No. 247 Strategic Forum October 2009 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss
Radicalization by Choice: ISI and the Pakistani Army by Robert B. Oakley with Franz-Stefan Gady
Key Points and its intelligence unit, the Inter-Services process whenever it threatened to run counter Intelligence Directorate (ISI), remain the to national interest and security as defined by most important elements in determining the army leadership.2 The Pakistani army and the Inter-Services Pakistan’s future. The army establishment is This tradition started with General Ayub Intelligence Directorate remain essential for the security and stability of Pakistan. Both organiza- the glue that holds this large multi-ethnic, Khan and the military coup he launched in tions have deliberately embraced Islamic radi- nuclear-armed Muslim country together. 1958. The ISI was instrumental in maintain- calism as a means to address the conventional Throughout Pakistan’s history, the army has ing Ayub’s military dictatorship. Subsequently, military gap between Pakistan and India. served as “kingmaker” with decisive influ- the army and civilian political leadership Although there are signs of a shift in ence on political leadership, as guarantor of took turns running the country, but Zulfikar Pakistan’s short-term strategic priorities and stability within the state, and as protector of Ali Bhutto was the only civilian to play a recognition that the challenge of homegrown the nation against external threats. truly dominant role in the 60-year history of Taliban is not just a U.S. problem, India will Pakistan’s armed forces are the eighth Pakistani politics. However, even he was over- remain the focal point of Pakistan’s long-term largest in the world.1 The ISI is in turn one thrown by Chief of Army Staff Zia al Haq in national security. Progress toward reordering of the largest military intelligence services 1977 (with the popular support of Islamist Pakistan’s strategic priorities and effecting a worldwide. Its reputation was enhanced dur- political parties). Despite their electoral victo- fundamental change in its strategic culture is ing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in ries, subsequent governments led by Benazir bound to be slow and difficult. Furthermore, it the 1980s, when it played a critical role in Bhutto and the Pakistan People’s Party cannot be forced by the United States. mobilizing and supporting the Afghan oppo- (1988–1990 and 1993–1996) and Nawaz The history of relations between Pakistan sition movement. The ISI is an integral part Sharif and the Pakistan Muslim League and the United States is complicated and am- of the armed forces of Pakistan and has been (1990–1993 and 1997–1999) were not able to biguous, largely due to Pakistani perceptions of instrumental in executing many of the coun- exert great influence on the Pakistani army. past U.S. abandonment. Any new U.S. strategy try’s foreign policy objectives. It also has a Democracy as a binding institution has not for Pakistan has to be considered against real- history of active intervention in Pakistan’s taken root despite U.S. efforts to strengthen istic expectations, which in turn have to take domestic politics. democratic institutions. due account of the longstanding, fundamental Civil-military relations have been a The ISI’s involvement with Afghan resis- nature of the factors that have shaped Pakistani major factor in Pakistan’s history since found- tance groups, including radical Islamist ele- strategic priorities and culture. ing father Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s death in ments, continued following Soviet withdrawal Events in Pakistan today resemble a fast- 1948. The army in Pakistan has had the repu- from Afghanistan in 1989.3 The ISI remained moving kaleidoscope. Although it is impos- tation—not fully deserved—of professional- involved in Afghan internal strife and actively sible to predict the future, Pakistan’s very ism, incorruptibility, and being the savior of supported the Taliban movement and indi- existence as a state undoubtedly is at stake. the country after partition and the guarantor rectly al Qaeda. This association raises seri- The danger this poses to the region and to of its independence. The highest ranking mili- ous questions in Pakistan and abroad about the United States is of the greatest magni- tary officer, the chief of army staff, found it to the radicalization of ISI and Pakistani armed tude. For better or worse, the Pakistani army be his solemn duty to intervene in the political forces in general.
