No. 247 Strategic Forum October 2009 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss Radicalization by Choice: ISI and the Pakistani Army by Robert B. Oakley with Franz-Stefan Gady Key Points and its intelligence unit, the Inter-Services process whenever it threatened to run counter Intelligence Directorate (ISI), remain the to national interest and security as defined by most important elements in determining the army leadership.2 The Pakistani army and the Inter-Services Pakistan’s future. The army establishment is This tradition started with General Ayub Intelligence Directorate remain essential for the security and stability of Pakistan. Both organiza- the glue that holds this large multi-ethnic, Khan and the military coup he launched in tions have deliberately embraced Islamic radi- nuclear-armed Muslim country together. 1958. The ISI was instrumental in maintain- calism as a means to address the conventional Throughout Pakistan’s history, the army has ing Ayub’s military dictatorship. Subsequently, military gap between Pakistan and India. served as “kingmaker” with decisive influ- the army and civilian political leadership Although there are signs of a shift in ence on political leadership, as guarantor of took turns running the country, but Zulfikar Pakistan’s short-term strategic priorities and stability within the state, and as protector of Ali Bhutto was the only civilian to play a recognition that the challenge of homegrown the nation against external threats. truly dominant role in the 60-year history of Taliban is not just a U.S. problem, India will Pakistan’s armed forces are the eighth Pakistani politics. However, even he was over- remain the focal point of Pakistan’s long-term largest in the world.1 The ISI is in turn one thrown by Chief of Army Staff Zia al Haq in national security. Progress toward reordering of the largest military intelligence services 1977 (with the popular support of Islamist Pakistan’s strategic priorities and effecting a worldwide. Its reputation was enhanced dur- political parties). Despite their electoral victo- fundamental change in its strategic culture is ing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in ries, subsequent governments led by Benazir bound to be slow and difficult. Furthermore, it the 1980s, when it played a critical role in Bhutto and the Pakistan People’s Party cannot be forced by the United States. mobilizing and supporting the Afghan oppo- (1988–1990 and 1993–1996) and Nawaz The history of relations between Pakistan sition movement. The ISI is an integral part Sharif and the Pakistan Muslim League and the United States is complicated and am- of the armed forces of Pakistan and has been (1990–1993 and 1997–1999) were not able to biguous, largely due to Pakistani perceptions of instrumental in executing many of the coun- exert great influence on the Pakistani army. past U.S. abandonment. Any new U.S. strategy try’s foreign policy objectives. It also has a Democracy as a binding institution has not for Pakistan has to be considered against real- history of active intervention in Pakistan’s taken root despite U.S. efforts to strengthen istic expectations, which in turn have to take domestic politics. democratic institutions. due account of the longstanding, fundamental Civil-military relations have been a The ISI’s involvement with Afghan resis- nature of the factors that have shaped Pakistani major factor in Pakistan’s history since found- tance groups, including radical Islamist ele- strategic priorities and culture. ing father Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s death in ments, continued following Soviet withdrawal Events in Pakistan today resemble a fast- 1948. The army in Pakistan has had the repu- from Afghanistan in 1989.3 The ISI remained moving kaleidoscope. Although it is impos- tation—not fully deserved—of professional- involved in Afghan internal strife and actively sible to predict the future, Pakistan’s very ism, incorruptibility, and being the savior of supported the Taliban movement and indi- existence as a state undoubtedly is at stake. the country after partition and the guarantor rectly al Qaeda. This association raises seri- The danger this poses to the region and to of its independence. The highest ranking mili- ous questions in Pakistan and abroad about the United States is of the greatest magni- tary officer, the chief of army staff, found it to the radicalization of ISI and Pakistani armed tude. For better or worse, the Pakistani army be his solemn duty to intervene in the political forces in general. No. 247, October 2009 Strategic Forum 1 Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, of changing attitudes on the part of Pakistan’s addition, Pakistan is divided along religious the United States pressured the ISI and army and government. However, progress lines—with a Sunni majority and a sizeable Pakistani armed forces to sever their