Polish Public Opinion Towards Germany and the Events of the Year 1968 Therein

Home , Marian Spychalski, Politics of Germany, Ryszard Siwiec, Television in Poland, Trybuna Ludu, Zygmunt Modzelewski

Project No. NN 108 1035 34 In the melting pot of generations – the year 1968 and its infl uence on the Polish-German relations between 1968 and 2007 fi nanced in 2010−2010 with state budgetary means assigned to scientifi c research

Translation into English Mariusz Kukliński

Proof reading Agnieszka Wosik

Cover Karolina Zaborska

ISBN 978-83-64091-07-0

Publisher Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk 00-625 Warszawa, ul. Polna 18/20 tel. (48) 22 825 21, fax (48) 22 825 21 46 www.isppan.waw.pl Realisation Ośrodek Wydawniczo-Poligraﬁ czny „SIM” 00-669 Warszawa, ul. Emilii Plater 9/11 tel. (48) 22 629 80 38, fax (48) 22 629 80 36 Contents

To the reader (Wanda Jarząbek, Piotr Madajczyk, Joanna Szymoniczek) ...... 7

Wanda Jarząbek The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects on Polish-German political relations between 1968 and 2008. Domestic and international aspects ...... 11 Introduction ...... 11 Immediate consequences of the events of 1968 ...... 14 1968 and the room of manoeuvre of the PRP’s diplomacy ..... 15 Grasping the nettle. The PRP’s German policy in 1969 ...... 25 The long-term effects of the events of 1968 ...... 43 Summary ...... 57

Piotr Madajczyk The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image of Poland and the Poles in public opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany ...... 59 Introduction ...... 59 Reactions to Poland’s participation in the suppression of the Prague Spring ...... 62 Reactions to the events of March ...... 65 The issue of anti-Semitism and the emigration of the Jews from Poland ...... 81 The echoes of the events of 1968 ...... 92 Appendix ...... 112

Joanna Szymoniczek Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events of the year 1968 therein ...... 129 Introduction ...... 129 The media in the People’s Republic of Poland ...... 130 Censorship in the People’s Republic of Poland ...... 134 West Germany in the Polish press in 1968 ...... 136 References in the Polish press to the events of 1968 in Germany ...... 148 “The moral collapse of the West” ...... 149 Terrorism in Germany ...... 151 Joschka Fischer, Foreign Minister of the FRG ...... 155 Other images of Germany and the Germans in the Polish press ...... 157

Bibliography ...... 163 To the reader

This volume presents the outcome of a research project carried out by the Department of German Studies in the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The project took place between 2008 and 2011 and was funded by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. The project, called “In the melting pot of generations – the year 1968 and its infl uence on the Polish-German relations between 1968 and 2007”, concerned a very interesting issue, namely the infl uence of events of 68 on the Polish-German relations. Although there have been many elaborations of this issue, they always looked at it from the same perspective. What was analysed were the internal cultural, social and political changes in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and lately, their global context. In Polish research the focus is mostly on the events of March 1968 and the problem of inner politics, with the key issue being the crisis of an authoritarian country. Moreover, the Polish studies lack not only reference to global events, but also to events happening in other countries of the Eastern bloc. The subject of our project was the German reception of the events which occurred in Poland in 1968: mass protests in favour of system democratisation, anti-Semitism, Polish participation in the 8 To the reader military intervention of Warsaw Pact (full name: the Warsaw Treaty Organisation of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance) countries in Czechoslovakia. The project also focused on the reception of events happening in the FRG by the Polish public opinion and their infl uence on Polish-German relations in the global context. This, however, does not mean that the project focused on problems which have been disregarded until now. Although the issue of the infl uence of ’68 generation’ both in Poland and the FRG on the Polish-German relations appears in the study, a further analysis is required as it does not constitute the main focus. The changes in culture, with a specifi c focus on political culture, and their infl uence on Polish-German relations should also be further analysed. During the project two volumes of Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki (The Polish-German Yearbookl) were published. They contained elaborations on the ongoing study. The fi rst volume (number 18) was published in 2010 and contained materials from a conference “1968 – A breakthrough in the East and West” which was co-organised with the German Historical Institute in Warsaw. The second volume (number 20), published in 2012, constituted a summary of the project. Both volumes contained not only elaborations, but also source materials of the concerned problems. The source materials include documents, published by Wanda Jarząbek, which concern FRG’s reaction to the March events, the military intervention in Czechoslovakia, and the evaluation of their infl uence on the situation in the Eastern bloc and the Polish-German relations. The source materials also include Polish diplomatic information about reactions in the FRG concerning the intervention in Czechoslovakia, published by Piotr Madajczyk, and also a sample of texts and caricatures found in Polish newspapers, published by Joanna Szymoniczek. To the reader 9

Furthermore, in 2012, Madajczyk published a book entitled Cień roku ’68 (Shadow of the Year 1968) which constitutes a wider elaboration on reactions in the FRG to the events in Poland. It brings together two different perspectives, historical and archival. The former constitutes German evaluation of the events in Poland, which is based on press articles and reports of the FRG’s Business Representation in Warsaw. The latter analyses press articles which appeared in subsequent years in Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Der Spigel and Die Zeit. We do hope that our materials are of great interest and will play an important role in the discussion of the signiﬁ cance of the year 1968.

Wanda Jarząbek, Piotr Madajczyk, Joanna Szymoniczek

Wanda Jarząbek

The impact of the events of 1968 and their effects on Polish-German political relations between 1968 and 2008. Domestic and international aspects

Introduction

The year 1968 is often regarded in scholarly literature as a year of events which, on the one hand, were themselves the result of transformations taking place in the societies of the time, while, on the other hand, they contributed to their further transformations. Some researchers regard them as one of the ‘revolutions’, a date of symbolic signiﬁ cance for the world’s history1. Though the changes in Eastern and Western Europe were not identical, this does not mean that they had no features in common2. In 1968, the crisis of communist authority

1 Wolfgang Kraushaar, 1968 als Mythos, Chiffre und Zäsur, Hamburg 2000; Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492– 1992, Oxford 1993. 2 1968. The World Transformed, Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert and Detlef Junker (eds.), Washington 1998, i.a. articles by Stuart Halwig, “The Revolt against Establishment: Students versus the Press in West Germany and Italy”; Gerd-Rainer Horn, “The Changing 12 Wanda Jarząbek in Eastern Europe once again came to the surface. In West European states, in turn, criticism of their political and social systems, not infrequently of far-reaching genesis and with strongly rooted structures, came about. Another facet of the year 1968 is related to changes in mores, a rejection of traditional systems of morality and values. Interest in issues related to the protection of the environment began to rise, movements and, in time, green parties emerged, which introduced issues that had previously been absent from traditional politics. In the case of some Western countries, new forms of terrorism emerged as one of the effects of the events of 1968, of a fascination with the revolutionary slogans of the Chinese and South American versions of Marxism and of the popularity of Mao Zedong and Che Guevara, respectively. It should be remembered, however, that in the case of the organisation known as Kommune I, which was formed in 1967, appeals for using violence occured. In the same year, strong protests against the visit of Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, were held in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)3. In the global perspective, the year 1968 was perceived in terms of modernising factors, setting out a new course for social and political life. In the FRG, it also brought about a new wave of settling accounts with the National Socialist past.

Nature of the European Working Class: The Rise and Fall of the `New Working Class` (France, Italy, Spain, Czechoslovakia)”; Eva Maleck-Lewy, Bernhard Maleck, “The Women’s Movement in East and West Germany”. See also: Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften, Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried and Karl Christian Lammers (eds.), Hamburg 2000; Paul Berman, A Tale of Two Utopias, The Political Journey of the Generation of 1968, New York 1996; Mark Kurlansky, 1968: The Year that Rocked the World, New York 2004. 3 Stefan Aust, “Terrorism in Germany: The Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon”, in: Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, No. 43, 2008; Bruce Hoffman, “Putting German Terrorism in Perspective: An American Response”, ibidem; Jeremy Varon, “Refusing to be a ’Good German’: New Left Violence as a Global Phenomenon”, ibidem. Federal Republic of Germany – ofﬁ cial name of the country, used in PRP until 1972. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 13

Generational changes and the entering into adult life of those born in the period after the Second World War were a factor common to both the events in the East and in the widely understood West, as well as in some developing countries. Almost everywhere this was also related to the manifestation of the discontent of the middle-aged generation, which had limited career opportunities; in the case of the Eastern bloc, the careers in question were pursued within the communist party apparatus. The issues related to the role of generations, including that of 1968, are much better described in the Western literature than in the case of its Polish counterpart4. The signifi cance of the events of 1968 may be observed both in the short-term and the long-term perspective. This also applies to their impact on Polish-German relations. In the short-term perspective, the European and Polish events of 1968 infl uenced the West German approach to the normalisation of relationships with the Eastern bloc countries and the Polish reception of the German Ostpolitik, as well as the leeway of the then Polish authorities. The consequences of the events of 1968 included issues related to the mutual perception of the Poles and Germans. The new generation, the 1968 generation, which, in time, began to play an even more important role in the cultural, social and political life of the FRG and Poland and in the media, also contributed new forms of perceiving reality and, not infrequently, different value systems to all the aforesaid fi elds.

4 Heinz Bude, Das Altern eine Generation: Die Jahrgänge 1938 bis 1948, Frankfurt a.M. 1995; Ronald Fraser, 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt, New York 1988; Habbo Knoch, “Gefühlte Gemeinschaften Bild und Generation in der Moderne” (particularly Section V: “Mythische Opferbilder: Die Rückkehr des kultischen Moments 1968”), in: Generationen. Zur Relevanz eines wissenschaftlischen Grundbegriffs, Ulrike Jureit and Michael Wildt (eds.), Hamburg 2008; Tobias Mündermann, Die 68er ...und was aus ihnen geworden ist, Münich 1988; Luisa Passerini, Autobiography of a Generation: Italy, 1968, Hanover 1996. 14 Wanda Jarząbek

Immediate consequences of the events of 1968

In the spring of 1968, Warsaw was determined to make its policy more dynamic, not only in respect of international security but also in respect of the German issue, and, as many indications suggest, it began to conclude that its stance with regard to bilateral relationships with Germany had to be modiﬁ ed5. The diplomatic talks conducted by the Polish diplomats and politicians in 1967 indicated that, while Poland managed in a sense to block the possibility of the countries of the Eastern bloc to start negotiations regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG on the basis of their own interests, where the interests in question were, not infrequently, not only not identical with those of Warsaw, but, according to the then Polish authorities, contrary to the latter, and to force them to accept the conclusions of the Warsaw Pact conference of February 1967, which is to say, the ﬁ ve pre-conditions for establishing diplomatic relations with Bonn, which included the acknowledgement of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a second German state, the acknowledgement of the existing borders in Europe and of the border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers, acknowledging the Munich treaties in respect of Czechoslovakia as null and void ex tunc and the FRG’s renouncing of possession nuclear weapons. The drawing up of the conditions did not in the least mean that the Soviet bloc countries discontinued their talks with FRG, but, rather, that they were all seeking for ways to get around the decisions taken

5 Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych [Archive of the MSZ, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hereinafter: AMSZ], Departament Studiów i Programowania [Department of Studies and Programming, hereinafter DSiP], zespół (fond, hereinafter: z) 57/77, wiązka (bundle, hereinafter: w) 1, „Notatka dotycząca potrzeby wzmożenia działalności krajów socjalistycznych na rzecz bezpieczeństwa europejskiego” [Memo regarding the need to intensify the socialist countries’ activity in respect of European security] 5 March 1968. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 15 in a manner which raised doubts. Also the Kremlin conducted talks with Bonn on the exchange of declarations on the renunciation of force, Budapest maintained its own contacts with Bonn and, following the change in the position of the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Alexander Dubček’s assumption of that function, Prague seemed to be more prone to undertake bilateral contacts. This could have implied the isolation of the PRP within the bloc. Political talks conducted with Western politicians and diplomats resulted in Warsaw’s assessment that the freezing of contacts with the FRG for a longer period would not be possible, particularly bearing in mind that a climate of détente was continuing to grow in both the U.S. and Europe and that Warsaw was clearly being persuaded to make a move in its policy toward Germany.

1968 and the room of manoeuvre of the PRP’s diplomacy

The events of March 1968 in the PRP and the PRP’s participation in the suppression of the Prague Spring have both been the topic of numerous studies in Poland, albeit that they have generally focused on the domestic dimension and neither their relation to the position of the then Polish state in international relations nor the impact of these events on Polish-German relations have been subjected to scrutiny6.

6 On 1968, vide, i.a., Jerzy Eisler, Polski rok 1968 [The Polish Year 1968], Warszawa 2006; Włodzimierz Suleja, Dolnośląski marzec ’68 [March ‘68 in Lower Silesia], Warszawa 2006; Marta Fik, Marcowa kultura. Wokół „Dziadów”. Literaci i władza. Kampania marcowa [Culture in March. Around ‘The Forefathers’. Writers and Power. The March Campaign], Warszawa 1995; Tadeusz Pióro; “Czystki w Wojsku Polskim 1967– –1968” [Purges in the Polish Armed Forces, 1967–1968], in: Więź [Ties], No. 6, 1998; Dariusz Stola, Kampania ‘antysyjonistyczna’ w Polsce 1967–1968 [The ‘Anti-Zionist’ Campaign in Poland], Warszawa 2000. For 1968 at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Włodzimierz Borodziej, “Dyplomacja PRL w i wobec Marca” [The PRP’s Diplomacy in and with Regard to March], in: Marzec 1968 trzydzieści lat później [March 1968, Thirty Years On], Marcin Kula, Piotr Osęka and Marcin Zaremba (eds.), vol. 1, Warszawa 1998, 16 Wanda Jarząbek

It was amidst the atmosphere of widespread anticipation with which the international milieu awaited the new opening in the FRG’s relations with the Eastern countries and the subsequent steps in the policy of détente, that, in Poland, disturbances occurred at the highest level of power. The events of March 1968 in the PRP primarily infl uenced the domestic determinants of the foreign policy7. The infi ghting in the highest ranks of power resulted in a weakening of the centre of decision-making. The effect of the in-house score-settling, which led to purges at the ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), was that the capacity to plan and launch initiatives was lost, while the staff were preoccupied fi rst and foremost with protecting their jobs. In April 1968, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Rapacki, submitted his resignation. Formally, it was only accepted in December, but by April he had already stopped coming to the offi ce. The departure of Rapacki had an impact on the perception of Poland abroad. He was highly experienced, enjoyed a certain respect and had many personal contacts. To some observers, taking into account the conditions in the bloc, he was also a symbol of a sui generis independence of thinking in the creators of the PRP’s foreign policy. At that time, the anti-Semitic elements of the events of March had no major impact from the point of view of the reaction in the third countries. At the government level, they maintained restraint; on the other hand, negative comments in respect p. 87 and ff.; on taking part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia: Leszek Pajórek, Polska a ’Praska Wiosna’. Udział Wojska Polskiego w interwencji zbrojnej w Czechosłowacji w 1968 roku [Poland and the `Prague Spring`. The Polish Armed Forces’ Participation in the Armed Intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968], Warszawa 1998. 7 Wanda Jarząbek, “Wpływ wydarzeń 1968 r. na politykę zagraniczną PRL” [The Impact of the Events of 1968 on the PRP’s Foreign Policy], in: Dzieje Najnowsze [Contemporary History], No. 1, 2008; eadem, “Zagraniczne reakcje na wydarzenia polskiego Marca 1968 roku w raportach polskich dyplomatów” [Foreign Reactions to the Events of the Polish March of 1968 in the Reports of Polish Diplomats], in: Marzec’68 z czterdziestoletniej perspektywy [March’68, as Seen Forty Years on], Danuta Kisielewicz and Małgorzata Świder (eds.), Opole 2009. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 17 of the PRP appeared in the media. It seems that almost all the observers were interested in whether any changes would occur in the communist establishment and regarded these events as a form of power struggle8. Those countries such as France, for instance, which performed an important role in the PRP’s foreign policy and with which more advanced contacts were maintained, did not intend to forgo them. After March, Paris continued to conduct talks with Warsaw regarding the planned visit by the fi rst secretary of the Communist party, Władysław Gomułka, in the French capital. Their discontinuation in June 1968 resulted from domestic changes in France; however, by early July, Paris was insisting on a speedy undertaking of bilateral consultations, which were held in the French capital on 11th and 12th of July9. In the process of these consultations, the Deputy Foreign Minister, Adam Kruczkowski, had the impression that France remained interested in maintaining contacts with Warsaw and other countries of Europe. Warsaw, on its part, continued talks in respect of disarmament10. Interest in the arrangements regarding partial disarmament measures was noticed in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and the Benelux countries. For Warsaw, this topic was important because, from the 1950s onwards,

8 Ibidem. See also: Jacek Tebinka, Nadzieje i rozczarowania. Polityka Wielkiej Brytanii wobec Polski 1956–1970 [Hopes and Disenchantments. Britain’s Policy toward Poland 1956–1970], Warszawa 2005, p. 319; Jakub Tyszkiewicz, Rozkołysana polska łódź. Dyplomacja i wywiad amerykański wobec Marca’68 [The Polish Boat Rocked. American Intelligence and Diplomacy toward March ’68], Toruń 2006, p. 85 and ff. 9 AMSZ, z. 17, w. 122, teczka (volume, hereinafter: t.) 15, “Pilna notatka z konsultacji polsko-francuskich w Paryżu” [Urgent memo from the Polish-French consultations in Paris], 11–12. July. A. Kruczkowski, 13 July 1968. 10 AMSZ, Gabinet Ministra, Kancelaria Tajna Specjalnego Znaczenia [Cabinet of the Minister, Top Secret Mail Offi ce, hereinafter: GM KTSZ; the documents were put in order; however, a part of them was also disposed of in the process; there is also no concordance, so the reference numbers from the handover/acceptance protocols are thus used], z. 1/77, w. 17, “Pilna notatka. Plan dalszej naszej akcji w sprawie bezpieczeństwa europejskiego” [Urgent memo. Plan of our further action regarding European security], J. Winiewicz, 2 May 1968. 18 Wanda Jarząbek it had consistently treated disarmament issues as a part of its German policy. In the case of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Warsaw also considered refraining from ratifi cation of the Treaty until it had been ratifi ed by the FRG11. In the diplomatic reports and analyses drawn up at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, considerable attention was paid to the FRG’s reactions to the events of 1968 in the PRP. It could be deemed surprising that, in accordance with the spirit of the then commentaries in the Polish communist press, the linkage between the activity of the FRG and Israel also emerges in the MFA’s memos12. Bearing in mind that the events in Poland caused considerable interest in West Berlin, a signifi cant role was performed by the PRP’s Military Mission there, which attempted to talk to the ‘friendly milieus’, which is to say, mostly the communist ones, in order to persuade them to to present the offi cial, Warsaw’s interpretation of the event. The Mission also attempted to conduct talks with the politicians of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD), hoping that some of them would be highly interested in looking for an opportunity to come to an understanding with Poland and would be inclined to comprehend Warsaw’s ‘reasons’, it is government’s that time policy13. The critical

11 AMSZ, GM KTSZ, z. 1/77, w. 17, “Pilna notatka. Konsultacja kierownictwa naszego Dep. Międzynarodowych Organizacji w Moskwie” [Urgent memo. Consultation of the executives of our Department of International Organisations in Moscow], J. Winiewicz, 20 September 1968. 12 AMSZ, Departament (Department) IV (hereinafter: Dep. IV), z. 22/75, w. 9, “Pilna notatka dot. antypolskiej kampanii propagandowej za granicą”, [Urgent memo regarding the anti-Polish propaganda campaign abroad], A. Kruczkowski, 29 April 1968. Regarding the press, vide, i.a.: Anna B. Jarosz, “Marzec w prasie” [March in the Press], in: Marzec 1968 trzydzieści lat później..., vol. 1, p. 99 and ff. In 1967, Tadeusz Walichnowski published his notorious pamphlet Izrael a RFN [Israel and the FRG], Warszawa 1967, linking the activity of these two states. 13 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/75, w. 6, letter from the Head of the Military Mission to the MFA’s Department of Press and Information, 10 April 1968; letter from the Head of the Military Mission to the MFA’s Department of Press and Information 24 April 1968; Dep. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 19 assessments of the March events, emerging mostly in the FRG’s media, were explained in many ways, often by the rapprochement between the FRG and Israel, motivated, as was pointed out, by, inter alia, economic reasons on the part of Tel Aviv, and by the activity of the Jewish milieus. It was also suggested that the reactions in the FRG were aimed at disavowing from the Germans and Germany responsibility for the Holocaust and war crimes14. In memos from the Polish Commercial Representative Ofﬁ ce in Cologne, attention was drawn to the cautious attitude of the German governmental milieus, often interpreting it, in fact, as a diplomatic manoeuvre consisting of attempting to retain, as phrased in one of them,‘the appearances of neutrality’ as regards the hopes attached to the Ostpolitik15. Also observed, as if, in a way, on the margin of the events in the PRP, was the pointing of a part of the German political class to Warsaw’s sui generis ‘inﬁ ltration’ in the FRG by, for example, the Zgoda (Unity) Union of Poles, the Society for Economic and Cultural Cooperation in Düsseldorf, and the Polish press correspondents, who were to ‘inspire’ the activity of the extra- -parliamentary opposition in the FRG16. The military intervention of the Warsaw Treaty, including the PRP, in Czechoslovakia turned out to be a factor which had a distinct impact

IV, z. 22/75, w. 4, abstract of a memo from the PRP’s Military Mission in West Berlin regarding Zionist activities in the GFR and the current aspects of GFR-Israel relations, 12 July 1968. 14 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/75, w. 6, letter from the Head of the Military Mission to the MFA’s Department of Press and Information 10 April 1968 and an abstract of a memo from the PRP’s Military Mission in West Berlin regarding Zionist activities in the FRG and the current aspects of FRG-Israel relations, 12 July 1968. 15 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/75, w. 6, “Syjonizm a działalność antypolska w NRF” [Zionism and anti-Polish activities in the GFR], covering letter of 3 June 1968. 16 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/76, w. 3, “Notatka dotycząca antypolskiej kampanii w NRF i w Berlinie Zachodnim na podstawie informacji Misji Wojskowej w PRL z końca czerwca br.” [Memo regarding the anti-Polish campaign in the GFR and West Berlin, based on information from the PRP’s Military Mission in late June this year], A. Willmann, 8 July 1968. 20 Wanda Jarząbek on the curbing of the East-West dialogue and signiﬁ cantly restricted the PRP’s diplomatic opportunities. It occurred on 20th August, which is to say, on the day after the USSR had agreed to commence the strategic limitations talks which were expected to lead to the Brezhnev-Johnson summit. The USSR probably thought that declaring a willingness to undertake the talks would prompt the Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration, which was interested in talks with Moscow, to be more tolerant of its conduct; the situation in Vietnam was also taken into account in this thinking. These calculations, however, fell far short of the mark17. The US was forced to react by freezing the announced talks, both because of the domestic reception and for reasons of international policy. Both sides were, nonetheless, willing to undertake a dialogue; therefore, by as early as December 1968, during the NATO ministerial session, the US, as well as Belgium, which was involved in work on a disarmament plan for Europe and preparation for a conference on European security, announced that they were in favour of returning to the talks. In early January 1969, Richard Nixon took power in the US. He was also interested in détente, which he understood not as an objective in itself, but as a tool to reach an agreement with the USSR on the most important issues, including those of disarmament and the war in Vietnam18. From the beginning of 1969, Nixon made it clear that he wanted negotiations, rather than a confrontation, to be the symbol of his administration19. Immediately after the entry of the Warsaw Treaty states’ armies into Czechoslovakia, the Western states reacted by freezing their dialogue with the participants in the intervention, including the PRP.

17 Warren I. Cohen, Introduction, in: Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World. American Foreign Policy, 1963–1968, Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Trucker (eds.), Cambridge 1994, p. 7. 18 Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Washington DC 1994, p. 5. 19 Andrzej Mania, Détente i polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec Europy Wschodniej, styczeń 1969 – styczeń 1981 [Détente and the US Policy toward East Europe, January 1969 – January 1981], Kraków 2003, p. 35. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 21

This also pertained to those directly involved in the talks; for instance, post-August, French diplomacy hinted that it would be possible to re-commence the political dialogue after the military operation in Czechoslovakia was brought to an end20. Relations with Great Britain cooled as well. London considered steps of symbolic signifi cance, such as cancelling an athletics competition, blocking the sales of fi lms offered by Polish television and suspending the exhibition of works of art from Polish museums. The actual implementation of this rather spectacular retortion generally failed21. In the case of the US, no serious deterioration of political relationships materialised, although diplomatic contacts were minimised. In discussions, the PRP’s diplomats attempted to explain the motives for this action, resorting, in fact, to the arguments also quoted at the time by the press, and thus referring to the threat concerning Czechoslovakia’s pulling out of the Eastern bloc. Nevertheless, in a manner not dissimilar to that displayed after March 1968, this time, too, no Western country resolved to apply any more severe sanctions, such as, for instance, suspending economic cooperation with the PRP. This certainly sprang from their own economic interests and their willingness to enter the Eastern Europe markets. The principal reason for such an approach was the acceptance of the geopolitical realities, which included the post Second World War division of the world into infl uence zones, whereby Poland was a satellite of Moscow with limited opportunities for acting independently. As a matter of fact, the Kremlin’s special rights in its zone were tacitly acknowledged. It was primarily the extra- -parliamentary groups and the intellectuals who protested in Western

20 AMSZ, z. 17, w. 17, t. 130, “Pilna notatka z rozmowy w dniu 29 sierpnia br. z ambasadorem Francji A. Waplerem z jego inicjatywy” [Urgent memo from a conversation with the French ambassador, A. Wapler, at his initiative, on 29 August this year], A. Willmann, 30 August 1968. 21 Jacek Tebinka, Nadzieje i rozczarowania..., pp. 332–333. 22 Wanda Jarząbek countries. There was, as well, a strong belief that it was necessary to undertake a dialogue with the East, which, according to some researchers, was also related to the consequences of the events of 1968 in Western Europe and the US. This resulted, on the one hand, from the shifting of political sympathies to the left and, on the other hand, from the acceptance of the existing geopolitical order22. The articulation of what was known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, which is to say, a doctrine proclaiming the limited sovereignty of the Eastern bloc countries, was an important element of the events related to the Prague Spring. Such a doctrine existed de facto as an unwritten principle shaping the relationships within the bloc earlier, as exempliﬁ ed by the USSR’s intervention in defence of ‘socialism’ in Hungary in 1956. This time, however, it took on a new quality, bearing in mind that other countries of the bloc also took part in the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Moscow resolved to intervene, the costs notwithstanding, regarding the move as an element of disciplining its zone of inﬂ uence and taking some leaders, too independent for its liking, to task, as well as making the West realise that nothing changes and that, in any contacts with the bloc, it cannot be bypassed23. The articulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine was to be a sui generis warning on the part of Moscow and to spare it the need to resort to such drastic measures in order to maintain its empire and its dependencies in the future. Some countries returned to contacts on the ministerial level quite soon. In October 1968, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Winiewicz, while returning home from the annual UN General Assembly, stopped in Paris in order to meet the French Minister of

22 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente, Cambridge 2003. 23 Wanda Jarząbek, PRL w politycznych strukturach Układu Warszawskiego w latach 1955–1980 [The PRP in the Political Structures of the Warsaw Treaty in 1955–1980], Warszawa 2008, p. 35 and ff.; Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy, Chapel Hill and London, 2003, p. 36 and ff. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 23

Foreign Affairs, Michel Debré. Winiewicz pointed out that, on the part of the PRP, there was “satisfaction with the part of Debré’s address at the UN which, in reference to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR) affair, emphasised that, in the post-war Europe, accomplished facts had occurred which should be acknowledged by Germany”24. According to the Polish deputy minister, Minister Debré assured him that both the policy of détente and that aimed at the development of relations with Poland would be continued. He was working to persuade Warsaw to consider undertaking talks with the FRG. He also gave his assurance that, in their talks with the FRG, the French politicians were maintaining that the border had to be recognised. The Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hervé Alphand, attempted to learn what the consequences of the proclaiming of a doctrine of limited sovereignty for the countries of the bloc were and whether it would mean “the end of any possibility of France’s direct dialogue with, for example, Poland”25. His question resulted from apprehensions not only shared in France. He expressed satisfaction with Winiewicz’s statement to the effect that Warsaw continued to be interested in developing bilateral relations and gave repeated assurances that “French policy continues to be aimed at opposing the concept of the two permanent blocs, which not only makes it possible for Paris to eliminate, inter alia, American inﬂ uences in Europe and to restrain the strength of the FRG impact, but also gives de Gaulle’s France the opportunity of playing an independent role. This is why it wants a weakened NATO, in order to encourage the socialist countries to ‘think in the terms of pan-European concepts’ as well”26. France and other Western states

24 AMSZ, GM KTSZ, z. 1/77, w. 17, “Pilna notatka. Rozmowy paryskie z Debré i Alphandem 24 i 25 bm” [Urgent memo. The Paris talks with Debré and Alphand on 24 and 25 this month], J. Winiewicz, 30 October 1968. 25 Ibidem. 26 Ibidem. 24 Wanda Jarząbek were taking a cautious approach to any talks with Moscow’s satellites, nonetheless, because of an apprehension about the Kremlin’s reaction. Winiewicz noted that “Alphand referred to a talk between Willy Brandt and Andrei Gromyko in a less clear manner, albeit with a subtext. Was that a new phase of the Soviet-German dialogue? A new Rapallo, which spells nothing but ill for France”27? The Rapallo syndrome was also present in the Polish thinking. The 5th Congress of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) in November 1968 played an important role from the point of view of the PRP and its foreign policy. What it signifi ed was a certain stabilisation of the power arrangements. Władysław Gomułka remained the fi rst Secretary and enjoyed ostentatious support from Brezhnev28. It cannot be ruled out that, in view of the events in Czechoslovakia, those in power in the USSR wanted no signifi cant changes in Poland. Despite the problems resulting from Gomułka’s conduct, he seemed to be a more reliable partner and, at the very least, a known one. Perhaps no decision had been yet made as to who was to succeed him. The results of the 5th Congress were perceived as unambiguous support for him on Brezhnev’s part. The Americans supposed, however, that, had it not been for the events in Czechoslovakia, Gomułka might not have survived 196829. In autumn 1968, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs returned to the implementation of its suspended projects. The hope was that the developing international dialogue would make their presentation

27 Ibidem. 28 Jerzy Eisler, Polski rok..., p. 621. 29 Centralna Agencja Wywiadowcza. Specjalny Raport Dyrektoriatu Wywiadu Przegląd Tygodniowy z 1 listopada 1968 [The Central Intelligence Agency. Special Report, Directorate of Intelligence, Weekly Review, 1 November 1968] and a telegram, “Pozycja Gomułki i walka o władzę”, [Gomulka’s position and the struggle for power], the Embassy in Warsaw to the State Department, 13 March 1969, in: Jakub Tyszkiewicz, Rozkołysana..., p. 153 and ff., 171 and ff. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 25 easier. From the late 1968 and early 1969, an increase in the number of bilateral contacts could be seen. The question thus arises as to what degree the changes in personnel at the MFA inﬂ uenced the quality of its work. This is not an easy question. In principle, the dismissals had not reached those who steered the issues, most important from the point of view of the then authorities, which is to say, German affairs and international security, even if they belonged to the ‘old guard’, such as, for instance, Winiewicz, or to the disarmament experts. This guaranteed the continuity of not only studies and conceptual work, but also of some aspects of the diplomatic tactics.

Grasping the nettle. The PRP’s German policy in 1969

The PRP’s diplomats noticed that with the beginning of 1969 the interest of the Western states in re-commencing the political dialogue with the Eastern bloc countries intensiﬁ ed. In a memo from the Bureau of Studies of the Polish MFA explaining why it was necessary to undertake diplomatic action, it was pointed out, inter alia, that the Western countries, particularly the FRG, may seize the initiative in respect of the European conference. This might lead to “the focusing of both the public opinion and the governments of the West European countries on concepts inconvenient to us”30. Poland was worried that

30 AMSZ, DSiP, z. 60/77, w. 1, “Projekt ew. akcji dyplomatycznej w sprawie europejskiej konferencji nt. bezpieczeństwa i współpracy w Europie” [A project of a possible diplomatic action regarding the European conference on security and cooperation], Z. Ludwiczak, A. Skowroński, 13 February 1969; Wanda Jarząbek, Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie. Plany i rzeczywistość 1964– –1975 [Poland vis-à-vis the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Plans and the Reality, 1960–1975], Warszawa 2008, p. 34 and ff.; eadem, Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa wobec polityki wschodniej Republiki Federalnej Niemiec w latach 1969–1976. Wymiar dwustronny i międzynarodowy [The People’s Republic of Poland vis-à-vis the Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1969–1976. Bilateral and International Perspective], Warszawa 2011, p. 131 and ff. 26 Wanda Jarząbek the Western concepts would not accord enough space to the issues of the territorial status quo and that they would be approached in a manner unsatisfactory to Warsaw, while the process would be dominated by issues related to the improvement of the climate in international relations. The authors also pointed to the growing interest in European issues in the United States and, in particular, to a document entitled Toward the reconciliation of Europe: New approaches for the U.S., the UN, and NATO; A report.31, which was drawn up by Theodore Sorensen, a former advisor to President Lyndon B. Johnson, an expert on international relations advising President Richard Nixon. It included an idea which envisaged the conference of the Great Powers setting up a commission consisting of ten states, with both German states numbering among them, the aim of which would be to carry out a debate on the issues related to European security. The report was thought to reﬂ ect, in part, the approach of the new Nixon administration to Europe. Commencing the conference proceedings in this manner would fail to guarantee Poland’s participation, considered by the PRP’s authorities to be paramount, while the hope of Poland’s being included among the ten states which were to set the tone of the talks were not very optimistic32. Warsaw had no expectations of anything which it might view as a positive turn in the US policy from the swearing-in of President Nixon in January 196933. It was noted that, on the one hand, the new US President was attempting to modify relations with those European countries demanding a more signiﬁ cant political role and to have their aspirations taken into account; however, on the other hand, as far as policy towards the USSR and Eastern Europe was concerned, the

31 UNA USA, New York 1969. 32 Ibidem. 33 AMSZ, Zespół Depesze (Dispaches, hereinafter: Z.D). z. 6/77, w. 242, t. 1117, coded telegram from Washington, Michałowski to Bejm, 4 February 1969. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 27

US was much more cautious. In 1969, Nixon travelled to Europe34, where he spoke of plans to hold talks with the USSR and announced consultations with the allies on bilateral talks with that country. Watching the ever more marked willingness to look for ways of communicating between the East and West, Warsaw intensiﬁ ed its work on the concept of a European conference35. Bearing in mind that the FRG continued to base its Ostpolitik on the concept of signing the treaties on the renunciation of force, it was suggested that “the problem of the renunciation of force in relations between the European states should be approached in such a manner as to make it impossible for the GFR to create additional possibilities to manoeuvre/attempt to use the dialogue with the USSR as an element of pressure to be placed on us [...]”36. Unsuccessful efforts were also undertaken with a view to having Warsaw’s concept taken into account in the bloc’s joint documents, which were to be approved by the PAC at its session in Budapest37. In the end, the Budapest Appeal, adopted on 17th March 1969, included a statement that “one of the fundamental premises for ensuring European security is the inviolability of the borders existing in Europe,

34 Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej, Biuro Udostępniania [Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance, Ofﬁ ce for the Preservation and Dissemination of Archival Records, hereinafter: AIPN BU], 02958/545, “Pilna notatka. Wstępna ocena europejskiej wizyty Nixona” [Urgent memo. Initial assessment of the Nixon’s European visit], R. Frąckiewicz, 6 March 1969. For the policy of the new administration, vide, i.a. Joan Hoff-Wilson, “Nixingerism: NATO, and Détente”, in: Diplomatic History, No. 4, 1989, p. 501 and ff. 35 AMSZ, GM KTSZ, z. 1/77 UW, w. 16, “Pilna notatka. Tezy do rozmów w sprawie bezpieczeństwa europejskiego. Pismo przewodnie S. Jędrychowskiego” [Urgent memo. Points for talks on European security. Covering letter by S. Jędrychowski], 13 March 1969. 36 Ibidem. 37 AIPN, BU O2958/545, “Pilna notatka dotycząca projektów komunikatu i apelu posiedzenia Doradczego Komitetu Politycznego Państw – Stron Układu Warszawskiego” [Urgent memo regarding draft communiqués and the appeal from the sitting of Political Advisory Committee of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty], S. Jędrychowski, 12 March 1969. 28 Wanda Jarząbek including the border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse, as well as the border between the GDR and GFR [...]”38. In view of the interest in so called ‘policy of movement’, a new opening, on the part of Moscow and the other countries of the bloc, it was found undesirable for the appeal to include any more stringent accents or any so-called ‘difﬁ cult’ demands. For the West, the bloc’s proposals were unclear, but the interest in dialogue was strong, albeit that many Western diplomats continued to be apprehensive about conducting any more active policy towards the East; this, however, pertained to Moscow’s satellites rather than to the USSR itself39. From the point of view of Polish-German relations, in the FRG, despite a sui generis discomfort resulting from the intervention in Czechoslovakia, both the Foreign Minister, Willy Brandt, and the Chancellor, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, gave assurance, in their statement of 25th August, that they were willing to continue West Germany’s policy of relaxation of tension. It was understood that it could no longer be the same policy as before. Doubts also emerged in some political circles as to whether it would be possible for the Ostpolitik to be continued at all, because the USSR was considered to have become hostile to it40. The very validity of applying the term Ostpolitik was pondered over, with being pointed out that, in the case of some of the Eastern bloc countries, it was perceived unfavourably, bearing in mind the unpleasant connotations such as, for example, its association with

38 “Zbiór Dokumentów” [Collected Documents], No. 3, 1969, p. 353 and ff. 39 Vide, e.g., Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes (hereinafter: PA AA), Bestand (foud, hereinafter: B). 42, Band (Bd.) 1328, “Gespräch Bundesminister des Auswärtigen mit belgischen Auβenminister Harmel”, 29 April 1969; PA AA, B. 42, Bd. 1328, Zusammentreffen des Herrn Staatssekretärs mit dem amerikanischen Auβenminister Rogers, 12 September 1969. 40 Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Depositum Bahr, Box 399, Aufzeichnung. Betr. Überlegungen des Planungstab nach der Besetzung der CSSR, 6 September 1968. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 29

Drang nach Osten. A suggestion was put forward to the effect that other designations be used more frequently, with a preference for the term ‘the German peace policy’ (Deutsche Friedenspolitik), which had an added advantage inasmuch as such a policy also pertained to the Western world. In time, the term Friedenspolitik was to become a commonly used phrase with regard to Willy Brandt’s foreign policy, particularly in the FRG. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Brandt in 1971 also certainly contributed to this41. In a memo to Brandt of 11 September, Egon Bahr pointed to the psychological consequences of the Czechoslovakian events, namely, an increased sense of living under a threat in the West and in West Germany and the emergence of opinions that, under the rights of the Four Powers, the USSR might also intervene, for instance, in the case of West Berlin42. He thus formed new priorities. He thought that the Ostpolitik should lead to the closing of contentious issues, including, fi rst and foremost, the settlement of the status of West Berlin, albeit noting that this may also be diffi cult because the three Western powers were of the opinion that leaving the matter open was occasionally benefi cial to them or may turn out to be so. Berlin might thus become a tool, both in the case of Moscow and in that of Paris, London and Washington and it could not be ruled out that a decision taken by the Great Powers would prove not to be identical with the German interest. Bahr thought that the situation remaining as a result of the war, whereby the FRG was not vested with full rights in international relations, had to be ended. This was the objective that the Ostpolitik was to serve and this was why it should be continued. He tried to refute the allegations

