Democracy Talks: How the Concept of Minzhu Zhuyi Is Discussed in Official and Online Fora in Mainland China

Democracy Talks: How the concept of minzhu zhuyi is discussed in official and online fora in Mainland China

Marco Basile

S2893223

Supervisor: Florian Schneider

MA Thesis

1 July 2021

Asian Studies: Politics, Society and Economy of Asia, Leiden University

Wordcount: 14,981

Table of Contents 1. Chapter 1: Introducing minzhu...... 3 2. Chapter 2: Literature Review: Chinese and Online Democracy ...... 6 2.1 CCP-led minzhu...... 6 2.2 Minzhu through the cyberspace...... 7 3. Chapter 3: Official Discourses...... 10 3.1 Defining Discourse: Approaches, Foucault, Politics...... 10 3.2 Mao Zedong and His “New Democracy”...... 12 3.3 Denghist minzhu: Between Tradition and Progress...... 13 3.4 Jiang: Pragmatism still in Charge...... 14 3.5 The Hu-Wen leadership: New Possibilities for Minzhu?...... 15 3.6 Xi: Chinese-style Democracy Comes Full Circle ...... 16 4. Chapter 4: Minzhu & Weibo: Online Democracy Talks...... 20 4.1 Methodology...... 20 4.2 Analysis...... 21 4.2.1 American Democracy vs. Chinese Minzhu, or “Democracy is not Coca- Cola”...... 22 4.2.2 Foreign commentaries...... 27 4.2.3 Chinese-style Democracy?...... 34 5. Chapter 5: Conclusion ...... 41 6. Bibliography...... 43

Chapter 1: Introducing minzhu

When debates of China’s current and future prospects ensue outside of the country, many elements are repeatedly brought to the fore: the expansion of the middle class (Ji, 2020; Cheng, 2019), GDP growth (Bloomberg News, 2021), its relations with the United States (Wong, 2021), its military expansion (Rogin, 2020), and many more. Among them, democracy represents one theme that, due to its often sentimentally charged nature, is prevalent in these discussions. Its relevance informs the entirety of my thesis, as I ask the following research questions: how have Chinese political elites shaped the concept of minzhu zhuyi in their discursive practices? How have young online users on the Twitter-like Weibo expressed minzhu zhuyi in their blogposts? Finally, how do these blogposts relate to the discursive practices of the Communist Party?

Long before the opening of the country to foreign markets in 1978, people outside of China have been approaching the concept of a “Democratic China” with hopes that the country would once and for all conform to Western liberal ideals of the modern nation. Western debates centered on Chinese democracy have been notoriously characterized by a striking polarization. When engaging in Chinese futurology, academics often see China as either the next democratic powerhouse (see Callahan, 2013, p. 1), or as an irredeemable “bastion of authoritarianism” (see Perry, 2015, p. 904). While one could argue that the truth can be located somewhere in the middle of these two diametrically different positions, I would like to propose a different movement: a movement that shifts discourses on China’s future from the outside to the inside of China. In doing so, I believe that we may better understand how the Chinese populace relates to the idea of democracy. Accordingly, from this point on I have mostly discarded the word “democracy”—at least when it comes to purely Chinese contexts. Instead, I have used more frequently the Mandarin translation of the word: minzhu zhuyi (民主主义).

The present thesis is constituted by a starting chapter that deals with the overall existing literature on the concept of minzhu zhuyi as expressed by official and online discourses. The literature review focuses on how scholars have previously approached the government’s rendition of minzhu zhuyi in Mainland China. The common theme of these articles is that they examine the definitional and linguistic choices that elites make in discourse-construction and narrative-building. Additionally, academic works on the internet’s role in shaping political identities among the Chinese youth— especially in the case of Weibo—have been explored.

A third, longer chapter focusing entirely on the official side of the narrative follows: this section explores the historical definition of minzhu zhuyi in Mainland China through a relatively short commentary on the words and actions of major Party figures from 1949 up to our present day. The key features of their stance on minzhu are obtained through the discourses, and analyses thereof, of the main leaders that have been at the helm of the Party since the founding of the PRC in 1949: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao together with Wen Jiabao1, and Xi Jinping. While other illustrious figures have also had much to say about this subject, I have attempted to zero in on the words of those that had the strongest authority over the official political thought of the CCP throughout the last seventy years.

The fourth chapter turns the attention to the examination of discussions on minzhu zhuyi by internet users on the popular platform known as Weibo. Here I finally explore the public side of the debate. To do so, I employed content analysis to review the posts and comments written by users on the popular Sina Weibo (新浪微博), a microblogging-based website with a monthly active user base of around 523 million (as of the third quarter of 2020; Thomala, 2020), and second only to the social media giant WeChat (微信) (DeGennaro, 2019; Thomala, 2020; Chernavina, 2021). A final section then follows, which combines the above findings, and present a clearer image of the relationship between official, and unofficial, virtual Democracy talks.

This thesis is of a rather descriptive nature, since it sets out to outline the core, and edges, of the discourse on minzhu zhuyi in Mainland China through the combined words of elite officials and everyday internet users. However, its aim is not just to describe: my goal here is to deepen the awareness and knowledge of the Chinese-side of the narrative on democracy and China, and democracy in China. What I believe my findings here will bring to the current field of studies on Chinese democracy boils down to essentially two aspects. First is a holistic approach to how CCP’s main figures—from Mao to Xi—have talked about, and dealt with, minzhu zhuyi. The term has appeared quite often in the words and lines of Party leaders through the decades; therefore, it deserves a more careful analysis. Second, this thesis provides an investigation into Weibo’s role as a “(limited) public sphere in China” (Bolsover, 2018, p. 454) that goes beyond traditional studies on Chinese internet speech and delves deeper into the particular of minzhu zhuyi talks. It does so by introducing the study of the blogposts written by young users on Weibo. Finally, I believe a holistic approach that combines the official and the unofficial, online side of the debate goes beyond the

1 As seen in Chapter 3, Wen Jiabao was particularly vocal about minzhu as a prime minister during the Hu Jintao leadership, so much so that any analysis of Hu’s stance vis-à-vis minzhu cannot ignore his contributions to the topic, despite the fact he was a secondary figure of his leadership generation. 4 limits of presenting only one of the two, and it allows for a more complex, and satisfying, image of the discourse on Chinese democracy.

Chapter 2

Literature Review: Chinese and Online Democracy

This chapter explores first the existing literature on minzhu zhuyi in relation to the Party’s stance on the subject, and its attempts at shaping the discourse in a way that fits China’s political experience; then, I turn to the analysis of previous scholarship on the use of the Internet in Mainland China and its role as a political identity-maker.

2.1 CCP-led minzhu What do we know so far about how the Party handles discourses on minzhu zhuyi? A prominent scholar engaged in outlining how the CCP presents democracy to Chinese citizens is Yu Keping. Defined as belonging to “inside the system” ( 体制内) (He, 2020, p. 825), Yu addresses the importance of the “natural” (Yu, 2016, p. 7) historical and cultural differences that separate the Chinese and the Western paths to democracy. Crucial are such differences, that, to Yu, it is “almost dead-end” to judge Chinese democratic efforts and politics through the lenses of Western democratic theories. He goes on to state that a system that reflects the public’s opinions and interests, and that guarantees that citizens can participate in political life “regardless of the particular party systems, election procedures, or power separation mechanisms” (Yu, 2016, p. 8) is what ultimately constitutes the core of democracy. And this is precisely what Yu believes the Central Government should subscribe to: the institution of a democratic paradigm with unique Chinese characteristics suited to China’s “culture and people’s needs” (Yu, 2016, p. 8). Now, we may ask ourselves: what constitutes exactly the kind of “Chinese-style democracy” introduced in his paper? Yu argues that, according to the CCP, there are four types of minzhu zhuyi in Mainland China—democratic election, democratic decision-making, democratic management, and democratic supervision. However, Yu further claims that, when it comes to elections, the government’s focus is solely directed towards political deliberation. What we have here at this point is, according to some scholars, not just any minzhu but a very specific one: xieshang minzhu (协商民主) (translated here as “deliberative democracy”).