No. 247, October 2009 Strategic Forum 1 Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, of changing attitudes on the part of Pakistan’s addition, Pakistan is divided along religious the United States pressured the ISI and army and government. However, progress lines—with a Sunni majority and a sizeable Pakistani armed forces to sever their ties toward reordering of the country’s strategic pri- Shia minority—and suffers from major socio- to the Taliban and actively join the war on orities and effecting a fundamental change in economic disparities. terror. Despite U.S. pressure and appeals, its strategic culture is bound to be slow and dif- Pakistani support has lacked the scope and ficult for several reasons: Pakistan’s strategic Influences on intensity desired by the United States, and culture and priorities, which are a product of Strategic Culture concerns persist about radicalization of the deliberate choices made by the country’s lead- ISI and military, their loyalties in the war on ers decades ago; a complicated and ambigu- Five issues have decisively shaped terror, and strategic priorities, raising doubts ous history of relations with the United States Pakistan’s strategic culture: about the future of Pakistan. Underlying U.S. misgivings about Pakistan’s true intentions ■ the conflict with India, finding its and strategic priorities have been its long- despite U.S. pressure most vivid expression in the struggle over term rivalry with India and concern that its and appeals, Pakistani Kashmir threat perceptions and priorities have not support has lacked ■ the dictatorship of Zia ul-Haq, who changed despite numerous pledges of support altered the face of the army through a pro- for the war on terror and vast amounts of U.S. the scope and gram of Islamization assistance intended to cement a partnership. intensity desired by ■ the war in Afghanistan during the The United States reportedly sent nearly the United States 1980s, which increased the power of the ISI $11 billion in economic and military assis- substantially tance to Pakistan between 2002 and 2008, ■ the perceived U.S. abandonment of mostly for military and security related pro- as Pakistan’s principal external partner; and a Pakistan in the 1990s (for example, the sanc- grams, in an effort to strengthen Pakistan’s legacy of war with India that is rooted in the tions imposed by the Pressler Amendment), role in the war on terror,4 demonstrate U.S. origins of the Pakistani state itself. Not only do which undermined U.S. influence in Pakistan commitment to the country, and encour- these factors amount to a difficult legacy for and reinforced Pakistani fears that their age it to reevaluate its strategic priorities and Pakistan, but also they are likely to define the country is a “disposable ally” of the United shift the focus from its rivalry with India to limits of Pakistan’s strategic reorientation, and States the problem of domestic radicalization and thus represent realistic constraints on, as well ■ the U.S. war on terror and the decision the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan. as guidelines for, U.S. policy. of the Pervez Musharraf regime to side with The Barack Obama administration has The powerful political rule of Pakistan’s the United States and its allies after 9/11. come up with further packages of military army—and the growth of Islamic radical- and economic assistance for Pakistan and ism—followed the sudden death in 1948 of Conflict with India. Kashmir— Afghanistan. The President has expressed his Pakistan’s founding father, the charismatic, or the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as it support for the bill cosponsored by Senators secular, politically astute Muhammad Ali is officially known—was ruled by a Hindu John Kerry (D–MA) and Richard Lugar (R– Jinnah. The absence of strong national polit- dynasty at the time of the partition of British IN) that authorizes $1.5 billion in support ical institutions in the new country left the India into India and Pakistan. The popula- for Pakistan every year over the next 5 years, army as the only force able to hold together tion of the state was predominantly Muslim. funds that are intended to build schools, the disparate peoples (including the fiercely The ruler of Kashmir, having first declared roads, and hospitals; create new energy infra- independent Pashtun in the northeast and the independence and facing a Muslim rebellion structure; and shore up the foundations of Baluch in the southwest) and provinces (such and infiltration of irregulars from Pakistan, a secular democratic state and counter the as poor rural Sindh in the south, largely dom- reversed course and decided to accede to influence of Islamic militants.5 inated by feudal landlords, and the relatively India, allowing Indian troops to enter the There are signs of a shift in Pakistan’s more prosperous Punjab in the east composed state. The conflict, which came to be known strategic priorities and recognition that the of farmers and small businessmen) thrown as the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947, ended challenge of home-grown Taliban is not just together as a result of the British partition in inconclusively with a ceasefire at the end of a U.S. problem. Recent military operations in 1947. The vast port city of Karachi is a chaotic 1948, and resulted in the establishment of the the Swat, Dir, and Buner districts are indicators conglomerate of all these ethnic groups. In Line of Control, or the de facto border along the line of ceasefire. Robert B. Oakley is a Distinguished Senior Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at In August 1965, the second war over the National Defense University and former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan. Comments may be directed to Kashmir broke out between India and [email protected]. Franz-Stefan Gady was a Research Assistant in INSS and an Analyst for the Project on Pakistan. The latter infiltrated forces into National Security Reform. Kashmir to try to overthrow the state government
