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Home , Ali Abdullah Saleh, Blockade of Yemen, Houthi takeover in Yemen

Letter from the Director

Dear delegates,

Welcome to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). My name is Alison Lee, and I am ecstatic to be serving as your Director for ICJ at CAHSMUN 2020. Staffing alongside myself will be your two Chairs, Jason Guo and Annie Tsoromocos. The three of us look forward to watching the committee engage in active debate on two critically important topics and collaborate to find lasting resolutions.

Currently, I am in my third year of involvement in Model , and can assure you that it is one of the most challenging, but by far, the most rewarding activity I have pursued. Model UN is a platform in which like-minded individuals can work together to solve issues not only diplomatically but pragmatically, and expand their knowledge in global affairs. It rejects the preconceived notion that academia can be boring, and encourages individuals to be curious about the world that surrounds them. We encourage you all to step out of your comfort zone, and truly immerse yourself in this surely unforgettable experience.

This year, our committee will discuss and attempt to resolve two topics pertaining to international justice: the advisory case, Saudi Arabian War Crimes in and the contentious case, Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean Somalia v. Kenya. Both of these issues will challenge you to research and immerse yourselves in their intricacies. Given the varying rules of procedure between the two topics and the nature of in-committee preparation time, it is integral that you expect the unexpected and keep an open mind to new ideas. I encourage you to take advantage of the flexibility of the committee, and let your imagination lead you to unprecedented resolutions to solve some of the most pressing issues the international community faces.

Once again, I welcome you to the ICJ and look forward to a weekend of diplomacy, leadership, productive debate, and the creation of lasting resolutions. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at [email protected]. We look forward to meeting all of you in April!

Cheers,

Alison Lee Director of ICJ — CAHSMUN 2020

Committee Description

Succeeding the Permanent International Court of Justice (PICJ), the International Court of Justice was established in 1945 as the primary judicial body of the United Nations. The ICJ was established with the purpose of overseeing a wide range of international legal activities, including resolving territorial disputes and providing legal advisory.1 The ICJ consists of 15 judges elected by the General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council from a list of nominees. The judges serve nine-year terms and every country may have a maximum of one judge in the ICJ.2

The ICJ classifies cases into two categories: contentious and advisory. Contentious cases are legal disputes between states that choose to submit a case to the ICJ, while advisory cases are requests for opinions (non-binding) on legal questions referred to the Court by United Nations organs and specialized agencies. Contentious cases typically result in a final judgement by the Court that is binding to the parties of the case without appeal, only to be reopened if a state to perform certain obligations. In this case, the Court may bring the matter before the United Nations Security Council.3 Contrastingly, advisory proceedings do not result in binding judgements and written decisions are much shorter. However, the Court’s advisory opinions are associated with its authority; therefore, the organ or agency that requested the Court’s opinion endorses it as if it were sanctioned by international law.4

In this committee, the advisory request will result in voting on resolution papers created by different blocs as it would in the standard Rules of Procedure in Model United Nations. Given the committee’s legal foundation, resolutions will also consider international law. However, for the contentious case, in order to simulate the court procedures of the real ICJ, delegates will be arranged into teams representing either Somalia or Kenya or selected to be a judge. Delegates will be given time to prepare arguments and final statements at the conference, and ultimately present a formal Court statement in the final committee session.

Since its inception, the ICJ has strived to maintain justice in a world of constant injustice. The ICJ does this by ensuring representation of different outlooks on justice, limiting bias in the court, and searching for the truth where good and evil is often muddled. Delegates should be prepared to do the same as they deal with currently proceeding cases in the Court.

1 https://www.icj-cij.org/en/history 2 https://www.icj-cij.org/en/members 3 https://www.icj-cij.org/en/how-the-court-works 4 Ibid.

Overview

In the past half decade, the Human Rights Watch has documented approximately 90 cases of unlawful Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Yemen. The targets of these airstrikes were not military bases or enemy forces; rather, they were residences, school buses, hospitals, and other civilian populated areas. In addition, the shells that were left over from more than a dozen of these vicious attacks have confirmed that these bombs are American-made.

