www.africa-confidential.com 23 June 2000 Vol 41 No 13 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL SUDAN 3 LIBERIA/SIERRA LEONE Hall of Mirrors The NIF regime is widely regarded Godfather to the rebels as brutal and repressive but the Dealing with Charles Taylor is key to any peace settlement. The UN may lift sanctions. NIF officials question is, how? have got Ethiopia and Egypt to say Khartoum has given up terrorism. The latest spate of sabre rattling between Monrovia and Freetown signals the final unravelling of the And shockingly, Cairo openly Sierra Leone peace accord signed in Lomé last July. The governments of President Ahmad Tejan pledges to prevent independence Kabbah and Charles Taylor are each accusing the other of preparing an invasion force. Both sides of southern Sudan ‘by any means’. have been moving troops towards their common border for ‘security reasons’. A key plank in the Lomé accord was that Liberia and its President would play a constructive role in persuading Corporal SUDAN 4 Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front to abide by the accord, surrendering its arms in exchange for jobs in a power-sharing government. He smiles and smiles That element of the accord, at least, relied heavily on mutual self-delusion. That has been Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman‘s stripped away since the collapse of the accord and Sankoh’s arrest last month (AC Vol 41 No 12). campaign against UN sanctions Yet Taylor remains, whatever Freetown says, key to any settlement in Sierra Leone. The end of has been a model of diplomatic diplomatic-speak between Monrovia and Freetown won’t have an immediate bearing on the military duplicity. It has skilfully exploited situation. Neither side is ready for a massive escalation of the proxy war between Taylor’s forces the strategic and commercial self- and Sierra Leone that has raged for nine years, two years longer than Liberia’s own civil war. Of interest of UN members states and is confident of success. the two, Taylor’s forces still have the means and the men to face down Kabbah’s shaky coalition of pro-government forces in a border war. Liberian Defence Minister Daniel Chea is accurate in his claim that Sierra Leone could not, currently, win a war with its neighbour. CÔTE D’IVOIRE 5 Yet neither side is looking at the border, which is clearly and unarguably delineated by the River Moro. The real focus is the diamond country of Kono District, home to the rich alluvial deposits The national along the River Sewa (see Map). There, the RUF and its Liberian and Burkinabè allies are prepared question to make their last stand. The RUF has been in continuous control of Kono since November 1998, General Gueï’s junta still hasn’t when it attacked in flying columns (highly mobile guerrilla units) in tactics developed by ex-South been able to decide whether former African Defence Force Colonel Fred Rindle. Along with other tactical specialists drawn from the Premier Alassane Ouattara is apartheid SADF (Rindle was a liaison officer for P.W. Botha’s regime and Jonas Savimbi’s rebels eligible to run as president. The in Angola) Rindle trained and equipped the RUF units to operate alongside Liberian and Burkinabè longer he delays, the more likely it fighters. looks that Gueï will stand himself. But he will have to watch Ouattara’s supporters in the junta’s own ranks. From apartheid soldier to Taylor trainer Rindle, who can be seen occasionally in Monrovia’s Mamba Point Hotel and styles himself as a BENIN 6 mining engineer, won Taylor’s confidence with the devastatingly successful 1998-99 offensive. The RUF and allies retook all of Kono District, before moving rapidly towards Freetown, where they took Kérékou, no coup the West African peacekeeping force, the Economic Commission of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog) by surprise. By 8 January 1999, RUF soldiers were giving interviews to the BBC Spiralling fuel prices, a troubled on satellite telephones from central Freetown: that invasion left more than 6,000 people dead and sale of the state cotton board and a whiff of corruption mean thousands more mutilated in less than a week. President Kérékou should worry From the frenetic military activity, the arms shipments to rebel-held Kono and the radio rhetoric about his re-election fight next from Monrovia officials, another major Liberian military operation is in train. Irritatingly for March against former President Taylor’s government, Kabbah’s government and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone now Soglo. Kérékou may be able to get good aerial reconnaissance reports of activity across the border. There is also far more human convince Benin that his errors have been less serious than Soglo’s intelligence available from former Sierra Leone Army (SLA) soldiers who fought alongside the RUF and from some recent operations behind the rebel lines, we hear. All this clearly shows trucks loaded with weapons, food and medicine going from Liberia into Sierra Leone along the three major RUF POINTERS 8 supply routes. One report suggests that a helicopter lent to Taylor by Libya’s Col. Moammar el Gadaffi to ferry UN hostages back to safety (500 were captured by the RUF at the beginning of May) Uganda/Rwanda, had been used to resupply RUF forces. Somalia/Djibouti Taylor’s ambivalent role - negotiator and ‘liberator’ of the UN hostages and godfather- and Eritrea/Ethiopia quartermaster of the RUF - has put him under greater Western scrutiny. In November 1998, the United States State Department’s Director for West Africa, Ambassador Howard Jeter, earned After Kisangani; time to talk; time of reckoning. 23 June 2000 Africa Confidential Vol 41 No 13

Kamaron G G Others, though, such as the Netherlands’ Ambassador to Côte G d’Ivoire and Liberia, Peter van Leewen, believe that a more

Bumbuna imaginative selection of carrots and sticks might persuade Taylor l e Makeni k D GUINEA o to end his backing for the RUF and his meddling in Sierra Leone. R G Mag G D Lunsar buraka G G Any such strategy would have to address Taylor’s war aims in G D G Yengema G Sierra Leone: D B Yele G G Koindu

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w Voinjama Falla e D Foya SIERRA S 1. Security. Many of Taylor’s former National Patriotic Front of LEONE D Bunumbu Kailahun Moyamba Segb wema Vahun Liberia soldiers have been fighting alongside the RUF for personal g D Daru n Bo D o RUF routes J profit. This enhances his reputation as the region’s guerrilla D from Liberia to D Kenema Giema Sierra Leone Zorzor godfather and generally stops them returning to Liberia to cause a B o Joru M LOFA trouble. However some of the fighting in Liberia’s north-west Bonthe o or COUNTY Pujehun D M Lofa County, which Taylor blamed on Guinean-backed rebels, Turn Gbatala ers Zimmi Pe (RUF training n. camp) may have been caused by disgruntled ex-NPFL and RUF soldiers B Bopolu fighting over spoils in the refugee camps close to the border. Gbarnga B Sulima Despite the proliferation of security units - Taylor’s ‘tontons Tubmanburg LIBERIA B Bauxite macoutes’ as they’re known in Monrovia on the old Haitian D Diamonds Robertsport analogy - government officials remain jittery about possible plots Kakata G Gold by one or other of the exiled warlords, such as Nigerian-based Bensonville 0 Kilometres 100 Roosevelt Johnson or US-based Alhaji Kromah. MONROVIA 0 Miles 50 2. Diamond trading. There is plenty of anecdotal and documentary evidence showing that most of Sierra Leone’s diamond production Taylor’s opprobrium by publicly stating that there was unambiguous is smuggled through Liberia and some specific indicators that the intelligence that the Liberian government was backing the RUF. business is handled by traders and valuers acting on behalf of This was later repeated by both the Nigerian and Ghanaian Taylor and his circle. It’s much harder to estimate what this trade governments following the RUF’s blitz on Freetown. The US is worth to Taylor. According to Antwerp’s High Diamond Council, Embassy in Monrovia, criticised by some Liberians for being soft Liberia’s ‘official’ diamond exports to Belgium were $269 mn. in on Taylor, insists there is no reason to change Jeter’s assessment. 