2 Strategic Forum No. 247, October 2009 and set up a successor regime, which would call the influence of Islam in order to keep the support in building up Islamist political par- for accession to Pakistan. India responded force- Pakistani military in check.7 Dismayed at the ties at home (for example, Jamaat-e-Islami) fully, and a series of attacks and counterattacks lack of U.S. support in the 1971 war, he sought and in organizing groups in Afghanistan to followed without producing a conclusive vic- a long-term relationship with China. He also conduct an insurgency against the pro-Soviet tory for either side. Several weeks of fight- initiated a program to develop nuclear weap- regime in Kabul. Pakistan had covert assis- ing were followed by a ceasefire in September ons. In 1974, Bhutto sent the army to fight tance from the United States in creating these 1965, and the two sides agreed to return to the an insurgency in Baluchistan without proper Afghan resistance organizations. ceasefire line that had existed prior to the out- training and equipment for a counterinsur- While Zia provided a major push toward break of hostilities. gency—a mistake that was to be repeated Islamic radicalism, he did not start the The third Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 decades later under President Musharraf. movement. Islamic radicalism in Pakistan and the subsequent Pakistani defeat was a Despite being essentially secular, Bhutto also has fluctuated over the decades. It grows pivotal event in Pakistan’s history. Tensions gave in to the Islamists and banned alcohol, from the ethnic and socioeconomic weak- in East Pakistan rose after the military gov- until then a common sight in the officers’ nesses of the nation that are reflected in its ernment refused to accommodate demands messes that still upheld the traditions of the institutional failures. Popular discontent has for autonomy there and did not accept the British imperial Indian army. found cyclical expression through street pro- results of national elections won by the leftist After its defeat in 1971, the army was tests, terrorist attacks, and military coups. Awami Party, whose victory in East Pakistan gradually transformed from a postcolonial Over the last three decades, the people’s frus- was overwhelming. Efforts by the Pakistani conservative force to a more politicized and tration with the corruption and failings of army to restore control over East Pakistan, radical instrument. It strongly supported both civilian- and military-led governments including use of force against the local resis- Bhutto’s efforts to develop nuclear weap- has been reinforced by radical teachings. tance movement, resulted in numerous casu- ons as a way to compensate for its shortcom- As in other Muslim nations, the Islamists’ alties and refugees. India’s active support ings in conventional warfare. The army also appearance of incorruptibility and their role for the resistance movement led to a series pushed for an increase in funding and train- as the “voice of the oppressed” has attracted of Pakistani airstrikes against Indian tar- ing for insurgent activity in the Kashmir many of the disaffected. gets in early December 1971. India counter- region, which it saw as a useful instrument Today, optimists describe Pakistan as a attacked, and within 2 weeks the Pakistani for executing its policy of “strategic diversion” transitional democracy; pessimists call it a military in East Pakistan was defeated by the against New Delhi.8 fragmented state. In this dangerous situation, combined Indian and local resistance forces. Zia ul-Haq and Islamization. the Pakistani army and the military intelli- East Pakistan won its independence and General Zia’s accession to power in a coup in gence services have a de facto monopoly over became the independent state of Bangladesh. July 1977 left indelible marks on Pakistan.9 nuclear policy as well as tight control over This was a traumatic event for Pakistan. It weapons and equipment procurement, the lost half its population and territory and left optimists describe national budget, and the country’s policies 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war in Indian toward Afghanistan and Kashmir. hands. The loss of East Pakistan was a bit- Pakistan as a transitional The Afghanistan War and ter pill to swallow for the army in particu- democracy; pessimists Radicalization. The year 1979 brought lar and the public in general.6 It undermined call it a fragmented state a series of events that fundamentally altered the army’s key claim to legitimacy based on the strategic landscape of Southwest Asia. its reputation as protector of the territorial In Iran, the shah was overthrown by radical integrity of the Pakistani state and showed A representative of the new postcolonial offi- Shi’ite leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. the army once and for all that it was unable cer class, he was deeply religious and from a He was determined to export his version to defeat India conventionally. The capability humble middle-class urban background. His of Shia Islam to the entire Muslim world, and resource gaps were just too big. Despite major legacy was further Islamization of the threatening both Saudi security and reli- this military setback, however, the army army and society. He changed the motto of gious supremacy and the West’s main source remained the most important force in the the army from “Unity, Faith, and Discipline” of oil. The shah for years had very close rela- country due to its dominance in all branches to “Faith, Obedience of God, and strug- tions with Pakistan (a majority Sunni state), of the government and the economy. gle in the path of Allah” and tried to rally which also felt threatened by revolutionary As a direct result of the defeat in East the nation under the state ideology of Islam Iran. The same year, Pakistan’s army relied Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was installed as in order to foster a Pakistani identity.10 Zia on popular discontent in Kashmir to intro- president by General Yahya Khan in a peace- began to change the culture of the Pakistani duce Pakistani-trained Islamist forces. The ful transition of power in December 1971. officer corps and introduced mandatory reli- culminating event in 1979 was the Red Army After consolidating his power, Bhutto set his gious learning as a requirement for advance- invasion of Afghanistan to keep the pro- own agenda. Most important, he increased ment. He also turned to Saudi Arabia for Soviet regime in Kabul from being ousted.
