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IBM Security Appscan Standard: User Guide Traffic Log

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IBM Security Appscan Standard: User Guide Traffic Log IBM Security AppScan Standard Version 9.0.3.12 User Guide IBM Contents Chapter 1. Introduction ........ 1 Content-Based Results view ........ 91 Product overview............. 1 Glass Box view ............ 94 Supported technologies .......... 1 Communication and Proxy view ...... 95 What's new ............... 2 HTTP Authentication view ........ 96 Contact and support information ....... 3 Test Policy view ............ 97 Test Optimization view ......... 102 Chapter 2. Installing ......... 5 Test Options view ........... 102 Privilege Escalation view ........ 105 System requirements............ 5 Malware view ............ 106 Flash Player upgrade .......... 7 Scan Expert view ........... 106 Flash Player configuration ......... 7 Advanced Configuration view....... 108 Install................. 8 Scan file structure ............ 123 Silent install .............. 8 Scan templates ............. 123 Uninstall................ 9 Predefined templates .......... 123 License ................ 9 User-Defined Scan Templates ....... 125 Load a node-locked license ........ 10 Loading scan templates ......... 125 Load a floating or token license....... 11 Editing Scan Templates ......... 125 Updates ............... 11 Changing the configuration during a scan .... 126 Temp file location ............ 12 Chapter 3. Getting started ...... 13 Chapter 5. Manual Exploring ..... 127 Using AppScan............. 127 How an automatic scan works ........ 13 Recording a Manual Explore ....... 128 Web applications vs. web services ....... 14 Exporting Manual Explore data ...... 130 Basic workflow ............. 15 Importing Manual Explore data ...... 131 Workflow description .......... 16 Using AppScan as a proxy server...... 132 Tour of the main window ......... 17 Using AppScan as recording proxy ...... 133 View selector ............. 17 Exploring with the External Traffic Recorder .. 133 Application Tree ............ 18 External Login Recorder ......... 135 Result List .............. 20 External Traffic Recorder ........ 135 Detail Pane ............. 21 Using GSC .............. 136 Scan panels ............. 21 Exploring with GSC .......... 137 Status bar .............. 21 Scanning a site that includes a SOAP web Tutorial................ 22 service as part of the site ........ 138 Step 1: Configuring the scan........ 22 Step 2: Running the scan ......... 23 Step 3: Reviewing Scan Results ....... 24 Chapter 6. Scanning ........ 139 Step 4: Communicating results ....... 25 Starting scans ............. 139 Sample scans .............. 25 Starting scans from the Scan Configuration Wizard .............. 139 Chapter 4. Configuring ........ 27 Starting scans from the Scan menu or the toolbar .............. 139 Scan configuration wizard ......... 27 Starting scans from the Welcome dialog box .. 140 Launching the Scan Configuration Wizard ... 28 Starting scans from the New Scan dialog box 141 Wizard for exploring with AppScan ..... 29 Scan progress ............. 141 Wizard for exploring with an external device or Pausing and continuing scans ........ 142 client ............... 34 Scans stopped due to connectivity issues ... 142 Wizard for exploring with GSC ....... 38 Scans stopped due to application issues ... 142 Scan configuration dialog box ........ 40 Saving and loading scans ......... 143 URL and Servers view.......... 41 Saving scans............. 143 Login Management view ......... 45 Automatic scan save .......... 143 Environment Definition view ....... 57 Loading saved scans .......... 144 Exclude Paths and Files view ....... 58 Importing a legacy scan template...... 144 Explore Options view .......... 63 Automatic scan............. 144 Parameters and Cookies view ....... 68 Automatic multiphase scanning ...... 145 Automatic Form Fill view ........ 80 Scan Expert .............. 145 Error Pages view ........... 83 Scan Expert recommendations ....... 146 Multi-Step Operations view ........ 85 iii Glass box scanning ........... 146 Viewing and saving reports ....... 212 Overview.............. 146 Creating partial reports ......... 212 For Java platforms........... 147 Earlier versions of report templates ..... 213 For .NET platforms .......... 166 Security reports ............ 213 Partial scans .............. 171 Limiting the size of Security reports ..... 215 Scan Multi-Step Operations Only ...... 172 Industry Standard and Compliance reports ... 216 Changing the configuration during a scan ... 172 Industry Standard reports ........ 216 Exporting scan results .......... 172 Regulatory Compliance reports ...... 218 Generating scan result DB and XML files ... 173 User-defined reports .......... 221 Firebird database structure ........ 173 Delta Analysis reports .......... 