The , fought between the Yemeni government—led by —and the Ansar Allah (commonly known as the Houthi armed movement), officially began in 2015 when the Houthi rebels took over the Yemeni government and mobilized their forces to expand southwards of the country. Although the people fighting on the ground are members of the two aforementioned organizations, the global community sees this war as a proxy conflict that extends and ’s pre-existing rivalry.

Saudi Arabia has long been condemned by the international community for its actions in Yemen. Since 2015, the Saudi-led coalition of nine Arab states—the (UAE), , , , , Egypt, , and Morocco—has carried out various acts of violence, directly and indirectly, in attempts to diminish the Houthi minority. In addition to airstrikes and civilian bombings, Saudi Arabia initiated the “” which prevented any humanitarian aid, food, water, and fuel from entering Yemen and created a widespread in the country. The plight of Yemeni citizens was exacerbated in 2017 when Saudi Arabia, along with the , strengthened the blockade against Yemen.

International and regional political interests in Yemen increase tensions in the area and encourage stalemates as each backing state attempts to defeat the other. While the Saudi-led coalition, with the financial backing of the United States, supports the Yemeni government, the Houthis are backed by Iran and its regional allies in addition to their long-term relationship with Russia. While there are many political incentives for this war, it is also exceedingly tense due to centuries of religious conflicts between the Shia and Sunni sects of Islam. Arab states continue to choose sides based on this division, and many acts of violence are still conducted in the name of extremist groups in either sect.

Timeline

June 2004 – Houthi armed forces lead a minor insurgency against the government after their leader, Abul-Malik al-Houthi, is killed following a demonstration against oppressive laws against the Houthi minority population.5

January 2007 – Houthi rebels accept a cease-fire, and put a temporary end to the violent clashes between the government and the rebel insurgency.

August 2009 – Agressions between the Houthi insurgency and Yemeni government reignite after police open-fire on protesters. However, the insurgency is quickly contained after a cease-fire is signed.6

November 2012 – President Saleh agrees to hand over power to Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, his deputy, after months of constant protests. A unity government including the prime minister from the opposition is formed. Promises of a more inclusive constitution are made.

March 2014 – The presidential panel approves a draft federal constitution to accommodate Houthi and southern grievances.

September 2014 – Houthi forces loyal to former president take control of , Yemen’s capital city, and much of the country. These Houthi forces demand a share of power before eventually rejecting the new constitution.7

January 2015 – Hadi attempts to announce the renewed federal constitution opposed by the Iran-aligned Houthis and Saleh, who arrest him. He escapes, triggering Saudi intervention in March along with a hastily assembled Arab military coalition.

March 2015 – The militant group, the Islamic State, carries out its first major attacks in Yemen. Two cases of suicide bombings specifically targeting Shia mosques in Sanaa kill 137 people.

5 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14704951 6https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-timeline/timeline-yemens-slide-into-political-crisis-and-war- idUSKCN1R20HO 7 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/yemen

July 2017 – Houthi armed forces respond to Saudi missile attacks by firing missiles into Saudi Arabia. Saleh turns against the Houthi forces, but is later killed while being pursued by the insurgency.

September 2018 – A military stalemate along the coast and the port city Hodeidah is caused by Saudi coalition-backed forces. The Houthis control the port but face growing opposition on the outskirts from Yemeni forces.

Historical Analysis

Historical Divisions (1962) Although Yemen’s civil war has been coined the “world’s worst man-made humanitarian disaster”, the country’s cataclysmic history has only worsened in the past years.8 Moreover, many believe that the longstanding divide in Yemen has made it a breeding ground for future conflict. For one, the country has rarely been under the rule of a single, stable government. For the majority of the past century, Yemen was divided into the northern (YAR) and the southern Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Although the two areas unified in 1990, the cultural differences between these two areas clashed. In the northern YAR, the culture and politics were shaped by 1,000 years of Zaidi Shia rule. The southern PDRY, however, was influenced by Western forces such as the British since the 1800s. After the British withdrew their control over the PDRY, the differences between the two areas only intensified after the PDRY became the only Marxist state in the Arab world.9 On top of this, the rise of political Islam and Sunni ideology in traditionally Zaidi Shia areas led to the inception of the .