No. 247, October 2009 Strategic Forum 3 These events not only changed the stra- ing insurgent groups, which it later applied disregarding repeated warnings from the U.S. tegic landscape, but they also were pivotal to operations in Kashmir and India. Government. Congress passed a number of in radicalizing both the Pakistani army and The Afghanistan war was the pivotal event resolutions intended to deter Pakistan from the ISI. With the outbreak of the Afghanistan in radicalizing the Pakistani army and the ISI. acquiring nuclear weapons by requiring the war and the U.S. decision to support the In sum, it illustrated the power of combining termination of economic assistance and mil- mujahideen, the ISI found itself as a major jihad, nationalism, and guerrilla warfare. itary transfers if Pakistan tested a nuclear element of U.S. global strategy against the Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Ever since device. The Pressler Amendment, which ini- Soviet Union. Since Pakistan was needed as Pakistan’s creation, the United States had tially increased the amount of U.S. assistance, the main base of U.S. operations for sup- enjoyed a close relationship with that coun- also called for termination of government-to- port of the mujahideen, the United States try. Following Jinnah’s death in 1948, Prime government military sales and new economic provided hundreds of millions of dollars in Minister Liaquat Ali Khan sought to ensure assistance unless the President certified annu- military and economic assistance. At the that international negotiations on Kashmir ally that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear same time, the United States covertly pro- did not undo whatever gains had been made device. While the United States was engaged vided hundreds of millions of dollars to sup- toward making it a part of the new state of in Afghanistan, the Reagan administration port the Afghan resistance. As a condition for Pakistan. In doing so, he relied heavily on was willing to give Pakistan the benefit of the allowing the United States to use Pakistan as Britain and the United States. The prime doubt when intelligence was uncertain.16 a base of operations, President Zia insisted minister also looked to the Soviet Union, but that all support for the Afghans be chan- when push came to shove he opted for the neled via the ISI. Presidents Jimmy Carter Western alliance.15 the United States 11 and Ronald Reagan agreed. The ISI took For its part, the United States found considered the role on the principal role in the execution of the Pakistan a useful ally in the developing covert war in Afghanistan, pushing the ISI Cold War due to its strategic location. India of Islam to be a from the background into the forefront of chose to seek closer ties with the Soviet powerful global political U.S. strategy. Union (and the Non-Aligned Movement), weapon against the During this period, the ISI both leaving the United States with little choice Soviets, as well as a gathered intelligence and handled sev- but to side with Pakistan. In return for its eral billion dollars’ worth of weapons and support against the Soviet Union, Pakistan mobilizing factor for the financial assistance, which were subject to expected U.S. help in its confrontation Afghan resistance little control or accountability.12 The major- with India. Pakistan started to receive U.S. ity of aid went to Afghan Sunni fundamen- military aid in 1954 under the Mutual talists—most of them from Pashtun ethnic Defense Assistance Agreement after Army With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union groups.13 The Afghani mujahideen also Chief of Staff (later President) Ayub Khan from Afghanistan in 1989, the United States received direct cash infusions from Saudi convinced Washington of the usefulness of lost its strategic incentive to remain engaged Arabia (which provided the United States Pakistan against the Soviet Union. By the in Afghanistan. In October 1990, the United with annual funds matching its contribu- 1960s, Pakistan was a member of South States decided to impose sanctions against tion).14 Saudi Arabia established bilateral East Asia Treaty Organization and Central Pakistan for pursuit of its nuclear enrich- programs in the Pakistan-Afghanistan bor- Treaty Organization, both U.S.-led anti- ment program. A total of $600 million of der region and the Afghan refugee camps Soviet alliances. U.S. aid was halted. Notwithstanding the aimed at spreading its Wahhabi version Even with these mutual commitments, administration’s efforts to persuade Congress of Islam. It built and staffed hundreds of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was an uneasy to delay sanctions until after the establish- mosques and madrassas, working with one over the next few decades, with the ment of Nawaz Sharif’s new government in Pakistani political-religious parties and United States suspending military and eco- Pakistan, U.S. lawmakers were not prepared the ISI to do so. Saudi Arabia also took the nomic aid during the wars of 1965 and 1971. to compromise.17 Pakistan and Afghanistan lead in recruiting thousands of Muslims And despite its commitments to