however, macy will soon return to the fore. can equally trigger a revival of tensions Finally, simply returning to the pre- within the army, as clashes between ‘bérets coup political order would mean failing rouges’ and army units loyal to the coup to acknowledge the severity of the crisis in leaders illustrated in February 2013. France Bamako. The coup exposed Mali’s democ- is likely to use its presence in Bamako to racy as nothing more than a façade. Those prevent further interference by the coup who staged it initially gained public sup- leaders in the political process. But even port because they had removed from power if this strategy is successful, it will not be a political class that was considered to be enough to end the crisis in Bamako. corrupt to its very core. Putting this politi- For external actors, the key of the tran- cal establishment back in power is unlikely sition process lies in elections. France and to be seen as a return to a legitimate politi- the EU have rightly sought to encourage cal order. the adoption of a roadmap to this effect, on External actors therefore currently have which the EU has conditioned its resump- to work with a government and a military tion of development aid. In late January, that are both internally divided, have little Prime Minister Django Cissoko presented a scope to take political or military action, roadmap that would lead the country to and lack broad societal backing. A weak elections at the end of July. In another sign government, however, will be unable to that France’s presence in Mali is curbing make the concessions needed to persuade the influence of the coup leaders, the northern groups to switch sides. A divided roadmap stipulates that unlawful impris- army lacking clear chains of command will onment and torture by the coup leaders struggle to keep its soldiers under control will be prosecuted. However, contrary to and prevent transgressions in the north. the interim authorities’ previous approach Pacifying northern Mali depends directly to resolve the crisis, the plan does not refer on making progress in the political process to a national dialogue. Moreover, instead in Bamako. of being agreed on the basis of an all-inclu- sive consultative process, the roadmap was passed by the – whose The dynamics of session had expired, and which is seen as military intervention dominated by the political establishment With the extremists’ advance that com- of the Touré era. France and the EU are pelled France to send in its troops, the likely to have backed Cissoko’s approach, international community’s original plans to avoid an open transition process that became obsolete, as they had been outlined could further weaken the interim authori- in UN Security Council Resolution 2085 ties. of 20 December 2012. The idea was to Nevertheless, it seems doubtful that Mali deploy the African-led International Sup- will actually be able to hold free and fair port Mission in Mali (AFIMSA), which was elections in the north anytime soon – espe- to be operational by autumn 2013 and was cially outside the cities of Timbuktu and intended to help the Malian army win back Gao. Another problem is that 150,000 the north. The European Training Mission Malians have fled to neighbouring coun- Mali (EUTM Mali) was to prepare Mali’s tries and allowing them to vote will be dif- soldiers to lead the operation. ficult. If these issues are ignored, northern With the French intervention, a number communities will feel excluded from the of key factors have changed for AFISMA and political process. Conversely, if the govern- the international community. The mission, ment delays elections until it becomes pos- whose troops have already started to arrive sible to hold them in the north are accept- in Mali, must now intervene in the conflict

