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Security Alert: A Study of Xinjiang-Central Asia and Its Implications for China’s Counterterrorist Policy* Sophia Chia-Chu Chang** Abstract While the activity of international terrorism has increased in recent years, for China, its concern lies with the potential cross fertilization between terrorism and extremism and separatism, or the triple threat. Specifically, Beijing is extremely concerned with the independence movement in Xinjiang and its possible connection with Central Asia. Records suggest that international terrorist groups have moved into Central Asia and established regional bases that sit on opportunities to carry out random attacks. Now, Beijing has been following out several major economic development projects in this region with anxiety. This paper is a discussion of the emerging security challenges in Xinjiang and Central Asia and its implications for China’s counterterrorist policy. Key words: Central Asia, International Terrorism, Xinjiang, Regional Cooperation * This draft is prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association Asia-Pacific (ISA AP) Conference, Hong Kong, June 25-27, 2016. ** PhD Candidate, Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University Introduction Since 9/11, the world has been engulfed in a wave of random terrorist attacks. According to a report released by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in May 2000, traditional forms of terrorism are disappearing and being replaced by new forms that are sophisticated and difficult to discriminate.1 A survey of recent activities suggests that terrorist attacks have become more violent and frequent. For example, recent cases in Thailand (Phra Phrom) and France demonstrate the diversity of terrorist techniques. The development of Al Qaeda into a global terrorist network and emergence of the Islamic State are among the factors contributing to the surge in international terrorism. In turn, terrorism has become a prioritized security challenge for the international community today. The Uyghur/Xinjiang Problem In the 19th century, European geographers began using the term “Turkistan” to describe the origin or dwelling site of the Turkistan populace. With time, the geographical scope of Turkistan expanded, composing of Russian regions in Central Asia noted as “West Turkistan” and the region of Xinjiang, China noted as “East Turkistan.”2 The Taiwanese (ROC) government has never recognized “Turkistan,” a term that is considered to be a forced title given to the region. Geographically, Xinjiang is located at the center of continental Asia and makes up Eurasia’s heartland. A brief review of the past two thousand years of China’s history reveals that the Middle Kingdom was at its apex of power when Xinjiang was a part of Chinese territory during the late Han, Tang, Yuan and Qin dynasties. In contrast, periods when Xinjiang remained outside of Chinese control marked relative weak governments. When western imperialism emerged and set its eyes on Central Asia, Xinjiang instantly revealed its strategic importance.3 Xinjiang is an important strategic hub in the Silk Road that connects Eurasia and serves traditionally as China’s gateway to the West. Historically, terrorist activities are not new occurrences in Xinjiang. Uyghur extremist groups have maintained contact with their counterparts in Central Asia. Ideologically, independence activists from both Xinjiang and Central Asia claim that Xinjiang or “East Turkistan” was originally an autonomous state, and 1 林文程，〈恐怖主義的特質與反恐主義的困境〉，《立法院院聞月刊》，第 29 卷第 10 期，2001 年 1 月，頁 36。 2 李湛軍，《恐怖主義與國際治理》(北京：中國經濟出版社，2006 年)，頁 160-161。 3 劉學銚，《正視紛爭下的新疆問題》(臺北：致知學術出版社，2014 年)，頁 23。 the region must separate from China in order to maintain the autonomy of local peoples. The collapse of the Soviet Union and succeeding emergence of Central Asian states gave way to new developments on China’s western border.4 Expansion of Central Asian Nationalism In the region between China’s northwest and Central Asia lies several minority groups. As the minority groups straddle the borders between China and Central Asian states, Beijing is challenged with the realities of pan-Turkistan thoughts. “Pan-Turkistan” was an idea proposed by the Tartars in the 19th century as a counterweight against Tsarist Russia’s pan-Slavicism. When pan-Turkistan carried over to Turkey, the idea was further promoted as a concept with the aim of restoring the glory of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkistan “homeland” presumably included the regions where Turkistan speaking peoples dwelled and gathered, or the “Turan” or “Turania.” Hence, the logic implies that should pan-Turkistan become an exploited slogan, the security of Xinjiang and Central Asia will be at risk. Border Disputes and Economic Development With the