ISSUE 134 | APRIL 2021

Peace & Security Council Report

Operationalising the new AU PAPS department is easier said than done The AU should persevere on the GERD issue Poor governance in Africa hampers progress No more half measures in Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis Chad’s turbulent presidential polls put democracy on the backburner Operationalising the new AU PAPS department is easier said than done

The new African Union (AU) Commission, elected at the recent AU summit, took office on 15 March 2021. In the wake of his election, Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, the new commissioner of the merged Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) department, has drawn up an ambitious action plan for the next year. The plan includes key deliverables aimed at improving coordination, re-energising AU early warning, achieving integrated conflict management, strengthening democracy and good governance, and achieving smart partnership for human security.

While the Commissioner’s efforts have been commended by staff in the short time he has been in office, it is clear that the implementation of the PAPS priority action plan will face challenges that will require his attention and significant political support from the Commission and the AU member states. Going forward, therefore, the process will benefit from a clear definition and delineation of mandates between the Conflict Management (previously the Peace and Security Department) and Governance and Conflict Prevention directorates (governance was previously under the Political Affairs Department).

The commissioner has shared an activity plan and budget in order to operationalise his vision for the department

In addition, there is concern that, in an attempt to make significant budget cuts, AU member states risk significantly reducing the capacity of the merged PAPS to deliver on flagship projects and priorities. If the priority plan for the PAPS is to achieve its goals, the commissioner Current PSC Chairperson will have to proactively engage the AU Reform Unit, the head of the Human HE Mohammed Idriss Farah, Resources department and department staff who have various key roles to ambassador of Djibouti to Ethiopia play in addressing emerging issues as a matter of priority. and permanent representative to the African Union. Shift in working methods There are already major shifts in the working methods of the PAPS PSC members Department. The commissioner has shared an activity plan and budget in Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, order to operationalise his vision for the department. Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, A department-wide priority plan will not only help align the work of the Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal two departments and enhance delivery but will also guide their focus and increase accountability.

2 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT One possible concern with regard to the priority areas there needs to be clarity as to where the programme will has been what to do with the activities various units be run from within PAPS. had begun implementing before the merger of the two Another tricky issue is short-term staff. In 2019 member departments, particularly in situations where those states expressed concern that 109 short-term employees activities are not highlighted in the priority plans. were seconded by external partners to work in the Peace and Security Department, compared to the 57 posts Getting the structure to deliver on priorities financed by member states. The first pillar of the priority action plan for PAPS focuses A major outcome of the restructuring process has on the implementation of the new merged structure. therefore been to eliminate short-term positions. Short- Several issues must still be clarified. One major question term staff are thus not sure whether they still have a job is how well the units in the new structure fit within the at the AU. It is also unclear where those with long-term mandates of the various directorates under which they contracts will be placed in the new PAPS structure, and have been placed. whether they will maintain their job grades. A number of personnel in managerial positions retired in 2020. As a For example, the new early warning and governance result, acting directors currently head the two directorates, monitoring desks are placed in the Conflict Management while all the division heads are yet to be appointed. Directorate rather than the Governance and Conflict Prevention Directorate. Ideally, however, they should simultaneously inform the conflict prevention efforts of One major question is how well the units both directorates. fit within the mandates of the various The new structure has also created a new Secretariat to directorates under which they are placed deal with both the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The AGA/APSA Secretariat has been placed under the The restructuring is also aimed at ensuring that the Governance and Conflict Prevention Directorate, even hiring process prioritises meritocracy and transparency. though it should support both directorates. This draws This means that staff will compete for their old positions attention to the centrality of seamless synergy in the or other available positions through an open and operationalisation of the various divisions and units’ transparent process. A team of 10 experts selected from the five regional blocs are expected to oversee functions to realise the commission’s goals. the hiring of key staff, including the director general in The issue is complicated by a significant reduction in the office of the AUC chairperson and the director of the capacity of some units and programmes in the new Human Resource Management, for which recruitment PAPS structure. is underway.

