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CANADA CONSOLIDATION CODIFICATION Regulations Establishing a List Règlement établissant une liste of Entities d’entités SOR/2002-284 DORS/2002-284 Current to September 11, 2021 À jour au 11 septembre 2021 Last amended on June 25, 2021 Dernière modification le 25 juin 2021 Published by the Minister of Justice at the following address: Publié par le ministre de la Justice à l’adresse suivante : http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca http://lois-laws.justice.gc.ca OFFICIAL STATUS CARACTÈRE OFFICIEL OF CONSOLIDATIONS DES CODIFICATIONS Subsections 31(1) and (3) of the Legislation Revision and Les paragraphes 31(1) et (3) de la Loi sur la révision et la Consolidation Act, in force on June 1, 2009, provide as codification des textes législatifs, en vigueur le 1er juin follows: 2009, prévoient ce qui suit : Published consolidation is evidence Codifications comme élément de preuve 31 (1) Every copy of a consolidated statute or consolidated 31 (1) Tout exemplaire d'une loi codifiée ou d'un règlement regulation published by the Minister under this Act in either codifié, publié par le ministre en vertu de la présente loi sur print or electronic form is evidence of that statute or regula- support papier ou sur support électronique, fait foi de cette tion and of its contents and every copy purporting to be pub- loi ou de ce règlement et de son contenu. Tout exemplaire lished by the Minister is deemed to be so published, unless donné comme publié par le ministre est réputé avoir été ainsi the contrary is shown. publié, sauf preuve contraire. ... [...] Inconsistencies in regulations Incompatibilité — règlements (3) In the event of an inconsistency between a consolidated (3) Les dispositions du règlement d'origine avec ses modifica- regulation published by the Minister under this Act and the tions subséquentes enregistrées par le greffier du Conseil pri- original regulation or a subsequent amendment as registered vé en vertu de la Loi sur les textes réglementaires l'emportent by the Clerk of the Privy Council under the Statutory Instru- sur les dispositions incompatibles du règlement codifié publié ments Act, the original regulation or amendment prevails to par le ministre en vertu de la présente loi. the extent of the inconsistency. LAYOUT MISE EN PAGE The notes that appeared in the left or right margins are Les notes apparaissant auparavant dans les marges de now in boldface text directly above the provisions to droite ou de gauche se retrouvent maintenant en carac- which they relate. They form no part of the enactment, tères gras juste au-dessus de la disposition à laquelle but are inserted for convenience of reference only. elles se rattachent. Elles ne font pas partie du texte, n’y figurant qu’à titre de repère ou d’information. NOTE NOTE This consolidation is current to September 11, 2021. The Cette codification est à jour au 11 septembre 2021. Les last amendments came into force on June 25, 2021. Any dernières modifications sont entrées en vigueur amendments that were not in force as of September 11, le 25 juin 2021. Toutes modifications qui n'étaient pas en 2021 are set out at the end of this document under the vigueur au 11 septembre 2021 sont énoncées à la fin de heading “Amendments Not in Force”. ce document sous le titre « Modifications non en vigueur ». Current to September 11, 2021 À jour au 11 septembre 2021 Last amended on June 25, 2021 Dernière modification le 25 juin 2021 TABLE OF PROVISIONS TABLE ANALYTIQUE Regulations Establishing a List of Entities Règlement établissant une liste d’entités 1 List 1 Liste 2 Coming into Force 2 Entrée en vigueur Current to September 11, 2021 iii À jour au 11 septembre 2021 Last amended on June 25, 2021 Dernière modification le 25 juin 2021 Registration Enregistrement SOR/2002-284 July 23, 2002 DORS/2002-284 Le 23 juillet 2002 CRIMINAL CODE CODE CRIMINEL Regulations Establishing a List of Entities Règlement établissant une liste d’entités P.C. 2002-1304 July 23, 2002 C.P. 2002-1304 Le 23 juillet 2002 Whereas the Governor in Council, on the recommen- Attendu que la gouverneure en conseil est convain- dation of the Solicitor General of Canada, is satisfied cue, sur recommandation du solliciteur général du that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Canada, qu’il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire each of the entities on the list established by the an- que chacune des entités visées dans le projet de rè- nexed Regulations Establishing a List of Entities has glement intitulé Règlement établissant une liste d’en- knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, partici- tités, ci-après, est une entité qui, sciemment, s’est li- pated in or facilitated a terrorist activity or is know- vrée ou a tenté de se livrer à une activité terroriste, y ingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of or in as- a participé ou l’a facilitée, ou qui, sciemment, agit au sociation with an entity that has knowingly carried nom d’une telle entité, sous sa direction ou en colla- out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitat- boration