The term’s history has been explored by Lo, who posits the issue of translating “deliberative democracy” into Mandarin, and how this translation has been applied by the CCP. The translative issue is at the core of Lo’s thesis, as the CCP’s “unique and exclusive” (Lo L., 2020, pp. 2) interpretation of the word has allowed the government to place its validity within the domain of China’s political traditions and far from Western influences. In fact, the series of official sources

6 reviewed by Lo—one that includes Party Central Committee documents, reports of the CPC’s National Congress, and speeches given by leaders of the likes of Jiang Zemin—display an overall “ambivalent relation with deliberative democracy” (Lo L., 2020, p. 2). While some of these documents recognize the suitability of xieshang minzhu to China’s political traditions, and conditions, others tend to stress a frequently heralded principle in Chinese politics: we will not copy the West. This both protects against Western influences and ensures that the authorities maintain the control over the interpretation of xieshang minzhu. This government-sanctioned, uniquely Chinese version of the concept of deliberative democracy thus sets itself as independent from any possible western interpretation. Among the many differences being claimed by this brand-new reconfiguration of the term, we find xieshang minzhu’s link not only to a system but also to a “work style” (Ngeow, 2014, pp. 109).

Another striking difference that relates to how the CCP manipulates discourses on minzhu zhuyi is outlined by Yue Hu. He starts his work on how the Chinese government tends to frame political language, by arguing that the word “democracy” is, in an apparent twist, a staple of the political vocabulary used by authoritarian governments. This goes hand in hand with Yue’s examination of the articles included in the People’s Daily—considered as the “mouthpiece” of the Central Committee of the Party (Yue, 2019, p. 307)—in the last fifty years: here the word “democracy”, together with its extensions (“democratic reform” and “democratization”), were mentioned more than 4000 times per year since 1949 (Yue, 2019, p. 302). Hu ultimately emphasizes how the CCP has rendered the expression in more pragmatic terms, i.e., “what the government is doing for democracy in favor of the established regime” (Yue, 2019, p. 303). Why this emphasis? The aim is not that of regime justification; rather, the objective is to recenter the discourse on minzhu, so that it is in line with national policy priorities (Yue, 2019), and far from the ideals provided by “a political development road universally applicable” (Qi, 2011, pp. 883). Despite these attempts by the Central Government at manipulating the discourse on Chinese-style democracy, it is imperative to both Cheng and Ngeow to take these discourses “seriously” (Ngeow, 2014, pp. 97). Otherwise, it will be nigh impossible to “assess the prospects of democratization in China” (Cheng, 2008, pp. 7).

2.2 Minzhu through the cyberspace Chinese young people’s engagement with online platforms, together with this engagement’s role on the formation of their political identity, are explored by Wang in her paper on how the rise of the Internet has impacted the political beliefs of Chinese college students, defined as “the most deeply

7 engaged group in the digital public sphere2” (Wang, 2014, p. 1136). She distinguishes between “vertical” and “horizontal” styles of digital communication—the former indicating the kind of political dialogue citizens and the government engage in, while the latter relating to debates between citizens. This distinction provides an interesting framework through which analyze the various ways the use of the Internet shapes one’s degree of support towards the government, as well as towards democratic norms. Her findings point to a basic difference concerning those who browse the Internet vertically and horizontally: users who visit Chinese government websites tend to lean more towards government support, rather than democratization. Conversely, those who acquire and exchange information online with other users, as it is the case with blogs (Wang, 2014, p. 1150), are more supportive of democratic principles, which include, according to Wang, political rights, individual freedom, and electoral democracy (p. 1140). Equally engaged in the relation between Internet and political beliefs is Fu, due to his work on the everyday online political participation of Chinese internet users. Through his qualitative research, Fu traces three descriptive categories under which Chinese online youth fall: “angry youth”, “powerless cynics”, and “realistic idealists”. These dispositions, Fu argues, are a product of “contingent participatory circumstances” (Fu, 2020, pp. 1) and are not static; rather, they are fluid subjectivities shaped by users’ mutual online interaction. Fu and Wang’s findings are of particular importance to this research, as they provide a framework through which proceed with the analysis of posts on Weibo around the concept of minzhu. As a matter of fact, my findings challenge Wang’s view that users of online forums tend to be more supportive of democratic principles, as some cases are explored where government support can be felt, albeit in various degrees. Equally informative are Fu’s contextually bounded categories, since they constitute a starting point through which develop my own categorization of the blogposts analyzed in this thesis. Indeed, anger, cynicism, and realism are key factors that contribute to giving life to the kind of comments and opinions that we find on Weibo; therefore, their influence cannot be ignored in the contextualization of minzhu on the platform.

The importance of online platforms in molding political subjectivities is further supported by Wang and Shi’s study on the relation between Weibo usage and political participation. According to the authors’ findings, Weibo works as an “online school of political participation” (Wang, Shi, 2017, pp. 528) that is pivotal in fostering political interest, civic virtue, and community-building. The political

2 “Public sphere” refers to the definition provided by Habermas’ (1962) who argued that the “bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public” (p. 27). The validity of this concept and its critique in relation to contemporary society are explored by Susen (2011) and Hofmann (2017). With regards to online forums, Wang (2014) does reiterate that they collectively constitute a public sphere, however, such stance comes under criticism in Dean (2003) and West (2013), who “dismiss the notion of the Internet as a contribution to the public sphere” (Rauchfleisch & Kovic, 2016, p. 2). 8 role of Weibo is also underscored by Bolsover, in her article on the comparison of political speech of active U.S. Twitter users versus Chinese Weibo users. The higher frequency in political speech by ordinary Weibo users—1 every 50 posts—is placed against the more “slacktivist” attitude of U.S. Twitter users (Bolsover, 2018, pp. 454). This corroborates Wang and Shi’s thesis, showing yet again the Internet, and Weibo’s potential as a “(limited) public sphere in China” (Bolsover, 2018, pp. 454). Whereas the debate around whether the internet provides any contribution to the public sphere continues to exist (Rauchfleisch & Kovic, 2016), we do find connecting threads on Weibo that display the “coming together as a public” conceived by Habermas (1989, p. 27). Such threads find their manifestation in the categories that I have introduced in the fourth chapter; that section, in fact, aims to prove that underlying political ideologies, and themes, provide a deeper layer of analysis in the study of minzhu. However, when considering the political ideologies that inform blogposts, Huang, Gui, and Sun’s work shows a more complex image of the “ideological landscape” (Huang et al., 2019, pp. 832). To them, the left-right spectrum typical studies has limited applicability at best. To better understand the ideological landscape, it is imperative to consider the “underlying political thoughts” that function as “intellectual resources for online ideational contestation” (Huang et al., 2019, pp. 845). This principle is indeed relevant to my analysis, as I have avoided the use of the left-right spectrum. In its place, I have focused on the contextual influences and widely shared political thoughts that serve as “intellectual resources” to the posts that follow.

Overall, the studies presented above succeed in portraying a satisfactory image of how the CCP handles discussions of minzhu zhuyi in Mainland China. Weibo-focused papers equally outline the platform’s crucial role in political identity-building and in the way political debates are propagated among young Chinese internet users. However, none of the papers above present a re-focusing on how the Party’s policies and official statements related to minzhu zhuyi model online debates on the subject. This shortcoming is atypical considering Bolsover’s claim of the Internet as a new public sphere (2018) and Wang’s argument that Weibo functions as a school of political participation (2017). Because of this, even more striking is the fact that the studies on Weibo’s function as a platform for political participation stop short of analyzing users’ discussions of minzhu zhuyi. Therefore, this research aims at bridging the gap between the CCP’s take on Chinese-style democracy and Weibo users’ debates on minzhu zhuyi, showing how the two are ultimately intertwined.

Chapter 3

Official Discourses

This chapter deals with the official side of the discourse around minzhu in Mainland China, that is, around what terms the top leadership has come to define Chinese-style democracy. Accordingly, I have first introduced the definition of discourse and its related approaches, both from a more theoretical standpoint and in relation to politics. The following sub-sections are then divided according to the ideological stance of each leadership generation’s key leader.

3.1 Defining Discourse: Approaches, Foucault, Politics

Before diving into the contents of each Party leader’s discourse in relation to minzhu, I deem it necessary to first introduce what constitutes a proper definition of “discourse”, both in terms of its broader definition and in relation to the field of politics (that is, political discourse).