Addressing staff concerns The 100-day priority plan indicates that recruitment for PAPS positions, especially for the two director positions, The merger of the two departments, the complete will be concluded by June 2021. Recruitment for the reshuffle of positions and, in some cases, the reduction entire PAPS department, however, is expected to take of available positions have created uncertainty. This is much longer. especially the case with divisions and programmes that These are major challenges the new commissioner have either disappeared, or have been split and merged will have to address if the operationalisation of the with other units, such as the Continental Early Warning PAPS department is to succeed as envisaged. The System (CEWS) division. new department is a key component of the ongoing While a number of CEWS’s functions have been AU reform process. Its success will make a major redistributed, others have disappeared entirely, such as contribution to the capacity of the AU to silence the guns the AU Border Programme. It is encouraging that the and maintain peace on the continent. As such, all efforts Border Programme is prioritised for renewal as part of should be made to support the realisation of the intended efforts to re-energise the early warning system. However, goals of the merger.

ISSUE 134 | APRIL 2021 3 Figure 1: PAPS proposed overview

Regular staff Short-term staff Total positions Communication, Monitoring 71 40 111 and Evaluation and Principal Partnerships Officer centralised Support staff (12): within relevant departments and - Special Assistant x1 (P3) deployed to Portfolio Department Commissioner - Correspondence Officer x1 (P1) PAPS - Private Secretary x1 (GSA5) (SP3) - Admin Assistant x4 (GSA5) SP3 - Secretary x2 (GSA4) Director - Secretary x1 Liaison Offices and RECs Head of Division (GSA4) Head of Unit - Senior Record Assistants x2 (GSA3) Regular Staff

Conflict Governance and Specialised Management (D1) Conflict Prevention (D1) institutions (56 staff)* (35 staff)

Early warning West and Central Mediation Democracy, AGA/APSA and governance Africa and Dialogue** Elections, and Secretariat monitoring Regional Desk Division Constitutionalism (P4) handled by (P4) (5 staff) (P5) (8 staff) Division (P5) (9 staff) (3 staff) Regional Desks

East and Southern Peace Support Governance and DDR/SSR*** Africa Operations Division Human Rights Division Regional Desk (P5) Division (P5) (P5) ACRST (P4) (5 staff) (16 staff) (12 staff) (6 staff)

North Africa Secretariat Peace Principal Regional Desk and Security Post-Conflict AFRIPOL (P4) Council Reconstruction (5 staff) (P5) (10 staff) (P4) (4 staff)

Focal Point Women Peace and +8 Junior AUC-PCRD AU Liaison Security, Youth, Professional Offices Child Protection Officers (P2) (1 staff) (P3) (3 staff) (1 per division)

Situation Room AFCONE Coordinator (P2) Assistants x6 (GSA5) (7 staff)

Notes: * Excluding African Standby Force (35 staff), Liaison Offices (148 staff) and peace keeping missions (63 staff) ** Secretariat support to Panel of the Wise and FEM Wise *** Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reforms (SSR)

4 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT The AU should persevere on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam issue

The latest bout of negotiations on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which took place from 4–6 April 2021, reached a deadlock when the parties – Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan – failed to come to an agreement on the way forward.

As matters currently stand, Ethiopia plans to proceed with a second filling of the dam when the next rainy season begins in June/July, to the dismay of both Egypt and Sudan, which have denounced the move. Facilitated by the African Union (AU) since 2020 under the chairing of South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, discussions on the GERD have been handed over to the chair of the AU for 2021, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) President Felix Tshisekedi.

The AU, having succeeded in bringing the three parties to the negotiation table, took over from a process led by the United States

There have been moments of high tension in this process, particularly between Egypt and Ethiopia when the latter was getting ready to proceed with the first filling of the dam in June/July 2020. The AU, having succeeded in bringing the three parties to the negotiation table, took over from a process led by the United States (US) under the Trump administration.

Difficult negotiations Progress in 2020 was slow and the first filling of the dam became faita accompli, mostly owing to high rainfall in Ethiopia. Ethiopia also argued that filling the dam was an integral part of the construction process; it had to take place in order to proceed with construction.