The cause of divisions lies in the failed transition of power, augmented by long-standing political and religious divisions in the country. The main reason for Yemen’s current instability, however, was the struggle for power between the Houthis and the new government, with each side supported by their own array of insider and outsider powers.

The Houthi Movement (1990s) The Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, are a Shia revivalist movement that was established during the 1990s in Northern Yemen.10 The Houthi movement was created by

8 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423 9 https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen 10 http://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Yemen-War-impact-on-populations-Advocacy-Analysis-Brief- 2018-ENG.pdf

Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, a member of Yemen’s Zaidi Shia minority. In the 1980s when Salafist Sunni ideals began spreading over to Yemen from Saudi Arabia, the Shia traditionalist Houthis began to militarize against the rise in Sunnism. This was due to the longstanding religious tension between the Sunni and Shia religions which tore countries apart and brought about violent catastrophe in the . However, the Houthis’ goals in taking over the government were mainly economic and political, even with their religious grounds.11

The Reallocation of Presidential Power (2011) When the permeated through the Middle East, Yemen was also plagued with widespread public distrust of the state government. Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh was at the core of the people’s frustrations, most notably for embezzling $32bn to $60bn USD while Yemen suffered as one of the poorest countries in the world.12 Pro-democracy civilians were upset with Saleh’s rule and called for his abdication. Frustration from civilians translated into violent animosity, as many Yemeni citizens began protesting in the streets in Sana’a, the capital of Yemen. In 2011, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down and handed power to his deputy Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi in an attempt to regain stability in the country.13 While this seemed beneficial in addressing the frustrations against Saleh, the transition of power actually left Yemen in a more unstable situation than it was in before. Hadi was faced with a myriad of problems, such as attacks by jihadists, a simmering separatist movement in the south, his security personnel’s rigid loyalty to Saleh, corruption, unemployment, and food insecurity. Many civilians who were frustrated with this transition decided to support the Houthi rebels planning to take over Sana’a. On top of this, Saleh-loyal security forces also banded with the Houthis to fight against the Hadi government.

The Houthi Takeover (2014) The , also known as the September 21 Revolution, began in 2014 when the Houthi insurgents took control of Sana’a demanding lower fuel prices and a new, reformed government. Following the government’s failure to meet these orders, the Houthis took over the presidential palace in January 2015.14 By March of 2015, President Hadi was forced to flee the country.

11 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462.html 12 https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/yemen/2011/02/201122812118938648.html 13 https://www.businessinsider.com/history-of-conflict-in-yemen-2017-12 14 https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen

The Saudi-led coalition (2015) Neighbouring countries, alarmed by this conflict, believed that foreign intervention was necessary to stabilize the situation. Acting upon their concerns, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of nine African and Middle Eastern countries to support President Hadi, with logistical and intelligence support from the United States, United Kingdom, and France.15

The beginning of the conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis was marked by the initiation of Operation Decisive Storm, which included a bombing campaign and naval blockade. This naval blockade was instituted to limit resources and aid flowing into Yemen. Although the conflict was fundamentally political, the civilians bore the brunt of the political tensions; the naval blockade made it extremely difficult for civilians to access food, water, and fuel. The blockade continues to the present day. Although United Nations officials have tried to broker peace agreements to halt this blockade, neither of the conflicting sides have agreed to compromise. Several of the countries in the coalition have also sent ground troops to fight in Yemen, while other states have only carried out air attacks.16

In February 2015, President Hadi moved to with the goal of re-establishing the Yemeni government. On March 21, he declared Aden the of the country. The Houthis, however, were advancing towards this city, supported by the security forces loyal to Saleh. In August 2015, the coalition ground troops landed in Aden to drive out the Houthis and their allies out of the south.17 Hadi’s government established a temporary base in Aden but struggled to provide basic services and security to the country. President Hadi was still in exile at this time. Although pushing the Houthis out of Aden was seen as a large success, the insurgent group still maintained a strong grip on Sana’a and was able to overthrow a third city, .18