Foucault viewed discourse as “ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them” (Weedon, 1987, p. 108). McHoule and Grace (2018) distinguish two different non-Foucauldian approaches to discourse: the formal and the empirical approach. The focus of the formal approach is purely related to language, as variations of formal linguistic methods of analysis (see Harris, 1952) and the social functions of language (see Mitchell, 1957) were key to formalist discourse analysis (McHoule & Grace, 2018). The empirical approach stresses, instead, human conversation and the sociological analyses thereof employed to outline discursive practices. On the other hand, Powers (2007) provides a thorough description of the main theoretical influences on the development of the Foucauldian approach: critical social theory, anti-foundationalism, postmodernism, and feminism (Powers, 2007).

The postmodernists’ main contribution to the development of discourse analysis is to be found in their utter rejection of notions of transcendentality and “bare facts” (Powers, 2007, p. 21). Rather than assuming the existence of universalities or totalizing narratives, postmodernism analyzes the kinds of power relations that are specific to a given historical context. In this sense, “postmodernists like Foucault are more likely to do history instead of theory building” (Powers, 2007, p. 25). Accordingly, Foucault’s definition of discourse distances itself from language or social interaction to favor instead historically bounded social knowledge (McHoule & Grace, 2018). This principle constitutes one of the main themes of his opus magnum The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), where he rejects the

10 quest for historical determinism that had by then become commonplace in the disciplines he examined (ibid., p. 25):

We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its sudden irruption; […] Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin but treated as and when it occurs.

However, Foucault (2002) equally stressed another aspect related to discourse production: “that in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, […], and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, […]” (p. 52). Power takes indeed the center stage in Foucauldian discourse analysis. Foucault’s concept of power—known as biopower—is concerned with the creation of “bodies”, in reference to the bio aspect of biopower, which will “support the status quo of power relations” (Powers, 2007, p. 27). It is precisely these context-specific power relations that produce tensions within society, and that alters the discursive formation: such is the case for the various procedures of exclusion (see Young, 1981). Foucauldian power is therefore invested not in the practice of restraint, but in the granting of rights and in the production of truth through the dominant “discursive practices of the human sciences” (Powers, 2007, p. 29).

How does this all transition into Political Discourse Analysis (PDA)? Van Dijk (2006) defines the political field as essentially ideological 3 : political parties need to constantly be “ideologically conscious and organized” (van Dijk, 2006, p. 732) if they wish to win over support. It follows that political discourses too are ideological in nature. Furthermore, political discourses make their related ideologies observable in the sense that it is in discourse that they are explicitly “expressed and formulated” (van Dijk, 2006, p. 732). Based on this, I argue that, together with (or perhaps behind) ideological stances, power relations find their object manifestation in political discourse. As a matter of fact, political speeches, statements, and utterances of all sorts, if they do occur in a political context and serve a political purpose (Van Dijk, 1998, p. 15), express perhaps some of the strongest truths (intended in relation to Foucault’s concept of biopower) established in a given society during a specific historical moment. Discriminatory remarks such as “because she is a woman” or “because he is black” show, according to van Dijk (2006), more explicitly the nexus between political discourse and ideology. However, they likewise reaffirm the dominance of certain discourses and especially the kinds of power relations these discourses are grounded on. After all, Foucault (1970, p. 52) himself believed that discursive production in our contemporary society is drenched in exclusionary practices.

3 Eagleton (1991) posits that the term “ideology has a whole range of useful meanings, not all of which are compatible with each other” (p. 1). Nonetheless, he provides a list of definitions of ideology in his “Ideology: An Introduction”. 11

There are certainly a wide variety of approaches related to discourse definition and discourse analysis, among them we find Lacanian-inspired discourse analysis (see Mark, 1994; Lefort, 1986; Laclau, 2001). However, my aim here has been to introduce the main traits of the Foucauldian stance and its relationship with PDA. In the following paragraphs, I present the nature and highlights of political discourse as undertaken by core CCP leaders.

3.2 Mao Zedong and His “New Democracy”

"You are dictatorial." My dear sirs, you are right, that is just what we are. All the experience the Chinese people have accumulated through several decades teaches us to enforce the people's democratic dictatorship, that is, to deprive the reactionaries of the right to speak and let the people alone have that right. (Excerpt taken from “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship”, Mao, 1961.)

Many, especially in the West, think of Mao as a ruthless dictator whose policies have further slowed, if not critically hindered, China’s resurgence from its tormented past. Given the predominance of this narrative, it is surprising, at least on a surface level, that he often engaged with the concept of minzhu in his speeches and writings.

Mao’s rendition of minzhu was infused with a sense of collectivity, as it represented a cause that every Chinese should fight for: such communal feelings were further underscored by the internal fighting with the Japanese, and the Guomindang. As China’s stability and the wellbeing of its people had continuously been under attack by decades of unrest, the idea of a New China under the banner of a “New Democracy” certainly appealed to millions of Chinese seeking redemption for their country.

It is indeed this “New Democracy” that exemplifies best Mao’s ideas concerning minzhu. In the treatise of the same name (“On New Democracy”), he argued for a democratic system that seemingly parted ways with the popular ‘democracy vs. dictatorship’ dichotomy. To Mao, minzhu was appliable exclusively to “the people”, that is, the “working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie” (Mao, 1961). “The people” are also in charge of enforcing “their dictatorship over the running dogs of imperialism” (Mao, 1961) and against all counterrevolutionaries, regardless of who those may be (Lin & Lee, 2013). The combination of these two divergent treatments “is the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” (Mao, 1961).

Another important dualism in Maoist political thought consists in the way he envisioned the official democratic advancement of the People’s Republic, as it pertains to the Marxist-Leninist idea of

12 democratic centralism (Lin & Lee, 2013). Democratic centralism, as the name already suggests, combines democracy and centralized guidance under the Communist Party (Yu, 2002). It is an indication of Mao’s pragmatic views vis-à-vis minzhu: democracy is subjected to hierarchy, and thus becomes a tool to amend the “ineffectiveness of the authority” (Lin & Lee, 2013). Thus, when minzhu begins to harm the authority, centralism comes to the fore to correct its dangers and maintain the unity of the party (Lin & Lee, 2013). In other words, minzhu did not constitute a goal in Mao’s eyes, rather a means to enhance the hierarchy in place within the confines established by the CCP.

3.3 Denghist minzhu: Between Tradition and Progress

In an apparent allusion to freedom and democracy, Deng said, “Open the windows, breath[e] the fresh air and at the same time fight the flies and insects.” (Retrieved from “China Under Deng Xiaoping” on factsanddetails.com on March 14th, 2021.)

Lo (1992) certainly makes a fair point in arguing that Deng Xiaoping was more of a realist “rather than an ideologue” (p. 650). Unlike Mao, he never produced any consistent theory of minzhu. If we were to define Deng’s attitude towards minzhu—and political reform in general—with one word, that would necessarily be pragmatic.

Defining in exact terms what Deng Xiaoping thought entailed vis-à-vis minzhu is therefore a complicated matter. One way to solve this issue, Hu S. (1998) argues, is to understand minzhu as what it should not be: Deng stressed that democracy should never harm the stability and unity of China. Rather, minzhu was to be a crucial instrument for the development of the socialist state (Hu S., 1998). In this sense, Deng upheld once again Mao’s principle of democratic centralism: the demands of the people would be fulfilled through the central authority of the government. This was the essence of the kind of democracy envisioned by Deng: as Western democracy (or “individualist democracy”, see Lo C.W., 1992, p. 652) was deemed to favor solely the dominant capitalist class (Hu S., 1998; Yu, 2002), “socialist democracy” (Hu S., 1998; Yu, 2002; Lo C.W., 1992) was the Chinese, collectivist road to the social, political, and economic development of the People’s Republic.

However, that Deng reiterated the dominant status of democratic centralism in the governance of the country does not imply that he merely parroted what Mao had conceived decades earlier. In fact, if we were to analyze Deng’s “Emancipate the Mind; Seek Truth from Facts; and Unite as One to Look to the Future” speech4, we would find multiple instances of criticism towards Mao. One of these

4 The speech was held at the Third Plenary Session of the XI Party Central Committee in 1978. 13 relates to how the previous leadership had “laid undue stress on centralism” (Yu, 2002, 184), so much so that centralism had become “divorced from democracy and there was little democracy” (Deng, 1983). Furthermore, Deng officially declared that, to the party, minzhu was no more a mere instrument, but a “goal” (Deng, 1983). Deng was therefore “opening the windows” of political reform and letting everyone in China “breathe fresh air”. However, as already stated above, minzhu was still under the firm grasp of the CCP: though the new leadership was now granting new rights to the people, minzhu had to constantly be in line with centralism and with the Four Cardinal Principles 5. Democratic centralism constituted therefore the key means to “fight the flies and the insects” of political chaos.