fall of the Soviet Union, China suddenly found itself to share its western border with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia – an immensely more complicated situation compared with the past. In particular, the Central Asian states held a strong stance towards border issues, which made border negotiations difficult.5 Besides border issues, for China, economic development in its western regions is an additional problem that bears on policy making. Traditional development strategies that emphasized coastal areas while de-emphasizing continental areas contributed to major development gaps in minority dominant regions. As economic resources from Beijing fell short in reaching China’s western regions, the coastal-continental development gap continues to grow. Nonetheless, Xinjiang’s strategic position is indisputable. For China, the loss of Xinjiang does not only mean a territorial deficit but also hints at the potential provocation of independence movements in Tibet and Inner Mongolia. At the same time, Xinjiang plays an important role in China’s expansion strategies towards the west such as the One Belt One Road and the Western Grand Development Strategy – projects that aim to China’s international status. 4 邢廣程，《崛起的中亞》(台北：五南出版社，民國 82 年)，頁 207。 5 邢廣程，同 4 註，頁 208。 Religious Extremism While the religious atmosphere in Xinjiang has continued to change over the course of time, since the entry of foreign religions into the region, the co-existence of Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, Catholicism and Daoism has been maintained until this day. In the early sixteenth century, Islam replaced Buddhism as the dominant belief in Xinjiang.6 As Samuel Huntington pointed out, a major characteristic of future conflicts in the world lies in the clash between the West and the rest, represented by the Islamic and Confucian civilizations. While Huntington’s view is faulted by many misinterpretations, nonetheless, the conflict between the West and Islamic states after 9/11 lends some support to the claim of religious strife between the two civilizations.7 Calls for Uyghur independence are sometimes linked with support for revolution and jihad, a situation that suggests negative connotations for religious fundamentalism.8 Ethnic Minority Issues Issues concerning minorities in Xinjiang have long been the most difficult problems to tackle. While ethnic minority groups in China make up approximately one-tenth of state population, about sixty percent of the minority population is concentrated along the country’s border regions. In contrast with the Han population, relatively low population, under development and the shortage of resources all contribute to deep distrust against Beijing and the Han by minority groups.9 The lack of trust plays a role in stimulating terrorism. China’s Counterterrorist Policies As Xinjiang borders Central Asia, a region that nests various terrorist groups, the expansion of terrorist activities into China via Xinjiang in recent years has become a major security concern for Beijing. China’s land border totals 22,243 km and shares approximately 7,500 km of its border with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia.10 Confronted with the vast territory of 6 〈新疆的歷史與發展〉，新華網， http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-06/12/content_916 235.htm(2003 年 6 月 12 日)。 7 巨克毅，〈全球化下的宗教衝突與基要主義〉，《全球政治評論》， 2002 年 8 月創刊號，頁 60。 8 〈中國新疆恐怖勢力揭密〉，華夏經緯網，http://big5.huaxia.com/200373/00034661.html〈2002 年 3 月 5 日〉。 9 〈中國大陸少數民族研究資源〉， http://www.lib.nthu.edu.tw/library/hslib/subject/an/ethnic.htm 10 《聯合報》，民國 85 年 4 月 22 日，第 9 版。 Central Asia and the diverse makeup of terrorist groups, China faces an uneasy problem on hand. Besides terrorism founded on separatism and religious extremism in Central Asia and Xinjiang, combination of the two forces complicate China’s efforts towards counterterrorism (CT). In response to the challenges raised by terrorism against regional security and economic development, Beijing has expended various efforts towards CT. This section briefly discusses China’s CT policy. Support for US CT Policy as a Way to Improve China-US Relations After 9/11, Beijing capitulated on US losses by expressing its interest to jointly combat international terrorism with Washington. Through such move, China hoped the US could adjust its global strategy and shift its strategic emphasis from missile defense to CT, a move that would decrease the threat against Beijing while increasing the ground for cooperation between China and the US. On the other hand, China’s support for the US could also be interpreted as a move undertaken in the interest of access to western markets after its ascension to the WTO. Consolidation of International Cooperation Currently, China has already initiated negotiations

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