DOCSLIB.ORG

Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests Home Country of Origin Information Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests (RIR) are research reports on country conditions. They are requested by IRB decision makers. The database contains a seven-year archive of English and French RIR. Earlier RIR may be found on the European Country of Origin Information Network website. Please note that some RIR have attachments which are not electronically accessible here. To obtain a copy of an attachment, please e-mail us. Related Links • Advanced search help 18 September 2019 NIC106354.E Nicaragua: Alianza por la República (APRE), including ideology, party logo, structure and leadership; membership in coalitions; whether the party issues membership cards; treatment of party members (2004-September 2019) Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1. Overview and Ideology According to Europa Regional Surveys of the World for 2006, President Enrique Bolaños created the APRE in May 2004 (Europa Regional Surveys of the World 2006, 659). Sources state that the APRE was created as an alternative to the Constitutional Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista, PLC) and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN) and in alliance with the Conservative Party of Nicaragua (Partido Conservador de Nicaragua, PCN) (Europa Regional Surveys of the World 2006, 659; Political Parties of the World, 444). According to sources, the APRE is a union of the following political parties: the PCN, Great Liberal Union (Gran Unión Liberal, GUL), Liberal Party 1913 (Partido Liberal 1913), Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democrático Nicaragüense, MDN), the Social Christians and National Unity (Social Cristianos y Unidad Nacional, PSCN) (La Prensa 26 May 2004; PHW 2006, 846) and the National Unity Movement (Movimiento Unidad Nacional, MUN) (PHW 2006, 846). According to La Prensa, a Nicaragua based news source, the President of APRE in 2004 was Miguel López Baldizón, and President Bolaños was an "honorary witness" in the creation of the alliance (La Prensa 26 May 2004). A news release published on the website of the National Assembly in 2005 similarly states that Miguel López Baldizón is the President of the APRE (Nicaragua 22 Mar. 2005). La Prensa quotes López Baldizón as stating that [translated] "[o]ne of the priorities of [APRE] is to improve the political culture, so as not to continue in the hands of bipartisanship, and to give the population the opportunity of new alternatives, where they do not have to choose between [the] corrupted or [traditional political] leaders," and that the party will [translation] "contribute to strengthening democracy" (La Prensa 26 May 2004). La Prensa quotes the president of the Conservative Party Mario Rappacciolo as saying that APRE's objectives include providing better opportunities to "the most disadvantaged sectors" (La Prensa 26 May 2004). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. 2. Past Elections and Activities 2.1 2004 - 2006 According to sources, in the local elections of 7 November 2004, the APRE won six local councils (Europa Regional Surveys of the World 2006, 659) or five mayoralties and one capital (PHW 2012). According to Agence France-Presse (AFP), the APRE united with the Nicaragua Liberal Alliance (Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense, ALN), supporting Eduardo Montealegre of the ALN as candidate for President in the November 2006 election (AFP 12 May 2006). The leader of the APRE at the time was Miguel López (AFP 12 May 2006). AFP reports that discussions leading up to the support of the APRE to ALN took place [translation] "amid strong political discrepancies" between party deputy Miguel López and the APRE's presidential candidate José Alvarado (AFP 12 May 2006). The same source reports that José Alvarado resigned his presidential nomination with the APRE due to "lack of internal consensus" within the APRE and accepted the candidacy as vice president for the PLC (AFP 12 May 2006). 