3.4 Jiang: Pragmatism still in Charge

We have established a State power of people's democratic dictatorship, with the Chinese people being the masters of their own destiny. […] This […] marks China's realization of a great leap from centuries-old feudalistic autocratic politics to people's democratic politics. (Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China, July 1, 2001.)

In his speeches, Jiang often reaffirmed many of the principles which belonged to either Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping Thought, if not both (Rolls, 2004). However, many veterans of the Party considered him a “political lightweight” (Narayanan, 2006, p. 335). Therefore, he found it imperative to define a coherent political line that distinguished him from his predecessors, and competitors, and that legitimized the new leadership.

Despite being closer to a pragmatist rather than an ideologue (Narayanan, 2006), Jiang’s “Three Represents” theory is necessary to understand his stance on political reform, and minzhu. First introduced during an inspection tour to Guangdong province and ratified during the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002, the Three Represents include6:

1.“The development trends of advanced productive forces.”

2. “The orientations of an advanced culture.”

5 Stated by Deng, they included: 1. The principle of upholding the socialist path 2. The principle of upholding the people's democratic dictatorship 3. The principle of upholding the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) 4. The principle of upholding Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism–Leninism (see “Uphold The Four Cardinal Principles”, Deng, 1979) 6 For a rundown of the Represents’ main features see: “What Is “Three Represents’ CPC Theory?” (found on China.org.cn), and “Three Represent” (found on Cpcchina.chinadaily.com.cn) 14

3. “The fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people in China.”

This theory defines the CCP role in China’s economic, social, and political advancement, as it constantly needs to fulfill the above three requirements. However, to do so requires the aid of the socialist democratic apparatus of the Party: democratic centralism is, unsurprisingly, called forth once again to maintain the balance between the will of the people and the authority of the CCP. Nonetheless, Jiang did advance several ideas whose aim was to improve the level of minzhu within the Party, but without causing any harm to the centralist aspect of the system. Among them, we find an emphasis on discussions between Party members to solve “all major issues in relation to the Party” (Jiang, 2001). Jiang saw improving the internal deliberation processes and the Party’s decision-making mechanisms as pivotal in the democratic success of the country. This process should also be supported by expanding the citizen’s participation in political affairs (Jiang, 2001), as well as by allowing them to engage in democratic management and supervision (Jiang, 2002). However, this is as specific as Jiang ever got to practically define democratically-oriented political reform. What exactly the “long- term coexistence, mutual supervision, treating each other with all sincerity and sharing weal and woe” (Jiang, 2002) strategy entailed vis-à-vis minzhu has often escaped Jiang’s speeches.

3.5 The Hu-Wen leadership: New Possibilities for Minzhu?

I think there are multiple forms of democracy in the world. What is important […] about democracy is that whether such form of democracy can really represent the calling and interest of the people. (Transcript of CNN interview with then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, September 23, 2008. Retrieved from CNN.com on March 17th, 2021.)

Hopes that the Hu Jintao administration’s lesser ideological stance (Bo, 2004) would bring forth a decisive change to China’s political system were high (Fewsmith, 2003). Have these hopes been completely shattered during their ten-year tenure? Perhaps they have: already during a conference at the tenth National People’s Congress in March 2003, Wen had barely scratched the surface of political reform by reiterating the same policies that the Jiang Zemin administration had advanced (Cho, 2004). However, the new leadership was not a mere copycat of the previous. If anything, a major change was that discussions related to minzhu zhuyi in official fora seemed to have peaked during those ten years.

Policy-wise, we find, once again, the emphasis on internal Party democracy as central to a strategy that had been part of Chinese political traditions for decades (Cho, 2004). However, the new administration promoted minzhu to the status of popularity in official discourse (He & Feng, 2008; Zhou, 2012). He and Feng’s findings (2008) on China’s historical democratization path validates this point by analyzing the frequency of words such as “democracy, intra-party democracy, and democratization” (p. 161) in official discourse. According to their findings, the presence of these terms in the People’s Daily, the “eyes, ears, tongue, and throat of the party” (党的耳目喉舌7), has increased significantly from 2003 to 2007. This is particularly true for minzhu, which went from around five thousand mentions in 2003 to close to forty thousand in 2007 (He & Feng, 2008). Furthermore, debates over minzhu and political reforms intensified as well. The breakthrough article itself named “Democracy is a Good Thing”, which challenged the Chinese understanding of democracy, was released by prominent Chinese political scholar Yu Keping in the Beijing Daily News in 2006 (He & Feng, 2007). The expansion of village elections has also demonstrated that ordinary Chinese do wish for more “individual freedom and political participation” (He & Feng, 2007, p. 165).

In their speeches related to China’s democratic future, both Hu and Wen have stressed the development of “scientific and democratic decision-making” (China Daily, 2007), which is to be achieved by increasing the information support, transparency of and public participation (e.g., through public hearings) in the decision-making process (China Daily, 2007) (CNN, 2008). Yet another aspect that emerged particularly in Wen’s discourse about minzhu was its duty to assist people in their individual development in an environment of freedom and equality (CNN, 2008). This certainly represents an element of novelty in the many facets of Chinese-style democracy, as individualism had rarely, if ever, surfaced in official minzhu discourse8.

3.6 Xi: Chinese-style Democracy Comes Full Circle

As an old Chinese saying goes, "To the south of the Huaihe River grow oranges, while to the north grow bitter oranges." The purpose of the saying is to highlight the influence of environment. We should draw on the achievements of other political civilizations, but we should never let them outweigh the foundations of China's own political system. (Part of a

7 This expression represents how the CCP traditionally views Chinese media. 8 Similarly favoring the individual’s needs over those of the collective is Hu’s ideological formulation of the “person as the core” (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018) 16

speech at the meeting marking the 60th anniversary of the National People's Congress, September 5, 2014.)

Comparing one’s country’s political features with the different kinds of oranges that grow in different areas brings up two elements that are central to not only Xi Jinping Thought, but also to its relation to minzhu: the maintaining of tradition, and the increased assertiveness of the Chinese political system due to its alleged exceptional status.

Tradition in his speeches is kept alive and fundamental to their relevant arguments by frequently referencing to old Chinese sayings9, and to Chinese historical progress (Mulvad, 2019), in relation to which the CCP represents both a “critical or essential part” (Lams, 2018, p. 403) and the deliverer of China’s fate (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018). It is in fact the Party’s duty to “keep to the long- established track of historical heritage […] rather than breaking with history” (Xi, 2014). This is obviously not the first time the Party attempts to locate itself within the historical continuum: as Weatherley and Magee (2018) suggest, history has been fundamental to the legitimacy of the CCP since its inception. However, when compared to his predecessors, Xi seems to have parted ways with the post-Maoist tradition of stressing economic matters, while favoring at the same time the return of the superstructure as key to maintaining dominance (Gow, 2016). Mulvad (2019) similarly agrees with Gow in stating that the scope of Xiism is not limited to following the steps of Deng’s ideology of modernization. Xi has, in fact, further elevated once more a “Mass-line party-building” (Mulvad, 2019, p. 451) to renew the Party’s “hegemonic appeal” (Mulvad, 2019, p. 454).

