C3- A call to end the bombing of and the blockade on its Ports

1 I. Title: A call to end the bombing of Yemen and the blockade on its Ports 2 3 II. Author Identification 4 Corresponding author: Elizabeth Nutting 5 Student, University of Washington, 1701 NW 56th St #714, Seattle WA 98107 6 [email protected], (512) 508-3523 7 APHA member number: 10255317, Mental Health Section, International Health Section 8 9 Ahmed Elshafei 10 [email protected], (617) 615-5547 11 APHA member number: 100-55-509 12 13 Dr. Kazuki Oshima 14 938 110th Ave. NE, Bellevue, WA, 98004 15 [email protected], (206) 218-9179 16 17 Mary Anne Mercer 18 Senior Lecturer, University of Washington, 1107 NE 45th St #350, Seattle WA 98105 19 [email protected] (206) 543-8382 20 APHA member number: 679670, International Health Section 21 22 Aisha Jumaan 23 3216 74th Place SE, Mercer Island WA 98040 24 [email protected] (206) 861-9590 25 26 Amy Hagopian 27 802 16th Ave, Seattle WA 98122 28 [email protected] (206) 551-5313 29 APHA member, International Health Section 30 31 III. Sponsoring Units: 32 International Health Section and Occupational Health and Safety Section 33 34 35 IV. Collaborating Entities: 36 Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation 37 38 V. Endorsements from: Peace Caucus and Forum on Human Rights 39 VI. Summary 40 The civil war in Yemen, ongoing since 2014, has engulfed neighboring and distant nation states in an 41 expanding conflict with significant global implications. Yemen was already the poorest country in the 42 ; the has now declared Yemen’s plight as the biggest humanitarian disaster in 43 a world. A UN-mandated investigation concluded that all the major parties to the conflict, especially a

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C3- A call to end the bombing of Yemen and the blockade on its Ports

1 Saudi Arabian-led coalition and the Yemeni government it backs, have shown a disregard for civilian life, 2 possibly amounting to war crimes. More than 91,600 people have been killed since 2015, more than 2 3 million are displaced, and more than 22 million people are in need of assistance to survive. We describe 4 the ways in which this conflict has become particularly deadly, and propose three areas of intervention: 1) 5 the U.S. Congress should continue its efforts to employ the 1973 War Powers Act to end our financing of 6 and military collaboration with warring parties; 2) all parties attempting to enforce a blockade of Yemen’s 7 ports should immediately lift barriers to the entry of humanitarian supplies ; and 3) robust UN-led efforts 8 should be undertaken to provide immediate relief and reconstruction, especially of health, education, 9 transportation and communications infrastructure that contributes most to health. 10 Relationship to Existing APHA Policy Statements 11 The APHA has a history of taking a stance against US involvement in war and advocating for the health 12 of populations affected by it. Previous statements adopted by the association related to this are: 13 APHA Policy Statement 201810 - International Food Security and Public Health: Supporting Initiatives 14 and Actions 15 APHA Policy Statement 20158 - Preventing Occupational Transmission of Globally Emerging Infectious 16 Disease Threats 17 APHA Policy Statement 20095 - The Role of Public Health Practitioners, Academics, and Advocates in 18 Relation to Armed Conflict and War 19 APHA Policy Statement 20089 - Strengthening Health Systems in Developing Countries 20 APHA Policy Statement 200718 - Opposition to US Attack on Iran 21 APHA Policy Statement 200617 - Opposition to the Continuation of the War in Iraq 22 APHA Policy Statement 200211 - Opposing War in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf 23 These are to be archived, but represent historical APHA positions in this field: 24 APHA Policy Statement 200030 - Preventing Genocide 25 APHA Policy Statement 9923- Opposing War in the Middle East 26 APHA Policy Statement 9817- Arms Trade Code of Conduct 27 APHA Policy Statement 9715- Impact of Economic Embargoes on Populations Health and Wellbeing 28 APHA Policy Statement 8926 - Foreign Assistance Act 29 APHA Policy Statement 8531(PP) - The Health Effects of Militarism 30 APHA Policy Statement 7913 - World Peace and the Military Budget 31 APHA Policy Statement 7632(PP) - Policy Statement on International Health 32 APHA Policy Statement 6716(PP) - International Health 33 VII. Rationale for Consideration