1998 and $330 mn. in 1997. Last year, Liberian gem exports to On 13 June at a European Union meeting, British Foreign Belgium were reckoned to be over $300 mn. again. That is the only Secretary Robin Cook produced a new intelligence dossier on part of the Antwerp market that requires certificates of origin and Taylor’s military support for the RUF. This shows in detail how doesn’t include the city’s two other informal markets: the Taylor benefits from the smuggled Sierra Leone diamonds passing unregistered but legitimate diamond dealers and the totally illicit through Monrovia and concludes that the Liberian leader’s strategy recipients of smuggled stones. Nor does it include exports to the is to maintain his influence over eastern Sierra Leone through the increasingly important Tel Aviv market, which is even less regulated RUF, amid the breakdown of all state authority in the area. than Antwerp’s. The RUF demanded its cut, after getting most of the diamonds Brussels freezes Monrovia through forced labour, before handing over to Taylor’s trading The Cook report was convincing enough to persuade the other EU network. Documents found in Sankoh’s house in Freetown show ministers, some initially sceptical, to agree to freeze a two-year, 48 that Taylor and his traders took a substantial slice of the profit; million Euro (US$47 mn.) development aid programme for Liberia. indeed Sankoh’s attempts to find new trading partners in Europe However, it didn’t affect the EU’s vital humanitarian aid programme, suggests a dissatisfaction with Taylor’s terms of business. We hear which provides clean water (there is no public piped water system), members of RUF commander Sam ‘Maskita’ Bockarie’s family seeds and other inputs for farmers, and aid to relocate people driven have been taking stones around buyers in Abidjan, also apparently out by Liberia’s own war. Cook also persuaded the EU ministers dissatisfied with Taylor’s terms. However, the huge Liberian to sign a statement expressing ‘deep concern’ about Liberia’s formal export figures recorded in Antwerp - let alone estimated involvement in Sierra Leone and its diamond trade with the RUF. figures for under-the-counter trade in Belgium and Israel - far He now wants to use the report to persuade the World Bank and UN exceed anything the RUF and its allies could produce from alluvial to put more pressure on Taylor. diamond deposits in Kono. This means that Monrovia is now a An economist from the International Monetary Fund in major centre, perhaps the world’s leading centre, for laundering Monrovia has been monitoring the Liberian economy all year and diamonds. UN reports show that many of the smuggled diamonds is due to deliver an interim report next month: under present from territory held by Savimbi’s União Nacional para a economic and political conditions, it is unlikely to recommend any Independência Total de Angola pass through Monrovia. Other early resumption of aid to Liberia. The World Bank had been reports indicate that diamond laundering in Monrovia attracts an sounding enthusiastic about extending a credit to Monrovia under array of mafia figures from Eastern Europe involved in arms and its post-conflict recovery programme but that, too, looks more drug trafficking. For example, a Ukrainian, Leonard Minin, who distant now. has a timber concession in Liberia is also known to be an arms and This has concentrated minds in Monrovia. The day before the gem trader. All this complicates matters. The Taylor regime’s EU meeting in Brussels, France’s Ambassador to Abidjan and income from diamond laundering depends on several other sources Monrovia, Francis Lot, went to see Taylor in his old redoubt of apart from Sierra Leone. Gbarnga. Taylor’s message, it seems, wasn’t enough to persuade For now the Kabbah government’s response, backed by London, Paris to demur from signing the common statement on Liberia. is to put military pressure on the RUF in tandem with more 2 23 June 2000 Africa Confidential Vol 41 No 13 diplomatic pressure on Taylor. The hoped for result is to persuade the RUF to start serious negotiations, which would centre on SUDAN handing over the Kono diamond fields to national government control. Given what is at stake to both the RUF and Taylor, a voluntary evacuation or handover of Kono is unlikely. The pro- Kabbah coalition of SLA figures, ex-SLA and Kamajor fighters Hall of Mirrors have slowed their advance, still hampered by poor logistics but The Khartoum regime is brutal and most of all by internal distrust among the component groups. There repressive but the UN may lift sanctions were fire-fights between ex-SLA and Kamajor fighters in Freetown over the weekend of 17-18 June and more trouble between ex-SLA The National Islamic Front government’s bid to get United Nations fighters and Nigerian troops serving with the United Nations sanctions lifted and claim a seat at the international table is reaching a Mission in Sierra Leone (Unamsil). climax. It could well succeed. Yet as African, Arab and European governments lobby on its behalf, the government is celebrating the Loyalists lash out eleventh anniversary of its coup on 30 June by promising to ‘build tanks Further disagreements among the pro-Kabbah forces around Lunsar with Sudanese hands’ and the Defence Minister has been shopping in mean their goal of retaking the RUF’s northern base of Makeni by China in preparation for a new offensive against northern and southern the end of June looks improbable, even if most civilians and RUF oppositionists. fighters in Makeni have already fled. RUF forces are moving On 1 June, after French Ambassador Jean-David Levitte took the eastwards towards Kono, though there are tactical differences UN Security Council chair for the month, Foreign Minister Mustafa among the commanders. ‘General’ Issa Sesay, who has been Osman Ismail (known to Sudanese as ‘Mr. Smile’) formally asked the engaged in negotiations for the release of the UN hostages, has Council to lift the sanctions it had imposed in 1996, following the June been more conciliatory; Lansana Bao in Makeni takes a tougher 1995 attempt to murder Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia. line and Jibril Massaquoi is between the two. Less clear is the As the fifth anniversary of that attack also approaches and with slick gameplan of Sam Bockarie, currently ‘on leave’ from his newly coordination, letters from the Organisation of African Unity, Arab built RUF village in Congo Town, Monrovia. Said to be working League (Ambassador Abdallah Baali of Algeria) and Non-Aligned on a military plan with Taylor’s son, Charles (‘Chucky’) Junior, to Movement (South African Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo) arrived at defend Kono, Bockarie has differences with the other RUF the UN asking for the sanctions to be lifted (see Box). On 13 June, Mali commanders such as Sesay, who remains loyal to Sankoh and submitted a draft resolution to the Council (but the United States got sceptical about Taylor. Insiders say Taylor had genuine difficulties discussion deferred). Mali is Khartoum’s ideal messenger - African, in persuading the RUF commanders to hand over the UN hostages overwhelmingly Muslim, not Arab, not much linked to Sudan, and a unless they were paid off, so the initial negotiations