Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms in Hungary: the New Challenges of EU-Accession

View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE

Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms in Hungary: The new challenges of EU-accession

JULIA SZALAI* Izvorni znanstveni članak Institute of Sociology UDK: 364.2(4-67:439) Hungarian Academy of Sciences Primljeno: prosinac 2005. Budapest, Hungary

During the transition and accession process in Hungary the questions of the fairness and efficiency of the welfare arrangements came to the forefront of public discussions and political contestation. The key questions concerned the type of welfare state arising on the ruins of the old state-socialist regime. The author investigates whether new welfare state resembles any of the “three worlds of welfare capitalism”, what is the role of the EU in their formation, and whether differences are merely a matter of the level of economic development or deep-rooted systemic causes and policies. The first part of the paper outlines competing visions on the transformation of the socialist state and it is followed by the presentation of ideological and political arguments standing behind the implemented measures in the field of social policy and the wider role of these measures in overall economic transformation. The author argues that the consequences of these measures in social policy, most notably increased poverty, though often considered as transitory, proved to be more permanent. Also, economic recovery has not brought the improvement of social services and local welfare assistance as expected. The second part of the paper offers a critical review of causes that brought about such a contrast between the declared goals and the actual results of the reform. The author argues that, contrary to the initial expectations of increased efficiency, batter targeting, and more social justice, the combined steps of funding cuts and decentralization of decisions failed to decrease poverty, while at the same time increased stigmatizing of recipients. The author concludes that Hungary’s recent developments point toward the crystallization of a distinguishable fourth type of the welfare state developing more or less independently from the influence of supranational welfare arrangements of the EU. Key words: Welfare state; post-socialist welfare policy; poverty; ethnici- ty; racial/ethnic conflict

* Julia Szalai, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Sociology, Department of Research on the So- cial History of Social Policy, Uri u. 49, 1014 Budapest, Hungary, [email protected]

309 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms...

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS new Western-type welfare state? If they Backed by the controversial experiences have: do the new structures resemble any of the decade-long history of post-com- of the “three worlds of welfare capitalism” munist transformation, a range of pressing so eloquently outlined by Esping-Andersen questions on the fairness and efficiency some 15 years ago (1990)? If they have of the prevailing arrangements in welfare not: are the departures merely a matter of came to the forefront of public discussions time and economic growth? Or, are there by the late 1990s in Hungary. The arising deep-rooted systemic causes, ill-shaped debates were fuelled by widely shared dis- policies, and sharp social conflicts in the appointments. Criticisms of the undimin- background of failing to fulfil the funda- ished insecurity of daily living, the unjust mental functions of welfare in compromis- and lasting sacrifices that “ordinary people” ing labour and general well-being, regulat- have had to make in the coupled processes ing and controlling inequalities, and provid- of marketization and privatization, and also ing the necessary safeguards to prevent so- for the evidenced incompetence of the new cial exclusion and political disintegration? democratic institutions of governance to Are the deplorable records of the Hungarian halt the unstoppable growth of inequali- welfare state due solely to the unfavourable ties and the spreading of deep poverty all external conditions of the otherwise press- around have become increasingly sharper. ing task of economic adjustment, or does The preparation for accessing (since then: one have to seek the explanation in the joining) the European Union has turned retardant historical heritages and binding these accusations to acute political conflicts structural deficiencies still at play? about the envisioned scope, role, and com- It is perhaps needless to argue at length petence of the country’s future “European- why these questions are of great importance ized” state. With an eye on the inescapable for the theoretical and political concerns structural reforms, and at the same time, alike. As to the theoretical implications, by well aware of the current limitations on exploring the deep-rooted causes behind the maneuvering, politicians, policy-makers, prevailing massive socio-economic segre- scholars and diverse vocal groups of the gation that proves resistant to any welfare general public have urged a thorough and policies for tackling poverty and social ex- critical exploration of the causes behind the clusion, studies of the post-communist wel- serious shortcomings of the near past in or- fare regimes can inspire the revision of ear- der to better navigate the country amid the lier assumed one-to-one relations between altered conditions of the enlargement. certain policies/measures and actual social The key questions brought up for con- development. Further, these discussions sideration are the following: What type can bring to the forefront a rather rich set of of welfare state has arisen on the ruins of formerly unidentified interests, traditions, the old state-socialist regime? What have customs and attitudes with a great and un- been the consequences of the unequivocally mediated impact on the shaping of welfare. claimed rapid institutional decomposition Thereby, they can significantly enrich our of the once omnipotent party-state with its scholarly understanding of the socio-politi- all-embracing domination over the lives cal, economic and cultural functions that of its subjects? Have the recently evolved welfare policies can convey much beyond democratic arrangements and the constitu- their ascribed professional roles. tional acknowledgement of basic citizens’ The political implications of the above rights concluded in the advancement of a short list of questions seem to be of equal

310 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... importance. Whether the post-communist the future of the entirety of the “old conti- societies of East and Central Europe actu- nent” and beyond. ally develop toward fitting into one of the Obviously, the above questions and coveted models of Western democratic their broad implications cannot be explored capitalism, or they take their own route at once, and certainly not by a single author with meaningful departures – this is a mat- in a single paper. My aim is much more lim- ter with far-reaching consequences beyond ited here. Through the study of the Hungar- the boundaries of the affected nation states. ian developments of the past decade and a After all, unmet social rights, socio-eco- half, I will present a case with lasting de- nomically founded sharp discrimination in partures from the classical paths of welfare practicing political rights, rapidly expand- state formation where the deviations can be ing economic and social marginalization, studied in their making. As I will argue, and the subsequent endangerment of social the root of the departures can be identi- cohesion in a cluster of societies beyond the fied in the unprecedented historical task of Elbe also have multifaceted implications converting the one-time party-state and its for the West. In the short run, the gradual planned economy to a modern democracy departure of Europe’s “new democracies” with the unchallenged domination of the from the main track of modern welfare market, and what is more, to accomplish state development – often conceptualized the swift conversion with one and the same by the Western public as “ethno-cultural 1 motion in all the decisive fields of political, otherness” – feeds Euro-skepticism and economic and social life. weakens the democratic attempts within the EU to speed up the integration beyond the Although the rapid decomposition of free flow of capital. In the longer run, the the old institutions was a unanimous claim departing “worlds of welfare capitalism” articulated by all the major political actors might end up in providing legitimization at the start of the transition, it has led, how- to policies on freezing (or, at least, seri- ever, to unforeseen troublesome results. The ously restricting) the free move of citizens, process has quickly turned to the desertion closing the “European border” before the of the state (Standing, 1997.), and simulta- eyes of migrants and refugees from the po- neously, to the strengthening of sharpened litically shaken and/or poorer parts of the social struggles over its remnants. A most world, and (re)creating the invisible walls serious consequence of these developments of separation much in ideological-political has been the evolvement of a dual structure concordance with the once so extensively with the increasingly deeper captivation of suffered cold war. In short, the direction in the coexisting corporatist and liberal drives which the welfare states of the so-called to utilize the state’s power and resources post-communist region develop is a critical for providing protection on the market, and matter for all of us: successful adjustment simultaneously, “freeing” the state from might carry promising potentials, while his- its classical welfare commitments toward torically-structurally informed departures the poor. Soon these developments have might bring about disastrous limitations for concluded into the effective ghettoization

1 There are clear indications in the Western press of intensifying hostility and suspicion toward the East-Cen- tral European “newcomers” in the core countries of the founders of the EU (ﬁrst of all, in Germany and the UK). Most probably, these symptoms are rightly conceptualized by a number of sociologists and political scientists as the manifestations of a new variant of white racism against whites (Minutes of the Workshop..., 2005.).

311 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... of welfare, which in turn, has accentuated The final part of the paper will attempt the processes of marginalization and social to draw some general conclusions. By disintegration. confronting the findings with Esping-An- As I will attempt to show, the structur- dersen’s characterization of the decisive ally ingrained duality of the state’s welfare traits of the corporatist and liberal models, functions and the concomitant evolvement respectively, I will point to the distinctive of a corporatist-liberal mix in policy-mak- nature of the new Hungarian welfare state ing are not accidental and easily alterable as the one being founded on their mix. As outcomes. In the light of them, it is prob- I will argue, the blend is different from its ably justifiable to call for a revision of our constituents: some features of the originals conceptualization of the existing worlds simply disappear, while others mingle in of modern welfare capitalism. There seem utterly new arrangements. This is why it to be good reasons to look at the Hungar- seems to me problematic to characterize ian case as an example of the historically the Hungarian case plainly as a stage on informed construction of a fourth distinc- the developmental ladder. If I am right, tive model. it is more appropriate to conceive it as a In building up the argument, I will first distinguishable fourth world of welfare briefly outline the major steps taken in the capitalism, though still in the process of field of welfare to assist the grandiose task crystallization. of post-communist transformation. I will present the ideological foundations and POST-COMMUNIST WELFARE the political rationales behind the drastic REFORMS AND THE RISE OF A restructuring while simultaneous financial DUAL ORDER impoverishment of the state’s provisions Upon the collapse of communist state- to serve the two twinned primary goals of socialism, the rapid dismantling of the the time: the swift transformation of the once omnipotent state was seen, as said, property-relations through massive privatization, and the speeding up of the insti- as the key to achieve a genuine systemic tutional transition from a planned toward a turnover in Hungary (as well as in all other market-ruled economy. The consequences societies earlier under Soviet rule). In this on diverting the prevailing redistributive unprecedented historic process, deep-go- policies and welfare institutions to com- ing reforms of social security and welfare pensate for the losses of the impoverishing were put high on the agenda as those among middle-class, while assisting adjustment to the few unquestionable preconditions of the market will be demonstrated through a genuine change. The urgency to meaning- quick overview of the binding historical fully limit the presence of the central state heritages of late socialism in their efficient in these areas was reasoned by a range of conversion into powerful forms of interest serious legal and financial considerations. representation during the changeover. The As to the legal aspects, it was a widely simultaneous implications on the steady shared view among domestic and foreign growth and deepened socio-economic seg- advisors, economists, financial experts, etc. regation of poverty will be shown through a that, without cutting off the strong bond be- closer look at the overt and covert functions tween the centrally administered schemes of decentralized welfare provisions con- of redistribution and the individuals’ en- structed for those who remained excluded titlements for benefits and provisions, the from the nationwide bargaining process very essence of the systemic transformation over the public resources: the poor. would be jeopardized: neither the reallo-