2.2 2011 - 2012 According to The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), in the election of 6 November 2011 for the National Assembly, the APRE obtained 0.37 percent of the votes (9,317 out of 2,512,584) and no seats with Róger Guevara as the leader (IFES n.d.a). An election campaign website for Róger Guevara for the 2011 presidential election lists among his priorities, the resumption of diplomatic ties with countries [translation] "that have withdrawn due to the mismanagement of the international policy of President Daniel Ortega", increase support for education, and end the monopoly of communication companies (Alianza APRE 12 Sept. 2011). According to La Prensa, the APRE won 0.23 percent of the vote (less than 6,000 votes) in the presidential elections of 2011 (La Prensa 28 May 2016). A report on political parties in Nicaragua by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), a think-tank and consulting agency that undertakes research on policy, democracy and justice issues (KAS n.d.), states that the APRE won 0.5 percent of the vote in 2011 (KAS 29 Oct. 2018, 4). La Prensa, indicates that in the 2012 municipal elections APRE had representation in 98 percent of municipalities with 6,223 candidates (La Prensa 28 May 2016). 2.3 2016 - 2019 According to sources, Carlos Canales [the President of the APRE (La Prensa 28 May 2016)] ran in the 2016 presidential elections as a member of APRE (La Prensa 21 Aug. 2016; Agencia EFE 7 Nov. 2016; BBC 3 Nov 2016), and Nilo Salazar ran as his vice president (INDE 7 Oct. 2016). According to IFES, Carlos Canales won 1.4 percent of the vote (35,002 out of 2,488,199 valid votes) in the 2016 presidential election (IFES n.d.b). The BBC reports that Carols Canales campaigned [translation] "against corruption and the rescue of ethical, civic and moral values that … have been lost in Nicaragua" (BBC 3 Nov. 2016). In the National Assembly election of 6 November 2016, the APRE won 2.04 percent of the vote (49,329 out of 2,441,955 valid votes) (IFES n.d.c). According to the website for the National Assembly, the APRE currently holds one seat in the National Assembly with Byron Rodolfo Jeréz Solis from the district of Managua, and with Gabriela Edisa Del Carmen Zepeda serving as his deputy (Nicaragua n.d.). According to the BBC, Jeréz is a former official of the Arnoldo Alemán government [1997-2002] (BBC 3 Nov. 2016). According to the Europa Regional Surveys of the World, Jeréz, an associate of Alemán, was accused of embezzling state funds and laundering them in US banks, and found guilty in June 2003 of defrauding the government for over US$400,000 (Europa Regional Surveys of the World 2006, 659). The same source states that in December 2003, Jeréz was declared innocent of "many of the charges" and released from prison on bail (Europa Regional Surveys of the World 2006, 659). According to La Prensa, Jeréz votes with the FSLN and "defends the actions of … Ortega" (La Prensa 8 Aug. 2019). The KAS report describes the APRE as a "satellite party" of the FSLN (KAS 29 Oct. 2018, 4). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. La Prensa reports that the president of the Municipal Electoral Council (Consejo Electoral Municipal, CEM) of La Concordia indicated that the registered mayoral candidate for the APRE was a member of the FSLN who reportedly was not aware that his name was on the list of candidates for that municipality (La Prensa 31 Oct. 2017). According to the same source, Carlos Canales would not explain why the member of the FSLN appeared as a candidate without his consent (La Prensa 31 Oct. 2017). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. 3. Party Logo, Structure, Membership's Cards, and Treatment of Party Members According to La Prensa, the APRE flag is red, green and blue (La Prensa 26 May 2004). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. Information on a party logo, structure, membership cards, and treatment of party members could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request. References Agence France-Presse (AFP). 12 May 2006. "Partido de gobierno se une a alianza derechista de Montealegre." (Factiva) Agencia EFE. 7 November 2016. "Nicaragua Opposition Reports 'Massive' Voter Abstention in National Election." (Factiva) Alianza APRE. 12 September 2011. "Roger Guevara Mena reanudaría relaciones con China Continental." [Accessed 3 Sept. 2019] British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 3 November 2016. Arturo Wallace. "Quiénes son los rivales de Daniel Ortega a la presidencia de Nicaragua (y por qué probablemente nunca has escuchado de ellos)." [Accessed 9 Aug. 2019] Europa Regional Surveys of the World. 2006. "Nicaragua." London: Routledge. Instituto Nicaragüense de Desarrollo (INDE). 7 October 2016. "Partido Alianza por la República comparte propuesta de agenda de nación con INDE." [Accessed 9 Aug. 2019] International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). N.d.a. "Republic of Nicaragua: Election for Asamblea Nacional (Nicaragua National Assembly), Nov. 6, 2011." [Accessed 9 Aug. 2019] International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). N.d.b. "Republic of Nicaragua: Election For President, Nov.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Nicaragua | Freedom House