centred on symbol of African democratisation. Taylor’s efforts to establish a ransom price. A military contest for Kono in the next few months of rainy Cairo and Addis help the NIF season pits the experienced, well equipped RUF, Liberian and The NIF government has been running its charm offensive since the Burkinabè forces against the much more disparate pro-Kabbah attempt to kill Mubarak, when Egypt and Ethiopia both accused Khartoum coalition. The Kamajors, regarded by one military source as ‘long of harbouring the terrorists and Mubarak himself accused NIF leader on bravery and short on tactical knowledge’, have major problems Hassan Abdullah el Turabi of involvement. The UN sanctions, under in working with the ex-SLA. Knitting these militias together into Resolutions 1044, 1054 and 1070, were mild, entailing restrictions on a force capable of attacking Kono would require sustained battle the number of Sudan’s diplomats and on foreign travel by its officials. planning and active military advice from experienced officers - Airline sanctions were never enforced. something well beyond the remit of the latest UK military mission The Khartoum government was supposed to hand over three men in Sierra Leone, which is to provide intelligence and planning accused of implication in the Addis Ababa attack and end its support for support for Unamsil, and to run a short-term training programme terrorism. Yet the sanctions were increasingly breached, in a climate for the pro-Kabbah forces and form part of a much bigger medium- where sanctions on Sudan’s ally Iraq were being widely condemned. term multinational training programme for the new national army. As oil began to flow, watched avidly by foreign companies, the If the Kabbah government is serious about taking Kono, it will government in Khartoum decided it was time to focus its campaign. need hands-on tactical advice and logistical support which, Mustafa Osman chose Sudanese daily El Rai el Aam to explain according to Sandline’s Col. Tim Spicer, his company is willing to triumphantly on 8 June how his government had manoeuvred the world provide to either Kabbah’s government or the UN. Even if the pro- onto its side. The operation was executed with the systematic planning, Kabbah forces were able to take Kono, it would not be the end of dedication and attention to detail typical of the NIF and its man heading the matter: the new occupants of Kono would doubtless try to the operation, El Fatih Mohamed Ahmed Erwa, once a major in reward themselves with diamond spoils. And they would have to President Ja’afar Nimeiri’s National Security and now Sudan’s UN pursue the war against the RUF into Kailahun, the agriculturally Ambassador. Washington refused to accept him as envoy to the USA fertile area where the rebels have retreated previously when under partly because he was in the southern capital, Juba, in 1992 during a pressure in Kono. The more Kabbah and his advisors look at the wave of executions, torture and disappearances during which government military option, the more attractive the diplomatic route to agents killed, in September, a local employee of the US Agency for renegotiating the ceasefire must seem. The diplomatic path will International Development, Andrew Tombe, and other Sudanese mean putting serious pressure on Liberia, something Kabbah’s working for international bodies. That was when the USA began its government has proved unable to do in the past. Internationally , move to isolate Khartoum. El Rai el Aam belongs to El Fatih Erwa’s Freetown is being helped by Britain’s efforts but it will need to first cousin, veteran Islamist Mahjoub Erwa. Its website gives El work harder in the region to encourage its main allies - Nigeria and Fatih’s name and number as its ‘administrative contact’ and ‘billing Ghana - to put real pressure on the Taylor network. 3 23 June 2000 Africa Confidential Vol 41 No 13 He smiles and smiles ‘We must have a calculated move to remove the sanctions’. This, Foreign The interview provides an unusual glimpse of the skill, planning and Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail told the Sudanese newspaper El Rai el Aam determination of NIF policy-making. As usual, it fails to mention on 8 June, was what he and Sudan’s United Nations mission decided at the UN embarrassing facts about the war or the international terrorism which General Assembly last September. ‘Mr. Smile’ also said that removing the provoked the UN sanctions in the first place. Mustafa emphasised that sanctions had been his main concern since he became Foreign Minister, in Sudan had now ‘signed all eleven international agreements on terrorism’; February 1998, when Hassan el Turabi’s National Islamic Front deputy, Ali Fatih Erwa declared that Khartoum had signed six this month alone. Osman Mohamed Taha, became Vice-President. The task was entrusted to Democracy advocates wonder why Sudan did not sign up before, whether UN Ambassador El Fatih Erwa. the agreements can be ratified while parliament is suspended under the ‘Quietly and within a very restricted circle, we started moving the Sudan state of emergency and how these agreements differ from the human rights sanctions file’. The words ‘quietly’ and ‘calculate’ appear and reappear in instruments already signed and ignored. The difference is that Sudan has Mustafa Osman’s description of how the NIF planned its bid to get sanctions manoeuvred key governments into positions where they will not challenge lifted, systematically charming key governments and isolating the United it on human rights, let alone on terrorism or democracy. States. The NIF made ‘calculated moves on relations with Egypt, Uganda, The government’s letters to carefully chosen envoys were timed to Ethiopia and Eritrea’, plus ‘influential’ states: ‘Kuwait, Algeria, Saudi arrive on the same day. ‘Surprise was very important in this case in order Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, other Arab countries and to prevent other forces working against us’, Mustafa went on. ‘If the Nigeria’. In addition to ‘broad moves’ with the Arab League, Organisation of United States uses its veto, it will isolate itself’, he declared, ‘and Sudan African Unity and ‘South Africa as the Non-Aligned Movement chair’, will show that the whole world is with it and this is injustice. These would Sudan also targeted the UN Security Council’s African members - Mali, be United States sanctions, not United Nations sanctions.’ Namibia and Tunisia - ‘who supported us and our project’. Meanwhile the government’s scorched earth policy continued in the oil Khartoum targeted Security Council permanent members, especially areas and security forces fired on a peaceful political meeting in Sennar, France. ‘We arranged to have the plan executed during the French killing one student and injuring a score. The boss of Canada’s Talisman chairmanship of the Security Council,’ Mustafa boasted, noting that Paris Energy, Jim Buckee, hinted at an exit strategy; the Canadian press also holds the rotating EU chair: ‘Our dialogue with the European Union reported that Franco-Belgian giant TotalFina-Elf (Total for two decades has advanced, as was reflected in the UN Human Rights Commission’ has held a vast unexploited oil concession south of Talisman’s) was its (where a bland EU resolution ignored evidence of human rights abuses most likely successor as lead company in the oil project. This reminded from the UN’s own Special Rapporteur, AC Vol 41 No 10). Mustafa Canadians that the son of TotalFina boss Thierry Desmarest is married to stressed that he had recently met British Ambassador Richard Makepeace Canadian Premier Jean Chrétien’s daughter, provoking discussions in and would visit London on 17 July. parliament and the press.