312 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... cation of properties2, nor the recruitment eliminate “waste” – in plain terms, to ensure of labour, nor free entrepreneurship as the that only those really in need received sup- fundaments of marketization were to be plementary sources through redistribution successfully launched otherwise. As to the and only to the extent of their neediness. It financial side, the equally widely shared could be hoped that with all this, the new views on the former “premature welfare system became not only more targeted but state” (Kornai, 1996.) implied that welfare also more just: public money was to be spent expenditures had occupied a too heavy only to meet the needs acknowledged by weight in the yearly state budget of the consensus, and only for those falling behind late 1980s, hence upon the turnover, they the widely agreed level of neediness. At the should be substantially reduced in order to same time, the fortunate majority above this reapportion funds for the primary purposes invisible, yet generally acknowledged line of transforming economic management ac- of true poverty was presumed to follow cording to the rules of the market, and fur- other paths opened up and regulated by the ther, also for substantiating modernization market (contribution-based provisions of and economic adjustment.3 social security; private pension-schemes; But another important principle behind market-related benefits in health care, etc.). advocating revolutionary reforms in the Hence, the new arrangements were thought broadly meant sphere of welfare was to in- to automatically keep apart the two pur- crease social justice and efficiency. It was posefully designed sub-systems with their a recurring motif of the criticism of social clear-cut mechanisms of distribution to meet policy in the late period of communist state- two distinctively, but justly defined sets of socialism that – contrary to the declared demands. goals of the regime – central redistribution, The technical and practical considera- strictly linked to employment, acted rather tions underlying the transformation were to increase income inequalities than towards linked to the assertion of these new ideas moderating them. Moreover, by originating of justice and efficiency. While the univer- entitlements from compulsory full employ- salistic considerations and welfare aspects ment, the misconstrued concept of “univer- of the centrally distributed provisions and salism” implied massive social injustices social security benefits weakened strikingly through also regularly canalizing the sub- with the introduction of a sequence of new stantial provisions to the relatively prosper- regulations, the dramatically reshaped divi- ous strata of society. Therefore, when laying sion of roles between the central bodies of down the principles of the new welfare sys- welfare distribution and the newly empow- tem, it was one of the fundamental goals to ered local authorities4 left the definition of

2 Although the process is customarily called “privatization”, in order to stress its fundamental difference from the respective Western-type version, it would be more accurate to call it “property re-establishment”. After all, the essence of the operation lies in two coordinated sets of action: in denominating owners in substitution of the once faceless all-encompassing ownership of the communist party-state on the one hand, and in dividing the “wealth of the nation” among them, on the other. In contrast, privatization in the Western sense of the term means an ordinary market-transaction between two identiﬁable actors, the state as the seller and the future ow- ner(s) as buyer(s). 3 Claims on restructuring the state budget and allocating substantial parts of it for “upgrading” the state’s properties prior to privatization where further accentuated by the severe indebtedness of the country and the chronic shortage of domestic capital. 4 Beside considerations on more efﬁcient and less wasteful economizing with the scarce public funds, dramatic decentralization – and the concomitant substantial empowerment of the local governments to make decisions

313 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... the scope and content of “customarily ac- within the above mutually exclusive ar- knowledged” needs to thousands of distinct rangements of welfare.5 However, at a urban and rural communities. With this, deeper scrutiny, the picture significantly the new decrees implied that in the area of changes when looking at the role that the needs at the most minimum rules could be state plays in making the division. Then it set up with general validity, but at the same becomes clear that it is not the market per time it was also made clear that henceforth se, but the marketized shares drawn from the central state was not prepared to give the state’s revenue at the expense of wel- either legal or financial guarantees for their fare that are at work in the background. In satisfaction. other words, the dual arrangements in wel- The new principles and their imple- fare do not arise from a clear separation of mentation proved extremely efficient: the the market and the state; instead they reflect change was sweeping. Within just a few deep socio-political inequalities in access years, a logically constructed, fully-fledged to power over the state, and help to man- welfare regime has evolved with two dis- age the long-term rivalry of the affluent and tinct sub-systems. Put into clear legal and the poor for the very same scarce resources institutional arrangements, it is by now the and institutions. rules of the market that navigate people Let me briefly outline how such a with regular earnings and/or interests to strange development has come about. The business-related benefits, tax-reductions, origins date back to the social history of contribution-driven social security provi- the 1980s. By that time, Hungary’s great sions etc. in the first sub-system, while it invention, the so-called second economy is primarily a range of locally defined and became an integral part of the working gravely limited welfare provisions that are of the old regime. As a number of studies to complete (or entirely substitute for) the convincingly demonstrated, the way of life scarce, irregular and low earnings, unem- put on two pillars (that is, to base livelihood ployment benefits and other temporary on work in the formal, state-regulated seg- incomes in the second. In other words, ment of the economy in combination with with the dual arrangement put in work, it an intensive participation in the family-run is in fact a dualistic vision of two coexist- micro-level productive endeavours) became ing but separated societies that has been a model followed by no less than some firmly institutionalized: one for the “ordi- three-quarters of the households (Szelényi, nary” people quickly adapting to the new 1988.; Kemény, 1991.; Juhász, 1991.; Gá- dominates of the market and another for the bor, 1992.; Vajda, 1992.; Laki, 1998.). The incapable poor. widespread practice had numerous fruitful Thus far and at a first superficial glance, consequences that importantly contributed one can greet here the victory of neoliber- to Hungary’s pioneering position among the alism: after all, it is exactly the dividing transitional economies of the 1990s. Just to line of success/failure on the market that mention a few: the second economy became provides the justification to direct people the major vehicle of modernizing the coun- in a wide range of public matters – was seen as the embodiment of the concerted determination of genuinely driving back the central state as the source of potential subjugation. 5 Whether one likes such an arrangement is an utterly different matter. Here it is my sole aim to state that, as to their appearance, the rapidly introduced new welfare arrangements seemed to be in full concordance with the strong neoliberal claims of such powerful institutions as the IMF or the World Bank. – We will see soon that the appearance was rather misleading.

314 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... try’s services and infrastructure; it served business a matter of acknowledged rights. as a workshop for acquiring craftsmanship This nationwide silent movement was prob- and market-related skills for later use in en- ably the most important collective deed of trepreneurial activities; the released flow of Hungarians in the post-1956 decades; it accumulated assets and savings, once fro- proved compelling enough for the ruling zen under political coercion, later helped Party to induce a number of smart innova- to overcome the sudden drop of livelihood tions to prevent political discontent with amidst the severe transitional crisis of the unpredictable implications.6 early 1990s. Most of these innovations were intro- However, these positive traits were but duced in the field of social policy. Gradu- just one side of the coin. For one cannot be ally more and more steps were taken to blind to the fact that the forced and lasting “reinterpret” the functions of the existing cohabitation of the two economies also had benefit schemes and services and make some deeply problematic implications. In them accessible as legalized channels for the context of the current discussion, it is temporary withdrawal from the state em- the creation and reproduction of the hardly ployment amid the otherwise maintained separable relation between the state and the framework of compulsory full employ- market that requires special attention. ment. Hence, disability pensions became Given the unquestionable domination a tacitly acknowledged legal path for early of the rules and requirements of the state- retirement in order to intensify production controlled first economy above the second, in home-based agriculture (Szalai, 1991.); the scope, time and energy that people could the three-year long child care leave became devote to their productive activities in the a state-financed period for home-based private sphere had to be adjusted – better to service-work (Vajda, 1997.); sick-leave say: subordinated – to the pulsation of the was greatly utilized to provide live labour planned sector. Further, their participation for private house-building or gardening was never a matter of innate rights, but that (Farkas and Vajda, 1988.), etc. These and of politically conditioned permissions. One similar reinterpretations made it clear from had to deserve the tacit consent of the chiefs the outset that it was not only the time for temporarily being away from the social- frame of private production that became ist workplace for fulfilling some pressing semi-legalized this way. As to the endur- productive tasks “at home”, and had to be ing consequences, the ways and forms of aware that such consents were immediately the involved financial contributions were withdrawn upon the slightest indication probably even of greater importance. For it of “disloyalty”. As a consequence of the was an ever increasing portion of the public endless bargaining amidst the undefined funds in social security and state-provided and slippery rules of the game, a constant welfare that were canalised to private pro- struggle has been waged to shift the invis- duction: they became customarily used as ible borderline between the two economies “salaries” for unpaid informal work, and/or and make the concessions for quasi-private as extra payments in addition to one’s (oth-

6 The unceasing fear from a repeated revolution was the single most powerful guiding principle of the Communist Party’s rule throughout the post-1956 decades. The 33 years history of the “jolliest barrack” of the (Soviet) camp – as Hungary was ironically called from the late 1960s onwards – cannot be understood without the delicate compromise that those regaining power on points of Soviet bayonets tried to establish with the de- feated revolutionary nation. The core of this compromise was to “liberalize” coercion to the very limits of the regime while maintain it to the very essence of it.