41 PA AA, B. 41, Bd. 1053, Verwendung des Begriffs “Ostpolitik”, 19 November 1968, Alternativen zu der Bezeichnung “Ostpolitik”, n.d. 42 “Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Bahr”, 11 September 1968, in: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (hereinafter: AAPD) 1968, doc. 293, p. 1132. 30 Wanda Jarząbek that the Ostpolitik, conducted improperly, which is to say, the attempts to reach an understanding with particular states of the Eastern bloc, treated as independent entities, raised concerns in Moscow as to the extent of its control over its satellites’ policy while, in the countries of the bloc, it would give rise to unnecessary illusions and hopes43. With regard to such suggestions, Bahr noted in one of his position papers that, after the events in Czechoslovakia, an erroneous impression had arisen to the effect that there was that country and, in a wider sense, Central-East Europe, which he referred to as Zwischen-Europa (Europe-in-between) the main object of Ostpolitik, although it was, in fact, aimed ﬁ rst at the USSR, followed by the GDR44. He conﬁ rmed in a conversation that the term Zwischen-Europa, which seemed to refer to the concept of Mitteleuropa, had been applied deliberately and expressed, inter alia, his belief that there was no unity in the bloc and that its countries have opinions of their own. In the case of Poland, it was Rapacki’s policy and the Polish bishops’ letter to the German bishops in 1965 which provided the testimony that the country was willing to maintain and demonstrate its separate identity. They were, he said, ‘rays of hope’ that a Polish-German reconciliation was possible45. Bahr also pointed out that Moscow played instrumentally upon the FRG and SPD’s political and diplomatic activity in the countries of Central Europe. Evidence for this included the fact that the issue of France’s Eastern policy did not surface in the bloc’s propaganda. He wrote with irony that, following in-depth studies, the USSR leadership would have had to come to the conclusion that the FRG’s

43 Vide: editorial note to “Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Bahr”, Betr. „Ostpolitik nach der Besetzung der CSSR”, 1 October 1968, in: AAPD 1968, doc. 324, p. 1278 and ff. . 44 “Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Bahr”, ibidem 45 Egon Bahr in conversation with the author, 7 December 2010. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 31 bargaining position had strengthened and that its political infl uence on the approaches to the USSR, for he used military terms to describe the Soviet zone of infl uence in Europe, carried more weight than French nuclear weapons46. He was of the opinion that it was the sense of threat to its own interests, the result of the diplomatic offensive on the part of the FRG, which had prompted Moscow to undertake efforts aimed at strengthening the cohesiveness of the bloc. According to the countries of Zwischen-Europa, in Bahr’s opinion, it was risky, because after the events in Czechoslovakia, their room for manoeuvre had become restricted, they themselves had also become more cautious and, bearing in mind that an active policy on the part of the FRG could bring about many risky moments, it might also imply potential complications in that state’s relations with its allies, which is to say, the states of NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC). According to Bahr, the remaining option was to give priority to relations with the USSR, which hinted at the necessity of undertaking talks on the re-establishment of bilateral relations. On the other hand, he did not consider it right to forgo entirely either the policy of submitting proposals (Politik des Angebots) suited to their interests to particular countries of the bloc, or, by the same token, tailoring the Ostpolitik on a country-by-country basis, and individualising it. He thus thought that, while a change in the status quo in Europe, in other words, the overcoming of the partition of Germany, remained the main objective of German policy, the achievement of the latter might be served by some form of acceptance of the former, assuming that it would be no more than a temporary acceptance. He thought primarily of fi nding a form of recognition of the GDR. In the case of the issue of the Oder-Neisse line, important to Warsaw, Bahr thought that talks on this subject, assuming far-going concessions on the part of the FRG, could result in an erosion of the

46 “Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Bahr...”, AAPD 1968, doc. 324. 32 Wanda Jarząbek

Soviet zone of infl uence and that they therefore needed to be somewhat postponed47. He also advised refusal to any talks with Moscow in respect of possible ‘concessions’ in this matter, which may indicate that, in his opinion, this complicated element of Polish-German relationships should be left to be resolved in a bilateral framework, either in order to use it as a bargaining chip to achieve other objectives of the German policy in relations with Poland or in order to improve the climate of these relations. Neither can it be ruled out that, for Bahr, the border may have been a bargain chip which could be brought into play, for instance, at the moment of closing the German issue, which is to say re-unifi cation, and could then be included in a package of agreements to be concluded with all the powers responsible for Germany under the Potsdam agreements. In view of the complications in the West, it could thus neither be settled with Moscow alone nor forfeited in its role as a potentially useful bargaining chip in the future. The conclusions reached at the level of the FRG’s Foreign Affairs Ministry were, generally, similar. However, there were no intentions of discontinuing the dialogue completely, even with the active participants of the bloc’s intervention in Czechoslovakia48. There was a growing recognition of the fact that the possibilities of particular countries of the bloc conducting a more independent policy had become restricted; following the invasion, their societies were permeated by a mood of disenchantment and their authorities disinclined to oppose the Kremlin. In such a situation, talks with the USSR seemed to be a natural route leading to wider contacts with the bloc. On the other hand, attention was being drawn to the risk that blaming the FRG for exerting infl uence on the events in Czechoslovakia which, from Moscow’s

47 Ibidem. G.F. Duckwitz put a question mark next to this part of the text (note made by the document’s editor). 48 PA AA, B. 42, Bd. 1329, Vermerk. “Künftige Gestaltung unserer Kontaktpolitik gegenüber den osteuropäischen Interventionsmächte”, 3 December 1968. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 33 point of view, was a negative one, would not make these talks any easier49. In the case of Poland, it was pointed out that, following the departure of the minister, Adam Rapacki, and the ‘policy of selective détente’, as it was referred to in the study in question, a policy to which he gave his name and which was addressed to certain Western states, changes in Poland’s foreign policy might ensue. It was, nevertheless, expected that the PRP’s authorities would want to maintain their international activity in the areas which were previously of interest to them, which is to say, the détente in East-West relationships and disarmament50. It was also pointed out that Gomułka’s position was growing stronger, which provided a stabilising factor51. Opinions also emerged to the effect that, with Rapacki’s departure, the epoch of a sui generis independence in Poland’s foreign policy had come to an end, while the new minister, Stefan Jędrychowski, was described, inter alia, not only as a conﬁ dant of Gomułka, which was true, albeit it seemed that Rapacki was as well, but also as a supporter of the USSR and a committed representative of the bloc’s policy implemented by Moscow, this latter assessment being both simplistic and unwarranted52. Jędrychowski, who had been a communist since before the war, professionally engaged in economic affairs, turned out, for example, in 1956, to render relationships with the USSR to the nature of a fairly relative partnership and, as was later to be seen, which is to say, during the process of negotiations on the signing of the Treaty of Warsaw with the FRG, while maintaining correct relations with

49 PA AA, B. 42, Bd. 150, “Stichworte für das Schluβwort des Leiters der Arbeitstagung”, undated (after November 1968). 50 PA AA, B. 42, Bd. 151, “Gegenwärtige Lage in Osteuropa (auβer Sowjetunion und CSSR)”, covering letter, H. Ruete, 7 October 1968. 51 PA AA, B. 42, Bd. 150, “Stichworte für das Schluβwort...”, 52 PA AA, B. 42, Bd. 1353, letter from Renate Finke-Osiander, 2 January 1969, drawn up on the basis of the Report of the FRG’s Trade Mission in Warsaw dated 30 December 1968. 34 Wanda Jarząbek

Moscow and informing it of the status of the talks, he displayed no submissiveness53. The issue of the changes in the Eastern bloc after the intervention in Czechoslovakia was the subject of a conference held for the political ofﬁ cers of the West German commercial representative ofﬁ ces in the Eastern bloc countries on 4–5 December 1968 at the FRG’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bonn. In the conclusions of the conference, it was mentioned that although the FRG’s peace policy (Friedenspolitik) was giving rise to genuine or fake apprehension in the bloc countries, it should be continued54. It was also pondered whether, bearing in mind Moscow’s willingness to monopolise contacts with the West, any talks with the bloc countries were possible and, if so, to what degree. Conducting talks with Moscow alone was thought to contribute to an impression being formed in the bloc countries that agreements were being concluded over their heads and at their expense, which might result in pushing the satellites into ‘Moscow’s arms’. Opinions were also voiced to the effect that a dialogue with the Kremlin may lead to the squandering of the positive capital accumulated as an outcome of the new Ostpolitik. It was thus concluded that the FRG should strive for the continuation of the talks with the satellite countries. Taking a position on the conditions for the normalisation of the relations with the FRG agreed by the Eastern bloc in Warsaw in February 1967, an assessment was set out in a memo, postulating that, from the

53 His approach to the USSR was demonstrated, inter alia, by his attitude in 1956. Wanda Jarząbek, “Wpływ wydarzeń 1956 r. na politykę zagraniczną PRL”, in: Rok 1956 w Polsce i jego rezonans w Europie [The Impact of the Events of 1956 on the PRP’s Foreign Policy, in: The Year 1956 in Poland and Its Resonance in Europe], Joanna Szymoniczek and Eugeniusz Cezary Król (eds.), Warszawa 2009, pp. 206–207. 54 PA AA, B. 1, Bd. 353, Aufzeichnung. Betr.: “Arbeitstagung der politischen Referenten der Vertretungen in Osteuropa”, in: “Der 21. August, Ausdruck dogmatischer Nervosität, hat die Friedenspolitik empfi ndlich zurückgeworfen. Denoch sollten wir an ihr festhalten”. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 35 point of view of the USSR, the conditions did not have the value of a ‘currency’, because the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line might only impress Polish society, rather than the leaders of that state; the context here suggests that exerting infl uence aimed at a major policy change was being considered. At the same time, it noted that the issue of recognising the Munich Treaty as null and void ex tunc had lost its psychological saliency55. These assessments were not quite accurate; at any rate, the meaning of these issues in the policy of both states, of both Poland and Czechoslovakia, was not limited solely to psychological and propagandistic. They were signifi cant because of their legal implications, citizenship problems, social benefi ts and so forth. If, on the other hand, thought was being given to their governments making themselves independent of Moscow, then, indeed, it had no major meaning. It was genuinely diffi cult to regard these matters as bargaining chips in talks with the USSR. During the talks in Bonn, attention was drawn to the economic constraints existing in all states of the Eastern bloc because of their technological backwardness and economic problems as a factor favourable to the FRG’s policy toward the communist countries. Suggestions were also being made with a view to making use of cultural and political opportunities. On the other hand, warnings were being voiced to the effect that undertaking talks with Beijing might do to the Ostpolitik more harm than good at that stage. Generally, it was acknowledged that the events of August 1968 had either resulted in the countries of the Eastern bloc losing their audacity, or confi rmed them in their caution toward more independent initiatives. The Polish-German dialogue continued through unoffi cial channels. For example, in a conversation with a journalist Ryszard Wojna in September 1968, Helmut Schmidt, hinted semi-offi cially that no gestures on the part of Germany should be expected by Warsaw

55 Ibidem. “Die Annerkennung der Oder-Neisse – Linie würde nur das polnische Volk, nicht aber seine beeindrucken”. 36 Wanda Jarząbek prior to the parliamentary elections in the FRG, which were to be held in September 196956. Apprehensions in respect of the possibility of conducting the Ostpolitik also became a topic in German diplomats’ talks with their Western partners. The French diplomats were under the impression that, at least at the level of the FRG’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was a tendency to turn the intervention in Czechoslovakia into an argument against the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. During talks between the political director of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jacques de Beaumarchais, and his West German counterpart, Paul Frank, the latter was interested in the talks between France and Poland, as well as Moscow, regarding the border and voiced the opinion that its recognition would deprive the USSR of one of its strongest cards with regard to the countries of the bloc, suggesting this might be badly received in Moscow57. The French diplomat, on the other hand, pondered whether events in Czechoslovakia, would not have taken a different turn had the FRG recognised the border in early 1968. He also added that the USSR wanted the status quo to be recognised. Frank, on his part, continued to deliberate as to whether the recognition of the border would not be considered an act of ‘aggression’ by the Kremlin, which obviously had no interest in that recognition whatsoever. Beaumarchais reminded him that the French government had more than once voiced its opinions on this topic and suggested that the German government make a statement, particularly on the border issue, because that would contribute to the improvement of the atmosphere and was even a factor evoking détente (un moyen de provoquer la détente). He also maintained that, in the

56 Krzysztof Gura, “Preliminaria do układu Polska-RFN z 7 grudnia 1970 r.” [Preliminaries to the Poland-FRG Treaty of 7 December 1970), in: Rocznik Polsko- -Niemiecki [Polish-German Yearbook] No. 5, 1996, p. 141. 57 Archive du Ministère des Affaires étrangères (hereinafter: AMAE), Europe, Status de l’Allemagne, vol. 62, extract from the minutes of the meeting of political directors in Bonn, on 11 December 1968, Annexe: Ligne Oder-Neisse. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 37 countries of the Eastern bloc, the border was universally recognised as a settled matter. Hans Ruete, who participated in the conversation, maintained, for his part, that, bearing in mind that the population which had settled in the former German territories was afraid that the Germans would return, the FRG, in conducting its policy, was, in a sense, helping Gomułka, as he was able to demonstrate both his indispensability and the necessity of maintaining relations with the USSR, so recognition of the borders would, in fact, be inconvenient for him. The German participants asked their French interlocutors, as was noted in the memo, not to record this part of the conversation in their minutes. As it was pointed out earlier, the temporary check in the contacts between the Western states and the USSR and its satellites did not last long. Despite the quite pessimistic overtone of the ministerial studies drawn up for in-house consumption, Bonn began to probe the possibility of renewing contact with the bloc. This time, however, although the FRG’s plans took Warsaw into account as well, it was clearly Moscow which was the main addressee of Bonn’s policy. On Willy Brandt’s initiative, talks with Andrei Gromyko were arranged during the 23rd session of the UN General Assembly. Information on the conversation between them was conveyed to the PRP’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the USSR embassy. It implied that Brandt maintained his interest in talks with the USSR. He also claimed that the renunciation of force was, in fact, tantamount to preserving the status quo58. Germany continued to attempt to undertake talks with Poland. As it had also occurred earlier, it resorted to unofﬁ cial channels, the main role among which fell to journalists. At the end of 1968, Ryszard Wojna conducted a series of talks in the FRG59, inter alia with Minister Erhard

58 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/75, w. 5, Pilna notatka [Urgent memo], z załącznikiem pt. ”Informacja” [Appendix, Information], A. Kruczkowski, 20 October 1968. 59 Wanda Jarząbek, Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa wobec polityki wschodniej..., p. 161 and ff. 38 Wanda Jarząbek

Eppler, the deputy chairman of the SPD and leader of its parliamentary club, Helmut Schmidt, and other people. Wojna pondered the fact that almost all of them were concerned by the developments in the international situation and the possible outbreak of a war60. Eppler mentioned that the Eastern bloc’s policy had to be modiﬁ ed, bearing in mind that it was necessary for its countries to obtain access to the new technologies in order to progress to the next stage of industrialisation. Eppler and Schmidt also claimed that they had attempted to rein in the politicians in Prague and advised against a conﬂ ict with the USSR. In the summer of 1968, Eppler travelled to Czechoslovakia, although he explained that the trip had been the result of his interest in the events of the Prague Spring rather than a mission related to the SPD’s policy towards Eastern Europe61. In view of such information, Chairman of the PRP’s Council of State, Marshal Marian Spychalski, requested the special German Task Group to accelerate its work. He also voiced the opinion that it should include not only political advisors, but also those concerned with economic, military and psychological operations62. In November 1968, the MFA drew up a memo in respect of the FRG’s policy in the new situation. Developments in Czechoslovakia were deemed therein to be a tool which was to serve the FRG in making its Ostpolitik more active. The FRG was also thought to be the main advocate in the West for the freezing of the policy of détente because it was unable to implement its objectives in its policy toward the East63.

60 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/75, w. 5, Pilna notatka [Urgent memo], Z. Wolniak, 10 September 1968. 61 Ibidem. Erhard Eppler in conversation with the author, October 2008, Prague. 62 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/75, w. 5, Dekretacja i uwagi Tow. Marszałka M. Spy- chalskiego w związku z “Pilną notatką” o rozmowach red. Wojny w NRF [Circulation request and comments of Comrade Marshal M. Spychalski on the “Urgent memo” on Mr Wojna’s talks in the GFR], undated. 63 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/75, w. 5, “Pilna notatka o aktualnych aspektach polityki NRF” [Urgent memo on the current issues in the GFR’s policy], A. Willmann, 6 November 1968. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 39

In the autumn of 1968, the PRP’s MFA continued to suffer from a certain stagnation and diffi culties in its operations. These disturbances were derived from both the general atmosphere in the country, resulting from waiting for the situation to stabilise, and from the personnel changes. The need to change the foreign policy was, however, perceived elsewhere. The MFA’s operations, the plans drawn up there and the aims in the policy towards the FRG seemed insuffi cient to Spychalski64. Likewise, in hand-written notes Józef Winiewicz, a Deputy Minister and the then acting Head of the Ministry, requested that more extensive comments on the FRG’s policy be drawn up and produced at the next meeting of the MFA’s department heads. Various ways of making the policy towards Germany more active were discussed, including propaganda. J. Kuczkowski, the deputy head of the PRP’s Commercial Representative Offi ce in Frankfurt am Main, suggested, inter alia, refl ecting on possible ways of exerting infl uence on the German youth, particularly the members of the trade unions aligned with the youth factions of the SPD and the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP), as well as the Marxist groups and the extra-parliamentary opposition, who were critical of the authorities65. It seems that the turning of attention to these groups also resulted from watching the events of 1968 in the FRG. Major hopes were pinned on the Polish- -German Society in Düsseldorf, albeit that it was thought that it would need to be re-organised. The necessity of employing professional companies to distribute the information and propaganda material, leafl ets and posters was noted. It was thought that Polish culture should

64 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/75, w. 5, Memo, K. Nowakowski, 8 November 1968. The Head of his Adiutants’ Offi ce advised the Minister’s Cabinet by phone as early as 8 November that the Marshal expected a “specifi c plan” in respect of relations with the FRG. A note was made by Józef Czyrek on a memo advising of this phone call, reading “they are urging us”. 65 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 23/77, w. 4, Memo, covering letter from J. Kuczkowski, 18 November 1968. 40 Wanda Jarząbek be presented more widely in the FRG, particularly at the local level. The PRP’s visa policy was also considered to be in need of liberalisation, primarily in the case of visits by business people from the FRG. After 1968, attempts to undertake a dialogue with Poland were being made by, inter alia, politicians from the FPD. In conversations held with members of the Polish Military Mission in West Berlin early in 1969, a suggestion was made as regards arranging a visit by the party’s chairman, Walter Scheel, to Warsaw. It was said that the FPD’s leaders shared the Polish opinion on the Oder-Neisse border. Attention was also drawn to the infl uence exerted by the party’s younger activists66. The FPD had supported looking for an agreement with the East even earlier, in the fi fties. Back in the 1954, Karl Georg Pfl eiderer, the German ambassador to Belgrade, with connections with the party, had attempted, while serving there, to seek opportunities to make contact with the PRP’s diplomatic service, said in the Bundestag that the Ostpolitik was uncharted territory and demanded that diplomatic relationships be established. In December 1956, the FDP submitted a parliamentary question in the Bundestag regarding trade with the East67. The FRG authorities attempted to encourage Warsaw to undertake contacts. In a conversation with Józef Winiewicz in January 1969, the Head of the FRG’s Commercial Mission in Warsaw, proposed undertaking talks on the Polish disarmament initiatives and a pan- -European treaty on the renunciation of force, as well as on cultural, scientifi c and technical exchange and Poland’s economic relationships in the context of the development of the EEC but Warsaw failed to respond

66 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/76, w. 3, Urgent memo regarding some elements of our relationships with the German Federal Republic, J. Winiewicz, 11 March 1969. 67 See Henning Köhler, Adenauer. Eine politische Biographie, Frankfurt am Main 1994, p. 969. Also: W. Jarząbek, “W sprawach niemieckich nasz głos musi mieć swą wagę... Problem niemiecki w polskiej polityce zagranicznej w latach 1956–1958” [Where German Issues are Concerned, Our Voice Must Carry Weight... The German Problem in Polish Foreign Policy in 1956–1958], in: Dzieje Najnowsze [Contemporary History], No. 2, 2001. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 41 to these proposals68. According to Winiewicz, as far as cultural relationships were concerned, they were sufﬁ ciently well ensured, despite the fact that cooperation in this area was not based on any formal agreement. Winiewicz saw a valid point in undertaking contacts, but primarily with feature writers and non-governmental interlocutors, in order to present the Polish standpoint. Given what was assessed as a lack of any clear change in the FRG’s position on the border issue, this was deemed to be enough. Winiewicz wrote that: “under no circumstances should we allow any attempt to draw up a «joint position» on the basis of a compromise. Such discussions would aim at demonstrating to Western opinion that we do not shirk talks and that the GFR’s unrealistic position provides no chances for their positive results”69. Following the launch of the Budapest Appeal by the countries of the bloc, Böx, at the request of the FRG’s MFA, expressed interest in the European Conference and declared willingness to exchange opinions on this topic. He also attempted to ﬁ nd out whether the bloc would make the holding of such a conference not contingent on the formal recognition of the GDR, to which Winiewicz responded to the contrary, but that, in the bloc’s opinion, East Berlin should attend it. On Brandt’s order, Böx proposed undertaking talks on the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (as an outcome of the European Conference)70. Signals arrived regularly from both the Military

68 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/76, w. 4, “Pilna notatka z rozmowy z szefem Przedsta- wicielstwa Handlowego NRF 18 bm.” [Urgent memo from a conversation with the Head of the GFR’s Commercial Representative Ofﬁ ce on 18 of this month], J. Winiewicz, 19 January 1969. 69 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/76, w. 3, “Pilna notatka dot. niektórych elementów naszych stosunków z Niemiecką Republiką Federalną” [Urgent memo regarding some elements of our relationships with the German Federal Republic], J. Winiewicz, 11 March 1969. 70 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/76, w. 4, “Pilna notatka z rozmowy z szefem Przedsta- wicielstwa Handlowego NRF, 14 bm.” [Urgent memo from a conversation with the head of the GFR’s Commercial Representative Ofﬁ ce on 14 of this month], J. Winiewicz, 15 April 1969. 42 Wanda Jarząbek

Mission in Berlin and the Commercial Representative Ofﬁ ce, stating that Bonn was probing the possibility of opening talks, but also that it wanted to avoid discussing certain issues, including, as could well be surmised, compensation for the Polish victims of the III Reich. Polish diplomats passed on the information that people close to Helmut Schmidt had suggested “that Poland should make it understood that, in case of the GFR’s recognition of the Oder-Neisse border, then, at a possible conference on a peace treaty with Germany, we would not make any additional demands, which is to say, demands beyond those we are posing at present”71.The SPD’s activists proposed certain steps to Warsaw, such as, for instance, publishing an article in Trybuna Ludu (The People’s Tribune) which would suggest that the recognition of the border and the FRG’s would make it easier to conduct a dialogue regarding other issues. The Secretary of State at the FRG’s MFA, Gerhard Jahn, passed on information to the correspondent of Trybuna Ludu to the effect that any initiative on the part of Warsaw would be treated seriously by Bonn and that Brandt himself would be prepared to visit Warsaw “if only there were some hope that such a journey would not be fruitless”72. Other interlocutors suggested that an opinion was held in Bonn that “on the way to Moscow one may, and one needs, to stop off in Warsaw; on the other hand, to travel to Moscow via the southern capitals makes no sense”73. In a speech made on 17th May 1969, Władysław Gomułka said that Warsaw was prepared to talk with Bonn. Following the autumn parliamentary elections in the FRG, Willy Brandt, now the Chancellor, proposed the holding of talks to Warsaw. The negotiations ended in

71 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/76, w. 3, Coded telegram from Cologne, Leszczyński to Olszowski, 15 April 1969. 72 AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 22/76, w. 3, Coded telegram from Berlin, Mąkosa to Willmann, 5 May 1969. 73 Ibidem. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 43 the signing, in Warsaw, on 7 December 1970, of the Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany Agreement concerning the basis for the normalisation of their mutual relations, often called Warsaw Treaty.

The long-term effects of the events of 1968

In the years 1970–1989, the effects of the year 1968, particularly those of the intervention of the armies of the Eastern bloc in order to suppress the Prague Spring, when considered in the context of their impact on the political relations between Poland and Germany, were, in fact, no longer of any major signifi cance, or what impact they had was not decisive anyway. These events of 1968 were regarded as a confi rmation of Moscow’s domination in its sphere of infl uence and a reminder that it was Kremlin which dealt the cards, but this did not mean that, in a situation where it was possible, no attempts were made by the West to undermine that infl uence. Bonn thus continued to look for opportunities to solve the issues in which it was interested by means of bilateral talks as well. As far as Polish-German relations were concerned, following the signing of the Warsaw Treaty, a period of arranging the bilateral relations began, a process of solving the existing legacy which is generally referred to as normalisation. Normalisation included dealing with a series of issues, some of which continued to remain a matter of controversy and were the subject of political talks which lasted until 1990 and beyond. The principal issues being determined included the problem with the interpretation of the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty, in particular Article number 1 thereof, which referred to the recognition of the Oder and Lusatian Neisse line as Poland’s western border, with opinions being voiced in the FRG to the effect that, if unifi cation occurred, it would not have to be binding for Germany any more; the emigration of people of German origin to the FRG; the 44 Wanda Jarząbek question of ‘family reunifi cation’; the matter of the German minority in Poland and consular protection over Germans in Poland, the latter issue being one which, with the passing of time, became an even more frequent source of frictions; and questions of cultural, scientifi c and technical cooperation between the two states, including the revision of the content of school textbooks, settled under an agreement concluded in 1976. The textbooks commission continued its work, nevertheless the PRP’s authorities consistently refused to approve the opening of a FRG cultural institute in Warsaw. There was also the matter of economic cooperation, linked not only by Poland, but also by the FRG, to other questions. Apart from objective reasons, related, inter alia, to differences in the level of development, diffi culties in cooperation also stemmed from the fact that it was treated instrumentally. Another issue was that of compensations for the consequences of the III Reich’s occupation policy on Polish territories. This matter also continued to be open in the period after the transformations of the political and economic system in Poland and after the reunifi cation of Germany. Yet another question was that of the operation of Radio Free Europe. Publications concerning Polish-German relations tend to focus strictly on political and economic relations, taking little account of the aspects related to the social determinants which infl uenced the authors of the foreign policy in both states. This also holds true for research into the FRG’s attitude towards the process of the enlargement of the European Union in the context of Poland’s accession74. If any

74 Dieter Bingen, Polityka Republiki Bońskiej wobec Polski. Od Adenauera do Kohla 1949–1991 [The Bonn Republic’s Policy toward Poland. From Adenauer to Kohl, 1949–1991], Kraków 1997; Krzysztof Miszczak, Deklarationen und Realitäten. Die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der (Volks-) Republik Polen von der Unterzeichnung des Warschauer Vertrages bis zum Abkommen über gute Nachbarschaft und freundschaftlische Zusammenarbeit (1970–1991), München 1993; Mieczysław Tomala, Patrząc na Niemcy. Od wrogości do porozumienia 1969–1990 [Looking at Germany. From Hostility to an Agreement 1969–1990], Warszawa 2007. See, i.a.: Janusz Józef Węc, “Ewolucja stanowiska niemieckich partii politycznych wobec The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 45 reference at all is made to the generational changes bringing about a different approach to various aspects of the bilateral relationships in these studies, then they are not generally linked to the widely understood effects of 1968. Such an impact did exist; it is, however, diffi cult to grasp and articulate. Bearing in mind the lack of research undertaken from the point of view of sociology and the study of culture, with an appropriately wide perspective and focussing on the impact of the events of 1968 and their consequences for Polish-German relations, this infl uence may be inferred on the basis of transferring the conclusions from the studies into the effects of 1968 which point to its modernising or revolutionary character and impact on the processes of democratisation at the level of societies and state structures. In the studies carried out on the FRG’s foreign policy and that of other Western countries at the time, the matter of the consequences of 1968, particularly as linked to the generational changes, does not come up as something articulated directly. This holds true both for those drawn up at what were then the highest levels of power, which is to say, the Political Bureau and the Departments of the PUWP’s Central Committee, and those compiled at the ministries responsible for the implementation of foreign policy, in other words, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as, to some degree, at the Ministry of the Interior, which also attempted to infl uence foreign policy, at the very przystąpienia Polski do Paktu Północnoatlantyckiego i Unii Europejskiej” [The Evolution of the Standpoint of the German Political Parties toward Poland’s Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty and the European Union], in: Rola Niemiec w procesie integracji Polski z Europą [Germany’s Role in the Process of Poland’s Unifi cation with Europe], Jerzy Holzer and Józef Fiszer (eds.), Warszawa 2001, p. 143 and ff.; Dorota Szułdrzyńska, “Kwestia rozszerzenia Unii Europejskiej o Polskę w opinii społeczeństwa niemieckiego” [The Issue of the Enlargement of the European Union by Admitting Poland, in the Opinion of German Society], in: Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki [Polish-German Yearbook], No. 14, 2006, p. 189 and ff.; Elżbieta Stadtmüller, “Polsko-niemiecka wspólnota czy sprzeczność interesów – ewolucja polskich poglądów” [The Polish-German Community, or a Confl ict of Interest – Evolution of Polish Opinion], in: Rola Niemiec w procesie integracji... . 46 Wanda Jarząbek least through the intelligence analyses put together by its Department I, although not by that department alone. As a matter of fact, this was a phenomenon typical of that period, not only at the level of government institutions, but also at that of academic institutions. This refl ection was to surface much later, when the 1968 generation began to be more active in the offi cial mainstream of state and social life, sometimes in the limelight. Studies on the 1968 generation became popular only at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. Nevertheless, this does mean that in Poland no attention was paid at the time (i.e. in the seventies and eighties) to the various aspects of the domestic transformations in the FRG, which should be taken into consideration as linked to, or resulting from, 1968. Diplomatic reports and memos provide evidence that the activities of the extra-parliamentary opposition, both in West Berlin and in the FRG, were closely observed. It was in the seventies that the presence of the ideas of 1968 and of the 1968 generation began to be marked in the Western media. At the time, the New Left was making its presence felt, primarily in opposition to the offi cial political mainstream, as well as in culture75. In the case of certain important political issues, such as, for example, the partition of Germany, to be ‘a sixty-eighter’ in the seventies and the eighties was tantamount to being an opponent of the reunifi cation of Germany. Some people associated this either with the fact that certain 1968 activists had their roots in the GDR or with funding from East Berlin76. What was commonly being pointed to was

75 Belinda Davis, “A Whole World Opening Up: Transcultural Contacts, Difference, and the Politicization of the ‘New Left’ Activists”, in: Changing the World, Changing Oneself. Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s, Belinda Davis, Wilfried Mausbach, Martin Klimke and Carla MacDougall (eds.), New York and Oxford 2010. 76 The Introduction to: 1968 in West Germany. A Guide to Sources and Literature of the Extra-Parliamentarian Opposition, Philipp Gassert and Pavel A. Richter (eds.), Washington DC 1998, p. 13. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 47 the moderation, among the young generation, of the unfriendly attitude to the USSR and criticism of the Cold War and the US policy towards the communist countries. Some scholars also indicate that the FRG’s Ostpolitik, the policy consisting of talking with the East and, primarily, with the USSR, might have been a factor which worked to calm the social mood at home, down in the sense that it provided a link between the political elites and the participants of the youth movements77. In time, given that the events of 1968 and the changes they triggered were of a global nature and that, after the passing of successive years, it was the 1968 generation which, as a result of the demographic processes, began entering the political arena, so other values, another approach to the world and a somewhat different understanding of priorities in international politics also started to appear to a wider extent, albeit that, in this case, it was not infrequent that the Realpolitik took the upper hand. The year 1968, which in common perception is often associated with the events in Western Europe, in particular, France, the FRG and the USA, had a much wider dimension. Various protests and manifestations also occurred in Latin America, the US, Africa, the Middle East and in almost all the countries of Europe78. One of the consequences of 1968 was a wider consideration being given in public discourse to the human rights. Admittedly, the focus was on their individual rather than their political or social rights, but they cannot be separated entirely. The growing interest in human rights, particularly after 1975, resulted not only from the entry into the political and social arena of a generation which paid more attention to them, but also from the fact that the politicians perceived them a useful instrument

77 See i.a., Jeremi Suri, Ostpolitik as Domestic Containment: The Cultural Contradictions of the Cold War and the West German State Response, in: Changing the World, Changing Oneself..., p. 133 and ff. 78 1968. Memories and Legacies of a Global Revolt, Philipp Gassert and Martin Klimke (eds.), Washington DC 2009. 48 Wanda Jarząbek with which to weaken the Eastern bloc. Truly, in the seventies, this was not the case with German politicians, albeit that the 1968 generation was slowly beginning to enter the media and politics. What also contributed to the dissemination of the issues of human rights was the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During preparations for the ﬁ rst review conference in Belgrade, it was the media that provided certain topics with publicity, while the politicians, with the exception of those from the US, maintained a far greater reserve79. The issue of the observance of human rights also performed an increasing role in the case of the bilateral talks with the FRG, which might be perceived both as an effect of an even more daring resorting to this argument in their policy toward various countries of what the Western states dubbed the socialist bloc, but it might also have been an effect of 1968, albeit that it is the political reasons, including those related to the domestic politics of the FRG, which may be deemed to have dominated the discourse. Apart from the then current issues in the bilateral relations, it was the legacy of the Polish-German relationship which continued to weight heavily. A question thus arises as to what degree the process of reconciliation between Poland and Germany was inﬂ uenced by the generational changes in both countries. It seems that, while it was the

79 See i.a., Wanda Jarząbek, “Od Helsinek do Belgradu – władze PRL a problematyka trzeciego koszyka KBWE w latach 1975–1978” [From Helsinki to Belgrade. The PRP’s Authorities and the Issues of the Third Basket of the CSCE in 1975–1978], in: Wrocławskie Studia z Polityki Zagranicznej [Wrocław Studies on Foreign Policy], Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, Bożena Szaynok and Jakub Tyszkiewicz (eds.), vol. 3, Toruń 2010; Breck Walker, “Neither Shy, Nor Demagogics – The Carter Administration Goes to Belgrade”, in: From Helsinki to Belgrade. The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade 1977/1978, Vladimir Bilandžić and Milan Kosanović (eds.), Belgrade 2008, pp. 207–230. This was also conﬁ rmed by the following interlocutors when interviewed by the author: Jeacques Andréani, Edouard Brunner, Luigi V. Ferraris, Rudolf Perina, Skjold G. Mellbin, Vladimir Bilandžić, Markku Reima, Hans Ola Urstad, Józef Czyrek, Adam D. Rotfeld, Jan Bisztyga, Andrzej Skowroński and Józef Wiejacz. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 49

1968 generation which called for a revaluation of the attitude towards the National Socialist past80, nevertheless, as far as bilateral Polish- -German relations were concerned, it was the older generation which continued to dominate in contacts of that kind. As a matter of fact, this may be seen as a quite natural phenomenon, bearing in mind that any reconciliation is, in principle, achieved ﬁ rst at the level of the participants in the events to which the process in question pertains81. The youth are, to a large degree, guided by their own experience, albeit that, in the case of relations so very burdened as those between Poland and Germany, the past can hardly be ignored and considered to have no signiﬁ cance. The PRP’s authorities often associated the change in attitudes towards Poland and Poles with the generational change, but with its biological aspects rather than with any reference to the social and mentality’s transformations which followed 1968. In fact, as of the early seventies, it was pointed out in documents that it was to this very young generation that propaganda efforts should be addressed to82. It

80 On the role of the past, see i.a., Andrea Ludwig, Neue oder Deutsche Linke? Nation und Nationalismus im Denken von Linken und Grünen, Opladen 1995; Harold Marcuse, “The Revival of Holocaust Awareness in West Germany, Israel, and the United States”, in: 1968. The World..., p. 421 and ff. 81 See i.a., the statements and studies published in: Od nienawiści do przyjaźni. O problemach polsko-niemieckiego sąsiedztwa [From Hatred to Friendship. On the Issues of the Polish-German Neighbourship], Friedbert Pfl üger and Winfried Lipscher (eds.), Warszawa 1994; Polacy i Niemcy pół wieku później. Księga pamiątkowa dla Mieczysława Pszona [The Poles and the Germans, Half a Century On. A Memorial Book in Honour of Mieczysław Pszon], Friedbert Pfl üger and Winfried Lipscher (eds.), Kraków 1996. See also: Dieter Bingen, “Der lange Weg der ‘Normalisierung’. Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Polen 1949–1990”, in: Die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen 1949–2000. Eine Werte- und Interessengemeinschaft?, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Basil Kerski (eds.), Opladen 2001; Ludwig Mehlhorn, “Zwangsverordnete Freundschaft? Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und Polen 1949–1990”, ibidem; Basil Kerski, “Die Rolle nichtstaatlicher Akteure in den deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen vor 1990”, ibidem. 82 See for example, AMSZ, Dep. IV, z. 27/77, w. 10, “Tezy na temat polityki wobec NRF” [Points regarding the policy toward the GFR], 16 July 1971. 50 Wanda Jarząbek was thought that it would be possible for Warsaw to persuade the youth with regard to certain of its arguments by disseminating its own vision of the past and providing information on it. Nevertheless, increasing the opportunities for unrestrained social contacts was not considered justifi ed, because their results would be diffi cult to predict. One of the questions having a bearing on the bilateral relationships was that of compensations for the Polish slave workers. The FRG had consistently refused any talks regarding individual compensations, apart from certain exceptions such as those for the victims of pseudo-medical experiments83. Nevertheless, in 1989, it was the opposition in the FRG, which, in a manner not unrelated to the approaching anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War, began attracting attention to the necessity of settling the issue of compensations for the Polish people. The ‘Greens’, a group whose emergence in the FRG’s political life was, to a large degree, associated with the results of the events in 1968, had been submitting drafts aimed at solving these issues since 1985. On 6th June 1989, the ‘Greens’ faction at the Bundestag tabled three draft- -bills: a bill on a federal foundation for “the compensation for Nazi

83 For more on this subject, see i.a., Wanda Jarząbek, “Władze Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej wobec problemu reparacji i odszkodowań od Republiki Federalnej Niemiec 1953–1989” [The Authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland’s on the Issue of Reparations and Compensations from the Federal Republic of Germany, 1953–1989], in: Dzieje Najnowsze [Contemporary History], No. 2, 2005; Problem reparacji, odszkodowań i świadczeń w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich 1944–2004 [The Issue of Reparations, Compensations and Benefi ts in Polish-German Relationships], Sławomir Dębski and Witold M. Góralski (eds.), vol. 1 (Studies), vol. 2 (Documents), Warszawa 2004; Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, Polskie zabiegi o odszkodowania niemieckie w latach 1944/45–1975 [Polish Efforts to Obtain Compensations from Germany in 1944/45–1975), Wrocław 2007; “Uwagi i propozycje w związku z VIII rundą rozmów pełnomocników szefów rządów PRL i RFN” [Comments and proposals regarding the 8th Round of the Talks of the Plenipotentiaries of the Heads of the Governments of the PRP and FRG], Mieczysław Pszon and Horst Teltschik (14–19 September 1989), in: Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec 1989–1991. Dokumenty dyplomatyczne [Poland vis- à-vis the Reunifi cation of Germany, 1989–1991. Diplomatic Documents], Włodzimierz Borodziej (ed.), Warszawa 2006, p. 11. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 51 slave labour”, a bill on “the political and legal initiatives of the federal government in respect of those who made use of slave labour”, on the basis of which, the FRG government should take measures with regard to either the companies which exploited slave labour or their legal heirs, with a view to making them initiate benefi ts for the former workers, and a bill on “the individual compensation for the former slave workers from the period of Nazi rule, by way of a global agreement”84. After 1985, the SPD’s position also began to evolve; nevertheless, rather than undertaking cooperation with the ‘Greens’, in June 1989 it submitted its own draft-bill on the formation of a foundation for ‘Compensation for Nazi lawlessness’, addressing different categories of the aggrieved, including, for instance, the inmates of concentration camps, those harmed as a result of the euthanasia programme, women forced to abort their pregnancies, homosexuals, persecuted communists and people who shirked military service. Nevertheless, these proposals did not cover the slave workers. It was suggested that a separate fund should be established to provide for their claims85. A question arises as to what degree such an approach resulted from a revaluation of priorities, since the aggrieved who were to be entitled to compensation included those groups whose rights had begun to be articulated, inter alia, as a result of the changes in the understanding of human rights which had ensued,