Going forward, the next rounds of negotiations are meant to find an agreement between the three parties over the continued filling of the dam, which is expected to take another four to seven years, depending on the volume of water for each filling and subject to the terms of a potential agreement between the parties. When the AU began to facilitate the talks in 2020, Egypt had for several June, July months expressed its preference for a process under the aegis of the US, while Ethiopia leaned towards the involvement of the AU. Sudan seemed much more indifferent over the platform for negotiations. 2020 THE FIRST FILLING OF The major divergences between the parties have been around the nature of THE GERD the agreement to be reached (binding vs. non-binding), water retention and

ISSUE 134 | APRIL 2021 5 release by the GERD during times of drought and low rainfall, the dispute resolution mechanism (international arbitration vs. diplomatic facilitation), and future developments upstream. Ethiopia is particularly reluctant to make any commitments on future developments on the Nile and argues that the current negotiations are about the operations of the GERD and not the (future) use of the Nile waters. The AU should stay the course and use its convening power to bring all three parties together to de-escalate the situation, particularly as tensions are sure to flare up again around the next filling of the GERD. This would help prevent a confrontation that would have disastrous consequences for both the countries involved and the region.

The AU should stay the course and use its convening power to bring all three parties together to de-escalate the situation

The continental body should also reflect on how to create a more conducive framework and process for the negotiations, including a clearly defined mediation process.

Complicated negotiating dynamics The AU has put together a team of technical experts who have been facilitating the discussions. The experts have been assisted by European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and US representatives with observer status; South Africa is sitting in on the talks as an observer.

Egypt and Sudan want the process to include the EU, the UN and the US as facilitators, if not mediators. This is a test of the commitment of AU member states to use the organisation’s processes and stay true to the aspiration of finding ‘African solutions to African problems’.

South Africa, as chair of the AU in 2020, seemed, from Egypt’s vantage point, too close to Ethiopia owing to bilateral relations. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed made a major state visit to South Africa in January 2020 – about a month before South Africa assumed the chair of the AU – during which he discussed the GERD matter with Ramaphosa and the idea of the AU’s involvement was publicly invoked.

Egypt’s bilateral relations with the DRC, chair of the AU in 2021, were also the subject of a state visit to Egypt by Tshisekedi in February 2021, on the eve of his assumption of duty at the helm of the continental body. Perceptions of neutrality have been somewhat The DRC polluted by these developments. AU CHAIR FOR 2021 The Ethiopian president also visited the DRC in late January 2021, before Tshisekedi’s assumption of the AU chairship.

6 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Crucially, throughout the negotiation process the what they call ‘rule of law operations’ to squash the question has been that of the perceptions of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) contestation disputing parties about the suitability if not the of the legitimacy of the federal government and the neutrality of the facilitators. As some parties have resultant fallout. contemplated the possibility of mediation or even It would not serve the Ethiopian federal government at arbitration, it would appear that the current facilitation home to uphold territorial sovereignty domestically while process could be considered as inadequate. In fact, wavering internationally on its claim to sovereign use of the talks to find a technical agreement on the filling of the Blue Nile’s waters for the GERD. the dam are in conflict with other important political and historical considerations. Egypt’s assertion of its ‘historical rights’ to its desired volume of Nile waters – beyond their socio-economic The GERD as a matter of domestic politics importance – is also a matter of power projection and national pride. As a regional power, Egypt does not The GERD situation is one where the international want to give its potential domestic detractors perfectly meets the national. All three parties, ammunition or appear to be unable to project and particularly Egypt and Ethiopia, have consistently effectively wield power on a matter it considers stated that the GERD is a matter of survival for their essential to its survival. respective countries and peoples. The former has claimed that millions of Egyptian livelihoods are at stake, while the latter has made a similar assertion The Ethiopian government cannot afford about its development goals and aspiration of lifting millions of Ethiopians out of poverty. to appear weak in the face of pressure These concerns have their own merits, as Ethiopia from Egypt and Sudan and Egypt are respectively the second and third most populous countries in Africa, with populations of over Sudan, meanwhile, is undergoing a transition dominated 100 million each. by the military, with a civilian prime minister who has Ethiopia, therefore, is increasingly asserting its claim been striving to take a stronger role. The Nile question to sovereignty and ‘natural rights’ over the waters of has, therefore, become a matter of competition the Blue Nile, which contributes about 80% of the Nile between the military and civilians domestically but also River water during rains. For at least the past two years in their international engagements, including with the GERD has been a key rallying point in the highly Egyptian and Ethiopian counterparts. The Sudanese polarised Ethiopian socio-political climate. military in particular needs to gain support both nationally and internationally. For at least the past two years the GERD Over the past couple of months, Sudan’s position seems to have evolved from being neither strongly has been a key rallying point in the highly on the side of Egypt nor specifically leaning towards polarised Ethiopian socio-political climate Ethiopia’s, to aligning more with the former. The dam issue may also have contributed to rising tensions Asserting sovereignty over the Blue Nile and forging around the Ethiopia–Sudan border dispute (if not ahead with filling the dam is one of the few things on mutually reinforced a crystallisation) and could partially which even highly divided Ethiopians agree. Internally, the explain why Sudan has moved closer to Egypt on Ethiopian federal government cannot afford to appear the GERD. weak in the face of mounting pressure from Egypt and In spite of these very serious and real considerations, Sudan, as this will have a detrimental impact on its all parties, with the help of the AU, need to meet each already contested power base. other halfway and make concessions to avoid The Ethiopian authorities seem even more compelled reaching a point of no return for them and the region to stick to their guns on the GERD since they launched as a whole.