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C3- A call to end the bombing of Yemen and the blockade on its Ports

1 This statement supports APHA’s history of taking a stand against war, for imposing strict limitations on 2 economic sanctions, and for policies that promote health in conflict settings. APHA has worked in concert 3 with Human Rights Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, the International Rescue Committee, Medact, 4 Save the Children, and other organizations to promote sound health policy in conflict settings. Until now, 5 however, the American Public Health Association has no policy statements specifically addressing the 6 situation in Yemen. This policy statement was approved by the APHA Governing Council as a late- 7 breaking policy at the 2019 Annual Meeting. It is submitted now for consideration through the regular 8 process. 9 VIII. Problem Statement 10 Yemen’s civil war began in 2014 when the nation’s Houthi insurgents took control of Yemen’s capital 11 and largest city, Sana’a, demanding lower fuel prices and a new government. These insurgents were 12 characterized as Shiite rebels with links to Iran, which had a history of opposition to the Sunni 13 government. Following failed negotiations, the rebels seized the presidential palace in January 2015, 14 whereupon President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his government resigned. Beginning in March 2015, 15 a coalition of Gulf states led by launched a campaign of economic isolation and air strikes 16 against the Houthi insurgents, with U.S. logistical and intelligence support. President Hadi rescinded his 17 resignation in 2015, and has lived in exile in Saudi Arabia since the end of 2017.1 18 The US and its allies, Saudi Arabia and , have conducted multiple air strikes on 19 Yemeni markets, hospitals and other civilian sites during the conflict. Blockades on the ports of entry 20 impede the import of food and medicine for this country that is highly dependent on such shipments.2 21 Yemen was already the poorest country in the Middle East; it is now the biggest humanitarian disaster in 22 the world, with several rivals for that standing. A UN-mandated investigation concluded that all the major 23 parties to the conflict, especially the Saudi Arabian-led coalition and the Yemeni government it backs, 24 have shown a disregard for civilian life, possibly amounting to war crimes.3 25 In March, 2019, the U.S. Congress actively objected to U.S support of the war in Yemen with the passage 26 of resolutions for reclamation of the War Powers Act by both the House and the Senate, which would 27 require withdrawal of such support without the approval of Congress. That effort was, however, vetoed by 28 the president in April, 2019. On May 24, Secretary of State Pompeo informed Congress that the president 29 is invoking his “emergency authority” to sidestep Congress and complete arms deals with Saudi Arabia. 30 These policies embolden the Saudi-led coalition to continue its war and the blockade on Yemen, 31 irrespective of international laws governing war. Millions of Yemeni civilians are affected each day, 32 especially by the blockade of food, medicine, fuel, and essential goods, most of which Yemen must 33 import. The result is a man-made , scarcity of medicine for chronic and infectious diseases, 34 inadequate medical services, and the largest outbreak in recent history.

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C3- A call to end the bombing of Yemen and the blockade on its Ports