315 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... erwise low) earnings in the formal sphere. adequate for continuous financing, capital Though this way a rapid erosion of the investment, technical innovation, market- benefit-schemes has evolved to the detri- ing, etc. In brief, the mere survival of the ment of those living solely or mainly from domestic business, and together with it, the such sources, and henceforth the political country’s potentials to keep pace with the innovations had their grave contribution to sharpened competition on the world market the spreading of poverty by the late 1980s have been at permanent risk. This is why (Szalai, 1990.), but the most severe con- the need for the state pillar in the raw mate- sequence came to the light only later. For rial sense has been a built-in constituent of the most troublesome development was the Hungarian embourgeoisement ever since. unnoticed (and certainly unintended) joint- In a rather early recognition of the fact, ing of the two distinct systems that never Hungarian entrepreneurs have thus arrived again could be broken up.7 The structurally at a general consensus that it was a primary constructed engagement of the state and the duty of the state to take the responsibility market has long survived the motifs that for their success, as well as it was its moral had called it into being. However, this is obligation to pay back the stolen decades, no surprise. As I will show below, there is and provide enduring support for catch- a wide range of old and new, transient and ing up. And this is why, in clear reflection lasting interests that provide the backing to of their common interests, self-employed maintain it at all costs.8 craftsmen and owners of the largest do- In the first place, the economic motives mestic firms were ready to promptly unite are obvious. Independent economic activity in encompassing chambers and business- entirely separated from the state requires a associations that have grown influential stable capital backing and a firmly estab- and powerful enough to become the prime lished market, but neither of these condi- partners of the subsequent governments tions could be created in the preceding dec- irrespective of their political stands. Thus ades of state-socialism. As mentioned, the the new Hungarian bourgeoisie has attained freeing of the frozen assets and concealed genuine success in the domestic arena: its savings driven from prior years-long work corporations testified acknowledgeable in the second economy were enough, at performance in maintaining a decisive say best, to provide funding only for the en- in planning the utilization of the collective trepreneurial start-ups upon the systemic funds with a steadily increasing share of turn. However, they proved seriously in- business up until now.9

7 In the old days, such a jointing obviously did not cause any serious deﬁciencies: after all, both the public sphere and the limited market of the second economy were under the strict control of the omnipotent party-state. However, the interlocking has long survived the old system: during the past decade and a half, it has proven strong enough to divert any attempts at separation. 8 Strangely enough, the earlier outlined liberal drives – though in full contradiction to their ideological foundation – have been of great assistance to smoothly reproduce the blurring. Later I will return to the forces that oddly create a high degree of concordance between corporatism and liberalism on the Hungarian stage. 9 By the very nature of the process, it is extremely difﬁcult to measure the exact magnitude of the yearly amounts diverted from the state’s revenue to private business. However, a number of case-studies among small and grand entrepreneurs, and further, the scattered data in the yearly reports of the biggest business chambers, the State Privatization Agency, the Ministry of Finance, etc. provide enough evidence to estimate that direct state support to private business makes up at least some 6-7 per cent of Hungary’s yearly GDP. This is a truly substantial portion, no less than 2.0-2.5 percent higher than the yearly share of the entirety of the public health care sector (Voszka, 2003.; Laki, 2003.; Laki and Szalai, 2004.).

316 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms...

At the same time, the need for the fi- ging behind”, to give them open assistance nancial presence of the state has been kept for the advancement they “deserve”, but alive by the fact that economic restructuring have never achieved – and they do not cease has induced erosion even in those market to outbid each other in submitting various relations that had hitherto been regarded as claims for compensation that are “legiti- more or less stable and “everlasting”. The mate” when considered separately. Having privatization of the state firms has disrupted the arguments that justify these claims ac- the state orders thought to be secure, while cepted and embodied in the legislation and, the collapse of the traditional eastern mar- consequently, in the annual plans for cen- kets and the rather difficult access to the tral financing, is a question of rude political western ones in substitution have confused force: in this way, the access to the public and endangered the established export refunds has mostly been the direct function of lations. Furthermore, the intense inflow of the latent bargaining positions established foreign capital and consumer products has prior to the systemic change. However, the also resulted in heated competition on the costs involved are not only those paid to the fronts of domestic sale. All this has greatly claimants. One also has to take into account increased the risk of full independence and the indirect ones. The most important are invoked for a strengthened buffer role of the costs of the bureaucratic staff that is the state. urgently needed to manage and administer However, the causes for claiming the the steadily spreading exemptions and the state’s long-term protection for establish- adjoining growing funds. Due to the simple ing independence from it include not only technical associations involved, the number direct economic components, but also cul- of full-time employees in public admin- tural and attitude factors. Above all, it is istration has increased by no less than 25 worth mentioning the apparently lasting percent between 1992 and 2002, while employment in the overall economy has suf- boomerang effect that has accompanied lib- fered 3 percent shrinkage in the meantime eration from the political power of the state. (Laky, 2004.). Paradoxically, the decades of resistance to the state as the oppressor have been quite In this sense, one can definitely say that clearly being reversed, and while the vari- the program of slimming the state down has ous corporate bodies and interest alliances so far led to its actual fattening up. How- only clung to the state distribution policy ever, this irony of history has rather seri- out of fear and defencelessness, now they ous financial implications: the portion spent make angry claims on it. Behind the oppos- by the central state for financing itself has ing principles of privatization intended to grown from 30 percent to 44 per cent of the “regulate” the plundering of public assets, central budgets of the respective years of 10 intensely competing demands for com- 1996 and 2003. pensation can be detected. Widely varying Some other arenas of social life throw an groups consider that the time has come for even clearer light on the indicated ambiva- “the” state to compensate them for their his- lences towards the state. The large number torical grievances and their decades of “lag- of civil societies, associations and founda-

10 Own calculations. Source: www.fn.hu/index. (In the computation, it is only the centrally run units of public administration and services that I took into account as those ﬁnanced directly from the central state budget. In other words, the two large spheres of public health care and education were not included, as 85-90 percent of their organizations are under the authority of local governance.)

317 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... tions that have been set up amidst the new The situation is similar in the collectiv- democratic conditions are model cases of ised acquisition and regulation of personal the simultaneous demand for self-organi- income. Enterprise managers and trade zation and for bureaucratic recognition.11 union activists are unanimous in protest- On the one hand, they have gained a vital ing against all forms of central restriction role in providing a wide range of services, of wage bargaining (interpreting even the especially in those areas where public pro- attempt to reach uniform agreements as a visions had been non-existent for decades sign of central intervention into what is by (e.g. re-training programs, home-care for now private production). At the same time the sick, alternative medicine, business and with the same momentum, they also consulting, etc.). On the other hand, they heavily rely on the very same central state. have capitalized on their very indispensa- They all use the old paths that have proven bility and claimed ample funding from the successful in obtaining individual treat- agent whom they substituted: the state. In ment to win compensation from various this duality, they have been uninterruptedly bodies of the central administration, either and faithfully continuing the traditions of because of the worsening market conditions the second economy – though now within due to sharpened foreign competition (e.g. institutionalized frames – which demanded, the domestic pharmaceutical firms), or for as said, undisturbed autonomy in defining the acknowledgment of the incomparable the terms, and support from above for com- importance of the service they provide (e.g. ing up them. As to the size of the slice that recurrently claiming a centrally funded this way the corporations embodying “civil rise in salaries for teachers, health-work- interests” can cut these days from the col- ers, etc.), or for the extra costs due to the lective cake, a few statistical figures signal boosting prices on the world market (e.g. rather remarkable success. In the year 2000, the Hungarian AA Community arguing the provisions they received in the form of on behalf of the “car-users’ collective” to direct state subsidies mounted to no less claim state protection against the losses due than 3.5 percent of the central budget, and to the rapidly rising price of oil), etc. – the this amount made up no less than 28.4 per- list can be continued endlessly. Again, the cent of their total revenue. In other words, claims taken piece-by-piece hardly can be within a short decade, the historically new labelled as “unfounded”. Nevertheless, to- civil sector has been heavily geared into the gether they end up in continuously tapping state, and the bondage has become so strong the public resources, and by doing so they that any political attempts at cutting it back contribute to the very reproduction of all would imply the risk of the immediate col- the persistent insecurities, imbalances, and lapsing of the entire sector.12 ambivalences discussed so far.

11 Prior to 1989, any grass-roots attempts at founding even a most innocent civil organization (say, for providing home-care for the elderly in the village) were perceived (and prosecuted) as dissident political acts. Hence, NGOs were practically non-existent, and the “civil sphere” was largely made up from a few thousand local sports-associations . With the systemic turn, the situation quickly changed. Within a decade, the number of the registered foundations grew from 400 to nearly 20 000, and those of the associations from 8 400 to 28 400 (Non-proﬁt szervezetek Magyarországon..., 2002.). 12 Own calculations, based on the national account and on the data in Non-proﬁt szektor...– It is worth adding that the state’s contribution proves exceptionally high in light of the respective indices of the productive sector. The contributions, subsidies and supports received from this latter segment of the economy, together with the gains made from the NGOs’ own business make up 22.8 percent of the yearly civil budget which is – as seen – substantially less than what comes through public channels.

318 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms...