ISSUE 134 | APRIL 2021 7 Poor governance in Africa hampers progress

Recent events in Senegal have brought to the fore the serious impact of the governance challenges facing the continent. This is of particular concern because Senegal is considered one of the more stable countries in Africa.

In March 2021 Senegal saw protesters take to the also cite Sall’s infamous declaration that he will ‘reduce streets of the capital city, Dakar, and other parts of the Senegalese opposition to its simplest expression’. the country, initially to object to the incarceration and Sonko’s case followed the judicial conviction and de impending trial of opposition figure Ousmane Sonko. facto political demise (albeit perhaps temporarily) of two Protesters’ grievances then morphed into protests of Sall’s strong opponents, namely Karim Wade (son of against their socio-economic conditions, worsened by former president Abdoulaye Wade and former minister) restrictive COVID-19 measures that have robbed many and Khalifa Sall (former mayor of Dakar). Senegalese of their livelihoods. Both Wade and Sall became ineligible to compete Although Sonko was released under legal supervision, in the 2019 presidential elections as a result of their which helped appease protesters and ended the convictions. The drafting of new electoral laws restricting demonstrations, the underlying socio-economic the number of opposition candidates ahead of the 2019 grievances and fundamental issues with the justice polls also fuelled the view that Sall was deliberately trying system must still be addressed. These are likely to to weaken the opposition. re-emerge in the coming months. The Senegalese case is an example of the governance African governance frameworks such as challenges facing various countries – even the most stable ones – on the continent. This raises questions the African Governance Architecture are about how to address countries’ structural vulnerabilities important normative tools to prevent generalised and protracted instability from taking root in Africa. The Senegalese case is a good illustration of a African governance frameworks such as the African governing authority that strips democratic institutions of Governance Architecture, as well as governance tools their substance in order to subjugate them to the whims developed at the level of regional economic communities, of an incumbent. This results in the distortion of the are important normative tools to help deal with political arena, delaying democratic maturation or even governance issues on the continent. rolling back hard-fought democratic gains.

However, instead of being mere ‘nice to have’ The tendency to tamper with the political playing documents, they should be domesticated and field by amending electoral laws has been observed implemented effectively. There should also be efforts in other countries, such as Benin. Its electoral to devise new ways to address challenges around the democracy was thought to have made progress governance of elections. over the past 30 years with inclusive elections and peaceful transfers of power. Electoral governance challenges Yet, as in Senegal, President Patrice Talon has enacted What has contributed to the public anger in the Sonko electoral reforms that have skewed the political playing affair is the perception that the Senegalese judiciary is field and caused the opposition to boycott elections under the thumb of President Macky Sall’s regime and since 2019, including crucial parliamentary polls. As a that he has used it to eliminate his political opponents. result, the country has also seen protests erupt, while This view is grounded in existing and documented the April 2021 elections took place without any serious concerns about the independence of the judiciary. Critics contenders running against Talon.