228 Template-based reports .......... 230 Chapter 7. Results: Application Data 179 Creating a custom report template ..... 231 Application Data: Application Tree ...... 179 Importing a custom template ....... 235 Application Data: Result List ........ 179 Requests .............. 180 Chapter 11. Tools.......... 237 Parameters ............. 180 Options dialog box ........... 237 Cookies .............. 181 Scan Options tab ........... 237 Failed Requests............ 182 Preferences tab ............ 238 Filtered URLs ............ 182 Recording Proxy tab .......... 239 User Interaction Needed......... 183 General tab ............. 242 Comments ............. 184 Advanced tab ............ 242 JavaScript ............. 184 Web Services Configuration wizard ...... 243 Application Data: Detail Pane ........ 185 Description files ........... 243 Domains .............. 244 Chapter 8. Results: Security Issues 187 Login Management .......... 244 Security Issues: Application Tree ....... 187 Sequences ............. 245 Exclude URL from scan ......... 187 Parameters ............. 245 Security Issues: Result List ......... 188 Complete.............. 246 Severity levels ............ 188 Scan Scheduler ............. 246 Issue state: Open or Noise ........ 189 Schedule a new scan .......... 246 Resending tests............ 190 Edit scheduled scan configuration ..... 247 Right-click menu ........... 191 Delete a scheduled scan ......... 247 Filtering Security Issues in Result List .... 191 Schedule a Test stage only ........ 247 Sorting the Result List ......... 192 Schedule a scan in installments ...... 248 Security Issues: Detail Pane......... 192 Scheduled task command line parameters ... 249 Issue Information tab.......... 192 User-Defined Tests ........... 250 Advisory tab ............ 196 User-Defined Test wizard ........ 250 Fix Recommendations tab ........ 198 Test Type .............. 251 Request/Response tab ......... 199 Filter ............... 251 Report false positive test results ...... 201 Modification............. 252 Manual tests.............. 202 Validation ............. 253 Non-vulnerable variants .......... 205 Advisory .............. 253 Saving all non-vulnerable variants ..... 205 Completing the wizard ......... 253 Defining variants as non-vulnerable ..... 205 PowerTools .............. 253 Non-Vulnerable Variants List ....... 205 Authentication Tester .......... 253 Deleting variants ........... 206 Connection Test ........... 260 Encode/Decode ........... 262 Chapter 9. Results: Remediation Expression Test ............ 263 HTTP Request Editor.......... 264 Tasks ............... 207 Generic Service Client (GSC) ........ 268 Remediation Tasks: Application Tree...... 207 Customizing the Tools menu ........ 269 Remediation Tasks: Result List ....... 207 Adjust the order of the PowerTools ..... 269 Searching Remediation Tasks in Result List .. 208 Add programs to the Tools menu...... 269 Sorting Remediation Tasks ........ 209 Extensions .............. 270 Manipulating priority levels ....... 209 Extension Manager .......... 270 Deleting Remediation Tasks from the Result List 209 Pyscan .............. 271 Remediation Tasks: Detail Pane ....... 210 Explore Optimization module ....... 272 Logs ................ 276 Chapter 10. Reports ........ 211 Scan Log .............. 276 Report overview ............ 211 AppScan Log ............ 277 Configuring report layout ........ 211 Update Log ............. 277 iv IBM Security AppScan Standard: User Guide Traffic Log ............. 278 Request-based login troubleshooting..... 309 Searching Results ............ 278 Advanced login troubleshooting workflow .. 310 Long or never-ending Explore stage ...... 312 Chapter 12. Integrations ....... 279 Flash movie troubleshooting ........ 312 AppScan Enterprise ........... 279 Some Flash movies are not scanned ..... 313 Importing AppScan Enterprise license Restore Adobe Flash Player settings ..... 315 permissions ............. 279 Multi-step operation troubleshooting ..... 315 Publishing to AppScan Enterprise ..... 280 Replacing unsigned extensions ....... 316 Creating a job in AppScan Enterprise .... 280 Scan Log messages ........... 316 Creating a scan template in AppScan Enterprise 282 AppScan Log messages .......... 325 Automation Frameworks ......... 282 Flash Log messages ........... 331 Creating the batch command ....... 283 Glass box troubleshooting ......... 332 Application Security on Cloud ....... 284 Uploading to Application Security on Cloud 284 Chapter 15. CLI .......... 333 Command structure ........... 333 Chapter 13. Best practices and FAQ 287 Commands .............. 333 Workflow for advanced users ........ 287 Exec command ............ 333 Initial Configuration .......... 289 Report command ........... 336 Initial Automatic Explore ........ 290 Delta analysis report command ...... 338 Improve site coverage
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