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Neb Yearbook 2016–2017
NEB YEARBOOK 2016–2017 NEB YEARBOOK 2016–2017 Committee of National Remembrance Budapest 2018 Edited by Réka Kiss and Zsolt Horváth Translation, development, and copy editing by Éva Misits © Office of the Committee of National Remembrance, 2018 © Barbara Bank, Kristóf Erdős, István Galambos, Martin Gulyás, Gergely Krisztián Horváth, Csaba Káli, Réka Kiss, Anita M. Madarász, Áron Máthé, Gabriella Müller, István Ötvös, István Simon, Viktor Attila Soós, Attila Szakolczai, Gábor Szilágyi, 2018 Published by the Office of the Committee of National Remembrance H-1088 Budapest, Vas utca 10. Responsible for the publication is the General Director of the Office of the Committee of National Remembrance Proofread by Gábor Szilágyi Layout by Júlia Varga Printed by SÉD Ltd. ISSN 2498-650X CONTENTS Introduction . 7 GERGELY KRISZTIÁN HORVÁTH Communist Agricultural Policy and Two Waves of Collectivization in Hungary . 11 ISTVÁN ÖTVÖS Political Trials and Their Utilization by the Hungarian Communist Dictatorship . 45 RÉKA KISS A Protestant Youth Association in the Early Cold War: The Persecution of the Hungarian YMCA by Communist State Security . .. 63 BARBARA BANK The Hungarian “Gulag”, 1945–1953 . 87 CSABA KÁLI Hungary’s Communist Party Elite in the “Long” fifties (1948–1962) . 121 ANITA M. MADARÁSZ British–Hungarian Cultural Diplomacy, 1953–1956 . 149 ISTVÁN GALAMBOS Self-Government During the Hungarian Revolution of 1956: the Establishment, Operation, and Scope of Competencies of the Várpalota Revolutionary Council . 167 5 MARTIN GULYÁS Characteristics of the Operation of the Revolutionary Workers’ Councils of 1956: Typical and Atypical Examples . 195 ATTILA SZAKOLCZAI The Internal Affairs of the Reprisals Following the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 . 225 KRISTÓF ERDŐS The “Clerical Reaction” in Court: the Only Convicted Clerical Victim of the Kádár Reprisals . -
Soviet Military Power 1981.P65
The more constructive East-West relationship which the Allies seek requires tangible signs that the Soviet Union is prepared to abandon the disturbing buildup of its military strength, to desist from resorting to force and intimidation and to cease creating or exploiting situations of crisis and instability in the Third World. From the Communique of the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting May 1981 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 CONTENTS I SOVIET MILITARY POWER 5 II MILITARY RESOURCE ALLOCATION 9 III ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES 15 IV SOVIET THEATER FORCES 25 V SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES 53 VI QUEST FOR TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY 71 VII SOVIET GLOBAL POWER PROJECTION 83 VIII THE CHALLENGE 95 The illustrations of new Soviet weapons systems introducing each chapter are derived from various U.S. sources; while not precise in every detail, they are as authentic as possible. PREFACE The Soviet Armed Forces today number more than 4.8 million men. For the past quar- ter century, we have witnessed the continuing growth of Soviet military power at a pace that shows no signs of slackening in the future. All elements of the Soviet Armed Forces -the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Ground Forces of the Army, the Air Forces, the Navy and the Air Defense Forces continue-to modernize with an unending flow of new weapons systems, tanks, missiles, ships, artil- lery and aircraft. The Soviet defense budget continues to grow to fund this force buildup, to fund the projection of Soviet power far from Soviet shores and to fund Soviet use of proxy forces to support revolutionary factions and conflict in an increasing threat to international stability. -
Reagan and the Soviet Union: Competing Military Strategies, 1980-1988