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immediately. Instead of the 3,300 soldiers conduct counterinsurgency operations set out under the original plan, AFISMA anywhere, let alone in desert regions. may count as many as 6,000 soldiers, who The Nigerian army, which is sending the will come from at least eight West African second-largest contingent to Mali (1,200), countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, , has been unsuccessful in fighting Boko Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo. Haram extremists on its own territory. Chad has also joined the mission, the only Boko Haram’s ranks have swelled due to country in the group that is not a member the Nigerian army’s ruthless approach. of ECOWAS. It is supplying by far the Although Chad’s army has experience of biggest contingent, having agreed to send desert combat, it has also called on France in 2,000 soldiers. a number of times (most recently in 2008) The chain of events has pushed into the to help it overcome rebel uprisings. Besides, background the (political, logistical and Chad’s main reason for getting involved in financial) reservations that Mali’s neigh- AFISMA is that the authoritarian regime bours have expressed about military inter- of President Idriss Déby is looking to earn vention. Politically speaking, AFISMA was political credit with France. Déby has had seen as a problem because it would be to rely on French troops a number of times coming to the aid of a government func- to ensure his political survival. Mauritania tioning outside the limits of a constitu- and , probably the two most impor- tional order. It had long been unclear tant countries for Mali in the region, have whether or not the coup leaders would refused to participate in the African mis- even agree to the intervention, seeing as sion. They fear that if they get involved, the ECOWAS was seeking to remove them from conflict will spill over into their territories. power. Furthermore, there was and still is The attitude in Mauritania, whose elites confusion about what political strategy have close ties to Mali’s Arabs and Tuaregs, should accompany the military action and is also shaped by the view that the conflict what the ultimate goal of that action is about “black” soldiers from Mali and should be. Logistical challenges have also West Africa attacking “white” groups in slowed AFISMA’s progress. ECOWAS still northern Mali. Major diplomatic efforts are does not have an operational standby force needed to promote political, security and – and that will not change until 2015. intelligence cooperation between Maurita- Even though substantial troop numbers nia and Algeria on the one hand and Mali, are being deployed to Mali, it is important France and AFISMA on the other. not to expect too much of AFISMA. The AFISMA will not be able to fulfil the task mission has begun six months earlier than originally set out in Resolution 2085. Most planned and has only limited capabilities. support for the Malian army in seizing back The troops are being sent in unprepared control of the north is likely to come from and without sufficient training. AFISMA is France. Indeed, the tripartite alliance logistically and financially dependent on between the French army, the Malian army the international community. Getting the and AFISMA will primarily have to rely on troops into Mali is by far the easiest prob- France’s capabilities. Paris will have to bear lem to solve. Much bigger question marks the bulk of the military load for the fore- hang over their ability to get around, com- seeable future. Even in the most optimistic municate and work together. scenario, it will still be several months The mission involves many relatively before France can slowly start handing small contingents, which will impede its responsibility over to the Malian army and cohesion and effectiveness. Only a fraction AFISMA troops. Until then, those forces will of the troops will actually be available for mainly be tasked with holding recovered combat missions. On top of that, the armies territory. But even that will be far from involved are not known for their abilities to straightforward, given the vast distances,

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the enemy’s mobility and the limited capa- groups that, following their military bilities of Malian and AFISMA soldiers. For defeats, will be more amenable to com- the foreseeable future, their control is promise, need a negotiating partner in likely to remain limited to a small number Bamako in order for talks to begin. of towns, while most of northern Mali will present a vacuumwhere armed groups can move around with ease. It is all the more Outlook important for third states and international Discussions at the UN Security Council in organisations to provide robust financial early February suggest that AFISMA is likely and logistical support to AFISMA. to be placed under the umbrella of a UN mission in the near future. This move is related to considerations about the mis- Military intervention and the sion’s broader legitimacy under a UN , political process as well as concerns about funding for the The apparent success of France’s military intervention. ECOWAS has estimated that intervention thus far can only be sustained AFISMA will cost just under €460 million in the long term on the basis of negotiated in the first year, and it is likely that the political solutions to the conflicts in north- final figure will be much higher. Robust ern Mali. Paradoxically, France’s interven- and mobile African units will be essential tion may prove “too successful” – in the in partially replacing the French army and sense that the government in Bamako, in driving forward efforts to stabilise Mali. propped up by French and African military The African-led mission can also play a support, could refuse to enter into mean- role in preventing incursions and acts of ingful negotiations. Now that extremist revenge by the Malian military and pro- groups have been weakened, France and government militias in the north of the AFISMA should aim to shift the focus country. back to the actual problem – the conflicts After successfully containing the extrem- between Mali’s elites. Of course, by inter- ist threat, external actors should refrain vening, France has now become a key from taking a position in the internal con- political actor within Mali, too. Paris will flicts in Mali. It would be wrong for exter- be tempted to use its military clout to nal actors to seek and select their partners influence the situation, while all the polit- among the actors in Mali’s north, or in its ical camps in Mali – be it the rebels or capital. The international community the competing factions in Bamako – will should focus its attention on what politi- attempt to manipulate external actors to cal process is best suited to establishing a their own advantage. The French army, legitimate and effective government in which is still being celebrated in Mali, Bamako – a government able to negotiate could thus soon find itself accused of neo- with northern communities and insurgent colonialism from rivalling Malian politi- groups. cians. Particular attention should be paid to Ideally, France and AFISMA should Mali’s military, which in the medium term merely establish the preconditions that should leave the political arena and submit allow the parties to Mali’s conflicts to start to civilian control. It is still unclear what negotiations. The military offensive and the impact the French intervention will have rebels’ weakened position should, above all, on the balance of power in Bamako. France, serve to steer the focus away from extrem- AFISMA and EUTM Mali will seek to curb ism and terrorism to the core issues behind the coup leaders’ influence. However, even the conflict. A long-term solution first if they are successful, the army leadership requires the advent of a legitimate, effective will attempt to capitalise on the fact that government in Bamako. Northern armed external actors depend on cooperation with