1 The heavy toll of the conflict in Yemen includes more than 91,600 people killed since 2015 (Armed 2 Conflict Location and Event Data), more than 2 million displaced (Office of the United Nations High 3 Commissioner for Human Rights), and more than 22 million people in need of assistance (United Nations 4 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs).4 5 The war on Yemen and especially the imposed blockade have profound public health consequences, and 6 represent an entirely preventable source of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. 7 A. Civilians 8 According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as of 9 November 2018, around 6,872 civilians had been killed and 10,768 wounded, the majority by Saudi 10 Arabia-led coalition airstrikes. These numbers reflect the direct causes of war, so do not include the 11 secondary (i.e. indirect) causes. 5 12 B. Children 13 UNICEF Regional Director Geert Cappelaere has described Yemen as a “living hell” for children, given 14 the limited access to clean water and food, leaving nearly 400,000 young lives at risk of severe acute 15 malnutrition.6 An international aid group estimated that 130 children or more die every day in war-torn 16 Yemen from extreme hunger and disease. According to different reports, continuing blockade by the 17 Saudi-led coalition caused the death of more than 50,000 children in 2017.7 18 At least one child dies every ten minutes in Yemen because of preventable diseases such as diarrhea, 19 malnutrition and respiratory tract infections. Children are especially affected by growing rates of 20 malnutrition. An estimated two million children are acutely malnourished, including nearly 360,000 21 suffering from severe acute malnutrition. The risk of acute malnutrition for children under age 5 remains 22 high especially in active-conflict or access-restricted communities such as , Hajjah, and 23 Taizz. As of 2019, an estimated 7.4 million children need humanitarian assistance, representing a 12 24 percent increase since 2017.3 25 Children also experience severe psychological effects from war, including anxiety, depression, PTSD, 26 anger, and hopelessness.8,9 Exposure to community violence, including witnessing atrocities, can result in 27 aggression and antisocial behavior in children at the time, as well as years after the exposure.10 In April 28 2018, an inter-agency needs assessment found that 96 percent of respondents noted significant changes in 29 the behavior, attitudes and psychosocial well-being of children and childcare providers.3 30 Protracted conflict and economic hardship are increasing risks of family separation, child recruitment, 31 child marriage, exploitive forms of labor and child trafficking. More than 1,200 unaccompanied and 32 separated children are in International Displaced Persons (IDPs) settlements in Yemen. In addition, child 33 marriage rates are rising, increasing threefold for girls under 18 between 2017 and 2018.

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C3- A call to end the bombing of Yemen and the blockade on its Ports

1 The conflict has also taken a severe toll on children’s access to education. Some two million children are 2 out of school, depriving them of an education and exposing them to greater risks of recruitment to armed 3 groups and child marriage.3 4 C. Women and girls 5 Women and girls suffered disproportionately from gender-based violence, poverty and violations of basic 6 rights before the conflict. The World Bank estimates that women are shouldering an inequitable share of 7 the burden in terms of worsening poverty rates and deprivations than the average of the population.11 8 Deteriorating security and economic conditions are affecting women’s and girls’ mobility, as well as their 9 access to services and resources. Their ability to reach health, nutrition, and other services remains a 10 challenge due to distance and lack of financial means to afford transport. The death of male relatives, 11 when men are usually the primary breadwinners in Yemeni families, increases economic pressure, 12 especially for female-headed households.3 13 D. Cause-specific health burdens 14 Cholera: In addition to direct airstrike attacks, civilians face further risk from infectious disease and 15 malnutrition because of the destruction of the infrastructure and blockade of humanitarian aid entry 16 through the Al-Hudaydah port. An outbreak of cholera began in Yemen in October 2016 and is ongoing 17 as of November 2019. More than 2.3 million suspected cholera cases and over 3,800 associated deaths 18 have been reported in 306 districts across Yemen – the worst single outbreak on record. In February and 19 March 2017, the outbreak seemed to decline during a wave of cold weather, but the number of cholera 20 cases resurged in April 2017.12 In 2018 alone (January to November), more than 311,000 suspected cases 21 were reported. This was due to the ongoing prevalence of risk factors, including collapsing health, water 22 and sanitation facilities.3 23 Diphtheria, a vaccine preventable disease, has been widely reported in Yemen since the beginning of the 24 war. From January to October 2019, a total of 1,600 probable cases of diphtheria were reported with 95 25 associated deaths, and 64% of districts in Yemen have reported probable diphtheria cases.13 Access to 26 vaccines is restricted, increasing the risk of several serious childhood diseases, as pointed out in a report 27 on US National Public Radio on Nov 5, 2018.6 28 Famine: Most food imports enter the country through Al Hudaydah and Saleef ports. Before the 29 escalation of the crisis, Yemen imported about 90 percent of its staple food and required an estimated 30 544,000 metric tons of imported fuel per month.14 One of the primary barriers to food security is the 31 restricted ability to import food, as ports are blockaded.3 32 The risk of famine in Yemen is intensifying. As of 2019, an estimated 7.4 million people in the 230 33 highest-risk districts do not know how they will obtain their next meal. Most households’ livelihoods in 34 these districts have totally or nearly collapsed. This has triggered spiraling coping behaviors such as the