contact’. its oil tank. In Cairo’s most interventionist statement yet on 20 June, The sanctions offensive has four main thrusts: its Khartoum Ambassador, Mohamed Asim Ibrahim, declared on the ● To get Egypt and Ethiopia to act as if the Mubarak assassination independence issue that Egypt ‘is determined to prevent such separation attempt did not happen; by all means’. This can only fuel the war. In the Nairobi talks process, ● To tempt European governments with oil-related contracts; the NIF has signed up to both a referendum on ‘self-determination’ ● To persuade Arab governments that the ‘Arab cause’ was at stake and to the separation of state and religion, though in fact it refuses to (Khartoum sees Sudan as an Arab country, fuelling southern contemplate either. Peace, sadly, is not around the corner. Yet most independence demands); European governments now choose to ignore the NIF regime’s slaughter ● To rally fellow African, Arab League and ‘Third World’ governments of civilians in the south, Nuba Mountains and in southern Blue Nile. around the anti-American flag. A longer-term aim is to get hold of Namibia’s Security Council Denying the evidence seat at the end of 2000 (a seat also coveted by Kenya and Mauritius). The NIF points to human rights abuses by the Sudan People’s Liberation The background is an opposition which the NIF has astutely divided, Army (which certainly happen, though much less so than a decade a collapsed economy which the International Monetary Fund has ago). European officials echo this complaint in justification of their again just criticised and a ‘first come, first served’ oil rush by overseas policy of ‘critical dialogue’ (known in Washington as ‘soft dialogue’). interests in a south devastated by systematic government atrocities. NIF supporters abroad systematically smear reputable journalists, (Nor is there any sign of environmental concern). Bank of Sudan church groups and other non-governmental organisations who give Governor Sabir Mohamed Hassan told an Islamic Financial reliable accounts of appalling atrocities, such as women and children Institutions’ meeting in Bahrain last week that the oil meant Sudan ‘is nailed to trees by government troops and militiamen before having now being viewed as the land of opportunity’ (AC Vol 41 No 11). their throats slit. In May, Amnesty International published ‘Sudan, the Describing Sudan’s US$24 billion debt and huge arrears as Human Price of Oil’, telling how civilians, mostly women and children, ‘unsustainable’, the IMF had urged Khartoum not to ‘squander the were ‘killed, raped, robbed, enslaved, forced from their homes’ while extra revenues from higher oil prices’ and said the economy and the the ‘international community has largely lost interest and stands idly poor would benefit from an end to the fighting in the south. By Fund by’. Human Rights Watch and other NGOs have compiled similar standards, this is strong stuff. evidence. Many Western supporters of rapprochement with the NIF argue Despite December’s agreement between the Sudanese and Ugandan that the war has gone on long enough and that ending the UN sanctions governments, the Khartoum-supported Lord’s Resistance Army (led might end the fighting. Yet veteran politician Bona Malwal Madut by Joseph Kony who is based near Juba) continues to commit Ring spoke for many southerners when he warned this month that the atrocities like those once typical of Mozambique’s Resistência war could go on ‘for a thousand years’. Certainly resistance will Nacional Moçambicana and, more recently, of Foday Sankoh’s continue until the fundamental issues are addressed. However, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. Human rights workers, NIF is clearly not about to grant independence to a south which is now

4 23 June 2000 Africa Confidential Vol 41 No 13

Sudanese and others, ask why governments such as Britain’s, touting its ‘ethical foreign policy’ and sending troops to stiffen the UN force CÔTE D’IVOIRE in Sierra Leone, has joined France in leading the European Union’s rush to normalise relations with Sudan. Most governments don’t even claim ethical labels. International legitimacy is fundamental to Khartoum’s attempt to show it is a The national question government like any other - and win UN votes. With some Arab General Gueï still hasn’t decided whether governments in mind, it raises the spectre of an imperialist-American- Ouattara can run in the presidential polls Zionist-Christian plot. Complaining on 8 June that the banking system The battle of the conjunctions has been joined. The conjunctions was ‘all Jewish’, Hassan el Turabi said, ‘We asked the government not in question are ‘ou’ and ‘et’. They are dominating political debate to give the Jews and the Christians [senior] positions’. In February, in Abidjan. Behind it is the constitutional question about who is Africa Confidential wrote that Foreign Minister Mustafa had been El Ivorian and eligible to fight this year’s presidential election. The Turabi’s deputy in the Popular Arab Islamic Conference (AC Vol 41 proposed new constitution stipulates that presidential candidates No 3), a Sudan-based umbrella for international fundamentalist groups, must have never had another nationality and that their mother or founded in 1991 to support Iraq when Islamists hoped the invasion of father should be Ivorian. The nationalists, who dominate debate in Kuwait would destabilise the whole Gulf region. The PAIC was the capital, want mother OR father changed to mother AND father. ‘officially dissolved in 1996’, AC said. Days later, just before Their hope is that such a clause would would rule out the candidacy President Omer Hassan Ahmed el Beshir went to Kuwait, Mustafa of former Premier Alassane Dramane Ouattara. Since it took signed a decree dissolving the PAIC again. over on 24 December 1999, General Robert Gueï’s military junta Khartoum’s greatest triumph has been to get Egypt and Ethiopia to has not settled the divisive issue of presidential eligbility or even write to the Security Council that Khartoum has complied with