In relation to this focus on the ideological, I argue that the twelve so-called “Core Socialist Values”10 constitute perhaps one of the projects that best exemplifies the return of the superstructure. Since late 2012, when the change of Party leadership occurred, this was the first set of values the Party required to be integrated into the legal system (Lin & Trevaskes, 2019). The twelve Socialist Values are defined as an attempt at unification of thought by Lin and Trevaskes (2019), who argued that morality’s codification into law functions as a nexus between the will of the people and the capacity of the Party to govern (Lin & Trevaskes, 2019; Gow, 2016). Denisov (2015) makes a similar point in arguing that this moralizing project was really a hegemonic one. However, he also views the Core

9 While there are many instances of this, the speech titled “Confidence in the Political System of Chinese Socialism”, delivered at the meeting marking the 60th anniversary of the National People's Congress in 2014, alone included three proverbs in the space of 250 characters (“To the south of the Huaihe River grow oranges, while to the north grow bitter oranges.” above; “In attempting to walk like a swan, the crow loses its own gait.” in reference to how you should never blindly copy the others, otherwise you will “turn the tiger you are trying to draw into a dog.”) 10 The twelve values are organized as such: prosperity (富强), democracy (民主), civility (文明), and harmony (和谐) as national values; freedom (自由), equality (平等), justice (公正), and rule of law (法治) as societal values; patriotism (爱国), dedication (敬业), integrity (诚信), and friendship (友善) as individual values (Gow, 2016). 17

Socialist Values as born out of the ideological confrontation with the West. In this sense, the twelve values constitute a rework of supposedly universal Western values into a ready set of moral precepts that allow for an ideological path towards modernization with Chinese characteristics (Denisov, 2015). The fact that minzhu is among the Socialist Values is a prime instance of Denisov’s point, as its inclusion suggests that it is not exclusive to liberal democracies (Lin & Trevaskes, 2019; Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018).

Perry (2015) views Xi’s promotion of minzhu among the prescribed national values as “something quite different from what American social scientists generally have in mind […] for China’s democratization” (p. 905). Indeed, minzhu has its roots in Chinese tradition, and its objective is to end the “enlightenment values are incompatible with illiberal politics” narrative (Perry, 2015). Gow (2016) argues instead that the twelve values should not be understood as separate, but as strictly inter- dependent concepts. Thus, while minzhu manifests itself in China as a key to achieving prosperity, harmony in the political environment is essential for the preservation of democratic centralism. Furthermore, since harmony has often been heralded as one of the key traits of Chinese civilization, it is the maintaining thereof that is conducive to stability (Gow, 2016).

Besides promoting minzhu as one of the core values of the “New China” (新中国) envisioned by Xi, he stressed that “democracy is defined not only by people's right to vote in an election but also the right to participate in political affairs on a daily basis” (Global Times, 2014). What, then, is the kind of democracy that allows for Chinese citizens to be an active part of politics in the PRC? As Xi puts it, the answer lies solely on the strengths of “consultative democracy” (协商民主11) (Xi, 2013). As seen in the previous chapter, Lo (2020) argues that the discourse on xieshang minzhu is fundamentally aimed at protecting the idea of minzhu from foreign interpretations. In his speech at the meeting marking the 65th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Xi reiterated this principle and further elaborated on it, displaying a stronger stance in relation to what democratic politics in China should look like. During the meeting, Xi criticized election-based democracies, where people “merely have the right to vote but no right of extensive participation, in other words […] this is token democracy” (Xi, 2014). He maintains that consultative democracy is instead the right path for China: not merely because it is a direct product of Chinese political culture, but especially on the grounds that “extensive deliberation under the leadership of the CPC […] embodies the unity of democracy and centralism” (Xi, 2014).

11 协商民主 (xieshang minzhu) can be translated as either “consultative democracy” or “deliberative democracy”, with “consultative democracy” being preferred in the English version of state-run media articles. 18

In addition to how Chinese “socialist democracy” finds its true form in deliberation, its fundamental status lies in the alleged ability to overcome the limits of Western “token democracy”. How so? By combining elections—mostly small-scale, rural elections—with deliberation in a system of complementarities, rather than contradictions (Xi, 2014). It is this amalgamation that, Xi argues, constitutes the true strength of Chinese socialist democracy (Xi, 2014). Therefore, the minzhu discourse has seemingly matured from discussing alternatives to the democratic monopoly held by the West, to asserting its higher status as a better path towards true democratic politics. “We will not copy the West” has now turned into “We have surpassed the West”. Chinese “oranges” are certainly better than “bitter oranges”.

Chapter 4

Minzhu & Weibo: Online Democracy Talks I now finally turn the attention to the wider, unofficial, side of discourse which Weibo provides us with. In this chapter, I ask the following research questions: how do debates and opinions held on the Twitter-like platform enrich our understanding of minzhu among Chinese youths in general, and among young online users in particular? How do these opinions relate to the general discourse around minzhu as expressed by the CCP?

According to Bouvier (2015), it is not just users who enjoy the ability to voice various ideas and opinions that is typical of social media (Gillmor, 2006), social media itself takes advantage of user activities, as they supply plenty of information related to what idea, story or picture is the most widespread and supported. This is, of course, to the advantage of the state, which profits from the availability of such information. However, this can also go a long way in helping us learn what are the most shared ideas and attitudes towards democracy among not only the specific pool of internet users which I have surveyed here, but among individuals in each society as well. Seen under this perspective, Weibo functions as a testing ground, where we can examine to what extent users challenge, or cooperate with the government’s official stance vis-à-vis minzhu.

Before I set out to describe the methodology adopted for this chapter, I deem it necessary to point out that the comments examined below deal with individual users, rather than organizations or other public entities, unless specified otherwise. Furthermore, even when presented with voices coming from sources institutionally closer to the government, the scope of this research does not change. As a matter of fact, my concern here is to introduce the various contents of public discourse in relation to minzhu, regardless of who produces it. Nonetheless, astroturfing—that is, “the practice of using deceptive communications to make a corporate or political message appear […] as if it comes from a very distributed group of individuals or naturally emerging social movements” (Techopedia, n.d.)—does exist on Weibo, together with other more or less direct methods employed by elites to direct public opinion online (see Miller & Gallagher, 2017; Neagli, 2021).

4.1 Methodology To understand how these users relate to and discuss minzhu zhuyi I have applied a content analysis approach to a sample of more than ten thousand comments on the subject. More specifically, the methodology I have adopted for this chapter is based on the one Wu and Fitzgerald (2020) employed in their study of political criticism on Weibo. In their research, they introduced three 20 main methods that Weibo users have employed to voice political criticism against the series of blasts that occurred in the chemical storage warehouses in Tianjin in 2015. Their focus was on the methods used to circumvent government censorship, namely: quotation, illusion, and irony. However, their choice to zero in on a series of instances that better exemplified these methods has inspired me to collect a set of illustrating posts to outline the kind of trends that dominate debates on minzhu. More specifically, I have first gathered posts according to their popularity (in terms of the number of reposts and likes received) and to how shared their main argument was in other users’ posts and comments. Then, I have picked those which ranked higher in popularity in the different clusters and that better articulated the given common theme. Thus, comparison has been central to my analysis.

Finally, key events in contemporary politics have been equally fundamental to my work, and I have thus surveyed posts that appeared during occurrences such as domestic (e.g., political controversies, unpopular decisions, etc.) and international tensions (e.g., continuous calls by foreign powers for China to democratize, protests abroad, etc.). I believe these instances can facilitate the analysis of how users discuss democracy in China online and especially reflect how certain events can shape opinions and attitudes even towards concepts that are often assumed to be either universal or unchanging.

4.2 Analysis Minzhu constitutes a frequently discussed topic on Weibo. A simple “民主” search entry already brings up plenty of results in the form of threads, comments, opinion pieces, as well as accounts dedicated to this topic. More data regarding the extent of the popularity of minzhu can be found thanks to the tag search function included on the platform: the relevant hashtag (#民主#) has received close to 27 million views and there are slightly more than twelve thousand discussion posts that include this tag (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: The above image displays the data regarding the popularity of #民主# on Weibo: we find more than 26,247,000 views, 14,000 posts, and 2689 original posters as of May 7, 2021.

Regarding the posts that I discuss below, they are organized according to common themes, namely: the U.S.-China democratic dichotomy, commentaries on foreign affairs, and Chinese-style democracy. The “Hot” section12 that appears in every search has been particularly helpful to the analytical effort, as it displays the posts users have interacted with the most—being in the form of reposts, comments, and likes. I have placed further stress upon the initiating post in each threaded discussion, as it tends to influence how people comment and engage with the post and with other users on the same thread (Sui & Pingree, 2016).

4.2.1 American Democracy vs. Chinese Minzhu, or “Democracy is not Coca-Cola” Wang Yi, current Foreign Minister and State Councilor of the PRC uttered the above “Democracy is not Coca-Cola” during a video conference with the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations held on April 23rd, 2021 (Xinhua.Net). Such analogy was a powerful one: at the time of writing, typing the word “民主” into Weibo’s search bar displays as a second result a statement that, without context, may be slightly confusing at first. How can we compare democracy with Coca-Cola?

