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China and ASEM: Objectives, Perceptions, Roles and Expectation Dr. Jin Ling THE ASIA-EUROPE MEETING 2020 (ASEM) Reading time: 17 minutes* China and ASEM: Objectives, Perceptions, Roles and Expectations Dr. Jin Ling1 1 Dr. Jin Ling, Senior Research Fellow, got her Ph.D. from CASS in 2007 in European Politics and joined China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) afterward. She now is the deputy director of the department of European Studies and the BRI research center in CIIS. Her major expertise is the EU integration and China EU relations. Recent years she published a lot on European issues and China-EU relations. From 2008-2010, she was the chair of a research project on China-EU-Africa relations, financed by the National Social Science Fund. Since the launch of Belt and Road Initiative, she has also done some researches on BRI. Her publication of the “comparative study between BRI and Marshall Plan has drawn wide interests among scholars.” 54 China and ASEM: Objectives, Perceptions, Roles and Expectation Dr. Jin Ling THE ASIA-EUROPE MEETING 2020 (ASEM) Introduction build new type of partnerships in international relations, leading to an equal and fair interna- China, as the biggest member of ASEM, has tional order in peaceful and cooperative way; played an important role in promoting Asia to promote ASEM as a platform for pragmat- and Europe cooperation. Its objectives to- ic cooperation for common development; to wards ASEM are in line with its foreign policy make ASEM a bridge for dialogue and commu- peace and development goals. In the more nication, enhancing mutual understanding. than over 20 years of ASEM process, China has served the role of an active contributor, To be the Model of New Partnership, leading initiator and strong promoter of prac- Promoting Equal and Fair tical cooperation. Generally, Chinese elite and International Order public hold a rather positive perception of ASEM while thinking it has its own deficiencies To promote a more equal and fairer interna- which need to be overcome to make it more tional order has always been China’s foreign efficient, healthy and sustainable. As regards policy goal. From Chinese perspective, the to the future of ASEM, China would like to see new order has some basic elements such as ASEM could be a platform for Asia and Europe equal and mutual respect, consensus build- to join hands in defending multilateralism, ing, and non-intervention and win-win coop- deepening pragmatic cooperation and more eration. From the very early beginning, China institutionalized, thus playing a role of stabili- has helped to set above elements as the basis ty anchor in the uncertain world. for ASEM with the hope the principles could set an example for the new type of coopera- Chinese Objectives Towards tion partnership between different countries ASEM with different levels of development, histories and political systems, and finally contributing Generally speaking, Chinese objectives to- to a fairer new international order. By now, wards ASEM are in line with what have been the international context has transformed stated in the “Presidency Statement” adopt- a lot, but Chinese government still strongly ed at the first ASEM Summit in 1996 that is advocate the new type of partnership based to maintain and promote peace and stability, on the principles above, which could be easily create favorable conditions for economic and traced from Chinese foreign policy positions. social development, and jointly conceive the future.2 Chinese government has never clearly Seeking the convergence of common inter- stated its objectives as regards to ASEM and ests to make ASEM become a model for in- its specific targets vary according to different ter-continental equality and cooperation, international, domestic situations and policy and an important force in promoting the es- priorities at different times. However, accord- tablishment of a fairer and more equal new ing to Chinese leaders’ speeches, different international order has been a long-term stra- policy proposals and initiatives, the objectives tegic goal from Chinese side. At the first sum- could be summarized into three aspects: to mit meeting, Chinese the then Prime Minister directly expressed Chinese hopes by saying : 2 ASEM, “Presidential Statement of the First Asia-Europe “Strengthening direct contacts between politi- Meeting”, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/ gjhdqzz_681964/lhg_682206/zywj_682242/t1270524.shtml cians on both continents of Asia and Europe 55 China and ASEM: Objectives, Perceptions, Roles and Expectation Dr. Jin Ling THE ASIA-EUROPE MEETING 2020 (ASEM) will help promote the establishment of a new China that “development is the key to China’s international political and economic order solutions to all problems”.6 With the advent of that is peaceful, stable, just and reasonable.”3 ASEM, Chinese attach important importance Since then, it has been repeatedly stressed by to it in promoting Chinese own development Chinese government during different levels to serve its core task with the hope to further as regards to ASEM meeting.4 Recent years, explore Asia market and