Pakistan, on were left to cope with the immense prob- from countries as far away as Indonesia a number of occasions the United States sup- lems caused by a decade of war, includ- and Morocco to join the jihad against the plied India with military hardware. The per- ing 4 million to 5 million Afghan refugees atheist Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The ceived fickleness of the U.S. commitment to in Pakistan. This development contributed United States considered the role of Islam Pakistan remains a big issue with Pakistanis significantly to strong anti-American atti- to be a powerful global political weapon to the present day. tudes within the ISI and Pakistani army. against the Soviets, as well as a mobilizing Spearheaded by the ISI, which had set up The Pakistani public’s and political lead- factor for the Afghan resistance. The war a division for the clandestine procurement of ers’ reaction was outrage. They felt that the in Afghanistan also provided the ISI with military technology from abroad in the 1970s, United States had willfully cut off assistance valuable experience in supplying and train- Pakistan was pursuing its nuclear ambitions, once the Soviets had been defeated and that
4 Strategic Forum No. 247, October 2009 the United States no longer needed Pakistan. Taliban was driven by the fear of strategic Tribal Areas (FATA), the Northwest Frontier Only a handful of very senior Pakistani gov- encirclement that was omnipresent in both Province, and Baluchistan. With the tacit ernment officials had been aware of the the ISI and army. Even today, the army cooperation of the Pakistani army (and nuclear problem in U.S.-Pakistani rela- fears that it could face both a U.S.-Indian- the ISI), the Taliban quietly reorganized, tions. A comment by President Ghulam Ishaq Afghan alliance and an Iranian-Russian rearmed, and reestablished their old con- Khan in May 1990 (prior to sanctions being alliance, aimed at checking Pakistani nections. They began preparing for a new imposed) to Central Intelligence Agency influence or even breaking up the Pakistani insurgency against the U.S.-supported (CIA) Deputy Director Robert Gates reveals state.21 As Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid Hamid Karzai government in Kabul. The the Pakistani opinion on the matter: “The stated recently, “Many in Pakistan believe truth is that the U.S. too often used its aid that the United States has deceived Pakistan as a lever. We did not succumb in the past into conniving with Washington to bring U.S. “abandonment” in and we will not give up our principles for the about its own destruction: India and U.S.- the 1990s opened the 18 sake of American aid or fear of war.” supported Afghanistan will form a pincer door to powerful Islamist, The Pakistani military felt around Pakistan to dismember the world’s betrayed. There were to be no more mil- only Muslim nuclear power.”22 anti-American Pashtun- itary exchanges with the United States. The War on Terror and based forces in Pakistan Intelligence cooperation between the CIA Musharraf. Following 9/11, President and ISI steadily declined. Important and Musharraf was forced to either turn away successful U.S. Agency for International from the Taliban and support the U.S. cam- Taliban also established close ties with Development projects were shut down. The paign in Afghanistan or face the conse- homegrown Afghan Pashtun resistance cancellation of delivery of 58 F–16 fighter quences of being seen as a supporter of groups such as those led by Gulbuddin jets, judged by the Pakistanis as critical Islamic terrorism. He opted for the former Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani. Despite to deterring India, was a particularly bit- with the objective of both receiving mili- the improved U.S.-Pakistan relationship, ter pill to swallow. Inadvertently, this made tary aid and countering the growing influ- large-scale infiltration from Baluchistan the pursuance of nuclear weapons a more ence of Islamic radicals in Pakistan.23 The Province and the FATA went unchecked for a pressing imperative for Pakistan because of United States, in turn, reengaged vigor- long time.26 its even greater inferiority in conventional ously in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Responding to U.S. pressure, President forces vis-à-vis India. It also forced Pakistan Pakistan, it dropped sanctions and rapidly Musharraf finally in 2005 moved Pakistani to turn to ballistic missiles and to develop reestablished large-scale military and eco- army forces into the FATA for the first time new, smaller nuclear warheads to put on nomic assistance programs, while encour- since the 1970s, where they were stalemated them. Partly in return for assistance to its aging other governments to provide sizeable by the determined attacks of both Taliban own nuclear program, North Korea pro- economic support. For the first time in a and Pashtun tribal warriors. The army expe- vided the missiles in a program approved decade, Pakistani military officers were rienced a major problem with Pakistani reg- by Prime Minister Bhutto and managed by enrolled in U.S. military schools. New weap- ulars of