The of Saleh (2017) On December 4, 2017, Houthi rebels shot and killed the former President Saleh, escalating tensions between the Houthi insurgents and the Yemeni government. The assasination also disrupted the good relations between the forces loyal to Saleh and the Houthis. Although they worked together for the past few years, these forces switched allegiances. Now, the Hadi

15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid.

government and the forces loyal to Saleh began fighting against the Houthis, the new common adversary.19

The Red Sea City of Hodeidah (2018) As the war began to stall, the Saudi-led coalition attempted a major offensive on the Houthi- controlled Red Sea city of Hudaydah. The offensive lasted for months until the terms for a ceasefire facilitated by the United Nations were agreed upon.20 The Houthis promised a two- phase redeployment out of the city, and declared that an alternative force would take over security. However, the details of this redeployment were never fleshed out, and efforts consequently stalled. In response, the United Nations sanctioned a Houthi withdrawal from the three main ports on Yemen’s Red Sea coast: Hodeidah, Ras Issa, and Saleef. Even so, the Yemeni government stated that these Houthi insurgents remain at these ports, albeit less violent.21

Current Situation

While the Yemen Civil War is an important basis for the complexities of this topic, the most pressing issue now are the serious, widespread violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law conducted by various groups and states with various, but undisputedly illegitimate, incentives. Many of these violations, such as civilian attacks, starvation, denial of access to humanitarian relief, torture, ill-treatment, and enforced disappearances likely fulfill the criteria of war crimes.22 Additionally, the deprivation of food and medicine caused by the Saudi blockade constitutes a systematic attack against the civilian population that may qualify as a crime of extermination against humanity.23 Ultimately, the issue today can be boiled down to three major areas of contention: pernicious incentives of various states, humanitarian crises, and the future of the nation.

The progression of the issues in Yemen are largely caused by the number of powerful states involved, both regionally and internationally. Regionally, the between Iran and Saudi Arabia has only progressed throughout the years as both nations continue to fight for regional hegemony. In addition to the millennia of Sunni-Shia divisions, the two energy-rich powers

19 https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/forces-loyal-to-saleh-clash-with-former-houthi-allies-1.723261 20 Ibid. 21 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/20/yemen-civil-war-the-conflict-explained 22http://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Yemen-War-impact-on-populations-Advocacy-Analysis-Brief- 2018-ENG.pdf 23Ibid.

have been backing conflicting interest and political groups across the Middle East for the past several decades.24 In recent years, the cold war tensions have escalated, with Saudi Arabia backing Iraqi dictator during the Iran- in the 1980s, involvement in the Yemeni Civil War in 2015, diplomatic ties between the two nations being broken in 2016, and financial backing of opposing political groups in Lebanon in 2018.

The cold war between the two nations is reminiscent of the Cold War between the USSR and the United States in much of the mid to late 1900s, with states across the Middle East dividing their support for either Saudi Arabia or Iran. This division stems significantly from the Shia- split in the region, as most of these states’ governments are representative of the religious majority in their respective countries. Additionally, in the case of Yemen, religious conflict is clear in the particularly brutal attacks carried out by the Islamic State, a Sunni extremist group.

A chart outlining major arms exporters to Saudi Arabia.25

24https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-11-12/cold-war-between-iran-and-saudi-arabia-heating-here-are-5-things-you- should-know 25 https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2019/05/saudi-arabia-world-largest-arms-importer-2014-2018- 190512140945972.html