4 Reagan and the Soviet Union: Competing Military Strategies, 1980-1988 David M. Glantz This essay evaluates the policies and military strategy introduced by U.S. Pres- ident Ronald Reagan vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, within the context of over forty years of intense strategic competition called the Cold War. The Cold War remained “cold” because the two competing countries emerged from the World War as victorious superpower with unchallenged military capabilities and un- precedented territories either under their control or within their spheres of in- fluence. Despite sharply differing ideologies and political systems, the United States and Soviet Union understood the risks and potential costs of war, espe- cially after both became atomic powers by the late 1940s. Both recognized that deliberately unleashing a world war was no longer a rational act. Given this unique constraint, the ensuing completion became a prolonged game of strategic “cat and mouse,” as the two counties jockeyed with each other for a more advantageous position militarily, politically, and economically. The instruments of this game were specific military strategies governing the nature of the competition and setting limits on the countries’ military actions, all of which acknowledged that the nuclear balance was quite literally a mutually-rec- ognized balance of terror. David M. Glantz, “Reagan and the Soviet Union: Competing Military Strategies, 1980-1988,” Essay, Enduring Legacy Project, John A. Adams ’71 Center for Military History & Strategic Analysis, Virginia Military Institute, 2014. 2 Conventional wisdom concerning the Cold War maintains that this “cat and mouse” game played out successfully, that is, relatively peacefully, because neither side was willing to violate the constraints imposed by this balance of ter- ror. -
Textbook on HUUC 2018.Pdf
MINISTRY OF HEALTH CARE OF UKRAINE Kharkiv National Medical University HISTORY OF UKRAINE AND UKRAINIAN CULTURE the textbook for international students by V. Alkov Kharkiv KhNMU 2018 UDC [94:008](477)=111(075.8) A56 Approved by the Academic Council of KhNMU Protocol № 5 of 17.05.2018 Reviewers: T. V. Arzumanova, PhD, associate professor of Kharkiv National University of Construction and Architecture P. V. Yeremieiev, PhD, associate professor of V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University Alkov V. A56 History of Ukraine and Ukrainian Culture : the textbook for international students. – Kharkiv : KhNMU, 2018. – 146 p. The textbook is intended for the first-year English Medium students of higher educational institutions and a wide range of readers to get substantively acquainted with the complex and centuries-old history and culture of Ukraine. The main attention is drawn to the formation of students’ understanding of historical and cultural processes and regularities inherent for Ukraine in different historical periods. For a better understanding of that, the textbook contains maps and illustrations, as well as original creative questions and tasks aimed at thinking development. UDC [94:008](477)=111(075.8) © Kharkiv National Medical University, 2018 © Alkov V. A., 2018 Contents I Exordium. Ukrainian Lands in Ancient Times 1. General issues 5 2. Primitive society in the lands of modern Ukraine. Greek colonies 7 3. East Slavic Tribes 15 II Princely Era (9th century – 1340-s of 14th century) 1. Kievan Rus as an early feudal state 19 2. Disintegration of Kievan Rus and Galicia-Volhynia Principality 23 3. Development of culture during the Princely Era 26 III Ukrainian Lands under the Power of Poland and Lithuania 1. -
Germans from Crimea in Labor Camps of Swerdlowsk District
GERMANS FROM CRIMEA IN LABOUR CAMPS OF SWERDLOWSK DISTRICT By Hilda Riss, printed in Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Russland Heimatbuch 2007/2008. Pages 58 – 91. Translation and publication by permission. Translation and all footnotes by Merv Weiss. Hilda Riss, born 03 December 1935 in Rosental, Crimea, was deported in the middle of August 1941 with her family to Siberia, where nevertheless, she was able to enjoy a good education. She completed her secondary schooling and after that she was a teacher and director of the library in Usmanka, Kemerowo district. She studied at the State University of Tomsk from 1957 to 1962. After her academic studies, Hilda Riss was an associate of the Institute of Crop Management in Alma-Ata until 1982, and from 1983 until