Mali: Beyond Counterterrorism WP Wolfram Lacher and Denis M

Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m Co Mali: Beyond Counterterrorism WP Wolfram Lacher and Denis M. Tull S The international military intervention in Mali is fraught with risks. The current cam- paign against extremists in Mali’s north could easily turn into a conflict between local communities. Attacks on civilians by the Malian army and African troops could cause the situation to escalate further. Progress in the north requires a government in the capital Bamako that has widespread support, which is currently lacking. The EU train- ing mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) will be confronted with the coup leaders of 2012 and ethnic militias in the army. By intervening, external actors are embarking on a long- term involvement in a complex conflict. To minimize these risks, stronger external focus is needed on the political process in Bamako, and the coordination of regional and international efforts must improve. The widespread assumption that interven- regional approach that was agreed in tion in Mali is about fighting extremist January 2013. groups is misleading. At the heart of the war are two closely intertwined crises. First, the conflict in the north is fundamentally Complex dynamics in northern Mali between elites from rival tribal and ethnic To understand the conflict in Mali, one groups, some of whom, for tactical reasons, has to look below the surface of the three have allied themselves with heavily armed Islamist extremist groups – Al-Qaida in the extremists. Second, the government in Muslim Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement Bamako has been largely paralysed ever for Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa since a military coup deposed President (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine – that control the Amadou Toumani Touré in March 2012. As north. a result, the government has been unable The conflict has its roots in tensions to win any allies in the north. A lack of re- between northern elites that had been gional security cooperation was also partly growing over recent years. Tuareg tribes to blame for the increasing extremist pres- of aristocratic descent saw their hitherto ence in northern Mali, and for the situation dominant position in Kidal region increas- escalating into a violent conflict in January ing eroded by the policies of the Malian 2012. The underlying reasons for this lack leadership under President Touré (2002– of cooperation persist – despite the joint 2012). To exert control over the north, Wolfram Lacher is an Associate in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 7 Dr. Denis M. Tull is Head of SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division February 2013 1 Touré drew on leaders of Tuareg groups elites was that they stood to lose power formerly vassal to the aristocrats, as well if they terminated the alliances with as Arab tribes from Timbuktu and Gao extremists. regions. Touré relied on militias from these France’s military intervention has groups and gave them free rein to partici- changed the game. It has raised the politi- pate in northern Mali’s flourishing drug- cal costs for the armed groups. French trafficking trade. With Mali’s leaders and military advances have weakened the bar- their allies involved in criminal activities, gaining position of the armed groups vis-à- AQIM was also able to expand its presence vis Bamako. Consequently, the tactical in the north. The vast sums of ransom alliances began to disintegrate shortly after money that European governments paid for the French military intervention began on the release of hostages played an important 11 January 2013. Some rebel factions are role in this development. Ransom money more likely enter into negotiations. Telling- created shared interests between terrorists, ly, the MNLA approached France even tribal leaders and high-level Malian deci- before the intervention, to offer its services sion-makers. It also fuelled local rivalries, as in fighting the extremists. As the militarily did control of the drug trade. When Tuareg weakest group, the MNLA had no bargain- fighters returning from Libya’s civil war ing power. When the French military inter- arrived in Mali in autumn 2011, the power vention began, many Ansar Dine fighters balanced tipped in favour of Tuareg groups who had left the MNLA because of military that had been on the losing side of Touré’s weakness subsequently returned. This ex- divide-and-rule policies. plains why, when French troops arrived in These groups include both the National the regional capital of Kidal in late January Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 2013, the MNLA was able to announce that (MNLA), which launched the rebellion in it was now controlling the town. The same 2012, and the leadership of Ansar Dine. The reasoning was behind the split of Ifoghas rift between the current leaders of the two Tuareg leaders from Ansar Dine to form the groups had already emerged during the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA) in