ties toward reordering of the country’s strategic pri- Shia minority—and suffers from major socio- to the Taliban and actively join the war on orities and effecting a fundamental change in economic disparities. terror. Despite U.S. pressure and appeals, its strategic culture is bound to be slow and dif- Pakistani support has lacked the scope and ficult for several reasons: Pakistan’s strategic Influences on intensity desired by the United States, and culture and priorities, which are a product of Strategic Culture concerns persist about radicalization of the deliberate choices made by the country’s lead- ISI and military, their loyalties in the war on ers decades ago; a complicated and ambigu- Five issues have decisively shaped terror, and strategic priorities, raising doubts ous history of relations with the United States Pakistan’s strategic culture: about the future of Pakistan. Underlying U.S. misgivings about Pakistan’s true intentions ■ the conflict with India, finding its and strategic priorities have been its long- despite U.S. pressure most vivid expression in the struggle over term rivalry with India and concern that its and appeals, Pakistani Kashmir threat perceptions and priorities have not support has lacked ■ the dictatorship of Zia ul-Haq, who changed despite numerous pledges of support altered the face of the army through a pro- for the war on terror and vast amounts of U.S. the scope and gram of Islamization assistance intended to cement a partnership. intensity desired by ■ the war in Afghanistan during the The United States reportedly sent nearly the United States 1980s, which increased the power of the ISI $11 billion in economic and military assis- substantially tance to Pakistan between 2002 and 2008, ■ the perceived U.S. abandonment of mostly for military and security related pro- as Pakistan’s principal external partner; and a Pakistan in the 1990s (for example, the sanc- grams, in an effort to strengthen Pakistan’s legacy of war with India that is rooted in the tions imposed by the Pressler Amendment), role in the war on terror,4 demonstrate U.S. origins of the Pakistani state itself. Not only do which undermined U.S. influence in Pakistan commitment to the country, and encour- these factors amount to a difficult legacy for and reinforced Pakistani fears that their age it to reevaluate its strategic priorities and Pakistan, but also they are likely to define the country is a “disposable ally” of the United shift the focus from its rivalry with India to limits of Pakistan’s strategic reorientation, and States the problem of domestic radicalization and thus represent realistic constraints on, as well ■ the U.S. war on terror and the decision the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan. as guidelines for, U.S. policy. of the Pervez Musharraf regime to side with The Barack Obama administration has The powerful political rule of Pakistan’s the United States and its allies after 9/11. come up with further packages of military army—and the growth of Islamic radical- and economic assistance for Pakistan and ism—followed the sudden death in 1948 of Conflict with India. Kashmir— Afghanistan. The President has expressed his Pakistan’s founding father, the charismatic, or the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as it support for the bill cosponsored by Senators secular, politically astute Muhammad Ali is officially known—was ruled by a Hindu John Kerry (D–MA) and Richard Lugar (R– Jinnah. The absence of strong national polit- dynasty at the time of the partition of British IN) that authorizes $1.5 billion in support ical institutions in the new country left the India into India and Pakistan. The popula- for Pakistan every year over the next 5 years, army as the only force able to hold together tion of the state was predominantly Muslim. funds that are intended to build schools, the disparate peoples (including the fiercely The ruler of Kashmir, having first declared roads, and hospitals; create new energy infra- independent Pashtun in the northeast and the independence and facing a Muslim rebellion structure; and shore up the foundations of Baluch in the southwest) and provinces (such and infiltration of irregulars from Pakistan, a secular democratic state and counter the as poor rural Sindh in the south, largely dom- reversed course and decided to accede to influence of Islamic militants.5 inated by feudal landlords, and the relatively India, allowing Indian troops to enter the There are signs of a shift in Pakistan’s more prosperous Punjab in the east composed state. The conflict, which came to be known strategic priorities and recognition that the of farmers and small businessmen) thrown as the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947, ended challenge of home-grown Taliban is not just together as a result of the British partition in inconclusively with a ceasefire at the end of a U.S. problem.