the Ivorian citizenship (AC Vol 41 No 1). The most likely reason for sanction demands. Yet Khartoum has handed over no terrorist and this, many believe, is that Gueï wants to stand himself. maintains active links with the ‘Islamist International’, for which it Ivorians are to vote on the new constitution on 23 July. The remains a focal point. Washington claims that some of those implicated outcome is hardly in doubt as the three major political parties are in bombing its embassies in Tanzania and Kenya (killing some 265 telling their supporters to vote ‘yes’. It’s surprising that Ouattara’s people, mainly local) in August 1998 took refuge in Sudan. The Rassemblement des Républicains wants a yes-vote given that the ‘rehabilitation’ has more to do with the confidence of Ethiopia that it text, published in the Journal Officiel on 26 May, can be interpreted can stave off Sudan and with Cairo’s renewed obsession with preventing as making him ineligible to stand. He was deputy Governor of the southern secession (not least to ‘protect’ the Nile waters). Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique d l’Ouest in the 1970s and Oil and critical dialogue travelled on an Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) diplomatic passport. Ouattara is unfazed: he says diplomatic passports don’t Governments seem to believe that a ‘dialogue’ with the NIF can confer nationality and in any case, other leading politicians in the somehow give them leverage over it. Yet the NIF has offered in country, such as Francis Wodié and Laurent Gbagbo, have exchange nothing save the odd business opportunity. Mustafa’s travelled, respectively, on Algerian and Burkinabè passports. description of the vote-winning operation reflects the triumphalism This is especially tricky for Gbagbo, currently positioning himself at the top of the NIF. For instance, on 20 June, the NIF offered an as an ultra-nationalist. Indeed, the xenophobia of Gbagbo and his amnesty to all and said it would release all political prisoners Front Populaire Ivoirien is embarrassing their political affiliate in (previously having denied their existence). It does this every six France, the Parti Socialiste. The FPI, which takes an increasingly months or so but retains the Public Order, Security and Emergency abrasive line towards the estimated 30 per cent of people in the laws which ‘legitimise’ the gaoling and torture. country who were born outside it, now has more in common with After Turabi last year talked of buying tanks with the proceeds Jean-Marie le Pen’s French fascist party, the Front National. from Sudan’s oil, denials emerged from Khartoum followed by Polish tanks, via Yemen. On 16 June, Lieutenant General Omer el New constitution Beshir again declared that the government would celebrate its Ouattara’s RDR had equivocated on the new constitution but now ‘revolution’ by manufacturing ‘tanks and heavy equipment’ believes it’s tactically astute to get it supporters to vote ‘yes’. It (probably meaning armoured vehicles). On the same day, Defence fully supports reforms such as setting the voting age at 18 and Minister Abdel Rahman Sir el Khatim was impressing officials limiting future presidents to two five-year terms. This leaves from the biggest investor in Sudan’s petroleum project, China. The Ouattara free to campaign and lays on Gueï’s military junta the Minister met Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo and Cao Gangchuan, risky decision to exclude him from the presidential race. Gueï may Director of the General Armament Department of the People’s prefer to leave the decision to the Supreme Court, which will Liberation Army and a member of the Central Military Commission interpret the new constitution’s rules on eligibility, probably in (CMC). Cao said the PLA had ‘paid close attention to developing August. Before that, Gueï has to name a new president of the cooperation with the Sudanese armed forces’. Gen. Abdel Rahman Supreme Court. One, only semi-jocular, story on Abidjan’s radio also met Defence Minister Chi Haotian, CMC Vice-Chairman, trottoir is that the number four in Gueï’s junta, the popular Colonel and Qian Shugen, deputy Chief of General Staff. Chi declared that Mathias Doué, will be named new Supreme Court President. Beijing supported African countries’ ‘just struggle to safeguard... Doué is both a lawyer and a serious challenge to Gueï’s authority. their territorial integrity’ and thanked Khartoum for its support on Moreover, it is still quite possible that Gueï will bow to pressure human rights issues. This means more arms to fight the southern from the FPI and the former ruling Parti Démocratique de Côte - and northern - opposition. However, Khartoum’s diplomats insist d’Ivoire and toughen the draft constitution’s rules on the nationality they long for peace in the south and warmer ties with their and ancestry of potential candidates before July’s referendum. neighbours. 5 23 June 2000 Africa Confidential Vol 41 No 13

Formerly sworn enemies, the FPI and PDCI have combined to back Gueï would be welcome to join the party and that talks are going on. the ‘Tout sauf Ouattara’ (All except Ouattara) group, which In exchange, though, the PDCI would insist on the release of campaigns against his presidential candidacy on a blatantly several senior members of the previous regime, arrested in Gueï’s xenophobic platform. ‘clean hands’ campaign. Two of those accused of embezzlement Only ten days after its publication, Gueï, on tour in the south, are former Housing Minister Albert Kakou Tiapani and Jean- said he would look at the constitutional text again if it seemed that Michel Moulod, ex-Minister of Infrastructure Development and a majority wanted tighter controls on candidates’ national origins. Director of Abidjan Port. Questions on this topic have dominated his tour and some, especially So Gueï’s hope of reconciliation with the PDCI conflicts with in the RDR, think the referendum may be postponed. several inquiries into corruption where party chiefs are implicated. Gueï’s tour, which will continue into July, also makes