her retirement in 1991, a leading agronomist, that is to say, a senior scientific associate in Kazakhstan. From 1959 to 1996 she published 5 books in Russian under the name “Galina Kosolapowa” and one book in the Tschechnian language on the subject of crop protection. In 1969 she qualified for a scholarship and in 1972 in Moscow received her certificate as senior scientific associate of entomology. After her retirement and particularly after her emigration to Germany in 1995, Hilda Riss increasingly turned her attention to the research of her fellow Germans from Crimea. She wrote her sixth book “Krim nascha Rodina” [Crimea, our Fatherland - MW] in Russian because she wanted to communicate with those German-Russian generations who were not able to attend a German school, in order to keep in contact with them, and togather material for a memorial book of the Crimean Germans in the German language. -
Barbarossa, Soviet Covering Forces and the Initial Period of War: Military History and Airland Battle
WARNING! The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Barbarossa, Soviet Covering Forces and the Initial Period of War: Military History and Airland Battle Dr. Jacob W. Kipp Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 1989 The issues surrounding the German attack upon the Soviet Union in June 1941 continue to attract the attention of historians and military analysts. The nature of the Soviet response to that attack has, as recent articles in Air University Review suggest, set off heated polemics. The appearance of Bryan Fugate's Operation Barbarossa with its assertion that the Soviet High Command did, indeed, have a "realistic plan or operative concept for coping with the situation" marked a major departure from conventional Western scholarly interpretation of the events leading up to the invasion.1 The response by Williamson t1urray and Barry G. Watts that Fugate was "inventing history" to find an unsuspected Soviet military genius where there was none confirms the controversial nature of the issue.2 These authors underscore the impact of surprise and tend to treat it as systemic and general. The Soviet Union, they argue, did not expect the blow and was unprepared for it. Soviet military doctrine and field regulations spoke of the offensive, while neglecting the defense.3 In assessing Soviet perception of the German threat, the authors are at odds not -
The Red Army and Mass Mobilization During the Russian Civil War 1918-1920 Author(S): Orlando Figes Source: Past & Present, No
The Past and Present Society The Red Army and Mass Mobilization during the Russian Civil War 1918-1920 Author(s): Orlando Figes Source: Past & Present, No. 129 (Nov., 1990), pp. 168-211 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/650938 . Accessed: 15/11/2013 18:56 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Oxford University Press and The Past and Present Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Past &Present. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 18:56:45 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION DURING THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR 1918-1920 The Red Armybegan life in 1918 as a smallvolunteer force of proletariansfrom the major urban citadels of Bolshevikpower in northernand centralRussia. By theend of the civil war against the Whitesand the various armies of foreign intervention, in the autumn of 1920,it had growninto a massconscript army of fivemillion soldiers,75 percent of them peasants1 by birth - a figureroughly proportionateto the size ofthe peasant population in Russia.2 For theBolsheviks, this represented a tremendous social change. -
BEHIND SOVIET LINES Hitler’S Brandenburgers Capture the Maikop Oilfields 1942