To sum up, the inseparability of the grown self-sustaining, and neither of the state and the market, and together with it, parties can break out of it. A parliamentary the tight interlocking of the public and pri- state has rather limited means for interven- vate spheres and resources of living seem ing. Instead, its role remains to maneuver profoundly ingrained in the post-commu- amid the conditions of heated inflation16 nist Hungarian society and economy. As and spiralling indebtedness17 that have been shown above, despite all the strong motives kept in coincidental motion by the endless for full-fledged independence, the majority bargaining mechanisms. Here and there, the has serious reasons and deep-rooted inter- new legislation tries to set the limit for one ests in maintaining the bond – even though group or the other – but the next time the the overall costs have been skyrocketing. boomerang certainly kicks back. Though attempts at assessing the exact There is only one arena where the door magnitude of the involved public funds still seems to be open for repeated cuts: this are complicated by the very nature of the is the domain of the welfare for the poor. game that works against transparency, one Here the state can rely on a vast political can still come up with some informed ap- consensus. All its efforts to apply extra proximation. By adding up the bits quoted strict rules without concessions are met by earlier, and also taking into account also dy- massive approval on the side of the ma- namic implications13, we are probably rath- jority, all the more so, because the matter er close to reality with estimating that no itself appears rather debatable. After all, it less than some 38-45 percent of the yearly is a widely shared and historically founded central revenue is spent on assisting pri- view among the non-poor that the poor have vate business and market activities through their own lot in their situation. 14 a great variety of support schemes that are The antecedents of this widespread con- 15 financed directly from public resources. viction date back to the years of late social- While this magnitude seems shocking, ism, when poverty in the material sense still the biggest price to be paid cannot be was largely bound to non-participation in expressed in currency – for the structural the nationwide movement of informal pro- traps have evolved. The interlocking has duction (Szalai, 1997.). By not having any

13 It is important to emphasize that the involved funds largely follow a one-way route, and are transferred to the recipients without even the hope of later return to the state’s revenue. This strange situation is partly due to the wide range of tax-exemptions, wavers, and similar favors that the respective regulations imply, and is partly a consquence of the widespread practice of tax-evasion. In sum, it is not only the size, but – probably more importantly – the essence of the relationship which makes the Hungarian case profoundly different from state support to private business in the West. 14 Just to list a few, these forms include the various sectoral subsidies, special public support-schemes to certain projects executed by private business, tax allowences and –refunds, publicly funded compensation-schemes, etc. and the adjoining costs of management and administration. 15 The overall amount is really extraordinary: it comes up to 13-15 percent of the annual GDP, meaning in other words that the yearly public support drawn into private business exceeds the state’s total expenditure on public healthcare and education by some 44-67 percent! 16 Between 1990 and 2000, consumer prices rose by a yearly average rate of 14-35 percent. For the past years, inﬂation has been on the decrease though its rate was still above 6 percent in 2004. (Source: www.fn.hu) 17 Taking the year of 1999 as an example, the total of foreign and domestic indebtedness of the state’s revenue amounted to 61 percent of the GDP. With this extremely high ratio, Hungary is far above the respective proportions of the seven other postcommunist countries that joined the EU in 2004. (In comparison, the index for the same year was 43 p.c. in Poland – granting her the second position in the row –, 28 p.c. in Slovakia and as low as 15 percent in the Czech Republic (Antal, 2004.).

319 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... extra resources from private endeavours, (public pensions, state-financed benefits, the poor of the 1980s became the primary unemployment benefits, local welfare as- victims of the above-outlined erosion of so- sistance etc.), which gives the appearance cial security and welfare. Furthermore, they that the “public” is supporting them. The had nobody else to blame but themselves: uniformity of their daily sources thus cre- amid the dramatically atomised conditions ates the false impression that in reality it is of self-protection through the second econ- they who “use up” the thin trickle of already omy involvement, it seemed their choice to dwindling public sources. The majority keep away. The collapse of the old regime are therefore in full agreement on continu- did not induce any substantial change in ously reducing the scope of their support: this appearance, particularly because the all initiatives for reducing “squandering” in majority of today’s chronically poor came this domain are given the green light. The from families of the one-time outsiders of liberal principles of economizing are more the informal sector, whose marginalization, than welcome here. in turn, could be traced back well into the Let me discuss now, how they are put decades of early state-socialism and before into motion in the daily operation of the (Horváth, 1996.). However, for varied po- second sub-system, i.e. in the welfare as- litical reasons and a range of counteract- sistance “just for the needy”. ing interests, the unbroken reproduction of their deprived situation has not been THE SECOND SUB-SYSTEM: revealed until today. Hence, the public has THE GHETTO OF POVERTY little cause to revise its strong belief that WITH THICKENING WALLS it is primarily themselves whom the poor should charge for the unchanged state of As outlined above, the creation of a their destitution. publicly funded separate sub-system for providing efficient and just welfare exclu- The belief has massively resisted all the sively for those in need was an inherent part dramatic changes around. Neither the col- of the liberal welfare reforms of the 1990s. lective experience of deep economic crisis, While the primary goal certainly was to nor the unbrokenly continued impoverish- contribute this way to the desired diminu- ment of the poorest, despite the upward turn tion of the state, some further important in the country’s economic performance, considerations were also involved. rendered sufficiently strong evidence to First of all, it was widely believed that falsify it. Thus, the broadly echoed personi- poverty would automatically wither away fied arguments are still dominant: the poor with the economic recovery. The arguments are poor because they behave differently, were in line with the reigning doctrines in they are somehow not like “us”. policy-making: amidst the conditions of True, in contrast with the majority, the continuous growth and the concomitant poor still have at best very limited access to expansion of the labour market, the unem- the market: they are too young or too old, ployed would become re-employed, run- uneducated, the Roma, in bad health, or ge- down factories would be replaced by well- ographically badly placed and so on to find paying business, household incomes would employment, or they have lost it long ago. rise, contribution-driven benefits for those It is also true that in the absence of earn- out of work would increase, etc. In short, ings and market-related gains, the low in- together with the elimination of its causes, comes their households rely on are derived poverty would shrink to a residual size and almost solely from the “official” sources if at all, it would hit people only tempo-

320 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... rarily. Secondly, it was also believed that else. After all, means-testing, disciplining improved targeting and the local schemes in order to teach the client to economize bet- built on the community’s consensus would ter and to be more diligent, providing tight ultimately conclude in generous supports supervision over all the miniscule deeds of sufficient to help the poor to overcome the daily life of the poor, etc. are built-in their destitute state. Thirdly, by swiftly de- components of such designs everywhere. centralizing a great number of former cen- Hence, they all carry the more or less uni- trally administered schemes and provisions, form momentum of humiliation and the poverty alleviation was also to be assisted concomitant stabilizing of defencelessness also from another aspect. It was assumed with little personal energy left for those as- that through empowering the local govern- sisted to break out of the state of constant ments, the key decisions on people’s daily destitution.18 This said, one can then con- living would arise from insightful knowl- clude that it is probably more the implied edge and personal acquaintance and thereby additional social, economic and political fairness, flexibility and accuracy would be functions of welfare assistance within the raised at once. entirety of the system of social protection However, history has nullified all these that qualify it than any particular internal expectations. As amply demonstrated by a characteristics of the scheme as such. number of independently run studies that When applying this broader approach, it have repeatedly arrived at the same conclu- is justified to say that Hungary’s decentral- sion (Spéder, 2002.; Havasi, 2002.; Szalai, ized assistance scheme has met the expecta- 2002.; Bass et al., 2003.; Szívós and Tóth, tion of its designers: its primary achievement 2004.), despite all the modifications to the has indeed been to carry out the purposeful support system, all the technical refine- transformation of the earlier all-embrac- ments in its regulation, and all the voca- ing central state redistribution.19 Together tional training of those dealing with the with this, the scheme has accomplished a matter, there has not been even the slight- perhaps even more important mission: the est reduction in the degree of poverty in canalization of an important part of the af- Hungary and social exclusion has even in- fected social groups into a sealed sub-divi- creased. Welfare assistance has obviously sion of provisions. True, without the great done little to help the poor. The question expansion of welfare assistance as a new, therefore arises: what have been the rea- dynamic branch of the economy it would sons behind that? hardly have been possible to break up the The answer can be given just partially former oversized system: while “guiding” by looking solely at the working of the sys- large strata into the market-regulated field tem of local welfare assistance. As to its of provisions, it was profoundly needed to principles and constituents, the scheme is “evict” other large groups from the potential certainly neither better nor worse in Hunga- use of central funds – and the local schemes ry than similar arrangements are anywhere reacted on this call with great perfection.

18 Since the birth of Richard Titmuss’ classical essay on the subject (1958.), a vast literature has repeatedly demonstrated these practically unalterable implications of means-testing. 19 A few ﬁgures indicate the scale of the change. Within the total of welfare transfers from public funds (comprising payments in social security, centrally distributed beneﬁts and local assistance), the ratio of provisions from the central budget dropped from 24 to 8 percent between 1991 and 2001, while the respective proportion of local welfare provisions rose from 5 to 10 percent in the meantime. (Own calculations based on data in the Yearbook of Welfare Statistics 2001 (CSO, 2002.).

321 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms...