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C3- A call to end the bombing of Yemen and the blockade on its Ports

1 sale of houses, land, productive assets, and livestock, exacerbating household food insecurity. Families 2 are increasingly going into debt to access food. In addition, 3 million people need nutrition assistance, 3 including 2 million acutely malnourished children under age 5.3 4 Malnutrition in Yemen has three main underlying causes: (i) inadequate access to food; (ii) inadequate 5 childcare practices; and (iii) poor water, sanitation and health services.3 The past four years of conflict in 6 Yemen have further exacerbated the impact and severity of these factors. 7 Bombing/Other violence: The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) data show that 8 between January 2016 and March 2019, ACLED recorded over 3,000 direct attacks targeting civilians 9 resulting in approximately 7,000 fatalities--over 2,300 of which occurred in 2018 alone.15 The ACLED 10 reports that 2019 was the 2nd deadliest year in the war, with over 23,000 direct conflict related deaths.16 11 Responsibility for the highest number of reported civilian fatalities in Yemen is linked to the Saudi-led 12 coalition, with approximately 4,700 reported civilian fatalities since 2016--including 67 in 2019-- 13 stemming from coalition activity.15 The Houthis and their allies are responsible for approximately 1,300 14 reported civilian fatalities, including 149 in 2019.15 15 Thus far, 2019 has been the only year in which the Houthis are responsible for the direct reported killing 16 of more civilians than the Saudi-led coalition. The UN says at least 7,025 civilians have been killed and 17 11,140 injured in the fighting since March 2015, with 65% of the deaths attributed to Saudi-led coalition 18 air strikes.15 19 Psychological harm suffered by civilians as well as combatants includes posttraumatic stress disorder 20 (PTSD), depression, alcohol misuse, and anxiety disorders, all of which can persist for years after the end 21 of combat.17,18,19 Victims and survivors of explosive-related incidents need access to proper assistance, 22 including medical, rehabilitation, psychosocial and socio-economic inclusion, particularly when survivors 23 are women. Conflict is undermining children’s psychosocial well-being. At least 35 percent of child 24 protection incidents reported to social workers in 2018 were related to mental health and psychosocial 25 issues.3 26 E. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Host Communities 27 Shifting frontlines, food insecurity, disputes over land use and ownership, and natural disasters all 28 contribute to primary and secondary displacement. As of late 2018, an estimated 3.3 million people 29 remained displaced in Yemen.3 Almost 400,000 people were newly displaced in 2019.20 According to a 30 nationwide Multi-Cluster Location Assessment findings, IDPs, host communities and returnees most 31 frequently identified food, livelihoods and drinking water as their top three priorities. In 2018, 60 percent 32 of respondents to an inter-agency child protection assessment confirmed cases of family separation in 33 their neighborhood due to internal displacement.3 34 F. Health Care Services and Infrastructure

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C3- A call to end the bombing of Yemen and the blockade on its Ports