8 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Map 1: Senegal

MAURITANIA

Dakar SENEGAL

MALI THE GAMBIA BURKINA GUINEA-BISSAU FASO GUINEA

Third terms and centralised power In a way, however, Senegal and Benin seem to represent more ‘palatable’ cases of problematic electoral governance. Overall, Africa has seen a growing tendency among incumbents to introduce constitutional amendments allowing them to run for third terms and, in some cases, increasing the power of the executive. While some blatantly remove the limit of two terms in office, other leaders such as those of Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea have played around with age limits and come up with the ‘innovative’ argument that a new constitution effectively institutes a new Republic, which then gives them a clean slate with regard to terms.

President Patrice Talon has enacted electoral reforms that have skewed the political playing field and caused the opposition to boycott elections

The different iterations of tempering with democratic dispensations and institutions to ensure electoral victory pose an increasingly difficult challenge, particularly in the face of new tactics to silence the political opposition, shrink the civic space, and capture state institutions. These issues are commonplace in longstanding regimes such as those in Chad, Uganda and the Republic of Congo, all three of which have seen incumbents Idriss Déby, Yoweri Museveni and Denis Sassou Nguesso re-elected in what many consider to be sham polls. Other longstanding regimes that could be running out of steam include those in Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, where the question of succession is becoming ever more pressing. Succession will also potentially become an 97.44% important question in Djibouti, where incumbent Ismael Omar Guelleh has ISMAEL OMAR GUELLEH’S just been re-elected (with 97.44% of the vote) for his fifth and possibly last ELECTION SCORE term in office.

ISSUE 134 | APRIL 2021 9 These challenges around electoral governance have not been and cannot be addressed by election observation alone, which has been taking place on the continent for at least the past two decades. Governance deficits transcend the electoral field and affect the very core of how African countries are governed, with clear implications for their stability.

Societal, social and economic governance Governance problems on the continent revolve around the management of states, resulting from the inability of many leaders to properly manage economies, diversities and political inclusion. This leads to a loss of trust in state institutions and in their capacity to execute basic functions, particularly the provision of the public good.

As such, economic and political inclusion, particularly that of women, youth, minorities and other marginalised groups, remains a major challenge. Even though some African economies have seen sustained growth over the past few decades, such economic growth trajectories have not benefited most people. In many countries, this has instead widened the gap between rich and poor.

Governance deficits transcend the electoral field and affect the very core of how African countries are governed, with clear implications for their stability

In other words, poor governance has failed to address the issues of political exclusion and economic marginalisation. This, in turn, has had a negative impact on social progress, particularly in contexts where there are no social safety nets provided by government.

Moreover, the double challenge of rising inequality and a growing population will become increasingly unsustainable for the continent.

Although the COVID-19 pandemic has had a lower death toll than initially projected in Africa, it has highlighted major governance issues, including structural economic and social security flaws. The governance of the pandemic itself, while touted as exemplary in many regards, has also been subjected to similar patterns around corruption, mismanagement of allocated public funds and abuses of power.

It is crucial to change the course of governance on the continent. This means ensuring more inclusive political and economic participation for all where needed, and creating new economic and social models to drastically reduce poverty and inequality.

While the African Continental Free Trade Area is touted as a formidable tool April 2021 to boost intra-African trade and stimulate sustained economic growth, it must ELECTIONS IN BENIN be used effectively to create more inclusive and sustainable economies. It cannot meet its goals without improving governance.

10 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT No more half measures in Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis

From 16 January to 7 February 2021, Cameroon hosted the African Nations Championship. Some games were played in the town of Limbe in the South-West region, which is in the grip of an armed conflict between government forces and secessionist militias.