strengthen econom- with the multilateral international order be- ic cooperation with European countries. Be- ing challenged, China put hopes on ASEM to sides that, China emphasize the development play a role in defending it. Under the global dimension of ASEM is also highly related to context full of uncertainties, Chinese govern- its own concept of security. China holds the ment strongly believes it is high time Asia and mindset its own development is highly de- Europe play the role of stability anchor. Dur- pend on a stable and secure neighborhood ing the summit meeting held last year, Chi- which could only be realized with win-win co- nese Primer Li Keqiang openly stated: “In the operation towards common development. common challenges facing the international community, we should strive to seek multilat- The above goal of China towards ASEM is eral solutions and abide by the international reflected from Chinese ASEM positions and agreements that have been reached. As ad- different initiatives. In setting the ASEM prin- vocates and beneficiaries of multilateralism, ciple, mutual benefit and common develop- Asian and European countries should also ment have been listed and clearly stated the become defenders and leaders of multilater- ASEM should focus on the economic coop- alism.”5 eration. Then after that, China plays a very active role to put forward proposals with the To be a Platform for Common common development purpose. Recent years, Development with its own Belt and Road initiative, Chinese government strongly support the pragmatic As a developing country, seeking common cooperation through connectivity. development is another important foreign policy goal of China. Since 1978’s reform and To be a Bridge for Mutual opening up policy, Chinese focus has been Understanding shifted to the economic development which has been written in all important government As the biggest country with different political policy papers. It has been a commonsense in system in ASEM, China fully understands the strategic mistrust and suspicion it faces, which explains China is hesitant to play leading role 3 “Premier Li Peng’s speech at the first Asia-Europe Meeting”, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/ in ASEM. In order to dissimilate misunder- gjhdqzz_681964/lhg_682206/zyjh_682240/t1281126.shtml standing, China advocates the importance of 4 Ma Chaoxu, “Asia-Europe summit will consolidate Asia- Europe economic partnership”, http://yuqing.people. ASEM as a bridge to serve mutual exchange com.cn/n/2012/1107/c349680-19521569.html”, Wang Yi, and dialogue, which could not only contrib- “Strengthening new partnerships to create a better future for Asia and Europe ” ute to the new type of partnerships between 5 Li Keqiang, “Li Keqiang’s speech at the 12th Asia-Europe Meeting” http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-10/20/ content_5332925.htm 6 “17th CPC Plenary Session report” , 1997 http://language. chinadaily.com.cn/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-10/16/ content_32684830.htm 56 China and ASEM: Objectives, Perceptions, Roles and Expectation Dr. Jin Ling THE ASIA-EUROPE MEETING 2020 (ASEM) Asian and European countries but also help ever from the existed reports, analysis and of- the trust building between china and its neigh- ficial documents, it could be easily found that bors. And if look at Chinese proposals at ASEM Chinese perception of ASEM is highly positive. meeting, strengthening political dialogue and The cooperation is considered as a natural enhancing mutual trust has been persistently strategic choice between Europe and Asia as a on the agenda. result of globalization and the trend of global multi-polarity, which has contributed a lot to Through analyzing Chinese prime ministers’ the Asia-Europe cooperation with huge poten- speeches during different ASEM summit tial for further cooperation. Of course, there meeting, it could be found China keep stat- are also some debates focus on its inherent ing Chinese peace and development policy deficiencies such as the ineffectiveness, im- including sharing Chinese development expe- balanced power structure and development riences with partner countries and classifying among its three pillars. domestic reform measures and foreign policy positions. For example, as a response to the ASEM is a Natural Result of partners concerns to Chinese future steps Globalization and Multi-polarization towards further opening up and reform, Pre- mier Li Keqiang gave a very detailed response ASEM, launched in 1996, is widely considered as regards to China’s macroeconomic policy as a natural result of the globalization and the and specific measures for opening up etc. trend of multi-polarization, which is repeated- ly expressed by official speeches and Chinese ASEM’s role in promoting mutual under- academians. It covers the following three im- standing was concluded as: “The Meeting has portant points: become an important stage for China to carry out summit diplomacy and bilateral or multi- Firstly, The ASEM process was initiated and lateral dialogue and cooperation with many developed against the background of eco- countries.
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