1 According to a 2018 report in The Lancet, over half of the health facilities in the country had been 2 destroyed by constant airstrikes and regional conflicts, and many Yemeni medical personnel had been 3 working without pay for nearly 2 years.21 Sameh Al-Awalqi, a health specialist from Yemen, confirmed 4 that the health workers in many areas have yet to get their salaries, some for the third year in a row. Also, 5 access to services is restricted by the active conflict in hot zones.21 In addition, the fractured health system 6 due to the war has left two ministries of health, resulting in delays in paperwork necessary for aid 7 organizations to provide health responses along with confusion from international health organizations 8 when designing and managing programs for the country.21 9 G. Human Rights 10 Violation of human rights, including torture, the erosion of free speech, and detention, are common 11 during the war and ultimately compromise health and well-being. 12 Conflict and economic pressure increase risks of gender-based violence, which disproportionately affects 13 women and girls. In 2018, Yemeni women and girls received nearly 85 percent of all services for gender- 14 based violence survivors, including psychological, legal, health and shelter support.3 15 From October 2017 to September 2018, the Country-level Task Force on the Monitoring and Reporting 16 Mechanism verified and documented 2,367 victims of grave child rights violations (1,852 boys, 512 girls, 17 3 children of unknown sex), an increase of 23 percent from the previous year. These violations include 18 killing and maiming of children, abduction of children, attacks against schools or hospitals, recruitment or 19 use of children as soldiers, denial of humanitarian access for children, and sexual violence against 20 children, with these numbers including 1,843 cases of killing and maiming (1,346 boys, 494 girls, 3 21 children of unknown sex) – an increase of 51 percent since 2017. The actual extent of grave violations of 22 children’s rights is almost certainly far higher than reported and verified cases.3 23 IX. Evidence-based Strategies to Address the Problem 24 1) Involvement of the in the war in Yemen: US involvement in the war in Yemen is 25 explicitly prohibited by the War Powers Act of 1973. This resolution states that involvement of US 26 Armed Forces in war is allowed by order of the President “only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) 27 specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States, 28 its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”22 Because support for Saudi-led forces has come from 29 the President despite there having been no declaration of war, statutory authorization, or attack upon the 30 US from this war, involvement in it is therefore unlawful. The United States Congress proposed a bill 31 invoking this resolution in 2018 regarding the U.S. support for Saudi-led military involvement in Yemen, 32 and this bill passed both the House of Representatives and the Senate in early 2019 before being vetoed 33 by the President in April 2019. The passage of this bill in Congress shows a majority support for ending 34 US involvement and the potential for enacting this resolution again.

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C3- A call to end the bombing of Yemen and the blockade on its Ports

1 2) The Saudi-led coalition’s blockade over ports of entry into Yemen: This policy statement calls for 2 consideration of both the current and lasting health implications of this blockade, as outline above. 3 Blockades as a method of warfare have been condemned by the United Nations, and the starvation caused 4 to civilian populations as a direct result of this blockade is in violation of International Humanitarian Law 5 Rule 53: Starvation as a Method of Warfare, which states that any blockade in which “the civilian 6 population is inadequately provided for, the blockading party must provide for free passage of 7 humanitarian relief supplies”.23 Furthermore, according to the protocol additions to the Geneva 8 Convention of 1949, “it is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to 9 the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of 10 foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific 11 purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, 12 whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any 13 other motive”.24 14 The Security Council of the United Nations has called for a complete opening of all ports into Yemen as 15 well as increased access to the airport in Sana’a.25 Despite this call and the Stockholm Agreement reached 16 in December 2018 by all warring parties that states Hodeidah and the ports of Hodiedah, Salif, and Ras 17 Issa shall be secured only by local security forces in accordance with Yemeni law,26 outside access to the 18 ports remain under the control of the Saudi-coalition. The U.S., a strong Saudi partner, is actively 19 supplying military aid to Saudi Arabia and therefore has the influence and means to put pressure on the 20 coalition to allow access to the ports. 21 3) Reconstruction in Yemen: Under The Responsibility to Protect, established by world leaders during 22 the 2005 United Nations World Summit, nations are called to protect populations that are “suffering 23 serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is 24 unwilling or unable to halt or avert it”.27 This agreement advocates for nations “to respond to situations of 25 compelling human need with appropriate measures,” which the United States as well as all involved 26 warring countries are able to do. In addition, the “’element of rebuild” states that nations who have been 27 involved in wars with devastating effects on civilian life should provide “full assistance with recovery, 28 reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt 29 or avert.” 30 X. Opposing Arguments/Evidence 31 1) US involvement in the war: An argument for continued involvement by the United States, which 32 includes efforts to prevent the United States from putting pressure against Saudi Arabia to lift the 33 blockade, is based on the relationship between the two countries. Saudi is considered an ally to the U.S. in 34 the region, is the main supplier of oil to the US markets, and is a major buyer of American arms. Others