As noted previously, the use of proverbs and metaphors generally constitutes a common practice in Chinese political language. However, what Wang Yi implied with his comparison was that while Coca-Cola is renown and enjoyed for his unchanging taste all over the world, democracy cannot be understood in the same way. The U.S., and every other country for that matter, should therefore respect the path undertaken by China, for it brings together all the ingredients best suited to Chinese political and societal standards. Wang Yi’s choice of words of course resembles the same strategy adopted by Xi Jinping in his speeches, as examined in the third chapter. However, the reason I bring up this event lies in the popularity of the topic on Weibo.

12 The section refers to the top trending posts under the same topic or hashtag. 22

Case in point, the hashtag “王毅称民主不是可口可乐” (lit. “Wang Yi claims Democracy is not Coca-Cola”), which appeared on the same date of the conference, already reached around 150 million views and more than 5,800 posts in the span of three days. Additionally, the top post of the People’s Daily including the news has more than 3,500 comments. All this suggests that the debate on minzhu on Weibo is not exempt from an element which we have already seen as predominant in the official side of the discourse: frequent referencing to the United States. The purpose of the posts down below is thus to further exemplify this tendency.

Figure 2: Democracy as the safeguard of civilization (Posted by: Xixifusi on January 8, 2021. Accessed on May 7, 2021.) Translation: The first picture shows the security guards of Congress13 pointing their guns, the second picture shows the veteran that broke into Congress and was shot dead. We can clearly see that the shots were fired at a very close distance. Even a barely trained shooter can easily fire a headshot at this kind of distance. Even so, the security guard aimed at the veteran’s neck, leaving her lying on the ground dead with such indecency. What makes democracy so appealing is that it safeguards the basis of civilization and keeps humans away from barbarism. #Democracy# #American Elections# In Figure 2, one can see the leitmotiv of much discussion concerned with American democracy: the inherent contradictions in American society. When juxtaposed with how the U.S. still markets itself both at home and abroad as a beacon of democracy, the political and social issues typical of American society become an easy target for criticism. Such criticism finds its way into Weibo via the posts of its users who tend to point out the serious deficiencies of American democracy.

13 The user here refers to the United States Capitol Police. 23

The storming of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021 proved to many Chinese yet again that the political system of the United States was, and still is, far from maturity. Weibo users saw this incident, and the gruesome images that followed it, as a grim reminder that China’s path towards democracy had better keep its distance from the violence which time and time again shakes the stability of the American system. As argued in Figure 2, what is the point of even having democracy, if it cannot maintain peace and stability within the country?

The call for peace and stability is a recurring sub-theme of U.S. related posts. Here the juxtaposition arises out of the allegedly irreconcilable difference between what is perceived as pivotal to the realization of democracy in the U.S. and in China. While the fight for freedom is inherent even in minzhu, as shown in Figure 3 below, Americans (and in this sense, all those who live in liberal democracies around the world) crown it as the central driving force that has informed all the U.S. history so far. This is in stark contrast to how most users frame the case of China: stability represents both the foundation upon which China is based, and the driver of further prosperity, of “rejuvenation” (Xi, 2012).

Figure 3: True democracy (Posted by: A-a-Daxiaoaoa on March 14, 2021. Accessed on May 7, 2021.) Translation: #Democracy# At least the CCP has taught me what true democracy is. The first point of what constitutes true democracy is to make your own decisions, the second is to fight for freedom. While fighting for other people’s freedom is good, we should strive for the complete freedom of body and mind. Finally, we ought to accept the constraints that come with human rights and social morality. In a so-called democratic society such as the United States, these principles are nowhere to be found. The American people have so far been hostile to socialism, the same system that helped them in their fight for freedom. In this sense, Figure 3 aptly testifies to the importance of stability in minzhu. Commenting on the need to free our body and mind from our own assumptions and from utopia, a recurring theme in discussions about other political systems, the above user stresses a supposedly less idealized understanding on minzhu. Therefore, it is imperative to accept the constraints which allegedly come

24 with human rights and public morals, as these cannot be given free reign unlike in other political systems, considered here inferior to the Chinese. The assertiveness of this tweet is a clear sign of how Xi’s reimagination of minzhu as superior to liberal democracy has penetrated the discursive practices of online users as well.

The above two findings can be linked to the “face-slappers” mentioned in Zhang Yinxian et al.’s research on nationalism on Weibo (2018, p. 773). This category consists of users who tend to engage in criticism directed towards the “partiality of America-admirers” (p. 774), claiming that any rosy depiction of the U.S. is ultimately unfounded. While in their work nationalism related to the American experience not only through its criticism but through praise as well, when it comes to minzhu and the U.S., it appears that there is a tendency to be critical of the American system. Criticism, however, does not solely deal with the perceived hypocrisy of American and liberal definition of democracy, nor does it merely bash the U.S. in favor of a clearly superior China.

Figure 4: A prelude to darkness? (Posted by: Shanghai Zhonggaoji Kouyikaoshi on January 9, 2021. Accessed on May 7, 2021.)

Translation: (SuperTopic: Democracy) Some people on YouTube are defending American #democracy#, saying that only American democracy can heal [the system]. I’m not sure if this is the case, but what is certain is that if you don’t act, change will never come. If the #Biden# presidency doesn’t manage to locate the deep-rooted problems of the #U.S.#, and then fix the morbid system, an incident such as the one that happened yesterday when #Trump supporters broke into the U.S. Congress# won’t be the last for this American-style democracy. It may as well be a prelude to unfathomable darkness!” #American Elections# Figure 4, which was also posted after the storming of the U.S. capitol, constitutes a similar critique to the one the above examples have provided us. The user here, an account which shares videos that were created for educational purposes on Chinese society and tech, shows their concern for the brutality of the incident which has shocked the whole world. They mention the need for Biden to “locate the deep-rooted problems” inherent in the U.S. in order to “fix the morbid system”14. Nonetheless, the user here displays a rather different stance. First, they do not consider American

14 The choice to use English here instead of Chinese is likely random, as I could find no reference to the “morbid system” in academia or political discussions. 26 democracy as faulty at the core and thus a danger to society, though they do not argue it is the solution either. Second, the fact that a need to fix the issues typical of American politics and society is at least mentioned here shows that the U.S. is not always seen as a monolithic country where everything is either black or white. Rather, a section of Weibo users sees the U.S. as a country that still portrays itself as the top superpower. However, just like any other country, the U.S. is not devoid of fundamental issues that need be solved lest the arrival of an “unfathomable darkness”. In this spirit, such users could be categorized as belonging right to the middle of the dichotomy that Zhang Yinxian et al. (2018) provide, in-between “face-slappers” and “America-admirers”.

4.2.2 Foreign commentaries This section spurs out of how foreign news and events are perceived and absorbed in China vis-à- vis minzhu. This time, however, I have collected foreign narratives from outside the U.S.-China dichotomy, which to this day remain prevalent both in offline and online environments. Instead, the users below are engaged in a commentary of the affairs of other countries as they gauge these events with the democratic expectations and practice of the relevant nation. I argue here that the desire to show the complexities and deficiencies of other political systems is not the only driver of interest in foreign affairs—which is widespread on Weibo. Such concern is equally motivated by a less explicit need to comprehend what democracy truly is by comparing the Chinese and foreign experiences with democracy.

Figure 5: Fight for democracy (Posted by: Tianzhende Xinxin on March 17, 2021. Accessed on May 9, 2021.) Translation: Lin Yaozong, 17 year-old of Chinese origin, used to be a first-year student at Yangon Medical College, he was going to turn 18 this August. Shot by the military junta, his death was a great tragedy to everyone, especially for his mother whose heart has suffered a great deal! All the people of #Myanmar#, students, workers, doctors, teachers, farmers, and monks too, they all resisted [the injustice], and their pursuit of democracy, freedom, and justice has injected hope into this chaotic world! Although it is a poor country with a small population, no one is afraid to fight and to become a hero.