The involved change of place not only impression that the “anomalies” in making required the application of financial tech- justified distinctions among the poor for ac- niques for regrouping, but it also opened knowledgeable entitlement were only inci- the way for important mobility processes. dental: they certainly could be eliminated Another important function of the rapidly by better and more precise local regulations, growing welfare assistance system was by better training of the providers and by that, by creating thousands of new offices refining the behaviour of the needy, espe- and tens of thousands of labour market cially their attitude to work. Moreover, this jobs with decent middle-class positions, it fragmentation has successfully hid the real created a refuge for many who had been in selective functions of the system behind danger of losing employment amidst eco- its welcome veil: the potential question of nomic restructuring.20 social responsibility for poverty has been An examination of local supports in almost automatically reduced to the ques- their natural community context reveals tion of improving the level of expertise of further important functions beyond these a few local welfare workers, a routine prob- macro-level roles. After all, the scheme lem that could and should be handled within turned out to be very helpful in creating so- the walls of the local authority. cial peace and smoothly operating relations It is important to stress that while ex- in the life of local communities. Firstly, ercising the economic and political func- it has provided a professional machinery tions listed here – which at first sight ap- and institutional background enabling the pear foreign to the spirit of assistance – the non-poor majority to deal with poverty as considerations of fairness and neediness a minority problem separated from its own mentioned above lose nothing of their sig- “normal” affairs; secondly, the system has nificance. Quite the contrary: the providers offered efficient instruments for managing are not being misleading when constantly the fluctuation of the local labour markets; affirming that their work is guided primarily thirdly, it has rendered reliable guaran- by these very considerations. However, by tees for the endured supply of the human transforming the principles into hundreds resources for the least qualified and least of thousands of decisions on particular desired jobs. cases, they are continuously doing a deli- In addition, the scheme of decentralized cate “translation” work in order to justify means-tested provisions in substitution of nothing but selection. In the final analysis, the earlier centralized arrangements has it is thus the legitimization of the prevail- been of great assistance in maintaining the ing deep social divides which is assigned

20 A few figures are sufficient to illustrate the process. First and foremost the figures for higher education bear witness to explosive growth. While in the 1990./91 academic year 1 600 students were enrolled in the various forms of social training offered at the country’s universities and colleges (social work, social pedagogy, later child welfare service activity, Jewish community work), by 2002/03 their total number had risen to 11 000. In the meantime there had also been a dynamic expansion in the scope and number of institutions. For example, figures published on care for the homeless show that the number of daytime warming rooms increased from 14 in 1993 to 71 in 2001, and the number of soup kitchens rose from 27 to 43; over the same period the number of residential institutions providing temporary care grew from 255 to 344 and the numbers they employed increased from 12 000 to 20 000. Only a relatively short time series is available on family helpers due to the repeated reorganisation of the services. But the trend is similar: between 1998 and 2001 their number increased by exactly 300 units (from 462 to 766). Finally, the annual figures on the non-profit sector also indicate substantial expansion: between 1993 and 2002 the number of foundations and associations serving social purposes increased by around 1 300, from 2 759 to 4 008 (Source of the data: the annual statistical reports for the different areas.).

322 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... to them as their chief role in the broad di- office has accepted them, they can count on vision of labour. This fundamental trait of its unconditional support. This is the circle the assistance scheme is inescapable. By of the faultless poor: elderly people with making distinctions between the needy low pensions who keep their homes tidy and those who are not entitled to support, and pay their bills in time, divorced women by always giving rationalization for this with low earnings whose children are neat distinction, and by channelling the clearly and attend the school regularly, miners and separated groups of clients into different factory workers whose financial situation, benefits (or treatment) paths, the local wel- as well as their health, has been undermined fare distributors are actually rendering an by long illness, crafted skilled workers who official basis sanctified by the decision of lost their jobs when the local factory shut an authority for the acceptance of hard so- down and whose poverty, regarded as a cial and labour market selection, and more misfortune, renders the ideal case to dem- generally, for the unquestionable confirma- onstrate what local welfare offices mean by tion of the institutionalised procedure of “persons in trouble through no fault of their discrimination. own”, etc. In these examples, it is beyond In this order the keyword is distinc- question that the cause of financial decline tion, which, at the same time, has its clear lies in the circumstances, for which at the indication: as said, it is the level of need. most those affected deserve understanding However, the level of need is not self-evi- and solidarity. dent; it is surely not identical with income. However, the majority of the poor who For no just categorizations can be done ex- apply for assistance do not belong to this clusively on weighing up one’s resources. group. The local office workers – like the After all, one knows from the daily experi- widest circles of public opinion standing ence what a huge difference can occur be- behind them – share the already outlined tween two households living on the same strong view that is little subject to appeal amounts. One is thoroughly economizing, on the situation and their own contribution the other is happy-go-lucky, one spares on to it. Expressed in its daily wording: “It heating, the other throws away money on is extremely rare that people are not at all alcohol, etc. Hence, in order to make jus- responsible for their own poverty and they tice in selecting the “truly” needy and also can certainly be expected to make at least to keep order and justice, some additional some attempts to get out of it. Of course, the characteristics are needed – otherwise the extent to which people are their own worst idea fails in its entirety. enemies differs from case to case.” On the Hungary’s invention is easy to guess: it basis of such a widely held conviction, no- is the centuries-old idea of deservingness. body would then question the rightfulness, Deservingness as the principle of a “just” and indeed the necessity, of taking into ac- selection has proven remarkably effective: count the degree of the applicant’s “faults”, with the purposeful application of the con- “errors”, “failures” and “irresponsibility” cept, local governments achieved the im- in judging applications for welfare assist- pressive result of cutting back the take-up ance to be given from nowhere else but the rates of public assistance by no less than taxpayers’ money. Hence, it is the primary 65 per cent! (Ferge, 2000.; Havasi, 2002.; duty of those assigned to spend this money Bass et al., 2003.; Szívós and Tóth, 2004.) to scrutinize each case in detail and decline As recent surveys have unequivocally all the claims that prove unjustified. shown, only a relatively narrow circle of The errors, shortcomings and irrespon- the needy can be sure that once the welfare sibility that can be listed as a basis when

323 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... making a decision come in many different what is implied. And the practice of wel- forms, but there are two particularly seri- fare assistance converts this widely inferred ous cases of people’s “own fault”. One is thought into money, while at the same time “irresponsibility” shown in having children it also transforms the personified struggles – because even if there is little money, the of openly racialized pre-selection into the family can still live on it with good and far- rule-governed cooperation of the office and sighted family planning. And the other is a its clients under the guidance of covertly “failed” attitude to work – for people can racialized rules. always do work of some kind if they really A recent survey on local welfare alloca- want to. A vast body of literature produced tion reveals the hidden, but efficacious ra- to refute them has still not managed to top- cial content of this second – rule-governed ple these two related dogmas. – stage, tailored exclusively for those who It is perhaps hardly necessary to argue at passed the first grade of pre-selection for length that the main force that keeps them establishing their “deservingness”.21 The alive is their clear ethnic/racial content, final result of the analysis can be summed giving the local communities a handy con- up in a few short sentences. The data show firmation for the conflict that causes the in the first place that the more the children, most tension in their everyday lives: the the higher is the risk to become rejected. feelings of the non-Roma majority who suf- Furthermore, if being accepted, the sum fered relative losses or at least have lived ultimately awarded in welfare assistance is in a state of constant insecurity amidst the in inverse proportion to the degree of pover- lengthy process of economic transforma- ty – the larger the family, the smaller the tion, towards the Roma minority living in aid granted to assist them. Additionally, it extreme and lasting poverty. Furthermore, is clear from the findings that these associa- the implied ethnic/racial differentiation tions apply only to the Roma families. also entails some beneficial outcome in But before attributing the matter to the the economic sense: it helps to keep claims prejudices of the distributors of welfare for local assistance within limits. After all, assistance, it is worth to look at the regu- amidst the arising competition and, in fact, lations. Then it becomes clear that if the heated rivalry between the Roma and non- local authorities do give support to assist Roma groups among the “truly” needy, it families with children, calculated per child is always the “others” whom to blame for they give slightly more aid to large families “eating up” the scarce local funds and for – both the Roma and non-Roma. However, lowering the actually delivered sums while poor Roma families usually comprise not winding up the rates of refusal. only more children, but also more adults Of course, in demanding that the men- than it can be found in the respective non- tioned cases of “own fault” be carefully Roma cases.22 Nonetheless, overcrowd- screened out, no one states (openly) that ing is not a criterion for entitlement in the “we are talking here mainly about the Roma prevailing regulations. It therefore follows (and the lumpen poor who have become like logically that the office recognizes needi- them”). But even so, everyone understands ness to a lesser extent precisely in those

21 The survey comprised detailed data of the welfare allocating practices of 30 local governments in the years 2000. and 2003. (Neményi and Szalai, 2005.). 22 Of course, this is not because of their “cultural otherness” but in the result of their greater poverty: with poorer housing, more sick family members in need of nursing, and less money, the only rational decision the Roma kin can make is to move under a common roof.