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C3- A call to end the bombing of Yemen and the blockade on its Ports

1 argue that we need to stand with the Saudis as they are our ally in confronting the Iranian influence in the 2 region. Numerous experts, including within US intelligence community, claim that purported Iranian 3 control of and influence over Houthis is exaggerated.28 4 In any case, U.S. involvement in a war without officially declaring war, as stated in the previous 5 section, is unlawful under the War Powers Act of 1973. In addition, this cycle of buying oil and arms 6 between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia aids the continued use of fossil fuels for U.S. energy and militarism in 7 and by Saudi Arabia, both of which have lasting public health effects as acknowledged and discouraged 8 by previous APHA policy statements.29,30 U.S.-Saudi relations, as well as foreign relations between Saudi 9 Arabia and many of their foreign investors, have also become weakened since the murder of U.S. 10 journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate.31 11 2) The necessity of the blockades: The main argument in support of the blockade suggests that it is 12 necessary to keep arms out of Yemen. However, the UN already has sanctions in place for this purpose. 13 The Security Council of the UN supports the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), 14 “which facilitates commercial shipping to Yemen, including by carrying out inspections of commercial 15 vessels over 100 metric tonnes”.24 In addition, as per the Stockholm agreement reached by all warring 16 parties in late 2018, an agreement to a ceasefire has already been reached in the ports of Hodeidah, Salif 17 and Ras Issa and allow the UNVIM be conducted there.25 18 3) Providing reconstruction to Yemen: An argument against the UN providing robust reconstruction to 19 Yemen immediately and continuing after the war is the idea that Yemen’s civil war should be 20 reconstructed from within the country. However, in alignment with The Responsibility to Protect, as 21 referenced earlier, because both the UN and several other nations have become involved with the war, it 22 is now the responsibility of all acting parties to provide reconstruction to any areas of the country that 23 have received damage as a result of their actions. 24 XI. Alternative Strategies 25 The alternative strategy to opposing the war in Yemen, ending U.S. involvement, ending the blockades 26 over ports of entry, and providing reconstruction, is to allow the war to continue as is and continue U.S. 27 aid to the Saudi-led coalition. Due to the mortality and morbidity experienced by the Yemeni people as 28 described above and the urgent nature of the situation, we do not believe that this is a humane alternative. 29 XII. Action Steps 30 Based on the history of U.S. involvement and the extent of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, it is critical 31 for organizations such as APHA to support policies and initiatives to address key elements of the 32 problem. 33 34 APHA therefore urges:

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C3- A call to end the bombing of Yemen and the blockade on its Ports