The absence of secessionist violence during the detriment of those actors advocating for a federal state championship may have given the impression that as the solution. the Anglophone crisis had been resolved – but that Up to 2016, most English-speaking citizens favoured a isn’t true. Cameroonian nation, regardless of the political regime. After four years of conflict, the figures are telling: Today it’s clear that prioritising military action won’t refugees rose from 20 485 in January 2018 to 63 resuscitate the fragile sense of national belonging of 235 in January 2021. In November 2020, the number many English-speaking Cameroonians. Instead, the of internally displaced people stood at 705 000 military response has likely crystallised the ‘imagined compared to 679 000 a year earlier. This is paradoxical English-speaking community,’ which will undermine as secessionist armed groups have struggled to exert any recent gains in the future. military control over the North-West and South-West regions, even if their social hold is real. The need for a lasting solution

Defence and security forces have managed to contain Cameroon’s efforts at finding a political solution secessionist groups’ territorial footprint, particularly in haven’t been fruitful. Separatist fever persists despite urban centres. National forces are using people’s fear of various efforts such as commissions to promote the separatists’ criminal activities against these groups. bilingualism and multiculturalism, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, the establishment A humanitarian crisis of a special status for English-speaking regions, and sentencing separatist leaders. Despite these favourable developments, the growing number of refugees and displaced people indicates a volatile security situation in the regions. Moreover, At stake here is the quality of the political Cameroon’s partners are increasing the pressure on the government to find a political solution. Local agreement on offer and the impact of political actors and activists seeking to embarrass the solutions favoured by the Cameroonian government have echoed these calls. government to date Cameroon’s approach to the crisis has always encompassed both political and military dimensions. Both the method and scope of these measures are to At stake here is the quality of the political agreement blame. Rather than holding talks with the insurgents, on offer and the impact of solutions favoured by the the government came up with the steps unilaterally. Cameroonian government to date The national dialogue organised in October 2019 also At stake here is the quality of the political agreement suffered from a lack of prior consultation. Any political on offer and the impact of solutions favoured by agreement will need the support of a majority of the Cameroonian government to date. Although stakeholders to be sustainable. the military has achieved results, abuses against A lasting solution to the Anglophone crisis requires alleged separatists by security forces have a change in Cameroonian political practice, which tarnished Cameroon’s reputation internationally. The is based on the myth that the government and government’s prioritisation of military responses has civil service are infallible. Government officials see probably swollen the ranks of secessionists to the themselves as above the people, who they consider

ISSUE 134 | APRIL 2021 11 as subjects to be ‘administered’ rather than citizens who can manage their own affairs In terms of scope, the political handling of the Anglophone crisis has mostly followed the ‘administrative’ path that characterises Yaoundé’s political culture. Indeed, the symbolic provisions of the English-speaking regions’ special status were considered inadequate because they benefited only the administrative elites concerned. The conflict in the North-West and South-West isn’t driven by these elites but by poor and relatively educated young men. These youth are determined to fight with rudimentary weapons against well-armed and trained defence forces. They also clash with elites who they accuse of having little concern for their fate. Any viable political solution must prioritise these active minorities who prevent the return of stability in the former Southern Cameroons.

The conflict in the North-West and South-West isn’t driven by these elites but by poor and relatively educated young men

Military successes shouldn’t lead Cameroon into complacency. South Sudan’s experience indicates that few secessions in Africa have resulted from military victories but rather a shift in external political dynamics. Cameroon faces a situation in which military gains are nullified by mounting pressures for political negotiations from outside the country.

All options should be on the table To date, Cameroon’s fight against separatist forces has benefited from the leniency and even cooperation of the Nigerian government leadership. There is no guarantee that this situation will endure, particularly as the new United States administration could take a tougher stance on human rights To revive national cohesion, Cameroon’s government needs a political solution that encourages active minorities to lay down their arms and turn away from secession. For this to happen, the administrative half- measures put in place must end, and the problem treated with more than lip-service and slogans. Rejecting a return to federalism in the name of territorial integrity is one such slogan often used by civil servants and government representatives. More than ever, dialogue with all sectors of the English-speaking minority and even the option of federalism must be on the table. Cameroon must avoid sacrificing national cohesion for the obsession October 2019 with formal territorial integrity. NATIONAL DIALOGUE Instead, the country needs innovative ways to forge unity and celebrate its IN CAMEROON cultural diversity. Cameroonians themselves must reinvent this new form of living together.