84 Archiwum Akt Nowych, Komitet Centralny Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej [The Central Archives of Modern Records, the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party, hereinafter: AAN KC PZPR], WZ 973/85, “Notatka dotycząca inicjatyw legislacyjnych (z 6 czerwca 1989 r.) partii ‘Zielonych’ w sprawie odszkodowań dla ofi ar prześladowań faszystowskich” [Memo regarding the ‘Green’ party’s legislative initiatives (of 6th June 1989) in respect of compensation for the victims of Nazi persecutions], J. Barcz. 85 AAN, KC PZPR, WZ 973/85, “Notatka dotycząca inicjatywy SPD (z 21 czerwca 1989 r.) na forum Bundestagu nt. utworzenia fundacji – ‘Odszkodowanie za bezprawie nazistowskie’” [Memo regarding the SPD initiative (of 21 June 1989) in the Bundestag in respect of establishing a foundation – ‘Compensation for the Nazi lawlessness’], J. Barcz. 52 Wanda Jarząbek to a large degree, as an outcome of the events of 1968 and to what degree it sprang from economic calculation. It was perfectly understood that extending the compensation act to cover all the victims of the III Reich in Eastern Europe, in particular the slave workers, would result in enormous budgetary expenditures. In the fi rst period after the turn of 1989 and 1990, in both Poland and the FRG, political life continued to be dominated by the representatives of a generation other than that of 1968, in the sense of active participation in events, albeit that this neither has to mean, nor does it mean, that the former were not, more or less infl uenced by the latter to a greater or lesser degree. In the case of the FRG, research into the 1968 generation made it possible to point out somewhat more precisely to whom and to which groups this term may apply. The group of direct participants in the events, linked to the student, youth and subculture movements and the extra-parliamentary opposition was quite substantial. In the 1990s, when Joschka Fischer took offi ce as the FRG’s minister of foreign affairs, one of the principal actors in these events became a high-ranked politician86. In the case of Poland, 1968 is associated with the crisis of the that time centre of power and the ‘anti-Zionist’ activities. The majority of studies thus focussed on these aspects, while 1968 events also included student protests which were not motivated by strictly political objectives87. Unlike in Germany, in Poland there are few books of the

86 For the role of Joschka Fischer and his generation: Paul Hockenos, Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic. An Alternative History of Postwar Germany, Oxford and New York 2008. 87 See i.a., Włodzimierz Suleja, “Polski nietypowy miesiąc – Marzec” [Polish Untypical Month – March], in: Dzieje Najnowsze [Contemporary History], No. 1, 2008; Mirosław Golon, “Marzec 1968 w Toruniu w świetle materiałów Służby Bezpieczeństwa” [March 1968 in Toruń in the Light of Security Service materials], ibidem; Katarzyna Maniewska, Mieszkańcy Bydgoszczy wobec wydarzeń 1968 r. [The Inhabitants of Bydgoszcz on the Events of 1968], ibidem. On the subject literature: J. Eisler, “Stan The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 53 memoir type which would describe the signiﬁ cance of the generational experiences and the role performed by 1968. As far as Poland is concerned, the term ‘the 1968 generation’ is quite fuzzy and, in fact, absent from research. It may be assumed to include, on the one hand, the people participating in the student demonstrations and, on the other hand, the émigrés, in general of Jewish origin, who were forced to leave the country after the March events. While in emigration, some of them became involved in political activities in the ranks of the opposition against the PRP’s authorities. The impact of the events in their home country was different and linked more to political issues. The effects of the events of 1968 in the global sense did leave their mark on Poland’s social and political life but their doing so was deferred because of the non-democratic nature of the state and the impediments to contacts with the outside world. In the post-transformation period, the people involved in the events of 1968 joined the power elites and the opinion-forming milieus. Nevertheless, if they refer to 1968 in their reminiscences, then they either dwell on those aspects which were related to the experiences resulting from belonging to the bloc, such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, or on those which were typically Polish, like March 1968. This is also conﬁ rmed by other research carried out for the purpose of this grant-supported project. The people who took part in the survey also pointed out that their knowledge of the events which occurred in 1968 in the FRG was scant88. badań historycznych nad Marcem ’68” [The Status of Historical Studies on March ’68], ibidem; cf. also: Oblicza marca 1968 [The Faces of March 1968], Konrad Rokicki and Sławomir Stępień (eds.), Warszawa 2004. The authors presented the results of research regarding the events of March, conducted in the principal urban and university centers, namely, in Warsaw, Kraków, Gdańsk and Wrocław and the social reactions thereto. Włodzimierz Suleja, Dolnośląski marzec ’68...; Marta Fik, Marcowa kultura...; Tadeusz Pióro, “Czystki... . 88 Jerzy Holzer, Uwagi związane z projektem 1968 roku [Comments on the 1968 Project], in: Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki [Polish-German Yearbook], No. 20, 2012, pp. 1–15. 54 Wanda Jarząbek

In the research on Poland’s and Germany’s elites carried out when Poland was pursuing accession to the European Union, the issue of the impact of 1968 on the bilateral relationships neither emerged as a question in numerous questionnaire-based surveys nor were these problems analysed on the basis of other data89. In the German edition of the research on the elites of both countries, which was a more extensive publication than the Polish one, a series of categories emerged; however, this could also be considered to demonstrate the fallout of the consequences of 1968 in a wide sense, which is to say, the issues of ecology, secularity, the attitude toward the church and denominational groups, and tolerance, albeit that it was the problems related to the determinants of the political relationships and, in particular, of foreign policy, which dominated the research and thus the publication90. The results of the research pointed to a high convergence of the respondents’ views; however, it should be kept in mind that the research itself was addressed to the elites only, rather than to the entire society. What results would have been obtained had the study been given a more extensive remit, is difﬁ cult to say. In the case of the bilateral political relationships, the role of elites is stronger than in a case where those relationships are understood in a wider sense, which is to say, encompassing contacts at the social level, among them those resulting from business operations, tourism, and so forth, where it is individuals who play a greater role, including those individuals who can hardly be deemed to belong to the elites. A survey conducted a few years later indicated that differences existed in the approach to many issues, primarily political, which also had an impact on the bilateral relations91.

89 Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Sergiusz Kowalski and Janusz Reiter, Elity Polski i Niemiec. Wspólnota interesów i wartości? [The Polish and German Elites. A Community of Interests and Values?], Warszawa 2000. 90 Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, Deutschland und Polen... . 91 A collection of essays summarising the research, in: Polska–Niemcy–Francja. Wzajemne postrzeganie po rozszerzeniu UE [Poland–Germany–France. Mutual The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 55

Social research on generational changes points to numerous changes which infl uence the views of wide social circles, as well as to diffi culties in studying generations92. The signifi cance of 1968 and the spread of the values which were typical of its active participants in the West and also, to some degree, in the Eastern Europe countries, including Poland, was certainly infl uenced by the fact that the end of the 60s was a period when the media started to enjoy a much wider social impact. It was thanks to the media that news had an easier reach. At that time, the role of the mass media, including the new forms, continued to grow, which also held true for the post-transformation period. The circles linked to the media were highly infl uenced by 1968 and they often consisted of its active participants. The elites and the opinion- forming milieus also infl uenced the image of the events of 1968. The active participants in those events particularly adhered to the slogans of the left wing93. Notwithstanding this, the very year 1968 itself also infl uenced other areas of the political arena or people of other views. Not everyone identifi ed with the ideals of the majority of those who protested then, which is understandable94.

Perceptions Following the EU Enlargement], Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, Mateusz Fałkowski (eds.), Warszawa 2008; Piotr Buras, “Fatalizm nierównoczesności: elity Polski i Niemiec po rozszerzeniu Unii Europejskiej na Wschód” [The Fatalism of Non- -Simultaneousness. The Elites of Poland and Germany following the EU Enlargement eastward], ibidem. 92 Heinz Bude, “‘Generation’ im Kontext. Von den Kriegs- zu den Wohlfahrtsstaatsgenerationen”, in: Generationen, p. 28 and ff.; M. Rainer Lepsius, “Kritische Anmerkungen zur Generationenforschung”, ibidem, p. 45 and ff.; Kurt Lüscher, “Ambivalenz – Eine Annäherung an das Problem der Generationen”, ibidem, p. 53 and ff. 93 George Katsiaﬁ cas, The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968, Boston 1987; Gerd-Rainer Horn, The Spirit of ’68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976, Oxford 2007; New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of Global Consciousness, Karen Dubinsky et al. (eds.), Toronto 2009; Between Marx and Coca-Cola, Axel Schild and Detlef Siegfried (eds.), New York 2006. 94 Rebecca A. Klatch, A Generation Divided: The New Left, the New Right, and the 1960s, Berkley 1999; Die 68er und ihre Gegner: Der Widerstand gegen die Kulturrevolution, Hartmuth Becker, Felix Dirsch and Stefan Winckler (eds.), Graz 2003. 56 Wanda Jarząbek

While the PRP was, to a large degree, a country which was closed, that does not mean that there was no fl ow of ideas, something which was assisted by both an increased fl ow of people, scholarship trips and tourism, which were easier in the 70s, and by emigration, including that which occurred after martial law was imposed Many people returned after 1989; some joined the active political life, while others became a part of the opinion-forming elite in the wide sense of the term. The effects of the global character of the events of 1968 may also be observed in the case of Poland. The conditions in which the socialisation of particular politicians was accomplished, the information which reached them and the value system imparted to them at home, at school and via the media, have had a large infl uence on political activity. It seems, however, that, with the passing of time and given the global character of the societies of the 21st century, easy access to information, and so forth, these issues are not of all that particular a signifi cance in the case of the Poles and the Germans, which does not mean that they have had no impact at all. In the existing literature on the subject, differences in approach to many political, social and other such issues in the bilateral relations have not been linked to the effects of the events of 196895. Nevertheless, it could be argued that, in the case of the Polish and the German societies, the different approach to various issues is also the long-term result of other effects of 1968, which, for reasons of both a domestic and an external nature, have taken a different course in the two countries. This may apply, in particular, to certain questions, such as, for example, ecological matters, which enjoy a better understanding in Western societies, including Germany. In the present circumstances, they also translate into politics, in the context of the EU.

95 Kazimierz Wóycicki, Waldemar Czachur, Jak rozmawiać z Niemcami. O trudnościach dialogu polsko-niemieckiego i jego europejskim wyzwaniu [How to Talk to the Germans. On the Difﬁ culties of the Polish-German Dialogue and Its European Challenge], Wrocław 2009. The impact of the events of the year 1968 and their effects... 57

In the nineties, differences of opinion were also emerging on the political level, and this, too, may be explained in part by the issues of value systems, although these cannot be acknowledged to be the sole determinant. A case in point is the Berlin’s criticism addressed to Warsaw, at both the political level and at that of the media, in connection with the support provided by the then Polish government to President George W. Bush’s policy regarding Iraq. Warsaw was also criticised in connection with the refusal to sign the Charter of Fundamental Rights, elaborated in European Union, which included adverse commentary on the part of one of the leaders of 1968, Daniel Cohn-Bendit.

Summary

In the short-term perspective, the impact of the events of 1968, particularly that of the Eastern bloc’s intervention in Czechoslovakia, consisted primarily in the temporary restriction of the leeway in the PRP’s diplomacy, something which was not large anyway. Nevertheless, it did not extend so far as to rule out the possibility of undertaking bilateral talks with the FRG, normalising diplomatic relationships and commencing a dialogue with a view to resolving the issues bearing on bilateral relations, albeit that the non-sovereign nature of the Polish state was a signiﬁ cant hindrance to their full settlement. In the longer perspective, the effects of 1968 consisted, inter alia, of changes in the value systems, primarily in Western Europe, but also in Poland, albeit that they occurred at a different pace and, as a result of both international and domestic determinants, including different social traditions, they were not identical in nature. Nevertheless, in the case of both Western and Eastern Europe, 1968 became a catalyst for the modus operandi of societies. In time, these transformations began to inﬂ uence the attitude towards the issues which were the subject of the bilateral, 58 Wanda Jarząbek

Polish-German political talks. They might have possibly determined the attitude towards the social and political issues debated at the supranational level, for example, within the structures of the European Union as well, albeit that it needs to be kept in mind that they were not the sole factor. It also seems that, in the case of Poland, the people who participated in the events of 1968, who witnessed them in person, point to their signiﬁ cance to a lesser degree than those who experienced 1968 in the FRG. Piotr Madajczyk

The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image of Poland and the Poles in public opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany

Introduction

The events of the year 1968 already have a very extensive literature. The extent to which it may provide the basis for an analysis of the topic of interest to us is, however, scant. Studies carried out in Poland focus primarily on the events of March 1968. Jerzy Eisler was the ﬁ rst historian to undertake a scholarly scrutiny of these events. Years later he returned to them, compiling a comprehensive study on ‘the Polish 1968’ where he again focused on the events in Poland1. Although other numerous works have been published in the meantime, this study remains the best analysis of them all. Its fundamental departure point is provided by an analysis of the crisis of an authoritarian social and

1 Jerzy Eisler, Marzec 1968. Geneza, przebieg, konsekwencje [March 1968. Genesis, Course and Consequences], Warszawa 1991; idem, Polski rok 1968 [The Polish Year 1968], Warszawa 2006. 60 Piotr Madajczyk political system, which principally extends the perspective in which the then events are perceived. A signifi cant issue which needs facing is the politicising of the debate on 1968 in Poland. The problem is well illustrated in the memoirs of Bettina Röhl, the daughter of Ulrike Meinhof, published by Fronda. The author exposes the dependence of the left-wing activists of ’68 on political and fi nancial support from the East, that is, from East Berlin and Moscow2. This is undoubtedly an interesting aspect and one that the people involved in ’68 prefer to pass over in silence. Nevertheless, it does not make it possible to understand the scale and signifi cance of the social, cultural and political transformations instigated at that time. On the other hand, a translation of a very interesting study by Paul Berman has been published in Poland. The author, taking the Joschka Fischer’s case as a point of departure, attempts to comprehend the paths which the lives of some members of the ’68 Generation’ have taken and the choices they have made. Not those who became lost to destruction in the radicalism of their slogans, though, but those who followed a road leading them to accept democracy and reject all forms of totalitarianism3. March ’68 is seldom perceived in Polish research and Polish historical memory as a part of the widespread wave of protest which, at the end of the sixties, swept over not only the states of the West, but also some countries in South America and the Eastern bloc. The problems of both the reception and impact of the events in other countries on Polish society and the reception of the year 1968 in Poland by public opinion in other countries are not acknowledged to any signifi cant extent. This is not a uniquely Polish issue, bearing in mind that complaints to the

2 Bettina Röhl, Zabawa w komunizm! Ulrike Meinhof, Klaus Rainer Röhl i prawdziwe korzenie nowej lewicy (1958–1968) [Making Communism Fun! Ulrike Meinhof, Klaus Rainer Röhl and True Roots of the New Left-Wing], Warszawa 2007 (German edition: So macht Kommunismus Spass! Ulrike Meinhof, Klaus Rainer Röhl und die Akte Konkret, Hamburg 2006). 3 Paul Berman, Władza i idealiści [Power and the Idealists], Warszawa 2008. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 61 effect that the international setting of the protests in Germany was not being given enough recognition and that attention was being focussed on domestic, German circumstances, were also voiced in that country by the participants of these events as well4. The common ground for the protest was provided by belonging to the same generation. Many Polish students identifi ed with the international protest movement. They wanted a freer life-style, more democracy and believed in the ‘new’ left, albeit that they understood these concepts in a markedly different way from their colleagues in the West. The circumstances in Poland were too disparate, which made the Polish youth more resistant to a naive belief in the renewing powers of Chinese, Cuban or Vietnamese communism. The fact, as pointed out by Norbert Frei, that the scale to which the Polish students changed their lifestyle was minor is not relevant here. What is relevant is that they desired these changes just as the youth in the Western countries did and that they believed they were possible. Apart from this, the generational split had its specifi c refl ection in Poland. In the Western countries, it primarily meant a rebellion against the older generation as the one imposing traditional and outdated norms and values. In Poland, the loss of support among young people by aging politicians, such as Władysław Gomułka and the team surrounding him, can be interpreted within these categories. Furthermore, the generational split was visible when the ’68 movement failed to obtain support on the part of the senior generation of workers whose life experience was different. It was, however, not directed against them and it considered itself to be a continuator of the Polish national tradition. Looking at ’68 as an epoch, it can be seen that the differences between particular countries are not that signifi cant. In the communist countries, the protest was focused on the issue of freedom, this being particularly marked in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Social and economic problems dominated in the Third World countries, while

4 Cf. Joscha Schmierer, “1968 erschütterte die Welt”, Welt-Online, 13 January 2008. 62 Piotr Madajczyk a marvellous epoch of economic growth and prosperity was being enjoyed by the countries of the West even though they had suffered from terrible experience of the war. However, neither the authorities nor society were able to cope with the growing aspirations of the youth, who invoked freedom and wanted a more extensive democracy, with wider participation and more transparency, and yet, at the same time, were naive, infl uenced by leftist slogans and intolerant of those who did not share their convictions. The social, economic, demographic and ideological context of the protests erupting at various points was thus different. Not without reason, however, do some historians refer to the worldwide revolution of ’68. What is missing in the Polish scholarly quest is the posing of the question, signifi cant from a research point of view, as to how the events of 1968 in Poland infl uenced the image of Poland, of Polish society and Polish history in the world media and international public opinion and which of those events have left a more enduring imprint, the democratic protest against dictatorship or the anti-Semitic campaign, which exerted a tremendously negative impression. The latter overlapped with the debates on the history of the Jews in Poland and the accusation of being co-responsible for the Holocaust levelled at the Poles.

Reactions to Poland’s participation in the suppression of the Prague Spring

The Prague Spring was brought to an end by the intervention of the Warsaw Treaty member states in Czechoslovakia, which completely overtook Polish issues in the West German press5. World public opinion

5 Cf. Małgorzata Świder, “Wydarzenia 1968 roku w Polsce i w Czechosłowacji w środkach masowego przekazu Republiki Federalnej Niemiec” [The Events of 1968 in Poland in the Mass Media of the Federal Republic of Germany], in: Marzec ’68 z czterdziestoletniej perspektywy [March’68, As Seen Forty Years On], Danuta Kisielewicz and Małgorzata Świder (eds.), Opole 2009, pp. 225–239, here p. 225. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 63 was, for a long time, dominated by photographs of the Soviet tanks and soldiers, illustrating the suppression, by force, of democratic strivings. It was this thread which took the upper hand, which implied a focus on the Soviet army, albeit that it was emphasised that the intervention was a joint undertaking on the part of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty. In the West German press of the time information about Poland was practically non-existent. At most, the ﬁ gure of Gomułka was shown as one of the malefactors in caricatures. The villains of the piece were always the same, in other words, Brezhnev, accompanied by the leaders of the communist parties in Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland and Hungary, depicted cynically announcing the suppression of the Prague Spring as a success in the struggle for peace.

We have assured peace in Europe

Source: Die Welt, No. 195, 22 September 1968. Author: Wolfgang Hicks. 64 Piotr Madajczyk

A fraternal hand from Moscow

Source: Die Welt, No. 198, 26 August 1968. Author: Wilhelm Hartung.

Later, it could also be seen that the attention of public opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany was primarily focused on the impact of the events in Czechoslovakia on East Berlin and the stability of the authority of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED), Walter Ulbricht. It is for these reasons that the participation of the Polish army in the intervention did not result in a more negative attitude towards Poland in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The intensifi cation, was only marginal and if the Polish involvement was recalled at all, it was in the context of the policy on the part of the communist authorities. The more diffi cult issue is the balancing of the proportions between two factors when describing the reception in the FRG of the events of 1968 in Poland, namely: the signifi cance of the 1968 movement in the democratisation of the system; the political power of the anti-Semite The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 65 policies of the then authorities in Warsaw, and, even more importantly, the support it enjoyed in society. Was the anti-Semite campaign described as a tool manipulated by the Polish authorities, one which they used to destroy the movement for democracy? Or as a campaign drawing on the strong anti-Semitic (anti-democratic) feelings existing in the Polish society? Queries articulated in such a manner recall to mind the fact that the debate on 1968 was, and is, also a part of the controversy regarding the problem of anti-Semitism in the post 1945 Poland.

Reactions to the events of March

News from Warsaw landed on the front page of the West German newspapers for the fi rst time on Monday, 11 March 1968. Just after an article on the tense situation persisting in Czechoslovakia, Angela Nacken, a Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) correspondent, wrote of the two-day disturbances in Warsaw, described by the authorities as ‘irresponsible excesses’, and about the situation in the higher educational institutions. She emphasised the students’ demands for freedom and democracy and the slogans declaring solidarity with the Czechoslovakian students which had appeared in public places for the fi rst time. She reported the guarded reaction on the part of society towards the students’ manifestations, the indignation at the militia’s brutality, the chanting of the word ‘Gestapo’ and an overheard comment, ‘this is worse than under the Germans’ (das sei ja schlimmer, als unter den Deutschen). Anti-Semitism is not referred to in her article, which describes the student protests with evident sympathy, regarding them as having originated under the infl uence of the events in Czechoslovakia6.

6 Angela Nacken, “Warschau spricht von ‘verantwortungslosen Exzessen’”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 60, 11 March 1968, and “In Warschau ertönt der Ruf nach Freiheit”, ibidem. 66 Piotr Madajczyk

However, in a commentary published the next day, along with her description of the protests and their extent, which had surprised the students themselves, and of the passive stance of the majority of society, who did not believe that any changes were possible, Nacken did refer to the anti-Semitic campaign and the allegations on the part of the authorities to the effect that it was the ‘Zionist circles’ which were responsible for the students taking to the streets. “By the same token, the demonstrations and the confl ict inside the party, which began with the pro-Arab position of the party and the government in the Israeli confl ict and had been growing for months, are linked”. She primarily focused on the intra-party infi ghting inside the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) as the cause of the confl ict, coming to the conclusion that, unlike what had happened in Prague, it resulted from a struggle for power, rather than for a direction in policy7. Nacken wrote in a tone similar to that taken in the commentaries published in Die Welt and written by Richard Davy, who was expelled by the Polish authorities from the country. He described the atmosphere of crisis which the authorities were attempting to get under control by using the police and informers and by intimidating the society. Analogous to the FAZ correspondent, he acknowledged that the key issue was the struggle for power taking place inside the PUPW (Mieczysław Moczar, Edward Gierek, Roman Zambrowski)8. A tone akin to this dominates in the reports sent by the FRG’s Commercial

7 “Damit wird eine Verbindung hergestellt zwischen den Demonstrationen und der seit Monaten in der Partei schwelenden Auseinandersetzung, die nach der proarabischen Haltung der Partei und Regierung im Israel-Konﬂ ikt eingesetzt hatte”, “Mit Tränengas gegen Warschauer Studenten”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 61, 12 March 1968 and Angela Nacken, “Die Studenten von Warschau”, ibidem. Much more brieﬂ y: “Polnische Presse kritisiert Studenten”, Die Welt, No. 61, 12 March 1968. 8 Richard Davy, “Sie wollen einen polnischen Dubcek”, Die Welt, No. 67, 19 March 1968, p. 5. The reason for his expulsion was allegedly the fact that he had published a students’ resolution, which was subsequently to be translated and broadcast by Radio Free Europe, in The Times. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 67

Representative Offi ce in Warsaw. They presented an image of a country immersed in a crisis, where any opportunity for more active undertakings was, to all intents and purposes, blocked. Introducing reforms with a forward thrust was impossible; the only actions being taken were in response to the immediate challenges, which resulted in the same problems recurring with multiplied force after a certain time. Gomułka’s rivals in the PUWP were described as too weak to make a grab for power, but Gomułka himself was also presented as too weak to conduct an active policy. He was forced to adopt the populist and nationalist slogans of his rivals, at most moderating them, but was unable to suppress the radicalism of the party rank and fi le. The entire apparatus of power was represented as operating ineffectively and the people in responsible positions as afraid to make decisions. Any amendment to the foreign policy was also blocked. In the mean time, the example of Czechoslovakia was reported as presenting an additional challenge and a threat to the communist authorities in Warsaw. Sympathy for the student protests in Poland dominated in the West German press. A commentary published in Die Welt presented both protests as two opposite extremes, ‘like a grotesque and a tragedy’ (wie zwischen einer Groteske und einer Tragödie). The participants of the protests in Poland and Czechoslovakia were described as supporters of democratic freedoms which were alien to German students fascinated with communism; The commentary read “Here, it is a radical minority which demonstrates against a tolerant majority. In the East, it is a minority, moderate in its essence, which demonstrates against the radical, ruling minority”. The article pointed out that, in the Eastern bloc, a protester risked repression and brutal action on the part of the police. In the FRG, including West Berlin, a protester risked nothing as long as the legal norms were not breached. The author, Matthias Walden, emphasised that burning newspapers meant something entirely different in a system based on the freedom of the press and in the country 68 Piotr Madajczyk where the censorship existed. He wrote about the ‘demonstrations for freedom’ (Freiheitsdemonstrationen) in Poland and Czechoslovakia and about the ‘demonstrations of radicals’(Extremisten-Demonstrationen) in Germany9. These arguments were to return in Die Welt many years later, phrased as a maxim, when the students in the West were manifesting their solidarity with the Vietcong, the people in the Eastern bloc were fi ghting for freedom; ‘Freedom, and not Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh’. It was Jan Skórzyński, a guest on the pages of that German newspaper, who authored the article published under this title10. What is probably being dealt with here is the Polish experience being used in the confl icts in German domestic politics, which were also played out in the media. Debates around the assessment of the year 1968 and its impact on subsequent events were a signifi cant part of this infi ghting. A negative appraisal of ’68 dominated in Die Welt. Referring to similar assessments in Poland and, to a lesser extent, in Czechoslovakia, was of help in its criticism; hence this confrontation of the then Polish striving for freedom and the German students’ fascination with communist ideology. The message carried at that time by the press was dominated by pointing to the domestic determinants of the protests in Poland. Whilst referring to Polish society, they wrote that there was a minority which dared to protest and the passive majority which did not believe

9 Matthias Walden, “Protest in Warschau – Protest bei uns”, Die Welt, No. 61, 12 March 1968, p. 2. “Bei uns demonstriert eine extremistische Minderheit gegen eine tolerante Mehrheit, im Osten demonstriert eine dem Geiste nach maßvolle Minorität zugunsten einer unterdrückten Mehrheit gegen eine radikale, herrschende Minderheit”. “Der radikalisierte SDS und seine Gesinnungsepigonen kämpfen gegen einen Popanz ihrer ideologischen Halluzinationen und beschädigen damit bestehende Freiheit. Die Studenten von Prag und Warschau kämpfen gegen eine objektiv bestehende, konkrete Unfreiheit, deren Repräsentanten nur die Fiktion des Fortschritts anbieten”. 10 Jan Skórzyński, “Freiheit statt ‘Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh’”, Welt-Online, 11 March 2008. He concluded that, despite extrinsic similarities, the two revolts were more disparate than they had in common. They also led in a different direction, bearing in mind that many Western students drifted into anti-democratic, left-wing radicalism, while many of their Eastern counterparts evolved towards democracy and a civic society. See Appendix 5. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 69 that changes were possible. This style did not change over the following days but the reports became more detailed. They indicated that the protests were being used as an excuse to settle the score with the liberal circles in Warsaw, wherein people of Jewish extraction played a signifi cant role11. In another major article, Angela Nacken wrote about a struggle for power within the party, a palace revolution (Palastrevolution) and manipulations with the slogans of ‘counter- revolution’, and about uncertainty and silence on the part of the central authorities of the PUPW, as well as the doubts in respect of the position which would be taken by the popular Edward Gierek. She emphasised that, in a deft policy on the part of the authorities, aimed at isolating the student protests, but also used more widely to fi ght off different opposition groups, with anti-Semitism being one of the tools. Her main conclusion was that, while in October 1956, different wings of the PUPW had had to strike a compromise, 1968 had brought about a second phase of ‘the October’, this time aimed not at liberalisation, but at the rejection of compromise and the fi nal takeover of power in the PUPW by one of those wings12. After a week, news from Poland became scarce, but could still be found in almost any March issue of Frankfurter Allgemeine. News from Czechoslovakia continued to dominate as the situation in and around that country became even more tense. As far as Poland was concerned, it was reported that further ‘purges’ in the PUPW were expected, while anti-Semitism (anti-Zionism) was deemed to be the tool being used

11 “Die polnischen Studenten-Demonstrationen breiten sich aus”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 63, 14 March 1968; “Nachwirkungen der Studentenunruhen in Polen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 64, 15 March 1968. 12 “Bei dem Bemühen, die Studenten zu isolieren, glaubte die Partei auf den Antisemitismus setzen zu können und beschuldigte ´zionistische Elemente´ als Inspiratoren der Demonstrationen. [...] Auch mit den Revisionisten wird abgerechnet, ebenso mit den Vertretern eines aufgeklärten Marxismus und den Kritikern der Kulturpolitik der Partei aus den Reihen der Schriftstellern”, Angela Nacken, “Polnischer Oktober – zweite Etappe”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 66, 18 March 1968. 70 Piotr Madajczyk to carry them out and evidence that the epoch which had commenced in October 1956 had come to an end. A rising sense of horror ‘primarily among the Poles of Jewish origin’, at the rallying cries to fi ght the ‘Zionists’, ‘cosmopolites’, ‘national nihilists’, ‘enemies of the nation’ and ‘ideological saboteurs’ was pointed out13. Moreover, a widespread support for these slogans was perceived to exist among the ranks of the PUPW, a support which Gomułka was unable to control. There are no grounds for making a fundamental distinction between the information published by the West German press and that arriving by diplomatic channels. One may recall the assessment, made by a West German diplomat in Paris and shared by the West German Foreign Ministry, to the effect that information arriving at the French Foreign Ministry from the bloc states was very extensive but, in terms of substance, it contributed no more, in any aspect, than the information published in the press14. This was in mid-March. It was known that, unlike Czechoslovakia, the student protests in Poland had its sources outside the party, while the students had not played a decisive role in the outbreak of the Prague Spring. In Poland, despite the fact that an overwhelming majority of the society rejected the system, the student protest failed to obtain support to any larger extent. The pattern of group fi ghting for domination within the PUPW was not particularly clear to the West Germans, albeit that their forecasts unanimously envisaged that the manner in which this confl ict was being fought out would have a negative impact on the authorities’ credibility and prestige. Angela Nacken based her assessments on grounds equally as uncertain as those of ambassador Manfred Klaiber, who, in his dispatches from Paris to his head offi ce, wrote that Gomułka’s position

13 Cf. “Diffamierungs-Kampagne erschreckt Polen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 68, 20 March 1968. 14 Telex from the FRG ambassador, M. Klaiber, No. 611 from Paris, dated 14 March 1968, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (hereinafter: PA AA), f. 40, vol. 161, pp. 131–133. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 71 was weakening and that he might be replaced by the so-called ‘Partisans’, but that Moscow does not, however, support such a solution, which would mean a stronger resorting to a nationalist ideology and a more independent foreign policy15. The head of the FRG Commercial Representative Ofﬁ ce in Warsaw, Heinrich Böx, analysed the situation among the Polish leaders, concluding, like Nacken, that the arrayment of forces is unclear and that it is impossible to say whether Gomułka will manage to control the developments, because of Mieczysław Moczar, anti-Semitism and so forth. The beginning of his telex message resembled part of the FAZ article:

Thousands of manifestations keep the party and the population on the move. The propaganda trumpets that Poland is in danger. [That] World Jewry threatens the existence of the state. [That] hostile forces have penetrated the structures of the leadership in the country, acting on the orders of imperialism in order to destroy socialism. [That] the leading centres are probably located in the U.S., Israel and the FRG. Demands are voiced in innumerable resolutions for Poland’s leaders to cleanse the party, state, economy and scholarship from dangerous elements, irrespective of persons and position. The movement has gained in both force and the extent of its impact out of all proportion to the cause. The propaganda, which raises memories of the years of Hitler, is an excuse for numerous dismissals in science, culture and administration, primarily of Poles of Jewish origin16.

15 “Gomulka erfreue sich daher jetzt erst recht das Vertrauens des Kremls, der alle Hebel in Bewegung setzte, um zu verhindern, dass nun auch noch in Polen Nationalisten die Fuehrung uebernehmen”, a telex message from the FRG ambassador, M. Klaiber, No. 927 from Paris, of 30 April 1968, PA AA, f. 40, vol. 161, p. 136. 16 “Tausende von Kundgebungen halten Partei und Bevölkerung in Bewegung. Propaganda trommelt, dass Polen in Gefahr sei. Weltjudentum bedrohe Existenz des Staates. Feindliche Kräfte hätten Führungsstruktur im Lande durchsetzt. Sie handeln im Auftrag des Imperialismus, Sozialismus zu zerstören. Steuerzentren laegen vornehmlich in USA, Israel und Bundesrepublik. In unzaehligen Resolutionen wird Fuehrung Polens aufgefordert, Partei, Staat, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft von gefaehrlichen Elementen ohne Ruecksicht auf Person und Stellung zu saeubern. Bewegung hat Gewicht und Breite angenommen, die in keinem Verhaeltnis mehr zu Anlass stehen. Propaganda, die alle Erinnerungen an Hitlerzeit hervorruft, wird als Vorwand zu zahlreichen Entlassungen, vornehmlich von Polen juedischer Herkunft in Wissenschaft, Kultur und Verwaltung benutzt”, cf. his telex No. 99 of 2 April 1968, PA AA, f. 117, vol. 3. 72 Piotr Madajczyk

It is worth adding that, by the time he held offi ce in Warsaw, Böx was probably already having an affair with Helge Berger, who worked at the Commercial Representative Offi ce and, simultaneously, for the GRD’s intelligence. He also raised doubts on the part of the West German counter-intelligence17. True, nothing was proven against him, but the ambiguous atmosphere might have resulted in his dispatches being regarded with some distance by the Foreign Ministry. However, it had to be accepted that, in view of the limited information on the developments in Poland, the dispatches sent by the Commercial Representative Offi ce in Warsaw had any impact on Bonn’s position, then they pointed more to a moderate stance on the part of Gomułka, who, attempting to restrain the escalation, was retreating under the pressure of the situation in domestic politics. It was in such a manner that the offi ce reported the speech delivered by Gomułka on 19 March 1968, in which he portrayed the students as unaware and manipulated, while the Jewish and German issues were given moderate treatment18. The Representative Offi ce was more interested in Polish-German relations, hence the propagandist accusations that the FRG was running an anti-Polish campaign together with the ‘Zionists’, which implied that Bonn was co-responsible for the protests in Poland, were registered more attentively. Criticism by the communist authorities in Warsaw of the students in West Berlin, who sympathised with their Polish peers, allegations of spying and acts of sabotage in collaboration with Radio Free Europe, as well as with ‘Zionist’ and ‘anti-socialist’ forces and ‘elements’ hostile to Poland within the country were also noted as belonging to the same campaign19.

17 “Schmutzige Wäsche” Spiegel-Online, No. 22, 24 May 1976. 18 Telex from the FRG’s Commercial Representative Ofﬁ ce in Warsaw (CRO), No. 88, Böx, 21 March 1968, PA AA, f. 117, vol. 3. 19 Telex from the FRG’s CRO in Warsaw, Böx, No. 82, 5 March 1968, PA AA, f. 42, vol. 183. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 73

News from Poland became even more scarce in FAZ as of April, and even in the last week of March in Die Welt. It was no longer printed on the front page in FAZ but, even before this, much more attention was being paid to, for example, the new accents in the Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) foreign policy. It briefl y reported the persisting pressure in Poland to cleanse the authorities and the scholarly milieu, through the use of slogans proclaiming the threat on the part of ‘Zionism’. A provisional summary of the situation was provided by Angela Nacken’s article from 8th April 1968. By looking at the infi ghting among the Polish authorities, she concluded that the organisers of the campaign had managed to create a situation where a dismissal of various people from their positions was decided not by the party authorities but by a kind of plebiscite, ‘the voice of the people’. She continued with an analysis of the fi ghting within the Party, but, at the end of her article, she came to an important conclusion:

The basis of the Party’s (PUPW – PM) claim on power is evolving towards a national consensus. A total involvement, a total profession of belonging to the nation and a total acceptance of communism on the Polish road to socialism is being called for20.

Using the word ‘total’ was, indeed, an exaggeration, but what the West German correspondent had perceived was a principal change in the manner in which the authorities were striving to mobilise support in society. The splits and inﬁ ghting in Poland were known to every Western diplomat and journalist who dealt with those issues. Another article was published on 15th April by Der Spiegel. It erroneously connected

20 “Der nationale Konsensus wird zur Basis des Herrschaftsanspruches der Partei. Verlangt wird das totale Engagement, das totale Bekenntnis zur Nation und die totale Bejahung des kommunistischen Systems auf dem polnischen Weg zum Sozialismus”, Angela Nacken, “Polens neue Welle”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 84, 8 April 1968. 74 Piotr Madajczyk

Moczar’s activity in the sixties with his position as the head of militia in Kielce, which he was alleged to have held during the notorious pogrom against the Jews in that city in 1946. It also, of course, referred to the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy (Związek Bojowników o Wolność i Demokrację; ZBOWiD), Moczar’s infl uence he had on the press and television, using the security service and gathering compromising materials against political opponents, as well as anti- Semitism. A phrase from the Belgrade ‘Komunist’, which referred to applying criteria from the National Socialist Der Stürmer, was quoted. The article noted that Moczar’s infl uence in the PUPW was being blocked and that the power struggle within the party continued. Moscow’s apprehension with regard to nationalist tendencies in Poland, mentioned here previously, was referred to, but so was the forced resignation of Edward Ochab, which was contrary to the former argument. The text fully focused on the intra-party power struggle and the use of anti-Semitism as a tool in the fi ght. Anti-Semitism in the Polish society was not mentioned at all21. A report by Böx from 15th April, had a similar structure. His argument revolved around the crisis of the authoritarian system which, in a diffi cult situation, was seeking scapegoats. He described the social feelings in Poland in terms similar to those used by the FAZ correspondent, Angela Nacken, who had written of the limited support for the protest. According to Böx, “Poland has changed and the changes have begun. The demands put forward in respect of the regime touch upon the fundamental, Marxist-Leninist base of the state”. He then listed the demands for changes, for democratisation, for freedom of conscience and denomination, in culture and science, for the abolishment of censorship and for independence from the Soviet Union. He also described how the authorities had managed to quell the protest,

21 “Polens Machtkampf. Weg der Untergangs”, Der Spiegel, 15 April 1968. See Appendix 1. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 75 which had failed to get wider circles of society involved. One of the reasons he gave for this was the fact that “the intelligentsia in Poland lives in a world of its own. It does not speak on behalf of the masses. It is almost like a gentry of contemporary times”. In his opinion, it was unable to exploit the potential of the discontent in society. Böx analysed the changes at the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pointing to an element which had not emerged in Angela Nacken’s report at all, namely, the existence within the army of a group which aspired to a policy more independent from Moscow. In his opinion, it was the failure to get this group under control which had resulted in Marshal Marian Spychalski (The Minister of Defence at the time) being replaced by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who, as Böx wrote, was to guarantee that the armed forces would hold to the course of the closest cooperation with the USSR. He was also convinced that a similar role fell to Adam Kruczkowski as a new deputy minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He envisaged Poland’s increased dependence on Moscow and, most probably, its remaining in an unpleasant situation as a domestically unstable USSR’s satellite22. The atmosphere of ambiguity continued. In May, Böx wrote that Adam Rapacki, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had not, in all likelihood, had a heart attack, because he had been seen in Warsaw, which implied that his political career was presumably coming to an end23. The ofﬁ cial West German assessment of the situation in Poland is well illustrated by a phrase used during a meeting with the Chancellor of foreign policy issues in May 1968: “What can be said of the situation

22 “Polen hat sich geändert. Es ist in Bewegung geraten. Die Forderungen an das Regime rühren an die Grundfesten des marxistisch-leninistischen Staatsgebildes [...]. Die Intelligenz in Polen lebt in einer eigenen Welt. Sie spricht nicht für die Massen. Sie ist fast die Slachta der Neuzeit.”, telegramme of the FRG CRO from Warsaw, No. 107, Böx, 15 April 1968, PA AA, f. 117, vol. 3. 23 Telegram from the FRG CRO in Warsaw, No. 121, Böx, 27 April 1968, PA AA, f. 117, vol. 3. 76 Piotr Madajczyk in Poland is that a shake-up and anxiety can be seen there; we should maintain contacts with caution”24. West Germany’s diplomacy preferred not to take any offi cial position at all. In accordance with the advice of its representative in Warsaw, it should consist, as had already happened quite often, of waiting, refraining from comments on the domestic events in Poland, watching the situation carefully and re-commencing talks, primarily with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when the time was right, but not attempting them right then because that might end in a compromising situation for the FRG. Waiting seemed to be the most sensible solution, bearing in mind that, according to Böx, the crisis in Poland had brought the existence of a domestic opposition which held a different vision of Polish foreign policy, including that toward the FRG, to the fore25. For the West German press, the events in Prague or Czechoslovakia’s attempts to establish closer economic relationships with the West were more important. After the assassination attempt on the life of Rudi Dutschke, on 11th April, the media were dominated by the concerns of domestic politics. At the end of 1968 and the beginning of 1969, the West German press referred, at most, to the changes under way after the intervention in Czechoslovakia and, obviously, to Moscow’s policy. Attention was raised by the situation in Yugoslavia and Romania, two countries which demonstrated independence from Moscow among the communist states mostly. Polish issues did not make the news. Browsing through FAZ on the fi rst anniversary of the intervention in Czechoslovakia, one would have come across articles condemning Moscow’s policy and its justifi cations

24 Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (hereinafter: AAP BRD) 1968, vol. I, doc. 146. 25 Telex message from the CRO in Warsaw, Böx, No. 104, 8 April 1968, PA AA, f. 117, vol. 3. Böx thought that the suggestions on the part of the US and French embassies to the effect that the FRG should keep resubmitting its proposals for an agreement were mistaken, because it would only be an unproductive reiterating of earlier declarations. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 77 of the operation, as well as those criticising the pressure exerted on the Czechoslovakian authorities in order to make them more resolute in conducting a policy compliant with the objectives of the USSR. It seems that the important role played by Walter Ulbricht in making the decision to intervene was better noticed by the West German politicians than by the journalists. It was also mentioned by Chancellor Kiesinger, who deemed it to be an important, but not critical, factor in the decision to intervene, because Moscow would not let itself be manipulated to such a degree26. Indeed, it turned out to be impossible to arrive at more precise conclusions regarding his role, with the background papers prepared for the British-West German consultations at the end of October stating:

We still lack substantial and reliable information about the role that Ulbricht’s regime played in the military intervention in Czechoslovakia. According to some sources, Ulbricht’s urging for military intervention was a key factor in the Soviet action of August 21. Other sources point out that Ulbricht was reluctant to go beyond political pressure for fear of damaging his image and his campaign for international recognition27.