1 A. The U.S. government to end the financing of and military collaboration with warring parties and hold 2 such parties accountable for attacks on health workers and civilians; 3 1. Prohibit any further U.S. assistance or support, including intelligence sharing and logistics 4 support activities, to any members of the Saudi-led coalition for the civil war in Yemen (per 5 https://www.justsecurity.org/63855/getting-past-the-veto-on-ending-yemen-war-how-congress- 6 next-move-can-succeed/) 7 2. Suspend Direct Commercial Sales licenses for maintenance and sustainment of fighter aircraft 8 used in the Saudi coalition’s offensive operations in Yemen. 9 3. Consider congressional action to cut off arms sales to Saudi Arabia, which could be limited to 10 certain categories of weapons (i.e., potentially excluding weapons systems that are defensive in 11 nature) or sweep more broadly to include all or a greater amount of weapons. 12 4. Congress should pass the Saudi Arabia Accountability and Yemen Act of 2019, which offers a 13 range of tools to hold the Kingdom accountable for its human rights abuses – including the 14 underlying problems that motivate Saudi dissidents such as the murdered journalist Jamal 15 Khashoggi to criticize the Saudi government in the first place – and for the Saudis’ devastating 16 restrictions on humanitarian access in Yemen’s civil war. 17 B. All concerned parties to support an immediate end to the blockade of Yemen’s ports and lift barriers 18 to the entry of humanitarian supplies, including: 19 1. US Government to apply pressure on Saudi Arabia to lift the blockades on all ports of entry to 20 Yemen, including air, sea, and land, and especially the ports of Hodiedah, Salif, and Ras Issa, and 21 allow unhindered entry of food, medicine and essential goods, including supplies for aid agencies 22 and commercial imports. 23 2. The US Government to apply pressure on Saudi Arabia to open Sana’a airport for civilian travel 24 and representatives of the United Nations, in accordance with the Stockholm Agreement, and to 25 lift restrictions on air travel to and out of Yemen and within Yemen, to include all Yemeni 26 airports. 27 3. UN agencies such as the World Health Organization, United Nations Children's Fund, United 28 Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the UN General Assembly, as well as 29 international non-governmental organizations including International Committee of the Red 30 Cross, Oxfam, Doctors Without Borders, Save the Children, and CARE, to express strong 31 opposition to the Saudi-led blockade on the Yemeni people. 32 4. Health professional associations in the US to adopt resolutions opposing the war and the blockade 33 imposed by the Saudi-led coalition on Yemeni ports, supporting the opening of the Sana’a airport 34 and allowing the unhindered entry of food, medicine, and essential goods into the country.

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C3- A call to end the bombing of Yemen and the blockade on its Ports

1 5. Public health practitioners to increase awareness in their own professional organizations on the 2 humanitarian effects of U.S. collaboration with the Saudi-led coalition blockade on Yemen, and 3 urge those groups to take a stand in opposition to it. 4 C. The UN to lead robust efforts to provide immediate relief and reconstruction in Yemen. 5 1. The U.S. Government to support UN efforts to rebuild destroyed or damaged health centers as 6 well as government and civilian infrastructure including homes, offices, water and sanitation 7 facilities, and food processing plants in Yemen and assist in reversing the damage that has been 8 done as the result of U.S.-supported military actions, in accordance with The Responsibility to 9 Protect. 10

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1 XIII. References 2 1. Kareem, Fahim. (2018, August). The deadly war in Yemen rages on. So why does the death toll stand 3 still? Retrieved from: https://wapo.st/2OF6kvy?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.d7d216fdb905 4 5 2. OHCHR | bachelet urges states with the power and influence to end starvation, killing of civilians in 6 yemen. (2018). Retrieved from 7 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23855&LangID=E 8 9 3. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Country Team in Yemen. (2019). 2019 10 yemen humanitarian needs overview. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-2019- 11 humanitarian-needs-overview-enar 12 13 4. Relations CoF. Council on Foreign Relations;23 January 2020. 14 15 5. Human Rights Watch. Yemen: Events of 2018. Retrieved from: https://www.hrw.org/world- 16 report/2019/country-chapters/yemen 17 18 6. UNICEF. (2018, December). Yemen conflict: A living hell for children. Retrieved from: 19 https://www.unicef.org/stories/yemen-conflict-living-hell-children 20 21 7. Associated Press. (2017, November). 50,000 children in Yemen have died of starvation and disease so 22 far this year, monitoring group says. Retrieved from: https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct- 23 save-the-children-yemen-20171116-story.html 24 25 8. Santa, B. J. (2008). In Levy B. S., Sidel V. W. (Eds.), War and public health (2nd ed.). New York: 26 Oxford University Press. 27 28 9. Williams, R. (2007). The psychosocial consequences for children of mass violence, terrorism and 29 disasters. International Review of Psychiatry, 19(3), 263-277. doi:10.1080/09540260701349480 30 31 10. Qouta, S., Punamäki, R., Miller, T., & El-Sarraj, E. (2008). Does war beget child aggression? military 32 violence, gender, age and aggressive behavior in two palestinian samples. Aggressive Behavior, 34(3), 33 231-244. doi:10.1002/ab.20236 34