BEHIND SOVIET LINES Hitler’s Brandenburgers capture the Maikop Oilfields 1942 DAVID R. HIGGINS © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com BEHIND SOVIET LINES Hitler’s Brandenburgers capture the Maikop Oilfields 1942 DAVID R. HIGGINS © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 4 ORIGINS 7 Germany’s special forces 7 World War II and the Brandenburgers 9 INITIAL STRATEGY 12 Operation Barbarossa 12 The Eastern Front in 1942 13 Operation Blau 18 THE PLAN 22 The war for oil 22 Technical challenges 23 Brandenburgers in Barbarossa 23 An unconventional plan 25 Training for the mission 27 Operating behind the lines 28 The Brandenburgers’ opponents 28 THE RAID 30 The Caucasus campaign 30 The battle for Rostov-on-Don 33 Hitler intervenes 38 The Brandenburgers seize Bataisk Bridge 40 Beyond the Don River 43 ‘Not a single step back!’ 46 The Brandenburgers’ chance to infiltrate Maikop 47 Behind Soviet lines 50 Guests of the NKVD 52 Touring the Maikop defences 54 The Panzers approach 54 The Brandenburgers strike 58 Belaya Bridge 62 AFTERMATH 65 Restarting oil production 66 ANALYSIS 68 The military objectives 68 The oil question 69 The broader campaign 71 CONCLUSION 75 BIBLIOGRAPHY 78 INDEX 80 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com INTRODUCTION For more than a year after the start of World War II in Europe, the German Army and Luftwaffe achieved a string of decisive victories against Poland, the Low Countries, Denmark, Norway, and most importantly against France – its historic rival, and promoter of the punitive Versailles Treaty that was intended to cripple Germany’s economy and military following the Great War. -
Table of Contents Item Transcript
DIGITAL COLLECTIONS ITEM TRANSCRIPT Aleksandr Kayzerman. Full, unedited interview, 2012 ID FL008.interview PERMALINK http://n2t.net/ark:/86084/b42v2cc6c ITEM TYPE VIDEO ORIGINAL LANGUAGE RUSSIAN TABLE OF CONTENTS ITEM TRANSCRIPT ENGLISH TRANSLATION 2 CITATION & RIGHTS 12 2021 © BLAVATNIK ARCHIVE FOUNDATION PG 1/12 BLAVATNIKARCHIVE.ORG DIGITAL COLLECTIONS ITEM TRANSCRIPT Aleksandr Kayzerman. Full, unedited interview, 2012 ID FL008.interview PERMALINK http://n2t.net/ark:/86084/b42v2cc6c ITEM TYPE VIDEO ORIGINAL LANGUAGE RUSSIAN TRANSCRIPT ENGLISH TRANSLATION —Today is November 28, 2012. We are in Miami meeting a veteran of the Great Patriotic War. Please introduce yourself and tell us when and where you were born. What was life like before the war? What was your family like? What kind of school did you attend? My name is Aleksandr Yakovlevich Kayzerman. I was born on December 12, 1923, in the town of Kamennyi Brod [Kamianyi Brid], Zhitomir [Zhytomyr] Oblast, Ukraine. But we did not stay there long. My mother was a Russian language teacher and my father was an accountant, so in the late 1920s they were able to move the family to the Donbas. Back then it was a burgeoning industrial center. At first we lived in the mining city of Gorlovka [Horlivka], where my father was the chief accountant at a coke and chemical plant, while my mother taught at a school. From Gorlovka we moved to Dneprodzerzhynsk [now Kamianske], about 40 kilometers from Dneprovetrovsk [now Dnipro]. This was also a major industrial city with a huge metallurgical plant, machine-building factories, and chemical plants. My father was the chief accountant of what was meant to become the largest coke chemical plant in the country. -
Is Reported Crushed by Russians;
Two Extra Pages Readers Prefer* The Sta7 In This Edition The Star’s afternoon and evening circulation is more than double that Late news and sports are covered on of any other Washington Pages 1-X and 2-X of this edition of newspaper. Its total circulation in The Star, supplementing the news of Washington far exceeds that of of its the regular home delivered edition. any contem- poraries in the morning or on Sunday. Closing N. Y. Morkets—Soles. Page 12. 040 Means Associated Press. 90th YEAR. No. Washington TTIDrP PTTVTQ Uwwhen 35,804. WASHINGTON, D. C., TUESDAY, MAY 12, 1942 and Suburb* J- ilJti-LiJu V, -L O Five Cent* ^WDULDiftYOuX YOU'D BETTE? LET \ LJKETo USETHIS 1 \us USf TH|S ONE.-IT CUTS Gas Registration Nazi Attack in Crimea ONE? IT CUTS V 0FF M0*E BUT ,T WESNT J Big-Scale V^DEEPER ) \HUKT ASMUa^/ Is Crushed Starts Today at Reported by Russians; Schools Here Chinese Beat Japs Back to Burma Rationing Cards V--— !• To Be Issued to Battle Going On SOVIET RUSSIA Heavy Fighting A-to-L Group For Four Days, Continues With (Picture on Page A-5.) Hitler Declares THUMBNAIL GUIDE on what you Enemy Remnants need to know about gasoline ra- tioning. Page B-l By the Associated Press. By the Associated Press. A third of the 125.000 automo- Russia’s Armies were reported 12.—The CHUNGKING, May bile owners eligible for registra- today to have crushed a big-scale main force of a Japanese inva- — tion under the gas rationing pro- German attack in the Crimea, sion which struck deep Morgenthau column, gram in Washington and vicinity frustrating a Nazi drive toward into China’s Yunnan Province, will go to public schools today to the great Caucasus oil fields after has been driven back to the list their fuel needs and to re- four days of heavy fighting. -