people An inquiry is under way into the assets of of ex-Premier Niamien wonder whether he will himself be a candidate. He has not N’goran and of Bédié himself, against whom an international declared his intentions and the official purpose of his journey was arrest warrant was issued on 8 June. Bédié and his family, exiled to preach ‘consensus and reconciliation’. He has visited all the in Paris, are getting homesick: the charges against Bédié could be regions and main ethnic groups in the country, gathering opinions dropped in exchange for a call by him and his allies to put up Gueï from local leaders and traditional chiefs. It looks like an election as the PDCI’s candidate. tour. Balla Keïta, his advisor on political and religious matters, Meanwhile, Gueï faces a more pressing problem: can the military was in Paris in June and said he thought that Gueï had a ‘presidential coalition hold together? Most worrying for him are questions being profile’. Several support groups have sprung up to promote his raised about the regime’s number two, Minister of State for Security candidacy, including the Rassemblement pour le Consensus Lassana Palenfo, and the number three, Chief of Air Staff National. He has also hired Claude Marti, a French spin-doctor. Abdoulaye Coulibaly. Both are close to Ouattara and the RDR and So Gueï has lately been appealing for reconciliation with the the subject of attention from Gueï’s personal security officers (and ousted President Henri Konan Bédié (AC Vol 41 No 9), who has now, we hear, foreign security specialists). been in Paris since Gueï’s coup d’état on 24 December. Palenfo and Coulibaly are unhappy with Gueï’s programme The first town Gueï visited on his tour was Aboisso, in the south- since in May he sacked all RDR (Ouattarist) Ministers save east, the stronghold of Bédié’s wife’s family. Here, Gueï insisted Henriette Diabaté. Some say that unhappiness has turned to that he had not forced Bédié into exile. At almost every stage of outright opposition now that Gueï may be ruling out Ouattara’s his tour, he has said as much before Bédié’s supporters, including candidacy, allowing Bédié free passage back to Abidjan and going his former Legal Counsel, Faustin Kouam, his Minister for slow on the anti-corruption campaign. By themselves, Palenfo and Relations with the Institutions, Timothée N’Guetta Ahoua, and Coulibaly can do little. Many think they have enough backing in his Defence Minister, Vincent Bandama N’Guatta, who was the military and police to make serious trouble for Gueï, which gaoled for a while when he returned home in April. might account for his studied ambiguity on policy matters. Even Ouattara and his RDR are sure Gueï is campaigning for the more seriously, a division among the ruling soldiers could precipitate presidency. If so, it would be helpful to take over the PDCI more division and intolerance among Ivorians - the same threat that political machine to organise and finance his campaign. The last December’s coup was meant to stop. PDCI’s provisional Chairperson, Laurent Dona Fologo, says

The military-metropolitan team In Paris, General Robert Gueï is supported by a troop of retired Laurent Gbagbo wins. Socialist intellectuals, such as Dominique generals who have gone into business. Most prominent is Gen. Jeannou Strauss-Kahn, Laurent Fabius, Catherine Tasca and Guy Penne, Lacaze, Chief of Staff of the French army in the 1980s; he was security favour Ouattara, regarding him as a dignified man and a good manager. advisor to the Zaïrean President Mobutu Sese Seko, then to military Pierre Joxe, a former PS Secretary and Defence Minister, reminds leaders Gnassingbé Eyadéma in Togo and Idriss Déby in Chad. them that Nicéphore Soglo, who left the World Bank to rule Benin Colonel Londreau, formerly of the French external intelligence (1991-1996), was a disappointment. service, the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, was quietly The Africa Director at the Quai d’Orsay, Georges Serre (partly of given a job with Gueï last January. He was recommended, we hear, by Malagasy origin) gets on well with Ouattara and less well with Bédié. a former DGSE Director, Gen. Jacques Dewatre, as a favour to his He thinks Ouattara should be allowed to run for the presidency (but brother-in-law, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, another former Chief of cannot say so publicly); above all he wants the next president to be Staff. The military go-between to Gueï is a former class-mate at Saint- cautious, not radical, fearing that recent misrule and economic troubles Cyr military college, Gen. Raymond Germanos (who is of Lebanese have destabilised the country. origin). The Gaullists, notably President Jacques Chirac and Michel These ex-soldiers are having trouble persuading the present military Dupuch, backed by super-rich businessman Vincent Bolloré , a major chiefs to back Gueï. The army old guard was discredited after the beneficiary of African privatisation, favoured Bédié and his Parti genocide in Rwanda and the chasing of Mobutu from Kinshasa; the Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire. Now Bédié faces an arrest warrant or technocrats and political chiefs make the decisions now. Just as the political exclusion if he tries to go back home, the Gaullists are likely technocrats in the Quai d’Orsay won out on Côte d’Ivoire policy against to line up behind a Gueï candidacy. They couldn’t back the PS- réseau d’Afrique veterans in the Elysée Palace. affiliated Front Populaire Ivoirien candidate, Gbagbo, no matter how France’s Parti Socialiste was always wary of African politics and is xenophobic he becomes; and they have long been wary of Ouattara, a more so since the debacles in François Mitterrand’s era. Guy suspiciously good English-speaker with his own independent political Laberti, an academic and an Africanist, favours a proper election in and business networks in the United States, where he worked as a Côte d’Ivoire, to include Alassane Ouattara and Bédié - provided that deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund.