Ulbricht’s role was considered to be marginal by the West German press, which was not to arrive at an opinion that it should be accounted for to a larger extent in an analysis, as should the inﬂ uence of the Polish and East German communists on Moscow’s taking the decision to intervene, until years later28.

26 “Er glaube, daß die Sowjets letztlich selber diese Entscheidung getroffen hatten und es nicht etwa Herrn Ulbricht überließen, die Sowjetunion auf einen gefährlichen Weg zu führen”, AAP BRD 1968, vol. II, doc. 275. 27 “East-German role in the invasion of Czechoslovakia”, Consultations 24 April 1968, PA AA, f. 40, vol. 158, pp. 552–556, here p. 553. 28 Cf. “Ost-Berlin hetzte zum Schlag gegen Prag”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 279, 28 November 2008, p. L19, in discussing a book by Stefan Karner, Natalja Tomilina and Alexandr Tschubarjan (eds.), Prager Frühling. Das internationale Krisenjahr 1968, Köln – Wien 2008. 78 Piotr Madajczyk

In various materials, including those circulating on the Internet at present, it is also easier to fi nd references, in the form of caricature, to Ulbricht’s dogmatic stance in respect of the Prague Spring than to that of Gomułka. This may result from the fact that Ulbricht and, later, Honecker, became the ‘bad guys’ of the GDR, thus giving rise to the emphasis, which I do not assume is deliberate, of their negative attitude towards the democratic transformations. It is in such a context that a caricature often emerges portraying Ulbricht as a teacher giving his student, Dubček, a German grade ‘6’, that is to say, a ‘Fail’, for his dictation exercise on ‘True Socialism’. It has proved impossible to fi nd a similar caricature of Gomułka, despite the fact that he was no less fi erce opponent of the Prague Spring than Ulbricht, while enjoying a greater infl uence on the decisions being made in Moscow.

True Socialism (a dicta on exercise). Ulbricht: Student Dubček has failed!

Source: Haus der Geschichte, Bonn. EB-No. 1998/03/010.00904. Author: Peter Leger. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 79

When the unrest which had begun in Poland in the late seventies kept escalating, a question was raised as to what degree the Brezhnev doctrine, articulated in 1968, still held true. Even before the strikes in August 1980, Der Spiegel asked whether the crisis in Poland would lead to similar social unrest as had occurred in 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976 and whether it would provoke a nervous Soviet reaction and intervention. These questions were asked in 1976 when the crisis and resistance against the communist authorities continued to grow29. According to Der Spiegel, most of the Polish opposition, as well as the leaders of the Catholic Church, including Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński (the Primate of Poland), feared that the situation would take precisely such a turn30. In reﬂ ection of this mood, the photo which illustrated the aforesaid article was captioned “Polish dissidents: ‘a sense of responsibility for the nation’”. This question also kept recurring in subsequent months and years. On 6th October 1980 Der Spiegel was asking whether the relaxing of censorship could become a challenge to the communist system similar to that which had occurred during the Prague Spring31, and whether the Gdańsk Beginning would end with the Prague Finale (Nimmt der Danziger Anfang ein Prager Ende?).

29 “Fünf Küsse”, Der Spiegel, 16 February 1976. 30 The article quoted an excerpt from a statement issued by the Polish Episcopal Conference: “Jeder, der eine Handlung unternimmt, muß sich von Besonnenheit und dem Gefühl der Verantwortung für die Nation leiten lassen, die Umstände von Ort und Zeit berücksichtigen”, “Hoffen auf Gott”, Der Spiegel, 31 December 1979. 31 “Ein Regierungssprecher kündigte gar an, die wichtigste Stütze des Regimes werde nun gelockert: die Zensur. Das klingt gefährlich nach Prager Frühling: 1968 hatte der tschechoslowakische Fernsehdirektor Jiri Pelikan, einst (mit Honecker und Arafat) Weltjugendfunktionär, die Pressefreiheit ausbrechen lassen – wichtigster Anlaß der Sowjet-Intervention”, “Polen: Kanias schwieriger Balance-Akt”, Der Spiegel, No. 42, 13 October 1980. 80 Piotr Madajczyk

Polish dissidents: @a sense of responsibility for the na onA

Source: Der Spiegel, 31 December 1979.

From August 1980, during the Solidarity era, comparisons were made in the FRG of the Soviet reactions to the developments in Poland and to the Prague Spring in 196832. The Prague Spring continued to recur as a reference point because it was a pre-Solidarity crisis which had shaken the Soviet bloc. This gave rise to making associations between the two and thus to questions regarding the earlier intervention in Czechoslovakia and its possible repetition in Poland. No references were made in this context to the Polish participation in the intervention

32 “In Worten haben sowjetische Schreiber mit der Polen-Krise fast schon jene in der CSSR vom Sommer ’68 überboten. In Warschau herrschen, glaubt man ihnen, Konterrevolution und faschistische Verschwörung”, “Agenten der Gestapo”, Der Spiegel, 27 April 1981. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 81 in 1968. Comparisons were made, between the situation of the two democratic movements in the Eastern bloc in an attempt to draw a conclusion as to whether the threats from Moscow may materialise, which is to say, whether it was possible that Moscow would react to Solidarity in the same manner as it had done to the Prague Spring. The 1968 intervention was perceived primarily as a mechanism aimed at maintaining the cohesion of the Eastern bloc.

The issue of anti-Semitism and the emigration of the Jews from Poland

In the late spring and early summer of 1968, the West German diplomats in Warsaw judged that Gomułka’s team had mitigated the anti-Semitic slogans, restricting them to the claim regarding the role of ‘Zionism’ in provoking the March events and distancing themselves from the later anti-Semitic utterances33. The change was too small to form a conclusion that the anti-Semitic campaign had been interrupted, but it was perceptible. Gans, in his report from the plenary sitting of the Central Committee of the PUWP on 8th–9th July, wrote that ‘Zionism’ was now regarded ‘merely’ as ‘one of the reactionary tendencies’, that devotion (Ergebenheit) to the USSR was emphasised, but that attacks on the FRG were ‘relatively restrained’34. In autumn 1968, the West German diplomats in Warsaw came to the conclusion that, having calmed down at the July plenary sitting of the Central Committee of the PUWP, ‘anti-Zionism’ had recurred, emerging in ofﬁ cial speeches and in the press.

33 Telex from the CRO in Warsaw, Gans, No. 168, 10 June 1968, PA AA, f. 42, vol. 183. See also: CRO in Warsaw, Böx, 13 May 1968, ibidem. 34 Telex from the CRO in Warsaw, Gans, No. 207, 10 July 1968, PA AA, f. 42, vol. 183. 82 Piotr Madajczyk

At the outset, the West German knowledge of the departures of people of Jewish origin was probably very incomplete. In early 1969, Böx asked his head offi ce to send him an Institute of Jewish Affairs’ publication with the names of one hundred and fi fty-two prominent ‘Polish Jews’ who had lost their positions in the preceding months. He explained that only a small number of them was known to the Representative Offi ce in Warsaw from available sources35. In 1969, the emigration of the Jews from Poland continued. It was not only closely observed both by the diplomats and the mass media but was also watched with great attention in Germany and the Scandinavian countries. While the issue of Poland’s involvement in the intervention in Czechoslovakia had abated by the end of 1969, that of the emigration of the Jews and people of Jewish origin was becoming more and more vocal. Immediately following the events of March, anti-Semitism was considered as an element of the policy on the part of the authorities in Warsaw and as a tool of the intra-party power struggle. Then, it was even more strongly associated with the issue of anti-Semitism in Poland. Related disputes escalated in late 1969 and early 1970. During that time, the international context also changed. In 1968, the attention of the media and diplomats was focused on the events in Czechoslovakia and the policy on the part of Moscow. The wave of emotions after the intervention slowly calmed down, sanctions were discontinued and attempts were made to return to the politics of detente. In March 1969, the Declaration of Budapest (17th March 1969), which appealed for a European Security Conference to be set up, was published. The policy of European states aimed at this direction. The Soviet policy was becoming more fl exible, it left more freedom to the states of the bloc and it seemed to take into better account the fact that it was rivalry in economic and technological development, which was of

35 CRO in Warsaw to AA, 13 January 1969, betr. Veröffentlichung des “Instituts of Jewish Affairs”, f. 117, vol. 68. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 83 paramount importance. At the same time, the opinion in Bonn was that Gomułka’s position in the apparatus of power had become strengthened. The successive escalation of anti-Semitic speeches and of emigration from Poland attracted the attention of the international public opinion. After being dampened down in July, the recurrence of the anti-Semitic rhetoric in Poland had already been noted by observers after the intervention in Czechoslovakia. It resulted in the number of Jews leave the country, which increased to around two hundred per month36. In March, along with the proclamation of the Declaration of Budapest, Der Spiegel published a list of Mieczysław Moczar’s collaborators, claiming that all of them had a fascist past37. The list illustrates the climate existing at the time in the FRG in respect of the political situation in Poland, albeit that one might have reservations as to the manner in which the notion of ‘fascism’ was being juggled, bearing in mind that it was being applied by the editors of Der Spiegel to an entire pre-war, national grouping in Poland, rather than to its radical wing. The ‘Partisan’ movement was seen in the same terms. The climate not only in the West German, but also in the wider Western media context and the reaction of the Polish authorities to the mood, is best illustrated by a study drawn up in January 1970 by the Göttinger Kreis. Its authors described the reaction of the Polish authorities to the violent attacks against them appearing in the

36 “Es scheint, dass als ‘Antizionismus’ politisch verbraente Antisemitismus, nachdem er auf ZK-Plenum im Juli eine Niederlage erlitten hatte, wieder auﬂ ebt. Vokabel ‘Zionismus’ taucht erneut in der Presse und in Reden prominenter Parteimitglieder auf. Es passt ins Bild, dass Parteiideologe Kliszko, der auf Juli-Plenum des ZK antizionistische Kampagne fuer beendet erklaert hatte, sich, wie auch Gomulka, zum Thema ‘Zionismus’ beharrlich ausschweigt”, telex message from the CRO in Warsaw, No. 329, 21 October 1968, 117, Vol. 3. 37 “Flucht im Expreß”, Spiegel-Online, No. 12, 17 March 1969. Mieczysław Moczar’s anti-Semitic involvement and his forcing of between eighteen and twenty-ﬁ ve thousand Polish Jews to emigrate was also emphasised in 1986 in a short notice about his death. (“Mieczyslaw Moczar”, Spiegel-Online, No. 46, 10 November 1986). 84 Piotr Madajczyk

West German press, which is to say, primarily to accusations of anti- -Semitism. In this assessment, the propaganda disseminated by the Polish authorities attempted to marginalise the accusations of anti-Semitism, to present them as tendentious and slanderous and to draw the attention to other issues. The indignation of the Polish authorities was raised by the Western press referring to the emigrating Jews as ‘the Polish fugitives’ or ‘expellees’ (Ausgewiesene). Using such descriptions was associated with “a horrible campaign meted out by hostile circles”38. The study indicated that the campaign included accusing the Western media of harming the manifestations of détente in Europe and the new climate, as well as the building of conﬁ dence in relations between Poland and the FRG. Its authors quoted part of a Polish Radio programme from 3rd December 1969:

Now, when certain signs of detente can be seen both in Europe as a whole, as well as between Poland and Western Germany, they are put at risk in order to poison the new climate. It is known who is set on this and who is, in fact, exploiting this campaign.

The study associated these accusations with allegations against the Landsmannschaften39, which the campaign portrayed as aggressively anti-Polish and attempting to take the stage as the “defenders of the Jews allegedly persecuted in Poland”. It also quoted another Polish Radio programme, this time from 19th December, which emphasised the threat to the detente in Europe in even stronger terms:

[...] when the opponents of the Ostpolitik of the new government of the FRG attempt to discredit not only the fundamental possibility of negotiating with

38 The study: “Göttinger Kreis: Warschauer Polemik gegen westliche Pressestimmen zum jüngsten Antisemitismus in der VR Polen”, 20 January 1970, PA AA, f. 117, vol. 68. 39 Regional associations in West Germany of the post-World War II expellees. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 85

Warsaw, but the very partner in the negotiations, Poland itself, they have done nothing more than ‘shifted the centre of gravity’ of their attacks on this policy.

The analysis suggested that what the Polish authorities wanted to achieve in such a manner was to make West German public opinion change its attitude and withdraw its support for the new policy of the FRG’s government. According to the Polish press, the general attack on Poland in the Western media was a planned and well-organised campaign rather than an accident40. The study quoted here claimed that, under the approach adopted by the Polish propaganda, Poland was unable to accept the accusations of anti-Semitism articulated in Germany. According to Warsaw, the Germans had already levelled such allegations against the Poles during the barbaric German occupation. Now, when swastikas were being painted on synagogues in the FRG, attempts were being made to divert attention from the racism existing in the FRG itself. The authors of the study pointed out that the Polish media were proffering explanations to the effect that the West German accusations of anti-Semitism were an attempt to distract attention from the growing inﬂ uences of the National Socialist organisations in the FRG, described as “the racist mist hovering over Rhein”. Opponents of the recognition of the border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers were being equated with those who accused Poland of anti-Semitism. Thus, the study suggested, in the Polish media the campaign of allegations of anti-Semitism against Poland was being merged with the campaign opposing the recognition of the border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse into a single whole and branded as “a campaign with a common, anti-Polish denominator”. The Polish media were not even attempting to respond substantively to the criticism, claiming instead that it was the German national identity which held true to a speciﬁ c form, based on prejudice against other

40 “Göttinger Kreis...”. 86 Piotr Madajczyk nations and a lack of knowledge of history, including the scale of the persecutions of the Jews in the III Reich and the occupied countries, as well as the anti-Semite attitudes still existing in the FRG41. Another method used in the Polish propaganda is exempliﬁ ed by an article published in a daily broadsheet Życie Warszawy (Warsaw Life) edition of 28th/29th December 1969. It consisted of discrediting the Western journalists who criticised the discrimination against the Jews in Poland. One example was the case of the Bonn correspondent of Berlingske Tidende, Henrik Bonde-Henriksen. The Polish media attempted to portray him as a nationalist, a person lacking seriousness, a laughing stock among other journalists, and, at the same time, a collaborator of ‘Zionism’ who was being deftly used by the ‘Zionists’42. The Foreign Ministry in Bonn did not quite know how to react to the events in Poland and the commentaries on them published in the West German media. On the one hand, it was not possible to ignore the indignation of Western public opinion, which was, of course, particularly visible in the media. On the other hand, for the reasons referred to earlier, Bonn was set on the continuation of the policy of détente and the West German diplomacy was aware that Poland reacts nervously to raising Jewish issues. An exchange between Marion von Dönhoff and Ryszard Wojna was recalled, as were the comments made by Ambassador Lucjan Piątkowski when he delivered the Polish note

41 Ibidem. The article referred to here is A. St.’s, “O co tym razem chodzi” [What It’s All about This Time], in: Trybuna Ludu [The People’s Tribune], No. 350, 18 December 1969. 42 Warschauer Polemik… “Could it be that the Zionist lobby in Bonn made the decision to use a third party, and, for better effect, one of Danish nationality? [...] These pronouncements seem to be part of a new phase of the anti-Polish campaign, already joined by the Springer press and the professional expellee milieux”, Ryszard Drecki, “Duńczyk z kurą w głowie” [A Dane with a Hen on His Mind], Życie Warszawy, No. 309, 28/29 December 1969. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 87 on 22 December 1969, to the effect that touching upon this topic does not serve the Polish-German talks43. In January 1970, Böx drew up a major report on the problem of anti-Semitism and the emigration of the Jews from Poland. In the summary, he emphasised that,

[...] Inasmuch as the ofﬁ cial Polish reaction is addressed at the articles in the Western press which sketch, without any restraints, parallels with the III Reich, it is not completely unjustiﬁ ed. The reaction of the largest part of the Polish public opinion is, at its best, indifferent; in its majority, however, it supports [the emigration of the Jews – PM].

Moreover, he clearly called Bonn to approve the emigration to the FRG for those wishing to leave. The phrase “the emergency situation should be taken into account”, indicates that the West German authorities looked upon the inﬂ ow of Jewish emigrants from Poland unfavourably and were not granting them approval for entry in the short time which they had to obtain a visa before leaving. This would certainly have required a departure from the standard procedures, as the consideration of a visa application was a lengthy process44. Böx’s report deserves a more detailed scrutiny. He described the post-1945 situation of the Jewish community in Poland, with successive waves of emigration, ﬁ rst in the second half of the forties and then after

43 German Foreign Ministry letter to the FRG’s CRO in Warsaw, 30 December 1969, betr.: „Auswanderung polnischer Juden”, PA AA, f. 17, vol. 68. 44 “Die offi zielle polnische Reaktion ist nicht ganz unberechtigt, soweit sie sich gegen westliche Presseartikel richtet, die uneingeschränkt Parallelen zum III. Reich ziehen. Die Reaktion der grössten Teils der polnischen Öffentlichkeit ist bestenfalls indifferent, überwiegend jedoch zustimmend. Offi zielle westliche Kommentare würden an den Verhältnissen nichts ändern und möglicherweise die Auswanderung gefährden. Bei Anträgen auf Einreisegenehmigung in die Bundesrepublik sollte den besonderen Verhältnissen Rechnung getragen werden”, Letter from the FRG’s CRO in Warsaw, 26 January 1970, betr. “Auswanderung polnischer Juden“, Kurzfassung, PA AA, f. 17, vol. 68. 88 Piotr Madajczyk the Polish October, as a result of which around thirty to forty thousand remained. He stated that, on his return to power, Gomułka had calmed the atmosphere but that he was neither able to eliminate the hidden anti- -Semitism which persisted in Polish society or to quash it when it was used as an instrument in the infi ghting between the factions within the PUWP. He had, however, put the anti-Jewish purges to an end, apart from the one which took place in the Ministry of the Interior. The report went on to say that, in June 1967, under the pressure exerted by the so-called Partisans, he had come to the conclusion that he would have to use political anti-Semitism himself as a tool in the power struggle; this, however, provided the Partisans with an impulse to launch the anti- -Zionist campaign. The report goes on to say that ‘Zionism’ also served to explain the regime’s domestic failures and to mobilise Polish society against the attacks on the part of world public opinion, which were presented as having been prepared by ‘World Zionism’. This resulted in the purges in every area of social and political life, albeit that they did not affect everyone of Jewish origin. They bore fi rst upon those in high-ranking positions, descending subsequently. Böx noted that the campaign had strongly affected the assimilated Jewish families, which is to say, the people who identifi ed themselves as Poles, who were often involved in the communist movement, who had Gentile spouses and who did not feel tied to Israel to any degree. The reaction on the part of the majority of society was indifferent and the attempt undertaken by Gomułka to put an end to this campaign by introducing a distinction between the Jews who were ‘Zionist’ and those who were ‘Polish patriots’ had failed. The little time left by the authorities between the issue of a travel document and its expiry date made the formal obtaining of a visa to the states of the West impossible. In this situation, it was the Danish and Swedish authorities who were extending a helping hand45.

45 Ibidem. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 89

The report then stated that, in order to counter the atmosphere generated by the commentaries being published in the Western media, the Polish authorities were positing that there was no anti-Semitism in Poland, that only those who were actively pro-Israel were being dismissed from their positions. Poland also claimed that emigration was voluntary and that the anti-Polish campaign in the media was harming the efforts aimed at détente in Europe. It is this section which deserves particular attention, because here Böx pointed out a signifi cant difference between the perspectives of the media and of diplomacy. In his assessment, while the fi rst types of argument elicited no interest in the West, the last of them, the political one, hit the target and did infl uence Western politicians. Moreover, he suggested that any comparisons to the III Reich were exaggerated, bearing in mind that they were being applied to Poland where, after an end was put to the most radical part of the campaign in 1968, subtler forms of discrimination, often invisible to an observer remaining on the outside, were brought into play in order to compel people to emigrate. Apart from that, the authorities could count on support on the part of the majority of society. The maintaining of the simplifi ed departure procedures after 1 September 1969 had resulted both from the so-called Partisans’ drive to ‘cleanse’ Poland and from the willingness on the part of Gomułka to make emigration available to the relevant people, at the very least, since he was unable to help them in any other way. As already mentioned, Böx called the authorities in Bonn to speed up the granting of visas to those willing to leave for West Germany. He simultaneously declared that the issuing of any offi cial statements and undertaking of any actions by the Bonn authorities would be a mistake, because the Polish authorities would respond to them by recalling the period of World War II and, in the end, nothing would change46. From

46 Ibidem. 90 Piotr Madajczyk the point of view of the talks between Poland and the FRG which were to commence in late 1969 – early 1970, what was particularly important was the fact that in his reports, Böx clearly did not lay the responsibility for the anti-Semitic action at the feet of Gomułka. In the major report just discussed, Gomułka was presented as having retreated under the pressure exerted by the so-called Partisans and as having tried to restrain the anti-Semitic campaign and limit the extent of the purges. In view of such perceptions, the indignation and criticism which dominated in the West German media were accompanied by restraint in the workings of Bonn’s diplomacy. The problem of Polish anti- Semitism was to recur, however, even after 1970, which is to say, after the ruling group in Warsaw changed. This emerged, inter alia, in 1973, when the thirtieth anniversary of the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto was commemorated. The commemoration did not trigger emotions comparable to those which had arisen earlier. However, the reactions were followed very closely in the diplomatic dispatches from Warsaw, which noted the emphasis the Poles placed on Polish aid to the Jews, the treating of the Jewish resistance movement as just a part of the Polish one, the attacks levelled at the West for the lack of any active assistance during the war, the diminishing of the signiﬁ cance of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising to a minimum and the marginalisation of the very commemorations themselves, with no information in the media, a minimum involvement on the part of society at large, an absence on the part of the leading politicians and a passing over of the participants in the uprising while giving prominence to the activists of the Union of the Fighters for Freedom and Democracy. The author of the report concluded that,

The commemoration leaves an impression that the Polish leadership were set on distancing themselves from the anti-Jewish campaigns of the past and The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 91

on obtaining a ‘vote of approval’ from the Jews surviving in Poland, by now already scarce47.

At the same time, on the pages of the Der Spiegel, news could be found of a changed situation, whereby a journalist, Roman Juryś, had launched a legal action against Władysław Machejek in reaction to a text published in a newspaper and describing the former as acting on an order issued by Simon Wiesenthal48. The reporter described this as a mark of a new climate, wherein such insinuations now resulted in a court trial rather than persecution by the secret services and emigration. At the same time, Western diplomats’ dispatches advised of the publication of a book by Wacław Szafrański, whom the Neue Zürcher Zeitung identiﬁ ed as Ignacy Krasicki49. Entitled “In Simon Wiesenthal’s Net”, it enjoyed a laudatory review in Nowe Drogi (The New Ways), but raised doubts as to whether it was related to another attempt to revive anti-Semitic feelings50. The dispatches also reported

47 “Die Feierlichkeiten erweckten den Eindruck, als ob der polnischen Führung besonders daran gelegen ist, sich von den antijüdischen Kampagnen der Vergangenheit zu distanzieren und sich von den noch wenigen in Polen lebenden Juden ‘Absolution’ erteilen zu lassen”, Report No. 214-320.10-814/73, Ellerkmann, betr. “Feierlichkeiten aus Anlass des 30. Jahrestages des Ghettoaufstandes in Warschau”, 27 April 1973, PA AA, f. 117, vol. 8817. 48 “In den Abgrund”, Spiegel-Online, No. 13, 20 March 1972 and No. 9, 26 February 1973. 49 “Polnische Denkwürdigkeiten”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 21 February 1973. It was ascertained in the article that, following Gierek’s quelling of the anti-Semitic campaign, it had now returned in a more acute form (Stürmer-Stil), with allegations levelled not only at Wiesenthal, but also at Polish and Czechoslovakian intellectuals and politicians of Jewish origin. Accusations of links with Wiesenthal were also made against Western correspondents, such as Philippe Ben of Le Monde, Der Spiegel, The New York Times, the BBC, Reuters and so forth. 50 “Auf das Buch von Szafrański und die Rezension in ‘Nowe Drogi’ angesprochen, meinte der Chefredakteur des Parteiorganes ‘Trybuna Ludu’ und ZK-Kandidat, Barecki, gegenüber meinem Vertreter, man könne unterschiedlicher Meinung darüber sein, ob so ein Buch sinnvoll sei. Barecki fügte allerdings hinzu, die Vermutung, es könnte sich um ein Wiederauﬂ eben des Antizionismus in Polen handeln, sei falsch. Das Buch sei 92 Piotr Madajczyk that Leopold Trepper, the founder of the Red Orchestra, was continuing his efforts aimed at obtaining permission to leave Poland. The sections of Folks-Sztyme (The People’s Voice) written in Yiddish were comprehended by too few readers to ensure the sales of any signiﬁ cant part of the print run. Interestingly enough, Henryk Jabłoński was mentioned by the West German diplomats as one of the very few Jews who still remained in their high-ranking positions51. However, these issues failed to disappear from the media, which continued to persist as a thorn in their reports from Poland.

The echoes of the events of 1968

In the German edition of Wikipedia, the encyclopaedia most often accessed by an average user of the Internet, the description which is of interest of the study begins with the following statement:

The March 1968 events in Poland refers to a political crisis which commenced with student demonstrations, inter alia, in Warsaw, Gdańsk and Kraków. The disturbances were quelled by militia units and volunteers from among the army reservists, the so-called worker activists.

Further on, the description identifi es two areas; that of the social protests striving for the democratisation of the system and that of the anti-Semitic policy of the authorities as an instrument of both domestic vielmehr gezielt gegen Wiesenthal geschrieben worden, ‘mit dem wir noch eine alte Rechnung zu begleichen haben’. Und er fügte hinzu ‘Wiesenthal wird schon wissen, was wir meinen’”, Ruete, “Antisemitismus in Polen”, Bonn 28 February 1973, PA AA, f. 117, vol. 8817. Istotne ogniwo wojny psychologicznej [A Crucial Link in the Psychological War], a review by Wiesław Nowakowski, Nowe Drogi, No. 1 (284), January 1973, pp. 157–159, concluded with a statement to the effect that the book “can provide anyone who wishes to know how certain Zionist circles act against socialist countries with plenty of food for thought”. 51 Report No. 214-320.10-814/73, Ellerkmann, “betr. Feierlichkeiten aus Anlass des 30. Jahrestages des Ghettoaufstandes in Warschau”, 27 April 1973, PA AA, f. 117, vol. 8817. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 93 politics and the suppression of the protests52. The English version emphasises the opposition to the dictatorship in a similar way, as an important protest on the part of the students and intellectuals against the communist authorities of the PRP, the repressions meted out to them by the security apparatus and a simultaneous ‘anti-Zionist’ campaign undertaken by the Polish government in reaction to a political crisis. It suggests that, tactically, the wave of anti-Semitism fuelled by the PRP’s authorities as part of their ‘anti-Zionist’ campaign served to divert public attention from the political crisis in the country and fi nally resulted in the mass fl eeing of the Jews from Poland53. The impact of the 1968 anti-Semitic campaign in Poland on the forming of negative stereotypes of the country cannot be seen in a number of historical studies either. This holds true both for works of an encyclopaedic nature54 and for those belonging to the general history classifi cation55. In accordance with the pattern of perception

52 However, an assertation also occurs to the effect that „Die Geschehnisse zusammen mit den antisemitischen Kundgebungen verdunkelten das Bild Polens in westlichen Ländern”, März-Unruhen 1968 in Polen (http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%A4rz- Unruhen_1968_in_Polen), 12 December 2009. 53 “1968 Polish political crisis” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968_Polish_political_ crisis), 12 December 2009. The entry in Russian is written in what is, essentially, the same tone. 54 A short, but objective description can be found under the entry for Poland in Europe Since 1945: An Encyclopedia, New York 2001: “Despite criticism by the Catholic Church, the authorities imprisoned students, dissolved six faculties of Warsaw University, and ﬁ red some professors, among them the philosopher Leszek Kolakowski, and forced about 30,000 people of Jewish origin to emigrate. Gomułka stayed in power thanks to the backing of Edward Gierek, a leader of the economic administrators, adopting anti- -Jewish slogans and retaining the support of the USSR”. Only a reference to the Moczar movement and his using of the anti-Zionist campaign can be found in the Das zwanzigste Jahrhundert. Europa nad dem Zweiten Weltkrieg series, Frankfurt am Main 1983 (pp. 429–430). 55 For instance, in his Revolution and Transition in East-Central Europe, Boulder 1996, David S. Mason does not deal with anti-Semitism, writing only that: “The 1968 demonstrations were met with harsh reprisals and purges of students and professors, especially those of Jewish origin” (p. 26). A similar perspective was adopted in Norbert Frei’s 1968. Jugendrevolte und globaler Protest, München 2008, pp. 197–202. 94 Piotr Madajczyk of the events of that time described earlier, two separate issues are described. Firstly, the manipulation by the communists of anti-Semitism in order to channel social discontent and maintain their grip on the helm of power, and secondly, a democratic protest quelled by force56. The manipulation, however, proved effective because the authorities appealed to social sentiments which genuinely existed, namely, a hostility toward the Jews and those who are ‘other’57. Some authors of historical studies emphasise the Polish communist authorities’ resorting to anti-Semitic feelings as an instrument of the domestic policy, focusing on their policy as the prime causative factor of the events at the time58.The authorities’ manipulation of the myth of the Jewish threat is demonstrated, as is its signiﬁ cance to the ideology of national communism59. The impact of this ideology on society is also

56 Cf.: Encyclopedia of Eastern Europe: From the Congress of Vienna to the Fall of Communism, Richard Frucht (ed.), New York 2000, p. 610. 57 “After the student revolts over half of all Jewish people at this time still resident in Poland were in fact forced to emigrate. [...] Through this anti-Semitic strategy the party leadership succeeded in isolating the student movement, since in the large parts of society this campaign had fallen on fertile ground”, Stefani Sonntag, Poland, in: Dissent and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe. Origins of Civil Society and Democratic Transition, Detleff Pollack, Jan Wielgohs (eds.), Wiltshire 2004, p. 7. The author refers to the conclusions reached by Marcin Zaremba and Dariusz Stola. Barbara J. Falk wrote in a similar vein in The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe. Citizen Intellectuals and Philosopher Kings, Budapest – New York 2003, stating that: “The campaign was successful, especially given the ability of the authorities to play on long-standing antipathies of average workers and citizens – both Jews and activist were effectively silenced and ‘othered’’’ (p. 24). She saw the reasons for society’s susceptibility to manipulation as lying in anti-Semitism, xenophobic nationalism and religious messianism. She goes, however, to analyse the enormous role of ‘68 in the forming of the opposition in Poland. 58 Mieczysław B. Biskupski, The History of Poland, Greenwood Press, Westport 2000, p. 131; Richard J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – And After, Routledge, London 1997, pp. 318–319. 59 Cf. the description of the policy of the party and the state authorities in Joanna Beata Michlic, Poland’s Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present, Lincoln NE 2006, which, however, refers to anti-Semitic attitudes: “The ethno- nationalist Communist elites also used the myth as a rationale and justiﬁ cation for The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 95 noted, albeit that it is usually shown in a balanced manner. The anti- -Semitic hue-and-cry after March is only one of the links included in a markedly longer process. The meaning of the image of the enemy in explaining all the Polish problems is described by Michlic as follows:

This explanation of all the problems that had troubled Communist Poland since its rise in 1945 resembled the National Democracy movement’s explanations of every Polish social, economic, and political problem during the interwar period.

For the PUWP it was a quest for legitimacy as a people’s party in an ethnically homogenous society60. On the thirtieth anniversary of March events, in an article published in FAZ, Olga Mannheimer focused on the fundamental signiﬁ cance of the communist authorities’ policy which had translated itself into a wider phenomenon of anti-Semitism that was, however, secondary to the inﬁ ghting carried out with its use within the PUWP61. In the

fi ring Jewish employees from scientifi c and cultural institutions, publishing houses, and national radio and television stations. [...] This people were replaced by ethnic Poles, who were either faithful followers of the PZPR’s propaganda, opportunists, or both” (p. 256). The author recognises the arguments of Marcin Zaremba, who claimed that a signifi cant part of the society was susceptible to the anti-Semitic slogans, as being more convincing that Jerzy Eisler’s opinion to the effect that it distanced itself from them. Nevertheless, she wrote of the resistance of certain social groups to the anti-Semitic propaganda. 60 Joanna Beata Michlic, Poland’s..., pp. 246–255. It was hardy ever mentioned when someone’s behaviour differed from the authorities’ offi cial line, such as, for instance, that evinced by the editorial offi ces of Tygodnik Powszechny [The Universal Weekly], which had links with the Catholic Church: “During the anti-Semitic campaign of 1968 Turowicz resolutely continued to publish Jewish writers, and when the Polish-Jewish poet Antoni Słonimski was blacklisted for criticizing offi cial anti-Semitism, Turowicz invited him to join the staff of Tygodnik Powszechny as a contributing editor”, Sabrina P. Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Meaning of the Great Transformation, Durham NC 1991. See also: Joanna Beata Michlic, Poland’s..., p. 258. 61 She added: “Einmal eröffnet, erfaßte die Treibjagd alle Bereiche, in denen es für eine nachdrängende Schicht Stellungen zu erobern galt. Nach den Politikern verloren Wissenschaftler, Journalisten, Schauspieler, Betriebsleiter, Juristen und Offi ziere jüdischer Herkunft ihren Arbeitsplatz”, Olga Mannheimer, “Der März der Antisemiten”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 57, 9 March 1998. 96 Piotr Madajczyk same issue, Michael Ludwig began his report with a description of the ceremony where Jacek Kuroń and Zygmunt Modzelewski were awarded the Order of the White Eagle, emphasising the struggle for the freedom of thought and expression in 1968. Only later does he arrive at Moczar’s policy and objective, namely, to present a ‘palace revolution’ as a ‘national-Bolshevik struggle for liberation’ from ‘the Jews obedient to Moscow’, and at its results in the form of a massive emigration from Poland. He concluded with a reminder of the political splits which makes the discussion of ’68 diffi cult, leading to a denial of the patriotism of people who, like Jacek Kuroń, had been involved in the communist movement earlier62. The reminiscences published by Die Welt on the fortieth anniversary of March ’68 were balanced. The newspaper recalled the democratic spurt in Warsaw and the slogans calling for freedom in order to move on to a recollection of the ‘anti-imperialist’ and ‘anti- Zionist’ campaign, and the policy hostile to Israel. This was followed by an assessment referring to the assertion of strong anti-Semitism in Poland; “in Polish society, this policy and the stoking up of anti-Semitic prejudices make a particularly dangerous mixture”. Nonetheless, the article fi rst made reminder of the democratic manifestations and then of the policy and manipulation on the part of the authorities in Warsaw, pointing to the problem of Polish society’s susceptibility to an anti- Semitic slogan only at the end63. The approach adopted by Matthias Schümann in FAZ was similar. The author began by recalling the

62 Michael Ludwig, “Anerkennung für den mutigen Kampf um souveränes und freies Polen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 57, 9 March 1998. 63 “Diese Politik und das Schüren antisemitischer Vorurteile sind gerade in der polnischen Gesellschaft eine gefährliche Mischung”, GNA, “Vor 40 Jahre. Polens Kommunisten gegen Studenten“, Welt-Online, 8 March 2008. Michael Ludwig wrote of the negative role played by the army and the degredation of ofﬁ cers of Jewish origin in “Antisemitismus in der polnischen Armee. Verteidigungsminister macht geheime Akten zugänglich”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 59, 10 March 2001. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 97 protesting students’ naive expectations that a return to anti-Semitism was impossible only in order to pass on to a description of the authorities’ anti-Semitic policy:

This means, however, was not chosen at random, because, as it was to transpire, the campaign of hatred faced a widespread support in the society where, in particular, in small towns, open conﬂ icts of a racist nature occurred, resulting in numerous Jews leaving the country64.