    Nicaragua | Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/nicaragua About Us DONATE Blog Contact Us REGIONS ISSUES Reports Programs Initiatives News Experts Events Donate FREEDOM IN THE WORLD Nicaragua Nicaragua Freedom in the World 2012 OVERVIEW: 2012 In November 2011, President Daniel Ortega was re-elected by an SCORES overwhelming margin and his party, the Sandanista National Liberation Front, won a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. There were STATUS concerns about the legality of Ortega’s candidacy, as well as transparency issues and other irregularities during the election. Partly Although international observers found no evidence of widespread fraud, serious concerns remained about the politicization of institutions and the Free rule of law. FREEDOM RATING The independent Republic of Nicaragua was established in 1838, 17 years 4.5 after the end of Spanish rule. Its subsequent history has been marked by CIVIL LIBERTIES internal strife and dictatorship. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a leftist rebel group, overthrew the authoritarian regime of the Somoza 4 family in 1979. The FSLN then moved to establish a left-wing government, leading to a civil war. The United States intervened, in part by supporting POLITICAL RIGHTS irregular rebel forces known as the contras. In 1990, National Opposition Union presidential candidate Violeta Chamorro 5 defeated the FSLN’s Daniel Ortega in free and open elections, leading to a peaceful transfer of power. Before leaving office, however, the Sandinistas revised laws and sold off state property to party leaders, ensuring that they would retain political and economic clout. Former Managua mayor Arnoldo Alemán of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC) defeated Ortega in the 1996 presidential election, but he was accused of corruption throughout his ensuing presidency.
    [Show full text]
  • ESS9 Appendix A3 Political Parties Ed
    APPENDIX A3 POLITICAL PARTIES, ESS9 - 2018 ed. 3.0 Austria 2 Belgium 4 Bulgaria 7 Croatia 8 Cyprus 10 Czechia 12 Denmark 14 Estonia 15 Finland 17 France 19 Germany 20 Hungary 21 Iceland 23 Ireland 25 Italy 26 Latvia 28 Lithuania 31 Montenegro 34 Netherlands 36 Norway 38 Poland 40 Portugal 44 Serbia 47 Slovakia 52 Slovenia 53 Spain 54 Sweden 57 Switzerland 58 United Kingdom 61 Version Notes, ESS9 Appendix A3 POLITICAL PARTIES ESS9 edition 3.0 (published 10.12.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Denmark, Iceland. ESS9 edition 2.0 (published 15.06.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. Austria 1. Political parties Language used in data file: German Year of last election: 2017 Official party names, English 1. Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) - Social Democratic Party of Austria - 26.9 % names/translation, and size in last 2. Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) - Austrian People's Party - 31.5 % election: 3. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) - Freedom Party of Austria - 26.0 % 4. Liste Peter Pilz (PILZ) - PILZ - 4.4 % 5. Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (Grüne) - The Greens – The Green Alternative - 3.8 % 6. Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ) - Communist Party of Austria - 0.8 % 7. NEOS – Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS) - NEOS – The New Austria and Liberal Forum - 5.3 % 8. G!LT - Verein zur Förderung der Offenen Demokratie (GILT) - My Vote Counts! - 1.0 % Description of political parties listed 1. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) is a social above democratic/center-left political party that was founded in 1888 as the Social Democratic Worker's Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, or SDAP), when Victor Adler managed to unite the various opposing factions.