Arms Sales In terms of the West, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France have been reported as possibly “complicit in war crimes in Yemen by arming and providing support to a Saudi- led coalition that starves civilians as a war tactic.”26 This sheds light on a greater issue that has been perpetuated by many Western nations for decades: arms sales. The three nations mentioned previously have the world’s highest arms export rates to Saudi Arabia, with 3.2 billion from the United States, 425 million from the United Kingdom, and 142 million from France in 2017 alone.27 According to data by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the United States’ arms sales to Saudi Arabia accounted for 88 percent of all arms sold to the country.28 These weapons include combat aircraft, missile defence systems, artillery, ships, tanks, armoured vehicles, frigates, and short-range ballistic missiles–in short, weapons of mass destruction and violence. To make matters worse, arms flow into the Middle East from the West has recently surged, nearly doubling in the past five years, fueling the turmoil. In late 2018, the American government accused Iran of supplying arms to the Houthis, in violation of a UN resolution prohibiting Tehran from selling arms outside of the country in addition to a resolution on Yemen prohibiting the sale of arms to Houthis.29

American Foreign Policy in Yemen In the case of the United States, the Trump administration has greatly shifted America’s foreign policy in the Middle East, in this instance, specifically altering relations with Saudi Arabia. On April 4th, 2019, the House voted to end United States military support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The measure argued that Congress never authorized support for the coalition, underscoring the state of American tension over the involvement in Yemen. Divisively, President Trump vetoed the bill on April 16, insisting that the coalition “has tried to reduce civilian deaths”.30 This reflects the capricious side of the United States’ foreign policy in Yemen, as domestic politics impede on international peace progression. The purposeful ignorance of the situation in Yemen exemplifies the lack of Western prioritization of peace in the issue through their arms sales finances and domestic political polarization.

26https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/03/uk-us-and-france-may-be-complicit-in-yemen-war-crimes-un- report 27https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2019/05/saudi-arabia-world-largest-arms-importer-2014-2018- 190512140945972.html 28 https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/fs_1903_at_2018.pdf 29 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-military/u-s-touts-new-evidence-of-iranian-weaponry-in-yemen- afghanistan-idUSKCN1NY1XL 30 https://www.thenation.com/article/war-crimes-united-states-saudi-arabia-yemen/

Impact on Yemeni Population As for the humanitarian crisis that continues to persist, recent years have witnessed the deteriorating circumstances and quality of life of Yemeni citizens. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimated that up to 80 percent of the population (24 million people) require some form of humanitarian protection or assistance.31 Up to 14.3 million of these people are in acute need, meaning they are in severe and immediate danger. This number continues to increase at a staggering rate, jumping 27 percent from 2018 to 2019. Furthermore, due to the combination of the Saudi-led blockade and constant domestic turmoil for the past decade, Yemen has been the poorest country in the Middle East and North , ranked 178 out of 189 countries on the 2017 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index.32

Yemeni Blockade Yemen faces issues of mass starvation, disease, and a migrant crisis as a result of the blockade. Since the blockade affected sea, land, and air routes, the most pressing impact has been a shortage of food imports, which Yemen heavily relies upon. Due to the blockade, the UN reports that 20 million of 29 million Yemenis are food insecure, and half suffer from extreme levels of hunger, including 2 million children who require immediate treatment for acute malnutrition.33 The coalition blockade has also caused water shortages, which have destroyed the already scarce agricultural sector that exists. Additionally, only about half of Yemeni households have access to safe drinking water, with the number shrinking to 35 percent in rural areas.34 As of July 8th, 2019, the UNOCHA reported 460 000 suspected cases of (200 000 of which were children). The same year, there were nine times as many cholera deaths in comparison to 2018. The United Nations Children’s Fund estimates that every 10 minutes in Yemen, a child dies of a preventable disease, adding up to 50 000 a year.35

Refugee Crisis As a result of the crisis, approximately 3.3 million people have been forced to flee the country, creating a large-scale refugee crisis.36 According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), “millions of internally displaced Yemenis live in makeshift shelters in urban and rural areas; hundreds of thousands of displaced individuals are living in Hajjah; refugees that

