CENTRALIZED LEADERSHIP – HETEROGENEOUS PARTY BASE Changes in the Membership Structure of the Chinese Communist Party

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CENTRALIZED LEADERSHIP – HETEROGENEOUS PARTY BASE Changes in the Membership Structure of the Chinese Communist Party MERICS CHINA MONITOR August 16, 2017 CENTRALIZED LEADERSHIP – HETEROGENEOUS PARTY BASE Changes in the membership structure of the Chinese Communist Party by Lea Shih, in collaboration with Kerstin Lohse-Friedrich Key findings and conclusions: The number of members of the Chinese Communist Since 2013, party leadership under Xi Jinping has signif- While party leaders vehemently claim organizational Party (CCP) has doubled in the past 30 years to nearly icantly curbed the influx of new members in an effort to unity and political solidarity, the party base is becom- 90 million. Membership rose by 26 percent from 2005 to reinforce the CCP‘s function as an elite, disciplined leader- ing increasingly diverse in terms of its social structure, 2016 alone. ship organization in politics, society and the economy. political interests and ideological preferences. As of yet, party leadership has covered up this gap through the con- At the same time, the membership structure has The CCP also built up 1.8 million grassroots organiza- sistent enforcement of their decision-making authority and changed significantly. The growing heterogeneity and tions in the private sector and in foreign companies in preventing the participation of the party members in the social spread of party membership reflects the increasing less than a decade. The penetration of the “new social intra-party decision-making process. individualization of the Chinese society in terms of life- strata“ – private entrepreneurs, self-employed in the ser- style, education and wealth. vice sector, employed professionals – is progressing slowly, however. | 1 Centralized leadership – heterogeneous party base Changes in membership of the Chinese Communist Party Figure 1: Number of CCP members increases rapidly Figure 3: The party is aging Declining growth rates from 2013 Share of dierent age groups in the CCP (2005, 2010, 2016) CCP members increase in members compared CCP members as a proportion younger than 35 years (%) (m.) to the previous year (%) of the total population (%) 23.0 23.0 25.7 24.3 26.9 25.4 between 35 to 60 years (%) ‘05 ‘10 ‘16 89.5 86.7 88.8 54.0 50.0 47.7 80 82.6 4 % older than 60 years (%) 78.0 m. 74.2 70.8 +3.1 70 +2.9 +2.9 +2.7 3 60 +2.4 +2.4 Overall growth +2.2 compared to 2005: 50 Figure 4: The CCP is becoming more elitist +1.7 +1.8 2 26.3 % 40 Share of dierent professional groups +1.3 30 +1.1 workers and farmers (%) members with academic degrees (%) 20 +0.8 1 10 50 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.5 % 0 0 45.9 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 43.7 44.3 42.8 43.0 41.5 41.6 40.8 39.7 40.0 39.1 38.6 40 Figure 2: Recruitment of new members slowed down after 2013 38.6 Applications for membership and admittance of new members (2005-2016) 38.3 38.1 37.9 37.1 37.5 36.9 applications for membership (m.) registered new members (m.) 35.7 34.0 ‘05 2.5 17.7 30 32.4 30.7 ‘07 2.8 19.5 29.0 workers and farmers (%) ‘09 3.0 20.2 ‘11 3.1 21.6 skilled workers, 22.7 23.7 25.2 ‘12 3.2 21.9 technicians (%) 20 ‘09 39.7 ‘12 38.3 ‘16 36.9 ‘13 2.4 21.7 cadres in party 8.5 8.4 8.5 ‘14 2.1 21.9 and state organs (%) 18.6 10.5 18.3 11.3 18.9 10.4 ‘15 2.0 22.3 pensioners (%) ‘16 1.9 20.3 others (%) 10 0 5 10 15 20 m. ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 Source: Figure 1: Central Organization Department of the CCP and National Bureau of Statistics of China; Figure 2,3,4: Central Organization Department of the CCP MERICS © MERICS | Mercator Institute for China Studies CHINA MONITOR | August 16, 2017 | 2 rejuvenation of the party organization have become Xi’s main 1. Introduction Figure 5: Recruitment from dierent concerns. He initiated various measures to reinforce the par- backgrounds speeds up change in In the upcoming fall, the 19th Party Congress will face criti- ty‘s role as an elitist and disciplined organization with a lead- membership structure cal decisions about who will move up into the top leadership ing position in politics, society and the economy. He also want- New members according to profession circle of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) alongside Gen- ed to regain the trust of the broad population. Directly after (in thousands) eral Secretary Xi Jinping. Analyses of leading personnel and Xi took office, the party drastically limited the influx of new power constellations in the party are undoubtedly important. members. Xi attempted