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Forthcoming elections to newly decentralised local authorities will test BENIN these regional allegiances. Kérékou’s support is solid in the north, although he did not do much for the region during his years of authoritarian power in the 1980s. His sleepy hometown in mountainous Atacora in the north-west, Natitingou, has little to show beyond a broad central avenue Kérékou, no coup and street lights; the main road to Parakou and the south wasn’t paved till Despite economic woe, the Beninese may Soglo came to power. give President Kérékou yet another chance Kérékou’s government inherited from the Soglo period a solid growth rate (4.6 per cent in real terms in 1995, 5.6 per cent in 1996) and has at last Spiralling fuel price rises, a troublesome cotton privatisation and a strong begun to ratchet up the pace of change. It hopes that its long running whiff of institutional corruption mean President Mathieu Kérékou Enhanced Structural Adjustment package from the International Monetary should worry about his re-election fight next March with Nicéphore Fund will be renewed under its new label, as a Poverty Reduction and Soglo, the man he defeated in 1996. Soglo has a solid reputation for Growth Facility (PRGF); this could lead to some debt relief and boost the economic competence (AC Vols 40 No 4 & 41 No 4). Cotonou’s middle interest of international investors as energy, water and cotton-processing class complains that Kérékou shows little appetite for economic or are privatised. political reform. Yet the veteran President may defeat Soglo’s comeback Finance Minister Abdoulaye Bio Tchané has built up some credit with bid - despite the economic troubles surrounding the Kérékou court. an aggressive campaign against corruption. Tchané (like Kérékou, a Kérékou’s ostentatious Catholicism - a strange mixture of born-again northerner) is a non-political technocrat who must take care not to evangelism and traditional doctrine - provokes mirth, given his former life antagonise vested interests. Until recently he had focussed on cleaning up as the country’s atheistic Marxist dictator. Religious zeal hasn’t helped his own Ministry and its agencies, such as the customs and revenue him clean up the court much: the commander of his Presidential Guard services (where staff from the director down to the driver have found was arrested on fraud and embezzlement charges at the end of May. themselves in gaol). Last month’s detention of the head of the Presidential Beninese don’t expect much from their politicians. Gross domestic Guard, Commandant Alexis Babalao, on the orders of an investigating product is growing but hardly benefits the poor. Democratic freedoms are magistrate in Parakou, may show that the reformers feel confident enough evident in raucous parliamentary clashes and the lively media. Urban to tackle barons whose power dates back to the authoritarian 1980s. voters, at least, think this is better than the oppression and economic decay By local standards, Babalao is accused of a mere trifle - fraud and that afflict their neighbours in Togo. misappropriation of 13 million CFA francs (US$19,100) allocated to an Kérékou’s consensual style suits the middle ground, especially the agro-pastoral project at Parakou military camp, where he was in command leaders of the small regional parties whose block votes could decide next in 1989 during Kérékou’s first presidency. He was fired in 1992, after a year’s presidential contest. Moreover, Soglo is not an inspiring alternative. commission of enquiry and Benin’s transition to democracy but Kérékou His supporters - most numerous in Cotonou and in the central region of appointed him to head the Guard after his return to power in March 1996. Zou, around Abomey, the traditional seat of the Dan Ahomey royal line Tchané wants to introduce a reform ethos among officials who, - lament his apparent arrogance and the unpopularity of his wife Rosine, although now paid on time, hold onto the private sidelines they relied on the strident parliamentary leader of his Renaissance du Bénin. when pay arrears were the rule. As power and budgetary authority are Soglo’s failure to attend the 8 May funeral ceremonies of Hubert devolved to new elected local authorities, it is hard to persuade civil Maga, the first President of Dahomey (as Benin was once known) servants that jobs in regional offices can be a challenge rather than a step reinforced his reputation for aloof arrogance. Maga had been fiercely off the promotion ladder. Even modest success with this project could partisan in his political heyday in the 1960s but transformed himself into further Tchané’s suggested promotion to a specially-created prime an elder statesman, a member of the Constitutional Court and a symbol of ministership. Young Beninois, bored by the Kérékou-Soglo rivalry, consensus. Kérékou, who had been Maga’s aide-de-camp, handled the might be keener on the President if he promoted a young moderniser. The period of mourning and national homage with low-key aplomb, like a drive against corruption is popular; privatisation is more difficult. The father-figure above politics. IMF and World Bank are pressing the government to move the power and Lack of the common touch contributed to Soglo’s defeat in 1996 when, water parastatals completely into the private sector by the end of this year. despite having restored growth and financial stability to a near bankrupt Yet even if privatising power and water delivered better service, it could economy, his confrontational politics antagonised both potential allies mean job cuts and higher prices. Bad news in an election year. and the electorate. Voters recall his faux pas: a bungled attempt to promote an alternative leadership of the voodoo cult, failure to pay a courtesy call on an influential local king before an election rally, jobs for family Visit our website at: www.africa-confidential.com Published fortnightly (25 issues per year) by Africa Confidential, at members in his entourage, a graceless personal attack on the Kérékou 73 Farringdon Road, London EC1M 3JQ, England. regime of the 1980s during the Francophone summit in Cotonou. Tel: +44 20-7831 3511. Fax: +44 20-7831 6778. Yet he is still in the race. Alliances with the small but solid regional Copyright reserved. Edited by Patrick Smith. Deputy: Gillian Lusk. parties are crucial in Benin and, for now at least, Soglo appears to have the Administration: Clare Tauben. support of the mercurial parliamentary speaker Adrien Houngbédji, Annual subscriptions, cheques payable to Africa Confidential in advance: whose Parti du Renouveau Démocratique dominates the south-east UK: £278 Europe: £278 around Porto Novo. The two are allied in the National Assembly, where Africa: £258 US:$697 (including Airmail) Rest of the World: £361 the pro-government Mouvance Présidentielle does not have a secure Students (with proof): £79 or US$126 majority. In the south-west, though, Kérékou is backed by Bruno All prices may be paid in equivalent convertible currency. We accept Amoussou, the Minister of State (senior minister) for Planning and American Express, Diner’s Club, Mastercard and Visa credit cards. Employment, whose Parti Social-Démocrate rules the roost in Mono. Subscription enquiries to: Africa Confidential, PO Box 805, Oxford OX4 1FH England. Tel: 44 1865 244083 and Fax: 44 1865 381381 Amoussou was the kingmaker last time and could swing a decisive block Printed in England by Duncan Print and Packaging Ltd, Herts, UK. in the second round of the coming presidential race. ISSN 0044-6483