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the Malian army for their intervention in organisations are continuing to increase the north. their offers of humanitarian, development, How to deal with the coup leaders will security or logistic assistance to Mali and also be a problem that EUTM Mali will face. the intervention. There is an urgent need to Currently, the military offensive takes pre- coordinate these efforts and, above all, to cedence, which will probably lead to the ensure that they do not get in the way of Malian army receiving tactical and logis- one another. This also applies to the mul- tical advice and support. However, EUTM tiple mediation initiatives of the past Mali should not lose sight of the question- months, which have included those by the able nature of the partner it is dealing with. UN, ECOWAS, Burkina Faso, Algeria, If the coup leaders are not prepared to give and Switzerland. It is unlikely that these up their newly won power, this may prove countries will leave everything up to France a persistent obstacle to finding a political when negotiations begin again. Algeria, in solution to the conflict, in Bamako as well particular, will seek to place itself yet again as in the north. The army’s behaviour in the at the heart of the negotiations. The EU © Stiftung Wissenschaft und reconquered areas of the north also raises should not aim to play a leading role in Politik, 2013 questions. An EU mission supporting the mediation. Appointing its own Sahel spe- All rights reserved

Malian armed forces and associated ethnic cial representative could certainly facilitate These Comments reflect militias while they perpetrate human coordination within the EU. However, an solely the authors’ views. rights violations and acts of revenge will EU Sahel envoy would be of limited value SWP find itself politically and legally compro- at international level, and France is set to Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik mised. EUTM Mali should therefore focus determine the EU’s policy on Mali whatever German Institute for on reforming the army, rather than simply happens. The EU and its members should International and Security Affairs building up its tactical capacities. This use their influence to reduce the number approach carries less political risk and is of divergent voices within the international Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 10719 Berlin necessary in the long term in any case. community to a sensible, productive level. Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 However, it will remain a difficult task as It would therefore make sense for the Fax +49 30 880 07-100 long as the acute conflict continues. Seek- African Union/ECOWAS as a regional repre- www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ing to reform an army at war is unlikely to sentative and the UN as a representative of be successful. the international community to lead a ISSN 1861-1761

two pronged diplomatic effort, bringing to- Translation by gether and coordinating all political efforts. English Express e.K., Berlin

Recommendations Mali is now entering a long period of (English version of The EU and other external actors should instability. In the medium term, two steps SWP-Aktuell 9/2013) focus stronger attention on the political will be key: free and fair elections organised process in Bamako than they have to date. by an independent electoral commission; They should not press for a quicker and and the creation of a legitimately elected apparently less risky transitional process government that can enter into negotia- that does not allow for the broad inclusion tions with the actors in northern Mali. and consultation of Malian political actors. Other than simply re-hatting AFISMA under This seemingly pragmatic solution is un- the UN umbrella, a UN mission could ful- likely to be sustainable. The EU should also fil two roles: firstly as an observer mission, avoid redirecting funds from development monitoring political developments and, in aid to AFISMA and EUTM Mali. If the Malian particular, the human rights’ situation government goes bankrupt, this will only in northern Mali. Secondly, in terms of its serve to undermine the political process. political dimension, preparing, supporting Furthermore, the EU and its member and observing the elections and negotia- states should seek to better coordinate tions. external engagement in the Malian conflict. Foreign governments and international

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