1968 was not something that could be omitted from any description of the history of the Jews in Poland and it stands to reason that it appeared in connection with a number of anniversaries, such as the fortieth anniversary of 1968, the Marches of the Living and the anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, or with events and debates giving rise to an interest in the topic, such as, for instance, Jedwabne, or the crosses on the Gravel Pit in Oświęcim. These articles have been infrequent, but in general, they have reported on the debate in Poland about the problem of anti-Semitism in a positive tone65. Michael Ludwig criticised the Polish authorities for their lengthy inability to cope with the provocative erecting of the crosses in the Gravel Pit and their playing on anti-Semitic feelings. At the same time, he pointed out the efforts ﬁ nally undertaken to change this situation as well as to the breakthrough in the isolation in which the Marches of the Living

64 “Beliebig war das Mittel allerdings nicht, denn wie sich zeigen sollte, stießen die Hetzkampagnen auf breite Zustimmung in der Bevölkerung, und besonders in kleinen Städten kam es zur offenen Austragung rassistisch geprägter Auseinandersetzungen, in deren Folge zahlreiche Juden das Land verließen”, M. Schümann, “Plötzlich wurde es leer. Polen und der Antisemitismus: ‘Verletzungen der Geschichte`”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 38, 14 February 2001. 65 Cf. an article on the press debate in Poland and in Romania by Joseph Croitoru, “Der Beitrag zur Nation. Blick in osteuropäische Zeitschriften: Polen und Rumänen vor der jüdischen Geschichte” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 187, 14 August 1999), which maintained a neutral tone. 98 Piotr Madajczyk had been held hitherto66. Another article, in which he focused on Poland’s problems in settling accounts with her history, was even more critical, remarking that it was only President Alexander Kwaśniewski who had mustered the courage to take the decision to restore Polish citizenship to those who had lost it after 1968 and wanted to regain it. He forcefully emphasised the dislike of this gesture in society, similar to that with which the earlier apologies on the part of Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz during the ﬁ ftieth anniversary of the pogrom in Kielce had been faced. He underscored the fact that this also holds true for a part of the political milieu that led Poland to liberation from the communist system, but which is unwilling to acknowledge that, in 1968, Moczar was able to exploit the anti-Semitism existing in society67. The reservations which this article gave rise to a pattern whereby, in the lack of a readiness on the part of the society to look critically at its history, any gestures made by Polish politicians seem to be suspended in a vacuum. It is known that Ludwig’s criticism was addressed only to a part of the Solidarity milieu and the right on the political scene but, having read the article, the average reader would probably have had the impression that the problem was one of an attitude of Polish society in its entirety. In 2008, Stefanie Peter, describing Poland’s difﬁ cult settling of accounts with the history of the Jews, avoided simple generalisations. She referred to Ryszard Siwiec’s self-immolation, the emigration of

66 Michael Ludwig, “`Marsch der Lebenden’ erstmals mit polnischen Christen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 86, 14 April 1999. 67 Michael Ludwig, “Keine Spur von Selbstkritik“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 60, 12 March 1998. See Appendix 2. Another article which should be mentioned is “Ganz langsam gesteinigt”, published in the Der Spiegel on 1 July 1996. It gives an extensive description of the events in Kielce, pointing subsequently to the exploitation of “anti-Semitic resentments” in politics in 1968, as well as to Lech Wałęsa’s resorting to “anti-Semitic prejudices” in 1990. The person responsible for Polish affairs at Der Spiegel was Leon Szulczyński, who left Poland in October 1968. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 99 the Jews and the appeals for their restoration to the Polish memory68. Konrad Schuller wrote in a similarly ambiguous tone in FAZ, attempting to make reminder of the denunciation of Jews by Poles during the war and the pogroms after it had ended and to recall the Polish assistance given to Jews in hiding, which is reﬂ ected by the fact that the most numerous representation among those commemorated at Yad Vashem are the Poles. His presentation of Poland’s accounting with history was just as varied69. Less than ten years earlier, Hans-Jörg Rother had written in like vein about the ongoing Polish-Jewish dialogue, the problem of anti-Semitism and its entanglement at the present time:

In the meantime, a new poison has emerged which has hatred for its primary cause. One of the photographs illustrates the destruction wrought on the Jewish cemetery in the Warsaw borough of Wola in 1996, another shows a wall with a credo: ‘Juden raus, Dr. Mengele o.k. [sic]’. During the electoral struggle in the same year, in order to discredit some politicians, a Jewish genealogical tree was added [to their ofﬁ cial biographies – PM] while, in the provinces, it can happen that football hooligans announce to the opposing team that they are in for a trip to Oświęcim (Auschwitz). On the other hand, the nine remaining Jewish communities are thriving. In 1994, a Jewish primary school will be opened in Warsaw and a Jewish sports club will be set up. As far as a symbiosis of Jewish and Polish culture is concerned, it seems, however, irretrievably too late70.

68 Stefanie Peter, “Ihr drei Millionen, kommt zurück”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 105, 6 May 2008. 69 Konrad Schuller, “Polen führt eine Debatte über seine Vergangenheit”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 2, 30 January 2008. 70 “Inzwischen quoll aus dem Urgrund des Hasses neues Gifvol. Ein Foto hält die Zerstörung auf dem jüdischen Friedhof im Warschauer Stadtteil Wola im Jahr 1996 fest, ein anderes zeigt eine Hauswand mit der Bekundung ‘Juden raus, Dr. Mengele o.k.’. Im Wahlkampf des gleichen Jahres wird Politikern ein jüdischer Stammbaum angehängt, um sie zu diskreditieren, und in der Provinz kommt es vor, daß Hooligans der gegnerischen Mannschaft eine Reise nach Oswiecim (Auschwitz) ankündigen. Andererseits entfalten sich nun die verbliebenen neun jüdischen Gemeinden. 1994 wird in Warschau wieder eine jüdische Grundschule eröffnet und ein jüdischer Sportverein gegründevol. Doch für eine Symbiose von jüdischer und polnischer Kultur scheint es unwiderruﬂ ich zu 100 Piotr Madajczyk

For some historians and journalists, the fundamental axis around which their considerations revolve is the setting of 1968 in the issues of anti-Semitism in Poland after World War II and, within this framework, post-1989. According to some historians, such as Joanna Beata Michlic and Andre Gerrits, the events of 1968 in Poland fi t with a connection between the communist and nationalist ideology typical of the post-war period in the Eastern bloc. In Poland, the nationalist form of communism included a strong element of anti-Semitism, which, after 1956, became visible both in the communist party and in the society. Initially it was not resorted to in the political power struggle. This only occurred in the changed circumstances of the growing crisis in the second half of the sixties71. A precise description as to what the connections between the political plane of the events and the social reaction to them looked like was also not infrequently lacking in works which aspired to the ranks of historical studies72. What did this execution of a project in accordance with Adam Michnik’s saying, willingly quoted by many, regarding a connection between the communist authorities and the tradition of Poland’s extreme right look like? A good example of a feature writer’s disquisition marked by such an inner incoherence is an article by Peter Dittmar published in 1996 in Die Welt and devoted to the fi ftieth anniversary of the pogrom in Kielce. Dittmar strongly emphasised anti-Semitism in Poland and pointed to its manifestations in the country’s earlier history, under the partitions, in the inter-war period and during World War II. The space he devoted to the anti-Semitism of the Poles under the III Reich’s occupation was more spät”, H.J. Rother, “Fremde im eigenen Land”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 63, 16 March 1999. 71 Joanna Beata Michlic, Poland’s…, pp. 230–242. 72 Cf. Tagungsbericht Internationaler Workshop Poland 1968 “The Jewish Escape and Communism within the People´s Republic”. 5–6 May 2008, Leipzig, in: H-Soz-u- Kult, 18 December 2008 (http://hsozkulvol.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/tagungsberichte/ id=2449). The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 101 extensive, at eleven lines, than that given over to the assistance they provided to the Jews, which is mentioned briefl y in two lines. Having written that “anti-Semitic sentiments disappeared in Poland following the end of the war in 1945 no more than they did in Germany”, he then moved on to the post-war period, focusing later entirely on the anti-Semitism in the policy of Poland’s communist authorities without making any reference to social attitudes whatsoever73. Karol Sauerland’s74 approach to these issues, particularly when dwelling on contemporary debates about history and anti-Semitism in Poland75, was quite emotional. His disquisition became agitated when 1968 was perceived, not without a reason, as the fi nal blow meted out to the Jewish community in Poland. An interest was awoken in stories describing the discovery of Jewish roots previously hidden and, sometimes, after the experience of 1968, thoroughly concealed76. One does sometimes come across a focus

73 Peter Dittmar, “Das späte Echo des Holocaust. 50 Jahre nach Kielce: Polen erinnert sich an seinen Antisemitismus”, Welt-Online, 5 July 1996. 74 Cf. the renowned article by Karol Sauerland in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 39, 15 February 2008, where he emphasised very strongly the consequences of the ’68 emigration: “Nach meinem Empfi nden ist die durch den Exodus 1968 entstandene Lücke bis heute nicht geschlossen worden, denn an den Universitäten änderte sich auch nach der Wende wenig. Vor allem befreiten sich die Hochschulen nicht von jenen, die 1968 als ‘Aktive’ hervorgetreten waren. Über ihre Taten beziehungsweise Untaten herrscht Stillschweigen. Heute sind diese Leute zumeist pensioniert oder bereits verstorben, jedoch ihr Geist lebt in vielem und bei vielen weiter”. The article quoted here, as well his other writings and his speeches delivered at conferences, had an enormous impact on the forming of the image of ’68 in Poland, particularly in the German media. See Appendix 4. 75 Cf. the debates on the books and articles of Jan Tomasz Gross. Natan Sznaider, “Nach dem Genozid der Mord”, Welt-Online, 12 August 2006. See also Karol Sauerland’s panegyrical “Kielce und anderswo: Zwei neue Bücher entfachen in Polen eine Debatte über den Nachkriegsantisemitismus”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 13, 16 January 2008, which takes a traditional approach in order to set Gross’ perception of history in opposition to that held by Marek Chodakiewicz. 76 Konrad Schuller, “Wiedergeboren in Warschau”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 35, 2 September 2007. 102 Piotr Madajczyk on the problem of anti-Semitism, but in a descriptive form, whereby the situation in 1968 is not emotionally treated as typical of Poland’s history. It may be a description of a person’s situation, as in the case of Henryk Isenberg, an architect whose life did not fi t the pattern of anti-Semitic persecution, becauseof his peaceful childhood in Bielsko- -Biała and then, in 1968, his conviction and the necessity to leave Poland because he no longer wanted to live in this country77. It may be the recollection, in connection with the erection of the Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw, of the anti-Semitic purges and the wave of departures in ’68, as well as of the authorities’ manipulation of the number of casualties in order to avoid references to the three million Polish Jews murdered. In the article in question, this was followed by a reminder that this burden had long weighed on Polish memories, both during the controversy around the crosses erected in Auschwitz and during Lech Wałęsa’s speech delivered there in 1995, but that a relief from the load could be seen, brought about by Aleksander Kwaśniewski, in respect of Jedwabne and by President Lech Kaczyński, who supported the erection of the museum and distanced himself from the anti-Semitic tradition of Polish right wing politics78. To all intents and purposes, the issue of those people of Jewish origin who, after the war and prior to their emigration, were actively involved in the building of the communist system, including its worst, Stalinist phase, did not appear in the press. One exception is an article by Bogdan Musial, who described the emigration of Zygmunt Bauman as the departure of a committed Stalinist, a former functionary of the Offi ce of Public Security and an agent of the military intelligence, who had been forced to leave Poland by a hue-and-cry unleashed by “his old

77 Rainer Schulze, “Einmal Hölle und zurück”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 1, 10 January 2010. 78 Konrad Schuller, “Die Rückkehr der Juden in die polnische Geschichte”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 149, 1 July 2009, p. 4. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 103 comrades and party-comrades”79. In this approach, Bauman is presented as being a victim of the system which he had helped to create. An article which predated it by a few years and was published in connection with his being awarded the Theodore W. Adorno prize, only referred to his emigration as having been the result of a “growing anti- -Jewish hatred towards the intellectuals” (wachsender antisemitischer Intelektuellenfeindschaft)80. The articles written by Helga Hirsch, describing individual cases but primarily showing one side of the events to a reader unfamiliar with the issues in question, were heavily loaded with emotions. “He was conspicuous by behaving differently, he was no longer one of ‘them’”; a portrayal like this, describing Mietek Lisak’s situation when refusing to condemn Israel’s policy publicly, suggested his exclusion from a community on the part of other Poles professing an anti-Israeli orientation, since this is probably what is meant by ‘them’ (ihnen). The fate of another person, Liliana Hausknecht81, was portrayed in a similar vein. The reader of Hirsch’s articles could have gained the impression that Poland was a country where the life of the Jews who remained there after the World War II was one incessant thread of discrimination and humiliation. On the other hand, one cannot deny the charm of her description of Zoja Perelmuter’s quest for her place in her new surroundings, so completely different from those amid which she had grown up in Poland, juxtaposed by the author with her unfailing memories of the Polish tradition:

79 Bogdan Musial, “Agent ‘Semjon’: Der Soziologe Zygmunt Bauman in Stalinismus”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 67, 20 March 2007. 80 Constanze Crüwell, “Philosophie als ethische Berufung”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 213, 14 September 1998. The emigration in 1968 was even mentioned in the short announcement at the award ceremony (Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, No. 37, 13 September 1998). 81 “Er ﬁ el auf durch abweichendes Verhalten, er war kener mehr von ‘ihnen’”, Helga Hirsch, “Sie glaubten, sie seien ein Teil Polens”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 176, 1 August 2007. 104 Piotr Madajczyk

She has never bid farewell to the country which has expelled her, she has truly never arrived in the country which she has chosen. As Zoja, who prefers to see the things in a positive light, describes it, she is in love with the two countries at the same time.

More importantly, taking a direct approach and employing explicit phrasing, Hirsch described the issue of the hostile attitude of many Jews toward an ‘anti-Semitic Poland’ and their forgetting of the German culpability for the Holocaust:

‘How could it happen’, reﬂ ects Zoja, ‘that so many Jews have fewer reservations about the Germans than they do about Poland?’ When she told an acquaintance that, after twenty years, she is about to go back to Poland, he asked, with a look of suspicion on his face, whether she hadn’t anything better to do. To which she then countered, without a moment’s reﬂ ection: ‘And when were you last in Germany?’ ‘I go there every year.’ ‘And you don’t have any qualms about it?’ It transpired that the acquaintance in question has an annual stay at a sanatorium in Germany fully paid for [by Germany – PM] and, on account of this favour, he had even accepted being in a room there with a German who had served in Poland during the war. ‘How could you live in the same room as him? Didn’t you hate him?’ ‘No, because I never saw him. I only ever saw the Poles directly’82.

The last sentence referred, obviously, to the years of World War II. Hirsch numbered among the mere handful of authors who wrote in the German press about the situation whereby the majority of the Jews, also inﬂ uenced by the manner of teaching history in Israel, associate the Holocaust and anti-Semitism primarily with Poland rather than with Germany. Michael Ludwig, too, referred to this, admitting that the anti- Semitic events of 1968 contributed to the situation whereby some of the co-organisers of the Marches of the Living ‘threw’ both the Poles and the Nazi murderers ‘into the same pot’, writing, in some of the

82 Helga Hirsch, “Die zwei Länder der Zoja Perelmuter. Grenzgänge zwischen Polen und Israel, zwischen 1968 und heute”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 238, 13 October 1968. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 105 brochures distributed among the young Jews in the U.S. prior to their departure for Poland, about ‘the Polish concentration camps’83. According to some historians, 1968 was of immense signiﬁ cance in the forming of the democratic opposition and society’s democratic protest against the communist dictatorship. Hubert Torzecki described these events as being of key importance in the forming of an entire generation of people too young to remember the terror of the Stalin period, only a handful of whom were later to become involved in the opposition. For the many more, this was their ﬁ rst experience of the communist system as a repressive dictatorship and the end of their youthful dreams; that it could be reformed84. One can also come across the negation of this experience, when, departing from the emphasis being put on the connection between the rise, in the sixties, of nationalism and anti-Semitism85, a thesis was articulated to the effect that, in the eighties, the events of 1968 were pushed from the collective memory in Poland in order to make it possible for the national ideology, blamed for March, to become a counterbalance to communism by means of forgetting its connection with the anti-Semitic actions86. The last argument seems to be among the most radical.

83 Michael Ludwig, “‘Die Weichsel hat einst jiddisch gesprochen’. Die Präsidenten Polens und Israels erinnern beim ‘Marsch der Lebenden’ in Auschwitz an den Holocaust”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 102, 3 May 2000. 84 Cf. Hubert Tworzecki, Parties and Politics in Post-1989 Poland, Boulder 1996, p. 46. 85 Cf. also Karol Sauerland, Polen und Juden zwischen 1939 und 1968. Jedwabne und die Folgen, Berlin – Wien 2004. 86 “Second, the effusive public memorialization of 1970 in the 1980 strikes masks the nearly complete omission of the student rebellions in 1968 which sparked a major anti- -Semitic movement from the pantheon of sacriﬁ cial events. 1968 has become a non-event, even though several important individuals of the intellectual wing of Solidarity began their activism there. One important effect of this omission is to preserve nationalism for the liberal opposition, to construct nationalism as anti-communism in reference to the 1980 strikes, by eliminating the memory of Communist-backed nationalist invectives against Jews. (Of course, in the years since 1980, nationalism has become a complex issue in Poland, and in the post-Communist period the Grunwald-inspired racial/religious 106 Piotr Madajczyk

Similar discussions were held in the press. A good analysis comes from 2001. The article described the setting of recollections of 1968 in the context of the politics of Poland and the Czech Republic. In the case of Poland, the commentary pointed to the emphasis placed by Adam Michnik on the role of the then events as a catalyst of the birth of the opposition and to the negation of this on the right of the Polish political scene. The author referred here to Jedwabne as an argument delegitimising the claims of the ‘nationalist and national-conservative representatives of the Church’ to Poland’s being a victim and a Messiah of the nations. Analogously, what was pointed to in the case of the Czech Republic was the emphasis placed on the role of the Prague Spring by the circles gathered around the president, Václav Havel, a stance challenged by Václav Klaus’ Civic Democratic Party (Občanská Demokratická Strana)87. The controversy described in the article was reﬂ ected in the following years, resonating with the German political divisions and debates on the assessment of 1968. Die Welt, being the right wing newspaper, pointed to the impact on the opposition activists in Poland of the events in Czechoslovakia and, in particular, to the Czechoslovak dissidents’ rejection of any belief that the communist system might be reformed88. In an article written for Die Welt, Adam Michnik took a different position. He referred to a common experience rather than to an inﬂ uence: “But 1968 has changed the political awareness. The later Polish and Czechoslovakian opposition movements are rooted in the events of 1968”. At the same time, he defended the nationalism is alive and well, especially in the political activities of the Catholic church.)”, Kristi S. Long, We All Fought for Freedom: Women in Poland’s Solidarity Movement, Boulder CO 1996, p. 40. 87 Barbara Wieland, “Das Jahr der politischen Wasserscheide. Diskussionen über 1968 in Polen und der Tschechischen Republik”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 171, 26 July 2001, p. 12. See Appendix 3. 88 Richard Herzinger, “Das lange Nachleben des Prager Frühlings”, Welt-Online, 20 August 2008. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 107 people who had believed that the system could be reformed against the accusation of having had connections with communism, because, while their belief had been naive, it had contributed to the national awakening and enhanced the striving for freedom89. The close connection between the assessment of the events of 1968 and the contemporary political situation could also be seen when, on the 40th anniversary of March, Paul Flückiger wrote:

[Adam] Michnik and [Henryk] Szlajfer remained [in Poland – PM]. Why have they ended up being hated by the circles which supported the Kaczyński twins in the past and to which Lech Kaczyński is condemned when he attempts to be re-elected, in other words, primarily, the anti-Semitic Radio Maryja90.

The close connection mentioned previously also meant that ’68 and the anti-Semitism of that time was recalled to a greater or lesser extent in the articles related to Jan Gross’ publication on Jedwabne and the further debates on these issues. By the same token, a large number of such articles were published in 2001, which is to say, the year when Gross’ book, Neighbours, came out and the commemorations in Jedwabne, attended by the president, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, were held. The next wave was brought on by the ‘round’ fortieth anniversary in 2008. The connection between 1968 and the issue of Jedwabne sometimes served as a point of departure for a critical appraisal of the

89 “Doch das Jahr 1968 veränderte das politische Bewusstsein. Die späteren polnischen und tschechoslowakischen Widerstandsbewegungen hatten Ihre Wurzeln in den Ereignissen von 1968”, Adam Michnik, “Als Kommunisten gegen Kommunisten kämpften”, Welt-Online, 19 August 2008. 90 “Michnik und Schleifer blieben. Und wurden deshalb von jenen Kreisen, die die Kaczynski-Zwillinge in den vergangenen Jahren unterstützt haben und auf die Lech Kaczynski für seine Wiederwahl in zwei Jahren angewiesen ist, allen voran vom antisemitischen Radio Maryja, gehasst”, P. Flückiger, “Schleppende Rehabilitation”, Welt- -Online, 8 March 2008. Since 2000, Flückiger has been an independent correspondent in Warsaw, also writing, inter alia, for Die Zeit and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung. He also made a reproachful mention of the fact that neither Adam Michnik nor Józef Dajczgewand were awarded any orders by President Kaczyński on the anniversary of March. 108 Piotr Madajczyk reaction of some Polish politicians to the debates regarding the latter. Lech Wałęsa was reproached for apologising for the expulsion of the Jews in the Knesset in 1991, but failed to make a similar gesture during the debate concerning Jedwabne91. Similarly, President Kwaśniewski faced allegations that the circle of his advisers included propagandists who had taken part in the anti-Zionist campaign; they were advised by the author of the piece to make their way to Jedwabne on 10th July and prove that their remorse was sincere92. Sauerland wrote that the president had belonged to the political formation which had unleashed the anti-Semitic hue-and-cry in 196893.

In the German press, involvement in the democratic movement in Poland in 1968 became a sui generis benchmark incessantly referred to when articulating assessments of on-going political events. In the subsequent years, the 1968 both domestic politics and the intervention in Czechoslovakia was recalled in order to emphasise the undemocratic nature of the system of power in the Eastern bloc and in Poland. References to the tradition of the democratic protests of 1968 made in Poland during the Solidarity years were noticeable. Following the introduction of martial law, it was recalled that some members of the military authorities had been involved in the quelling of social protests including the intervention in Czechoslovakia. The phrase ‘in the West German press’ may be misleading here, bearing in mind that the West German press published, inter alia, articles written by Adam Michnik.

91 Joanna Tokarska-Bakir, “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 101, 2 May 2001. 92 Michael Ludwig, “Achtung und Selbstachtung. In Polen diskutiert man über den Judenmord von Jedwabne”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 88, 14 April 2001. 93 Karol Sauerland, “Polens Pogrom. Nationale Ehrensachen: Der Historikerstreit um Jedwabne”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 58, 9 March 2001. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 109

An example of this may be provided by his article in Der Spiegel in December 1980, where, while disqualifying Moczar as a ‘reviver’ of the system of power in Poland, he recalled, in a short remark, his ‘shameful role’ in 196894. The assessment of Jaruzelski was not unambiguous. Der Spiegel wrote that he had attempted to not only restore the ethos of the Polish armed forces, which had been destroyed by the involvement in the intervention in Czechoslovakia, something that was not given prominence in the army’s tradition, but also to create a uniform for offi cer corps which would be patriotic, but not anti-Russian. On the other hand, an observation recurrently emerged to the effect that, in 1981, the Polish army on its own did what had required outside intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Apart from Jaruzelski’s services in respect of the reconstruction of the Polish army, his cleansing it of Jewish offi cers and those of liberal political opinions was also recalled95. It goes without saying that Adam Michnik had a symbolic, positive signifi cance in this context:

My personal experience is the experience of a man…who was imprisoned for the ﬁ rst time twenty-ﬁ ve years ago in March 1965, who participated in the 1968 student uprising in protest against the anti-intellectual and anti- Semitic hue-and-cry organised by the Communist bureaucracy in Poland, who stubbornly wanted to be part of the independent community, and who saw that this community was being systematically disrupted by the force of police crackdowns96.

94 Adam Michnik, “Die letzte Chance”, Der Spiegel, No. 53, 29 December 1980. 95 Cf. Der Spiegel of 21 and 28 December 1981; see also: “Ein General regiert Polen”, Der Spiegel, 16 February 1981. 96 Arista Maria Cirtautas, The Polish Solidarity Movement: Revolution, Democracy and Natural Rights, London 1997, p. 171. For a similar emphasis given to the events of March as the impetus for Michnik’s entry into politics in order to build a democratic Poland, cf.: “Käse ist böse”, Welt-Online, 11 March 2008. P. Flückiger’s article, “Schleppende”, also focused on the Michnik and Szlajfer. See also: “Adam Michnik 60”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 241, 17 October 2006. 110 Piotr Madajczyk

Michnik also appeared as the author of writings published in Der Spiegel, which were usually accompanied, even if very briefl y, by a reference to his role in 196897. Following the death of Bolesław Geremek 1968 was recalled in the German press. It was recalled that it was Sławomir Mrożek’s protest against the intervention in Prague and his asylum in France that had brought an end to the Polish communist authorities’ friendliness toward his work98. Certainly, whenever Der Spiegel published an article, the hero of which was Jacek Kuroń, his participation in the protest in 1968 was mentioned. This was the period when Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński began their political involvement, forged in their youth by the quelled student protest and the wave of anti-Semitism unleashed by the authorities99. It was the period when the sixteen-year-old Bronisław Komorowski took part in demonstrations for the fi rst time100. The communist authorities persecuted the philosopher Leszek Kołakowski, fi nally forcing him to leave Poland. A comment of this nature, be it longer or briefer, was deemed a necessary accompaniament to every item published in the press about him101. Among these celebrities, only Ryszard Kapuściński, who, in 1968, had “sympathised with the nationalist faction responsible for

97 Cf. an extensive text about him: “Adam Michnik: Mehr Freiheit für Polen“, Der Spiegel, 8 March 1982. 98 Marta Kijowska, “Dramatiker der logischen Phantasie“, FAZ.Net, No. 140, 21 June 2010, p. 32. Regarding Geremek, see also Michael Ludwig, “Mehr als ein Spieler mit verdeckten Karten”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 266. 15 November 1997. 99 “Wir müssen die Mission der Toten vollenden”, FAZ.Net, No. 97, 27 April 2010, p. 1; Konrad Schuller, “Er war in der Gegenwart angekommen”, FAZ.Net, No. 84, 12 April 2010; Reinhard Veser, “Wie die beiden Brüder Kaczynski ihre Welt sehen wollen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 January 2007. 100 Konrad Schuller, “Schnubart statt Smartphone”, FAZ.Net, No. 74, 29 March 2010, p. 4; ibidem, “Sikorski und Komorowski in Duell”, FAZ.Net, No. 68, 23 March 2010, p. 6. 101 Cf. G. Gnauck, “Polens bedeutendster Philosoph”, Welt-Online, 10 August 2009. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung wrote about Kołakowski’s expulsion from the PUWP on 8 December 1966, “20 Polnische Schriftsteller protestieren”. In the report of his death, (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 164, 18 July 2009, p. 1) the daily also recalled that he had left Poland following the “anti-Semitic events in 1968”. It was the same The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 111 the shameful, anti-Semitic campaign”, numbers among the exceptions. However, Karol Sauerland, the author of the article, then added that in the stormy period of 1968, he was away from Poland and no one can know how he would have behaved upon seeing the brutal actions against the Jews, students and intellectuals102. An unambiguous recapitulation of these deliberations on the infl uence of the events of 1968 on the image of Poland in Germany and, initially, in West Germany, is a diffi cult task. Poland’s participation in the military intervention in Czechoslovakia had no major impact in this respect. The pro-democracy movement in March ’68, which was to become the springboard for the activity of many Polish oppositionists and formed a positive image of Polish society, was more signifi cant. What is more diffi cult to determine is the impact of the anti-Semitic campaign unleashed by the authorities. This campaign did manage to gain some support in society, which, overall, had a negative infl uence on the image of Poland and the Poles, harking back to the stereotype of Polish anti-Semitism. Let us thus conclude with the appeal, voiced by Karol Sauerland, for the restoration of the Jews to Polish memory, which refers to an important issue also articulated in the West German press as a reproach to the Poles, a reproach in respect of the fact that, despite the enormous change which Poland has undergone, this restoration is yet to occur. This was bluntly expressed by Sauerland,

[...] And the main issue; how can one write Poland’s history anew, so as to not exclude the history of the Jews from it? The Jewish March 1968 is also the Polish March’103. in: “Marxismen, nicht mehr Marxismus”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 206, 3 September 2008, p 3, as well as in a short report in Der Spiegel, 8 September 1980. 102 Karol Sauerland, “Es geht nicht nur um Kapuscinski”, FAZ.Net, No. 58, 10 March 2010, p. 32. 103 “Und – das ist die Hauptfrage – wie kann man die polnische Gesichte so umschreiben, dass die Geschichte der Juden nicht ausgegrenzt wird? Der jüdische März 1968 ist auch ein polnischer gewesen“, Karol Sauerland, “Der dumme und der heldenhafte Tod”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 60, 11 March 2008, p. 38. 112 Piotr Madajczyk

Appendix

1. “Polens Machtkampf. Weg des Untergangs”, Der Spiegel, 15 April 1967

Im Jahr nach der Befreiung Polens von den Nazis, im Juni 1946, wurden in Polen Juden gesteinigt. Nach ofﬁ ziellen Angaben mißhandelten und erstachen Einwohner der Stadt Kielce über 60 Juden, wahrscheinlich jedoch mehr als 200. Die Polizei griff nicht ein. Die Regierung beschuldigte lokale Chauvinisten der Tat. Der Chef der untätigen Polizei von Kielce war ein Partisanenführer der Besatzungszeit. Er hieß Mieczyslaw Moczar. Heute ist er Polens Innenminister, Chef der Polizei, des Staatssicherheitsdienstes und der Hilfspolizei “Ormo”. Er greift nach der Macht. Sein jüngstes Opfer ist Polens Staatspräsident Edward Ochab. Kollege Novotny in Prag wich dem neuen tschechoslowakischen Liberal- -Kommunismus. Ochab wich dem – stalinistischen – Nationalkommunisten Moczar. Letzten Montag bot der Staatschef, 61, dem Warschauer Parlament seinen Rücktritt an, angeblich wegen gesundheitlicher Schwäche. Ochabs wahre Schwäche aber liegt in Herkunft und Heirat: Er war im Krieg Moskau-Emigrant und ist Ehemann eine Jüdin. Moczar hingegen will Polen unabhängig von seinen Erbfeinden machen: Er nennt sie „Zionisten”, er meint Russen und Deutsche. Wie kaum eine andere KP wurden Polens Rote von jüdischen Intellektuellen geprägt. Rosa Luxemburg und Karl Radek standen in ihren Reihen. Jetzt säubert Moczar diese Partei von „jüdischen Nationalisten”, die angeblich das Vaterland an Israel verraten. Nationalkommunist Moczar hatte sich stets im Hintergrund gehalten. Vorletzten Freitag, vier Tage vor Ochabs Rücktritts-Offerte, trat er aus der Deckung: Erstmals erschien der Hintergrundkrieger im polnischen Fernsehen, auf einer Versammlung der Veteranen-Organisation „Verband der Kämpfer für Freiheit und Demokratie”. Dazu pries der Fernsehkommentator die Führungsrolle des Kriegervereins in der gegenwärtigen Staatskrise. Vorsitzender der Vereinigung ehemaliger Partisanen: General Moczar. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 113

Dieser Veteranenklub zählt rund 800 000 Mitglieder. Sie sind privilegiert: Sie empfangen Orden, deren Verleihung mit 25 Prozent Rentenzuschlag verbunden ist; sie genießen kostenlose ärztliche Behandlung und werden bei der Vergabe von Portiersstellen und Zeitungskiosken, in der Zuteilung von Wohnungen, Geschäftslizenzen und Studienplätzen ihrer Kinder bevorzugt. Über den Kämpfer-Hilfsfonds konnte Moczar in fünf Jahren 50 Millionen Zloty verteilen. Er baute seine Machtpositionen aus: Drei Warschauer Wochenzeitungen und das Bürokraten-Blatt „Prawo i Zycie” (Recht und Leben) gerieten unter Moczars Einfl uß; auch das polnische Fernsehen begann, sich nach ihm auszurichten. Vor allem eroberte sich Moczar den Polizei- und Konfi denten-Apparat und sammelte Dossiers über seine Gegner. Als Chef der Sicherheitspolizei „Bezpieka” suchte er seit 1956 Stück um Stück kleine Freiheiten wieder abzubauen. Nur in der Partei blieb Moczars Einfl uß schwach. Er selbst sitzt seit 1945 im Zentralkomitee, dessen Mitglieder ihm etwa zu einem Fünftel folgen. Im Politbüro gibt es nur einen Moczar-Mann, den Sekretär Strzelecki. Doch nach der Nahostkrise im vorigen Jahr eröffnete Moczar den Sturm auf die Partei-Festung – mit der Parole: gegen den “Zionismus”. Unter den Anführern der Studentendemonstrationen im März ermittelten Moczars Observanten Studenten jüdischen Namens. Moczar säuberte die „Juden-Fraktion”. Auf Tausenden von Betriebsversammlungen und Volkskundgebungen forderten polnische Bürger Ordnung und Sauberkeit von zionistischem Unrat. Unter dem Druck des Volksempfi ndens stürzten sieben Universitätsprofessoren. 34 Studenten der Warschauer Universität wurden relegiert, sieben Fachschaften geschlossen – ihre Hörer müssen neue Zulassungsprüfungen ablegen. Gegen die Autoren Kisielewski – einen auch im Westen bekannten Feuilletonisten – Grzedzinski und Jasienica, Verfasser historischer Bestseller, läuft ein Antrag auf Ausschluß aus dem Schriftstellerverband. Mehrere Theater- und Filmfachleute wurden entlassen, der weltbekannte Regisseur Alexander Ford angegriffen. Ihm wird vorgeworfen, daß er den Film “Der achte Wochentag” mit dem Berliner Artur Brauner ko-produziert habe – und dem ehemaligen polnischen Staatsbürger Brauner wird der Weg nach Westdeutschland vorgehalten, “dem Land, wo er auf jedem Schritt die Mörder seiner nächsten Angehörigen 114 Piotr Madajczyk trifft”. In dem Film „Der achte Wochentag” sei die polnische Gesellschaft als Ansammlung notorischer Trinker dargestellt worden. Moczar säuberte Polens Sport: Der Direktor des Instituts für Leibesübungen und ein Berater des Sport- und Touristenausschusses wurden gefeuert. Moczar säuberte Polens Regierungsapparat: Leitende Funktionäre des Handelsministeriums, der Chef der Atomenergie – Kommission, der Präsident des Amtes für Staatsreserven verloren ihr Amt. Als Moczar auch die Genossen Diplomaten säubern wollte, erlitt Minister Rapacki eine Herzattacke. Zynisch bemerkte das Moczar-Organ Prawo i Zycie, die Krankmeldungen Urlaube und Kuraufenthalte der Außen- -Beamten häuften sich: Gefährdete Funktionäre fl üchteten vor der Verfolgung. Moczars Strecke zählt bisher 36 Spitzen-Funktionäre – die meisten sind Juden. In dem Belgrader Parteiblatt „Komunist“ nannte das jugoslawische ZK- Mitglied Oskar Davico die Moczar-Aktion eine „Überprüfung nach „Stürmer’- -Art”. Nach „Stürmer”-Art entdeckte Polens Presse nun auch eine „zionistische Weltverschwörung”. Die Trybuna Mazowiecka verlangte von der „Sozial-kulturellen Gesellschaft der Juden in Polen“ („Babel-Club”) eine Stellungnahme gegen die „zionistischen Zentren im Westen”. In den Synagogen von New York, behauptete das Blatt, verkündeten die Rabbiner zum Jahrestag des Warschauer Getto-Aufstands einen „Bannfl uch gegen Polen”. Doch die Rabbiner klagten allenfalls darüber, daß die Warschauer Zeitung Kurier Polski jetzt erklärte, nur 1000 Juden hätten sich 1943 am Aufstand gegen die Deutschen beteiligt. Die „Führer der Welt-Judenorganisationen, die heute in Israel herrschen”, hätten sie im Stich gelassen. Moczar gestattete 1967 zur Einweihung eines Denkmals im Vernichtungslager Auschwitz keinen jüdischen Gottesdienst. Jetzt beschuldigte er den – von dem Ex-Sowjetagenten Leopold Dan geleiteten – “Babel-Club” des Landesverrats an Polen: Er sei eine Spionage-Organisation. Zu der jüdischen Kultur-Vereinigung, so die Moczar-treue Jugend-Zeitung Sztandar Mlodych, gehörten: • der 1955 in die USA gefl üchtete Geheimdienstoberst Jozef Swiatlo, geboren als Isaak Fleischfarb, • der 1965 in den Westen übergetretene, im vorigen Jahr gestorbene West-Berliner Missionschef Wladyslaw Tykocinski, der eigentlich Tikotiner The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 115 hieß, der 1960 von einem Amerika-Besuch nicht zurückgekehrte Armee-Oberst Pawel Monat und der Polizei-Funktionär Severyn Bialer, Dozent an einem ZK-Institut, der Gestapo-Mitarbeiter gewesen sei. Der neue Volksfeind-Typ ist nicht nur Jude, sondern auch “Kosmopolit”: Es ist auch jeder Pole, der neben seinem polnischen Vaterland noch ein anderes hat – das Vaterland aller Werktätigen, die Sowjet-Union. Als sich in Moczars Diffamierungs-Feldzug auch antisowjetische Töne mischten, griff Parteichef Gomulka ein. Er ließ drei hohe Moczar-Offi ziere auf unwichtige Posten versetzen: den Chef der polnischen Luftlande-Division („Rote Barette”), den Kommandanten des Militärbezirks Warschau und den Stabschef des Militärbezirks Pommern. In diesen Positionen hätten sie einen Staatsstreich Moczars decken können. Nun haben sie keinen Kontakt zur Truppe mehr: Sie dürfen nur noch ausbilden und inspizieren. Denn der Kreml meldete Bedenken gegen Polens National-Kurs an. Die Moskauer Zeitung Sowjetskaja Rossija warnte vorletzten Donnerstag vor „gefährlichen nationalistischen Tendenzen” in der kommunistischen Weltbewegung, vor der Mißachtung der Rolle der KPdSU. Damit meinte das Kreml-Blatt nicht die bündnistreuen Tschechoslowaken und auch nicht die nationalkommunistischen Rumänen. Das Blatt behauptete vielmehr: „Polnische bürgerliche Nationalisten ... versuchten im März, Polen auf den Weg des Untergangs zu stoßen”. Nationalkommunist Moczar ließ sich indes nicht einschüchtern: Vier Tage nach dem Sowjet-Tadel stieß er Polens moskautreuen Staatschef Ochab, Träger des Ordens „Erbauer des Vaterlands”, auf den Weg der Abdankung.