avec elle, ed a terrorist activity; Therefore, Her Excellency the Governor General in À ces causes, sur recommandation du solliciteur gé- Council, on the recommendation of the Solicitor Gen- néral du Canada et en vertu du paragraphe 83.05(1)a eral of Canada, pursuant to subsection 83.05(1)a of du Code criminel, Son Excellence la Gouverneure gé- the Criminal Code, hereby makes the annexed Regu- nérale en conseil prend le Règlement établissant une lations Establishing a List of Entities. liste d’entités, ci-après. a a S.C. 2001, c. 41, s. 4 L.C. 2001, ch. 41, art. 4 Current to September 11, 2021 À jour au 11 septembre 2021 Last amended on June 25, 2021 Dernière modification le 25 juin 2021 Regulations Establishing a List of Entities Règlement établissant une liste d’entités List Liste 1 The following list is established for the purposes of 1 La liste d’entités ci-après est établie pour l’application Part II.1 of the Criminal Code. de la partie II.1 du Code criminel : Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (AGAI) (also known as Islamic Al-Jama’a al-islamiya (AJAI) (alias Groupe islamique Group (IG)) (GI) Al Qaida (also known among other names as Al Al-Qaïda (connu notamment sous les noms suivants : Jihad (AJ), Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Vanguards of Al Jihad (AJ), Jihad islamique égyptien (JIE), Avant- Conquest (VOC), Islamic Army, Islamic Salvation garde de la conquête (AGC), Islamic Army, Islamic Foundation, The Base, Group for the Preservation of Salvation Foundation, The Base, Group for the the Holy Sites, Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Preservation of the Holy Sites, Islamic Army for the Holy Places, World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Liberation of the Holy Places, World Islamic Front for Jews and Crusaders, Usama Bin Ladin Network, Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, Usama Bin Ladin Usama Bin Ladin Organization and Qa’idat al-Jihad) Network, Usama Bin Ladin Organization et Qa’idat al- Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (also known Jihad) among other names as Tanzim Qaedat bi-Bilad al- Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) [connu Maghrab al-Islami, Tanzim al-Qa´ida fi bilad al- notamment sous les noms suivants : Tanzim Qaedat Maghreb al-Islamiya, The Organization of Al-Qaida in bi-Bilad al-Maghrab al-Islami, Tanzim al-Qa´ida fi the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qa´ida Organisation in the bilad al-Maghreb al-Islamiya, The Organization of Al- Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qa´ida in the Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qa´ida Organisation Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qa´ida in the Lands of the in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qa´ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaïda dans les pays du Maghreb Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qa´ida in the Lands of the islamique, Salafist Group for Call and Combat Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaïda dans les pays du Maghreb (GSPC), Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le islamique, Salafist Group for Call and Combat combat, and Salafist Group for Preaching and (GSPC), Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le Combat) combat et Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat] Armed Islamic Group (GIA) (also known as Groupe Groupe islamique armé (GIA) islamique armé (GIA)) Harakat ul-Mudjahidin (HuM) (connu notamment Harakat ul-Mudjahidin (HuM) (also known among sous les noms suivants : Al-Faran, Al-Hadid, Al- other names as Al-Faran, Al-Hadid, Al-Hadith, Harkat- Hadith, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harakat ul- ul-Mujahideen, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Harakat al- Mujahideen, Harakat al-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harakat ul-Ansar, Harakat ul-Ansar, Harakat al-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Jehad- Harakat al-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami, Harkat e-Islami, Harkat Mujahideen, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen Mujahideen, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen al-Almi, Holy al-Almi, Mouvement des combattants de la guerre Warriors Movement, Movement of the Mujahideen, sainte, Mouvement des moudjahidin, Mouvement Movement of the Helpers, Movement of Islamic des compagnons du Prophète, Mouvement des Fighters, Al Qanoon and Jamiat ul-Ansar) combattants islamiques, Al Qanoon et Jamiat ul- Asbat Al-Ansar (AAA) (“The League of Partisans”) Ansar) (also known among other names as God’s Partisans, Asbat Al-Ansar (AAA) (« La Ligue des partisans ») Gathering of Supporters, Partisan’s League, Osbat Al (connu notamment sous les noms suivants : Ansar, Usbat Al Ansar, Esbat Al-Ansar, Isbat Al Partisans de Dieu, Rassemblement des partisans, Ansar, Usbat-ul-Ansar, Band of Helpers, Band of Osbat Al Ansar, Usbat Al Ansar, Esbat Al-Ansar, Isbat Partisans and League of the Followers) Al Ansar, Usbat-ul-Ansar, Band of Helpers,
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