Pashtun descent who were reluctant Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. ons and critical spare parts for old weap- to kill fellow Pashtuns.27 At the end of 2008, The U.S. “abandonment” in the 1990s ons systems flowed from the United States over twice as many Pakistani soldiers were opened the door to powerful Islamist, anti- to Pakistan, increasing the army conven- involved in the fight against the Taliban American Pashtun-based forces in Pakistan. tional capabilities. In 2006, U.S. arms sales (120,000 in FATA) than the total number of The Taliban, springing up largely on their reached $3.5 billion.24 U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization own in Afghanistan, soon received sub- In Afghanistan in 2001, the U.S. cam- (NATO) forces in Afghanistan (55,000). stantial support in the 1990s from the ISI paign resulted in the fall of the Taliban Pakistan suffered more military deaths and Pakistani army under the tutelage of regime. The thousands of Taliban who fled (over 1,800 in FATA) than the International the civilian governments of both Benazir to Pakistan after the lightning U.S. vic- Security Assistance Force and United Bhutto (during her second term) and Nawaz tory were mostly Pashtun, as were many States combined in Afghanistan (1,006).28 Sharif.19 The objective was to reestablish of the personnel working for the ISI (the Furthermore, the attacks on Pakistani mil- traditional Pashtun control of Afghanistan army remains a Punjabi-dominated force). itary personnel by their fellow countrymen and eject the Tajiks and Uzbeks. In 1994, A smaller number of al Qaeda fighters have lowered morale, increased desertion Prime Minister Bhutto organized an inter- who fled were mostly from Arab and other and suicide rates, and led to growing discon- agency group on Afghanistan. ISI briga- Islamic nations. Some individuals sent to tent with the political leadership of President diers urged her to maintain pressure on Guantanamo Bay reportedly were arrested Asif Ali Zardari, who replaced Musharraf in Ahmad Shah Massoud’s government in in Pakistan.25 Most Taliban Pashtun fight- 2008. These operations were seen by most Afghanistan as it was perceived to be too ers, however, settled along the border in Pakistanis as yielding to U.S. pressure rather “pro-Indian.”20 Pakistani support for the the Pakistani Federally Administered than pursuing Pakistan’s own interests.29
No. 247, October 2009 Strategic Forum 5 Zardari’s Election recent offensive in the Swat Valley, using ele- extremists in Pakistan, there appears to be no and Beyond ments of the Frontier Corps, heavy artillery, alternative to the dual policy of building up the tanks, and helicopter gunships, has shown capabilities of the Pakistani army and ISI while The election of Asif Ali Zardari first signs of progress and inflicted heavy casual- working to shore up popular and political sup- as Pakistan’s prime minister and sub- ties on the Taliban. However, given the like- port for this critical effort. sequently as president in 2008 was to a lihood of the Taliban’s return as soon as the large degree made possible by the deci- army pulls back, the sustainability of this Observations and sion of the new Chief of Army Staff General offensive and the degree to which the army Recommendations Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to keep the army is reorienting itself toward irregular warfare and ISI out of electoral politics and sup- remains an open question. After a period of uncertainty, Pakistan’s port the electoral process. Zardari’s pros- The army and the Zardari govern- military forces appear to be confronting pects were also helped by a wave of sympathy ment must also confront a renewed insur- the major security threats. They have sur- following the assassination of his wife, gency by ethnic Baluch tribesmen. For prised most observers by their combined arms Benazir Bhutto.30 Furthermore, the United decades, the Baluch have seen the revenues operations using F–16s, helicopters, artil- States applied strong pressure to hold free for their province’s oil and gas deposits go lery, tanks, and infantry to great effect, dem- and fair elections. After a decade of essen- to the central government. Little has been onstrating the value of U.S. training and tially authoritarian rule, something resem- done to provide education and health care. material assistance. The hard work of the bling democracy has returned to Pakistan. Jobs created by new construction projects Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral The Islamist political parties lost almost (for example, ports and roads) went to per- Michael Mullen, in developing a close rela- all their seats in the National Assembly, as sons from other provinces. Former President tionship with Pakistani army leadership is well as their majorities in regional legisla- Musharraf’s attempt to crush the insurgency also paying off. tures in the key provinces of Baluchistan This is most decidedly not the time to and the Northwest Frontier, which border place restrictions upon U.S. assistance to the Afghanistan. However, since the election, this is most decidedly Pakistani armed