    [Show full text]
  • How Unique Is the American Situation? Comparing Affective Polarization Across Party Systems Through the Inter-Party Marriage Measure
    HOW UNIQUE IS THE AMERICAN SITUATION? Comparing Affective Polarization Across Party Systems Through the Inter-party Marriage Measure ERIK KNUDSEN WORKING PAPER SERIES 2018:4 DIGSSCORE DIGITAL SOCIAL SCIENCE CORE FACILITY UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN BOX 7802, 5020 BERGEN DECEMBER 2018 ISSN 2535-3233 © 2018 BY ERIK KNUDSEN. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Running head: AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION ACROSS PARTY SYSTEMS 1 How Unique is the American Situation? Comparing Affective Polarization Across Party Systems Through the Inter-party Marriage Measure Erik Knudsen University of Bergen Short Working Paper — All comments are welcome AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION ACROSS PARTY SYSTEMS 2 Abstract Prior research has demonstrated that Americans are increasingly affectively polarized: viewing opposing partisans negatively and copartisans positively. While the literature has thus far provided mixed results to whether the U.S. situation is one-of-a-kind, we lack comparative evidence that takes into account that multiparty systems have multiple political parties. Without accounting for such differences, we risk exaggerating the uniqueness of the U.S. situation. To accommodate this concern, I test an experimental strategy for comparing affective polarization in a two-party setting (the U.S.) with a multiparty setting (Norway) through the inter-party marriage measure. The findings provide evidence to suggest that there are no observable differences in terms of partisan affective polarization in Norway and the U.S., indicating that the U.S. situation is not unique. AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION ACROSS PARTY SYSTEMS 3 How Unique is the American Situation? Comparing Affective Polarization Across Party Systems Through the Inter-party Marriage Measure Prior research has demonstrated that Americans dislike opposing partisans to the extent that they would be unhappy if their son or daughter married someone voting for the other party (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012).
    [Show full text]
  • Colombia Country Fact Sheet
    National Documentation Packages, Issue Papers and Country Fact Sheets Page 1 of 4 Home > Research > National Documentation Packages, Issue Papers and Country Fact Sheets Country Fact Sheet COLOMBIA April 2007 Disclaimer 1. GENERAL INFORMATION Official name Republic of Colombia. Geography Colombia is located at the northern point of South America and shares borders with Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil and Venezuela. Colombia has a total of 3,208 km of coastline on the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. The total area is 1,038,700 km2. The coast has a tropical climate, the interior plateaux are temperate and some Andean areas have snow year-round. Population and density Population: 43,593,035 (July 2006 estimate). Density: 39.7 persons per km2. Principal cities and populations (2005 estimate) Bogota (political capital) 8,350,000; Medellin 3,450,000; Cali 2,700,000; Barranquilla 1,925,000; Cartagena 1,075,000. Languages Spanish (official). Religions Catholic 90%. Ethnic groups Mestizo 58%, white 20%, mulatto 14%, black 4%, mixed black-Amerindian 3%, Amerindian 1%. Approximately 75 % of Colombians are of mixed-blood. Demographics http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:8080/Publications/PubIP_DI.aspx?id=209&pcid=359 2/23/2011 National Documentation Packages, Issue Papers and Country Fact Sheets Page 2 of 4 Population growth rate: 1.46% (2006 estimate). Infant mortality rate: 20.35 deaths/1,000 live births. Life expectancy at birth: 72.6 (2004). Fertility rate: 2.54 children born/woman (2006 estimate). Literacy: 92.8% of people aged 15 and older can read and write (2004). Currency Colombian Peso (COP).