2. Michael Ludwig, “Keine Spur von Selbstkritik. Für manche in Polen ist Kwasniewskis Geste an die Juden eine Unverschämtheit”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 March 1998

Acht Jahre Freiheit und Souveränität waren offenbar eine zu kurze Zeit für den polnischen Staat, um das Unrecht wiedergutzumachen, welches die kommunistische Führung “Volkspolens” vor dreißig Jahren den Juden des Landes angetan hatte, indem sie viele von diesen der Staatsangehörigkeit beraubte und zur Emigration zwang. Bisher weiß niemand ganz genau, wieviele polnische Juden, die den deutschen Vernichtungslagern entkommen 116 Piotr Madajczyk waren, nach einer großangelegten Hetzkampagne im März 1968 das Land mit einem Reisedokument verließen, das die Rückkehr ausschloß. Die Akten des Sicherheitsdienstes, die im Innenministerium lagern und Aufschluß geben könnten, sind geheim. Schätzungen zufolge verloren damals aber bis zu 20 000 polnische Juden ihre Staatsangehörigkeit, ihr Vermögen und ihre Heimat. Es war die dritte Welle des jüdischen Exodus aus Polen nach dem Krieg. Eine erste Gruppe hatte das Land schon bei Kriegsende oder kurz danach verlassen. Einer der Gründe war der Haß, der damals den Juden – viele von ihnen waren aus der Sowjetuniuon zurückgekehrt, wohin sie vor den Deutschen gefl ohen waren – in der polnischen Bevölkerung entgegenschlug. Eine zweite Gruppe verließ zu Beginn des polnischen Tauwetters Mitte der fünfziger Jahre das Land, nachdem zuvor eine Fraktion der kommunistischen Partei, die „Natolin-Fraktion“, gegen die Juden in der Partei, im Staatsapparat und im Militär aktiv geworden war. Von ursprünglich einer knappen Viertelmillion polnischer Juden, die dem Holocaust auf die eine oder andere Weise entkommen konnten, leben gegenwärtig noch rund 10000, vorwiegend ältere Menschen, in Polen, die sich in irgendeiner Form zum Judentum bekennen. Aus Anlaß der dreißigsten Wiederkehr der Märzereignisse fand nun dieser Tage ausgerechnet ein polnischer Präsident, dessen politische Karriere im verblichenen kommunistischen System ihre Wurzeln hat und der über Jahre Chef der postkommunistischen Sozialdemokratie war, den Mut, im Namen des neuen, des demokratischen Polen den entrechteten Staatsbürgern von einst wenigstens ein Quentchen Genugtuung widerfahren zu lassen. Kwasniewski, der an der Verantwortung der Kommunisten für die antijüdische Kampagne von 1968 keinen Zweifel ließ, kündigte an, die polnischen Juden, die damals in die Emigration getrieben worden waren, auf Antrag wieder in ihre Rechte als Staatsbürger einzusetzen. Im politischen Lager, das die Freiheit Polens vom kommunistischen System erzwungen hatte, wurde diese Geste Kwasniewskis jedoch von manchen als Unverschämtheit bewertet. Schließlich, so war beispielsweise aus rechtsnationalen Gruppierungen zu vernehmen, trügen die Kommunisten allein die Schuld am Schicksal der polnischen Juden. Die Frage nach der Mitverantwortung der Bevölkerung, die Frage nämlich, ob latenter Antisemitismus im Volk die Taktik General Moczars, der 1968 die Fäden gezogen hatte, wenigstens erleichterte, wurde nicht gestellt. Ebenso wich The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 117 man der Frage aus, wieso das “Solidarnosc”-Lager, wieso Walesa als Präsident nach der Wende nicht den Mut – oder die Zeit? – gefunden hatten, die Märzereignisse vor dreißig Jahren auf ähnliche Weise wie Kwasniewski aufzuarbeiten. Eine solche Reaktion hat Tradition. Als der postkommunistische Ministerpräsident Cimoszewicz vor zwei Jahren, aus Anlaß des 50. Jahrestages des Pogroms von Kielce die Juden für diese Tat von Polen um Verzeihung bat, kam aus der Bevölkerung, aus rechten Parteien und von Veteranen der antikommunistischen Partisanenverbände Widerspruch. Die Begründung ähnelte jener von heute. Nicht nur hinter vorgehaltener Hand wird meist hinzugefügt, daß den Juden im Grunde recht geschehen sei, schließlich hätten diese den meisten Einfl uß in der kommunistischen Partei besessen, hätten den stalinistischen Terrorapparat in Nachkriegspolen auf Moskaus Befehl installiert und getragen. Daß “rein polnische” Kerkermeister und Folterknechte ihren Anteil an der Ausschaltung der politischen Gegner und bei der Vernichtung des antikommunistischen Untergrunds hatten, wird in diesem Zusammenhang ausgeblendet, weil es nicht ins Schema der polnischen Selbsteinschätzung paßt. Dies ist nichts anderes als ein später Sieg Moczars. Dessen Leute sollen nicht einmal davor zurückgeschreckt sein, Flugblätter mit Hetzparolen gegen die Juden aus der deutschen Besatzungszeit ins Polnische übersetzen zu lassen, um die antisemitische Hysterie im Lande anzuheizen. Zu allem Überfl uß beteiligte sich dieser Tage auch noch die vielgelesene katholische Tageszeitung Nasz Dziennik am Zündeln. Das Blatt steht der katholischen Rundfunkstation des Redemptoristenpaters Rydzyk „Radio Maryja“ nahe und beruft sich gern auf die “schweigende Mehrheit” im Lande. Sie kreierte eine neue Verschwörungstheorie, indem sie behauptete, die Wiedereinsetzung in die Rechte von polnischen Staatsbürgern diene einzig dazu, den 1968 emigrierten Juden die Möglichkeit zu eröffnen, Vorteile aus dem anstehenden Reprivatisierungsgesetz zu ziehen. Auch das Schlagwort von der “jüdisch-kommunistischen Schicksalsgemeinschaft” (“Zydokomuna”) kam, wenigstens zwischen den Zeilen, wieder zu öffentlichen Ehren mit der Behauptung, die Wiedergutmachung an den Juden liege der Staatsführung (sprich: dem Postkommunisten Kwasniewski) mehr am Herzen als das Los der Ostpolen, die nach Abtrennung der früheren Ostgebiete Polens, ihre 118 Piotr Madajczyk

Staatsbürgerschaft und ihr Vermögen unter sowjetischer Herrschaft verloren hatten. Es bedeute ihr auch mehr als die Entschädigung für aus Ostpolen nach dem Krieg vertriebene Polen. Mit christlicher Nächstenliebe, auch mit dem Bemühen der katholischen Weltkirche ein neues Verhältnis zum Judentum zu begründen, hat das alles wenig gemein. Dafür wird ein eher atavistisches Denkmuster deutlich, das ohne Sündenbock nicht auskommt.

3. Barbara Wieland, “Das Jahr der politischen Wasserscheide. Diskussionen über 1968 in Polen und der Tschechischen Republik”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 July 2001

Wer an Zahlenmystik glaubt, mag sich von den Ereignissen des Jahres 1968 bestätigt fühlen. In diesem Jahr wurde in Deutschland das Attentat auf Rudi Dutschke verübt, die Studentenproteste in West-Berlin erreichten ihren Höhepunkt. In Amerika wird Martin Luther King ermordet, und in Frankreich enden Großdemonstrationen blutig. Der Ruf nach Freiheit und einer anderen Gesellschaftsstruktur sorgt auch jenseits des Eisernen Vorhangs für Frühlingssehnsucht. In Polen demonstrieren Studenten für Meinungsfreiheit, in Lemberg entstehen Hippie-Kolonien, und in der Tschechoslowakei wird eine neue Form des Sozialismus geträumt. Bei aller Unterschiedlichkeit ist in Polen und der Tschechischen Republik das Jahr 1968 eine politische Wasserscheide. Dabei geht es um den Lackmustest der politischen Positionierung: “Sage mir, wie du zu 68 stehst, und ich sage dir, wohin du gehörst”. Wo früher Stalinismus gegen Reform stand, stehen sich nun unterschiedliche Konzepte vom Wesen des eigenen Staates gegenüber. Im polnischen März 1968 gingen Studenten, zunächst in Warschau, auf die Straße, um für mehr Freiheit und Demokratie zu demonstrieren. Die kommunistischen Machthaber bekamen Angst, hatten sie doch das Abschreckbild Prag direkt vor der Haustür, wo Parteichef Novotný im Januar 1968 zum Rücktritt gezwungen worden war. Um ihre Macht zu sichern und zumindest die Basis der Partei auf regierungstreuen Kurs zu bringen, brachte der innerste Zirkel um Gomulka eine antisemitische Kampagne ins Rollen. Juden wurden aus Parteiämtern und höheren Funktionen verdrängt; viele Intellektuelle, Akademiker, Künstler emigrierten, insgesamt fast 20 000. Auf The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 119 deren Plätze rückten begierig Wartende nach, die gleich noch in eine der freigewordenen Wohnungen einziehen konnten. Nach der Wende begann Polen, die schwarzen Flecken der eigenen Geschichte anzupacken. Einer dieser Flecken ist der Antisemitismus. In jüngster Zeit erhitzte das Pogrom von Jedwabne im Jahr 1941 die Gemüter. Aber auch das Jahr 1968 ist unvergessen in der öffentlichen Diskussion. Anfang dieses Jahres wurden Akten veröffentlicht, die belegen, daß jüdische Offi ziere seit 1968 in der polnischen Armee degradiert wurden, bis in die achtziger Jahre hinein. Daß auch jenseits neuer Enthüllungen immer wieder über den März 1968 gesprochen wird, liegt nicht unerheblich an Adam Michnik. Michnik, ein Symbol für 1968 und die polnische Oppositionsbewegung, gibt seit einigen Jahren die Gazeta Wyborcza heraus, die größte polnische Tageszeitung. Wenn seine Zeitung das Thema anpackt, fühlen andere sich verpfl ichtet, darauf einzugehen. Zwar ist Michnik in den vergangenen Jahren in die Schußlinie geraten, weil er die Annäherung an ehemalige kommunistische Machthaber sucht, doch ist die Haltung seiner Zeitung und der ihr nahestehenden liberalen “Unia Wolnosci” (Freiheitsunion) unverändert: Mit den Märzereignissen entstand überhaupt erst die Idee, sich in grundsätzlicher Opposition zur Partei zu sehen. Noch gab es keine festgefügte Organisation – die entwickelte sich erst seit 1976 – doch wandten sich jetzt reformorientierte Intellektuelle endgültig von der Partei ab. Für Aleksander Smolar, der wegen seiner Beteiligung an den Märzereignissen ins Gefängnis kam und danach nach Frankreich emigrierte, war der März 1968 eine kulturelle Wende. Hier setzte sich bei den Intellektuellen der Gedanke fest, für Menschen- und Bürgerrechte zu kämpfen. Nationalistische Kreise und nationalkonservative Vertreter der Kirche leugnen jegliche katalysatorische Wirkung des Jahres 1968. Sie halten den damaligen Dissidenten vor, selbst aus der kommunistischen Partei zu kommen und deshalb kompromittiert zu sein. Bis vor kurzem konnten diese Gruppierungen die antisemitische Kampagne in das Bild vom “Polen als Opfer” vom “Polen als Messias der Völker” einbauen. Ausschließlich die Partei sei schuld an dieser “antizionistischen Kampagne” gewesen, das Volk sei nur instrumentalisiert worden. Dabei berufen sie sich auf den Historiker Dariusz Stola und sein Werk “Die antizionistische Kampagne”. Stola 120 Piotr Madajczyk belegt in diesem Buch, daß die Märzereignisse vorrangig eine parteiinterne Angelegenheit waren. Dabei übersehen die Nationalkonservativen, daß Stola den Märzereignissen durchaus eine kulturelle Dimension zugesteht, die den Ansichten Smolars und der „Unia Wolnosci“ nahekommt. Doch seitdem heftig darüber diskutiert wird, daß es höchstwahrscheinlich polnische Bewohner von Jedwabne waren, die 1941 Juden in eine Scheune getrieben und diese Scheune dann angezündet haben, kann Polen nicht mehr so recht der Messias der Völker sein. Der polnische Opfermythos ist auf dem Rückzug. Die Entmythisierung hat begonnen. Für die Tschechische Republik war das Jahr 1968 ungleich bedeutender als für Polen. Vom Prager Frühling, dem Sozialismus mit menschlichem Antlitz, wollten sogar deutsche Studentenführer lernen. Der Einmarsch der Truppen des Warschauer Pakts im August 1968 machte dem Experiment ein Ende und stürzte die Tschechoslowakei in eine tiefe Depression. Auf Anordnung Moskaus wurde die Tschechoslowakei auf Linie gebracht. Normalisierung heißt die Zeit unter sowjetischer Besatzung – den verhafteten Bürgerrechtlern muß dieser Begriff wie bitterer Spott in den Ohren geklungen haben. Nach 1989 gab es eine kurze Welle der Begeisterung für Dubček und die Dissidenten, die mit wachsendem Antikommunismus in den neunziger Jahren abfl aute. Jetzt sprechen Parlamentarier der bürgerlichen ODS um den Präsidenten der Abgeordnetenversammlung, Václav Klaus, dem Prager Frühling ab, nachhaltig Einfl uß gehabt zu haben. Damals seien die Leute naiv gewesen, sie hätten weiterhin an den Kommunismus geglaubt und die wahren Ideale nicht erkannt – so lautet ihr Verdikt. Deshalb nehmen sie ihre politischen Konzepte überallher, nur nicht aus der eigenen Geschichte. Dagegen betonen die Anhänger des Präsidenten Havel und Teile der einzigen oppositionellen Gruppe im Parlament, der sogenannten Vierer- -Koalition, die Kontinuität von 1968 zu 1989. Für sie war das Jahr 1968 eine Phase der Freiheit, deren Ideale auch unter kommunistischer Unterdrückung weiterlebten. Hinter dem Streit zwischen Marginalisierung und Kontinuität von 1968 steht die grundsätzliche Frage, wie die tschechische Demokratie aussehen soll. Klaus und die ODS wollen eine Parteiendemokratie nach westlichem Vorbild bauen. Havel und andere ehemalige Dissidenten wie der Senatspräsident Pavel Pithart sehen keinen Grund, mit den Idealen ihrer Vergangenheit zu brechen. Im Kampf gegen den kommunistischen Staat bauten The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 121 sie zivilgesellschaftliche, oppositionelle Strukturen auf. Deshalb schwebt ihnen heute eine Demokratie mit starken zivilgesellschaftlichen Elementen vor, sozusagen ein demokratischer „dritter Weg“ zwischen westlichem Demokratieverständnis und Sozialismus mit menschlichem Antlitz. Diese theoretischen Fragen dringen aber kaum in breite Teile der Gesellschaft vor. Nur punktuell wirbeln politische Ereignisse Staub auf und werden zu “Stammtischthemen”, so während des Fernsehstreiks zu Beginn des Jahres. Ansonsten herrscht Pragmatismus vor, um möglichst schnell alle Voraussetzungen dafür zu erfüllen, daß die Tschechen in die EU eintreten dürfen. Eine tiefgreifende Auseinandersetzung mit der kommunistischen Vergangenheit fehlt. Der Historiker Michal Svatos, der seine Fachkollegen mit Vorträgen und Konferenzen dazu auffordert, sich mit der kommunistischen Vergangenheit des Faches auseinanderzusetzen, sagt, es habe in Deutschland auch mehr als zwanzig Jahre gedauert, ehe der Nationalsozialismus umfassend diskutiert wurde: “Vielleicht brauchen wir noch etwas Zeit – und so etwas wie die deutschen Achtundsechziger”.

4. Karol Sauerland, “Das Jahr des grossen Exodus”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 February 2008

Die Ereignisse des Jahres 1968 in Polen ähneln in gewisser Weise den Studentenunruhen im Westen. Die Ähnlichkeit besteht darin, dass auch hier an den Hochschulen gestreikt wurde. Aber die Ursachen der Unruhen waren ganz andere als in den Vereinigten Staaten, Frankreich oder Westdeutschland. Sie begannen damit, dass die Machthaber Mitte Januar 1968 das Verbot der Warschauer Aufführung des Dramas “Die Totenfeier” von Adam Mickiewicz (auch als “Die Ahnen” bekannt) angekündigt hatten; die russlandkritische Tendenz hatte die Inszenierung unter den Studenten zum Kult werden lassen. Ende Januar sollte das Stück das letzte Mal gespielt werden. Im ganzen Lande wurden Unterschriften für eine an den Sejm gerichtete Petition gegen das Aufführungsverbot gesammelt. Allein in Warschau fanden sich mehr als dreitausend Personen, die unterschrieben, in Breslau waren es über tausend. Alle Juden galten als Volksfeinde Zur selben Zeit tauchten zahlreiche Flugblätter antisemitischen Inhalts auf. In ihnen wurde gegen den “übermächtigen Einﬂ uss” von Zionisten und 122 Piotr Madajczyk die mit ihnen verbundenen Intellektuellen Stimmung gemacht. So hieß es in einem Flugblatt: Michnik, Blumsztajn und Szlajfer können und werden uns nicht die patriotische Tradition unseres Volkes lehren, was im Klartext hieß: Diese Juden können uns Polen nur in eine Sackgasse führen. Als am 29. Februar der Warschauer Schriftstellerverband zu einer außerordentlichen Versammlung zusammentrat, auf der mehrheitlich eine Resolution gegen die Kulturpolitik der Partei und Regierung verabschiedet wurde, und als kurz darauf Studenten im ganzen Lande diese Politik sowie das brutale Vorgehen der Ordnungskräfte gegen Teilnehmer an der Demonstration auf dem Warschauer Universitätscampus am 8. März verurteilten, leiteten die Machthaber eine antisemitische Kampagne von einem Ausmaß ein, wie sie in einem kommunistisch regierten Land bis dahin unbekannt war. Ich befand mich zu jener Zeit in Ost-Berlin, um Materialien für meine Dissertation über Wilhelm Dilthey zu sammeln. Als ich von den Protesten hörte, wäre ich am liebsten gleich nach Warschau, wo ich Universitätsassistent war, zurückgekehrt, aber die Vorschriften erlaubten es damals nicht, ein staatliches Stipendium zu unterbrechen. Ich hätte kein neues Visum für die Rückkehr nach Berlin erhalten. So musste ich versuchen, durch die Lektüre polnischer Zeitungen, die man im Polnischen Kulturinstitut an der Friedrichstraße gleich vor der Spreebrücke einsehen konnte, zu erfahren, was sich in Polen tat. Ich traute meinen Augen nicht. Da las man plötzlich, dass die Teilnehmer der Protestdemonstration am 8. März aufs Engste mit den “Zionisten, Revisionisten und Trotzkisten” verbunden seien. Immer häuﬁ ger wurde auf die jüdische Herkunft der Verhafteten hingewiesen – man sehe es bereits an den Namen: Dajczgewand, Szlajfer, Michnik, dessen Vater Ozjasz Szechter hieß, et cetera. All diese jungen Menschen wurden zugleich als ehemalige Stalinisten beziehungsweise als Kinder von solchen bezeichnet. Kurzum, sie seien Feinde des polnischen Volkes, die jetzt im Streit um die “Totenfeier” nur vorgäben, um die Erhaltung des nationalen Erbes zu kämpfen. Unter den Hetzartikeln befanden sich auch solche, deren Verfasser ich kannte und von denen ich nie angenommen hätte, dass sie zu solchen antisemitischen Äußerungen imstande sein könnten. Aber viel näher ging mir, dass so viele Professoren entlassen wurden, die zum Teil meine Lehrer waren. Andere hatte ich bei ihren Auftritten erlebt. The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 123

Als ich im Herbst nach Warschau zurückkehrte, hatte Wladyslaw Gomulka, der damalige Erste Parteisekretär, die von ihm selbst angeheizte antisemitische Kampagne Mitte des Jahres stoppen lassen – nachdem Zehntausende Ausreiseanträge gestellt hatten, denen die Machthaber gern nachkamen. Fast alle polnischen Juden, die die Schoa überlebt und nicht gleich nach dem Krieg aus Polen ausgewandert waren, verließen um diese Zeit nach meiner Rückkehr das Land. Der Danziger Bahnhof in Warschau war der Ort, von dem aus sie sich nach Wien begaben, um von dort aus nach Israel, in die Vereinigten Staaten oder auch in die Bundesrepublik weiterzureisen. Man nannte diesen Bahnhof damals den “Umschlagplatz”. Gott sei Dank führte er nicht in den Tod, aber so gut wie niemand hatte sich freiwillig zur Ausreise entschlossen. Die meisten empfanden tiefe Trauer, denn sie hatten sich mit allen Kräften für den Wiederaufbau dieses Landes engagiert. Ich war mehrmals auf diesem Bahnhof, um Bekannte zu verabschieden. Unter ihnen befanden sich etwa Roman Karst, ein rühriger Literaturkritiker, Teilnehmer der berühmten Kafka-Konferenz in der Tschechoslowakei, und der Germanist Emil Adler, der sich in Polen um das Andenken von Herder verdient gemacht hatte. Er hatte den Anstoß dazu gegeben, dass in Herders Geburtsort Morungen ein entsprechendes Museum eingerichtet wurde, wenn dies auch erst mehrere Jahre nach seinem Weggang geschah. Die Abschiede verwandelten sich jedes Mal in Demonstrationen und Bekenntnisse, die nicht immer ohne Folgen für diejenigen waren, die blieben. Man besuchte natürlich auch jene, die noch ihre Koffer packten, sofern man sie näher kannte. Ich hatte zu jener Zeit Texte der Philosophen Bronislaw Baczko und Leszek Kolakowski ins Deutsche übersetzt, die bei Suhrkamp und Kohlhammer erscheinen sollten und dann auch erschienen. Beide hatten kurz nach dem 8. März so wie der Soziologe Zygmunt Bauman, der Ökonom Wlodzimierz Brus und andere Hochschullehrer ihre Arbeitsstellen an der Warschauer Universität verloren. Unvergesslich bleibt mir der Besuch bei Kolakowski. Es muss im Oktober gewesen sein. Ich fragte ihn, was er jetzt mache. Er antwortete, er lese Paracelsus, um der Sprache Heideggers auf die Spur zu kommen. Es war keine theatralische Geste, sondern entsprach seinem damaligen Charakter. Er wusste wahrscheinlich, dass die Machthaber eines Tages gegen die Andersgläubigen, damals Revisionisten genannt, gewaltsam 124 Piotr Madajczyk vorgehen würden; schließlich hatte er in einem breitangelegten Buch über das Wechselspiel zwischen Häresie und Konfession im siebzehnten Jahrhundert gezeigt, dass der abweichend Denkende, der Dissident, eines Tages aus der Glaubensgemeinschaft ausgestoßen wird. Er ist dann gezwungen, entweder eine neue Konfession zu gründen und um deren Anerkennung zu kämpfen oder das Weite zu suchen. Als Häretiker, Dissident, der nur seine Ansichten zu verteidigen gedenkt, hat er keine Chance, in Ruhe gelassen zu werden. Nach dem Oktober 1956, dem polnischen Herbst, als Gomulka wieder Erster Parteisekretär und als Hoffnungsträger bejubelt wurde, hatte sich in Polen ein blühendes Kulturleben entfaltet, das zwar recht schnell Einschränkungen erfuhr, aber noch viel Freiräume für künstlerische und auch geisteswissenschaftliche Aktivitäten ließ. Ich nahm an mehreren interdisziplinären Seminaren aktiv, also mit eigenen Beiträgen, teil; besuchte private Treffen – man sprach auch von Salons – bei denen über vorgegebene Themen debattiert wurde, von denen im Westen manche erst später Furore machten. Diese Treffen waren meine eigentlichen Universitäten, hier fühlte ich mich wie der Fisch im Wasser. In einer solchen kreativen Atmosphäre verließ ich Warschau, um meinen Stipendiumaufenthalt anzutreten. Als ich zurückkehrte, waren die Salons geschlossen. An interdisziplinäre Seminare war nicht mehr zu denken. Die Staatssicherheit hätte sofort einige ihrer Teilnehmer zu Verhören geladen. Warschau, ja das ganze Land trocknete geistig aus. Akademische Hetzer Persönlich vergleiche ich den Exodus führender Köpfe und der vielen talentierten jungen Leute (zu ihnen gehörte übrigens auch Jan Tomasz Gross, der mit seinem Buch über Jedwabne und nun mit seiner Studie über den polnischen Nachkriegsantisemitismus für erregte Debatten sorgt) mit dem Jahr 1933 in Deutschland. Ein Leszek Kolakowski mit seinem glänzenden Polnisch war unersetzbar, um nur einen Namen von vielen zu nennen. Und so gut wie keiner von denen, die Polen verlassen hatten, kam nach einundzwanzig Jahren, also 1989, wieder zurück, um seinen verlorenen Posten einzunehmen. Das hätte auch wenig geholfen, denn die sogenannten Märzdozenten, das heißt jene nicht habilitierten Akademiker, die sich an der Hetzkampagne beteiligt hatten, waren nachgerückt und hatten Scharen von entsprechenden Schülern produziert. Auch das Solidarnosc-Jahr konnte die Lücke, die im geistigen Leben Polens entstanden war, nicht schließen, obwohl diejenigen, die 1968 protestiert The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 125 hatten und geblieben waren, in dieser Zeit äußerst aktiv waren. Unvergesslich sind mir die Tage im März 1981, an denen man versuchte, die Ereignisse dreizehn Jahre zuvor zu rekonstruieren, den Verfolgten Genugtuung zu erweisen. Aber diese Versuche unterbrach General Wojciech Jaruzelski, der 1968 an dem Exodus mitgewirkt hatte, durch die Einführung des sogenannten Kriegszustands. Die Freiheitsbewegung wurde auf diese Weise brutal niedergeschlagen. Nach meinem Empﬁ nden ist die durch den Exodus 1968 entstandene Lücke bis heute nicht geschlossen worden, denn an den Universitäten änderte sich auch nach der Wende wenig. Vor allem befreiten sich die Hochschulen nicht von jenen, die 1968 als “Aktive” hervorgetreten waren. Über ihre Taten beziehungsweise Untaten herrscht Stillschweigen. Heute sind diese Leute zumeist pensioniert oder bereits verstorben, jedoch ihr Geist lebt in vielem und bei vielen weiter.

5. Jan Skórzyński, “Freiheit statt ‘Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh’”, Welt-Online, 11 March 2008

Während sich die Studenten im Westen mit dem Vietkong solidarisierten, kämpften die Menschen im Osten Europas 1968 gegen den Obrigkeitsstaat der Kommunisten. In Paris, West-Berlin, London und Rom war das Frühjahr 1968 von Studentenprotesten gegen den Vietnamkrieg gekennzeichnet. Und auch in Warschau protestierten die Studenten, doch ging es ihnen nicht um dasselbe wie ihren Gegenübern im Westen. Die jungen Polen gingen nicht auf die Straße, um aus Solidarität mit den Vietkong “Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh” zu skandieren, sondern vielmehr, um die Freiheit ihres eigenen Landes gegen eine erstickende kommunistische Herrschaft zu verteidigen. Statt im Chor Hos Namen zu rufen, legten die jungen Polen Blumen am Denkmal von Adam Mickiewicz nieder, einem Dichter des 19. Jahrhunderts, dessen zum Lob des Freiheitskampfes geschriebenes Stück Totenfeier kurz zuvor für subversiv und anti-sowjetisch erklärt und dessen Aufführung am Nationaltheater in Warschau abgesetzt worden war. Dies sind nur einige der Unterschiede zwischen west- und osteuropäischen Studenten während dieses nunmehr 40 Jahre zurückliegenden Frühlings der 126 Piotr Madajczyk

Rebellion. Obwohl die beiden Jugendrevolten von derselben Generation durchgeführt wurden und mit Straßendemonstrationen und Sit-ins eine ähnliche Form annahmen, gab es zwischen den Studentenrevolten beiderseits des Eisernen Vorhangs deutlich mehr Unterschiede als Gemeinsamkeiten. Die Unterschiede ergaben sich natürlich aus ihrem Zusammenhang. Die Ausgangssituation der Studenten im Westen – mit Rede- und Versammlungsfreiheit, einem Pluralismus der Ideologien und einem demokratischen politischen System – war für ihre Kollegen im Osten ein fernes Ziel, dessen Erreichen unwahrscheinlich war. Unzufrieden mit der kapitalistischen Konsumgesellschaft, die überall um sie herum Metastasen bildete, griffen die westeuropäischen und amerikanischen Studenten das System aus linksradikalen Positionen an. Die polnischen, tschechischen und jugoslawischen Studenten richteten ihre Proteste gegen eine kommunistische Diktatur, die ihren Gesellschaften elementare bürgerliche Freiheiten vorenthielt. Für die Westler war die Hauptbedrohung der amerikanische Imperialismus, dem sie die Schuld für den „schmutzigen” Krieg in Vietnam gaben. Für die Polen und anderen im Osten war die Bedrohung der Sowjetimperialismus – eine Bedrohung, die in der Niederschlagung des Prager Frühlings durch Breschnew nur allzu bald Realität werden sollte. Während Erstere die Revolution wollten, verlangten Letztere nur – was um nichts weniger waghalsig war – dass die Behörden sich an das Gesetz halten sollten. “Die Presse lügt!”, riefen die Demonstranten in Warschau und verbrannten von der Partei kontrollierte Zeitungen. Für Wladyslaw Gomulka, den polnischen Parteichef, und andere hohe Tiere bei den Kommunisten waren freie Medien eine bourgeoise Verirrung. Im selben Frühjahr verbrannten in Paris Demonstranten Autos aus Opposition gegen den bürgerlichen Lebensstil. Was man sieht, hängt davon ab, wo man steht. Während die Studenten in Paris und Berkeley sich gegen die akademische Wissenschaft stellten, demonstrierten ihre Altersgenossen in Warschau und anderen polnischen Städten in Verteidigung der traditionellen Rolle der Universität und ihrer Autonomie und wurden dabei von vielen ihrer Professoren unterstützt. Anders als im Westen spielte der Generationenkonfl ikt 1968 in Polen nur eine untergeordnete Rolle. Schriftsteller und Wissenschaftler schlossen sich aus Zorn über die offi zielle Zensur gegenüber Mickiewicz‘ Stück und ihrer nationalen Kultur dem Protest der Jungen an. Die Studentenbewegung in Polen The impact of the events of the year 1968 on the forming of the image... 127 nahm während der Demonstration an der Universität Warschau am 8. März 1968 den Charakter einer Massenbewegung an. Die Studenten schlossen sich aus Unterstützung für zwei ihrer Kommilitonen, die wegen ihrer Proteste vor dem Nationaltheater vom Studium ausgeschlossen worden waren, zusammen. Einer der beiden war Adam Michnik, später lange Zeit politischer Gefangener, der in den 1980er Jahren zum politischen Strategen der Solidarnosc werden sollte. Die friedliche Demonstration wurde von der Polizei und “freiwilligen” Tugendwächtern der Partei brutal aufgelöst. Nie gab es den Versuch eines Dialoges. Unter Verletzung einer Jahrhunderte langen Tradition universitärer Autonomie marschierte die Polizei auf dem Campus auf, verprügelte Studenten und verhaftete eine große Zahl von Demonstranten. Als Reaktion hierauf schwappte eine Welle des Protests auf andere Universitäten im ganzen Land über, häufi g unterstützt von jungen Arbeitern. Die Verlogenheit der kommunistischen Presse, die die Bedeutung der Proteste verfälschte und die Studentenführer persönlich angriff, heizte die Situation weiter an. Die Partei nahm Zufl ucht in antisemitischer Propaganda und verwies auf die jüdische Abstammung einiger der Studentenführer. Die nun folgende Hasskampagne unterstrich das völlige Fehlen der Redefreiheit. Die Forderung nach Abschaffung der Zensur war eine der ersten politischen Parolen der polnischen Märzunruhen des Jahres 1968. Rufe nach Versammlungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit folgten. Äußerst wichtig ist an dieser Stelle, dass die Protestierenden keine freien Wahlen verlangten. In dieser Hinsicht waren sie Realisten. Was sie aber forderten, war ein gewisses Maß bürgerlicher Kontrolle über die Obrigkeit, und zwar sowohl im politischen wie im wirtschaftlichen Bereich. Eine Parole lautete: „Kein Brot ohne Freiheit”. Nach 1968 traten die protestierenden Studenten nach und nach in das politische und geistige Establishment ihrer jeweiligen Länder ein. Die polnischen Dissidenten fanden sich im Gefängnis oder im Exil wieder. Mehrere tausend von ihnen wurden von ihren Universitäten ausgeschlossen, und nach politisch motivierten Prozessen wurden 80 von ihnen inhaftiert. Die Behörden entließen außerdem prominente Professoren, die die Studenten beeinfl usst und unterstützt hatten. Die düsterste Antwort des Regimes, eine antisemitische Säuberungsaktion, führte zum Exodus von mehr als 10 000 Menschen, denen auch die Staatsbürgerschaft entzogen wurde. 128 Piotr Madajczyk

Die Frühjahrsproteste, an die sich viele im Westen so gern zurückerinnern, hatten ein deutlich anderes Ergebnis. Antikapitalistischer Radikalismus drängte viele westliche Protestierende in Richtung der extremen Linken, zur Abkehr von der freiheitlichen Demokratie und, in manchen Fällen, dem Terrorismus. Die ideologische Evolution der polnischen Studenten führte diese in die entgegengesetzte Richtung – von Bemühungen zur “Verbesserung” des Sozialismus im Namen eines “echten” Marxismus zur antitotalitären Opposition und zur Errichtung einer freien Zivilgesellschaft. Die Inhaftierung schloss diese Evolution der Märzstreiter ab und nahm ihnen alle Illusionen. In den 1970er Jahren schufen sie das größte Oppositionszentrum innerhalb des sozialistischen “Lagers”. Die Solidarnosc- -Bewegung der 1980er Jahre und der friedliche Sturz des Kommunismus waren großteils das Werk ihrer Generation. Es war das einzig passende Ende des Weges, der 1968 am Denkmal von Mickiewicz begann. Joanna Szymoniczek

Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events of the year 1968 therein

Introduction

The aim of this study is to present reactions of the Polish society and the Polish public, of the events of 1968 in Germany. To reach the aim, press articles have been analysed from a number of angles, including the frequency of their appearance, the way of depicting the events, the opinions and commentaries, the headlining of reports and the placement of photos, as well as the relationship of the articles in question with those tackling other topics which were printed in the most popular publications of the time. The articles were taken from the following daily newspapers: Dziennik Ludowy (The People’s Daily), Gazeta Krakowska (The Krakow Gazette), Gazeta Robotnicza (The Workers’ Gazette), Ilustrowany Kurier Polski (The Illustrated Polish News), Trybuna Ludu (The People’s Tribune), Trybuna Robotnicza (The Workers’ Tribune) and Życie Warszawy (Warsaw Life). Moreover, articles from weeklies such as Polityka (Politics), Forum, Tygodnik Powszechny (The Universal Weekly) and Szpilki (Pins) were also taken 130 Joanna Szymoniczek into account. The research also took cognisance of television and radio news reports broadcast by Telewizja Polska (Polish TV) and Polskie Radio (Polish Radio). The principal objective of the study is to endeavour to demonstrate how the foreign and domestic policy requirements of an authoritarian state, for such was the People’s Republic of Poland, led to the distortion of the picture of the events of 1968. Furthermore, it seeks an answer to whether the articulation of the views of Polish public opinion was possible in 1968; how was the image of the events of 1968 in Germany manipulated in the press; how Polish society reacted to those events; whether the events had their continuation in the Polish media and whether they were invoked in subsequent years and, if so, then how and upon what occasion. The work begins, however, with a few observations as to both the subject of the general position of the media in the People’s Republic of Poland and the matter of censorship.

The media in the People’s Republic of Poland

The media system which shaped in Poland after the Second World War was subordinated to political practice. From the outset, the ruling communist party treated the radio and the press, and later, television as well, as one of the most crucial instruments for the exertion of power and the control of social processes1. The regime determined precisely which topics should be discussed, which matters could appear in articles and what should be mentioned, in small print, under the world events column, which topics warranted reportage, with whom interviews could be conducted, and whose photos or what ﬁ lmed material may be

1 Maciej Iłowiecki, Media, władza, świadomość społeczna [Media, Power and Public Awareness], Łódź 1999, pp. 39–43. Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 131 presented to readers. The substance of everything to be communicated was subjected to incisive censorship. Only content prepared in this way was recognised as valid and authentic2. By the same token, there existed far-reaching possibilities of creating a picture of the world for the recipients which either differed fairly radically, or even diverged from reality completely. The role assigned to the media from the moment they came into existence was not to be fulfi lled. Rather than playing their part as the mouthpiece of society’s opinions and public feelings, they had become a one-way channel, a channel with the fl ow of information being from ‘the authorities to the masses’3. Given the subject under discussion, several measures undertaken in respect of the press in Poland should be addressed. First and foremost, the authorities restricted access to sources of information other than the Polish Press Agency (PAP; Polska Agencja Prasowa). This included a prohibition on the monitoring of foreign radio stations by editorial staff. Polish Press Agency itself was limited as far as potential undertakings were concerned. In order to put the aforementioned principle into practice, the authorities increased the number of correspondents fi elded by the agency in the People’s Republics, but elsewhere, and particularly in the United States and the countries of Western Europe, it not only drastically reduced the staff, but also closed down a number of bureaus. The right of editorial offi ces to make use of American and Western European photo agencies was curtailed, with the necessity of paying high copyright fees and in foreign currencies as an argument. Being compelled to use home-grown photographs or, alternatively, those from ‘friendly’ states, was one of the reasons

2 Marek Karpiński, Zapis na cenzurę [Censorship: Prohibited!], Warszawa 1981, p. 6. 3 Andrzej Kozieł, “Prasa w latach 1944 – 1989” [The Press between 1944–1989], in: Prasa, radio i telewizja w Polsce. Zarys dziejów [The History of the Press, Radio and Television in Poland], Warszawa 2001, p. 143. 132 Joanna Szymoniczek underlying the recurrence of the same images, not only in successive articles, but also in other newspapers. Editorial staff were also expected balance information in favour of news from socialist countries and to fi ght against ‘Americanisms’, in other words, against ‘an uncritical admiration for American science and technology’. In consequence, even events of the highest importance in the Western European countries and the United States were frequently ousted by those of minor signifi cance, but occurring in the Soviet Union, Poland herself, or the other states within the Eastern Bloc4. Truth was relativised. It was common to operate half-truths or write untrue things, as it was acknowledged as desirable, just as long as it served the purpose. The world was depicted in black and white, tapping into an internally coherent system of stereotypes and selectively gathering facts and arguments in tune with a thesis established in advance. By using stereotypes, the press consolidated and preserved a range of myths. The absence of any polemic whatsoever was perceptible in the writing, as was its one-sidedness. In the majority of cases, the articles and other writings were formulated in the predictable and derivative language of cliché, slogan-fi lled wording and propagandist newspeak. The predominant topics during those years included fuelling the atmosphere of menace by using texts about imperialism, the Cold War, Poland’s chief enemies: the United States and West Germany, the enemies’ agents, saboteurs and exhortations to watchfulness and to seek out the enemy. They also covered attacks on the Church, the glorifi cation of all things Soviet, clarion calls to meet production plans, the kindling of rivalry in fulfi lling work targets and stirring propaganda in support of rural collectivisation5. This

4 Wiesław Sonczyk, Media w Polsce. Zarys problematyki [Media in Poland. The Outline of Problems], Warszawa 1999, p. 28. 5 Media w Polsce w XX wieku [The Polish Media in XX century], Renata Gluza (ed.), Poznań 1999, p. 32. Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 133 encompassed every kind of press publication which came out at the time, although particular differences did, of course, appear, in line with the nature of each type. Thus, the party’s own papers, intended for party activists, were saturated with propaganda and rousing promulgation of both party and system. The Czytelnik publishing house’s dailies, which were more popular in character, featured less ‘brazen’ propaganda, better and more composed editing, while what normally prevailed in the afternoon papers intended for a mass readership, was lightness of form, animated language, dynamic graphics and a preponderance of entertaining content6. The change in the situation of the press which came about in connection with the ‘thaw’ after Stalin’s death was short-lived. The content was rendered more attractive and efforts were made to differentiate and enrich both form and language in order to bring the publications closer to the people and their concerns. As a result, on the one hand, in a great many titles, serious topics and issues were addressed, while, on the other, reviews and portrayals of Western fashion and culture were featured, thus bringing American music, primarily jazz, the Western lifestyle, fi lm and so forth to the mix. However, right after the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP), the measures were taken to ‘put the press in their rightful place’. This involved, inter alia, signifi cant changes in editorial staff, more rigorous censorship, a dearth of artistic and journalistic freedom and the miniaturisation of the press. The next verifi cation of the journalistic milieu was to occur in the aftermath of March 1968.

6 Aldona Małgorzata Dereń, Andrzej Kudłaszyk, “Polskie prawo prasowe” [Polish Press Law], in: Mass media w systemie komunikacji społecznej w Polsce [Mass Media in the System of Social Communication in Poland], Andrzej Kudłaszyk, Andrzej Małkiewicz and Roman Karpiński (eds.), Wrocław 1995, pp. 45–49. 134 Joanna Szymoniczek

Censorship in the People’s Republic of Poland

Censorship creates an image of events which is established in advance, it blocks information and substance incompatible with the interests of the authorities and replaces them with propagandist content. It thus constitutes a fundamental structure within a non-democratic state, since it permits the legitimisation of those who hold power. If all that is available to society is one, manipulated image, then that is the basis upon which opinions and judgements will be formed. Hence control over the media affords unlimited potential for the manipulation of reality’s image. In the People’s Republic of Poland, information imparted for public consumption by the press, by scholarly and cultural publications and by entertainment was under supervision from 1944 until 1990. Initially, the function of censorship was controlled by the Minister of the Interior. However, as early as 5th July 1946, by means of a decree contradictory to the Press Law of 1938, the Central Offi ce for the Control of Press, Publications and Entertainments, Główny Urząd Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk (GUKPPiW), was established7. In July 1981, it was renamed the Central Offi ce for the Control of Publications and Entertainments (GUKPiW; Główny Urząd Kontroli Publikacji i Widowisk). It reported to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The institution consisted of local Offi ces for the Control of Press, Publications and Entertainments. The director of the GUKPPiW was appointed by the Council of Ministers at the request of its Chairman,

7 Archiwum Akt Nowych in Warsaw [The Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw], hereinafter: AAN, GUKPPiW [Central Offi ce for the Control of Press, Publications and Entertainments], WZ. 2813, Dekret z dn. 5 sierpnia 1946 r. o utworzeniu Głównego Urzędu Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk (The Decree on the Establishment of the Central Offi ce for the Control of Press, Publications and Entertainments, 5 August 1946), pp. 6–8. Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 135 while the Offi ce itself was funded by the Council’s Presidium. The GUKPPiW’s brief was set out in Article Two of the aforementioned decree and read as follows:

[...] supervision of the press, publications and entertainments in the scope provided for under the particular legal regulations, control over the dissemination of any and every type of work by means of printing, images and the spoken word”. The said supervision and control was to prevent “harm to the political system of the Polish State, disclosure of state secrets, infringement of the Polish State’s international relations, infringement of the law or transgression of decency, misleading public opinion by means of imparting information inconsistent with reality.