Figure 6: Wisdom and democracy (Posted by: Nanyang 2019 on February 2, 2021. Accessed on May 9, 2021.) Translation: The Socratic trap of democracy: the rule of law sustains democracy, democracy requires for people to be wise, wisdom sustains the ruler, the ruler holds the tiger tally15, and the tally represents the military power. Once the military power is stripped off its vests, the coup will begin at once. The ruler will have nowhere to hide, regardless of the people’s wisdom. Democracy will be in vain, and only military law will reign supreme. Behind the tragedies occurring in Thailand and Burma we find an unrestricted military power and a democracy that is not guaranteed by law. The two examples above refer to the series of protests and violence that have occurred in Myanmar and Thailand from the summer of 2020 to the first half of 2021. These protests are significant as they have occupied a fair share of posts appearing under the tag of #minzhu#. The relevant threads tell stories that diverge significantly to the kind of narratives concerned with protesters in Hong Kong, who are, instead, deemed as “rioters”. What emerges here is, in fact, first and foremost a sense of solidarity towards the protesters—which tends to prevail over criticism towards them. Protests in the name of democracy here are not seen as a time and resource-wasting endeavor that is no more than an obstacle to stability. Rather, judging from the many posts relevant to foreign protests, the side of the oppressed, instead of the elite (see Figure 8), is the one that is usually taken. This is particularly fascinating: while protests in China find visibility and support through Chinese social media (see Yang, 2016; Qin et al., 2017; Qin et al., 2019), I find here a genuine concern

15 The “tiger tally” (虎符) refers to the fu (符), a tally used as a proof of authority by the central government of Imperial China since the Warring States period. 30 towards the political and social well-being of other populations. Even more interestingly, such wellbeing seems to be linked to the realization of democracy, as seen in Figure 6. Therefore, these users seem to value democracy, intended here as an illuminated freedom in a stable society, as essential, rather than exclusive.

Another element worth mentioning here is the reference to Socrates. As shown in Figure 7 below, the Greek philosopher is a popular icon on Weibo and even more so when it comes to discussions on democracy. This points to the fact that frequent referencing to Socrates as a support for one’s argument may be influenced by the tendency of Chinese political discussions to use historical analogies and figures to justify the current status of things. In this sense, Chinese users’ interest in history and use thereof in their reasoning is to be noted, as this also helps us comprehend their understanding of China’s and world history.

Figure 7: Socrates, the enemy of democracy (Posted by: Huangzhengting Elsie_yasikouyu on April 12, 2021. Accessed on May 9, 2021.) Translation: It turns out that Socrates was the first person to stand up and satirize the democratic system. He pointed out precisely that not everyone is suitable for voting, voting requires wisdom.

Figure 8: The importance of government legitimacy in the democratization process (Posted by: Halie_IV on March 21, 2021. Accessed on May 9, 2021.) Translation: Although it sounds desperate, it seems that the democratization process in Thailand and Myanmar is not at the same level. If the Thai army and the royal family still hold any kind of legitimacy under the country’s constitutional framework, then democratic reforms (if smooth) can proceed with stability. If that is the case, then the former military junta will be declared unlawful. It is as if people cannot help but continue to arm themselves, while society falls into the abyss of violence and conflict.

Figure 9: Protesting for democracy. (Posted by: Jacknan99 on February 28, 2021. Accessed on May 10, 2021.) Translation: Fight for democracy Police Violence [middle finger, middle finger] #Thailand# #Democracy#

Figure 8 and 9 reiterate what I have already argued above regarding the first two posts, though now the focus of attention is directed towards the Thai anti-government protests which are still ongoing at the time of writing.

Figure 8 emphasizes the need for greater stability to solve the tensions that have shaken Thailand since early 2020. Only with a stable political environment, provided here that those in power hold legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens, can a country achieve democratic reforms. This principle seems to be predominant on Weibo, as users, even in their fiercest critique of the system, still tend to subordinate democracy to a harmonious, growth-inducing political apparatus. This plays into how the CCP has described minzhu over the decades: aspirations for minzhu and for more democratic politics cannot ever supplant pragmatism, a core value shared by all Party leaderships for decades and that is now similarly stressed by the users.

Figure 10: Free elections are not enough (Posted by: Hu Xiaozhou on April 23, 2021. Accessed on May 10, 2021.) Translation: We should not blindly sympathize with India, because of the out-of-control pandemic outbreak. In a free world with elections, this is how they16 practice liberal democracy. In fact, when we talk about European and American countries, [we know] they have been active in fighting the pandemic, while practicing the heroic feats of freedom and democracy, and thus gaining the people’s respect. They have found a unique solution in order for mankind to combat the virus, and their eternal contributions shall be remembered by all of mankind. Born under freedom and democracy, and died under the novel Coronavirus epidemic, their deaths are heavier than the Alps. Figure 10 may not seem like suggesting much at first, however, it does exemplify another tendency in commentaries reserved to the current affairs of other countries. Discussions that focus on what is occurring outside of China will frequently mention democracy—together with the perceived quantity, and quality, thereof—and link it to the state of that specific country or area. As is the case

16特们 (temen) is used here in place of 他们 (tamen, “they”) as a derogatory term: the implication is that the subjects here are compared to animals (most likely cattle, as the radical for 特 is 牛, meaning cow, ox). 33 with the example above, the pandemic situation and the tragedy that India has experienced, and is still experiencing at the time of writing, turn into instances that exemplify the instability of Indian liberal democracy. This is further supported by how democracy is mentioned again when confronting the Indian situation with the one in European and American countries. Their stories of success are equally underscored by the quality of their democracy. In this sense, minzhu appears to lose its institutional and political traits, and rather takes on the role of a term of comparison.

4.2.3 Chinese-style Democracy? The posts below focus on minzhu as expressed in Chinese contexts and in relation to Chinese politics and society. Users included in this section deal with minzhu by delving deeper into the inherent features of democracy and confronting them with their own individual perception of democracy and, or, with the state of things in China.

As one can easily imagine, Taiwan and Hong Kong are mentioned as well since they provide an important term of comparison with which to juxtapose the democratic state of Mainland China. Thus, the description of Chinese-style democracy becomes intimately linked with the stories and comments shared regarding the current political state of Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Figure 11: Socialist democracy as true Chinese democracy. (Posted by: Zhang Shuotao on March 1, 2020. Accessed on May 10, 2021.) Translation: (SuperTopic: Democracy) Where is Chinese-style democracy? It’s by the side of every Chinese citizen. Since the early days of New China, the Communist Party led the people all over the country to establish local power at all levels, implement land reforms, and suppressed counter-revolutions so that the Chinese people could be truly free from oppression and exploitation, rise up and become the masters of their country. China has changed the world tremendously and shown its new face. Through never-ending struggles and difficult choices, the kind of beauty that no one would have never imagined before has now become a reality, and this sharp contrast has filled people with joy. In relation to this, Chinese-style democracy has developed from scratch and has become a political guarantee that allows people to be the masters of their own fate. Socialist democracy revolves around the core concept of the people being masters of their country, and it has become part of all aspects of social life in China. Socialist democracy has been playing a major political role, and it has irreversibly promoted the development and progress of Chinese politics.

Figure 12: Substantative democracy as real democracy (Posted by: Yefeng Shijiao on December 19, 2020. Accessed on May 11, 2021.) Translation: (SuperTopic: Democracy) #Democracy# #substantative democracy=people-centered, life-oriented# #democracy≠general elections# #popular elections=formal democracy# General elections are blasphemy to democracy, as the governance of a nation is a technical affair. The reasons for this are: 1. Choosing candidates is a technical job, since the public’s perception of candidates is very superficial, and the “public opinion” that is being deceived [in the process] is even less rational. 2. Candidates are controlled by capital in various ways, and they represent the capitalist interests. 3. Candidates manipulate issues in order to win votes, causing social divisions. 4. The results of the vote do not benefit voters, nor the entire population. Those who reap the advantages are those who financially back the candidate. This is related to the core issue of democracy: “people-centered, life-oriented” do not form a nexus. Therefore, in the end, it’s all about elections, desolate elections. 5. The result can only represent the emotions and wishes of some people, as the will of the person who voted for another candidate [i.e., that has lost the elections] is discarded in accordance with the law. 6. Voting empowers the candidate, and it is also a means to hand over one’s right to speak (electing someone who is not wise means surrendering to one’s fate, “you voted him yourself”). Thus, the popular voting system deprives voters of their right to speak, so that the one elected can commit all kinds of bad deeds…

Figure 11 and 12 respectively reflect two fundamental master narratives that can be found in the kinds of speeches and statements typical of how the CCP frames the discourse on minzhu, especially since the beginning of the Xi leadership.