    [Show full text]
  • Political Conflict and Power Sharing in the Origins of Modern Colombia
    Political Conflict and Power Sharing in the Origins of Modern Colombia Sebastián Mazzuca and James A. Robinson Colombia has not always been a violent country. In fact, for the first half of the twentieth century, Colombia was one of the most peaceful countries in Latin America, standing out in the region as a highly stable and competitive bipartisan democracy. When faced with the critical test for political stability in that epoch, the Great Depression of 1930, Colombia was the only big country in South America in which military interventions were not even considered. While an armed coup interrupted Argentina’s until then steady path to democracy, and Getulio Vargas installed the first modern dictatorship in Brazil, Colombia cele brated elections as scheduled. Moreover, the ruling party lost the contest, did not make any move to cling to power, and calmly transferred power to the opposition. However, Colombia was not born peaceful. That half-century of peaceful political existence was a major novelty in Colombian history. Colombia’s nine- teenth century was politically chaotic even by Hispanic American standards: the record includes nine national civil wars, dozens of local revolts and mutinies, material destruction equivalent to the loss of several years of economic output, and at least 250,000 deaths due to political violence. How did Colombia make the transition from political chaos to political order? What were the causes of conflict before the turn of the century, and what were the bases of internal peace after it? The emergence of order in Colombia was temporally correlated with a major transformation of political institutions: the introduction of special mechanisms for power sharing between Liberals and Conservatives, Colombia’s two dominant political forces.
    [Show full text]
  • THE ROLE of CROATIA in the EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Rolando Andrade Matamoro
    ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 20, No. 4 (HR) July 2019 Croatia external relations briefing: THE ROLE OF CROATIA IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Rolando Andrade Matamoro 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 THE ROLE OF CROATIA IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Summary Croatia elected twelve Members of the European Parliament (MEP) in the elections that took place in May 2019. Eleven MEPs have already taken their seats, while the twelfth MEP will go to the European Parliament (EP) once the United Kingdom leave the European Union. The eleven MEPs come from the following parties. Four are from the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and they will join the European Peoples Party (EPP) group in the EP. Four were elected on the Social Democratic Party (SDP) list and they will join Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group in the EP. The remaining four were each elected from the following parties: the anti-systemic Human Blockade (Živi zid) and he will be a non-attached member of the EP; Mislav Kolakušić who was elected as an independent candidate and will also be non-attached in the EP; Ruža Tomašić who served in the previous mandate of the EP and was now reelected on the list of coalition of conservative parties – Croatian Sovereigns – will join the European Conservatives and Reformists Group; and Valter Flego from the Istrian Democratic Forum (IDS) party who will join the Renew Europe group (former ALDE).
    [Show full text]
  • The Norwegian Progress Party: an Established Populist Party Johan Bjerkem
    EUROPeAN VIeW DOI 10.1007/s12290-016-0404-8 ARTICLE The Norwegian Progress Party: an established populist party Johan Bjerkem © The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract This article sheds light on one of Europe’s successful right-wing populist parties, the Norwegian Progress Party. Since 2013 the party has been in a coalition with the Conservative Party. The history, ideology and position of the party in the Norwegian political system are factors that explain how a centre–right party and a populist one have been able to form a viable coalition. Over time the Progress Party has become increasingly well integrated into the political system. The fact that no cordon sanitaire or total boycott policy was implemented against it may explain why the party developed a more moderate and pragmatic approach than most other right-wing populist parties. In turn, this made it possible for the Conservative Party to offer to form a coalition with the Progress Party and placed the centre–right in the strategic position of cooperating with parties both in the centre and to the right. Keywords Populism | Right-wing politics | Political parties | Centre–right | Norway | The Progress Party J. Bjerkem (*) Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Rue du Commerce 20, 1000 Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] 1 3 EUROPEAN VIEW Introduction The Norwegian Progress Party is an example of a successful European populist party which has not only gained seats in parliament, but has also become a governing party. Established in the early 1970s, mainly as an anti-tax protest party, it transformed into an anti-immigration and anti-establishment party in the 1980s, before positioning itself as one of the main political forces in Norway.