forces. U.S. policymakers the Zardari government has been plagued not the time to place must make this very clear to Congress, leav- by allegations of corruption and charges of restrictions upon ing no doubt of the disastrous consequences incompetence and overall poor governance. that would ensue. His government has low popularity ratings.31 U.S. assistance to the When talking about the radicaliza- This situation underscores the mili- Pakistani armed forces tion of both the ISI and the army, it is tary’s critical role in Pakistan. It remains important to understand one crucial fact: essential to the country’s domestic stabil- the army has embraced that radicalism by ity, efforts to combat homegrown Taliban, by brute force made matters worse, and the choice. Over the last 25 years, Pakistanis and to safeguarding the nuclear arsenal. Zardari government has done nothing to believe that it has been their most effec- Thanks to technical assistance from the follow up on its promises for reform. The tive weapon in defending the nation against United States and a complete overhaul of the Pakistani army also mounted a new offen- Indian power. Radicalism, therefore, is a nuclear command and control system, the sive in South Waziristan, the main base of rational means to achieve a particular end: U.S. Government reportedly finds the pres- the allegedly killed Taliban leader Baitullah the survival of the Pakistan state. ent safeguards adequate.32 This is particularly Meshud reportedly responsible for the assas- The new Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, important because a number of simulations sination of Benazir Bhutto. General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, has ousted a reportedly conducted by the U.S. military and A national poll conducted in mid-2008 number of corrupt and incompetent senior Intelligence Community have repeatedly cast found that 74 percent of Pakistanis oppose officers and has removed some 200 active- doubt upon the ability of the United States to direct U.S. military action against Taliban and duty and retired officers from top-level posi- recover a weapon if the Pakistani army loses al Qaeda militants.35 The same poll shows that tions in the civilian administration. He has control of it. However, with Pakistan’s future most Pakistanis oppose the entire Pakistan-U.S. replaced the top commanders at the ISI in an domestic stability not to be taken for granted security relationship. A separate March 2009 attempt to cut ties with the Taliban and other and the obvious risk of further radicalization poll found that while 69 percent of Pakistanis Islamic radical groups—particularly after of the army and ISI, the prospect of radical agreed that having the Taliban and al Qaeda the Indian embassy bombing in Kabul in elements gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear operating in Pakistan was a serious prob- 2008, which was directly linked to the ISI.37 arsenal cannot be ruled out.33 lem, only 24 percent said that they would sup- But disentangling the ISI from its liaison with The Pakistani army, largely a conven- port American military incursions in the tribal radical Islamic groups will prove difficult tional force designed for traditional warfare, areas.36 Given such attitudes and the continu- if not impossible. Despite General Kayani’s has experienced difficulties in adapting to ing critical role of the Pakistani military, when efforts, he only was able to purge the top the requirements of irregular warfare.34 The it comes to the task of confronting Islamic leadership of the ISI. In most cases, it is hard
6 Strategic Forum No. 247, October 2009 to distinguish between contacts by junior- capability to assist Pakistan economically, Arabia, Japan, Europe, International Bank level ISI operatives acting on their own and as well as having the potential to bring for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD], their contacts made at the direction of high- Islamic extremists under control and assist Asian Development Bank, and International level authorities. The longstanding Pakistani in the reform of the Islamic schools. Monetary Fund) and developing both short- policy of maintaining contacts with militant Fourth, in addition to greater near- and long-term plans to revive and reform the groups and providing them with some assis- term support, the United States ought to con- economy. The United Nations and the IBRD tance—with no precise purpose—is a form sider collaborating with Turkey, which has a could play the leading role. However, these of insurance against the possibility of the long history of close relations with Pakistan, plans should include Central Asia, which United States again withdrawing its support in training the Pakistani army. It is also could play an important role as a potential and tensions with India increasing. essential that the United States, preferably source of oil, natural gas, and electric power President Obama presented his new in cooperation with other countries (such for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy on March 21, as Turkey), help Pakistan develop a long- 2009. It was the result of three independent