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Kazini, in Kisangani, with disastrous Mogadishu are largely absent and the Darod are Pointers consequences and of dissembling at summit only partially represented in the absence of the meetings and using the Ugandan media to stir up Majerteen of Puntland. The conference will have anti-Rwandan feeling. The RPA now hints that to build up more support inside Somalia. Otherwise RWANDA/UGANDA the UPDF is cultivating links with the Interahamwé a government in exile, even with international and other hostile groups, suggesting further backing, will merely add an extra faction to an treachery and mayhem to come. already excessively long list. After Kisangani ERITREA/ETHIOPIA After the third, bloodiest, confrontation between SOMALIA/DJIBOUTI the armies of Uganda and Rwanda on 5-10 June, Kisangani has now officially been demilitarised. Time of reckoning The United Nations Special Representative in Time to talk Congo-Kinshasa, Kamel Morjane, told reporters The Somali National Peace Conference in Djibouti The agreement signed on 18 June in Algiers has in Geneva recently that troops from the Armée finished six weeks of initial consultations and little to recommend it to Eritrea. Only after a Patriotique Rwandaise (APR) and the Ugandan moved on last week to phase two (AC Vol 41 No comprehensive peace agreement - still some way People’s Defence Force (UPDF) had left the city 7). Hundreds of participants (some picked by off - is the Eritrean-Ethiopian border to be as earlier agreed, the Ugandans going north and Djibouti’s President Ismail Omar Guelleh and demarcated, according to ‘colonial treaties’ and north-east, the Rwandans south and south-east. his team, some self-selected) finally chose enough international law. The interim boundary, without The UN Observer Mission in Congo acceptable delegates to fill clan quotas. Phase two prejudice to a final settlement, will be the one (MONUC), which singularly failed to prevent is supposed to deal with a constitution and existing on the ground until May 1998. So Ethiopia these hostilities, is looking to expand its presence, structures of government, the status of Mogadishu, gets back, for now, all the areas Eritrea seized. with specialised South African defence units the issue of property looted over the past decade of The accord binds Ethiopia to withdraw its supposedly earmarked for Kisangani and hints of conflict and, perhaps of most interest to those troops from Eritrea (AC Vol 41 No 11) but not till UN peacekeepers on the way. attending, choosing a parliament and a government. two weeks after 2-3,000 United Nations’ troops The city may remain a flashpoint: each army Like the United Nations, Djibouti wants results. operating under the auspices of the Organisation has accused the other of faking withdrawal, duping Funds are running out and neither the UN nor the of African Unity have arrived. This arrangement UN observers and moving in reinforcements on Arab League have produced enough. The UN is was designed to satisfy Eritrea’s request for UN the quiet. Meanwhile, Rwanda’s and Uganda’s asking donors for support and Ismail Omar has intervention and Ethiopia’s for the OAU’s. The Congolese allies have their own scores to settle. taken the risk of pressuring delegates. There are force’s composition and mandate remain Having gained an important tactical and delegates claiming to represent most clans but undecided, so it will not be organised for several propaganda victory, Rwanda says it has no interest questions have been asked about whom they months. Ethiopia has already specified that soldiers in returning to Kisangani. Yet its main ally, the represent. President Ismail refused to accept from ‘some’ countries would be unacceptable and Goma wing of the Rassemblement Congolais pour unrepresentative warlords and faction leaders. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said on 19 la Démocratie-Goma, says its forces will remain, Yet he has welcomed equally unaccountable ex- June that no troops had yet been offered. arguing that pulling out would mean a loss of ministers of President Mohamed Siad Barre’s In the meantime, Ethiopian troops will stay sovereignty and leave the way open for the return regime, long exiled intellectuals and businessmen, inside Eritrea. Even when a UN force arrives, it is of the UPDF and its Congolese allies. The RCD’s and traditional elders, many of his own choice. meant to be stationed in a 25-kilometre buffer military wing, the Armée Nationale Congolaise The conference stipulates a single united zone entirely within Eritrea, from which Eritrean (ANC), hugely dependent on the APR in the past, Somalia. This has alienated the government of the troops (but not administrators, police or local played a negligible role in the recent fighting. unrecognised republic of Somaliland, which militia) would be banned. For an army and a The UPDF has been accused of bringing in described the meeting as ‘hostile’ after some of its people encouraged to believe in their invincibility, hundreds of soldiers from the Mouvement pour la opposition leaders appeared there. Another this will be hard to swallow. Libération Congolaise (MLC), the rebel movement ‘building block’, Puntland, accused Djibouti of Ethiopia wants compensation for relief food headed by businessman Jean-Pierre Bemba, fixing the agenda and the participants; its grain stolen at Assab in 1998, for the treatment of which has concentrated its efforts in the far north government withdrew its delegates on 17 June people in Irob taken over by Eritrean forces in and north-west of Congo-K. Bemba claims and disowned those who stayed on in Djibouti. May 1998 and for those displaced by the fighting. considerable popular support in Kisangani and The most significant absentees are most of the Eritrea wants compensation for the property of recently offered to use his army as an ‘independent Mogadishu and Benadir region Hawiye warlords. Eritreans expelled from Ethiopia in 1998-99 and peacekeeping force’, while suggesting the holding The Rahenweyne Resistance Army, which controls the effects of the Ethiopian incursions into Eritrea. of city-wide elections. He is viewed by the RCD Bay and Bakool regions, refused to attend till its Ethiopia is in no particular hurry for a final and Rwanda as a Ugandan stooge, with no commander, Colonel Shati Gadud, turned up settlement. The opposition Alliance of Eritrean independent military base. unexpectedly with a team this week. It’s not clear National Forces has carefully kept its distance but Despite the insistence of Rwandan Foreign if he wants to be participant or onlooker but to was still able to collect stocks of abandoned Minister André Bumaya that ‘the doors of show that the organisers want the RRA on board, weapons. Ethiopia optimistically hopes the AENF dialogue with Kampala remain open’, Ugandan- its Secretary General, Abdullah Derow, was made can use the power vacuum in western Eritrea to Rwandan relations appear worse than ever. a co-chairman. The other is Hassan Abshir, ex- build up its support and that criticism of President Rwanda maintains President Paul Kagamé’s Interior Minister of Puntland, which will not please Issayas Afeworki will grow as Eritrea’s defeat 4 June meeting with Congolese President Laurent the territory’s absentee government but seems sinks in. Kabila in Kenya was routine. However, the intended to please its major clan, the Majerteen. Both governments are claiming victory but surprise summit has revived Ugandan fears of a President Ismail is determined to produce a must now account to their peoples for the casualties. Rwandan-Congolese pact, while also triggering Somali government, which would surely be It’s estimated that 100,000 people have died, newspaper speculation about Rwanda being given recognised by the UN. The process is now moving roughly half in each country. Though their armies a large stake in Kabila’s diamond interests. into the crucial and dangerous area of clan politics. are similarly huge (Ethiopia has about 350,000 Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni is now The arrival of the RRA suggests that the troops, Eritrea, over 250,000) their populations getting the Rwandan press treatment once reserved Rahenweyne think they might be able to take the are not. The impact of the appalling death toll on for Kabila. Museveni has been accused of giving leading role. Of the other major clans, the Isaaq Eritrea’s 3.5 million or so people is even more a green light to his Chief of Staff, Brigadier James (Somaliland) are barely present, the Hawiye of acute than that on Ethiopia’s 60 million. 8