    [Show full text]
  • Conservative Manifesto
    Get Brexit Done Unleash Britain’s Potential The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2019 My Guarantee If there is a majority of Conservative MPs on December 13th, I guarantee I will get our new deal through Parliament. We will get Brexit done in January and unleash the potential of our whole country. I guarantee: • Extra funding for the NHS, with 50,000 more nurses and 50 million more GP surgery appointments a year. • 20,000 more police and tougher sentencing for criminals. • An Australian-style points-based system to control immigration. • Millions more invested every week in science, schools, apprenticeships and infrastructure while controlling debt. • Reaching Net Zero by 2050 with investment in clean energy solutions and green infrastructure to reduce carbon emissions and pollution. • We will not raise the rate of income tax, VAT or National Insurance. If Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour and Nicola Sturgeon’s SNP team up and take control on December 13th, we will have two referendums on Brexit and Scotland in 2020. Please support a majority Conservative Government so our country can move on instead of going backwards. 2 Contents Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 2 Get Brexit Done ......................................................................................................................... 5 We Will Focus On Your Priorities ................................................................9 We Will Unleash Britain’s Potential ....................................................25 We Will Strengthen Britain In The World ................................. 51 We Will Put You First ......................................................................................................59 The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2019 Introduction For the last three and a half years, this country has felt trapped, like a lion in a cage. We have all shared the same frustration – like some super-green supercar blocked in the traffic.
    [Show full text]
  • Margaret Thatcher and Conservative Politics in England
    Click Here to Rate This Resource MARGARET THATCHER AND CONSERVATIVE POLITICS IN ENGLAND Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Nicknamed the “Iron Lady,” Margaret Thatcher (1925–2013) served longer than any other UK prime minister in the 20th century. IN A HISTORIC ELECTION IN 1979, VOTERS The Conservative Party, also cation secretary, part of his Cabinet IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (UK) ELECTED called the Tory Party, is one of two (government officials in charge of de- MARGARET THATCHER TO BE PRIME MIN- major parties in England along with partments). As secretary, she made a ISTER. SHE WAS THE FIRST WOMAN the more liberal-left Labour Party (in controversial decision to end the gov- ELECTED TO THAT OFFICE. SHE WENT ON the UK, the word “labor“ is spelled ernment’s distribution of free milk to TO BE THE LONGEST-SERVING PRIME labour). Conservatism is a political schoolchildren aged 7 to 11. The press MINISTER IN THE 20TH CENTURY. AS ideology that generally supports pri- revealed that she privately opposed HEAD OF THE UK GOVERNMENT AND vate property rights, a limited govern- ending the free-milk policy, but the LEADER OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, ment, a strong national defense, and Treasury Department had pressured THATCHER PROVOKED CONTROVERSY. EVEN AFTER HER DEATH IN 2013, SHE the importance of tradition in society. her to cut government spending. REMAINS A HERO TO SOME AND A The Labour Party grew out of the VILLAIN TO OTHERS. trade union movement in the 19th ‘Who Governs Britain?’ century, and it traditionally supports Struggles between the UK govern- Born in 1925, Thatcher was the the interests of working people, who ment and trade unions marked daughter of Alfred Roberts, a middle- want better wages, working condi- Thatcher’s career.
    [Show full text]
  • Nicaragua: the Threat of a Good Example?
    DiannaMelrose First Published 1985 Reprinted 1986,1987,1989 ©Oxfam 1985 Preface © Oxfam 1989 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Melrose, Dianna Nicaragua: the threat of a good example. 1. Nicaragua. Economic conditions I. Title 330.97285'053 ISBN 0-85598-070-2 ISBN 0 85598 070 2 Published by Oxfam, 274 Banbury Road, Oxford, 0X2 7DZ, UK. Printed by Oxfam Print Unit OX196/KJ/89 This book converted to digital file in 2010 Contents Preface vii Introduction 1 Chronology of Political Developments 2 1. The Somoza Era 4 The Miskitos and the Atlantic Coast The 1972 Earthquake Land Expropriation Obstacles to Community Development The Somoza Legacy 2. A New Start for the People 12 The Literacy Crusade Adult Education New Schools Public Health Miners' Health Land Reform New Cooperatives Food Production Consumption of Basic Foods Loss of Fear The Open Prisons Obstacles to Development 3. Development Under Fire 27 Miskito Resettlement Programme Disruption of Development Work Resettlement of Displaced People Economic Costs of the Fighting 4. Debt, Trade and Aid 39 Debt Trade Aid 5. The Role of Britain and Europe 45 UK Bilateral Aid Other European Donors EEC Aid Trade A Political Solution Europe's Role 6. Action for Change: Summary and Recommendations 59 Notes and References Abbreviations Further Reading iii IV Acknowledgements First and foremost I would like to thank all the Nicaraguan people who gener- ously gave their time to help with research for this book, particularly Oxfam friends and project-holders who gave invaluable assistance.