term program for training and equipping reviews conducted by the National Security its police forces. Such programs have been given the extreme Council, U.S. Central Command, and Joint a major part of U.S. strategy for both Iraq sensitivity of Pakistan- Staff, synthesized by another team, and per- and Afghanistan. There has only been min- U.S. relations, the U.S. sonally approved by President Obama. First, imal assistance to Pakistan in this respect. the Obama plan calls for a comprehensive, The Pakistani army has neither the train- policy should avoid being long-term approach, combining security with ing nor the equipment to deal with the sig- perceived as advocating political and social development. Given the nificant criminal threat in major cities (such specific changes in extreme sensitivity of Pakistan-U.S. relations, as Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad) and is the U.S. policy should avoid being perceived already badly overstretched. Pakistan’s political as advocating specific changes in Pakistan’s Fifth, there needs to be Pakistan- institutions or leadership political institutions or leadership. India rapprochement. Ever since partition, Second, over the long term, the FATA Pakistan’s fears about its larger neighbor— need to be brought into the political main- and anger over what it sees as the unjust The perils of the present situation in stream. The present system is one of indirect occupation of Kashmir—have been the chief Pakistan are enormous not only for that rule based upon tribal structures with their motivator for Pakistani support of jihadist country and Afghanistan but also for the own separate authorities, most of which were movements and the dominant political role of entire region, including India. The danger of installed by the British. This is a structural its army, as well as the cause of several wars. another military confrontation between India weakness that has been exploited by various Even an interim agreement would make it and Pakistan is very much alive, with the risk extremist groups, a source of constant dan- much easier for Pakistan to make the neces- that it could develop into a nuclear exchange. ger for the Pakistani army and the Frontier sary political reforms. More significantly, it Amid all the current discussion on counter- Corps. Closer integration between the army would open the way for Pakistan to drop its insurgency operations, this issue has received and the Frontier Corps would be desirable and restrictions on trade with India. The latter little coverage in recent months. would help the overall unity of effort. would then become a locomotive that is badly Despite its scope and scale, the new U.S. Third, there is an obvious need for needed to help revitalize Pakistan’s economy. strategy for Pakistan has to be considered regional diplomacy, starting with an inter- Sixth, there also needs to be continued against realistic expectations, which in turn national conference on assistance for progress in U.S.-sponsored efforts to improve have to take into account the longstanding Afghanistan and the creation of a per- relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan fundamental nature of the factors that have manent “contact group” covering both and relieve the deep distrust between them. shaped Pakistani strategic priorities and cul- Afghanistan and Pakistan (which pre- The recent meetings in Washington between ture. Thus, expectations for U.S. policy and sumably includes Russia, China, India, Presidents Obama, Zardari, and Karzai were assistance will have to be set accordingly. Iran, and Saudi Arabia), as well as the helpful, yet progress is going to be slow. In Hopes for near-term significant changes in United States and NATO members. China addition to what can be accomplished on the Pakistan’s strategic culture or U.S. ability to is making huge public and private invest- political side, there is a great deal to be done dictate Pakistan’s national interests are likely ments in Pakistan—developing its min- on the economic front, including regional to prove exceedingly optimistic. Previous eral resources, roads, and ports—as well economic cooperation. Pakistan was already attempts to do so have been futile, and there as in Afghanistan. It has a major long- in deep economic crisis before the global are few reasons to expect it to be otherwise in term interest in stabilizing both countries meltdown. Its situation now is truly desper- the future. in order to establish a reliable corridor to ate. The United States has taken the first step Whatever their faults, the Pakistani the Indian Ocean for imports and exports. in organizing an international conference army and ISI remain absolutely essential Saudi Arabia is another country with the of major partners (including China, Saudi forces for security and stability in Pakistan.
No. 247, October 2009 Strategic Forum 7 Notes Press, 2001), chapter 5; and Rizwan Hussein, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy (Aldershot: Ashgate 1 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Publishing, 2005), chapter 6. Pakistan,” March 2009, available at
8 Strategic Forum No. 247, October 2009