Nord Stream 2 and Turkstream
IN RUSSIA’S GAS GRIP: NORD STREAM 2 AND TURKSTREAM KRZYSZTOF KAMIŃSKI newdirection.online @europeanreform @europeanreform NDeuropeanreform [email protected] Founded by Margaret Thatcher in 2009 as the intellectual hub of European Conservativism, New Direction has established academic networks across Europe and research partnerships throughout the world. New Direction is registered in Belgium as a not-for-profit organisation and is partly funded by the European Parliament. REGISTERED OFFICE: Rue du Trône, 4, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Naweed Khan. The European Parliament and New Direction assume no responsibility for the opinions expressed in this publication. Sole liability rests with the author. AUTHOR Krzysztof Kamiński Krzysztof Kamiński graduated from the University of Warsaw (Internal Security) and completed the course in The Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC. He gained his professional experience in energy sector. Currently he serves as President of the Board of the Warsaw Institute think tank. His areas of interest are geopolitics, energy security and public affairs. February 2020 New Direction CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION 7 2 THE GAS STRATEGY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 11 3 SOUTHERN FRONT: TURKSTREAM 17 4 NORTHERN FRONT: NORD STREAM 2 27 5 UKRAINIAN FRONT: GAS TRANSIT AND DIVERSIFICATION 35 6 THREATS TO RUSSIAN PLANS 43 7 SUMMARY 53 newdirection.online @europeanreform New Direction Krzysztof Kamiński 1 INTRODUCTION he Russian Federation’s use of hydrocarbons Secondly, large gas export pipelines from Russia to in its foreign policy refers to a theory the state its top gas recipients in Europe are intended to bind Thas added to its doctrinal documents, yet it these countries close to Moscow, mainly Germany shows its practical nature in the first place. -
The White Poles and Wrangel April – November 1920
The White Poles and Wrangel April – November 1920 “. Раз дело дошло до войны, все интересы страны и ее внутренняя жизнь должны быть подчинены войне.” “. Before the matter of the war is finished, all interests of the country and internal considerations must be subordinated to the war.” 55 Map 9 The White Poles and Wrangel // April – November 1920 Colored Lithographic print, 64 x 101 cm. Compilers: A. N. de-Lazari and N. N. Lesevitskii Artist: A. A. Baranov Historical Background As the title of the map indicates, the Soviets maintained that the Poles and the counterrevolutionary White forces operated as allies. Though possessing more or less the same goal, that of defeating the Bolsheviks, the two sides pursued different agendas, as well as withheld military and political assistance from each other, thus foregoing mutual victory. The most salient features of the map are the application of the colors red and white, as well as the use of pho- tomontage. Red and white, in their variations of density, shading, and force, give the illusion of having been applied in broad brushstrokes of watercolor. Russia is engulfed by an imaginary fireball, which originates near the attack of the Red Army on White positions in the Kuban, and spreads across the nation. The incorpo- ration of photographic cut-outs also gives the illusion that the map is a construction of multi-media. The pho- tographic images depict major protagonists of the period: Bolsheviks and their enemies. The chief antagonist to Bolshevik aims was Marshal Jozef Piłsudski, Poland’s Head-of-State, who is pictured on the Polish flag.