    [Show full text]
  • Codebook: Government Composition, 1960-2019
    Codebook: Government Composition, 1960-2019 Codebook: SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMPARATIVE POLITICAL DATA SET – GOVERNMENT COMPOSITION 1960-2019 Klaus Armingeon, Sarah Engler and Lucas Leemann The Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set provides detailed information on party composition, reshuffles, duration, reason for termination and on the type of government for 36 democratic OECD and/or EU-member countries. The data begins in 1959 for the 23 countries formerly included in the CPDS I, respectively, in 1966 for Malta, in 1976 for Cyprus, in 1990 for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, in 1991 for Poland, in 1992 for Estonia and Lithuania, in 1993 for Latvia and Slovenia and in 2000 for Croatia. In order to obtain information on both the change of ideological composition and the following gap between the new an old cabinet, the supplement contains alternative data for the year 1959. The government variables in the main Comparative Political Data Set are based upon the data presented in this supplement. When using data from this data set, please quote both the data set and, where appropriate, the original source. Please quote this data set as: Klaus Armingeon, Sarah Engler and Lucas Leemann. 2021. Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960-2019. Zurich: Institute of Political Science, University of Zurich. These (former) assistants have made major contributions to the dataset, without which CPDS would not exist. In chronological and descending order: Angela Odermatt, Virginia Wenger, Fiona Wiedemeier, Christian Isler, Laura Knöpfel, Sarah Engler, David Weisstanner, Panajotis Potolidis, Marlène Gerber, Philipp Leimgruber, Michelle Beyeler, and Sarah Menegal.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ends of Modernization: Development, Ideology, and Catastrophe in Nicaragua After the Alliance for Progress
    THE ENDS OF MODERNIZATION: DEVELOPMENT, IDEOLOGY, AND CATASTROPHE IN NICARAGUA AFTER THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY by David Johnson Lee December 2015 Examining Committee Members: Dr. Richard Immerman, Advisory Chair, History, Temple University Dr. Harvey Neptune, History, Temple University Dr. David Farber, History, University of Kansas Dr. Michel Gobat, History, University of Iowa © Copyright 2015 by David Johnson Lee All Rights Reserved ii ABSTRACT This dissertation traces the cultural and intellectual history of Nicaragua from the heyday of modernization as ideology and practice in the 1960s, when U.S. planners and politicians identified Nicaragua as a test case for the Alliance for Progress, to the triumph of neoliberalism in the 1990s. The modernization paradigm, implemented through collusion between authoritarian dictatorship and the U.S. development apparatus, began to fragment following the earthquake that destroyed Managua in 1972. The ideas that constituted this paradigm were repurposed by actors in Nicaragua and used to challenge the dominant power of the U.S. government, and also to structure political competition within Nicaragua. Using interviews, new archival material, memoirs, novels, plays, and newspapers in the United States and Nicaragua, I trace the way political actors used ideas about development to make and unmake alliances within Nicaragua, bringing about first the Sandinista Revolution, then the Contra War, and finally the neoliberal government that took power in 1990. I argue that because of both a changing international intellectual climate and resistance on the part of the people of Nicaragua, new ideas about development emphasizing human rights, pluralism, entrepreneurialism, indigenous rights, and sustainable development came to supplant modernization theory.
    [Show full text]