324 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... occurrences where there are most people: unregistered work casts a shadow on the re- when it assists the Roma families. lationship of trust, the welfare provider who The differences in the provided sums has been “tricked” cannot do anything, even are rather small. Nevertheless, the sym- though they would help anyway. The only bolic value is rather substantial: after all, it possibility left to them is exposure. They is the very act of differentiating that re- must order an unannounced investigation ally matters here. And by building it into to display the abuse, using the full weight the regulations (whether on purpose or out of their official powers to put a timely stop of certain blindness to social reality), the to this unlawful receipt of assistance (and welcome messages are clear. The commu- safeguard their job in the eyes of her su- nity in a constant battle with the Roma can pervisors). Thirdly, unregistered work is be assured that “its” poor receive slightly by nature fluctuating: sometimes it can be more than those of the minority; the sup- found continuously, at other times not, and ported numbersome families among the at such times the client genuinely does not non-Roma can gain some self-respect in have anything to live on. In such a situa- comparing themselves to the Roma; the as- tion s/he really would be entitled to support, sisted Roma poor enjoy a similar advantage but the offices are not able to follow such with a glimpse at their rejected neighbours, fluctuation. Unpredictability, aggravated and above all, the earlier indicated rivalry by the undermined trust result in constant as an efficient self-regulatory instrument sharp conflicts and provide everyday con- to keep welfare claims within strict limits firmation of the view that “these Gypsies” remains in motion. – because who else would they be?! – are The situation is more complex for the impossible to deal with. If they were to fi- second qualified case of “own fault” – a nally work “properly”, everything would “failed attitude” to work. Because in this be different. domain applications for welfare assistance For all these reasons, there are many can be rejected on two grounds: if the ap- problems with them. But they at least work. plicant works, and if s/he does not. In the And even if this fact cannot be recognized first case, because the work is being done with welfare assistance, the office utters a “not in the right place” and “not legally” few words of understanding for their efforts – in plain words, the income is earned ille- between two personal fights. gally. In the second case, because although But there is a group of “own fault” ap- it is rightfully expected, s/he still does not plicants who do not deserve even these few take a job, or is “choosy” about accepting good words. They are the ones who “just the (public) work intended solely for wel- look out for where they can get welfare as- fare applicants. sistance instead of going out and looking Let me show in some details how these for work”. There would be plenty of work considerations are applied in the daily prac- for them – true, all are rather demanding tice of assistance. and poorly paid. But the Roma “resist” if The welfare office has many problems the office offers this kind of work with good with the unregistered work. Firstly, it gener- intentions. This is the way they are “social- ates income for which the person concerned ized”– as the welfare workers often put it cannot be required to provide evidence, for explanation. even though it is perfectly obvious that It is easy to see that, regardless of their the family is not as poor as it claims to be. personal attitudes, the staff of the local wel- Secondly, and closely related to this: the fare offices simply have no means at their

325 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... disposal to properly react to the present la- those who are prepared to do the work the bour market position of those many appli- office allots them can expect to receive sup- cants – for the most part Roma – who were port. And the main task of welfare work- thrown out of regular employment 10–15 ers is to make their clients understand that years ago, and since then have been able to compliance is their only option. find casual, unregistered black work at best. The survey data show that Roma – and From their viewpoint, this labour market the very poorest non-Roma sharing a simi- situation does not exist. In response they lar fate – came to see this long ago. It was can do two things. Either they try to force the pressure of a number of daily facts that the clients into “proper” jobs, and in so do- taught them. The first among them is the ex- ing they continue the legacy of the former treme segmentation of the Hungarian labour state-socialist police, that is, they regard market dating back to the very origins of the their official task as being principally the post-1990 economic transformation (Ker- prosecution of crime; or they acknowledge tesi, 2000; Kemény, 2000.; Fazekas, 2001.; the reality and become silent accomplices Köllő, 2001.). As a result of the gradually to the clients who have been pushed off the intensifying segmentation, the poorest stra- margin, in which case they risk their own ta of workers (with a heavy overrepresen- positions. Either way, a continuous conflict tation of the Roma among them) are now is unavoidable. almost entirely excluded from any access to It is this that gives the dynamics of one proper jobs. Of course, their exclusion did of the main roles of the welfare offices in not begin today, but it became practically today’s Hungary: meeting the local demand complete by the years after the millennium for the worst jobs and providing an outlet (Lukács, 2005.). The second set of lessons for labour market fluctuations. Because if that the poor – especially the Roma poor the environment is more tolerant and the su- – had to learn was that the marketization periors and the opinion-setting strata of the from below led to an unprecedented com- community are ready to turn a blind eye23, petition among those inside employment the welfare office reacts like a seismograph to capitalize on all the good jobs that today and looks the other way: within the limited arise from the old informal production.24 In frames set, it generously renders assistance. this process of marketization from below, And the reverse is also true: if landscaping the access to work is still at the most only needs to be done in public areas but the partly regulated by the demand and sup- funds are lacking, if the residents are com- ply, and is largely a question of trust and plaining that the streets are dirty and “it is connections where the former relations of time the mayor did something”, if an army mutual favours play the main role in the of auditors descends to check the accounts distribution of the considerably reduced of the indebted local authority, then only number of jobs.25 The poor generally did

23 Local opinion-leaders and respected members of the community have good reasons to be blind from time to time. After all, as participants of the earlier described under-funded vast Hungarian embourgeoisement process, they are compelled to economize with the resources in all the imaginable forms. Cheap or unpaid labor of the most defenseless welfare recipients is one the forms where the cost/benefit ratio is truly minimal (The harm made to human rights and dignity are rarely considered, the least when the laborers are Roma.). 24 This phenomenon is basically the result of the gradual “merger” of the once existent first and second economies (Laky, 1995.). 25 The process and some of its consequences for the social division of work today are very clearly reflected in the data series of the CSO for 1986 and the national representative time budget survey of the year 2000 do- cumenting work done in the formal and informal economy (Vági, 2002.).

326 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... not have and still do not have anything exploiting themselves to the maximum. As to offer in exchange, and so the well-paid survey data show, when the poorest people contracts, commissioned work, consulting obtain work they outdo everyone in their projects, etc. remain beyond their reach. efforts, clearly refuting the widely held And even if they have the necessary train- opinion that they are shirkers.26 ing and experience, they have little hope of These and similar facts should make it being the ones to learn in time about any clear that whether the poor have their hands opportunities that exist. full with work or not does not depend on In sum, in Hungary today well-paid, their attitude. It is the reality though, that protected and secure jobs are open only to their efforts remain largely invisible: to those who already have such jobs, while themselves because of the very small pay- those who for one reason or another never ment they receive for the extreme exploi- entered this circle or were forced out it tation, and to the outside world because no are denied the access to work. The poor, written contract was made to set its terms, especially the Roma poor, are shockingly no records were taken of its details, and underrepresented in the first group, while further, because neither them, nor the em- dramatically over represented in the second. ployees paid any taxes or social security The cultural arguments that owe the lack of contributions on it. On top of the involved employment to “bad” socialization and the obvious defencelessness, it is a most tragic subsequent “faulty” attitudes to work have irony that, amid the indicated conditions, to be considered against the brutal facts of such a traceless existence is in the own sharp segmentation and dramatic exclusion best interest of the poor themselves. The that are further accentuated by a set of eth- situation is clear: if they do not have even nic/racial implications. a chance of a proper occupation, then they Under such circumstances, it is taken for should at least be allowed a livelihood; and granted that if on rare occasions the possi- for this they have to apply for welfare as- bility for even the worst kind of paid work sistance which the office would refuse to arises, it is a must for the poor to accept it give them if it knew about their “illegal” without hesitation or bargaining. They have incomes from work. At the same time, these no other concerns but immediately grabbing incomes from work are so little that they it even if the resulting earnings are so small make no real difference, even to the lives of that, adding up all what the members of the the poorest of the poor. Under such circum- family pool from payments for casual work, stances, welfare assistance is quite literally the resulting monthly income of the house- needed for mere survival – obtaining it is of hold does not amount to more than three- vital importance. And in the same way, it quarters of the minimum monthly wage of is a vital question on which the sharp-eyed a single employee in the legal economy. welfare providers should be reassured: the Moreover, being selected amidst the other- concealment of the casual work that now wise hopeless state of uninterrupted desti- and then turns up is in the common interest tution is a treasure and the poor repay it by of the office and the client.

26 Further proof of this fact is provided by the ﬁndings of the already mentioned national time budget survey made by the Central Statistical Ofﬁce in the year 2000. The processing of close to 11 000 time use diaries found that although the “poor falling behind” have barely over half the chance of doing paid work compared to the average for the adult population aged 15 to 79, the intensity of their work exceeds the average. The length of working time calculated for the number of persons actually working on a given day of the year is no less than 23 percent longer for those in the poorest group of society than the national average (Szalai and Vági, 2002.).

327 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms...

These common interests therefore gua- the individual to meet certain obligations in rantee two things. On the one hand, they an exchange for certain rights. Those who secure that unregistered employment en- cannot meet the former should not expect shrouded by the working of local welfare society to provide the latter. In this vein, assistance continues to flourish unchanged the earlier outlined liberal considerations on and as needed; on the other hand they pow- the usefulness of a separated sub-system of erfully safeguard that the bargain to be provisions for the needy are completed and, struck between the provider and the client at the same time, justified by the notion of remains a matter of internal struggles be- “cultural otherness”. However, as we have tween the rather defenceless office work- seen, their bondage becomes the foundation ers in service of the public will and the ex- of structural disintegration. After all, the tremely defenceless poor – above all: the coupled principles of unlimited competition Roma poor – in service of demonstrating on the market and expulsion on the grounds general “justice” and wise economizing of individual failure keep alive as a right- with the public funds. ful order the institutional separation of an In this way, the ghetto is constructed out utterly closed world – a ghetto proper – for of common interests. All that remains is to those whom the concepts imply: Hungary’s safeguard its walls, so that social peace can dramatically marginalized long-term poor be maintained and the majority can accom- and, above all, the Roma among them. plish its huge national tasks while enjoying The coexistent two sub-systems of welfare the gifts of democracy which – for the (un- – the rather generous public financing of limited) time being – implies only their full the market and the running of the impov- citizenship. As we have seen, the persistent erished quarters of public provisions for “cultural arguments” about explaining pov- those outside of it – reflect and reproduce erty along ethnic/racial lines are of utmost the outlined strange social contract in stead- importance here: without their powerful fast advancement toward a social structure justification, full citizenship with all what divided along ever sharper fault-lines. it means should embrace all citizens of the country, the (Roma) poor included. Howev- CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE er, as discussed earlier, other tasks seem to SHAPING OF A FOURTH WORLD be ranked higher in the eyes of the Hungar- OF WELFARE CAPITALISM ian public at this stage of its lengthy postcommunist transformation. It is enough to Now that the above discussions hope- recall the pressing chores of modernization, fully made the reader acquainted with the quick adaptation to the enlarged Europe, basic traits of the two sub-systems of wel- uplifting of the level of wages to support fare provisions in their troubled coexistence competition on the Western market, etc. In in contemporary Hungary, it seems inescap- this rating, it seems wise and also “evident” able to return to the more general questions to put the clearly domestic issue of poverty of the introduction and make an attempt to toward the end of the scale. properly locate the case on the map of the However, in a country with a democratic “worlds of welfare capitalism”. constitution and declared citizens’ rights, However, any such endeavours can such a differentiation cannot be made in an be only tentative at this stage, for at least open way. But if put in “cultural” terms, it for two reasons. Firstly, the period since immediately gives reason for an important the collapse of “softened” totalitarianism democratic principle: after all, citizenship is in Hungary has been too short to reliably nothing but a contract between society and construct the necessary time-series for an