12 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Chad’s turbulent presidential polls put democracy on the backburner

Chadians went to the polls on 11 April for the sixth presidential election since a multiparty system was introduced in 1990. President Idriss Déby Itno, who had been in power for 31 years, ran for a sixth term. The results were expected on 25 April.*

The pre-election period was marred by political tension and the exclusion and defection of several opposition leaders from the process – all of which raise doubts about whether much-needed political and social dialogue will now be possible.

The election pitted the Patriotic Salvation Movement, which has won every election since 1996 and has a strong presence across the country, against a highly fragmented opposition with limited national representation. Although several alliances were formed, opponents failed to form a common front behind a single candidate. Some partnerships broke up well before the election.

Chadians abroad were excluded from the electoral process. The National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) declared their vote inadmissible because the electoral roll had not been revised, and CENI was unable to set up branches outside the country

Pre-election violence In February this year, a Presidential Guard unit attacked opposition candidate Yaya Dillo Djérou’s home. Two relatives, including Djérou’s mother, were killed. Djérou is the candidate of the Socialist Party Without Borders (PSF) and the New Front for Change alliance.

The authorities said force was needed to arrest Djérou as he failed to comply with a court summons for ‘defamation and insults’ against First Lady Hinda Déby Itno. Djérou had accused her of embezzling funds that were meant for the country’s fight against COVID-19.

The Supreme Court received a total of 17 candidacies for the presidential race, of which only 10 were approved. Among those rejected were Masra Succès of the party Les Transformateurs and the PSF’s Djérou. After the attack on Djérou’s house, three candidates withdrew from the process, including the main opponent Saleh Kebzabo of the Union Nationale pour le Développement et le Renouveau, who ranked second in the 2011 presidential election.

The other candidates who ran against Déby were either from ally parties or novices without a real popular base or clear political programme. This 11 A p r i l meant the stakes in the election were very low, with Déby competing against ELECTIONS IN CHAD opponents who were in no position to challenge him.

ISSUE 134 | APRIL 2021 13 Opposition candidates who were rejected and those who voluntarily withdrew from the poll organised demonstrations for several weeks against Déby’s bid for a sixth term. Throughout the pre-election period, the government ensured that the electoral calendar was respected and prevented opponents from disrupting it. Even on election day, the anti-riot police’s presence was strong.

Social tensions Social discontent continued in the build-up to voting. Negotiations between unions and government about non-salary benefits stalled, and demonstrations by unemployed graduates increased. To make matters worse, Déby’s campaign speeches seemed designed to escalate tensions rather than seek appeasement. Public demonstrations were banned to limit the reactions of excluded political actors and contain the social discontent of workers and youth. This has resulted in regular clashes between demonstrators and the police and arrests of political opponents and civil society activists. The High Authority for Media and Audiovisual also banned interactive media debates for the entire election period. And access to mobile communication and the internet is regularly interrupted.

Dialogue needed Legislative elections – which last took place about 10 years ago – are due after the presidential poll. After several postponements, the date for legislative voting has still not been set. There is a risk that parties that withdrew from the presidential election will refuse to join the legislative race or that parties whose candidates were rejected will be excluded. These are essential concerns for Chad and its partners, who have been labouring to achieve political dialogue and national cohesion in the country since 1990. Chad’s geostrategic position – between the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin – and Déby’s leadership in addressing terrorism in the region mean that the socio-political situation in the country is less of a priority. Nevertheless, had tensions been appeased ahead of free and fair presidential elections, the chances are better that the public would have accepted the results. Unfortunately, this was not the case. The onus is now on the ruling party to reach out to other political actors, especially those excluded from the electoral process or those who have decided to withdraw from it. A frank dialogue is needed to revive the political debate and guarantee peaceful, fair and reliable legislative elections. Without this, Chad will again find itself with an unbalanced National Assembly that has no real influence 31 years on the country’s governance. IDRISS DÉBY’S PRESIDENCY * Note this article was finalised before the untimely death of Déby, announced by the military on 20 April.

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ISSUE 134 | APRIL 2021 15 About the PSC Report The Peace and Security Council Report analyses developments and decisions at the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC). The monthly publication is the only one of its kind dedicated to providing current analysis of the PSC’s work. It is written by a team of ISS analysts in Addis Ababa.

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