31 https://disasterphilanthropy.org/disaster/yemen-humanitarian-crisis/ 32 http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI 33https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-19/how-saudis-turned-yemen-war-into-humanitarian-crisis- quicktake 34 https://disasterphilanthropy.org/disaster/yemen-humanitarian-crisis/ 35 http://news.trust.org/item/20180710132547-6a2x1 36 https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/yemen/

have fled Yemen have gone to Oman, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan”.37 The conflict continues to destroy the country’s infrastructure; schools, roads, bridges, hospitals, and homes are regularly attacked by air raids, a result of frequent arms sales and violence brought about by the Saudi-led coalition. The Houthis are also complicit in committing war crimes; a UN panel has determined that Houthi authorities have recruited child soldiers, bomb civilian areas indiscriminately, and wage siege warfare.38

Ultimately, Yemen’s future is bleak in the coming years. Political stalemate within the nation’s domestic politics prevent the government in Yemen from progressing to more innovative solutions. Religious tensions between the Shia Houthis and the Saudi-backed, Sunni Yemeni government only cement the situation into its current state. International involvement has only been conducted with malicious intent, and as tensions continue to rise in the cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, proxy conflicts throughout the region are growing more plentiful and violent. In order to strive for a future in Yemen, the international community must first address the illegitimate use of power and irresponsible actions of international superpowers in the nation to reduce violence before moving towards more long-term financial and political reparations to the state.

UN Involvement

The United Nations has directed substantial amounts of attention and resources to the situation in Yemen since the start of the civil war. Much of this action has been focused on mitigating the outcomes of the conflict, with the UNOCHA and UNDP conducting research and allocating resources, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) contributing financial resources to the deteriorating social fabric of the state, UNHCR managing the refugee crisis, and the World Food Programme working to combat mass starvation. While this work has been admirable, the roots of the conflict in Yemen have yet to be addressed. Most United Nations organs lack the appropriate jurisdiction to make real changes surrounding the root of the issue, with the exception of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Court of Justice.

The UNSC has taken several actions in the past five years to mitigate the conflict in Yemen, but has largely failed to make substantial or lasting change. In early 2015, the UNSC began discussions on the outbreak of in-fighting between the Houthis and the Yemeni government,

37 Ibid. 38 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/world/middleeast/war-crimes-yemen.html

releasing a press statement that condemned the attack on the presidential palace and endorsed President Hadi as Yemen’s legitimate authority.39 On February 15th, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2201, which identified the Houthis as an insurgency group in Yemen that threatened the stability of the region. A week later, it adopted Resolution 2204, which further weakened Houthi forces and once again reinforcing the legitimacy of President Hadi. By August 2015, it had become clear to the international community that the blockade on Yemen by the Saudi-led coalition had become detrimental for the citizens, according to a briefing by Stephen O’Brien, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief.40

Since March 2015, both the Saudi Arabia-led coalition and the Houthis have systematically hindered humanitarian aid from reaching the civilian population. This, in addition to the rise of Saudi-led air strikes and frequent bombings in Yemen, has redirected United Nations focus to the external actors that plague the nation. While the UNSC still struggles with the internal policies of its P5 countries and fails to bring peace to Yemen, other UN organs have increased financial and human resources in the nation. Furthermore, multiple international non- governmental organizations such as Doctors Without Borders and the International Commission of Jurists have participated in mitigating the devastation in Yemen.

The International Court of Justice stands in a unique position. While it does not have jurisdiction to try war crimes in the manner that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has, the ICJ is capable of facilitating much needed negotiation between nations that are directly complicit in the situation in Yemen, and advising them of the correct way to proceed in regards to international law. As the advisory board, it will be critical for all relevant nations to be invited to the trial, a privilege that is unique to the ICJ as it does not exclude any states the way that other UN organs and specialized agencies could.

Possible Advisements

In the ICJ at CAHSMUN, the advisory statement produced by the end of the Topic A will strongly resemble a traditional resolution paper in structure as it will have preambulatory and operative clauses. However, the content of the clauses will have a basis in international law as the purpose of the committee is not to directly intervene in the issue; rather, it is to advise States to act in accordance with what is legal, just, and legitimate. The following solutions are

39 https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/yemen.php 40 Ibid.

principles of IHL which will serve as an outline for the statement you will construct. Although the issue is not currently considered an international conflict, there has been debate within the international community since 2018 on whether it should be re-classified as international. While the following principles fall under IHL, they are applicable to large scale, non- international conflicts as well. Consider these principles from the perspective of both contending states as it will improve your commentary as an objective Member of the Court. The judgements of the Court will set an outline for other branches of the United Nations on how to proceed.