to correct undesirable development "new social strata" However, to properly assess the prospective political devel- by tightening control mechanismsparty members had to reg- cadres in party and state organs opment of China, we should also look at the CCP membership ister again and undergo training in Marxist doctrine. Political employees, skilled workers and technicians structure, which has changed considerably in the past decade. and ideological controls in higher education were intensified. workers and farmers The number of CCP members increased strongly, the social Leading cadres of the party were subjected to harsh discipli- composition of the party base changed, and the party contin- nary measures. students ues to strengthen its presence in private businesses and the civil society. 15 Under these conditions, how effective are calls from the 129 party leadership for organizational unity and solidarity among 585 the party members? Can Xi Jinping reliably mobilize the par- 10 ty base for his political agenda? In an effort to answer these 14 200 questions, this MERICS China Monitor looks at how the mem- 113 bership structure of the CCP has evolved over the years. 570 467 Membership structure began to change even before Xi 803 14 Jinping became the General Secretary of the CCP in 2012. 108 The party leadership desired this change: in times of pro- 414 found societal shifts it wanted to include a wider range of 601 interests in the party base. The recruitment of new mem- 718 bers from different social strata was also aimed at increasing the acceptance of the party within society. However, not all 1,185 474 changes to party membership met the expectations of the party‘s leaders. From their point of view, the rapid quantitative 946 growth has brought about a deterioration of quality and disci- 736 689 pline of the party members. Many new members joined mainly for career reasons, attended party meetings irregularly, and were indifferent to political and ideological guidelines of the leadership. Some even exploited administrative and economic networks to their own advantage. When Xi Jinping took office in 2012, the party was 0 0 1 16 shaken by a series of scandals and intrigues. Therefore, the Source: Central Organization Department of the CCP MERICS strengthening of the discipline among party members and the © MERICS | Mercator Institute for China Studies CHINA MONITOR | August 16, 2017 | 3 2. Structural transformation of 2.1 DOUBLING OF TOTAL MEMBERSHIP WITHIN 2.2 THE CCP IS BECOMING MORE ELITIST THREE DECADES the CCP membership Traditionally, the CCP was a union of workers and farmers, From 1985 to 2016, CCP membership has doubled to nearly much like any communist party. The massive growth in mem- How has the membership of the CCP developed in the past 90 million, which corresponds to 6.5 percent of the population bers has changed the structure of the party. decades? The statistics published annually by the Central (see Fig. 1). The number of members rose by 26 percent from The share of the traditional core clientele has dropped Organization Department of the CCP reveals some significant 2005 to 2016 alone. In terms of membership, the CCP is by steadily – from 43.2 to 37 percent between 2005 and 2016 shifts. far the largest communist party of all time. Currently, it is the alone. At the same time, the proportion of party members with second-largest party in the world, after the Bharatiya Janata a university degree rose from 16.9 to 45.9 percent. Compared Party in India (which claims to have more than 100 million to the year 2000 (21.1 percent), the proportion of universi- members). An average of 20 million people per year apply for ty graduates doubled by 2016. In 2012, it exceeded that of membership to the CCP. Only about one candidate in eleven is blue-collar workers and farmers (40 vs. 38.3 percent) for the accepted. first time. It should be noted however, that in the population INFOBOX: THE PATH TO CCP MEMBERSHIP 1 The five-step procedure in detail: Meanwhile, the responsible party cell verifies the can- didate‘s information in the curriculum vitae as well as There are many reasons and incentives to become a 1) Written application: First, the candidates place a request their political commitment and beliefs. To do this, the member of the Chinese Communist Party. Political and with the local party cell. In their application, they have to ex- party interviews at least eight colleagues, neighbors and ideological belief in objectives, statutes and the lead- plain their interest and motivation in joining the CCP. Within acquaintances of the candidate. ership of the CCP are essential for many.
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