First, we find the praise for Chinese-style democracy. Usually, this praise is directed towards the efforts undertaken by the Communist Party to lead China to political, social, and, finally, economic stability. Minzhu is thus first intended as a means, and, again, not a result, that allows people to become masters of their fate, and of the fate of their own country—with the two aspects often assimilated as one. Secondly, democracy comes from the sum of the numerous and long-standing struggles that the Chinese people had to endure to build a “New China”. If democracy cannot end oppression and bring prosperity, the user who wrote the post may ask, is it even worth it?

Second, figure 12 suggests the other trend I mentioned above: the criticism moved against the inherent contradictions of liberal-style democracy: to the user, this kind of democracy is no more than a sham. The biggest attack here is aimed at elections, and at the supposedly important role they play in liberal democracies: voting does not lead to real democracy, so the argument goes. If anything, it merely leads to “formal democracy”. What China should seek, according to the user, is true, “substantive” democracy. In this sense, while it is not clear what the user exactly implies in raising the idea of substantive democracy, I would argue that the use of the word is similar to the definition provided by Montufar (2008), according to which substantive democracy centers around the “preeminence of the fundamental rights, dignity and the autonomy of people above any kind of political, social, cultural or economic power” (p. 394).

Figure 13: Good deeds as the foundation of democracy (Posted by: Xiao Yu Andy on April 24, 2021. Accessed on May 11, 2021.) Translation: SuperTopic: to do a good deed every day | #transparency# To do a good deed every day, to be virtuous, [to achieve] prosperity, democracy, civilization, harmony are the goals of my country in the building of a modern socialist nation. Similarly, these goals sum up the basic life values belonging to the socialist core values, and they are of the highest importance, so much so that they have a leading role that precede all other values.

Minzhu finds equal representation also as one of the Core Socialist Values, another more recent development in Chinese political language. Figure 13 makes it a point that democracy is included and perceived in this line of reasoning as a key ethical value on the same level of being virtuous and doing good acts for one’s community. While this definition of democracy appears as more ceremonial, it is undeniable that people have increasingly come to understand minzhu as grouped with the series of values listed above and in the previous chapter. Xi’s push towards this understanding in this sense is more than noticeable.

Figure 14: The flaws of each democratic system (Posted by: Leizhong Handao Xingli Ergou on September 9, 2016. Accessed on May 11, 2021.) Translation: #Democracy# I casually wrote a few words, without any political color whatsoever “Democracy in Taiwan is such that everyone has ideas, although they are all buzzing around confusedly, the system often changing. The Mainland’s democracy is such that nobody can hear, as everything is quiet, the system unresponsive. In American democracy, everyone draws a big pie, while [at the same time] they’re given empty checks and the recycle bin is full. [As for] Hong Kong… it’s on the street.”

Figure 15: Democracy is a means, not an achievement (Posted by: A-longge BLOG on December 2, 2019. Accessed on May 11, 2021.) Translation: Democracy is only a means, a beginning, and we use it to explore and build a better society. Now Hong Kong, and even Taiwan, do not seem to understand this truth. They simply see democracy as a result, and naively believe that it is all only about competition, checks and balances, and even the separation of powers. This is clearly a misunderstanding of democracy. In addition, many people have misinterpreted democracy, it is not simply about the minority obeying the majority, but about the majority that must respect the minority. This means that pluralism and tolerance, rather than splitting and opposition, are the essence of democracy. Obviously, Hong Kong has just recently failed to achieve this result. Perhaps, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and us in the Mainland should deepen our understanding of democracy and be more objective about it, we should also practice democracy more rationally and healthily... #HongKong# #Democracy#

Finally, the last two examples suggest the relevance of Taiwan and Hong Kong to the discussion and overall understanding of Chinese-style democracy. In the same fashion that the United States play a comparative role in defining the nature and boundaries of democracy in general, and of democracy in China in particular, Taiwan and Hong Kong serve as a reminder that a form of Chinese democracy outside the Mainland does indeed exist already. In this sense, due to the historical and political context of China in the last seventy years, both territories’ looming presence force debates around minzhu to confront the reality of things: how does the Mainland’s minzhu fare in comparison with Hong Kong’s and Taiwan’s minzhu?

As one can expect already from the strained relations between the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, comments on the latter two territories’ political system and society tend to lean towards criticism, though of a different kind from that reserved to the U.S. Interestingly, in some posts there appears to be a shift of tone when Hong Kong and Taiwan are thrown in the debate as well: the definition of Chinese democracy in relation to the two regions is much less assertive than is the case with the U.S. Whereas posts comparing the U.S. and China tend to be polarizing in that description of either country falls directly into the categories of “good” or “bad”, when Taiwan and Hong Kong enter the scene, this dichotomy is more blurred. Surely, major crises tend to gather a great chunk of attention, and, if anything, they often become an excuse to ramp up criticism towards the perceived instability of their political system. However, as seen in figure 14 and 15 above, mentions of Taiwan and Hong Kong sometimes are enough to warrant a softer narrative—perhaps due to the closer connection felt by Chinese towards their Hong Kongese and Taiwanese “compatriots”. While Hong Kong and Taiwan are still seen as belonging to the liberal democracy faction, despite Taiwan being the only relatively true liberal democracy of the two, they still play an important comparative role in shaping how users on Weibo see minzhu. As a matter of fact, Chinese users’ idea of “Greater China” informs their concern with minzhu in all its territories. Chinese democracy, to these users, equally 39 hinges on developments both in the Mainland and in Greater China: rather than an us versus them, what we find here is a “we” (我们).

Chapter 5 Conclusion As stated at the start of the first chapter, in this thesis I have raised the following issues: how have Chinese political elites shaped the concept of minzhu zhuyi in their discursive practices? How have young online users on Weibo treated minzhu zhuyi in their blogposts? Finally, do these blogposts relate to the discursive practices of the Communist Party? And how? Despite the caveats inherent in the present study, the main aim of answering such questions has been to bridge the existing literature on the CCP’s rendition of minzhu zhuyi and on the role of the internet in China as a school of political participation. In this sense, the emphasis placed on minzhu on Weibo has been instrumental in showing that not only is minzhu an extremely popular topic on the social media platform, but it also assumes various connotations that, to a varying degree, resemble what I have

40 termed earlier as the “official” side of the debate. This is most evident when debates around minzhu fall into any of the three categories I mentioned in the fourth chapter. That is, the government hand is felt more strongly when elements relate to U.S.-China relations, major political crises in foreign countries, and the depictions of what “Chinese-style democracy” should entail.

When confronting the CCP’s general attitude and discourse around minzhu with the posts examined in Chapter 4, we find a discreet series of patterns and elements common to both sides. These include relying upon historical references, consolidating the idea that history does play a remarkable role in political speech in China; the criticism of the voting system in liberal democracies as deemed to be conducive to “token democracy” (Xi, 2014); juxtaposing the nature of liberal democracy with frequent references to a truer democracy that favors the population in toto—a stress on the demo of demokratia. However, the examples analyzed have also suggested instances that conform less, if at all, to the Party’s agenda on democracy. More specifically these instances include the support directed towards protesters in foreign countries, who are less likely to be labeled as “rioters”, and a more critical stance towards China’s current situation vis-à-vis minzhu—despite maintaining support for the CCP.

This research represents a first attempt at analyzing the discourse around democracy in China via the use of Weibo as a platform. Therefore, there are several areas that require a more careful analysis and that will allow for the scholarship on Chinese democracy to advance. I would argue that, among other possible developments, future research centering on the themes I presented in this article could focus on whether the CCP benefits from how minzhu is expressed online in general, and on Weibo in particular. In this sense, my research has merely tried to show the nexus between the official and the online side, how the CCP responds to what is debated online around democracy remains to be discussed.

Another path that research on this topic could take is to examine how the CCP frames discourse on democracy when it is directed towards foreign audiences and compare it to the discursive practices adopted domestically. As we have seen already, minzhu is an issue that branches out into several narratives which do not necessarily coincide in terms of content and end-goal. Therefore, when it comes to minzhu, a more holistic approach that includes, for instance, the contribution of the Internet in China as a platform for voicing one’s opinion or how the discourse adopted by the CCP changes in relation to who is listening may further this research and lay out a clearer image of what democracy in China, and according to the Chinese, really is like.

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