The control exercised by the Offi ce encompassed every kind of publication, theatre production, radio and television broadcast, report of parliamentary speeches and even all types of operating instructions for machinery and labelling on food products and checked for content which failed to conform to the line taken by offi cial propaganda. Between 1945 and 1980, no indication whatsoever was given of the censor’s interventions in printed texts8. The Decree on the Establishment of the Central Offi ce for the Control of Press, Publications and Entertainments was at variance with the Constitutional Act on the structure and spheres of activity of the highest bodies of the Republic of Poland, as of 19th February 1947 and known as the Small Constitution9, as well as with the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland10, which was passed by the Legislative Sejm on 22nd July 1952. It guaranteed civil freedoms. The article number 71 said:

8 AAN, GUKPPiW, WZ. 829, “Przeglądy interwencji i przeoczeń w publikacjach periodycznych, nieperiodycznych, drukach ulotnych itp.” [Overview of intervention and ommisions in periodic, non-periodic publications and pamphlets], pp. 118–120. 9 Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 1947, No. 18, item 71. 10 Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Laws] 1952, No. 33, item 232. 136 Joanna Szymoniczek

The People’s Republic of Poland assures its citizens of freedom of speech, print, public assembly, rallies, marches and demonstrations. The fulﬁ lment of this freedom shall be served by the restoration of printers, paper supplies, public ediﬁ ces and halls, means of communication, radios and other material resources indispensable to the working people and their organisations.

It was not until 1981 that the possibility of appealing against the GUKPiW’s decisions in the Supreme Administrative Court was introduced. The decree itself was revoked on 1st July 1984 and preventative censorship was abolished in 1990.

West Germany in the Polish press in 1968

Along with the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was the ‘villain of the piece’ throughout the era of the People’s Republic of Poland. The press published many reminders of the Second World War, brandishing successive anniversaries of speciﬁ c crimes and incessantly recalling their scale, the destruction and the number of victims. Against this background, the heroism of the Soviet Union and its role in defeating fascism was continuously emphasised. The articles made frequent reference to the revisionist politics of the post-war FRG. Hence, West Germany was presented as a militaristic state desirous of atomic weapons and rockets, bringing pressure to bear on the Western partners in the case of armament and obstructing disarmament11. It was the FRG, together with Israel and the United States, that was also reported to have brought about an escalation of tension by reason of its attitude towards the conﬂ ict in Vietnam and the Middle East. Readers were informed of an FRG where every effort was made to eliminate the left wing and where, while the police persecuted the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD),

11 Zdzisław Bagiński, “Bundesmarine i rakiety” [Bundesmarine and missiles], Polityka [Politics], No. 8, 24 February 1968, p. 10. Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 137 the Nazis, in the form of the National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD), gained in strength12. Poland was unable to trust the Federal Republic, particularly in the face of Bonn’s obsession with a unifi ed Germany. The enmity of the Polish authorities was further intensifi ed by protests in the FRG against the dismissal of several professors from the University of Warsaw after the events of March 1968. The image of the FRG in Poland’s press thus conformed to the aims of Polish foreign policy towards Germany, whereby the most crucial matter was to block the Federal Republic’s establishment of diplomatic contacts with the states of the Eastern Bloc. During a meeting of the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Pact, held in Bucharest on 4th–5th July 1966, the conditions essential to the establishment of relations with the FRG were set out, with the inviolability of the borders, including Poland’s western border and the border between the two German states, being invoked. For the fi rst time, the Eastern Bloc states had formulated common principles for their policy towards Germany. Polish diplomats, though, suspected that individual countries would not be observing them. Prague’s policies were observed with concern. However, the greatest problem for the Polish diplomats was posed by the policy emanating from Bucharest; Romania’s growing interest in developing political relations and economic cooperation with the FRG was observed uneasily. Moreover, the Romanian leader had opposed attempts to intensify integration under the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and criticised the proposal for establishing, under its auspices, a multilateral cooperation in which not all the member states would participate13.

12 Hanna Harting, “NPD wyjaśnia...” [NPD Explains...], Polityka [Politics], No. 16, 20 June 1968, p. 12. 13 Debra J. Allen, The Oder-Neisse Line – The United States, Poland and Germany in the Cold War, Westport 2003, p. 258. 138 Joanna Szymoniczek

Because Poland lacked the capability of exerting an inﬂ uence on other bloc states, the then leader of the PUWP, Władysław Gomułka, pressed the Soviet authorities to assume the initiative in convening a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs, with a view to further discussion of the principles of policy towards Germany. He himself did not block the possibility of Polish-West German talks, proposing contact with the FRG at ministerial level. On 18th January 1967, Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union met Gomułka during an unofﬁ cial visit to Łańsk. He was prepared to accept the talks undertaken by the states of the bloc with the FRG; Gomułka, however, was unwavering in emphasising the necessity of Poland’s aforementioned conditions’ being met. Notwithstanding pressure from Warsaw and Berlin, on 31st January 1967, Romania established diplomatic relations with Bonn. This led to tension in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and, on 8th February, another conference between the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact was held in Warsaw. Gomułka added the repudiation of the Munich Agreement as null and void from the outset to the matters on the table. His position was strong enough for this condition to be accepted14. Although the condition of recognition of the GDR ostensibly best served the interests of that state, it was advocated by Gomułka, who deemed it essential in a situation where more and more countries of the Eastern Bloc were beginning to make moves toward establishing diplomatic and, in particular, economic relations with the FRG. He accepted the importance of advancing the condition of this recognition

14 Wanda Jarząbek, “‘Ulbricht-Doktrin’ oder ‘Gomułka-Doktrin’? Das Bemühen der Volksrepublik Polen um eine geschlossene Politik des kommunistischen Blocks gegenüber der Westdeutschen Ostpolitik 1966/67”, Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa No. 1, pp. 79–115, here pp. 96-97; Douglas Selvage, “Polska – ‘Doktryna Ulbrichta` w świetle dokumentów” [Poland – ‘Ulbricht’s Doctrine` in the Documents], Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki [Polish-German Yearbook] 1995, No 3, pp. 77–105, here pp. 78–80. Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 139 over and above that regarding the border along the Oder and Neisse rivers, since the border was fi rst and foremost secured by the USSR, while recognition of the GDR was unacceptable to the FRG and effectively blocked the thrust of West German foreign policy15. Gomułka believed that Polish support for the GDR was important enough to induce East German openness to Poland’s proposals for intensifi ed economic collaboration. Yet, in November 1967, the authorities of the GDR withdrew from decisions which had already been taken concerning the enhancement of coordination of the economies of the two states. They took refuge behind objective economic diffi culties, but it was clear that the decision was primarily political in signifi cance. Meanwhile, West German diplomacy was beginning to emerge from its earlier impasse. In 1967, diplomatic relations between the FRG and Romania were established, and a year later they were re-established with Yugoslavia. The FRG’s policy towards Czechoslovakia and Hungary became more active. The Western partners’ appraisal of West Germany’s readiness to enter into talks was a favourable one. In terms of propagandist objectives, things were no different in 1968, with negative information regarding the FRG readily being published, though it should be noted that it were the events in the United States of America and France which were predominant in the Polish media that year. There was a preponderance of unfavourable news which could be used for the purposes of propaganda, fi rst and foremost with regard to American foreign policy. In 1968, the Vietnam War, in particular, was emphasised to this end, especially when the Americans committed crimes, were defeated in battle or suffered grave losses of personnel. The news was usually accompanied by dramatic images from the Asian or Latin-American states, depicting the

15 Mieczysław Tomala, “‘Przyjaźń` z Niemiecką Republiką Demokratyczną, ale za jaką cenę?” [“Friendship” with the FRG – What is the Price?], Rocznik Polsko- -Niemiecki [Polish-German Yearbook] 1995, No. 3, pp. 58–75, here pp. 71–75. 140 Joanna Szymoniczek enormous poverty and despair therein, responsibility for which, in the authors’ opinion, lay at the door of the United States and its imperialist policies. The intention was to discredit, in much the same way as were accounts relating to the training of special units and suppression of liberation movements in Latin America. The press reports also focused on American support for Israel16. The domestic policy of the US was subjected to critical judgement as well. 1968 was, ﬁ rst and foremost, a year of assassinations, with the slaying of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy17. Both events were used for a profound criticism of the United States, of its grave political, social and moral crisis, of the society lost and adrift, with all interpersonal ties severed and human beings lonely and forlorn in the crowd, of growing fascist tendencies in America, of an economic structure based on ties between the most important politicians and the Maﬁ a and so forth. As for the domestic events in France, that country, too, was often a guest in the columns of the Polish press, though here the picture was different, since France was critical of the policies of the USA and enjoyed a well-disposed

16 Archiwum Telewizji Polskiej [The Polish Television Archive], hereinafter: A TVP, WZ. F 913, “Przegląd roku 1968” [The Overview of 1968] and WZ. 68201, „Demonstracje studentów w Japonii, USA i Korei przeciwko wojnie i rasizmowi” [Student demonstrations in Japan, the USA and Korea against the War and Racism]; ”Pierwsze samoloty z USA dla armii izraelskiej” [First Aircrafts from the USA for the Israel Army], Życie Warszawy [Life of Warsaw], 18 June 1968, p. 1; E. Osmańczyk, “Most Pearl Harbour – Sydney – Tokio” [Bridge Pearl Harbour – Sydney – Tokyo], Polityka [Politics], No 8, 24 February 1968. 17 “Dr Martin L. King zamordowany” [Dr Martin L. King Murdered], Życie Warszawy [Life of Warsaw], 6 April 1968, p. 1; “Stany Zjednoczone w ogniu rozruchów” [Riots in the USA], Życie Warszawy [Life of Warsaw], 7 April 1968, p. 1; Archiwum Polskiego Radia [The Polish Radio Archive], hereinafter: A PR, WZ. 3211, item 1, “7 dni w kraju i na świecie” [The Week in Poland and the World], 14 April 1968; “Kawalkada czasu 1964–1974. Część 2: “Śmierć Martina Luthera Kinga” [Cavalcade of Time: Death of Martin Luther King]; sygn. EF 4666, “Pogrzeb Martina Luthera Kinga” [The Funeral of Martin Luther King]; “Zamach na Roberta Kennedy’ego” [Robert Kennedy’s Assasination], Życie Warszawy [Life of Warsaw], 6 June 1968, pp. 1–2; “Robert Kennedy nie żyje” [Robert Kennedy is Dead], Życie Warszawy [Life of Warsaw], 7 June 1968, p. 1. Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 141 attitude on the part of the Arab nations. The Polish press pointed to the stand taken by France in introducing an embargo on the supply of weapons to the conﬂ ict-ridden Middle East. Reminder was made of Iraq’s friendly attitude towards de Gaulle’s Middle East policy “and, especially, towards his criticism of Zionist expansionism”. De Gaulle’s reservations and apprehensions in respect of Germany’s growing role, German armaments and the possibility of reuniﬁ cation were emphasised. France’s obstruction of the enlargement of the European Communities was also advantageous to Poland and it was styled as a positive counterbalance to the policies of the USA, the FRG and Israel. Commentary on the events in France, particularly as compared to the manner of reporting the situation in the United States, was scanter, more laconic and considerably more balanced18.

18 Maria Pasztor, Między Paryżem, Warszawą i Moskwą [Between Paris, Warsaw and Moscow], Toruń 2003, pp. 116–121; Wanda Jarząbek, “Rozmowa w cztery oczy między generałem Charles’em de Gaulle’em i Władysławem Gomułką” [The Four Eyes Talk between Charles de Gaulle and Władysław Gomułka], Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny [Polish Diplomatic Review] 2005, vol. 5, No. 2 (24), pp. 147–167, here p. 148; “Od stycznia do sierpnia” [From January to August], Polityka [Politics], No. 35, 31 August 1968; Tadeusz M. Pasierbiński, “Nie cofniemy się nigdy...” [We Will Never Step Back...], Polityka [Politics], No. 9, 27 January 1968, p. 9; “Francja w obliczu zaostrzającego się kryzysu politycznego” [France Facing a Political Crisis], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], 30 May 1968, pp. 1–2; “V Republika na dnie” [5th Republic on the Bottom], Głos Szczeciński [Voice of Szczecin], 30 May 1968, p. 2; “Francja w obliczu głębokiego kryzysu społeczno-politycznego” [France Facing a Deep Social and Political Crisis], Gazeta Robotnicza [Workers’ Newspaper], 22 May 1968, pp. 1– –2; “Narasta kryzys we Francji” [The Crisis in France is Growing], Gazeta Krakowska [Cracow’s Newspaper], 30 May 1968, p. 1–2; “Nowa fala rozruchów w wielu miastach Francji” [New Wave of Riots in French Vities], Głos Olsztyński [Voice of Olsztyn], 13 June 1968, p. 1–2; “Narasta kryzys we Francji” [The Crisis in France is Growing], Gazeta Krakowska [Cracow’s Newspaper], 30 May 1968, p. 1–2; Dariusz Fikus, Daniel Passent, “Francja w ogniu” [France on Fire], Polityka [Politics], No. 23, 8 June 1968, pp. 1–10; Ryszard Wojna, “Nie zmienił się front walki” [The Front Line Hasn’t Changed], Życie Warszawy [Life of Warsaw], 9–10 June 1968, p. 6; “Zdobycie większości parlamentarnej przez gaullistów – rezultatem polityki groźby i szantażu” [Supporters of de Gaulle Win Majority of Votes in the Parliament as a Result of Politics of Threat and Blackmail], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], 1 July 1968, pp. 1–2. 142 Joanna Szymoniczek

Given such signifi cant and absorbing events offering themselves up for propagandist purposes, especially in the United States, as well as the instructions referred to earlier, which compelled editorial offi ces to exercise scrupulous care as regards the ‘proper’ ratio of coverage favourable to socialist states, the subject of the FRG featured less frequently in 1968 than might be expected. Nevertheless, this does not mean that West Germany was not addressed at all during the course of that year. As a consequence of the wave of protests and demonstrations occurring there, the sporadic appearance of copy related to the FRG became an inherent part of a succession of articles on events in the United States, France, Great Britain, Belgium or Italy, wherein, rather than being turned upon specifi c events in specifi c countries, the focus was usually combined, treating them jointly as states of the West. What emerged was a picture of those states as overwhelmed by a wave of social movements, protests against the Vietnam War, fi ghting in the streets and tension in schools and higher education institutions, with the youthful generation on strike, demanding changes to the rules and regulations of scholarship and study, increased expenditure on education, or a reform of the education system. The perception was that the sixties had brought to the Western world a new social and moral manifestation, the foundations of which were cultural transformations and the frustrations of the students and graduates in search of jobs, as well as a naive anarchism, this last being a reaction to prosperity, order and the absence of more serious problems. These manifestations and the transformation in morality were negatively appraised in the Polish media19. What was emphasised was the image of growing social confl icts in the ‘capitalist countries’, encompassing both the USA and the FRG, as well as the strikes in Great Britain. Comprehension of the essence

19 A TVP, WZ. Zarch. 68201, “Demonstracje studentów w Japonii, USA i Korei przeciwko wojnie i rasizmowi” [Student Demonstrations in Japan, the USA and Korea against the War and Racism]; Paul D. Zimmerman, “Wszystko dozwolone” [Everything is Allowed], Forum, No. 52/53, 1967, pp. 25–27. Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 143 of this movement was of minor importance in the commentaries. The pressing matter was purely one of creating a picture of a repressive system, quelling any and every opposition by violent means. It was only due to the attempted assassination of Rudi Dutschke that separate copies were devoted to Germany. First of all, on 12th April 1968, news appeared regarding the assassination attempt itself, along with information about one of the leading lights of the Socialist German Student Union (Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund, SDS); “The United States does not have the monopoly on political murder. In West Berlin, an assassination attempt has been made on Rudi Dutschke, a leader of the Socialist German Students Union”20. What was happening in the FRG was reported precisely, emotionally and propagandistically, covering the mass resistance on the part of the young people, the brutal policing methods and the German politicians’ deafness to the arguments of the youth. The responses of the world’s politicians, their voices raised in opposition to this policy on the part of Bonn, were quoted. The press then focused on the Emergency Acts passed on 30th May 1968, this being the Bundestag’s reaction to both a mass demonstration in which tens of thousands of people in twenty-seven German towns participated and to the social unrest. The Emergency Acts, which limited civic freedoms, were intended to enable the authorities to ﬁ ght the disturbances effectively. The repetition of protest slogans such as “1933? Never again!” or “In defence of democracy”, though frequently ill-juxtaposed with the reports of the protests, created an impression for the reader that the stand was taken, not by protesters in the FRG, but by other societies under threat which feared that the emergency acts drawn up in that country would introduce Dictatorship in the full majesty of the law. The content of the articles

20 A PR, WZ. 3211 item 1, “7 dni w kraju i na świecie” [The Week in Poland and the World], 14 April 1968; “Strzały na Kurfürstendamm” [Shooting on Kurfürstendamm], Forum, No. 16, 21 April 1968, p. 5. 144 Joanna Szymoniczek was underscored by their tone, which was alarmist, often hysterical and with no shortage of loaded headlines, which usually made reference to the Second World War and the perpetual threat posed to both Poland and the other Eastern Bloc states by the FRG. Meanwhile, articles appeared which intended both to demonstrate that the spring of 1968 in Germany was no less heated than in other Western states and to bring the fi gure of Rudi Dutschke into something more of a close-up by focussing upon his role on the Committee of the SDS, as well as in the organisation of the demonstrations during which the students had demanded reforms in higher education and, centred around what was dubbed the ‘Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (APO; Außerparlamentarische Opposition), had come out against the Grand Coalition and the Emergency Acts and protested against the Vietnam War. Brief mention was also made of Benno Ohnesorg, a student who was shot by a policeman, Karl Heinz Kurras, on 2nd June 1967, during a demonstration against the state visit of the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Space was also given over to Rudi Dutschke’s participation in organising a sit-in, one of the two aims of which was to force the resignation of those responsible for the police operation. The other intention was encapsulated in the propagandist slogan of the protest, “Expropriate Springer” (“Enteignet Springer”), directed towards Axel Springer, founder of a publishing company which owned a string of newspapers and magazines. The students held the manner in which his papers, particularly Bild, had been reporting events which were responsible for Ohnesorg’s death. Nonetheless, these reports were decidedly behindhand, overly superfi cial and terse, particularly with regard to news relating to other Western states. It should be emphasised that in the nineteen daily paper titles analysed only one photo of the Socialist German Student Union leader was found. However, the Polish press lost interest in the events in Germany and the fi gure of Rudi Dutschke fairly quickly. It was impossible Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 145 even to deduce from the dailies whether or not he had survived the assassination attempt, since, following a few statements regarding his condition directly after the event and covering what had been happening in Germany, the subject by and large disappeared from the columns of the papers. Meanwhile, the disturbances persisted throughout Germany. In Berlin itself, a crowd of around fi ve thousand people attempted to storm the tower which housed the headquarters of Axel Springer, owner of Bild, the paper at the door of which responsibility was laid as a consequence of its ‘murderous’ propaganda and smears against the SDS, Dutschke and his comrades-in-protest. At the time, though, the attention of the Polish media was once again riveted on events in the United States and France. In 1968, the FRG turned up in the Polish press in one other context, that is, in connection with the gathering menace in Czechoslovakia. As it could be expected, close attention was paid in Poland to the events taking place in its southern neighbour. In January, the media reported the discussions under way there in respect of the October Plenum of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická Strana Československa, KSC). The diverse outlooks were emphasised, but so was the ability to reach a harmonious standpoint. The separation of the highest functions of party and state implemented there was pointed out, as were the discussions in progress in respect of numerous problems in “the construction of socialism”, which were “by no means only formal in nature”. The information published lacked details, but indicated that events in Czechoslovakia were being followed with close attention, with the reporting of Major General Jan Šejna’s escape to the USA and the problems in stimulating the National Front into action and ensuring the uniform management of political life. These items of news were reported without adhering to an alarmist tone. Information regarding the discussions on democratisation in the economy, eliminating bureaucratic working methods and increasing the rights of state-owned enterprises 146 Joanna Szymoniczek to make their own plans and to autonomous fi nancial management was imparted benevolently. The emergence of an ‘anti-socialist’ tendency was also noted by the Polish press. Descriptions were given of the polemics of the authorities of the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic (CSRS) refl ecting this tendency, which aimed at discrediting the leading role of the party and disparaging its achievements. It was pointed out that the imperative of curtailing and combating antisocialist forces had been underrated in Czechoslovakia. The KSC had not acted as the instigator of transformation, but had permitted discussion on the establishment of opposition parties. The anti-party forces had not been given enough serious consideration because the KSC was too strongly rooted in the traditions of acting within the existing law, as had been the case in the interwar years. It was not inured against sabotage and provocation. The KSC was attempting to oppose a departure from scientifi c socialism solely by means of polemics and was failing to emphasise the menace on the right. In July the news of the abolition of censorship came. Following the publication of the Two Thousand Words manifest in the Czechoslovakian press, its Polish counterpart evinced a growing criticism of their neighbour’s tolerance of “attacks on the socialist system”21. It was in the context of the communists’ loss of control over the political situation in Czechoslovakia that information regarding Prague’s change of policy toward Bonn appeared in the Polish press. The reports, which were later denied, concerned the removal of the security barrier on the Czech side of the border with the FRG. An excerpt of František Kriegel’s statement was quoted; “On the other hand, however, we have to introduce a modern policy derived from an international division

21 R., “Po Plenum” [After the Plenum], Polityka [Politics], No. 4, 27 January 1968, p. 10; “Pilne i najpilniejsze” [Urgent and the Most Urgent], Polityka [Politics], No. 17, 27 April 1968, pp. 10–11; H.Z., “Walka polityczna” [Political Fighting], Polityka [Politics], No. 21, 25 April 1968, p.18. Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 147 of work and in friendship with every peace-loving country”. Also a statement made by Antonin Šnejdárek, director of the Institute of International Politics and Economics in Prague was cited, to the effect that the necessity of developing mutual relationships with the FRG in every area, i.e. economic, cultural, scientifi c and academic, was of greater importance than diplomatic relations with that country, since these would most certainly be established in the future. The rumours concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel and the possibility of undertaking talks with the Sudeten German Homeland Association (Die Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft Bundesverband) or consenting to the return of “a specifi ed number of the German nationals” expelled on the strength of the Potsdam Agreement, were also reported. This was not news of the fi rst importance, but it formed a permanent backdrop to the commentaries on events in Czechoslovakia, commentaries which implied a danger of Poland’s being encircled from the south. It was acknowledged that genuine problems existed there, such as the failure to hold a fi nal accounting in respect of the era of the ‘cult of personality’, the repression of those who demanded this, relations between the Czech and the Slovakian parts of the country and issues with the excessive centralisation of the economy. However, on the domestic front, the KSC’s policy had resulted in an attack on the part of revisionist forces, while its foreign policy put at peril an agreement with the FRG, plans to terminate discussions about Munich and the new watchwords of ‘neutrality’ and ‘new foreign policy’, which would spell the end of the Warsaw Treaty. “The unprecedented activity of militaristic circles from Bonn in aggravating tension around the CSRS was a real political fact”22.

22 “Od stycznia do sierpnia” [From January to August], Polityka [Politics], No. 35, 31 August 1968, p. 21. 148 Joanna Szymoniczek

The fact that Germany was a favourite subject for Polish caricaturists during the entire era of the People’s Republic of Poland should also be noted. Even so, the number of caricatures and cartoons connected with the Germans which appeared in the columns of the Polish press in 1968 was impressive. The best evidence of this is the fact that, in that year, the satirical weekly, Szpilki, devoted as many as four of its front covers to the subject of Germany. This was a considerable proportion; other nationalities and countries were unable to count on ‘such interest’ and would feature on the front cover only sporadically. Throughout the years of the People’s Republic of Poland, the typical image of a German was rooted in the most straightforward of associations, presenting the uniform, the swastika and the characteristic moustache and was thus usually connected with the Second World War. It was far more rare for references to be made to other associations linked with that nationality and these, too, were very simple i.e. involving beer, sausages, orderliness and so forth. This was particularly so in the 1950s, when caricatures of the Germans were most frequently published and were highly aggressive. In subsequent years, they appeared somewhat more rarely, though they were still fairly plentiful. The caricatures gradually became milder and milder; nonetheless, the usual associations continued to relate to the Nazi era. It was no different in 1968. Photographs of the aforementioned Szpilki covers focusing upon Germany have been included in this volume.

References in the Polish press to the events of 1968 in Germany

As elucidated in the foregoing section, the events of 1968 in Germany were not to enjoy much interest on the part of the Polish media. It was no different in the years that followed. References in the Polish press to what went on in Germany in 1968 are rare; by and large, Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 149 mention is only made when levelling criticism at the Western lifestyle and “the moral collapse of the West” and when reporting on terrorism- -related events in Germany, particularly the activities of the Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion, RAF) in the 1970s, and the appointment of Joschka Fischer as Foreign Minister of the FRG in 1998. Even then, though, if they are referred to at all, it is to a minor extent and in passing, with seldom more substantial analysis nor conclusions.

“The moral collapse of the West”

The Polish media’s focus on the problems of the West endured throughout the era of the People’s Republic of Poland. It was one of the tasks to be fulfi lled by the television, print media and radio. Hence the ready reporting of anything at all which might damage the image of the Western states in the eyes of Polish society; economic problems, aggressive foreign policies, social unrest, assassinations, murders, disasters and so forth. This was particularly so in the case of the United States, which, on account of Polish society’s great fondness and support for all things American, was the main villain of the piece. Whenever circumstances allowed, the problems of other Western states were also eagerly summoned into play. One such opportunity lay in focussing on “the moral collapse of the West”. The rise of drug abuse; the permissive society; the cultural decline, the purported evidence of which was the growth of pop culture and the popularity of provocative and frequently scandalous fi lms; the revolt of the young people against the world of the adults, as evinced in the slogan “Don’t trust anyone over thirty”, and against the institutions of that world i.e. the family, the Church, school, work, the bosses, competition, money, the army, war, norms, constraints, prohibitions; the negation of authority and the crisis of confi dence in social and political institutions; the emancipation of women, which threatened the traditional role of the family; the 150 Joanna Szymoniczek increase in self-destructive behaviours; the tolerance toward profl igate sexuality, pornography and homosexuality. All of these added to the moral collapse of the Western world23. Youth subcultures such as the mods, the hippies, the serious heavy-metal fans, the punks and the skinheads received a very poor press24. The hippies were the target of particular attack on account of this subculture’s emergence in Poland25. The source of all these negative manifestations was perceived in a multitude of factors, including, of course, the events of 1968 in the West and their consequences, since those events were held to have brought about profound and negatively evaluated transformations to the consciousness of Western societies, with the students becoming the social and political or academic elite in their countries, something of which no good could come. What draws the attention in this presentation of the problem is a certain inconsistency in the assessment of both the events of 1968 and their outcome. As for the events themselves, what ensued was appraised negatively, yet so were both the ‘old order’ and the actions taken by the states in order to suppress the discontent of the protesters26. This disapproval of the ‘old order’ served as a vindication for those who wanted change. However, at the same time, they were censured for their behaviour. The transformation in the morals and lifestyles of the West were described very superfi cially; the purpose was not to enter into a deeper analysis of the matter, but solely to carry out the most simplistic of attacks on the states in question, including Germany.

23 Paul D. Zimmerman, “Wszystko dozwolone”...; “Nostalgia za niegdysiejszą epoką wiktoriańską” [Nostalgia for the Victorian Era], Forum, No 36, 8 August 1977, p. 23. 24 “Hippis” [Hippie], Forum, No. 26, 25 June 1967, pp. 18–19. 25 Nicolas Berland, “O hippies źle i lepiej” [About the Hippies – Bad and Better], Forum, No. 52/53, 23 December 1967, p. 28. 26 “Bonn wprowadza stan wyjątkowy” [Bonn Introduces the State of Emergency], Forum, No. 48, 26 November 1967, p. 6. Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 151

Terrorism in Germany

In 1977, a grave crisis arose in the FRG. Known as the German Autumn (Deutscher Herbst), it was connected to the activities of the ‘second-generation’ Red Army Faction (RAF), who ﬁ rst murdered Siegfried Buback, the chief investigator in the case of the group’s leaders, themselves imprisoned, and then, as part of what it termed ‘Offensive 77’, went on to murder several notables from the German business world, including the President of the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände) and the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) Hanns-Martin Schleyer and the Chairman of Dresdner Bank, Jürgen Ponto. The RAF was supported by Palestinian terrorists, who hijacked a German passenger plane which was then recaptured by an anti-terrorist unit. As these events were unfolding, the group’s leaders had died by means of what was described by the authorities in an ofﬁ cial statement as suicide. A left-wing terrorist organisation with ideological links to Maoism, Marxism, anarchism and the New Left, the RAF had launched its activities prior to 1977. However, until that year, by and large, news of the organisation and its operations had not appeared in the Polish press. Single reports were published following the Heidelberg incident in May 1972, when the faction bombed the headquarters of the U.S. Army in Europe, with the loss of three American soldiers. In April 1975, when the RAF occupied the FRG’s embassy in Stockholm and, following Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s refusal to accede to their demands, killed two hostages, the Polish press broke the news of these events27. However, the reporting was limited to a sparing presentation of the

27 “Napad na ambasadę RFN w Sztokholmie” [Assault on the FRG’s Embassy in Stockholm], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 95, 25–27 April 1975, p. 1. 152 Joanna Szymoniczek facts, as was also the case with the shooting of Prosecutor General Siegfried Buback on 7th April 197728. The situation changed in the autumn of that year. On 5th September, members of the RAF kidnapped Hanns-Martin Schleyer, and, having held him captive for forty-one days, proceeded to murder him. From the outset, the topic was fairly widely reported in Poland; in fact, news appeared on a daily basis with regard to the abducted man, the actions taken by the German authorities in attempting to secure his release, the demands of the kidnappers, the reactions of individual German politicians to acts of terror and so forth29. Following the

28 “Zamach na prokuratora generalnego RFN” [Assassination of FRG’s State’s Attorney], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 84 , 9–11 April 1977, p. 1–2. 29 “Porwanie Schleyera” [Schleyer’s Abduction], Forum, No. 37, 15 September 1977, p. 6–7; “Porywacze żądają uwolnienia terrorystów” [Abductors Demand Freeing Terrorists], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 212, 8 September 1977, p. 2; “Żądania porywaczy Schleyera wobec władz” [Demands of Schleyer’s Abductors from the Authorities], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 213, 9 September 1977, p. 2; “Władze przejęły taktykę ‘elastycznej nieustępliwości`” [The Authorities Practice the Tactics of Resilent Tenacity], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 214, 10 September 1977, p. 2; “Tajemnica otacza pertraktacje władz z terrorystami” [Negotiations between the Authorities and Terrorists Remain a Mystery], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 215, 12 September 1977, p. 2; “Terroryści gotowi do negocjacji” [Terrorists ready for negotiations], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 216, 13 September 1977, p. 2; “Rząd boński kontynuuje wysiłek zmierzający do uwolnienia H. Schleyera” [The Government in Bonn Continues Attempts to Free H. Schleyer], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 221, 19 September 1977, p. 1; “Rząd RFN próbuje rozwiązać sprawę Schleyera” [FRG’s Government Trying to Solve Schleyer’s Case], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 22, 22 September 1977, p. 2; “Nowe oznaki życia H.M. Schleyera” [Schleyer’s New Life Signs], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 227, 26 September 1977, p. 2; “Czy Schleyer został wywieziony za granicę?” [Was Schleyer Taken Abroad?], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 229, 28 September 1977, p. 2; “Schleyer uwięziony na jachcie u wybrzeży duńskich?” [Is Schleyer Kept on a Yacht Near the Danish Coast?] , Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 23, 30 September 1977, p. 1–2; “Kolejne posiedzenie ‘sztabu kryzysowego’ w sprawie Schleyera” [Another Meeting of the Crisis Staff Regarding Schleyer], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 234, 4 October 1977, p. 2; “List Schleyera do redakcji dwóch dzienników paryskich” [Schleyer’s Letter to Two Parisian Newspapers], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 239, 10 October 1977, Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 153 hijacking of the German passenger plane and the anti-terrorist unit’s assault at Mogadishu airport30, the suicide of the RAF’s leaders31 and the murder of Hanns-Martin Schleyer32, a closer scrutiny of what was happening in the FRG began in the Polish press. On the one hand, the focus was turned toward the crisis being faced by that state during the German Autumn, since this concurred with the guidelines laid down for the media, while, on the other hand, there was a growing interest in terrorism itself and the underlying causes thereof, with endeavours being made to analyse what had occurred in Germany and, indeed, why it had happened in that particular country33. p. 2; “Sprawa Schleyera bez gorączki” [Schleyer’s Case without Emotions], Forum, No. 41, 13 October 1977, p. 7. 30 “Scenariusz pisany krwią” [A Script Eritten in Blood], Forum, No. 42, 20 October 1977, pp. 4–5; “Uprowadzony samolot wylądował w Dubaju” [Hijacked Plane Landed in Dubai], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 244; 15–16 October 1977, pp. 1–2; “Porwany samolot RFN wyładował w Adenie” [FRG’s Hijacked Plane Landed in Adena], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 245, 17 October 1977, pp. 1–2; “Dramatyczny los pasażerów samolotu `Lufthansy” [Dramatic Lot of Lufthansa Passengers], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 246, 18 October 1977, pp. 1–2; “Pasażerowie uwolnieni – trzech porywaczy nie żyje” [Passengers Free – 3 Hijackers Dead], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 247, 19 October 1977, pp. 1–2. 31 “Czwórka z siódmego piętra” [The Four from the 7th Floor], Polityka [Politics], No. 44, 29 October 1977, p. 11; “Nadal znaki zapytania wokół śmierci terrorystów w więzieniu stuttgarckim” [Terrorists’ Death in Stuttgart’s Jail Brought into Question], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 254, 27 October 1977, p. 2; “Pogrzeb terrorystów w Stuttgarcie” [Terrorists’ Funeral in Stuttgart], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 255, 28 October 1977, p. 2. 32 “Teraz cię zastrzelę” [I Will Shoot You Now], Polityka [Politics], No. 44, 29 October 1977, pp. 12–13; “H.M. Schleyer nie żyje” [H.M. Schleyer is Dead], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 248, 20 October 1977, pp. 1, 9. 33 “Bonn po szoku” [Bonn after the Shock], Forum, No. 44, 3 November 1977, pp. 8–9; “Miałem wszelkie pełnomocnictwa” [I Had All Necessary Proxies], Polityka [Politics], No. 44, 29 October 1977, p. 12; “Partie polityczne w Bundestagu potępiają akty terroru” [Bundestag political parties condemn acts of terror], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 219, 16 September 1977, p. 2; Ryszard Drecki, “Mroki terroryzmu” [Darkness of Terrorism], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 245, 17 October 1977, p. 2; “Prawica w RFN wykorzystuje walkę z terroryzmem dla swoich celów” [The Right in the FRG Uses the Fight against Terrorism for Its Own Purposes], Trybuna Ludu 154 Joanna Szymoniczek

Accounts thus appeared which endeavoured to explain and dissect the events described in the foregoing. It was pointed out that the group had sprung from the waves of youth and student unrest which had occurred in 1968. The killing of Benno Ohnesorg during the West German police force’s breaking up of the demonstration organised in protest at the visit of the Iranian dictator, Shah Reza Pahlavi, to West Berlin in 1967 was recalled, as was Joseph Bachman’s attempted murder of Rudi Dutschke in 1968. Mention was made of the fact that the RAF questioned Germany’s superﬁ cial settling of accounts with her National Socialist past, which also presented an opportunity for further dwelling upon the subject of Nazism in that country, the Second World War and the pasts of certain German politicians. The RAF’s challenging of American imperialism and the Vietnam war was also covered, giving a pretext for reminders of the USA’s aggressive foreign policy, and space was allocated to their pursuit of the overthrow of capitalism in the FRG and their support of national liberation movements in the Third World, with their links to the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and the countercultural Kommune 1 being underscored. Emphasis was placed on matters which showed the politics of Germany and the Western European states in a poor light and assailed capitalism and the Western lifestyle34. In this regard, opinions were cited to the effect that industrialised society had itself provoked its own destruction from within by systematically stripping away the power of individuals, subjecting them to the laws of the market and divesting them of a life with any kind of substance

[People’s Tribune], No. 250, 22–23 October 1977, pp. 1–2; “Wielka akcja policji na razie bez rezultatów” [Huge Police Campaign Brings No Result], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 251, 24 October 1977, pp. 1–2; “Wielki pościg za terrorystami” [The Great Pursuit of Terrorists], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 252, 25 October 1977, pp. 1–2; “Trwa obława na terrorystów” [Police Raid of Terrorists Continues], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 253, 26 October 1977, pp. 1, 9. 34 Wojciech Giełżyński, “Bez psychozy” [Without Psyhosis], Polityka [Politics], No. 44, 29 October 1977, p. 13; Henryk Zdanowski, “Jeśli spełnicie warunki” [If you Meet the Vonditions], Polityka [Politics], No. 39, 24 September 1977, pp. 10–12. Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 155 to it. The roots of terrorism were perceived in the student movement of 1968 and those of the movement itself in the youth subcultures, where different roads were sought and established behaviours, traditions, institutions and authorities were opposed. On the one hand, what was being shown was the extent of the licence accorded to the young people of Germany and even that they were being permitted to get away with too much, while, on the other hand, the ﬁ nger was being pointed at unemployment, poor levels of education and the spread of addiction35. The opinions which appeared in the German and European press to the effect that terrorism was a result of the German economic miracle and the brutality of that country’s system were reiterated. The events in the FRG and the RAF’s connections with other terrorist organisations, including, inter alia, the Red Brigades, provided an opportunity for a wider discussion of terrorism, focusing not only on the FRG, but also making reference to instances from other European states36.

Joschka Fischer, Foreign Minister of the FRG

On 27th October 1998, Joseph Martin Fischer, one of the leading lights of Germany’s Alliance ’90 / The Green Party, was appointed Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor under Gerhard Schröder’s government37. Given his background, this fact became a pretext for recalling the events of 1968 in Germany. However, the focus was on the recollection of the events of thirty years ago themselves, which was

35 “Pokolenie zbędnych” [Generation of the Unwanted], Forum, No. 32 , 11 August 1977, pp. 6–7; “Gdzie są kwiaty z tamtych lat?” [Where are the Flowers from Those Years?], Forum, No. 40, 6 October 1977, pp. 20–21; Henryk Zdanowski, “Dlaczego właśnie RFN?” [Why FRG?], Polityka [Politics], No. 46, 12 November 1977, pp. 10–11. 36 Michał Jaranowski, “Za sceną terroru” [Behind the Stage of Terror], Polityka [Politics], No. 45, 5 November 1977, p. 12. 37 “Skrzydła Gerharda” [Gerhard’s Wings], Polityka [Politics], No. 43, 24 October 1998, pp. 38–43. 156 Joanna Szymoniczek often conducted in a ‘cheap, sensationalist’ style, and on more or less undisguisedly giving voice to an astonishment that a politician with such a past could hold the offi ce of German Foreign Minister, although comments referring to a certain irony as regards the fate and expectations of the new chancellor were not lacking, either. It was pointed out that this was a career without precedence; “an erstwhile vagrant, a rebel living on the margins of society, who hurled stones at police offi cers and fought on the barricades… [is now] the head of German diplomacy”. In 1967, Joschka Fischer had become an activist in the German student movement, which organised protests on the streets of the country’s towns and cities, and he was also a member of a militant left- -wing group, Revolutionary Struggle (Revolutionärer Kampf), from 1968 to 1975. In a book entitled So macht Kommunismus Spass! (Making Communism Fun)38, Bettina Röhl accuses him of assisting the terrorists of the RAF and attacking police offi cers during the riots, which gave rise to his being questioned several times by the Prosecutor’s Offi ce. What enjoyed the interest of the press were events such as these, to which should be added Fischer’s support, as Germany’s diplomatic leader, for military intervention in the Balkans and, following the suicide attacks on New York and Washington D.C. on 11th September 2011, in Afghanistan. This diverged not only from the Green Party’s primary aims and pacifi st approach to any and every kind of confl ict, but also from the views Joschka Fischer had himself held in the sixties and seventies39. Serious elaborations upon the subject were also lacking in this instance.

