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The Organization of Terrorist Groups University of Nebraska at Omaha DigitalCommons@UNO Student Work 8-1-2020 From Simple to Sophisticated: The Organization of Terrorist Groups Michael K. Logan Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork Part of the Other Law Commons Recommended Citation Logan, Michael K., "From Simple to Sophisticated: The Organization of Terrorist Groups" (2020). Student Work. 3709. https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/3709 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FROM SIMPLE TO SOPHISTCATED: THE ORGANIZATION OF TERRORIST GROUPS By Michael K. Logan A DISSERTATION Presented to the Faculty of The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Major: Criminology and Criminal Justice Under the Supervision of Dr. Gina Ligon Omaha, Nebraska August 2020 Supervisory Committee: Dr. Gina Ligon Dr. Todd Armstrong Dr. Gaylene Armstrong Dr. Douglas Derrick ii FROM SIMPLE TO SOPHISTCATED: THE ORGANIZATION OF TERRORIST GROUPS Michael K. Logan University of Nebraska, 2020 Advisor: Dr. Gina Ligon Abstract This dissertation draws on gang organization research and organizational theory to assess the underlying dimensions of organization in terrorist groups. Using the Leadership for the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) dataset, findings suggest that organization is a multidimensional construct in terrorist groups, including the structuring of activities dimension and the concentration of authority dimension. In relation to violence, terrorist groups high on the structuring of activities dimension were significantly more lethal in general and more lethal when attacking hard targets, whereas terrorist groups high on the concentration of authority dimension attacked hard targets at a significantly higher rate. These findings demonstrate that both dimensions of organization were related to an increased capacity for violence yet in different ways. In light of these findings, a theoretical model is outlined, and practical implications are discussed with a focus on how both organizational dimensions highlight the role of criminal capital and bureaucratic control mechanisms in terrorist groups. i COPYRIGHT PAGE ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First, I would like to thank my wife, Kimberly, for her support and encouragement through my academic journey. Leaving our families and moving halfway across the country was never easier for her. She took a chance on me and for that I am thankful. Second, I would like to thank my daughter, Landry, who provided the much-needed motivation, laughter, and fun as I completed my comprehensive exams and dissertation. Although there many more people to go, I cannot move forward without thanking my dog, Leroy, who has been at my side since I started my master’s program. On many occasions, taking him to the park or on car rides were the best part of my day. Third, I would thank my parents, Pat and Sandy, who instilled a strong work ethic in me and always encouraged my intellectual curiosity. To that end, I’d also like to thank my in- laws, Angus and Josett, for their support and welcoming me into their lives with open arms. Although I moved over one-thousand miles away, my friends Erik, Brandon, Thomas, Jared, Albert, and Lucas have also been supportive and provided a much-needed distraction from academia whenever we spoke. I am extremely grateful to my mentors, Drs. Gina Ligon and Doug Derrick, for their support over the past five years. Gina and Doug took a chance on me early in my doctoral studies. They truly pushed me to be more than I thought was possible. I would also like to thank my committee members, Drs. Gaylene Armstrong and Todd Armstrong, for their encouragement and advice not only on the dissertation, but also in my development as an academic. I would not have pursued my Ph.D. without guidance from Drs. Kimberly McCabe and Nicole Hendrix. The two of you were instrumental in my career path and pushed me to go further than I thought possible. I could not write an iii acknowledgement section without thanking my doctoral cohort members, Sara and Julie. We experienced many successes and failures together in five years and I can’t wait to see what the future holds for us. With that in mind, I would also like to thank my cohort members from my master’s program, Danielle and Cheryl for their friendship and support. I would not have gotten where I am today without help from Steven Windisch. Watching and trying to mimic his professionalism and work ethic was huge for my development as a researcher and scholar. I would also like to thank my network of UNO graduates including Drs. Karyn Sporer, Tim Barnum, Starr Solomon, and Jared Ellison for their advice and friendship. Finally, on a lighter note, I would like to thank Jim Rome and the rest of the clones for providing me daily humor and sports talk. I started listening to Jim Rome when I began graduate school and -- while many things came and went since then – “The Jungle” has remained. I would also like to thank the Jacksonville Jaguars, Virginia Cavaliers, and Nebraska Cornhuskers for entertaining me during my graduate career. DUVAL, WahooWa, and Go Big Red! iv TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM .......................................................................................... 2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND AGENDA ............................................................................... 4 KEY TERMS: TERRORISM AND TERRORIST GROUPS .......................................................... 6 CRIMINOLOGICAL STUDY OF TERRORISM ......................................................................... 7 Crime-terror continuum ............................................................................................... 9 Gang-terror continuum .............................................................................................. 10 LEVEL OF ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................... 11 THE TERRORIST DILEMMA AND THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATION ....................................... 15 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................ 17 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................... 19 INSTRUMENTAL-RATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ...................................................................... 20 INFORMAL-DIFFUSED PERSPECTIVE ............................................................................... 21 GANG ORGANIZATION AND CRIMINOLOGICAL OUTCOMES ............................................ 24 Structural indicators of gang organization ................................................................ 27 GANG ORGANIZATION THEMES AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS ............................ 32 Centralization ............................................................................................................ 33 Formalization ............................................................................................................. 34 Interconnectedness .................................................................................................... 35 Complexity ................................................................................................................ 36 Summary .................................................................................................................... 37 ORGANIZATION IN TERRORIST GROUPS .......................................................................... 38 ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS AND THEORETICAL MECHANISM .................................. 43 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................... 48 GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE .................................................................................... 48 LEADERSHIP FOR THE EXTREME AND DANGEROUS FOR INNOVATIVE RESULTS .............. 49 Historiometric approach ............................................................................................ 52 Data collection and source credibility ....................................................................... 54 Missing data ............................................................................................................... 55 MEASURES OF ORGANIZATION ....................................................................................... 55 VIOLENT OUTCOMES ...................................................................................................... 58 ADDITIONAL GROUP LEVEL VARIABLES ........................................................................ 61 ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES ............................................................................................. 64 Exploratory factor analysis ........................................................................................ 65 Cluster analysis .......................................................................................................... 67 Hierarchical Poisson regression ................................................................................ 69 CHAPTER 4: RESULTS .................................................................................................
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