328 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... informed comparison of the post-commu- In this historic crusade, decomposition and nist welfare state with its established West- construction still go hand in hand, and their ern counterpart. Secondly, due to the very blend still generates rather fluid conditions, nature of the systemic transformation that blurred institutional arrangements, and un- was aimed at turning upside down a range clear relations that do not foster any endeav- of old institutions, rules, and arrangements, ours for classical statistical comparisons. one would end up with a number of empty Despite the barriers that largely hinder cells when filling the columns of Esping- the collating of the numerical indicators, Andersen’s matrices with the respective the Hungarian case nonetheless seems to contemporary data for Hungary. carry certain crystallized traits that allow Let me mention two key examples for us to venture a few conclusions in a com- highlighting the difficulties: full employment parative vein. and the rate of de-commodification in social Let me turn to them now. policy – as two essential elements of any of As this paper intended to demonstrate, in the modern welfare regimes. Taken in simple contemporary Hungary, neither of the dis- numerical values, one can establish that, as to cussed two sub-systems of welfare seems the old party-state, both of these constituents to be of a transient character. Firstly, as we had scored high, and they both seriously fell saw, their post-communist development upon its collapse. Nevertheless, when con- has strikingly adapted a scope of arrange- sidering also the actual content behind the ments and practices earlier of key impor- measures, the one-time high ranking proves tance, though the adaptation has taken place nothing but an artefact. For it turns out that amidst the profound re-tailoring of their the bare numeric comparison of the old and one-time functions and roles. Secondly – the new regimes actually “rewards” the op- but certainly not independently – both sub- pression instead of rights, there are dictates systems have been deeply ingrained, as also from above instead of choice, subjugation discussed, into the evolving social structure instead of freedom, and forced collectivism of belated embourgeoisement. Moreover, instead of respected privacy. they both have strongly assisted in its ad- A mere statistical appearance would thus vancement and reproduction. Therefore, we be fully misleading; moreover, it would hide have good reasons to assume that, despite the actual traits of the old rule instead of the above-indicated unsettlement as to the revealing them. After all, full employment details and daily routines, the fundamental and “de-commodification” in social policy attributes and workings of Hungary’s wel- were the true fundaments of it – however, fare regime have been firmly drafted and not for benefiting people, but for maintain- will stay like this for quite some time. ing the totalitarian regime. It was then not This said, let me put my main conclu- incidental, but essential for the changeover sion: the post-communist welfare state of to deconstruct full employment based Hungary neither fits any of the “three worlds on coercion and also to liberate choice on of welfare capitalism”, nor is it implying in- the market in replacement of the rendering dications of proceeding toward any of them. of “de-commodified” impoverishment. In Instead, Hungary represents a fourth model: brief, Hungary – as all other societies for- a mix of corporatism and liberalism, but as merly under Soviet rule – had to start anew. such, it is a powerful entity.27

27 It is not Esping-Andersen’s failure but perhaps a trick of history that, at the time of publishing his book, it was exactly this mix that the author excluded from the expectable scenarios. He wrote: “The degree to which

329 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms...

This is a strong statement. Let me bring ed those groups whose integration into the up some considerations in support of it. established strata of state-socialism was less In its mixed quality, the Hungarian successful: the unqualified rural laborers and post-communist welfare state manifests – above all – the dissolved one-time Roma the forcefulness of the deep-lying historical communities. Their fate was to become the structures: contemporary developments can marginalized, though still involved, prole- be considered as the lineal continuations of tariat on the fringes of socialist industry and a broken path. As studies in political history society. It was the totalitarian hoop that kept have convincingly shown, the country’s them inside, and with its falling apart, it was current welfare regime is strongly built the liberal design of the welfare ghetto that on those pre-war structures that had been came in substitution. After all, the logic of “suspended” by the communist experiment, construction was clear: with the impossi- but that could then be revitalized due to bility of a historic return and with no alter- their effective preservation (Szabó, 1995.; natives for the integration into the market, Tamás, 2002.). After all, the rise of the sec- there seemed to remain no other option but ond economy and its gearing into the formal exclusion. Hence, liberalism is not an “in- world under the party-state’s rule had been tellectual fashion” that comes and withers a prelude to the naked restoration of the away with time, but a deeply ingrained and fragmented institutional bargaining mecha- probably lasting constituent of the rising nisms upon the systemic turn. In this sense, post-communist welfare regime. post-communist transformation in Hungary As it was shown, another peculiarity of is but a return to the country’s temporarily the Hungarian case is the extensive utiliza- frozen trajectory, i.e. to the working of a tion of the state’s financial and power re- political structure built on strong corpora- sources for corporatist drives but, unlike in tions (with an etatist blend).28 the classical cases, the attempts in question Nevertheless, the decades of state-so- aim at steadily expanding the private market. cialism changed the pre-war trends in one In other words, the rather strong tendency of fundamental aspect. Through forced indus- Western corporatism toward de-commodifi- trialization, the old agrarian formations were cation does not apply here. To the contrary, broken up once for all, and together with the post-communist reforms have brought this, the vast peasantry living before amidst about a pronounced trend of re-commodi- half-feudal conditions became the urban fication. Here, again, the immediate prehis- working class. As studies in the social history is decisive. De-commodification in its tory of the period have amply documented, extreme form was, as said, one of the most this was a substantial change, concluding, essential cornerstones of state-socialism. Its for the most part, in genuine upward mobil- genuine function was lying, however, far ity (Fokasz and Örkény, 2000.). The pro- from both the ideological principles of the found shift in the social structure also affect- regime and the one-time claims of the work- clearly defined regime-clusters exist depends, then, on the extent to which regime-specific features are exclusively present only in one type. To give an example, we would not expect a conservative-type system (with strong corporatism and/or civil-service privileges) to also harbor liberalist traits (such as a large private market) or socialist traits (such as universalism).” (Esping-Andersen, 1990.:69) – The later vast literature inspired by his book left unchallenged this thesis (For a summary of the related works and their contribution to the characterization of the three models, see Hicks and Kenworthy, 2002.). 28 For a most insightful discussion of this structure and also its political manifestations in the 1920s and 1930s, see Bibó (1991.) and Szabó (1989.).

330 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms... ers’ movement: it was primarily to suppress REFERENCES: wages in order to speed up industrialization Antal, L. (2004.) Fenntartható-e a fenntartható through the over-centralization of all pos- növekedés? [Can Sustainable Growth Really be sible resources. Nevertheless, the seriously Sustained?]. Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány. curtailed purchasing power of society had Bass, L., Ferge, Zs. and Márton, I. (2003.) Gyorsje- to be compensated somehow: the inven- lentés a szegényedésről 2000–2003 [Account on tion was the vast “de-commodification” of Impoverishment 2000–2003]. Szociális Szakmai Szövetség. services that became directly rendered by Bibó, I. (1991.) Democracy, Revolution, Self-Deter- the central state – though under the strict- mination (Selected Writings). (ed: Károly Nagy), est possible control and, obviously, on the Social Science Monographs & Atlantic Research lowest possible level. and Publication Files. New York. In the light of these developments, the CSO (2002.) Non-profit szervezetek Magyarországon silent struggle for the expansion of the sec- 2000 [Non-profit organizations in Hungary, ond economy outlined earlier can be inter- 2000]. preted as a fight for two distinct, though in- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990.) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Polity Press terrelated, goals: for re-commodification as Minutes of the Workshop on “Gender Equality and the way for material advancement, and for Cultural Diversity” (2005.). May 27-28, 2005, the concomitant expansion of the market to London: LSE loose the party-state’s potentials to halt fur- Farkas, J. and Vajda A. (1988.) A lakásépítés második therance. In other words, the enlargement of gazdasága.[Housing and the Second Economy]. the market and re-commodification of ear- In: J. Szalai et al. (eds.): Arat a Magyar [Hungar- lier free provisions were seen together as ian harvest] (pp 166-176). IS HAS. those warranting liberation and affluence. Fazekas, K. (2001.) Az aktív korú állástalanok rend- And it was the corporatist traditions used szeres szociális segélyezésével és közcélú fogla- lkoztatásával kapcsolatos önkormányzati tapasz- toward such liberal ends that were put in talatok [Experiences of Local Authorities in Con- motion, first, to erode, then to effectively nection With the Regular Welfare Assistance and deconstruct the state. In this regard, the Employment on Public Works for Unemployed post-communist reforms simply pulled to Persons of Working Age]. MTA KTK. light what had been accomplished before. Ferge, Zs. (2000.) Elszabaduló egyenlőtlenségek [Ine- In sum, corporatism and liberalism are qualities Breaking Loose]. HRSZE – IS ELTE. strongly interwoven in the welfare regime Fokasz, N. and Örkény, A. (2000.) Magyarország társadalomtörténete 1945-1989 [Social history of today’s Hungary. The peculiar triangle of Hungary 1945-1989]. Új Mandátum. of the deserting state, the expanding pri- Gábor, I. (1992.) A második gazdaság ma - az áta- vate market, and the firmly sealed ghetto lakulás kérdõjelei [Second Economy Today – its of the poor seems to be securely grounded Transformation Called Into Question]. Közgaz- by historical structures and contemporary dasági Szemle, (10):940-953. power relations alike. True, the increasingly Havasi, É. (2002.) Szegénység és társadalmi kirekesz- manifest tendencies of social disintegration tettség a mai Magyarországon [Poverty and So- might sooner or later conclude in a sudden cial Exclusion in Hungary Today]. Szociológiai explosion that reshapes the entire frame- Szemle, 12(4):51–72. work. But without such gravely unwanted Hicks, A. and Kenworthy, L. (2002.) Varieties of Welfare Capitalism. Luxembourg Income Study developments, the construction promises to Working Paper No.316. Retrieved at www.lis- work for some time to come. And if this is project.org/publications.htm. the case, then we have justified reasons to Horváth, Á. (1996.) Az elmesélt idő[Time as Nar- name what we see here: it is the corporatist- rated]. IS HAS – MWA –KÁVÉ. liberal fourth world of welfare capitalism Juhász, P. (1991.) Polgárosodás [Embourgeoisement]. that grew out of state-socialism. Századvég, (2-3):181-184