38 Bettina Röhl, Zabawa w komunizm! Ulrike Meinhof, Klaus Rainer Röhl i prawdziwe korzenie Nowej Lewicy (1958–1968) [Making Communism Fun! Ulrike Meinhof, Klaus Rainer Röhl and True Roots of the New Left-Wing], Warszawa 2007 (German edition: So macht Kommunismus Spass! Ulrike Meinhof, Klaus Rainer Röhl und die Akte Konkret, Hamburg 2006). 39 Krzysztof Kęciek, “Maratończyk Joschka Fischer” [Marathon Runner Joschka Fischer], Przegląd [Review], No. 28, 2003. Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 157

Other images of Germany and the Germans in the Polish press

As it has already been mentioned, 1968 events in Germany aroused no great interest in the Polish media on account of the ‘more attractive’ events occurring in other Western states, primarily in the United States and France, which yielded to being used for propaganda purposes. In subsequent years, there were few references in the Polish press to what went on in Germany in 1968, since wheresoever it proved possible, journalists took the subject of the Second World War as their reference point. As mentioned earlier, it also happened that, even when, exceptionally, the very events of 1968 themselves were accorded extra space, they were introduced in relation to 1933 and not to what was occurring in the streets of Germany’s towns and cities. The subject of Germany thus appeared in the columns of the Polish press relatively frequently; however, it usually played second ﬁ ddle to topics concerning the USSR and the United States, though not always France, none of which should be a matter of surprise. Matters relating to the USSR dominated to such an extent that even the initialling of the treaty between Poland and the FRG in November 1970 was nudged to one side by a report on the Soviets’ lunar rover, the Lunokhod (Moonwalker) which, roaming the moon, had been performing its scientiﬁ c and technical tests. Admittedly, both stories made the front pages of the majority of the papers on 19th November; nonetheless, it was the news of the latter, another success for Soviet science in its conquering of the universe, which took pride of place, with congratulations in the name of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, the State Council, the government and the Polish nation appended40.

40 “Parafowanie układu Polska-NRF” [The Signing of Agreement between Poland and the FRG], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 322, 19 November 1970, pp. 1–2; “Lunochod 1’ kontynuuje eksperyment na Księżycu” [Lunokhod 1 Continues 158 Joanna Szymoniczek

The press devoted a great many column inches to anniversaries connected with the Second World War, its beginning and end, the liberation of the extermination camps, the pacifi cations, the executions and so forth. Besides reports of the ceremonies held in Poland, recollections and references to the war itself appeared, as did the tragic stories of witnesses, reminders of the scale of the crimes and, on occasion, photos dating from those times. These topics were usually linked with German expectations of apologies for the expulsions, statements in respect of the contested borders along the Oder and Neisse rivers and so on41. News relating to the neo-fascist party and to commemorative ceremonies held in Germany in relation to the Second World War or to a politician of that era was imparted vividly and highly emotionally. When politicians made their pronouncements, if inappropriate references to the past fi gured in their speeches, then this was reported with disquiet. Warnings were sounded against German revanchism and relationism. It was pointed out that, at any time, Germany could become a threat, with the issue of Poland’s western border usually making an appearance at this point, and that the Germans had failed to make suffi cient apology for the Second World War42. Also brought into play was the notion that the view of this most recent history promulgated in the FGR was wrong, being characterised by “an inadequate historical awareness”, the touching-up of every morbid and criminal note and the quest for extenuating circumstances, while the

Experiments on the Moon], p. 1; “Parafowanie układu Polska-RFN” [The Signing of Agreement between Poland and the FRG], Ilustrowany Kurier Polski [Illustrated Polish Courier], No. 275, 19 November 1970, pp. 1–2; “‘Łunochod` zakończył pierwszy etap księżycowej wędrówki” [Lunokhod Ended Its First Leg of Moonwalking], pp. 1–2. 41 “Memorandum Bensberger Kreis”, Polityka [Politics], No. 11, 16 March 1968, p. 9; Mieczysław F. Rakowski, “My i Niemcy” [We and the Germans], Polityka [Politics], No. 33, 16 August 1969, pp. 1, 8–9; Adam Krzemiński, “Czy przepraszać Niemców?” [Should we Apologize the Germans], Polityka [Politics], No. 35, 1 September 1990, pp. 1, 6. 42 Hanna Harting, “NPD wyjaśnia...” [NPD Explains], Polityka [Politics], No. 16, 20 April 1968, p. 8. Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 159 facts were ignored43. The revival of the German army also gave cause for great concern44. Throughout these years, a relatively large number of column inches was given over to the German political scene, with elections being of particular interest, be they presidential, parliamentary, or to the Landtags (State Diets). However, these reports were under-analytical and focussed more on imparting the information itself, or, if anything, on emphasising troubles, rows or a lack of consensus on the country’s political scene. During the post-1990 election campaigns, the authors pondered which of the candidates would be the most advantageous from Poland’s point of view and in terms of Polish-German relations. Candidates and the newly-elected alike were subjected to a highly critical scrutiny in respect of their attitude toward history, the Second World War and relations with, ﬁ rst, the Eastern Bloc, and then with Central-Europe and Poland itself45. German politicians’ visits to Poland also received wide coverage, and vice versa46. An event which drew the particular attention of the Polish media was the fall of the Berlin Wall. Numerous titles published extensive reports full of the views of joyful Berliners which were accompanied by photographs47. However, when it came to the actual reuniﬁ cation of

43 Norbert Honsza, “Podręczniki potomków Niebelungów” [The German Nibelungen Descendants and Their Handbooks], Polityka [Politics], No. 26, 24 June 1972, pp. 1, 10. 44 Andrzej Skowroński, “Duch i siła kastry” [Spirit and Power of Castra], Polityka [Politics], No. 29, 18 July 1970, p. 10. 45 Henryk Zdanowski, “Koalicyjne gry i zabawy” [The Games of Coalition], Polityka [Politics], No. 3, 15 January 1977, pp. 1, 11; “Prasa o nowej koalicji” [The Press about the New Coalition], Polityka [Politics], No. 42, 18 October 1969, p. 9; Mieczysław F. Rakowski, “Sprawa Polska nad Renem” [Polish Case on the Rhaine], Polityka [Politics], No. 6, 5 February 1972, pp. 9–11; Adam Krzemiński, “Kandydat ze Wschodu” [The Candidate from the East], Polityka [Politics], No. 43, 23 October 1993, p. 1. 46 A PR, WZ. 5548 item 3, “7 dni w kraju i na świecie” [The week in Poland and the world]. 47 “Berliński mur przechodzi do historii” [The Berlin Wall is a History], Ilustrowany Kurier Polski [Illustrated Polish Courier], 1989, No. 263, p. 1; Marek Regel, “Noc pełna 160 Joanna Szymoniczek

Germany, some gave it scant attention. The reports were cool, imparting only the most signifi cant information, and were usually tucked away amongst other news items. For instance, although the subject made the front page of the Ilustrowany Kurier Polski (Illustrated Polish Courier), it was covered in no more than a few lines, ‘losing out’ to other stories, such as “Sejm housing debate promises to be tough”, “The Public Mood in September” and “Ceremony inaugurates the academic year at Bydgoszcz’s Academy of Medicine”48. A few days later, however, a number of articles deliberating upon the infl uence of German reunifi cation on Poland appeared. Devoid though they were of the alarmist and hysterical tone typical of the previous political system, concerns were voiced regarding this neighbour to the West’s being over-powerful, when her earlier deeds had already put Poland through so much. Some of the pieces also evinced the hope that a united Germany would be of greater signifi cance in Europe and across the world, something which might be of benefi t to Poland, particularly in the context of joining the EEC and NATO, given that its neighbour supported its aspirations. Against this background, Polityka (Politics) stands out, with the subject not only occupying the fi rst pages, but also seeing several solid pieces devoted to it. However, it should be noted that they made their appearance somewhat tardily in relation to the occurrence of the events themselves49. What should also be pointed out is the fact that, throughout the years preceding the reunifi cation of Germany, the possibility that this event would occur at any given time szczęścia” [The Night Full of Happiness], Polityka [Politics], No. 46, 18 September 1989, p. 12. 48 Ilustrowany Kurier Polski [Illustrated Polish Courier], No. 230, 4 October 1990, p. 1. 49 “Początek przełomu w naszych stosunkach” [The Beginning of the Breaktrough in Our Relations], Ilustrowany Kurier Polski [Illustrated Polish Courier], No. 262, 13 November 1989, pp. 1–2; Adam Krzemiński, “Nasz nowy, stary sąsiad” [Our New Old Neighbour], Polityka [Politics], No. 41, 13 October 1990, pp. 1, 12. Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events... 161 was feared. This was not solely on account of the infl uence, if any, that it may have on Poland, but also with an eye to the GDR, where “the changes and achievements belong under the category of those transformations which have already taken root in new soil and are not for dislodging”50. Across the entire period under analysis in this study, the Polish media were more than happy to impart news of problems and predicaments. It was of no importance what they were about; what mattered was that they existed at all, be it the fall of a government, economic woes, terrorism, the excesses of the young people, the defeat of Germany’s national football team, or the FRG’s ‘only’ winning a silver medal in the Olympics, particularly when the gold went to someone from the Eastern Bloc51. Before 1989, this willingness to present the FRG unfavourably is highly visible; later it becomes less direct, though it can still be perceived in some of the titles.

The image of events created in the Polish press was intended to conform with propagandistic premises and Poland’s foreign policy. Hence it was neither reliable nor veracious, but merely manipulated, ‘ﬁ ltered’ by the censors and frequently supplemented by suitable commentary in order that the public would know what they were to think. The news that appeared in all the dailies was usually the same

50 “Inwazja” [The Invasion], Polityka [Politics], No. 23, 7 June 1969, p. 10; Marian Podkowiński, “Boński koszmar” [The Nightmare of Bonn], Polityka [Politics], No. 33, 17 July 1968, p. 10; “Pokój w Europie nie jest zagrożony” [Peace in Europe is Not in Danger], Polityka [Politics], No. 12, 19 March 1977, pp. 1, 12; Mieczysław F. Rakowski, “Dwa państwa niemieckie” [Two German States], Polityka [Politics], No. 5, 31 January 1970, p. 8. 51 Mieczysław F. Rakowski, “Kryzys w Bonn” [Crisis in Bonn], Polityka [Politics], No. 21, 20 May 1972, pp. 1, 5–11; Tadeusz Drewnowski, “Burza nad Renem” [Storm over Rheine], Polityka [Politics], No. 19, 6 May 1972, pp. 1, 4, 8. 162 Joanna Szymoniczek or well-nigh the same and if a picture was included, then this, too, was usually the same one, as was also the case with commentaries. There was frequently a dearth of serious analysis, as well as honest opinions and commentaries. The situation was not to change until after 1989. The picture of a German painted in the Polish press was ﬁ rst and foremost one of a revanchist, a revisionist, distorting history and permeated with nostalgia for the Nazi era, which was either concealed to a greater or lesser degree, or hardly masked at all. A German of this nature comprised a threat to the Poles and Poland, particularly in the context of the border to the west. This tone abated slightly during the seventies, but it proved impossible to slough off misgivings about the Germans. This is particularly noticeable in the reports regarding the reuniﬁ cation of Germany and in subsequent articles depicting its power, primarily economic, in the international arena and the European Union. Hence the picture of Germany painted by the Polish press in 1968 was focussed primarily on the introduction of the Emergency Acts, the suppression of protests and police brutality, as well as on criticism of the situation that had come to pass there. Apart from the attempted assassination of Rudi Dutschke, no further attention was paid to the events themselves; the student protests in Germany were recorded as part and parcel of similar occurrences in other Western states at the time. Things remained much the same in subsequent years. References to 1968 were few and far between, being superseded by those relating to the Second World War. The year itself was predominantly treated as the cause and explanation for everything that had gone wrong in the moral and social spheres, which is to say, such manifestations as youth subcultures, feminism, the decline of the traditional family, sexual freedom, drug addition, the decline in education, terrorism and so forth, all of which were adjudged negatively. Following the nomination of Joschka Fischer to the position of German Foreign Minister, the events of 1968 made a comeback in the columns of the Polish press, but in the form of ‘cheap sensationalism’. Bibliography

Books and articles in journals

[Die] 68er und ihre Gegner: Der Widerstand gegen die Kulturrevolution, Hartmuth Becker, Felix Dirsch and Stefan Winckler (eds.), Graz 2003. 1968 in West Germany. A Guide to Sources and Literature of the Extra- -Parliamentarian Opposition, Philipp Gassert and Pavel A. Richter (eds.), Washington DC 1998. 1968. Memories and Legacies of a Global Revolt, Philipp Gassert and Martin Klimke (eds.), Washington DC 2009. 1968. The World Transformed, Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert and Detlef Junker (eds.), Washington DC 1998. Allen Debra J., The Oder-Neisse Line – The United States, Poland and Germany in the Cold War, Westport 2003. Aust Stefan, “Terrorism in Germany: The Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon”, in: Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, No. 43, 2008. Berman Paul, A Tale of Two Utopias, The Political Journey of the Generation of 1968, New York 1996. Berman Paul, Władza i idealiści [Power and the Idealists], Warszawa 2008. Between Marx and Coca-Cola, Axel Schild and Detlef Siegfried (eds.), New York 2006. Bingen Dieter, „Der lange Weg der `Normalisierung`. Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Polen 1949– –1990“, in: Die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen 1949–2000. Eine Werte- 164 Bibliography

und Interessengemeinschaft?, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Basil Kerski (eds.), Opladen 2001. Bingen Dieter, Polityka Republiki Bońskiej wobec Polski. Od Adenauera do Kohla 1949–1991 [The Bonn Republic’s Policy toward Poland. From Adenauer to Kohl, 1949–1991], Kraków 1997. Biskupski Mieczysław B., The History of Poland, Westport 2000. Borodziej Włodzimierz, “Dyplomacja PRL w i wobec Marca” [The PRP’s Diplomacy in and with Regard to March], in: Marzec 1968 trzydzieści lat później [March 1968. Thirty Years On], Marcin Kula, Piotr Osęka and Marcin Zaremba (eds.), vol. 1, Warszawa 1998. Bude Heinz, “`Generation` im Kontext. Von den Kriegs- zu den Wohlfahrtsstaatsgenerationen”, in: Generationen. Zur Relevanz eines wissenschaftlischen Grundbegriffs, Generationen. Zur Relevanz eines wissenschaftlischen Grundbegriffs, Ulrike Jureit and Michael Wildt (eds.), Hamburg 2008. Bude Heinz, Das Altern eine Generation: Die Jahrgänge 1938 bis 1948, Frankfurt am Main 1995. Buras Piotr, “Fatalizm nierównoczesności: elity Polski i Niemiec po rozszerzeniu Unii Europejskiej na Wschód” [The Fatalism of Non- -Simultaneousness. The Elites of Poland and Germany Following the EU Enlargement Eastward], in: Polska–Niemcy–Francja. Wzajemne postrzeganie po rozszerzeniu UE [Poland–Germany–France. Mutual Perceptions Following the EU Enlargement], Lena Kolarska-Bobińska and Mateusz Fałkowski (eds.), Warszawa 2008. Cirtautas Arista Maria, The Polish Solidarity Movement: Revolution, Democracy and Natural Rights, London 1997. Cohen Warren I., Introduction, in: Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World. American Foreign Policy, 1963–1968, Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Trucker (eds.), Cambridge 1994. Crampton Richard J., Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – And After, London 1997. Davis Belinda, “A Whole World Opening Up: Transcultural Contacts, Difference, and the Politicization of the ‘New Left’ Activists”, in: Changing the World, Changing Oneself. Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s, Belinda Bibliography 165

Davis, Wilfried Mausbach, Martin Klimke and Carla MacDougall (eds.), New York and Oxford 2010. Dereń Aldona Małgorzata, Kudłaszyk Andrzej, “Polskie prawo prasowe” [Polish Press Law], in: Mass media w systemie komunikacji społecznej w Polsce [Mass Media in the System of Social Communication in Poland], Andrzej Kudłaszyk, Andrzej Małkiewicz and Roman Karpiński (eds.), Wrocław 1995. Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften, Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried and Karl Christian Lammers (eds.), Hamburg 2000. Eberwein Wolf-Dieter, Ecker-Ehrhardt Matthias, Deutschland und Polen. Eine Werte- und Interessengemeinschaft? Die Eliten-Perspektive, Opladen 2001. Eberwein Wolf-Dieter, Kowalski Sergiusz, Reiter Janusz, Elity Polski i Niemiec. Wspólnota interesów i wartości? [The Polish and German Elites. A Community of Interests and Values?], Warszawa 2000. Eisler Jerzy, Marzec 1968. Geneza, przebieg, konsekwencje [March 1968. Genesis, Course and Consequences], Warszawa 1991 Eisler Jerzy, Polski rok 1968 [The Polish Year 1968], Warszawa 2006. Eisler Jerzy, “Stan badań historycznych nad Marcem’68” [The Status of Historical Studies on March ’68], in: Dzieje Najnowsze [Contemporary History], No. 1, 2008. Europe Since 1945: An Encyclopedia, New York 2001. Falk Barbara J., The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe. Citizen Intellectuals and Philosopher Kings, Budapest – New York 2003. Fik Marta, Marcowa kultura. Wokół „Dziadów”. Literaci i władza. Kampania marcowa [Culture in March. Around ‘The Forefathers’. Writers and Power. The March Campaign], Warszawa 1995. Fraser Ronald, 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt, New York 1988. Frei Norbert, 1968. Jugendrevolte und globaler Protest, München 2008. Frucht Richard, Encyclopedia of Eastern Europe: From the Congress of Vienna to the Fall of Communism, New York 2000. Garthoff Raymond L., Détente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Washington DC 1994. Gluza Renata (ed.), Media w Polsce w XX wieku [The Polish Media in XX Century], Poznań 1999. 166 Bibliography

Golon Mirosław, “Marzec 1968 w Toruniu w świetle materiałów Służby Bezpieczeństwa” [March 1968 in Toruń in the Light of Security Service Materials”], in: Dzieje Najnowsze [Contemporary History], No. 1, 2008. Gura Krzysztof, “Preliminaria do układu Polska-RFN z 7 grudnia 1970 r.” [Preliminaries to the Poland-FRG Treaty of 7 December 1970], in: Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki [Polish-German Yearbook] No. 5, 1996. Halwig Stuart, “The Revolt against Establishment: Students versus the Press in West Germany and Italy”, in: 1968. The World Transformed, Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert and Detlef Junker (eds.), Washington DC 1998. Hockenos Paul, Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic. An Alternative History of Postwar Germany, Oxford and New York 2008. Hoffman Bruce, “Putting German Terrorism in Perspective: An American Response”, in: Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, No. 43, 2008. Hoff-Wilson Joan, “Nixingerism: NATO and Détente”, in: Diplomatic History, No. 4, 1989. Holzer Jerzy, Uwagi związane z projektem 1968 roku [Comments on the 1968 Project], in: Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki [Polish-German Yearbook], No. 20, 2012. Horn Gerd-Rainer, “The Changing Nature of the European Working Class: The Rise and Fall of the `New Working Class` (France, Italy, Spain, Czechoslovakia)”, in: 1968. The World Transformed, Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert and Detlef Junker (eds.), Washington DC 1998. Horn Gerd-Reiner, The Spirit of ’68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976, Oxford 2007. Iłowiecki Maciej, Media, władza, świadomość społeczna [Media, Power and Public Awareness], Łódź 1999. Jarosz Anna B, “Marzec w prasie” [March in the Press], in: Marzec 1968 trzydzieści lat później [March 1968, Thirty Years on], Marcin Kula, Piotr Osęka and Marcin Zaremba (eds.), Vol. 1, Warszawa 1998. Jarząbek Wanda, “Od Helsinek do Belgradu – władze PRL a problematyka trzeciego koszyka KBWE w latach 1975–1978” [From Helsinki to Belgrade The PRP’s Authorities and the Issues of the Third Basket of the CSCE in 1975–1978], in:. Wrocławskie studia z polityki zagranicznej [Wrocław Studies on Foreign Policy], Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, Bożena Szaynok and Jakub Tyszkiewicz (eds.), Vol. 3, Toruń 2010 Bibliography 167

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Press articles

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“Ganz langsam gesteinigt”, Der Spiegel, 1 July 1996. “Gdzie są kwiaty z tamtych lat?” [Where are the Flowers from Those Years?], Forum, No. 40, 6 October 1977. Giełżyński Wojciech, “Bez psychozy” [Without Psyhosis], Polityka [Politics], No. 44, 29 October 1977. Gnauck Gerhard, “Polens bedeutendster Philosoph”, Welt-Online, 10 August 2009. “H.M. Schleyer nie żyje” [H.M. Schleyer is Dead], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 248, 20 October 1977. H.Z., „Walka polityczna” [Political ﬁ ghting], Polityka [Politics], No 21, 25 April 1968. Harting Hanna, “NPD wyjaśnia...” [NPD Explains...], Polityka [Politics], No. 16, 20 June 1968. Herzinger Richard, “Das lange Nachleben des Prager Frühlings”, Welt-Online, 20 August 2008. “Hippis” [Hippie], Forum, No. 26, 25 June 1967. Hirsch Helga, “Die zwei Länder der Zoja Perelmuter. Grenzgänge zwischen Polen und Israel, zwischen 1968 und heute”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 238, 13 October 1968. Hirsch Helga, “Sie glaubten, sie seien ein Teil Polens”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 176, 1 August 2007. “Hoffen auf Gott“, Der Spiegel, 31 December 1979. Honsza Norbert, “Podręczniki potomków Niebelungów” [The German Nibelungen Descendants and Their Handbooks], Polityka [Politics], No. 26, 24 June 1972. “In den Abgrund”, Spiegel-Online, No. 13, 20 March 1972. “In den Abgrund”, Spiegel-Online, No. 9, 26 February 1973. “In Warschau ertönt der Ruf nach Freiheit”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 60, 11 March 1968. Jaranowski Michał, “Za sceną terroru” [Behind the Stage of Terror], Polityka [Politics], No. 45, 5 November 1977. “Käse ist böse”, Welt-Online, 11 March 2008. Kęciek Krzysztof, “Maratończyk Joschka Fischer” [Joschka Fischer – The Marathon Runner], Przegląd [Review], No. 28, 2003. 176 Bibliography

Kijowska Marta, “Dramatiker der logischen Phantasie“, FAZ.Net, No. 140, 21 June 2010. “Kolejne posiedzenie `sztabu kryzysowego` w sprawie Schleyera” [Another Meeting of the Crisis Staff Regarding Schleyer], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 234, 4 October 1977. Krzemiński Adam, „Czy przepraszać Niemców?” [Should We Apologise the Germans?], Polityka [Politics], No. 35, 1 September 1990. Krzemiński Adam, “Kandydat ze Wschodu” [The Candidate from the East], Polityka [Politics], No. 43, 23 October 1993. “List Schleyera do redakcji dwóch dzienników paryskich” [Schleyer’s Letter to Two Parisian Newspapers], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 239, 10 October 1977. Ludwig Michael, “Achtung und Selbstachtung. In Polen diskutiert man über den Judenmord von Jedwabne“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 88, 14 April 2001. Ludwig Michael, “Anerkennung für den mutigen Kampf um souveränes und freies Polen“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 57, 9 March 1998. Ludwig Michael, “Die Weichsel hat einst jiddisch gesprochen`. Die Präsidenten Polens und Israels erinnern beim `Marsch der Lebenden` in Auschwitz an den Holocaust“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 102, 3 May 2000. Ludwig Michael, “Keine Spur von Selbstkritik“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 60, 12 March 1998. Ludwig Michael, “’Marsch der Lebenden` erstmals mit polnischen Christen“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 86, 14 April 1999. Ludwig Michael, “Mehr als ein Spieler mit verdeckten Karten“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 266. 15 November 1997. “Łunochod 1` kontynuuje eksperyment na Księżycu” [Lunokhod 1 Continues Experiments on the Moon], Trybuna Ludu [People’s Tribune], No. 322, 19 November 1970. “Łunochod` zakończył pierwszy etap księżycowej wędrówki” [Lunokhod Ended Its First Leg of Moonwalking], Ilustrowany Kurier Polski [Illustrated Polish Courier], No. 275, 19 November 1970. Mannheimer Olga, “Der März der Antisemiten“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 57, 9 March 1998. Bibliography 177

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Dokumenty i materiały [Exchange of Prisoners of War between Second Polish Republic and the Soviets in the Inter- war Period. Documents and Materials] W. Materski, R. Żelichowski (eds.): Polska transformacja. Spojrzenie po dwudzie- stu latach [Polish Transformation. Reminiscing after 20 Years] J.J. Matuszewska: Trzy światy. Modele polityki zagranicznej Unii Europejskiej, Stanów Zjednoczonych i Rosji w perspektywie komparatystyczno-dyskursywnej [Three Worlds: The Models of Foreign Policy of the European Union, the Uni- ted Stated and Russia in Comparative-Discoursive Perspective] W. Mędykowski: W cieniu gigantów. Pogromy 1944 r. w byłej sowieckiej strefi e okupacyjnej. Kontekst historyczny, społeczny i kulturowy [In the Shadow of Giants: Progroms of 1941 in the Former Soviet Occupation Zone. Historical, Social and Cultural Context] G. Motyka, R. Wnuk, T. Stryjek, A.F. Baran: Wojna po wojnie. Antysowieckie podziemie w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w latach 1944−1953 [The War after the War: The Anti-Soviet Underground in the Central-Eastern Europe 1944–1953] E. Nalewajko: Między populistycznym a liberalnym. Style polityczne w Polsce po roku 1989 [Between Populism and Liberalism – Political Styles in Poland after 1989] E. Nalewajko (ed.): Radni sejmików wojewódzkich. Role i konteksty [Members of the Regional Councils. The Roles and Their Contexts] W. Narojek: Perspektywy pluralizmu w upaństwowionym społeczeństwie [Perspec- tives of Pluralism in Nationalised Society] A.M. Nogal: Ponad prawem narodowym. Konstytucyjne idee Europy [Beyond Na- tional Law. The European Constitutional Ideas] A. Orzelska: Polityka zagraniczna Polski wobec wybranych kwestii spornych w stosunkach transatlantyckich (1989–2004) [The Foreign Policy of Poland in the Face of Divergencies in Transatlanic Relations (1989–2004)] A. Orzelska: Wpływ konfl iktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjed- noczonymi a Unią Europejską 1990–1995 [The Implications of the Yugoslav Confl ict for Relations Between the United States and the European Union, 1990–1995] A. Orzelska (ed.): Stosunki transatlantyckie z perspektywy polskiej polityki zagranicznej [Transatlantic Relations from the Perspective of Polish Foreign Politics] P. Osęka: Marzec ’68 [March ‘68] A. Paczkowski (ed.): Centrum władzy w Polsce 1948–1970 [The Centre of Power in Poland in the Years 1948–1970] I. Pańków (ed.): Meandry legitymizacji. Studia i analizy [The Intricacies of Legiti- misation. Studies and Analyses] I. Pańków, B. Post (eds.): Kobiety u władzy? Spojrzenie z Sejmu [Women in Power? A View from the Sejm] T. Paszewski: USA i UE wobec nowych wyzwań globalnych [The United States and the European Union towards the New Global Challenges] K. Persak: Sprawa Henryka Hollanda [The Case of Henryk Holland] R. Piłsudski: Pisma wybrane [Selected Papers] Polska–ZSRR. Struktury podległości. Dokumenty KC WKP(b) 1944–1949 [Poland – USSR. Structures of Vassalage. Documents of Soviet Communist Party, 1944–1949] P. Popieliński: Młodzież mniejszości niemieckiej na Górnym Śląsku po 1989 roku [German Minority Youth in Upper Silesia after 1989] J. Rainer: Imre Nagy. Biografi a polityczna [Imre Nagy. Political Biography] T. Rakowska-Harmstone, P. Dutkiewicz (eds.): New Europe. The Impact of the First Decade, vol. 1: Trends and Prospects; vol. 2: Variations on the Pattern Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki [Polish-German Yearbook] 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 I. Sadowski: Społeczna konstrukcja demokracji lokalnej [Social Construction of Local Democracy] I. Słodkowska: Społeczeństwo obywatelskie na tle historycznego przełomu. Polska 1980–1989 [Civil Society against the Historical Breakthrough. Poland 1980– –1989] I. Słodkowska (ed.): Wybory 1991. Programy partii i ugrupowań politycznych [1991 Parliamentary Elections. Programmes of Political Parties and Groups] I. Słodkowska (ed.): Wybory 1993. Partie i ich programy [1993 Parliamentary Elections. Political Parties and Their Programmes] I. Słodkowska, M. Dołbakowska (ed.): Wybory 1997. Partie i ich programy [1997 Parliamentary Elections. Political Parties and Their Programmes] I. Słodkowska, M. Dołbakowska (ed.): Wybory 2005. Partie i ich programy [2005 Parliamentary Elections. Political Parties and Their Programmes] I. Słodkowska, M. Dołbakowska (eds.): Wybory 2007. Partie i ich programy [2007 Parliamentary Elections. Political Parties and Their Programmes] I. Słodkowska (ed.): Wybory prezydenckie 1995. Programy kandydatów [1995 Pre- sidential Elections. Candidates’ Programmes] I. Słodkowska (ed.): Wybory prezydenckie 2000. Programy kandydatów [2000 Pre- sidential Elections. Candidates’ Programmes] I. Słodkowska (ed.): Wybory prezydenckie 2005. Programy kandydatów [2005 Pre- sidential Elections. Candidates’ Programmes] I. Słodkowska, M. Dołbakowska (eds.): Wybory prezydenckie 2010. Programy kandydatów [2010 Presidential Elections. Candidates’ Programmes] I. Słodkowska, M. Dołbakowska (eds.): Eurowybory 2004 [2004 European Elec- tions] I. Słodkowska, M. Dołbakowska (eds.): Eurowybory 2009 [2009 European Elec- tions] I. Słodkowska, M. Dołbakowska, E. Wosik (eds.): Wybory 1989. Dokumenty stro- ny solidarnościowo-opozycyjnej, t. 1: Kwatera Główna, t. 2: Regiony [1989 Elections. Documents from the Solidarity Opposition Faction, Vol. 1: Head- quarters, Vol. 2: Regions] K. Smogorzewski: Myśli o integracji Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 1939–1944 [Refl exions on the Cental-Eastern Europe’s Integration] P. Sowiński: Zakazana książka. Uczestnicy drugiego obiegu 1977−1989 [A Forbid- den Book. Polish Publishing Resistance, 1977–1989] M.T. Staszewski (ed.): Referendum konstytucyjne w Polsce [Constitutional Refe- rendum in Poland] J. Stefanowicz (ed.): Między tożsamością i wspólnotą. Współczesne wyznaczni- ki polityki zagranicznej państw europejskich [Between National Identity and Commonwealth. Contemporary Determinants of Foreign Policy of European States] D. Stola: Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949−1989 [A Country with no Exit? Migrations from Poland, 1949–1989] D. Stola, K. Persak (eds.): PZPR jako machina władzy [Polish United Workers’ Party as the Machine of Authority] T. Stryjek: Jakiej przeszłości potrzebuje przyszłość? Interpretacje dziejów narodowych w historiografi i i debacie publicznej na Ukrainie 1991–2004 [What Past Does Future Need? The Interpretations of the National History in the Historio- graphy and the Public Debate in Ukraine, 1991–2004] B. Szklarski: Przywództwo symboliczne: między rządzeniem a reprezentacją. Amerykańska prezydentura końca XX wieku [Symbolic Leadership – between Governance and Representation American Presidency at the End of the 20th Century] H. Szlajfer: Droga na skróty. Nacjonalizm gospodarczy w Ameryce Łacińskiej i Eu- ropie Środkowo-Wschodniej w epoce pierwszej globalizacji [Taking Shortcuts. Economic Nationalism in Latin America and Central-Eastern Europe in the Epoch of First Globalisation] A. Szpociński: Inni wśród swoich. Kultury artystyczne innych narodów w kulturze Polaków [The Others in the Midst of Countrymen. The Representatives of the Others Nations’ Artistic Cultures in the Polish Culture] A. Szpociński (ed.): Lokalny, narodowy, ponadnarodowy. Wymiary świata kreowa- nego przez media [Local, National, Supranational. Dimensions of the World Created by Mass Media] A. Szpociński (ed.): Różnorodność procesów zmian. Transformacja niejedno ma imię [Diversity of Change Processes. Transformation Has Many Names] J. Szymoniczek, E.C. Król (eds.): Czas totalitaryzmu. Stalinizm, faszyzm, nazizm i pokrewne systemy polityczne w XX wieku [A Time of Totalitarianism. Fas- cism, Nasism, Stalinism and Related Political Systems in the 20th Century] J. Szymoniczek, E.C. Król (eds.): Rok 1956 w Polsce i jego rezonans w Europie [1956 in Poland and Its Implications in Europe], also German edition: Das Jahr 1956 in Polen und seine Resonanz in Europa J. Ślusarczyk: Ruch obrońców pokoju w latach 1948–1989 [Peace Movements, 1948–1989] R. Traba (ed.): Akulturacja/asymilacja na pograniczach kulturowych Europy Środ- kowo-Wschodniej w XIX i XX wieku, t. 1: Stereotypy i pamięć; t. 2: Sąsiedztwo polsko-niemieckie [Acculturation and Assimilation on the Cultural Border- lands of Central-Eastern Europe in 19th and 20th Century, Vol. 1: Stereotypes and Rememberance, Vol. 2: Polish-German Neighbourhood] P. Ukielski: Aksamitny rozwód. Rola elit politycznych w procesie podziału Czecho- słowacji [The Velvet Divorce. The Role of Political Elites in the Process of Dissolution of Czechoslovakia] M. Walewska: W cieniu ustawy o reformie rolnej. Wspomnienia 1944–1945 [In the Shadow the Land Reform. Memoirs 1944−1945] A. Walicki: Filozofi a prawa rosyjskiego liberalizmu [Philosophy of the Law of Russian Liberalism] J. Wasilewski (ed.): Political Leadership in Polish Counties M. Wierzbicki: Ostatni bunt. Młodzieżowa opozycja polityczna u schyłku PRL 1980–1990. Fakty, konteksty, interpretacje [The Last Revolt. Youth Political Opposition in the Turn of People’s Republic of Poland, 1980–1990. Facts, Contexts, Interpretations] M. Wierzbicki: Związek Młodzieży Polskiej i jego członkowie [Union of Polish Youth and Its Members] A. Wołek: Demokracja nieformalna. Konstytucjonalizm i rzeczywiste reguły polityki w Europie Środkowej po 1989 roku [Informal Democracy. Constitutionalism and the Real Rules of Politics in Central Europe after 1989] A. Wołek: Słabe państwo [A Weak State] J. Wódka: Polityka zagraniczna „nowej” Turcji. Implikacje dla partnerstwa trans- atlantyckiego [Foreign Policy of the ‘New’ Turkey. Implications for the Trans- atlantic Partnership] J. Wódka: Polityka zagraniczna Turcji. Uwarunkowania wewnętrzne oraz podmio- ty decyzyjne [Turkish Foreign Policy. Internal Conditions and the Deciding Authority] M. Zaremba: Wielka trwoga. Polska 1944−1947. Ludowa reakcja na kryzys [The Great Fear. Poland 1944–1947. People’s Reaction to Crisis] Z. Zaremba: Listy 1946–1967 [Letters, 1946–1967] R. Żelichowski: Gibraltar R. Żelichowski: Stosunki polsko-holenderskie w Europie powersalskiej [The Po- lish-Dutch Relations in the Post-Treaty of Versailles Europe] R. Żelichowski (ed.): Ideologie – państwa – społeczeństwa [Ideologies – States – Societies] R. Żelichowski (ed.): Małe państwa Europy Zachodniej i terytoria o statusie spe- cjalnym [Small Western European States and Special Status Territories] R. Żelichowski (ed.): Pierwsza pięciolatka. Małe państwa Europy Środkowo- -Wschodniej w Unii Europejskiej [First Five Years. Small Central-Eastern Europe Countries in the EU] R. Żelichowski (ed.): Świat i Polska wobec globalnych wyzwań [The World and Poland towards Global Challenges] R. Żelichowski (ed.): Terytoria zamorskie Wielkiej Brytanii, Francji i Niderlan- dów oraz niektóre europejskie terytoria specjalne a Unia Europejska [British, French, and Dutch Overseas Territories and Some European Special Territories versus the EU]

Dokumenty do dziejów PRL [Documents of the History of Polish Peoples’ Republic]: Aparat bezpieczeństwa w latach 1944–1956. Taktyka, strategia, metody. Część II. Lata 1948–1949 [Security Apparatus 1944–1956. Tactics, Strategy, Methods. Part II. 1944–1956] Centrum władzy. Protokoły posiedzeń kierownictwa PZPR. Wybór z lat 1949–1970 [The Centre of Power. Protocols from the Seatings of the Polish United Wor- kers’ Party. Examples from the Years 1949–1956] Kierownictwo PPR i PZPR wobec wojska 1944–1956 [Leaders of the Polish Wor- kers’ Party and the Polish United Workers’ Party towards the Military, 1944– –1956] Komuniści wobec harcerstwa 1944–1950 [Communists towards Scout Movement 1944–1950] Ku wielkiej zmianie. Korespondencja między Ambasadą PRL w Waszyngtonie a Mi- nisterstwem Spraw Zagranicznych, styczeń–październik 1989 [Towards a Great Change. Correspondence between the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland in Washington and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. January–October 1989] „My z Zetempe...”. Upadek i likwidacja Związku Młodzieży Polskiej (1955–1957) [“We, the Members of UPY”… Union of Polish Youth – Its Fall and Liquida- tion (1955–1957)] Polska w dokumentach z archiwów rosyjskich 1949–1956 [Poland in Documents from the Soviet Archives, 1949–1953] Protokoły posiedzeń Sekretariatu KC PPR 1945–1946 [Protocols from Seatings of Secretary of Central Committee of the Polish Workers’ Party, 1945–1946] Protokoły posiedzeń Biura Politycznego KC PPR 1947–1948 [Protocols from Seatings of the Political Ofﬁ ce of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers’ Party, 1947–1948] Rozmowy na Zawracie. Taktyka walki z opozycją demokratyczną (październik 1976 – grudzień 1979) [Talks on Zawrat. Tactics of Fighting the Opposition, October 1976 – December 1979] Wywiad polski w roku 1949. Sprawozdanie z działalności [Polish Intelligence in 1949. The Activity Report]

Z archiwów sowieckich [From the Soviet Archives]: Vol. III – Konﬂ ikty polsko-sowieckie (1942–1944) [Polish-Soviet Conﬂ icts, 1942– –1944] Vol. IV – Stalin a Powstanie Warszawskie [Stalin and the Warsaw Uprising] Vol. V – Powrót żołnierzy AK z sowieckich łagrów [Home-coming of the Soldiers of the Home Army from Soviet Prison Camps]

We also publish the following journals:

• Studia Polityczne [Political Studies, abstracts in English] • Kultura i Społeczeństwo [Culture and Society, contents in English] • Civitas [contents in English] • Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia [Central-Eastern Europe] 1993; 1996; 1997–1998; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006, 2007; 2008; 2009

All the above-mentioned publications are available in bookshops and in the Institute of Political Studies Polish Academy of Sciences 00-625 Warszawa, ul. Polna 18/20 tel.: (48-22) 825-52-21, fax: (48-22) 825-21-46 [email protected]