late 1990s conflict in northern Mali, as well as January. the 2006-09 rebellion. Ideological differ- Current trends suggest that the armed ences play only a secondary role today, as groups in the north are splintering into they did then. The ethnic militias that until their respective ethnic and tribal compo- the military coup had fought in the north nents. Ansar Dine’s Berabiche Arabs in on the government’s side partly fled to January formed their own brigade, Ansar southern Mali or Niger. Partly, they joined al-Sharia, which has close ties to AQIM. The the extremists or formed a separate militia MUJAO’s Lamhar Arabs and Songhai could – the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA). The also form their own militias, which would three extremist groups won their dominant leave behind a hard core of regional jiha- position by entering into tactical alliances dists. To evade French military strikes, the with tribal leaders, criminal networks extremists will fragment into small groups, and regional jihadists. These alliances some of which will move into neighbour- relied on the financial power that the ran- ing countries, while others will remain in som money had brought to AQIM and the northern Mali to adopt guerrilla tactics. MUJAO, which formed when it broke away The latter trend was already apparent in from AQIM in late 2011. Local factions tried early February 2013. Armed groups in the to use these alliances to gain military sup- north would no longer posed a direct mili- remacy over their rivals in the north and tary threat to Bamako – but conflict in thus manoeuvre themselves into position northern Mali was far from over. for potential negotiations with the national The big risk in this scenario is that con- government. The dilemma facing local flict dynamics in the north would develop SWP Comments 7 February 2013 2 into a war between groups based on dif- armed groups might be persuaded by ferent ethnic and tribal groups, similar credible offers of positions in the national to what happened in the 1990s. In late administration or the military – although January 2013, the Malian army’s Imghad such an approach would constitute a hard Tuareg militias who had earlier fled to sell in the country’s south. Once the armed Niger, led by Major Colonel Hadj Gamou, groups have been weakened to the point joined the Franco-Malian offensive. The that an inclusive political process can involvement of ethnic militias in Malian begin, negotiations could begin that would military offensives is likely to escalate the lead to further-reaching concessions. One conflicts between ethnic groups and tribes of these could be truly decentralising the in the north. Some armed groups will prob- country – decentralisation was agreed in ably distance themselves from the jihadists the 1990s but never actually implemented. to avoid coming under attack from the But for such a process to succeed, there has French army. But it is also possible that to be an effective government in Bamako – some tribal groups, like the Berabiche and and that has not been the case since the Lamhar Arabs, could see the war as a fight coup last year. against their communities, and ally themselves even more closely with the extremists. In any case, the supposed counter- The political crisis in Bamako terrorism mission that external actors Since the putsch, little progress has been are engaged in is likely to reveal itself as made in efforts to return to a constitu- an intervention in a conflict internal to tional order and to form a functional gov- northern Mali. The conflict in the north ernment. Mali’s interim president Dion- is neither primarily due to on regional counda Traoré, the coup leaders under jihadism, nor to a “Tuareg problem”. In- Captain Amadou Sanogo, and former prime stead, rivalries oppose the elites of different minister Cheick Modibo Diarra consistently Tuareg groups, as well as Tuareg and other blocked each other. Diarra’s forced resig- communities in the north. To resolve this nation in December 2012 showed that the conflict will be a far more difficult and coup leaders were continuing to exercise protracted task than fighting a hard core their veto power. They gradually consoli- of extremists. Even if regional jihadists dated their position within the army and partially move into neighbouring coun- security apparatus. Units loyal to ex-presi- tries, the conflict in northern Mali would dent Touré were dissolved and leading be likely to continue. officers imprisoned. Allies of the coup Until France intervened, there were few leaders continue to dominate the govern- incentives for the armed groups to try and ment and act as a counterweight to the negotiate a solution. They were under no interim president. military pressure whatsoever and their France’s military intervention and the position was too strong for them to start international community’s increasing making compromises that would be accept- involvement in Mali are also changing the able to other communities in the north.

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