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1 11. Yemen's economic outlook - october 2018. (2018). Retrieved from 2 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-outlook-october-2018# 3 4 12. WHO. (2019, November). Cholera Situation in Yemen November 2019. 5 Retrieved from: http://applications.emro.who.int/docs/YEM/YEM-Chol-Nov-2019-eng.pdf?ua=1 6 7 13. Relief Web. Yemen: Diphtheria Outbreak - Nov 2017. Retrieved from 8 https://reliefweb.int/disaster/ep-2017-000175-yem 9 10 14. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Country Team in Yemen. (2017). 2017 11 humanitarian response plan YEMEN. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen- 12 humanitarian-response-plan-january-december-2017-enar 13 14 15. Jones, Sam. (2019, March 20th). Yemen war deaths on overall decline as UN works to salvage truce. 15 Retrieved from: https://www.acleddata.com/2019/03/20/press-release-yemen-war-deaths-on-overall- 16 decline-as-un-works-to-salvage-truce/ 17 18 16.The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. 10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2020. Retrieved 19 from: https://www.acleddata.com/2020/01/23/ten-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2020/#Yemen 20 21 17. Hoge, C. W., Castro, C. A., Messer, S. C., McGurk, D., Cotting, D. I., & Koffman, R. L. (2004). 22 Combat duty in iraq and afghanistan, mental health problems, and barriers to care. N Engl J Med, 351(1), 23 13-22. doi:10.1056/NEJMoa040603 24 25 18. Kanter, E. D. (2008). In Levy B. S., Sidel V. W. (Eds.), War and public health (2nd ed.). New York: 26 Oxford University Press. 27 28 19. Levy, B. S., & Sidel, V. W. (2009). Health effects of combat: A life-course perspective. Annual 29 Review of Public Health, 30(1), 123-136. doi:10.1146/annurev.publhealth.031308.100147 30 31 20. Displacement Tracking Matrix. Yemen – Rapid Displacement Tracking Update (15 Dec – 21 Dec 32 2019). Retrieved from: https://displacement.iom.int/reports/yemen-rapid-displacement-tracking-update- 33 15-dec-%E2%80%93-21-dec-2019?close=true 34

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1 21. Al-Awlaqi, Sameh. (2019, March 18th). Yemen’s health system fragmentation during the conflict: The 2 impact on the health and nutrition status of a vulnerable population. Retrieved from: 3 https://www.internationalhealthpolicies.org/yemens-health-system-fragmentation-during-the-conflict-the- 4 impact-on-the-health-and-nutrition-status-of-a-vulnerable-population/ 5 6 22. Joint resolution concerning the war powers of Congress and the President., H.J. Res. 542, 93rd 7 Congress. (1973). 8 9 23. ICRC, Customary IHL Database. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule53. 10 Accessed 5/12/2019. 11 12 24. ICRC, Customary IHL Database. https://ihl- 13 databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=C5F28CACC22458 14 EAC12563CD0051DD00. Accessed 5/12/2019. 15 16 25. United Nations, Security Council. Statement by the President of the Security Council. 17 S/PRST/2015/5. Available from https://undocs.org/S/PRST/2018/5. 18 19 26. United Nations, Security Council. Stockholm Agreement. S/2018/1134. Available from 20 https://undocs.org/S/2018/1134. 21 22 27. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Responsibility to 23 Protect. 2001. International Development Research Centre. 24 25 28. Juneau, T. (2016, May 16). No, Yemen's Houthis actually aren't Iranian puppets. Washington Post. 26 Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/16/contrary-to- 27 popular-belief-houthis-arent-iranian-proxies/ 28 29 29. The Public Health Impact of Energy Policy in the United States. (2018). American Public Health 30 Association. Policy 20183. 31 32 30. The Health Effects of Militarism. (1985). American Public Health Association. Policy 8531(PP). 33

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1 31. U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations. (2018, December 7). Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from 2 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-saudi-arabia-relations 3

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