UZBEKISTAN AT TEN: REPRESSION AND INSTABILITY 21 August 2001 ICG Asia Report No 21 Osh/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS MAP OF UZBEKISTAN ..............................................................................................................................................................i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................................................................ii I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................................1 II. UZBEKISTAN’S FRACTURED POLITICAL LANDSCAPE.....................................................................................3 A. SECULAR DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION ........................................................................................................4 B. OFFICIAL PARTIES .....................................................................................................................................8 C. ISLAMIC OPPOSITION...............................................................................................................................12 III. REGIONAL, CLAN AND ETHNIC RIVALRIES.......................................................................................................16 IV. A RISING TIDE OF SOCIAL DISCONTENT ............................................................................................................21 V. EXTERNAL FORCES....................................................................................................................................................26 VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................................27 A. GOVERNMENT OF UZBEKISTAN ..............................................................................................................27 B. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ........................................................................................................28 APPENDICES A. GENERAL INFORMATION ON UZBEKISTAN..............................................................................................30 B. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................................33 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ..........................................................................................34 D. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS ....................................................................................................35 E. ICG BOARD MEMBERS ...........................................................................................................................39 sh 55° 60° 65° 70° a d q l l a KAZAKHSTAN B K 45° n 45° Ostrova UZBEKISTAN Vozrozhdeniya Qyzylorda ARAL a Komsomol'sk SEA KAZAKHSTAN Zhaslyk l oq un S y USTYURT M r D a y r ba K y w y PLATEAU im z a Altynkul' h y Zhambyl C Takhtakupyr l Qunghirotù K KARAKALPAKSTAN o Nukus Kulkuduk u h Mynbulak m nc L Shymkent KYRGYZSTAN Knerge Uchquduq Caspian iq Beruni 7 ch Sea ir Urganch Ch Turtkul' n Zarafshon Tashkent 12 anga Khiva n Angren am 5 A Yangiyul' N m NAWOIY 6 Andijon a u Ozero Almalyk r D Aydorkul' 1 T u a Quqon 3 T r 10 y 2 Nurata a Bekabad U Dargan Ata BUKHARA Farish Guliston 40° ( Farghona 40° R O Nawoiy 9 Jizzakh x Gazli Gizhduvan u K s Kattakurgan ) 4 M Bukhoro (Bukhara) Samarqand UZBEKISTAN E Kagan N Mubarek International boundary I Chrjew Kasan Kitab S 8 TAJIKISTAN Autonomous republic and wiloyat boundary T Qarshi Dushanbe National capital A Guzar Denau Centre of autonomous republic or wiloyat N Talimardzhan Town 11 Main road Amu Dar'ya Mary Secondary road Termez Railroad Airport Wiloyat of Uzbekistan 1 Andijon 7 Nawoiy N AFGHANISTAN TA 0 50 100 150 200 250 km 2 Bukhara 8 Qashqadaryo IS ISLAMIC K 3 Farghona 9 Samarqand A REPUBLIC OF P 0 50 100 150 mi IRAN 4 Jizzakh 10 Sirdaryo 5 Khorazm 11 Surkhondaryo Jammu The boundaries and names shown and the presentation used on this map 6 Namangan 12 Tashkent and 55° do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 65 ° 70° Kashmir Map No. 3777 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS Department of Public Information August 1998 Cartographic Section ICG Asia Report No 21 21 August 2001 UZBEKISTAN AT TEN: REPRESSION AND INSTABILITY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Uzbekistan plays a pivotal role in Central Asia. It organisations and increasingly repressed opposition is the region’s most militarily capable and groups, most international financial assistance populous country, and large Uzbek minorities (including security aid) has continued to flow. live in neighbouring states. As it approaches the Ironically, in looking past the Uzbekistan tenth anniversary of its independence, however, government’s frequent abuses out of concerns internal and external pressures threaten to crack regarding Islamist radicalism in the region, the the nation’s thin veneer of stability. While the international community has inadvertently helped government has been quick to blame outside create exactly the conditions that it has always forces for its woes and indeed to exaggerate the feared the most. Growing political repression and impact of these forces, it is clear that the most poverty now provide a fertile breeding ground for important factor driving the mounting instability violence, instability and increasingly active Islamist is Uzbekistan’s failure to embrace real political extremist groups. The authoritarian approach has at or economic reform. best postponed, but not defused, a looming economic and political crisis. Evidence continues to mount that Uzbekistan’s “unique state-construction model” is falling apart. It requires relatively enormous financial, human and The last two years have witnessed bombings in other resources for the government of Uzbekistan to the capital, Tashkent (February 1999) and armed maintain authoritarian rule and keep control over incursions by the Islamic Movement of competing internal factions based on regionalism, Uzbekistan (IMU) into Uzbekistan and ethnicity, and patronage networks. The Kyrgyzstan (summer 1999 and 2000). However, establishment of near absolute power by the the growing potential for civil unrest is driven by executive branch has only been achieved though a the twin prongs of severe political repression and brutal crackdown on moderate voices and through economic despair, as protests this year in power-sharing arrangements with leftover Soviet-era Tashkent, Andijan and Jizzakh over crop seizures bureaucrats in the “power” ministries. Tashkent’s and the detention of political prisoners make authoritarian domestic approach has sparked a clear. political crisis marked by mismanagement, the emergence of a strong Islamist opposition, broad During the early stages of independence, many economic dislocation, endemic corruption, growing observers attributed Uzbekistan’s relative socio- dissatisfaction with the government, poor relations economic and political stability to President with neighbours and continuing regional turmoil. Islam Karimov’s authoritarian policies. Despite the country’s often abysmal human rights record, A consolidation of anti-government forces is likely and over the protests of human rights over time and raises concerns about the succession Central Asia: Uzbekistan at 10 –Repression and Instability ICG Asia Report N° 21 ,21 August 2001 Page iii of power in Uzbekistan whenever Karimov’s rule 5. The separation and equality of the executive, ends. With no meaningful civil society and judiciary and legislative branches declared by alternative political figures and groups operating the Constitution should be upheld. underground in a highly secretive fashion, the potential for a bloody civil conflict in the struggle 6. The government should combat unlawful to replace the current leadership is real. If practices by security agencies, such as the Uzbekistan implodes in violence, the harassment of journalists and human rights reverberations will be felt across all of Central activists. Asia, and pose security implications for Europe, China, Russia, the Middle East and the United 7. The government should cease antagonising States. The only way to defuse this unfolding ethnic minorities, ending for example, crisis is to strengthen democracy and liberalise deportation of ethnic Tajiks from the Uzbek- Uzbekistan’s still highly centralised economy. Tajik border area in the Surkhan-Darya Since it is obvious the Karimov government will Province that does not improve the security not make any moves toward reform without both situation and only serves to increase tensions. substantial internal and external pressure, governments friendly to Uzbekistan need to rethink their current policy approach. The TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY opportunity for avoiding conflict in the region may soon be gone. 8. The international community, in particular the United States, the European Union nations and Japan, must be more discriminating in their RECOMMENDATIONS response to the problem of Islamist extremism, recognising that unquestioning support for TO THE GOVERNMENT OF UZBEKISTAN: secular dictatorships only antagonises Central Asian Muslim communities, thus encouraging 1. The government should permit opposition extremism and an anti-Western orientation. groups, including the Birlik People’s Movement and the Erk Democratic Party, 9. Government donors to Uzbekistan should to register as political parties. make