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Houthi and Insurgent Threats to Maritime Operations

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Houthi and Insurgent Threats to Maritime Operations Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2018-12 INSURGENCY IN YEMEN: HOUTHI AND INSURGENT THREATS TO MARITIME OPERATIONS Awad, Bilal O. Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/61208 Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS INSURGENCY IN YEMEN: HOUTHI AND INSURGENT THREATS TO MARITIME OPERATIONS by Bilal O. Awad December 2018 Thesis Advisor: Afshon P. Ostovar Co-Advisor: Michael W. Jones Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form Approved OMB REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2018 Master's thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS INSURGENCY IN YEMEN: HOUTHI AND INSURGENT THREATS TO MARITIME OPERATIONS 6. AUTHOR(S) Bilal O. Awad 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The world depends on the Suez Canal for ocean trade, and the United States maintains a presence in the Red Sea region to ensure open waters around the Cape of Hope. During Yemen's ongoing civil war, the Houthi movement has targeted the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, including U.S. Navy ships. This thesis explores whether the threat to the U.S. Navy and partners has increased and whether, as a result, CENTCOM's strategy needs to change to protect U.S. interests. The thesis examines U.S. grand strategy, CENTCOM strategy, the rise of the Houthi movement and its support from Iran, and the attacks on U.S. and partner ships. As the humanitarian crisis in Yemen worsens, this thesis finds that the maritime threat has also increased, creating a threat to both U.S. interests and global trade. U.S. leadership must consider a revised response. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF Yemen, maritime insurgency, terrorism, Saudi Arabia, coalition forces, Iran, Iran-proxy, PAGES Saudi-proxy war 93 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. INSURGENCY IN YEMEN: HOUTHI AND INSURGENT THREATS TO MARITIME OPERATIONS Bilal O. Awad Lieutenant, United States Navy BBA, American Intercontinental University, 2011 MBA, American Intercontinental University, 2012 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2018 Approved by: Afshon P. Ostovar Advisor Michael W. Jones Co-Advisor Afshon P. Ostovar Associate Chair for Research Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT The world depends on the Suez Canal for ocean trade, and the United States maintains a presence in the Red Sea region to ensure open waters around the Cape of Hope. During Yemen's ongoing civil war, the Houthi movement has targeted the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, including U.S. Navy ships. This thesis explores whether the threat to the U.S. Navy and partners has increased and whether, as a result, CENTCOM's strategy needs to change to protect U.S. interests. The thesis examines U.S. grand strategy, CENTCOM strategy, the rise of the Houthi movement and its support from Iran, and the attacks on U.S. and partner ships. As the humanitarian crisis in Yemen worsens, this thesis finds that the maritime threat has also increased, creating a threat to both U.S. interests and global trade. U.S. leadership must consider a revised response. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................1 B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................2 C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................4 D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .......................9 E. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................10 F. CHAPTER DESIGN ................................................................................11 II. INSURGENCY IN YEMEN ...............................................................................13 A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................13 B. YEMEN’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT POST-ARAB SPRING ....................................................................................................13 C. TIES TO IRAN ........................................................................................20 D. TIES TO HEZBOLLAH .........................................................................25 E. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................26 III. MARITIME INSURGENCY ..............................................................................27 A. THE HOUTHIS’ MARITIME INSURGENCY OBJECTIVE ...........27 B. STRATEGY FOR INSURGENCY ........................................................29 C. MISSILE THREATS ...............................................................................35 D. CONSEQUENCES OF THE HOUTHI THREAT IN THE RED SEA ............................................................................................................46 E. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................48 IV. THE U.S. RESPONSE .........................................................................................49 A. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND RESPONSE...........................................49 B. CENTCOM COUNTER-IRAN STRATEGY .......................................54 C. ANALYSIS: CENTCOM’S STRATEGY .............................................58 D. BALANCE VERSUS DOMINANCE .....................................................62 E. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................64 V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................65 A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................65 B. HYPOTHESES ........................................................................................65 C. FINDINGS ................................................................................................65 D. RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................67 E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH .....................................68 vii F. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................69 LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................71 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................79 viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Map of Yemen. ..........................................................................................18 Figure 2. Houthi Military Chain of Command January 2018. ..................................20 Figure 3. Similar Sea Mines Discovered near Thwaq Island. ...................................23 Figure 4. Image of Sea Mine from Iranian Arms Fair...............................................24 Figure 5. UN Threat Map Red Sea Region. ..............................................................29 Figure 6. The Unmanned Boat Bomb Detailed during a 12 December 2017 U.S. Presentation on Iranian Assistance to Ansar Allah. ...........................31 Figure 7. Rebels Unveiled Their Burkan-1 Ballistic Missile on 2 September 2016............................................................................................................36 Figure 8. 610MM Zelzal 2. .......................................................................................37 Figure 9. Zelzal 2.......................................................................................................37
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