Rule of Proportionality The rule of proportionality in international humanitarian law requires the methods and means used to the conflict to be proportionate to the military gain anticipated from the operation. This principle prohibits the conduct of attacks “which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”.41 The rule of proportionality is a particularly important specificity to the Yemen crisis as much of the damage has been claimed to be “unintentional.” It is also important to note that proportionality is difficult to assess given the historical religious disagreements and varying degrees of attacks. What is perceived to be a proportional response from one side may not be considered legitimate by the other.

Principle of Distinction The principle of distinction dictates that “the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives”.42 In non-international armed conflicts, the position of “combatants” pursuant to this principle is typically assumed by civilians taking direct part in hostilities, who in this case, would be the Houthis. Civilians participating in hostilities lose their protection from direct attacks, yet only for the duration of such participation. In addition to such direct attacks, indiscriminate attacks are also prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are those which strike military objectives and civilian objects without distinction. IHL also forbids using starvation as a method of warfare, and removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as crops and water supplies. This principle is relevant specifically to the Saudi-led coalition blockade.

41https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Yemen-War-impact-on-populations-Advocacy-Analysis-Brief- 2018-ENG.pdf 42 Ibid.

Principle of Precaution The principle of precaution prescribes that constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. An attack under execution must be cancelled if it turns out that the target is not a military objective or that collateral damage would be disproportionate. This principle attempts to preemptively limit irresponsible attacks that result in harming civilians. Hence, while IHL accepts that civilian casualties may be sustained during attacks on military targets, the parties to the conflict are required to take all feasible measures to minimize injury to and death of civilians as well as damage to civilian objects.

Bloc Positions

While Members of the Court are objective and unassociated with the policies of their respective nationalities, it is important to consider the main blocs in the conflict to better understand the contending perspectives in relation to this issue.

Saudi-led Coalition The Saudi-led coalition has several incentives to continue its blockade against Yemen. While it is true that these incentives may be rooted in the centuries old conflict between Sunni and , in which Saudi Arabia is the leader of the Sunni alliance and Iran is the leader of the Shia alliance, the incentives specifically in relation to Yemen are important to understanding the conflict. Yemen, located just South of Saudi Arabia, is in a critical port position on the end of the . While the Saudi coalition backs the Sunni government in Yemen and claim their attacks to be targeted towards combating the Houthi rebels, their true motives may be to expand their control.

Houthi-Iran Alliance In direct opposition to the Saudi coalition, Iran wishes to expand the Shia alliance it controls within the region. This is an extension of the cold war sentiment that exists between the two Middle Eastern powers, and has been particularly destructive to Yemeni civilians who are neither pro-Houthi nor pro-Saudi. This is important as it leaves the majority of the Yemeni population in between two powers, both of which have exploited their safety and livelihoods.

The Permanent 5 The P5 are divided among the issue as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States continue to conduct massive amounts of arms trade with Saudi Arabia while condemning the actions of the coalition. On the other end, China and Russia’s historical practice of supporting

Iran in order to offset Western influence fuels and prolongs the conflict. This has been detrimental to the effectiveness of the UNSC in solving the Yemeni crisis as members of the P5 have repeatedly disagreed on how to proceed.

Works Cited

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Know about It.” Public Radio International, www.pri.org/stories/2017-11-12/cold-

war-between-iran-and-saudi-arabia-heating-here-are-5-things-you-should-know.

Cumming-bruce, Nick. “War Crimes Committed by Both Sides in Yemen, U.N. Panel Says.”

The

New York Times, , 3 Sept. 2019,

www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/world/middleeast/war-crimes-yemen.html.

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