331 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms...

Kemény, I. (1991.) Közelrõl s távolból [Close View Standing, G. (1997.) The Folly of the Social Safety From a Distance]. Gondolat. Nets: Why Basic Income Is Needed in Eastern Kemény, I. (2000.) A romák/cigányok és a láthatat- Europe. Social Research, 64(4):1339-1381. lan gazdaság [Roma and the Invisible Economy]. Szabó, M. (1989.) Politikai kultúra Magyarországon Osiris – MTAKI. 1896-1986 [Political Culture in Hungary 1896- Kertesi, G. (2000.) Cigány foglalkoztatás és 1986]. Medvetánc Könyvek. munkanélküliség a rendszerváltás előtt és után Szabó, M. (2002.) Múmiák öröksége [The Heritage [Roma Employment and Unemployment before of Mummiﬁed Bodies]. Új Mandátum. and After the Systemic Change]. In: Á. Horváth Szalai, J. (1990.) Néhány gondolat a szegénységről és et al. (eds.): Cigánynak születni [Born: ‘Gypsy’] a létminimumról [Some Thoughts About Poverty (pp.425–471). Budapest: ATA–Új Mandátum. and the Concept of the Subsistance Minimum]. In: Kornai, J. (1996.) Vergődés és remény: Gondola- R. Andorka, T. Kolosi and G. Vukovich (eds.), tok a gazdasági stabilizációról és a jóléti állam Társadalmi Riport 1990 (pp 418-430). TÁRKI. reformjáról.[Floundering and Hope: Thoughts Szalai, J. (1991.) Hungary: Exit from the State Econo- on Stabilization of the Economy and Reform of my. In: M. Kohli et al. (eds), Time for Retirement the Welfare State]. KJK:175–205. (pp. 324-362). Cambridge University Press. Köllő, J. (2001.) A járadékos munkanélküliek ál- Szalai, J. (1997.) Power and Poverty. Social Research, láskilátásai 1994 és 2001 tavaszán [Job Pros- 64(4):1403-1423. pects of the Unemployed Receiving Beneﬁts in the Early Months of 1994 and 2001, Respectively]. Szalai, J. (2002.) Social Outcasts in 21st Century Hun- MTA KTK – BKÁE. gary. Review of Sociology, 8(2):35-53. Kuczi, T. and Vajda A. (1992.) Privatizáció és má- Szalai, J. and Péter, V. (2002.) A különböző munkat- sodik gazdaság. [Privatization and the Second evékenységekre fordított idő változása a 15–79 Economy]. Holmi, (1):99-110. éves népességben, 1986/2000 [Change in the Time Spent on Different Work Activities in the Laki, M. (1998.) Kisvállalkozás a szocializmus Population Aged 15–79 Years, 1986/2000]. után.[Small Entrepreneurs After Socialism]. Mimeo, CSO. Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány. Szelényi, I. (1988.) Socialist Entrepreneurs: Em- Laki, M. (2003.) Opportunities for Property Acquisi- bourgeoisement in Rural Hungary. University ton and Some Characteristics of Big Entrepre- of Wisconsin Press neurs in Post-socialist Hungary. Europe-Asia Studies, 55(5):693-711. Szívós, P. and György Tóth, I. (2004.) Stabilizálódó társadalomszerkezet. [Stabilizing Social Struc- Laki, M. and Szalai J. (2004.) Vállalkozók vagy ture]. TÁRKI. polgárok? [Entrepreneurs or Citizens?]. Osiris. Titmuss, R. (1958.) The Social Division of Welfare- Laky, T. (1995.) A magángazdaság kialakulása és a Essays on the Welfare State. George Allan and foglalkoztatottság [The Formation of the Private Unwin Ltd. Economy and Its Impact on Employment]. Köz- Vági, P. (2002.) A különböző munkatevékenységekre gazdasági Szemle, (7-8):687-707. fordított idő alakulása az időmérleg adatok Laky, T. (2004.) A magyarországi munkaerőpiac tükrében – a társadalmi elkülönülések egy újabb 2004. [The Hungarian Labor Market, 2004]. dimenziója. [Time Spent on Different Types of Foglalkoztatási Hivatal. Work – a Revealed New Aspect of Drastic Social Lukács, G. R.(2005.) Roma munkaerőiaci programok Segmentation]. Amaro Drom, (8):23-29. és környezetük [Job-creating Projects for the Vajda, Á. (1997.) A legális munkahelyeken végzett Roma and Their Social Environment]. In: M. munkák az 1980-as évek végén, az 1990-es évek Neményi, and J. Szalai (eds.), Kisebbségek elején.[Work Outside the First Economy in the kisebbsége [The Minority of Minorities]. (pp.94- Late 1980s and Early 1990s]. In: E. Landau et al. 128.). Új Mandátum. (eds.), Az államtalanítás dilemmái: munkaerőpiaci Miklós, G. T. (1995.) A helyzet [The Situation]. Iro- kényszerek és választások [Dilammas in Disman- dalom Kft – Journal Art Alapítvány. Neményi, M. tling the State: Constrains and Choice on the Labor and Szalai J. (2005). Kisebbségek kisebbsége [The Market] (pp. 234-282). ATA Minority of Minorities]. Új Mandátum. Voszka, É. (2003.) Versenyteremtés – alkuval [Com- Spéder, Z. (2002.) A szegénység változó arcai [The petition in the Making – Through Bargains]. Changing Faces of Poverty]. ARTT – Száza- Akadémiai Kiadó. dvég. Yearbook of Welfare Statistics 2001., CSO, 2002.

332 Rev. soc. polit., god. 13, br. 3-4, str 309-333, Zagreb 2006. Szalai J.: Poverty and the Traps of Postcommunist Welfare Reforms...

Sažetak SIROMAŠTVO I ZAMKE POSTKOMUNISTIČKIH SOCIJALNIH REFORMI U MAĐARSKOJ: NOVI IZAZOVI PRIDRUŽIVANJA EU

Julia Szalai

Institut za sociologiju Mađarske akademije znanosti Budimpešta, Mađarska

Tijekom procesa tranzicije i pridruživanja, pitanja pravičnosti i učinkovitosti socijalnog sustava izbilo je u prvi plan javnih rasprava i polititičkih prepirki u Mađarskoj. Ključna pitanja odnosila su se na tip socijalne države koja se uzdigla na ruševinama sta- rog socijalističkog režima. Autorica istražuje sliči li nova socijalna država bilo kojem od »tri svijeta socijalnog kapitalizma«, koja je uloga Europske unije u njihovu stvaranju i jesu li razlike samo pitanje razine gospodarskog razvoja ili dublje ukorijenjenih sustavnih uzroka i mjera. Prvi dio članka prikazuje različite poglede na transformaciju socijalističke države, a nakon toga predstavljaju se ideološki i politički argumenti koji su u pozadini provedenih mjera u području socijalne politike, kao i šira uloga tih mjera u sveukupnoj gospodarskoj transformaciji. Autorica ukazuje na to da su posljedice tih mjera u socijal- noj politici, prvenstveno povećanje siromaštva, mnogo trajnije, iako ih se često smatra prolaznima. Isto tako, gospodarski oporavak nije doveo do poboljšanja socijalnih usluga i socijalne pomoći na lokalnoj razini. Drugi dio članka nudi kritički prikaz uzroka koji su doveli do takvog kontrasta između najavljenih ciljeva i stvarnih rezultata reforme. Autor- ica tvrdi da kombinirani koraci smanjivanja ﬁnanciranja i decentraliziranja odluka nisu smanjili siromaštvo, usprkos tome što se isprva očekivalo povećanje učinkovitosti, bolje planiranje i više socijalne pravde. Istovremeno, ti su koraci doveli do veće stigmatizacije korisnika. Autorica zaključuje da nedavni razvoj Mađarske ukazuje na kristalizaciju za- sebnog, četvrtog tipa socijalne države koja se razvija manje ili više neovisno od utjecaja nadnacionalnih socijalnih aranžmana EU. Ključne riječi: socijalna država, postsocijalistička socijalna politika, siromaštvo, ras- ni/etnički sukob

333